

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 1 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Monday, 1 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. My Lady, we have  
4 a handful of witness statements left over from last week  
5 to read. Would it be acceptable if we commenced with  
6 those before turning to the live witnesses this morning?

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

8 MR HAY: My Lady, if I may start with the statement of  
9 Neil Barclay, dated 7 July 2005, which has the usual  
10 declaration of truth.

11 Statement of MR NEIL BARCLAY read

12 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was in uniform from  
13 8.00 am as the driver of Serial 112B. We are part of  
14 Serial 112 as part of a Central London reserve. We  
15 attended Buckingham Gate Feeding Centre and, whilst  
16 there, were deployed by GT to Liverpool Street Tube  
17 station. Upon arriving at Liverpool Street Tube  
18 station, we were told to redeploy to Aldgate Tube  
19 station. Upon arrival here, we were told to deploy at  
20 the rendezvous point, which was Aldgate bus station.  
21 All of our Serial 112B were then deployed on foot to  
22 outside Aldgate Tube station under the immediate command  
23 of our Serial inspector, Inspector Wheeler.

24 "I was partnered with PC Tilley, who was a medic, in  
25 order to assist the injured. At this time, the area

1 immediately in front of the Tube station main entrance  
2 was cordoned off and clear of traffic.

3 "PC Tilley and myself - I am a First Aid at Work  
4 trained and an ex-medic - were directed into an office  
5 seating area to the right side of the Tube station's  
6 main entrance. Inside were a number, about eight  
7 persons, who all appeared to have injuries. Most had  
8 evidence of blood on their respective hands and heads.  
9 All persons were capable of walking and all injuries  
10 appeared relatively minor.

11 "After an assessment of each person, we escorted the  
12 whole group over to the bus station and then on to the  
13 first available double decker bus. Myself and PC Tilley  
14 then joined Serial 112A, who were directed by  
15 Inspector Wheeler to assist inside Aldgate Tube station.  
16 We were led by a BT inspector inside and down the main  
17 stairs on to the platform level. We were informed that  
18 all power within the station at trackside was off and,  
19 therefore, safe to walk on the tracks.

20 "We were led by the BT officer towards the train  
21 using tracks to the side of the left-hand platform. As  
22 we approached the nearest end of the train, I could see  
23 that, towards the middle end of the train, there were  
24 many firemen. These were inside the carriage towards  
25 the middle and also standing trackside. Those inside

1 were clearly assisting a male who was injured, trapped  
2 within the carriage. There were no doors on this  
3 carriage, but these appeared to be lying by the tracks  
4 towards the rear of the train. On the tracks to the  
5 rear of the damaged carriage and close to the train was  
6 an IC3 female named Thelma. She had dark upper clothing  
7 that was torn. On her right thigh, just above the knee,  
8 she had two large wounds and both her feet were embedded  
9 with glass and had numerous cuts. She was conscious and  
10 breathing and responded to voice commands.

11 "After waiting next to this carriage, which had the  
12 rear roof area badly damaged and pushed up, Serial 112A  
13 were asked to leave the area and returned along the  
14 tracks to the station. Myself and PC Tilley remained to  
15 assist with Thelma who was being spoken to by firemen.  
16 There were no LAS staff available. PC Tilley attempted  
17 to apply a neck brace to Thelma but, due to her  
18 difficult position, she complained it hurt and he did  
19 not complete this.

20 "At times, a HEMS doctor attended and told us to  
21 move her from the station immediately. PC Tilley  
22 produced a carry-mat from his medic vest, Thelma was  
23 placed on to this and then lifted on to a rigid  
24 stretcher which had since arrived. Myself, PC Tilley,  
25 two firemen and two police officers then lifted the

1     stretcher and carried Thelma out of the Tube station via  
2     the track and main stairs.

3     "Further to the above, while next to the damaged  
4     Tube train carriage, I saw the apparently lifeless body  
5     of an IC1 person. This person was about 6 feet further  
6     away from the platform than Thelma, but directly behind  
7     her, her head being nearest the body with her feet  
8     towards the platforms. The body was face down with  
9     the head towards and close to the train carriage. The  
10    person had dark, collar-length hair. The legs were  
11    exposed, as nearly all the trousers had been ripped off.  
12    The person's legs and feet were lying on the raised  
13    rail.

14    "Whilst waiting at the bus station entrance, our  
15    supervisors were approached by a member of the LAS  
16    wearing a silver jacket. He ask if we could provide any  
17    drivers to assist with driving ambulances. He already  
18    had British Transport Police officers driving some  
19    ambulances but required three more drivers. I was  
20    nominated to assist. I handed the keys to the police  
21    carrier to PC Tilley. I was asked to drive an ambulance  
22    call sign E104, or possibly E140, with an LAS man named  
23    John. I was directed to drive on an emergency 'blues  
24    and twos' run to the Royal London Hospital in  
25    Whitechapel. I drove to the casualty department at this

1 location and assisted John in escorting our casualty,  
2 Thelma, into casualty."  
3 My Lady, the next statement I propose to read is  
4 that of David Morgan, dated 9 January 2006. That also  
5 has the usual declaration of truth.  
6 Statement of MR DAVID MORGAN read  
7 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty in full  
8 uniform performing level 2 duties as part of Serial 500  
9 on the G8 reserve. At around 08.55 hours, we received  
10 a call to attend Liverpool Street Tube station as there  
11 had been an explosion at the location. At this time,  
12 the cause of the explosion was unconfirmed. We made our  
13 way to Liverpool Street arriving there minutes later.  
14 There were already road closures being put in place at  
15 the junction with Bishopsgate and several uniformed  
16 officers were already in Liverpool Street. I alighted  
17 the police vehicle and approached a female member of the  
18 Tube staff who was stood outside the Liverpool Street  
19 Tube entrance at the junction with Old Broad Street.  
20 The entrance to the station was shut and the female  
21 member of staff was directing members of the public away  
22 from the location. I asked what had happened, and she  
23 stated that she and her colleagues had heard an  
24 explosion whilst down in the Underground, which came  
25 from the Tube tunnel in the direction of Aldgate, but

1 they were not aware of what had happened.

2 "I then boarded the police vehicle, as did the rest  
3 of my Serial, and we made our way to Aldgate High  
4 Street. We arrived at this location shortly after  
5 09.00. Already outside Aldgate Tube station were LFB,  
6 and I noted a police pushbike parked. We alighted our  
7 vehicle and initially PC Whyte requested I direct the  
8 emergency vehicles into Aldgate High Street. I engaged  
9 myself in this for a minute or so, but very quickly  
10 Aldgate High Street was full. We directed the  
11 passengers across the road into Aldgate bus station  
12 where those with injuries were being treated.

13 Approximately 100 people passed me who came out of the  
14 Tube and nearly all of these people showed physical  
15 signs of smoke inhalation, having blackened marks under  
16 their nostrils and mouths. Some people had worse  
17 injuries, heavy cuts and bleedings from various parts of  
18 the body.

19 "A colleague then approached me, John, the driver of  
20 our Serial, and asked me if I and two other officers  
21 would assist him to enter the Tube line at a request  
22 from LFB to help LAS and LFB to extract those with more  
23 severe injuries. I then approached PC Girling and Tony,  
24 two officers in my Serial, and requested their  
25 assistance. I made my way down to the platform and

1 walked in a northerly direction along the platform and  
2 entered the tunnel. I forgot what the platform number  
3 was, but I know it was the most westerly platform.  
4 "Approximately 200 metres, possibly less, in the  
5 tunnel towards Liverpool Street I could see the Tube  
6 train. It was dark within the tunnel but my eyes soon  
7 adjusted. The carriage nearest to Aldgate Tube station  
8 had minor damage which consisted of broken windows and  
9 smoke marks. The second nearest carriage to Aldgate  
10 Tube station was clearly where the explosion had taken  
11 place. Near to the end of the carriage, by the third  
12 carriage, the doors had apparently been blown off. The  
13 roof of the train had been ripped open, as had the  
14 sides, and I could see a hole in the floor of the  
15 carriage. Windows had been blown out and there were  
16 smoke marks throughout the carriage.  
17 "As I neared the wrecked carriage where LFB and LAS  
18 were gathered, I noticed further down the track towards  
19 Liverpool Street a body was face down laying over the  
20 tracks. It appeared this person had been blown from the  
21 train in the blast. My initial thought was to assist  
22 this male, but a member of the LFB informed me that he  
23 was dead. There were body parts, limbs, pieces of flesh  
24 and bones strewn across the tracks.  
25 "I was stood just outside the carriage next to where

1 the blast had taken place and had a clear view inside  
2 the carriage. There were bodies, body parts and a large  
3 amount of blood on the floor of the carriage, and a few  
4 members of LFB and LAS were inside the carriage  
5 assisting with the wounded. I also saw PS Kemp in the  
6 carriage, also assisting.

7 "My initial reaction to seeing the carriage in the  
8 tunnel was that a bomb had been detonated. As I arrived  
9 at the carriage, a large-built male was being placed on  
10 the stretcher and was being carried out by the LFB.  
11 I remember this male being white. Minutes later,  
12 another male who was on a stretcher was passed out to us  
13 and we assisted in removing him from the carriage. Due  
14 to the debris around us, this was not easy. The male  
15 was conscious and muttering incoherently. The male's  
16 left leg had been amputated below the knee. PC Girling  
17 assisted in carrying this male out of the tunnel.

18 "Once this male had been removed, there was one  
19 survivor left on the train who was slightly trapped by  
20 the wreckage. This was a female by the name of Martine.  
21 PS Kemp had established this through talking to her and  
22 reassuring her. Martine was clearly in immense pain and  
23 was screaming in agony. She was placed on to  
24 a stretcher and passed out to us. I assisted with  
25 carrying the stretcher. I could see that Martine's legs



1 were badly damaged. Below the knee her legs had been  
2 turned to what I would describe as 'mush'. She had  
3 other injuries on her body but, due to the amount of  
4 blood, it was hard to tell where exactly. As we carried  
5 Martine along the tunnel, PS Kemp walked with us  
6 constantly speaking to her and reassuring Martine, as we  
7 all were.

8 "We carried Martine out of the entrance/exit of the  
9 station and placed her on the pavement outside where LAS  
10 were immediately on hand to give medical aid."

11 My Lady, the next statement is that of John Levey,  
12 dated 8 January 2006 which also has the usual  
13 declaration of truth.

14 Statement of MR JOHN LEVEY read

15 "I am a serving police officer in the City of London  
16 Police and have been for the last 16 years. At 8.00 on  
17 Tuesday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty in uniform as a crew  
18 member of a marked police van, call sign Serial 500.

19 "I was assigned the duties of van driver and, at  
20 08.30, the vehicle was tasked to attend Liverpool Street  
21 station where it was reported that an explosion had  
22 occurred. I parked the vehicle in Devonshire Square  
23 while the crew deployed to the station area. I remained  
24 with the van as instructed by the van supervisor.

25 "After a short while the van was redeployed to

1 Aldgate Tube station where it was reported a serious  
2 incident had taken place. On arrival at Aldgate, at  
3 approximately 08.45, I assisted other units and members  
4 of the London Ambulance Service to evacuate the walking  
5 wounded passengers from the Tube train on which it  
6 appeared an explosion had taken place. These persons  
7 were escorted across the road to the bus station for  
8 onward transmission to hospital.

9 "At approximately 9.00, I encountered an ambulance  
10 technician who was struggling with equipment. I asked  
11 whether he required any assistance, to which he replied  
12 'Yes, we could do with people to carry stretchers'.  
13 I instructed three other members of my van crew to  
14 accompany me: namely, PCs Morgan, Graham, Girling.  
15 I descended two flights of stairs to the platform.  
16 I walked to the end of the platform where I saw  
17 a stationary train approximately 100 yards from the  
18 platform. I could clearly see that the second carriage  
19 had severe damage. Although lighting at track level was  
20 not good, I could also see that one body was covered  
21 with a blanket lying between the track levels with the  
22 front of the second carriage.

23 "If possible, this body had been moved to assist  
24 movement of rescue services. On approaching the rear of  
25 the second carriage, I could see the roof and the side

1 of the carriage had been blown outwards. Looking to the  
2 rear of the train, I could see a further body straddling  
3 the tracks. It was clear this person was dead and it  
4 appeared to have been blown from the carriage on to the  
5 tracks.

6 "Inside the carriage, where the explosion had taken  
7 place, I could see several bodies apparently dead, also  
8 Fire Service and ambulance staff were struggling to free  
9 persons trapped still alive. After approximately ten  
10 minutes, a black male was freed and placed on  
11 a stretcher and passed down to the waiting persons at  
12 track level for conveyance to street level. I could see  
13 this male had lost his right leg below the knee.

14 I passed up a further stretcher into the carriage.

15 I remained in the carriage door to await the release of  
16 one further person who was trapped in the carriage.

17 While waiting at the doorway, I saw on the floor of the  
18 carriage a female who was wearing a woollen top. She  
19 was on her right side facing, away from me to her left,  
20 what appeared to be a human body part, but I cannot be  
21 certain.

22 "Whilst waiting, I could hear medical staff talking  
23 to the lady who, judging by her screams, appeared to be  
24 in great pain. This person, who I now know to be  
25 Martine Wright, appeared to be the last alive passenger

1 in the carriage. After what appeared a short while, the  
2 lady was freed and placed on a stretcher, which I passed  
3 up. She was then lowered to myself and PC Morgan who  
4 was with me and who supported the head end of the  
5 stretcher.

6 "I could see the lady had extensive injuries to both  
7 legs below the knee. Ms Wright was carried to street  
8 level and, during the course of this journey, the  
9 Fire Brigade were filming the scene and the evacuation.  
10 As Ms Wright was the last live passenger, the scene was  
11 then secured and rescue personnel departed. I continued  
12 to assist others on the surface and eventually assumed  
13 cordon duties until relieved. I remained on duty until  
14 7.30 in the evening where at Snow Hill police station  
15 I was stood down."

16 MR KEITH: My Lady, the last two statements to be read are  
17 those of Jeffrey Edwards and David Cook.

18 Jeffrey Edwards' statement is dated 28 January 2006.

19 Statement of MR JEFFREY EDWARDS read

20 "I have been a firefighter for eight and a half  
21 years. I am based at Whitechapel fire station on red  
22 watch for the London Fire Brigade. I had previously  
23 made a written report for the LFB on 29 July. I am  
24 aware that the Metropolitan Police have a copy of my  
25 report and I have used this report to refresh my memory

1 prior to making this statement.

2 "On the morning of Thursday, 7 July, I was a crew  
3 member on a pump appliance with the call sign  
4 Foxtrot 332. The other crew members during this tour of  
5 duty were Firefighter McPartland, Firefighter Salim and  
6 Firefighter Hughes. My role was that of appliance  
7 commander. At 08.57 hours that morning, we were  
8 mobilised by London Fire Brigade control to attend  
9 a report of a fire and explosion at St Botolph's Street.  
10 As we approached Aldgate London Underground station,  
11 a London Underground representative waved us down and  
12 informed us that the incident was actually in an  
13 Underground train at the station. He stated that a bomb  
14 had exploded on the train. As he was relaying this  
15 information to me, I was trying to call the other  
16 Whitechapel pump ladder appliance, Foxtrot 331, on my  
17 handheld radio to inform Sub-Officer Clarke watch  
18 commander that the incident was not in St Botolph's  
19 Street, but on an Underground train at Aldgate station.  
20 "While I was informing Sub-Officer Clarke of the  
21 incident, passengers started exiting the Underground  
22 station who needed immediate first aid attention.  
23 Sub-Officer Clarke immediately made our attendance at  
24 Aldgate a major incident procedure. Firefighters Taylor  
25 and McGee from Foxtrot 331 were detailed to deal with

1 the most serious casualties that had been evacuated from  
2 the train, while the rest of the casualties were led to  
3 a safe area to the side of the station entrance.  
4 "I assisted one of the casualties who, like the  
5 others, was covered in dust and soot. This casualty was  
6 female. She had severe burns to her face, hand, legs.  
7 She was in the company of a male passenger who had  
8 slight burns to his hands and was complaining of stomach  
9 pains. At this point, casualties were required to be  
10 moved to a bus stop on the opposite side of the road.  
11 I then assisted these two casualties to the bus stop and  
12 stayed with them until they were taken away by the  
13 London Ambulance Service. I think at this time it was  
14 about 10.30. I then returned to the entrance to the  
15 station where I assisted in ferrying casualties from the  
16 entrance to waiting ambulances.  
17 "Once all the live casualties had been evacuated  
18 from the train, we were asked by the police to also  
19 evacuate the area so that they could check for secondary  
20 devices."  
21 David Cook's statement is dated 13 January 2006.  
22 Statement of MR DAVID COOK read  
23 "I have been a fireman for 16 years. I am now  
24 employed as a fire investigation officer at New Cross  
25 fire station on red watch for the London Fire Brigade.

1 I had previously made a written report for the London  
2 Fire Brigade on 8 July 2005 which details my actions at  
3 Aldgate station on the 7th. I am aware that the  
4 Metropolitan Police have a copy of my report. I have  
5 used this report to refresh my memory.

6 "On the morning of 7 July, I was in the Fire  
7 Investigation Department office at New Cross fire  
8 station as the fire investigation officer covering red  
9 watch assigned call sign OK16. At 08.57 that morning,  
10 I was mobilised via a pager from the LFB control at  
11 Docklands to attend a report of a fire and explosion at  
12 Aldgate London Underground station.

13 "During my journey to Aldgate, I heard over the  
14 London Fire Brigade main scheme radio system to  
15 implement major incident procedures at the scene.  
16 I arrived at 09.13 and noticed that three London Fire  
17 Brigade appliances were already in attendance,  
18 Foxtrot 331, 332 and 251. Later, a fire rescue unit  
19 Echo 216 from Lewisham arrived. There were also police  
20 and London Fire Brigade in attendance at the time.  
21 I parked my vehicle outside St Botolph's Church out of  
22 the immediate area of operations, dressed in my fire  
23 gear. I then spoke to a female who appeared with  
24 a soot-stained nose and mouth. I asked, 'Is it a crash  
25 of trains or an explosion on board?' She replied

1 'Definitely an explosion'. I do not know this woman's  
2 name.

3 "I approached the scene of operations and noted that  
4 Foxtrot 331 was the incident command pump. I then saw  
5 Sub-Officer Sean Clarke and introduced myself to him.  
6 He identified himself as officer in command at that  
7 stage. He was from Whitechapel. He informed me that  
8 I was the first station officer to arrive at the scene  
9 and was I to take command.

10 "I spoke further with Sub-Officer Clarke asking what  
11 other resources we had at the scene, apart from the  
12 three appliances and the Fast Response Unit I had seen  
13 earlier. As I was aware that this had been classed as  
14 a major incident, other resources would have been  
15 mobilised to attend at the scene. At this time, I was  
16 not aware of the other incidents occurring within the  
17 capital. I decided to gather all the sub-officers  
18 together in an initial 'head shed' group next to the  
19 command appliance Foxtrot 331, as the radio link  
20 incident command pump was in place.

21 "Following this meeting, we agreed that the  
22 following was needed:

23 "1. Casualty clearance as a priority. This would  
24 happen naturally also aided by London Underground staff,  
25 police and firefighters.



1 "2. A gear dump of cutting equipment, first aid  
2 equipment, resuscitation, burns, dressings. This  
3 appeared to have also commenced to the front left of the  
4 station on the pavement.

5 "3. A determination of breathing apparatus, BA gear  
6 on-site, with a view of setting up a BA stage 11 system  
7 at the scene.

8 "4. To seek confirmation that this was not a dirty  
9 bomb detonation.

10 "5. That a forward control point be established at  
11 platform level.

12 "At this point, we had been joined by a number of  
13 other station officers from the Old Kent Road station  
14 and from Poplar station. Having agreed these taskings,  
15 I then remained up at pavement level and moved on to the  
16 roadway outside of the station. At this point, I was  
17 approached by the senior City police officer at the  
18 scene. I believe that he was inspector rank but do not  
19 know his name. He asked if I was the IC Silver at that  
20 point. I said to him that it would that I had been  
21 given that task, although I could not confirm whether  
22 officers of Assistant Divisional Officer rank were  
23 already on the site or elsewhere. However, I said that  
24 I would remain as London Fire Brigade Silver control at  
25 that point outside the station. We both agreed at this

1 point to use the nearby bus station depot opposite the  
2 Aldgate Underground station as a casualty clearing area.  
3 The police inspector then organised officers to clear  
4 the bus station site for London Ambulance Service and  
5 the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service.  
6 "By now various requests for equipment assistance  
7 were coming in by word of mouth. Where we could,  
8 I delegated various firefighters crews to locate  
9 equipment and assist. Shortly after, the officer in  
10 charge of the MAIRT, the Multiaction Incident Report  
11 Response Team, approached me, asking if I was Silver  
12 control. Again, I responded that that would appear to  
13 be the case. I asked what his team needed to deploy to  
14 check for any signs of a dirty bomb. I then arranged  
15 for the Fast Response Unit E216 to assist with the  
16 rigging and setting up a decontamination area.  
17 "Shortly after this, I spoke to Divisional Officer,  
18 DO Paul Rigby and stated that, as he was now the senior  
19 officer in attendance, he should assume the role of  
20 Silver control. I introduced him to the City Police  
21 inspector and the MAIRT team leader. At the request of  
22 DO Rigby, I arranged for him to be supplied with the LFB  
23 'main scheme' radio.  
24 "As casualties were now exiting Aldgate station in  
25 a steady stream, I obtained a loudhailer and began to

1 inform the public to cross the road to the bus station  
2 where a casualty triage had been set up by the London  
3 Ambulance Service. Whilst carrying out the task,  
4 further requests for equipment assistance were still  
5 directed towards me, even though I was no longer Silver  
6 control. At various times, I arranged or carried out  
7 the following tasks:

8 "1. Arranging and collecting stretchers for  
9 colleagues from appliances.

10 "2. Asking various drivers to move appliances to  
11 free up access.

12 "3. Have the control unit moved further away out of  
13 the immediate scene for the same reason and set up  
14 a hydrant.

15 "4. Arrange for three short extension ladders to be  
16 gathered for casualty handling. I had no direct  
17 involvement in casualty handling at any stage."

18 My Lady, may I now call, please, Sean Jones?

19 MR SEAN JONES (affirmed)

20 Questions by MR KEITH

21 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

22 A. Sean Eric Jones.

23 Q. Mr Jones, what rank were you in July 2005?

24 A. Firefighter.

25 Q. Firefighter. You were assigned to Southwark fire

1 station?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Were you on blue watch, which meant that you were on  
4 duty at 9.00 am?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. That morning, were you assigned to an appliance E331?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Was the officer in charge of that appliance a gentleman  
9 called Sub-Officer Harris?

10 A. It was.

11 Q. If we could have on the screen [LFB17-1], we can see E331  
12 right in the middle of the page, up a little bit, there  
13 we are, one of the appliances, E331, Sub-Officer Harris,  
14 so there is your crew commander.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. We can see a little bit further down the page, 09.02,  
17 "E331, commit", and further down the page still, one of  
18 the appliances mobilised at 09.02.03 was your appliance,  
19 E331.

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. If you could go over the page, and enlarge the middle,  
22 please, we can see that the resource changes for E331  
23 include a mobilisation time 09.08.06, but no arrival  
24 time and we've heard evidence that for an arrival time  
25 to be logged, it's necessary to send a message by use of

1 the device in the cab of the appliance to show Control  
2 that you've arrived?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. It may be that in the urgency or perhaps because the  
5 machine wasn't working, no one did that.

6 A. Yes, to my knowledge.

7 Q. When you arrived at Aldgate, what did you understand to  
8 be the nature of the incident?

9 A. Initially, we got called to smoke issuing, which happens  
10 on a relatively regular basis, brakes lock up on trains.

11 Q. Brakes lock up on trains?

12 A. Lock up on trains and smoke ensues. So that's my  
13 initial thought process behind that.

14 On driving round to get to Aldgate station, the  
15 traffic had stopped. We pulled up to the right of the  
16 entrance of the station, and there were lots of people  
17 coming up, smoke-blackened faces, Whitechapel crews were  
18 treating people with injuries on the stairs to the  
19 entrance.

20 My initial thought was it was some kind of exercise,  
21 it just didn't tally with our call, the call we got  
22 mobilised to.

23 Q. Did you receive any information, either from the public  
24 or from your fellow firefighters, as to --

25 A. I became aware very, very quickly that something had

1 happened on the train. It was still unclear as to what.  
2 I didn't speak to any members of the public about what  
3 had happened below.

4 Q. What was the first priority on your arrival? What did  
5 you do first?

6 A. We -- my Sub-Officer Harris, he left the appliance and  
7 liaised with the officer in charge there, Whitechapel.

8 Q. Sub-Officer Clarke?

9 A. Sub-Officer Clarke. Myself and the other firefighters  
10 on the appliance then started getting off all our  
11 cutting equipment, lighting equipment, stuff that would  
12 be needed that we presumed would be needed in a train  
13 incident, whatever it may be, a crashed train, derailed  
14 train, whatever, we didn't know what it was. So we  
15 just -- we literally pulled all our lighting and cutting  
16 equipment off.

17 Q. Everything that you thought might be needed?

18 A. Might be needed, yes.

19 Q. Because at that stage, you didn't, of course, know what  
20 you were dealing with?

21 A. No.

22 Q. How long did that process take of taking the cutting  
23 equipment, lighting and so on, off the --

24 A. Only a matter of minutes. Our appliance was right by  
25 the entrance, so we didn't have very far to go.

1 Q. The cutting equipment consists of cutting equipment on  
2 a sled, doesn't it?  
3 A. It does.  
4 Q. Together with a generator?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. So does it take more than one of you to lift it off?  
7 A. It takes four people to lift it off.  
8 Q. So all four of you were engaged in taking the cutting  
9 equipment off the appliance?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Where did you put it all?  
12 A. Outside the entrance to the Tube, slightly to the right,  
13 not far from our appliance. But pretty much outside the  
14 entrance to the Tube station.  
15 Q. Once you'd taken all the equipment off that you thought  
16 might be required, did you then put on your breathing  
17 apparatus?  
18 A. No, I waited for information back. Sub-Officer Harris  
19 came back to us, then told us what plan they were  
20 formulating. This took a couple of minutes or so. We  
21 were then told Sub-Officer -- sorry, Watch Manager Spier  
22 then came across to us and said "I'm taking you down,  
23 your crew down, or my fellow firefighters down, as  
24 a breathing apparatus crew to assess the situation down  
25 below."

1 Q. Either from Sub-Officer Harris or from Officer Spier,  
2 did you understand anything about the nature of the  
3 explosion or the incident?

4 A. No, not the dynamics of it, no. We -- to my knowledge,  
5 our brief was to go down, assess the situation and  
6 report on that.

7 Q. Sub-Officer Clarke had already been down, had he not?

8 A. I don't know.

9 Q. You don't know?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Did you go straight down, or did you have to wait for  
12 power to be confirmed off?

13 A. No, we went straight down to the platform and  
14 assessed -- we were stood on the end of the platform.  
15 It then became evident what had happened.

16 From there, I believe Watch Manager Spier then went  
17 back up to report the situation. We ascertained that we  
18 no longer needed breathing apparatus because part of the  
19 tunnel is open to air. There was no smoke  
20 contamination. So we dropped our sets and then  
21 approached the affected carriage.

22 Q. Is it a question of just taking off the sets -- moving  
23 your arms out of the webbing and leaving them on the  
24 floor?

25 A. There are two buckles to undo, two buckles and the sets



1 get dropped.

2 Q. As you were on the platform, you no doubt became aware  
3 of passengers coming along the track and up onto the  
4 platform away from the train?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What satisfied you that the power was off?

7 A. Because there were hundreds of people walking back the  
8 other way.

9 Q. Did you need to seek, or feel the need to seek,  
10 confirmation from others, for example,  
11 London Underground, as to --

12 A. I don't recollect in asking for it at all. I -- my  
13 thought process was: there were people walking towards  
14 us on the tracks, power is off.

15 Q. Having taken off your BA apparatus, your breathing  
16 apparatus, did you then go to the train?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Who did you go with?

19 A. Temporary Crew Manager Turner, Firefighter Osborne and  
20 Firefighter Brown.

21 Q. We know where the bomb was, it was in carriage 2.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is that the carriage that you went into?

24 A. Yes, we approached and entered via the double doors, the  
25 first set of double doors we saw.

1 Q. Could we have [INQ10280-9] , please? This is the carriage.

2 Did you enter, therefore, by the second set of double

3 doors D6?

4 A. Double doors D6.

5 Q. Who were the first people whom you saw inside the

6 carriage?

7 A. There were two or three people sat opposite on seats 11,

8 12. One was a lady whose shoes had been blown off and

9 somebody sat alongside her, and then there were people

10 sat in 20, 21 and 22, we also saw those and we saw

11 a casualty over 21 and 22.

12 Q. All right. Concentrating on 21 and 22, if we may, did

13 you subsequently discover that it was a man and a woman

14 and their names were --

15 A. We know -- the only name I know was Crystal.

16 Q. All right. And there was a gentleman sitting next to

17 her?

18 A. There was a gentleman sitting next to her.

19 Q. They were -- perhaps it was plain to you, they were

20 associated in some way?

21 A. Yes, it became evident, and then obviously in the press

22 afterwards I now know that they were dance partners.

23 Q. Yes. I'd like to ask you, please, though, about the

24 lady who was lying across the lap of either one or both

25 of those two people. Could you see her?

1 A. Yes, we could.

2 Q. Can you tell us, please, where you recollect her being,  
3 as far as you are able to remember?

4 A. Laying across the laps of predominantly 22, which was  
5 Crystal, but she was also across 21, which was her  
6 partner.

7 Q. Did you see whether she was entangled in any way with  
8 the wreckage?

9 A. She wasn't entangled per se. An upright handbar from  
10 the end of the seat, she was wedged between that and  
11 Crystal.

12 Q. Could you see which way she was facing?

13 A. Her head was towards us, her head was towards the double  
14 door.

15 Q. And her feet the other direction?

16 A. And her feet down the other way.

17 Q. Can you remember anything about her clothing or her  
18 description, the colour of her hair, for example?

19 A. I thought she was wearing all black. I thought she was  
20 dark-haired. I remember thinking she was young, late  
21 teens, early 20s.

22 Q. Do you recall whether there was a second lady, ever, in  
23 the near vicinity of Crystal and her dance partner,  
24 Bruce?

25 A. There were -- not in that immediate vicinity. There

1 were casualties further down that row of seats, but  
2 I don't recollect anybody right in that vicinity.  
3 Q. Do you recollect there being a group of people lying on  
4 the floor in front of that bank of seats?  
5 A. My impression was they were slightly further down the  
6 carriage.  
7 Q. Between 14 and 19, for example?  
8 A. Between 14 and 19, yes.  
9 Q. Other than that group of people, did you see any other  
10 casualties near 20, 21 and 22?  
11 A. No, they were -- to my knowledge, they were further down  
12 into the area between double door D8 and double door D7.  
13 Q. All right. Could you tell us, please, what you recall  
14 of the lady? Did Crystal tell you anything about the  
15 state or the -- what she knew of the lady who was lying  
16 across her lap?  
17 A. I don't -- I recollect asking Crystal if she was hurt.  
18 She said her legs were hurting. We then asked are her  
19 legs hurting because she had somebody laying across her  
20 or because of injuries. She then said "I think it's  
21 because someone is laying on top of me, but I can't  
22 confirm that".  
23 I don't recollect her saying anything about --  
24 Q. The lady herself?  
25 A. The lady herself.

1 Q. Was the lady moving at all?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you and your fellow firefighter, Mr Turner, check

4 her for signs of life?

5 A. We did basic first aid. We checked originally and we

6 detected nothing at all.

7 Q. When you say you checked, how did you check?

8 A. We checked for vital signs, pulse, breathing.

9 Q. That means checking wrist and neck?

10 A. I think we checked her neck.

11 Q. You think you checked her neck, and there was no sign of

12 a pulse and no breathing?

13 A. We found nothing ourselves.

14 Q. Forming the view that she had died, did you then decide

15 that the best thing to do was to move her so as to free

16 Crystal?

17 A. No, we discussed with Crystal how she was doing. She

18 said she was okay but her legs were still hurting.

19 A paramedic then appeared. I think he came from further

20 down the train, so he would have come in through D8 and

21 worked his way down the train. We asked if he could

22 check. He -- I can't remember what check he did,

23 whether it was mechanically or physically checked. He

24 said that she'd passed and we then removed her from that

25 position.

1 Q. In your statement, you seemed to suggest that, before  
2 the paramedic arrived, you made a preliminary attempt to  
3 try to move the lady --

4 A. I think --

5 Q. -- but you weren't successful and then you stopped, the  
6 paramedic arrived and checked as well.

7 A. We didn't -- because she was trapped, we didn't want to  
8 start trying to exert too much force. I think it became  
9 evident that she wasn't going to be removed from there  
10 without a little bit of force, which we -- until we  
11 confirmed that she was dead, we didn't want to start  
12 interfering with possible injuries, if she was still  
13 alive.

14 Q. We understand. Do you recall -- you've mentioned as  
15 a possibility, but do you recollect any monitoring  
16 device or any machine of any sort being used by the  
17 paramedic?

18 A. I don't remember specifically.

19 Q. The paramedic having ascertained that she was dead, did  
20 you then come to move her?

21 A. We did, yes.

22 Q. Where did you place her?

23 A. We extricated her from the position she was in and,  
24 initially, we then laid her down on the carriage floor  
25 and then, fairly quickly afterwards, I believe --

1 I couldn't tell you a timeframe -- a piece of short  
2 extension ladder was handed up to us which we used as an  
3 improvised stretcher.

4 We placed her on that. She was then extricated from  
5 the train, removed.

6 Q. Did some of your fellow firefighters outside the  
7 carriage help, holding the extension ladder as the lady  
8 was passed out?

9 A. Yes, as she was passed out.

10 Q. I now want to ask you, please, about what you recollect  
11 of a fellow officer, Kevin Richards, and what he was  
12 doing.

13 A. At that point, I believed it was Kevin Richards. It  
14 transpired it wasn't. I think that you're -- there was  
15 a gentleman who had a breathing apparatus mask with him.  
16 I thought that was Kevin Richards. It wasn't.

17 Q. Right, where did you see this person, whoever it was?

18 A. My impression was that he was in the area around double  
19 door D7 and D8.

20 Q. Regardless of who it was, what was this person doing?

21 A. He had a breathing apparatus mask on a casualty, on the  
22 face of a casualty.

23 Q. Can you remember anything about the casualty?

24 A. He was a 30/35-year-old gentleman, laying on the floor,  
25 slightly prone position, and that's as far as I can

1 remember.

2 Q. Do you recall whether he was lying on the floor nearer  
3 double door D8 or up towards D7?

4 A. My impression was he was nearer D8.

5 Q. Therefore, he wasn't associated with the people you  
6 could see at the end of the carriage around about 16 and  
7 15?

8 A. No, he was -- if you did a minor sectorisation of where  
9 we were, he wasn't part of the area I was working.

10 Q. Could you see what happened to that gentleman?

11 A. He passed away.

12 Q. While the man you whom you saw was applying the mask?

13 A. I believe so. He was being constantly checked by  
14 paramedics at this stage and I remember him, the  
15 paramedic, just saying "No", so I presumed that at some  
16 point he was there, but then the paramedic just said,  
17 "No, he's not". So treatment was stopped on him.

18 Q. The gentleman who was applying a mask or looking after  
19 the man on the floor, do you recollect whether he was  
20 wearing a uniform of any kind?

21 A. He was a fireman.

22 Q. He was a fireman, but you don't think it was  
23 Firefighter Richards?

24 A. It wasn't Kevin Richards.

25 Q. Right. In relation to the bodies whom you could see



1 between the seats, so between 14 and 19, was there any  
2 movement there at all?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you try to remove some of the debris to see what was  
5 underneath?

6 A. Yes, just working our way down, once the lady on the  
7 short extension had been removed, we then started  
8 working down towards the door, the area between doors D8  
9 and D7. There were casualties. They were partly  
10 obstructed by sheeting from the roof. When we were  
11 going down there, at this stage I wasn't checking for  
12 vital signs because they had been, to my knowledge,  
13 checked by paramedics.

14 Q. How do you know that? Had you seen the paramedics  
15 check?

16 A. The paramedics had come back up that way so I just had  
17 assumed that they were checked.

18 Q. Do you recollect anything about the descriptions of the  
19 people there?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Or the number?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Did you then move towards the end of the carriage?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. And did you start looking after a lady whom you

1 subsequently discovered was called Kira Mason --

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. -- who had, I think, injuries to her left hand and her  
4 left leg --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- very serious injuries. Did you assist with calming  
7 her and making her as comfortable as you could?

8 A. Yes, she had -- while we were dealing with the  
9 casualties our end, it was -- she had a firefighter with  
10 her the whole time that I remember and, as we were  
11 working further down the carriage towards her, her name  
12 was being called, and there was concern because she was  
13 passing in and out of consciousness. So there was  
14 concern about her. So I was aware that there was  
15 somebody with her all the time. So as soon as I was  
16 free and got down there, I assisted with that gentleman.

17 Q. Do you recollect that there were two other passengers at  
18 the end of the carriage, a man and a woman opposite --

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. -- Andrew Brown and Martine Wright --

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. -- who were moved around about the same time, there was  
23 an order of removal from the carriage?

24 A. We removed Kira first because she was in and out of  
25 consciousness, I believe the paramedics were more

1 concerned with her than the other two casualties. So  
2 Kira was the person who was removed first, and then it  
3 was the gentleman, and then it was Martine Wright.

4 Q. May I just ask you whether you recollect the presence of  
5 one or two individuals who were also assisting so that  
6 we can get our bearings and the timings?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was one of the firefighters there Mr Curnick?

9 A. I'm afraid I don't know names.

10 Q. Do you remember an off-duty female police officer,  
11 Elizabeth Kenworthy being there?

12 A. I don't remember the female. I remember a male off-duty  
13 police officer --

14 Q. An off-duty City of London Police sergeant?

15 A. No, a plainclothes policeman. He identified himself as  
16 a policeman.

17 Q. There was a gentleman in T-shirt and jeans, an off-duty  
18 City of London Police sergeant?

19 A. He identified himself as a policeman.

20 Q. All right. In your statement, you use these words:

21 "We had no radio contact and no real medical  
22 resources to deal with the injuries and the conditions  
23 we faced."

24 Could I ask you about that sentence, please? We  
25 know from other evidence there was no radio contact in

1 the tunnel.

2 A. No.

3 Q. How did that impact upon what you were trying to do  
4 yourself?

5 A. Not at all. We -- the only information that we passed  
6 on was taken up by Watch Manager Spier, or at least the  
7 original assertion of what we believed to be the  
8 incident, and once myself, Firefighter -- Temporary Crew  
9 Manager Turner, got on the train, we just did what we  
10 needed to do. At no point did we look for instruction  
11 or require instruction. We just got on with the work  
12 that needed to be done.

13 Q. You got on with applying first aid?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you have enough equipment to, albeit in  
16 a rudimentary way, assess and treat the casualties whom  
17 you came across?

18 A. At that stage, all we carried on our fire engine was  
19 a very basic first aid kit, a number of bandages,  
20 elastic tape. The nature of the injuries that we saw on  
21 the train, there was no mild first aid, it was either  
22 seriously injured or they got up and walked off. So  
23 there was no triage that needed to be done, there was  
24 nothing like that. It was just purely a case of the  
25 casualties that we saw were way beyond our remit and

1 skill levels to be able to treat. So our first aid kit  
2 had been useless anyway.

3 Q. So even if you'd been able to get radio contact to LFB  
4 Control, and asked for further equipment, in truth it  
5 was a question of waiting for paramedics and HEMS  
6 doctors?

7 A. Yes, we needed paramedics and HEMS there.

8 Q. You described for us the male in the area near D8 with  
9 a mask. Do we take it, therefore, that for those people  
10 who died before the paramedics arrived, or at the point  
11 that they arrived, in truth there was nothing that you  
12 or perhaps the police officers who were there could have  
13 done for them, because none of you had the specialist  
14 medical equipment necessary?

15 A. No, no. I mean, I couldn't even confirm that that  
16 gentleman was alive. He was -- I assumed he did because  
17 he had a face mask being applied to his face. There was  
18 nothing that we could have done.

19 Q. Did you see him again?

20 A. Not that I recall.

21 MR KEITH: Thank you. Will you stay there, please? There  
22 may be some further questions for you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

24 Questions by MR COLTART

25 MR COLTART: I represent a young man called Richard Ellery

1 who died on the carriage that morning. He was the only  
2 male who was alive at the time that the emergency  
3 responders arrived and who died on the carriage. So  
4 when you talk of someone having a mask applied to their  
5 face, it seems likely that it was him. All right?  
6 I just want to explore a few more of the issues in  
7 relation to him, if I may.

8 Now, you said this morning that you understand now  
9 that, contrary to what's in your statement, it may not  
10 have been Kevin Richards who applied the mask to him.

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Is that something that you know -- I'm not suggesting  
13 there's nothing wrong with this -- but something that  
14 you know through discussions you've had with your  
15 colleagues before giving evidence this morning?

16 A. Kevin Richards, since the incident, was posted to the  
17 station, to my station, to Southwark. So in discussions  
18 with him, just generally over the period of his time at  
19 Southwark, talking to him about that, it's then  
20 transpired that it wasn't him.

21 Q. We're going to hear from Mr Richards later anyway. We  
22 had some evidence from a firefighter called Mr Curnick  
23 at the end of last week, who said that he, himself, had  
24 dealings with Mr Ellery, but that he had never applied  
25 an oxygen mask at any stage to his face. If we can

1 establish who that was, it would be helpful, but you  
2 don't know?  
3 A. I have no idea.  
4 Q. No. Just in relation to that topic, though, I think you  
5 said in answer to questions from Mr Keith that he had  
6 a mask attached to a breathing apparatus --  
7 A. That's correct.  
8 Q. -- over his face. Is that right? So it wasn't  
9 a laerdal resuscitator; it was the BA kit that you first  
10 donned in order to go down to the tunnel?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. If there had been a laerdal resuscitator available at  
13 the time, would that have been used in preference to the  
14 mask from the breathing kit?  
15 A. Yeah.  
16 Q. Was there any discussion on the carriage, that you were  
17 aware of, about a lack of or a shortage of laerdal  
18 resuscitators?  
19 A. No.  
20 Q. Were you aware of any request being made from the  
21 carriage being relayed back up to the surface for  
22 further resuscitators to be provided?  
23 A. I do not recollect a conversation, but apparently  
24 I turned round to Firefighter Brown at one stage and  
25 asked him to go to the surface and get a laerdal.

1 Q. Why did you make that request? You say there wasn't any  
2 discussion about resuscitators, but what prompted you to  
3 ask him to do that?

4 A. I don't know, because I can't remember the conversation.

5 Q. Do you recall the paramedics bringing extra supplies of  
6 oxygen with them when they arrived at the carriage?

7 A. I don't recall that. I will assume that they did, but  
8 I don't -- once I was on the train, I didn't see  
9 anything that was put on to the train or come from,  
10 purely because I was concentrating on what I was doing.  
11 I wasn't making a conscious point of looking for stuff.

12 Q. Did you recollect, either at the time or in discussions  
13 you had with others subsequently, about a shortage of  
14 supplies of oxygen on the carriage, London Ambulance  
15 Service oxygen?

16 A. Nothing specific. It was purely discussions that were  
17 made that have -- that came to light in the press.  
18 There was nothing at the time about a shortage of  
19 breathing -- of laerdals, of oxygen masks. It was only  
20 what transpired after the event.

21 Q. Do you recall any discussion on the carriage about the  
22 wrong type of oxygen cylinders being brought by the  
23 London Ambulance Service?

24 A. No.

25 Q. The young man who had the mask over his face was alive



1 for a while before he was pronounced dead. Is that  
2 right?

3 A. I am only assuming that because he had a -- he was  
4 having a mask held over his face, so I'm only assuming  
5 that. I do not know that for a fact.

6 Q. Do you recall any discussion at any stage about moving  
7 him?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Were you conscious of the need for additional stretchers  
10 to be provided on the carriage?

11 A. Yes, purely because the first casualty we removed, we  
12 used an improvised stretcher in and a piece of short  
13 extension ladder. All the other casualties that  
14 I assisted with got up and walked off. She was the only  
15 person, apart from -- by the time we got to Kira and  
16 Martine and Mr Brown, everyone, HEMS was there,  
17 paramedics were there, there was -- every time  
18 a casualty was ready to be removed from the train,  
19 a stretcher was available.

20 Q. In relation to Mr Ellery, you say that a stretcher was  
21 available every time someone needed to be moved, but are  
22 we right in assuming that one wasn't available in order  
23 to move him?

24 A. I had no dealings with the gentleman at all. I don't  
25 know whether he was requested to move or he was going to

1 stay in situ. I had no dealings with the gentleman at  
2 all.

3 Q. I will ask someone else about that particular topic in  
4 due course.

5 Can I ask you one further question, please? In  
6 relation to your radios, did you ever receive an  
7 instruction to switch your radio off for fear that it  
8 might trigger a secondary device?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Was that, as far as you were aware, a message that was  
11 ever passed down through the carriage?

12 A. I don't recollect such a comment being made.

13 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

15 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

16 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Jones, when you went into the carriage and  
17 you saw at seats 21 and 22 -- if we have the plan back,  
18 it may assist you. In 22, you recall that the lady who  
19 was sat there was Crystal, Crystal Main?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. We've heard other evidence, Mr Jones, that there were  
22 two ladies who both lost their lives that day. One was  
23 Carrie Taylor, who was across Crystal Main and wedged by  
24 that pole.

25 A. Mm-hmm.

1 Q. I think that's the lady you've been describing to us.  
2 The other was a lady called Fiona Stevenson. The  
3 evidence we've heard from Mr Lait, who's the gentleman  
4 in seat 21, Bruce Lait, was that Fiona Stevenson was  
5 across him.

6 Do you ever remember seeing two ladies -- and they  
7 were very similar both in age and description, although  
8 Carrie Taylor, the one you've described, was slightly  
9 younger than Fiona.

10 A. No, I don't recollect two people there.

11 Q. Thank you. There's been evidence that somebody -- we  
12 thought a firefighter -- had removed Fiona Stevenson  
13 from Bruce Lait's lap.

14 A. I don't recollect that.

15 Q. Were you, as far as you are aware, one of the first  
16 firefighters into the carriage?

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. The gentleman asking questions, Mr Coltart, before me,  
19 mentioned the name Mr Curnick. Do you know Mr Curnick?

20 A. No.

21 Q. So you can't help us with anything that happened to  
22 Fiona Stevenson?

23 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

24 Q. You've described a number of bodies that you saw on the  
25 floor and have described sheeting across them.

1 A. Mm-hmm.

2 Q. Do we take it that that sheeting is the material from  
3 the carriage itself --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- rather than the sheet that was brought to the scene?

6 A. No, it was metal sheeting.

7 Q. As far as you were aware, nobody, in treating other  
8 casualties, had moved that sheeting?

9 A. To assess people on the floor, yes, I think it had been  
10 moved.

11 Q. Was that something you saw, Mr Jones?

12 A. I didn't see that.

13 Q. Can you help me with this: you've explained to us that  
14 you believe these people were already dead, they'd  
15 already died?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. On the triage packs, we've heard already that there are  
18 priority 1, 2 and 3 cards. There are also cards where  
19 somebody is believed to be dead. Had any of those cards  
20 been placed with these individuals?

21 A. I don't know.

22 Q. Not that you saw?

23 A. Not that I saw.

24 Q. And not that you were responsible for placing or asked  
25 to place yourself?

1 A. No.

2 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Jones.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

4 Questions by MS SHEFF

5 MS SHEFF: I just want to ask a question or so about that  
6 particular area that Mr Saunders has just been asking  
7 you about. You were asked whether you could recall how  
8 many bodies there were. If you cast your mind back now,  
9 can you remember whether there were two or more than two  
10 bodies in that particular location?

11 A. I thought there were more than two.

12 Q. More than two?

13 A. I couldn't tell you. I couldn't tell you specifically  
14 how many were there at all.

15 Q. But it appeared to be more than two bodies?

16 A. It appeared to be more than two.

17 Q. In a -- horrible word to use -- pile, but you know what  
18 I mean?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. They were all under this metal sheeting?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. And you could see no movement and presumably you heard  
23 no sound either?

24 A. No.

25 Q. But you assumed that they'd already been checked by

1 paramedics?

2 A. I had, because the paramedic had worked his way down the  
3 coach to us, to myself and Temporary Crew Manager Turner  
4 when we were with Crystal.

5 Q. Your inference, from what the paramedics were doing in  
6 the carriage, as they worked their way down towards  
7 you --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- was that they were checking on all the casualties to  
10 see if they required any medical assistance?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. So your assumption, from what you'd seen, and being in  
13 the carriage, was that they'd been checked and there was  
14 nothing that could be done for them?

15 A. That was my assumption, yes.

16 Q. As far as you were concerned, you didn't remove those  
17 bodies or move them in any way at all?

18 A. No.

19 Q. You literally just lifted up the sheeting to check on  
20 them --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and make your own assessment, and then move on to  
23 those you could help?

24 A. Yes, I mean -- yes, I mean, I wasn't even lifting the  
25 sheeting up. It was a process of working down the

1 carriage to then work with Kira. So I had no real  
2 involvement at all with anybody on the floor of the  
3 carriage.

4 Q. Because you were assessing whom you could assist?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And, as far as you were concerned, they were beyond your  
7 assistance?

8 A. That's correct.

9 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much indeed, Officer.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff. Ms Boyd?

11 Ms Simcock?

12 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

13 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady, I just have two questions.

14 The person dealing with Mr Ellery, who was providing him  
15 with oxygen, whom you saw, how sure are you that that  
16 person was a firefighter rather than a paramedic?

17 A. I'm not 100 per cent. My assumption was, because he had  
18 a breathing apparatus, he was a fireman.

19 Q. But it's possible it could have been a paramedic?

20 A. It could be possible that it could be somebody else.

21 MS SIMCOCK: I'm very grateful. Thank you, my Lady.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

23 Questions by MS BOYD

24 MS BOYD: Mr Richards, you were led down to the train by  
25 Station Officer Spier or is it Spire?

1 A. Spier.

2 Q. Spier, I'm sorry. Were you aware he says in his written  
3 statement that he had spoken to the officer in charge,  
4 Sub-Officer Clarke, who told him that some crews had  
5 already been committed. So in other words you weren't  
6 the first crew down. Were you aware of that?

7 A. I wasn't aware of that conversation, no.

8 Q. Station Officer Spier also says it's his recollection  
9 that he accompanied you along the track and then went  
10 back to radio for further assistance and equipment.

11 A. He may well have done. At the point at which he  
12 departed us, I cannot recollect.

13 Q. I understand. Having made your way along to the train,  
14 were you aware, on reaching the train, that there were  
15 other firefighters already there?

16 A. Not at that time. Once we dealt with the people  
17 directly opposite us through the door, looked down --  
18 further down the train and there were firefighters  
19 further down the train.

20 Q. That's when you first noticed them?

21 A. That's when I first noticed them.

22 Q. When you entered the train through door 6, were you  
23 aware of a passenger who made herself known to be  
24 a doctor, that's Dr Quaghebeur?

25 A. Not to my recollection, no.



1 Q. So were you aware of anyone telling you that the  
2 passengers opposite Crystal could be moved?

3 A. I don't recollect that, but that's not to say it wasn't  
4 there.

5 Q. The firefighter further down the train who was looking  
6 after the lady, Kira Mason, do you know who that was?

7 A. I don't.

8 Q. Mr Jones, did you consider from your point of view that  
9 there were enough people on the bombed carriage to deal  
10 with the casualties that were there?

11 A. For the three casualties we were handling towards the  
12 end, there were ample people there.

13 Q. Were there enough firefighters to handle stretchers and  
14 assist outside the train and back up to the platform?

15 A. Definitely.

16 Q. Were you aware of any firefighters acting as runners to  
17 convey messages?

18 A. No, I wasn't. All the time that I was there, I was on  
19 the carriage and it was -- every time we removed or  
20 somebody was ready to be removed, there were people  
21 ready to take stretchers and equipment that needed to go  
22 on the trackside. That's the only real contact I had  
23 with anybody off that carriage for all the time I was on  
24 it.

25 Q. Whilst you were on the carriage, were you or did you

1 become aware of any threats of secondary devices?

2 A. No, there was -- with firemen coming on, there were  
3 reports of, I think it was up to ten other explosions  
4 around London, but it was just comments that were made,  
5 nothing specific about Aldgate.

6 Q. You just got on with your job and did what you could do?

7 A. We just carried on getting on with what we needed to do.

8 Q. Finally, Mr Richards, there has been widespread -- I'm  
9 sorry, not Mr Richards, Mr Jones. I apologise.

10 A. That's all right.

11 Q. There has been widespread reporting last week of  
12 firefighters being delayed going down to the train and  
13 track. As far as you are concerned and the crew that  
14 you were with, do you consider there was any delay in  
15 you being deployed or proceeding to the train?

16 A. No, all the time, from the moment we arrived, we were,  
17 as I mentioned before, removing cutting equipment,  
18 lighting equipment. Whilst that process was going on,  
19 once that had finished, we were -- a minimal delay  
20 before we were instructed to do what we needed to do,  
21 which was to and get our breathing apparatus on. Then,  
22 as soon as we went down onto the platform, it became  
23 evident what had transpired. We then removed our sets  
24 and moved straight down onto the tracks.

25 So from my point of view, there was very little

1 delay, if any. Only purely operational,  
2 information-gathering.

3 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Mr Taylor?

5 Questions by MR TAYLOR

6 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Jones.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. First of all, I'd just like to deal with -- you were  
9 from Southwark fire station?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Southwark fire station, as I recall, is on the south  
12 side of the river and Aldgate is on the north side of  
13 the river.

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. But in effect, it's not very far away.

16 A. No.

17 Q. So the route from that would be along Southwark Bridge  
18 Road, across the bridge, is that the way --

19 A. We would go -- to Aldgate, we would go up Southwark  
20 Bridge Road on to Southwark Street, Southwark Street on  
21 to London Bridge, across London Bridge and then down  
22 Fenchurch.

23 Q. I would have thought that you would have gone the other  
24 way, actually, across Southwark bridge and turn right  
25 and then round by the one-way system, that probably

1 would have been quicker, I would have thought?

2 A. That is the route that I've learnt from -- I was driving  
3 that day, I learnt from other firemen, and previous  
4 drivers, that's the route that we've always taken. At  
5 that time of morning, if you go across the bridge, the  
6 traffic on Lower Thames Street, Upper Thames Street, is  
7 solid and there's no way to move away from that traffic.  
8 If you go across London Bridge, you have an option to  
9 get away from the traffic.

10 Q. I was going to ask you that, actually, what the traffic  
11 was like on that morning, was it very busy?

12 A. I recollect no delays.

13 Q. You can't remember, okay. How long -- I'm trying to  
14 establish a time here. I know it's very, very difficult  
15 to establish times. How long would you say it would  
16 take to get to Aldgate from there?

17 A. Three, four, five minutes, at most.

18 Q. Have you got -- I know it's difficult, but do you have  
19 any idea of the actual time you arrived?

20 A. No, I don't.

21 Q. When you arrived, and you eventually went down to the  
22 carriage and that, the communications were very  
23 difficult for you, obviously. I think the young lady  
24 here has just dealt with a problem. You never saw the  
25 runner service operating?

1 A. Once I was on the train, I didn't see what was going on  
2 trackside at all.

3 Q. So from start to finish, while you were on the train,  
4 how long would you estimate you were actually on the  
5 train in the carriage until you actually vacated?

6 A. I don't know, I really have got no -- I am imagining an  
7 hour and a half, an hour and three-quarters, two hours.  
8 I have no accurate timescale for it at all.

9 Q. All that time, the communications were really  
10 unavailable to you?

11 A. The task we were doing, I -- I cannot recollect even  
12 trying to communicate. It was -- we were doing specific  
13 tasks, one progressed on to the next, progressed on to  
14 the next. At no point do I remember trying to make any  
15 radio contact with anybody.

16 Q. Let's turn to the position of our daughter, Carrie. We  
17 obviously know where Carrie was now. You have -- you  
18 obviously were with her. She was pinned by a post?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Between the screen, or the screen had gone, had it?

21 A. The screen had gone.

22 Q. She was partially laying across, we think, Crystal Main.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Just confirm for me, was she face up or face down?

25 A. I believe she was face up.

1 Q. You're a first aider, I would imagine. You've been  
2 taught first aid?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. Of course, if you go to anything like this, it's  
5 very, very difficult. We are basically first aiders and  
6 that's basically what we do, we're not paramedics, we  
7 don't give treatment, we give a certain amount of  
8 treatment, but we can't do what a paramedic does. What  
9 we're taught as first aiders, the first thing that's  
10 actually drummed into us is the DRAB system, danger,  
11 response, airway and breathing; okay? Obviously, the  
12 danger was quite apparent to everyone. Response. Did  
13 you speak to Carrie, did you call her, did you speak to  
14 her?

15 A. We did -- we weren't in conversation. We tried -- you  
16 tried to ascertain a conscious level, you tried to --  
17 it's a response thing. So we would have -- we said "Can  
18 you hear us? Can you feel us?", anything like that. We  
19 got no response at all.

20 Q. The airway, did you check the area?

21 A. She had no breathing whatsoever.

22 Q. That's the "B" for "breathing". There used to be a "C"  
23 for "circulation", but we don't check for that now.

24 Now, it's been said before that there could have  
25 been a gurgling noise coming from Carrie. Did you

1 observe any noise?  
2 A. None whatsoever.  
3 Q. None whatsoever. Okay.  
4 The pole. Some confusion about the pole. Was the  
5 pole actually wrapped around Carrie or Carrie wrapped  
6 around the pole?  
7 A. Carrie was wrapped around the pole. I do not recollect  
8 any physical injuries to Carrie at all, but the pole  
9 was -- it was a third into her stomach, so she was  
10 wrapped around it, but it was to the point it was very  
11 difficult to remove her.  
12 Q. When you say a third, it actually pierced?  
13 A. No, not at all, her body was wrapped -- if that is the  
14 pole here, her body was wrapped around it that way.  
15 Q. I see, but there was no actually --  
16 A. No penetration.  
17 Q. Just basically the last point. Training. Are the  
18 Fire Brigade actually trained to deal with mass  
19 casualties incidents?  
20 A. Our training has increased. We now have a mass  
21 decontamination process. Our first aid equipment has  
22 increased in technology and equipment levels. We have  
23 nothing specific for mass casualty. It is just purely  
24 a process of assessment and treatment.  
25 Q. But are you talking now or -- I was asking before,

1 before 2005?

2 A. Before, no, it would have been purely a first aid  
3 certificate. Nothing specific for mass casualties.

4 Q. I asked this yesterday -- not yesterday, Friday,  
5 I think. Are you aware it was around about 2003,  
6 about September, that there was a rather large training  
7 exercise in London to deal with something similar to  
8 this, I believe it was at the Bank Tube station. It was  
9 on the Waterloo and City Line between Waterloo and the  
10 Bank that included National Health Service,  
11 firefighters, paramedics and police, and it wasn't  
12 basically for an explosive device, it was more for  
13 a chemical device, but it was a resilience planning for  
14 something like this. And that was less than two years  
15 previous. Have you any recollection of any training  
16 given there?

17 A. We have -- as I said, we have a mass decontamination  
18 process and training that we have alongside that. But  
19 that would be for a chemical incident along those lines.

20 Q. But you're not aware of this actual training session  
21 taking place?

22 A. I was not on that exercise.

23 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any more  
25 questions for Mr Jones?



1 Thank you very much, Mr Jones. As soon as you  
2 realised people were in trouble, you did everything  
3 possible to go and help and you stayed in the most  
4 appalling conditions until you knew that there was no  
5 one left alive for you to help. I thank you for  
6 everything you did on that day.

7 A. Thank you very much.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, Paul Osborne, please.

10 MR PAUL WILLIAM OSBORNE (sworn)

11 Questions by MR KEITH

12 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full  
13 name, please?

14 A. Paul William Osborne.

15 Q. Mr Osborne, in July of 2005, on 7 July, you were  
16 a firefighter on E331, were you not?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Indeed, the same appliance as Mr Jones from whom we've  
19 just heard.

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. We don't know the arrival time because the piece of  
22 equipment that was meant to log the arrival time of your  
23 appliance wasn't triggered or operated, so I just want  
24 to ask you, can you recollect how long it took you to  
25 get to Aldgate that morning?

1 A. I've thought about this and, as Mr Jones has just said,  
2 we weren't held up. I remember the call coming through,  
3 I remember our initial response being very quick because  
4 it had just been the change of shift, so we were all in  
5 the appliance bay. We mounted the appliance very  
6 swiftly. We were out of the bay doors, I would expect,  
7 in well under a minute, probably more nearer under half  
8 a minute. The route that we took I don't remember  
9 a delay. I don't remember any traffic problems  
10 whatsoever, and Firefighter Jones has been driving for  
11 a long period of time, I remember it being very swift,  
12 very controlled, and we arrived at the scene in what  
13 I can only believe was somewhere between 3 and  
14 4 minutes, but I remember it being very rapid and  
15 I remember not being held up and not being concerned at  
16 being held up.

17 Q. Can you just help us with how long, customarily, it  
18 takes firefighters to get into the appliance once you've  
19 received a mobilisation call? We're not familiar with  
20 the actual mechanics of it.

21 A. Okay, if you can imagine, a fire station doesn't just  
22 consist of where the fire engine is placed, that's in  
23 the appliance bay. So a fire station can have a number  
24 of floors where firefighters will respond from. So,  
25 therefore, there could be a delay of maybe as much as

1 a minute before those firefighters get on to the  
2 appliance before it actually leaves the fire station  
3 itself.

4 So in that respect, firefighters would normally  
5 respond from maybe a communal area or a lecture room, or  
6 offices within the fire station, but it wasn't the case  
7 on this day, due to the fact that we had just taken roll  
8 call, which determines what each individual person is  
9 doing specifically on that crew, so whether they are  
10 a breathing apparatus wearer, whether they are someone  
11 that is detailed to undertake entry control procedures,  
12 whether they're someone that's detailed to take hydrant  
13 location procedures. So we were all --

14 Q. Were you still all together when the mobilisation call  
15 came in?

16 A. -- together, we had taken roll call, but the  
17 mobilisation came through and, as I say, we were very,  
18 very quick in our response, quicker than maybe we would  
19 have been an hour later because we would have been  
20 within the station.

21 Q. Dispersed around the station?

22 A. It's the fastest that we could possibly be other than  
23 had we been on the appliance and actually just round the  
24 corner from the station, from the incident.

25 Q. There's a very interesting reference in your statement

1 to the fact that you don't carry watches.

2 A. I always made a point -- it's not the case per se of  
3 every firefighter. I always made a point of not wearing  
4 any jewelery and a watch, because, unfortunately, I've  
5 seen -- if you can imagine, if you're in a very hot  
6 climate in a fire and the watch strap gets to such  
7 a temperature that it can burn you, I've seen that  
8 happen to colleagues and it's obviously a health and  
9 safety issue. So, therefore, watches, rings, et cetera,  
10 aren't worn.

11 Q. Right. Moving on to your arrival at Aldgate, can you  
12 recollect how it was that you came to be wearing  
13 breathing apparatus, BA?

14 A. The reason for wearing a breathing apparatus was the  
15 fact that our call slip we were called to was smoke in  
16 a tunnel. The officer in charge, Sub-Officer Harris,  
17 now known as Watch Manager Harris, detailed as the  
18 breathing apparatus crew, both myself and Temporary Crew  
19 Manager Turner, to don breathing apparatus en route to  
20 the incident because that is a standard operating  
21 procedure. If you know that you are possibly attending  
22 an incident where there is the presence of fire gases --  
23 that is smoke, that we term in the Fire Service as fire  
24 gases -- then you will don the appropriate equipment for  
25 obvious health and safety reasons.

1 Q. Do we take it from your reference to breathing apparatus  
2 crew, that certain, but not all of you were designated  
3 as being firefighters who should wear BA or was it all  
4 of you were ordered to wear breathing apparatus?

5 A. No, sir. The standard procedure would initially be  
6 that, on roll call, two firefighters on this appliance,  
7 two firefighters will be detailed to be breathing  
8 apparatus wearers. Those two firefighters on that day,  
9 one of them was myself and the other was Temporary Crew  
10 Manager Turner. The other firefighters were detailed  
11 with other roles.

12 However, at an incident, when you turn up there,  
13 when you have other resources, so other appliances that  
14 are there. That can then change and then further  
15 firefighters that form up part of that crew, can then  
16 don their breathing apparatus sets.

17 So on the actual fire appliance itself, there are  
18 not just two breathing apparatus sets, but five  
19 breathing apparatus sets.

20 Q. I understand. When you arrived, you no doubt spoke to,  
21 or certain of your crew spoke to other firefighters who  
22 were already there, and it was obvious passengers were  
23 coming out who had injuries.

24 Do you recollect spending a little time, but not  
25 very much time, setting out an equipment dump?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. At the top of the station, at the ground level, or  
3 further down?

4 A. Not within the station itself, sir. But at the station  
5 entrance, as Mr Turner has previously described, we've  
6 various equipment that it was being assumed that we  
7 would require. I still wasn't fully aware of what the  
8 incident was, but it appeared to be more than smoke in  
9 a tunnel at this point.

10 Q. How did you come to be ordered to go down to the track?

11 A. Sorry, could you repeat the question, please, sir?

12 Q. Yes. How did you come to be ordered to go down to the  
13 track? Tell us what you recollect of how you came to be  
14 going down to --

15 A. Right, following the equipment dump that we got  
16 together, two fire -- two further firefighters on the  
17 appliance -- so that was Firefighter Jones and  
18 Firefighter Brown -- were detailed to don their  
19 breathing apparatus sets as well.

20 From what I recall, we were instructed by  
21 Sub-Officer Harris to go with Station Officer Spier from  
22 the Old Kent Road fire station, and another crew member,  
23 who I believe had come from his station as well, and he  
24 was to act as an entry control officer, so someone that  
25 books in those breathing apparatus wearers and books

1     them back out should they go under air and move away  
2     from that point of reference.

3     Q. All right. So you came to go down.

4     A. Yes.

5     Q. Did you pause on the platform or did you go straight  
6     down on to the track?

7     A. I'm not 100 per cent sure whether there was a pause.

8     I don't recall there being a pause. I recall somebody  
9     asking about the power, whether it had been shut off.

10    However, the number of casualties and people walking out  
11    from the affected tunnel to me was a good enough sign  
12    that we were safe to go down. There was -- within  
13    myself, I was wondering whether the power on the line  
14    where the train was on was still off, but I thought it  
15    was more appropriate to make my way down --

16    Q. And get on with it?

17    A. -- and find out what the actual incident was.

18    Q. We know that you took your breathing apparatus off at  
19    some stage before entering the train?

20    A. That's correct, sir, yes, sir.

21    Q. Did you do that whilst you were in the tunnel or whilst  
22    you were still in the platform?

23    A. Whilst we were in the tunnel adjacent to the train.

24    Q. You carried on into the tunnel with your breathing  
25    apparatus on and took it off alongside the train?

1 A. That's correct, sir.

2 Q. Did you come to go into the carriage, the second  
3 carriage?

4 A. Yes, I did, sir.

5 Q. Could we have [INQ10280-9], please? Can you recollect how  
6 you got into the carriage?

7 A. From what I can recall, I don't know how they got there,  
8 but there were a set of wooden steps that were at the  
9 side of double door D6, and I recall that we gained  
10 access by using those wooden steps. I can only assume  
11 that they were part of what's carried on an Underground  
12 train, but I've never seen them.

13 Q. All right, they weren't Fire Brigade ladders?

14 A. They weren't Fire Brigade ladders, sir, no.

15 Q. In your statement you describe how the first severely  
16 injured person you saw was a woman lying across another  
17 woman's lap?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. She was being looked after by a member of the public?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Probably an off-duty doctor called Dr Quaghebeur, or was  
22 it a man?

23 A. It was a male.

24 Q. Did you ever catch his name?

25 A. No, but we did -- I remember there being quite a lot of



1 conversation backwards and forwards between us. As we  
2 entered the carriage, we wanted to know as much  
3 information as possible, so, as he had been tending to  
4 this lady, I remember asking whether the lady was  
5 conscious, breathing, whether he knew a name, how long  
6 they had been there for, various information that our  
7 training requires from us so that we can start making  
8 that primary assessment of a casualty.

9 Q. We've heard evidence from a gentleman called  
10 Steve Desborough who we assess is the gentleman whom you  
11 spoke to.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. He's told her Ladyship how there was a lady called  
14 Dr Quaghebeur in the train who initially looked after  
15 the young lady who was severely injured and she  
16 described to him what she thought was the nature of her  
17 injuries and he's recounted evidence of how he told the  
18 firefighters who spoke to him what he knew of the young  
19 lady. So it seems that was him.

20 What did you gather about the nature of her injuries  
21 and how severely injured she was?

22 A. From what I gathered, from what I can recall -- and  
23 I appreciate it's a length of time.

24 Q. Of course.

25 A. What I can recall is that she had been breathing and

1 that she had not been conscious, she had been  
2 unconscious since the incident. I can't recall that she  
3 had been moving.

4 Q. Was there not some reference to her trying to speak at  
5 all? Did Mr Desborough, the gentleman, ever tell you  
6 that she had been making some sort of noise or attempt  
7 to speak?

8 A. It may well have been the case. I can't say that he's  
9 lying. It's -- it may well be the case, sir.

10 Q. We've had described to us that she did have an injury to  
11 her neck or throat area. Indeed, we've heard evidence  
12 of a laceration, a deep, open wound to her throat.

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Do you recollect the lady having any kind of injury to  
15 the neck or the throat?

16 A. I don't recollect the actual injury itself, but  
17 I remember there being an injury around that area, but I  
18 don't remember a deep laceration or the size of it or --

19 Q. But you recollect that there was an injury associated  
20 with the throat or the neck to some degree?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. All right. In your statement, you describe how she  
23 passed away soon after you arrived, and we know from  
24 other evidence that she was removed from the carriage on  
25 an improvised stretcher.

1     Could you tell us, please, what you recall of how  
2     she passed away and how you know that she passed away?  
3     A. Right. Following what Firefighter Jones has said, once  
4     the lady was assessed by -- I believe it was  
5     a paramedic. I can only -- I think I can remember that  
6     the individual was wearing green, but I'm not  
7     100 per cent sure. I'm aware that HEMS were wearing an  
8     orange jumpsuit, or that's the practice that I recall.  
9     I seem to recall that this member of the paramedic  
10    team used a device on the lady that -- I don't know what  
11    the device does, but I'm guessing that it measures vital  
12    signs, some sort of wiring pad or affair, I don't know.  
13    Q. Did it have some sort of electrocardial stickers or  
14    plasters that are applied to the chest area?  
15    A. That's correct, but I don't recall it being  
16    a defibrillator, but again, I'm not 100 per cent sure.  
17    At that point, that paramedic instructed us that the  
18    lady was, unfortunately, gone.  
19    Q. Was that the stage at which she was then removed from  
20    the carriage?  
21    A. A short period of time following that, there was  
22    deliberation on where was the safest place for her to be  
23    placed. She's still a person, even though she's  
24    deceased. And the Fire Service --  
25    Q. Would you like a glass of water? Take your time.

1 (Pause).

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's not easy talking about these  
3 things, Mr Osborne. I was going to take a break during  
4 the course of the morning. Would it help if I took that  
5 break now?

6 A. No, it's okay, my Lady.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are you sure?

8 A. The Fire Service prides itself on looking after the  
9 deceased and the living, so we made the decision to  
10 remove her and place her next to the carriage where she  
11 wouldn't be disturbed anymore.

12 MR KEITH: Thank you. Your duties, however, had to continue  
13 and you then moved, I think, to another part of the  
14 carriage, did you not, where you continued carrying out  
15 the priority which was to assess casualties and to get  
16 casualties out of the train as quickly as possible.

17 Did you find yourself, in fact, at the other end of  
18 the carriage or to the rear of the carriage where there  
19 were two ladies and a man who had between them very  
20 severe injuries in the seats area between 15, 16, 17 and  
21 18 on that plan, did you go to that end of the carriage?

22 A. I didn't get to that exact area, sir, no.

23 Q. How far did you go?

24 A. I got to between -- around the area of 14 and 19, sir.

25 Q. Can I ask you about that and I will do so very briefly?

1 A. That's fine, sir.

2 Q. Was it apparent to you that there were a number of dead  
3 people lying in the floor area between 14 and 19?

4 A. Unfortunately, yes, sir.

5 Q. In summary, was it absolutely apparent to you that there  
6 was no movement from any of the people there and they  
7 must surely have been dead?

8 A. I would never assume that someone is dead. I would  
9 always want to make sure that someone has already made  
10 that assessment, and I was aware, by that point, that,  
11 as Firefighter Jones has recently stated, that a member  
12 of the Ambulance Service now -- I don't know whether it  
13 was a doctor or a paramedic, et cetera -- had come from  
14 the end, from D8, through to D6, and because they had  
15 made that -- they had processed through the carriage in  
16 that way, we were -- again, I can't remember  
17 100 per cent, because it's these individual details that  
18 I've forgotten, unfortunately, but I can't believe that  
19 that individual wouldn't have checked on every  
20 individual person as they came through, and I'm sure  
21 that they had stated that they had checked people as  
22 they had come through, because then our primary concern  
23 was to deal with the casualties that the paramedics had  
24 identified to that point, so that we could give them --  
25 get them to definitive care and get them into the

1 operating theatres, et cetera, that they so rightly  
2 needed.

3 Q. You took part in the extremely difficult process of  
4 carrying people along the track --

5 A. Yes, I did, sir.

6 Q. -- on stretchers, sometimes improvised, sometimes not,  
7 and getting them up to ground level?

8 A. I did, sir.

9 Q. Did you do that repeatedly, did you go up and then back  
10 down, and up and back down or --

11 A. I can't remember the amount of times. I can remember  
12 specifically one lady, and you mentioned the name  
13 earlier, but I didn't know her name, it was a lady that  
14 had an injury to her hand.

15 Q. Kira Mason.

16 A. Okay, so that lady. And I remember a laceration in her  
17 leg.

18 Q. It was her left leg.

19 A. I remember that we were particularly careful with her  
20 and, as soon as we got her out to the station entrance,  
21 that I called for what was a HEMS doctor there, and  
22 I know him to be a HEMS doctor because he was in an  
23 orange jumpsuit, and he then took her off. Well, we  
24 placed her on the floor, and he then processed her and  
25 then I returned back down to the carriage and continued.

1 Q. To help with further casualties?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 MR KEITH: Mr Osborne, thank you very much. Will you stay  
4 there, there may be some further questions for you.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

6 MR COLTART: No, thank you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

8 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

9 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Osborne, I will be as brief as I can.  
10 I think I understand what you've been describing, in the  
11 way in which you have, the lady that was on top of  
12 Crystal Main, lying across Crystal Main --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and the action you took in relation to her.  
15 Can I just confirm that you didn't see another lady,  
16 Fiona Stevenson, we know her to be, who was across the  
17 gentleman at seat 21, Bruce Lait?

18 A. I don't recall it, sir, but I may have seen her.

19 Q. We know that, at the initial stages after the explosion,  
20 she was across Mr Lait, and then somebody has moved her  
21 from him, for him to be able to be evacuated from the  
22 carriage. Can we take it that you weren't the person  
23 who did that?

24 A. No, sir. I remember a number of casualties on that  
25 side, sir, the initial side that we entered through,

1 being on people's laps and processing it in my mind and  
2 working out that the unfortunate people that were laying  
3 on people's laps were people that had been affected by  
4 the device, and the people that were indeed sitting down  
5 had been protected by those individuals that had been  
6 blasted onto them.

7 But I don't know specifically -- I don't recall  
8 specifically the person that you're representing, no.

9 MR SAUNDERS: All right, thank you very much, Mr Osborne.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

11 Questions by MS SHEFF

12 MS SHEFF: Yes, just on that last point, so your view from  
13 going into the carriage was that the people who had  
14 unfortunately been deceased were those who were either  
15 standing up or had been blown onto the people who were  
16 now sitting down and fallen on the floor?

17 A. That's what I recall processing in my mind to try and  
18 bring some sort of sense to the situation personally,  
19 ma'am.

20 Q. So it appeared to you the survivors were seated?

21 A. That's correct, at that time.

22 Q. Yes, and that was your assessment, therefore, of how  
23 they'd come to be in the positions they were on the  
24 train?

25 A. That's correct.



1 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much. That's all I have.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

3 MS BOYD: No questions.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anybody else? Mr Taylor?

5 Questions by MS ORMOND-WALSH

6 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Thank you. I am Ms Ormond-Walsh, my Lady,  
7 and I act for the HEMS doctors, Mr Osborne. I would  
8 just like to ask you a question about your recollection  
9 about the HEMS doctors in relation to the lady who was  
10 lying on Crystal.

11 A. Yes, ma'am.

12 Q. I think my understanding of your evidence is that you're  
13 not absolutely sure whether she was confirmed dead by  
14 paramedics --

15 MR KEITH: I'm sorry for rising and interrupting my learned  
16 friend, I think your microphone might be off.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You were asking about the lady who  
18 was lying on Crystal Main.

19 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Yes, the lady who was lying on  
20 Crystal Main, and I act for the HEMS doctors, we have  
21 a HEMS doctor tomorrow who will say he remembers  
22 confirming that person dead in the carriage.

23 A. Right, ma'am.

24 Q. Would that jog your memory in relation to a HEMS doctor  
25 seeing her?

1 A. It wouldn't. I can't remember. As I said earlier,  
2 I can't remember whether that individual was wearing  
3 orange or green.

4 Q. Could it have been that it could have been a paramedic  
5 and a HEMS doctor that had seen her before she was  
6 moved?

7 A. It could have been, ma'am, but I'm not 100 per cent  
8 sure.

9 MS ORMOND-WALSH: All right, thank you very much, thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Ormond-Walsh.

11 Mr Taylor?

12 Questions by MR TAYLOR

13 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Osborne.

14 A. Good morning, sir.

15 Q. I'd like to start with basically about the journey to  
16 Aldgate.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. You probably know more than I do. What are the nearest  
19 fire stations to Aldgate?

20 A. At the time, I actually didn't know. I'd recently  
21 transferred from a different fire and rescue service at  
22 the beginning of that year, but the nearest fire  
23 stations I know now to be Whitechapel and --

24 Q. Whitechapel is just around the corner, isn't it, on the  
25 one-way system, if I remember rightly?

1 A. That's correct, yes, sir.

2 Q. Is there also one on I think it's called  
3 Upper Thames Street?

4 A. There is, yes, where I am based currently, it's called  
5 Dowgate fire station, but everybody would understand  
6 more that it's just practically directly underneath  
7 Cannon Street station.

8 Q. That's correct. That's a lot closer than Southwark,  
9 isn't it?

10 A. It is closer than Southwark, yes, sir.

11 Q. When you first got to Aldgate, and you entered the  
12 station, were there any other fire officers waiting on  
13 the platform or on the mezzanine floor?

14 A. I don't remember other fire officers being present on  
15 the platform. I remember being down adjacent to the  
16 affected carriage and looking to the distance and seeing  
17 another firefighter dealing with a gentleman that had,  
18 it appeared, no clothes on, where I can only assume the  
19 blast had taken his clothes off, and I remember --  
20 I recall another fire officer being in the carriage, but  
21 I don't recall any fire officers being on the platform.

22 Q. When you actually arrived at Aldgate at ground level,  
23 did you park right outside Aldgate?

24 A. We did, we parked just back from the entrance to the  
25 station where commuters would make their way down.

1 Q. Can you remember how many fire appliances were there?

2 A. I believe there was a fire appliance directly in front  
3 of us and another on the opposite side of the road.

4 Q. At that time, there were no ambulances there?

5 A. I don't recall any ambulances there at that point, sir,  
6 no.

7 Q. Just turning to when Carrie was removed from the train  
8 itself --

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. -- she was taken out on a makeshift stretcher, which was  
11 like a ladder?

12 A. She was, sir.

13 Q. And you were present there, you saw that, did you?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Can you remember -- I may have got this wrong from  
16 reading through all the documents that we've read  
17 through -- can you remember if her arm actually fell  
18 from the stretcher and it --

19 A. The -- I apologise for this now, but the overriding two  
20 things that I remember from your daughter was that, one,  
21 her neck fell back as initially the stretcher was -- as  
22 the short extension ladder was lifted up, so the short  
23 extension ladder was placed back down and she was moved  
24 so that her head was protected, so that it didn't  
25 just -- so that we were still caring for her, and I also

1 remember that she had a severe laceration to one of her  
2 legs, but I don't remember her arm flopping down.

3 Q. Was she covered at the time? Did she have a blanket or  
4 something over her?

5 A. She had a blanket over her, yes, that's correct.

6 Q. At that time, when she was taken off, the paramedics and  
7 the HEMS doctors were still in the carriage?

8 A. They were in the carriage. When we were taking her off,  
9 they had already made their assessment of her.

10 Q. There were other people still on the carriage? Like,  
11 was Martine still left on the carriage?

12 A. I can't recall that, sir. I remember us trying to --  
13 there was a small number of us because of the size of  
14 the carriage, you didn't need lots of people in there  
15 because you wouldn't have been able to move, but we were  
16 trying to give care to people and also trying to get  
17 people out of the carriage that weren't affected so that  
18 we could space-create, get more space so that we could  
19 then tend to the casualties that were still on the  
20 affected carriage.

21 Q. Finally, while you were there, were you aware that there  
22 could have been a secondary device or possible chemical  
23 or biological device?

24 A. I was, sir. I recall a senior officer that was standing  
25 back on the opposite lines telling us that there were

1 other incidents going on around in the capital city and  
2 I remember him saying that there could be secondary  
3 devices and that, if people wanted, they could -- if  
4 they were concerned about that, they could retreat from  
5 the scene of operations and that there would be no harm  
6 in that, you know, they wouldn't be told off for that,  
7 but I remember everybody stayed present and carried on.

8 Q. Just finally, how did you know that the power was off  
9 when you went down?

10 A. It was only purely from seeing the members of the public  
11 walking in the opposite direction. I hadn't had it  
12 confirmed by any individual person from another  
13 authority.

14 MR TAYLOR: Just to say I thank you very much for what you  
15 did for my daughter.

16 A. Thank you, sir.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any more  
18 questions for Mr Osborne?

19 Mr Osborne, thank you, too, for doing your job so  
20 calmly and so bravely in those dreadful conditions and  
21 for staying when you didn't have to.

22 We'll take a break now for 15 minutes, please.

23 (11.42 am)

24 (A short break)

25 (11.55 am)

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

2 MR KEITH: My Lady, Kevin Richards, please.

3 MR KEVIN JAMES RICHARDS (sworn)

4 Questions by MR KEITH

5 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

6 A. Kevin James Richards.

7 Q. Mr Richards, in July 2005, you were assigned to

8 Bethnal Green. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. On 7 July, you were crewed with an appliance

11 Foxtrot 261 --

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. -- together with Sub-officer Robinson, who was the

14 firefighter or the officer in charge, and I think

15 Fireman Kirby, Fireman Munro and Fireman Walker?

16 A. That's right, sir.

17 Q. Could we have [LFB17-1] on the screen , please? You were

18 committed at 2 minutes past 9.

19 If you could go over the page, please, to the top

20 and enlarge, there was a split attendance because three

21 appliances were sent to Aldgate, but in relation to

22 Foxtrot 261, it says:

23 "Foxtrot 261 proceed to Liverpool Street station

24 London Underground, Liverpool Street, City, EC2."

25 A. Mm-hmm.

1 Q. Did you go to Liverpool Street --

2 A. No, sir --

3 Q. -- or did you end up at Aldgate?

4 A. -- straight to Aldgate.

5 Q. Is that because you were redirected on the way?

6 A. No, sir.

7 Q. You were sent straight there?

8 A. I didn't see the slip. I was sitting in the back, the

9 officer in charge was in the front and he would have had

10 the slip.

11 Q. So you just don't know --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- whether it was a redirection or whether you were

14 always going to go to Aldgate?

15 A. I think it was probably a mistake.

16 Q. All right. On arrival, you were able to see members of

17 the public coming out from the station --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- plainly injured. Was there some discussion as to

20 whether or not radiation --

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. -- was an issue that had to be considered?

23 A. Yes, sir, the leading firefighter from Whitechapel red

24 watch, he advised me to make sure all the crew were

25 carrying their EPDs.



1 Q. What are EPDs?

2 A. Electrical personal dosimeters. It gives a reading of  
3 radiation.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Electrical?

5 A. Personal dosimeters.

6 MR KEITH: D-O-S-I-M-E-T-E-R-S. Presumably, that only took  
7 a matter of seconds to put on?

8 A. That's right, sir.

9 Q. Did you keep them on or did there come a time when that  
10 concern dissipated and you didn't have to wear them  
11 after all?

12 A. No, we just kept them on, they were in our pockets.

13 Q. I think you collected them and handed them out?

14 A. That's right, sir.

15 Q. Then was further information received that suggested  
16 that you might need cutting gear?

17 A. Yes, sir, yes.

18 Q. Where did that information come from?

19 A. From a sub-officer on the stairs.

20 Q. Would that have been Sub-Officer Clarke, do you know?

21 A. I don't know, sir, I don't know if it was Mr Clarke.

22 Q. At any rate, you were told that you would need cutting  
23 equipment?

24 A. Mm-hmm.

25 Q. Did that, therefore, require you to go to the appliance

1 and take off the sled that contains the cutting  
2 equipment and the associated generator?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And carry it to where?

5 A. Into the station. Three of the crew, the other three  
6 firefighters, were actually treating an injured female,  
7 one of the first walking wounded, so I collected the  
8 dosimeters, then collected the crew when we went to the  
9 RTA gear.

10 Q. Where did you put the cutting equipment?

11 A. We carried it into the station and I can't recollect the  
12 exact location where we left it, but we left it because  
13 a firefighter that was being a runner come running past  
14 and he said "You probably won't need that or, if you do,  
15 you'll need it on the track", so --

16 Q. So you put it down?

17 A. We put it down.

18 Q. Did it take a while for the -- how long did it take for  
19 the cutting equipment to be taken off the appliance and  
20 for you to take it into the station and then find out  
21 that you didn't need it?

22 A. Four minutes, start to finish.

23 Q. Do you think in hindsight that knowing that there had  
24 been an explosion on the train at the moment you  
25 arrived, and knowing that there was no real issue about

1 a dirty bomb or radiation or chemical or biological  
2 concerns, would have impacted materially on the amount  
3 of time it took for you to get down to the track once  
4 you'd been told to go down?

5 A. No, not really, sir.

6 Q. You then, I think, started preparing a forward dump,  
7 that is bringing equipment downstairs, down to the  
8 platform level and putting it on to the platform?

9 A. Yes, that's what we started to do, and then another  
10 firefighter said it won't be needed.

11 Q. Did you see another crew on the platform whilst you  
12 started to prepare your forward dump and before you were  
13 told it wouldn't be needed?

14 A. At the same time, probably, sir.

15 Q. What were they doing?

16 A. They were standing at the edge at the end of the  
17 platform leading to the track and they, I believe, were  
18 a crew from Dockhead.

19 Q. Did it appear to you that they were waiting for  
20 something?

21 A. Yes, sir, I spoke to their leading firefighters, the  
22 same rank as myself, and he said that there's -- they  
23 believed there are secondary devices, and "We've been  
24 told to hold back".

25 Q. He made specific reference to secondary devices, he

1 wasn't holding back, it seemed to you, because of  
2 waiting for confirmation that the power was off?  
3 A. No, I did say to him "Is the power off?", and he said  
4 "Yes, but it's the secondary devices that are the  
5 issue", but then there was a -- quite a large number of  
6 members of the public that started to vacate the track  
7 area on to the platform.

8 Q. Did they stay there or did they move on?

9 A. No, they moved to leave the station. The Dockhead  
10 stayed there.

11 Q. The Dockhead?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you, however, go on into the tunnel?

14 A. Yes, sir, I risk assessed it and checked with the crew  
15 and we was up for going towards the carriage.

16 Q. When you got to the train, and to the second carriage,  
17 do you recall whether other members of London Fire  
18 Brigade were already there?

19 A. Yes, sir, I remember seeing some Shadwell personnel on  
20 the track and I remember seeing Mr Curnick in the  
21 doorway of the carriage.

22 Q. When you arrived, was the first thing that you did to  
23 help a severely injured lady off the carriage?

24 A. That's right, sir, we was passed by other firefighters.

25 Q. Could you please look at the screen at [INQ10280-9] and

1 tell us which doorway that severely injured lady was  
2 brought out through?

3 A. It's either D6 or D4. It's one of those, I'm not sure,  
4 sir. I can't be precise.

5 Q. Do you recall anything about that lady?

6 A. Yes, we were going to try to put her on a ladder at one  
7 point, but I asked her if she was able to walk and she  
8 said that she was, so I passed her to Whitechapel's crew  
9 and myself and Firefighter Munro went back to the  
10 carriage.

11 Q. Was there any kind of ladder which allowed firefighters  
12 to get up into the carriage by this stage?

13 A. I don't remember a ladder, but Firefighter Kirby,  
14 another one of our crew, had arrived with a three-piece  
15 extension ladder at around about this point, then  
16 I informed Mr Curnick that we would make a second entry  
17 into the next carriage, which is probably number 3  
18 carriage, is it?

19 Q. It is, the third carriage. How did you get into the  
20 third carriage?

21 A. We split the three-piece and put a section up to the  
22 broken window and climbed into the window.

23 Q. Presumably there was broken glass and sharp metal in the  
24 window?

25 A. Yes, sir, broken glass, I don't remember any --

1 Q. But you managed to crawl through that window opening --

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. -- by going up the ladder and then getting down the

4 other side?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Then how did you get through into the second carriage?

7 A. The door was open, because, as we got on to the seats

8 through the window, there was a discarded rucksack that

9 was on the seat in front, and I immediately became

10 concerned because of the secondary devices, but when

11 I went into the carriage where the explosion had

12 occurred, there was an off-duty WPC and I ascertained

13 from her that it was her bag.

14 Q. That was Elizabeth Kenworthy, we know, and was she

15 helping severely injured passengers at the end of

16 carriage 2, at the rear of the carriage?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Do you remember seeing an off-duty City of London Police

19 sergeant?

20 A. I remember seeing a male, but I don't know what police

21 force he was from.

22 Q. Where was he?

23 A. He was with the WPC.

24 Q. At the end of the carriage. Did you have

25 a conversation, or did you speak to Ms Kenworthy, the

1 off-duty WPC?

2 A. Yes, I still didn't know she was an off-duty PC and  
3 I thanked her for what she had done and advised her to  
4 leave the carriage.

5 Q. Did she?

6 A. Yes, sir, she did. I offered to take her back in  
7 because we had an injured person laying in the doorway,  
8 and the damage and the debris that was in -- is it D8?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. D8. I offered to take her back and put her through the  
11 window and down, but she declined and made her way off  
12 the train.

13 Q. I'll come back to who was in the doorway and who was  
14 severely injured there. But dealing with the people  
15 right at the end of the carriage, do you recall that  
16 there was a lady in the vicinity of seats 15 and 16 with  
17 a serious hand injury?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And opposite her -- that is to say to your right near 17  
20 and 18 -- there was a man and a woman leaning against  
21 each other?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Andrew Brown, Martine Wright. They both had very  
24 serious leg injuries, did they not?

25 A. Yes, they did, but Martine, we believed, when I spoke to

1 her and tried to just talk to her and comfort her, she  
2 said that it was her guts, she put her hand to her  
3 stomach, and brought up some blood, and she said it was  
4 her guts, and I tried to talk to her to reassure her and  
5 she said "I can't hear you", and she started to shout,  
6 she said "You'll have to shout, I can't hear you". So  
7 I said "Okay". And then the WPC had informed me that  
8 she'd placed a tourniquet on the injured lady's leg.

9 Q. Could you see that tourniquet?

10 A. No. I could when I moved to try to check, because I'd  
11 monitored -- clarified there was no stomach injury,  
12 because she thought it was her guts.

13 Q. Was that when you were able to see the tourniquet?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you stay with the man and the woman who were leaning  
16 against each other, or did you go elsewhere in the  
17 carriage?

18 A. I went across to help my colleague, Firefighter Walker,  
19 who was with the female in seat 15.

20 Q. With a hand injury?

21 A. And the leg injury.

22 Q. And the leg injury.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then what did you do?

25 A. I looked across and saw, I think, Mr Ellery in the



1 doorway.

2 Q. Now, I want to ask you about him. Can you tell from the  
3 map whereabouts he was?

4 A. Yes, he was probably in line with number 11, the line  
5 that goes up.

6 Q. What state was he in?

7 A. He was laying on his side, he had priority 1 on his  
8 chest, and --

9 Q. Just to explain that, what did you understand the  
10 priority 1 label to mean?

11 A. That he was the first priority to get off.

12 Q. Who would have put that there?

13 A. I don't know, sir. That was there when --

14 Q. You didn't put it there?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Did the Fire Brigade firefighters that you were crewed  
17 with carry these sorts of cards?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. So you must have presumed a paramedic of some sort had  
20 placed it there?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What was he doing?

23 A. He was just laying on the floor, he was -- he wasn't  
24 throwing his arms -- I put, I think, in my statement  
25 that he was throwing -- but he was moving his arm and he

1 was blinking, and I said to Mr Curnick, "Is he being  
2 dealt with?", and he said, "Yes, we're waiting for  
3 stretcher".

4 Q. Was anybody tending to him at that moment?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you see the stretcher arrive?

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. Did you see any paramedic return and give him medical  
9 assistance?

10 A. No, sir, I don't know about anybody returning, but we  
11 had a paramedic that arrived and I got him up through  
12 the ladder in through our window.

13 Q. You got him back through the same window in the third  
14 carriage that you had entered?

15 A. Yes, sir. Because he -- I don't think he could make it  
16 through the double doors of --

17 Q. Because of the debris, the devastation and the hole left  
18 by the bomb?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. So he went up the ladder and in carriage 3 through the  
21 broken window and through the interconnecting door?

22 A. Yes, sir. I placed my tunic across the broken glass  
23 because he was a little concerned about the glass.

24 Q. Where did he go once he entered the carriage?

25 A. I introduced myself and said that we would work to his

1 rules and his orders, he would take charge, and we'd do  
2 what he wanted.

3 Q. What did he do, who was the first person that he  
4 assessed?

5 A. I'm not sure, to be honest, sir, which one was first.  
6 I think he went round to all three.

7 Q. That's the three people round 15, 16, 17 and 18?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. What about the man, Mr Ellery, in the double door area?

10 A. I don't know if he -- he may have checked him, but I  
11 don't remember seeing him checking him.

12 Q. Did the paramedic stay with you?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. What was he doing? Just give us a bit more detail about  
15 who, in particular, he was --

16 A. He was with our three casualties, I think he was  
17 assessing their situation and their wounds.

18 Q. So Mr Ellery, you understood from your fellow  
19 firefighter that he was waiting for a stretcher?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He had a priority 1, but did you see any medical  
22 technicians go back to him and --

23 A. No, sir.

24 Q. -- see what could be done for him?

25 A. No, sir. I don't recollect that. I don't know whether

1 in the time it had taken for the paramedic to arrive  
2 and -- Mr Ellery had stopped blinking and was not  
3 moving.

4 Q. You don't know, or you think he did?

5 A. I think it happened in the gap, in the time that  
6 elapsed.

7 Q. Certainly in your statement, you say prior to the HEMS  
8 doctor arriving, the man with the sign on his chest  
9 appeared to pass away. Was that because you recall  
10 a specific HEMS doctor arriving a little later, after  
11 the paramedic?

12 A. No, at some time, I did -- I shouted across to the guy  
13 on the floor, "It won't be long, we'll get you off in  
14 a minute", just to reassure him, and then, when  
15 I checked again --

16 Q. Did he respond at all to that?

17 A. No. When I checked again, he was just staring.

18 Q. By checking, you mean, when you looked across, you could  
19 see he was staring?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So his eyes were still?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was that before or after the paramedic had arrived  
24 through the interconnecting door?

25 A. I can't recall, sir.

1 Q. Do you recall specifically a subsequent medical  
2 technician arriving, a HEMS doctor?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. How long after did he appear?

5 A. It didn't seem that the paramedic was there that long  
6 before the HEMS doctor arrived, and then the HEMS doctor  
7 took over.

8 Q. Where did the HEMS doctor go?

9 A. He came down to assess our three casualties, and he  
10 prioritised who went off first.

11 Q. What about Mr Ellery?

12 A. I don't know whether he had been assessed by then.

13 Q. Is it possible that the HEMS doctor had assessed him  
14 prior to coming to you and your three casualties?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. You don't know, your first recollection is of the HEMS  
17 doctor appearing in your midst --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- so you don't know whether he was seen beforehand?

20 A. No, he could have seen Mr Ellery and I missed that. We  
21 were treating -- we were trying to keep the lady in  
22 seat 15 leg elevated, she had it on some damaged train  
23 bodywork and we tried to elevate it up there because she  
24 kept sliding it off.

25 Q. Did you stay with her until she was removed?

1 A. All three, we stayed with.

2 Q. Did you assist in carrying them out of the carriage and  
3 up to the ground level?

4 A. No, sir. We passed them to the doorway and they were  
5 taken from another crew.

6 Q. Did you stay until they were all removed?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Do you recall Mr Ellery being removed at any time?

9 A. No, sir. I think he was --

10 Q. You don't know when he was?

11 A. No, sir. The doctor, the HEMS doctor, was the last one  
12 in the carriage, and he ordered everyone off the train  
13 for certification to take place, I believe.

14 Q. Do you recall at any stage either the paramedic or  
15 a HEMS doctor or anybody else applying any kind of  
16 oxygen mask or --

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. -- resuscitator to Mr Ellery?

19 A. No, sir.

20 MR KEITH: All right. Thank you very much indeed. Will you  
21 stay there? There may be some further questions for  
22 you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

24 Questions by MR COLTART

25 MR COLTART: Very briefly, Mr Richards, if I may. You

1 mentioned that Mr Curnick had said that a stretcher was  
2 awaited, as far as Mr Ellery was concerned. Was that  
3 the first discussion you'd had with Mr Curnick about  
4 Mr Ellery? Was that as soon as you got on to the  
5 carriage, in other words?

6 A. Yes, it was pretty soon as we entered.

7 Q. Did Mr Curnick give any indication as to how long he had  
8 been waiting at that stage for a stretcher to arrive?

9 A. No, sir.

10 Q. Was it apparent from that or any subsequent discussion  
11 you had with him whether he had been waiting for a long  
12 time; in other words, was there a sense of urgency about  
13 the situation?

14 A. There was a sense of frustration because we was asking  
15 for extra first aid equipment to treat the people and it  
16 didn't seem to be coming down.

17 Q. What attempts were being made to obtain this extra first  
18 aid equipment?

19 A. Well, because we were on the train, I was using the  
20 chain of command to Mr Curnick and he was telling people  
21 on trackside to become runners, if you like, to try and  
22 get the gear down.

23 Q. Other than first aid equipment and stretchers, was there  
24 any discussion about any other equipment which might be  
25 needed, oxygen for example?

1 A. No, sir, not from my crew.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What kind of first aid equipment did  
3 you want, Mr Richards?

4 A. Bandages, anything to dress the wounds with. But then,  
5 after we had requested the extra first aid equipment,  
6 ma'am, the paramedic had arrived.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you actually ask for more  
8 stretchers? I think Mr Coltart said you asked for first  
9 aid equipment and stretchers, did you ask --

10 A. No, I didn't ask for stretchers, ma'am. Mr Curnick was  
11 waiting for the stretcher to remove Mr Ellery.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

13 MR COLTART: Were you conscious of those requests for  
14 further stretchers being made?

15 A. No, sir, because I was in situ on the train, so --

16 Q. I just want to try to get the chronology straight in my  
17 mind, if I may. When you first entered the carriage  
18 through the rear door at the back of carriage number 2,  
19 were you aware of other paramedic -- or paramedics,  
20 sorry, being on the train at that point?

21 A. No, sir. I thought the first paramedic was the one  
22 I got through the window.

23 Q. When you first saw or were conscious of Mr Ellery, did  
24 he already have the priority sign around his neck?

25 A. Yes.



1 Q. But I think you've told us that that's not something  
2 which the London Fire Brigade would ordinarily carry.

3 A. No.

4 Q. So it's possible, in fairness, is it, that there had at  
5 least been another paramedic on the carriage at some  
6 point before you arrived?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Did you see Mr Ellery quite quickly, were you conscious  
9 of him quite quickly after your arrival into that  
10 carriage?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Coltart. Mr Saunders?

14 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

16 Questions by MS SHEFF

17 MS SHEFF: Just the same point, really, please, Mr Richards.

18 Can we have the plan back up, please, [INQ10280-9]?

19 You've told us about the bodies that were in the centre  
20 of the seats between 14 to 11 and 19 to 22, and you  
21 remembered the paramedic going to all three of those.

22 Do you remember him assessing them?

23 A. No ma'am, the paramedic was treating the casualties in  
24 seats 15, 16, 17 and 18 with my crew.

25 Q. Sorry, my mistake. Did you see anybody assessing those

1 casualties?

2 A. No. No, ma'am.

3 Q. You've been asked about Mr Ellery, at number 11 you put  
4 him. I represent the family of Mr Lee Baisden, whom  
5 you'll see marked as number 6 just by double doors D7.

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, ma'am.

8 Q. You were asked if you saw anybody else in that area  
9 being assessed, and you said you didn't.

10 A. No, ma'am.

11 Q. I just wanted to clarify what you just said in response  
12 to Mr Coltart, because you at first thought that the  
13 paramedic who assessed the people around the 16 to 18  
14 area was the first on, the one you helped climb in using  
15 your jacket. But there may well have been, you now  
16 think, somebody else on the train earlier who could have  
17 been assessing and handing out priority cards and also  
18 checking for vital signs?

19 A. Yes, ma'am.

20 Q. You wouldn't necessarily have noted that because your  
21 attention was diverted to the other casualties you were  
22 attempting to assist?

23 A. That's right, ma'am. When we passed the double doors  
24 D8, I think Mr Ellery already had the priority 1 while  
25 we was trackside already on his chest. So it had

1 happened before we got on the train.

2 MS SHEFF: Yes, thank you very much.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd? Any other questions?

4 There are no other questions for you, Mr Richards,  
5 it seems. Thank you very much for everything you did.

6 You and your crew showed the kind of courage and  
7 determination that we've come to expect from the  
8 Fire Brigade.

9 A. Thank you, ma'am.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 MR KEITH: Mr Hay will call the next witness.

12 MR HAY: My Lady, may I first read the statements of  
13 Liam Brown, the first is dated 2 February 2006 and the  
14 second is dated 27 October of this year, both have the  
15 usual declaration of truth.

16 Statements of MR LIAM STUART BROWN read

17 "I am based at Southwark fire station and have been  
18 a firefighter for two years now. I have been on blue  
19 watch at Southwark since I left training school. On  
20 7 July 2005, I arrived at work early at around 7.00 am  
21 to be ready for the 9.00 am start of the shift. I was  
22 on appliance E331 with Crew Manager Lewis Turner, Watch  
23 Manager Chris Harris, Firefighter Sean Jones and  
24 Firefighter Paul Osborne.

25 "It was about two or three minutes past 9.00 am when

1 the station bells went. I was downstairs and looked at  
2 the printer and saw the call was to smoke issuing from  
3 tunnel. We made our way to Aldgate Underground station  
4 and, on arrival, I was asked to rig in my breathing  
5 apparatus by Sub-Officer Harris as a crew of four with  
6 the others on the appliance.

7 "About a couple of minutes later, we were all  
8 instructed by Station Officer Spier to go down into the  
9 tunnel with him to assess the situation. As we walked  
10 in the front doors of the station, to my right-hand side  
11 there was a first aid area which had been set up by  
12 firefighters who had arrived earlier. I do not recall  
13 seeing ambulance crews at this point. There was  
14 a steady roll of casualties walking out being assisted  
15 by firefighters.

16 "The people were very quiet and their faces and  
17 clothes were covered in soot. Some had severe cuts to  
18 their hands, arms and faces and were bleeding badly.  
19 I thought maybe they were glass cuts and that a train  
20 had crashed and there was a fire possibly.

21 "I continued with the others to the platform where  
22 we were met by another officer and we were informed that  
23 there had been an explosion on one of the Tubes. As  
24 I looked down the tunnel, I could see red lights on the  
25 back of the carriage. We continued to walk towards

1 a visibly exploded carriage, it was the fourth or fifth  
2 carriage from the rear and the whole side of the  
3 carriage was ripped away and you could see the metal was  
4 ripped. The worst area seemed to be at the doors.  
5 "There were wounded people being brought past us by  
6 other firefighters, they were walking and had similar  
7 injuries to those I had seen upstairs, blackened faces  
8 with cuts to hands and faces, and were all very quiet.  
9 "I boarded the carriage with Watch Manager Harris,  
10 Crew Manager Turner and Firefighter Jones and assisted  
11 the paramedics with the removal of casualties.  
12 "I remember helping one young girl by the door. She  
13 had been lying across a person and had her clothes blown  
14 off. Her pelvis was crushed against the handrail.  
15 Crew Manager Turner said we had to lift her off the  
16 passenger, as the passenger was getting a bit anxious  
17 with the body on top of her. I lifted her legs and we  
18 put it on a short bit of ladder which was a makeshift  
19 stretcher. Her foot was hanging off, held on by  
20 tendons. We handed her down to firefighters outside who  
21 put her down besides the train as she was dead.  
22 "I continued to assist, wherever required, the  
23 walking wounded, helping them out of the carriage, and  
24 also the severely wounded, people missing legs,  
25 et cetera. I remember a young lad, a white boy, with

1 a blue T-shirt on, 14 years' old and blond hair. He was  
2 lying in the carriage and was underneath one of the  
3 carriage doors. I lifted the door and asked a paramedic  
4 to check him. He put a machine on him but he was dead  
5 and there was no pulse from his hand.

6 "At this point, Firefighter Jones asked me to go to  
7 the first aid area at the entrance and collect  
8 a resuscitator, a laerdal resus unit for the paramedics.  
9 I collected this and gave it to Firefighter Jones when  
10 I got back to the train. I continued assisting as  
11 required until all live casualties had been removed from  
12 the carriage, then we were instructed to leave the  
13 carriage as it was now a crime scene."

14 My Lady, turning to Mr Brown's second statement  
15 which reads as follows:

16 "I am currently based at Deptford fire station,  
17 although I was based at Southwark in 2005. I have been  
18 a firefighter for six years. Whilst it is difficult to  
19 recollect timings accurately, I believe that we arrived  
20 at Aldgate station within 10 minutes after leaving the  
21 fire station. Once we arrived at Aldgate, we were told  
22 to rig in breathing apparatus, which we did. Once we  
23 had done so, we were instructed by Station Officer Spier  
24 to go down into the tunnel. I think that we would have  
25 entered into the station no more than 5 minutes after

1 arriving at the station.

2 "We went down on to the platform and then straight  
3 on to the track and into the tunnel. When we arrived at  
4 the carriage, I placed a piece of short extension ladder  
5 against the train and entered the carriage. As I have  
6 described in my previous statement, I recall helping  
7 a young girl by the door who was lying across a person  
8 and who had her clothes blown off. I assisted in  
9 lifting her off the train, handing her down to  
10 firefighters on the track.

11 "Again, whilst it is difficult to recollect timings  
12 with any certainty, I believe that from entering the  
13 station to passing the girl out of the carriage was  
14 approximately 15 to 20 minutes. It was straight after  
15 that that I saw who I believed to be a young boy wearing  
16 a blue T-shirt under one of the carriage doors. I think  
17 there must have been a paramedic in the carriage at this  
18 stage, as I asked a paramedic to check the boy's pulse.  
19 As I said in my previous statement, the paramedic put  
20 a machine on him, but was not able to detect a pulse.  
21 I recall seeing the boy very soon after lifting the girl  
22 off the train, therefore. I believe it must also have  
23 been about 15 or 20 minutes after entering the station  
24 that I asked the paramedic to check his pulse."

25 My Lady, the next --

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, Mr Hay, just before you go on,  
2 I don't seem to have a copy of that second statement.  
3 MR HAY: I'll ensure that's made available to you.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. I have  
5 a handwritten note and I have a report headed "The  
6 London Fire Brigade", but I don't have the second  
7 statement.  
8 MR HAY: It arrived at the end of last week, and it may be  
9 why it's not made its way to you.  
10 MR KEITH: Can I hand up this copy?  
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. (Handed).  
12 MR HAY: My Lady, the next statement I propose to read is  
13 that of Mark Spier dated 3 November 2005 which also has  
14 the usual declaration of truth.  
15 Statement of MR MARK SPIER read  
16 "I am employed by London Fire Brigade as a Watch  
17 Manager at their Old Kent Road London fire station. On  
18 Thursday, 7 July 2005 I was on duty on the day shift,  
19 which commenced at 9.00 and I was crewed on appliance  
20 E351. I was officer in charge of the appliance. E351  
21 is a pump ladder appliance. About 09.10 that day, we,  
22 as a crew, and with our appliance, were ordered to  
23 attend Aldgate London Underground station following the  
24 report of a major incident. We mobilised immediately  
25 and attended that location. We parked immediately



1 outside the Tube station and, as we arrived, so did the  
2 Southwark appliance. We parked behind theirs.  
3 "On arrival at the Tube station, we were met with  
4 a scene of injured people leaving the front of the  
5 station. I spoke to the officer in charge of F33, which  
6 is the appliance from Whitechapel, who informed me that  
7 there had been a possible explosion on a train  
8 approximately 100 metres from the platform towards  
9 Liverpool Street. He told me some crews had been  
10 committed to the train but he did not know the extent of  
11 the damage or number of casualties.  
12 "I told him that I would proceed to the train with  
13 a crew from the Southwark appliance E33 and make an  
14 assessment as to the scale of the incident. As we  
15 walked to the train, we were passed by many walking  
16 wounded leaving the train, passing us to safety. At the  
17 site of the blast in the second carriage from the front  
18 of the train, four or five firefighters were tending to  
19 casualties and two paramedics and a plainclothes  
20 policeman. There was extensive damage to the carriage,  
21 the atmosphere was quite clear and there was enough  
22 light to see reasonably clearly. I could see there were  
23 three obvious fatalities and several people with serious  
24 injuries. One body was on the track and was being  
25 attended by London Underground staff. I spoke to a crew

1 commander in the carriage and asked him to give me  
2 a brief assessment of the number of casualties involved.  
3 I then relayed to the message back to the surface by  
4 means of personal radio, which roughly read:  
5 'Six-carriage train, explosion in the second carriage,  
6 six casualties trapped, three apparently dead'.  
7 "I then sent a request for first aid equipment and  
8 short extension ladders to assist with access and to use  
9 as improvised stretchers. I was subsequently nominated  
10 as forward control officer and tried to maintain  
11 communication with the surface, although the signal was  
12 intermittent.  
13 "As the equipment arrived, I used those firefighters  
14 bringing the equipment to assist passengers leaving the  
15 train to the surface. This helped keep the number of  
16 firefighters in the tunnel to a minimum. I was  
17 conspicuous because I was the only firefighter there  
18 with a white helmet and did get asked questions and  
19 subsequently directed firefighters at the scene and gave  
20 instructions as to the manoeuvring of equipment and  
21 casualties.  
22 "I was subsequently relieved by Assistant Divisional  
23 Officer Station Manager Kent and, having briefed him of  
24 the situation, I assisted in the removal of the  
25 remaining live casualties. When the last live casualty

1 had been removed, carried out by Station Officer Magyar  
2 and myself, we were ordered to leave the tunnel and  
3 stood down. This had been the instruction for when the  
4 last casualty left. At no time did I get on to the  
5 train, but I did lean in through the main set of double  
6 doors at the nearest point in the carriage to the site  
7 of the actual explosion in the second carriage.  
8 "It was obvious to me from the damage and the  
9 injuries suffered that this was caused by a blast and  
10 not a collision."  
11 My Lady, may I now invite to you call Lewis Turner?  
12 MR LEWIS RAYMOND TURNER (sworn)  
13 Questions by MR HAY  
14 MR HAY: Can you give your full name to the court, please?  
15 A. Lewis Raymond Turner.  
16 Q. Mr Turner, on 7 July 2005, you were based at Southwark  
17 fire station?  
18 A. That's right.  
19 Q. On that day, you were the temporary crew manager on  
20 appliance E331?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. We know on that appliance was yourself,  
23 Sub-Officer Harris and Firefighters Osborne, Brown and  
24 Jones.  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Mr Turner, we've tried to establish the arrival time of  
2 your appliance at Aldgate, and I was wondering if you  
3 may be able to help us with that. I'm not sure whether  
4 or not you were in court this morning when the MOBIS  
5 report was on the screen. Were you?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. We know from that that you were mobilised at 09.02, just  
8 after 09.02, and then the MOBIS report said that you  
9 were mobile at 09.08, but it didn't have an arrival  
10 time.

11 Can you help us, first of all, with the mobile time?  
12 How does that actually get recorded? How does the  
13 system know that you're mobile?

14 A. The system knows you're mobile when you -- there's  
15 a button box on the front of the appliance, and you  
16 press to say -- the terminology is status 2, and that  
17 means you're en route to a call.

18 Q. We heard from Mr Osborne that it wouldn't have taken  
19 more than a minute for to you become mobile from once  
20 the call had come through. Does that seem right to you?

21 A. Yes, that does seem right.

22 Q. So if the call came through at 09.02, you would have  
23 been mobile at 09.03, rather than 09.08?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How long do you estimate that it would have taken you to

1 arrive at Aldgate?

2 A. Approximately five minutes.

3 Q. Because what I was wondering was whether or not the  
4 mobile time of 09.08 was more likely to actually be your  
5 arrival time, and someone may have simply pressed the  
6 wrong button or hadn't pressed the button when you were  
7 mobile?

8 A. Yes, that's plausible. I don't know, because I wasn't  
9 sitting on the front of the appliance, so ...

10 Q. But if you left at 09.03, an arrival time of 09.08 would  
11 seem about right?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. Thank you. On arrival at Aldgate, what did you think  
14 had happened?

15 A. On arrival, people exiting the station with blackened  
16 faces, with injuries, and my initial assumption would be  
17 a fire on a Tube train.

18 Q. Were you aware that a major incident had been declared  
19 by the Fire Brigade?

20 A. Before we turned up, no. On arrival, I was quite close  
21 to some of the officers that were in charge at the time  
22 and they said that they were going to initiate major  
23 incident procedure.

24 Q. When was the first time you were aware that there had  
25 been an explosion on the train?

1 A. The first time I was aware there was an explosion on  
2 a train was when I was looking at it.

3 Q. So it's not until you'd gone all the way down. No one  
4 had said anything to you previously?

5 A. No.

6 Q. On arrival at Aldgate, what were you told to do?

7 A. I was told to don my BA set, put our breathing apparatus  
8 on, and be part of a crew that was going to go down and  
9 investigate what had happened.

10 Q. Donning your breathing apparatus, we understand that's  
11 quite a quick procedure, it's literally behind you on  
12 a chair, is that right --

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 Q. -- and you just put your arms through it?

15 In your witness statement dated 2 February 2006, you  
16 say that:

17 "About 3 to 4 minutes after our arrival, the four of  
18 us went down to the platform with  
19 Station Officer Spier."

20 Does that seem about right to you, that 3 or  
21 4 minutes?

22 A. Yes, I mean, it's very difficult to put a time on things  
23 at these type of incidents or any incident, but it would  
24 take approximately that time to report in to the officer  
25 in charge at that time, to have a short discussion about

1 what was going on, what the plan would be, you know,  
2 what we were going to do, and then to get our equipment  
3 necessary and get ourselves together and make our way  
4 down.

5 Q. So if you arrived at about 09.08, you would have made  
6 your way down to the platform about 09.12?

7 A. Something like that, yes.

8 Q. When you were on the platform, did you see people  
9 walking from the tunnel towards the platform?

10 A. Yes, there was a line of people being led by an  
11 official, I believe from the Underground staff, along  
12 the far left-hand wall of the tunnels towards the  
13 platform.

14 Q. From that, was it apparent to you that the traction  
15 current was off?

16 A. There were people at the train, yes, I would assume that  
17 people would not have been walking around the train if  
18 the traction current still would have been on.

19 Q. Did you or any one of your crew ask for confirmation  
20 that traction current was off?

21 A. No -- well, I can't recall one way or the other, I don't  
22 remember asking myself.

23 Q. You then proceeded to make your way to the train. If we  
24 could have up on the screen [INQ10280-9], please, when you  
25 got to the train, were you aware of other emergency

1 responders already on the carriage?

2 A. There were people assisting persons on the train.

3 I recollect there being maybe two or three firefighters

4 or Fire Brigade personnel there. They were the only

5 uniformed people on the scene that I remember.

6 Q. Looking at the carriage plan on the screen, the

7 left-hand side is the rear of the carriage, the

8 right-hand side is the front of the carriage, the X

9 marks the point of approximate detonation.

10 Can you help us with where those firefighters were?

11 A. There was definitely one in that area. There was

12 another firefighter --

13 Q. Sorry, pausing there, one in that area, what do you mean

14 by "that area"?

15 A. Somewhere where that X is, they were with the casualties

16 in that particular point, and then there was definitely

17 another further along where someone was outside the

18 train on the next carriage up.

19 Q. At that point, were you -- before you got there, do you

20 think there were paramedics already there?

21 A. No, I don't recall seeing anyone else there.

22 Q. You were with Mr Jones, is that right?

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. He told us that he boarded through double doors D6. I'm

25 assuming you also did the same, is that correct?



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. At that point, again, doing the best you can with  
3 timings, if you left the platform at about 12 minutes  
4 past 9, roughly what time do you think you got on to the  
5 carriage?

6 A. From leaving the platform to the actual carriage,  
7 approximately a minute.

8 Q. When you got on to the carriage, what did you see?

9 A. Once we were on the carriage, there were people sitting  
10 on the seats between double doors D8 and D6, and on the  
11 other side between D7 and D5. There were casualties  
12 where the X is, where the main explosion took place.  
13 I couldn't describe exact locations of them. I just  
14 remember people being in that blast area.

15 And then there was a guy, a casualty, on the next  
16 carriage up just outside the train near the wheels of  
17 the train.

18 Q. Focusing on the people sitting on seats 21 and 22, were  
19 you aware of a young lady lying across those people?

20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. Can you just describe her to us, please?

22 A. From my memory, a young lady, young, blond,  
23 brownie-coloured hair, fair skin and like  
24 a light-coloured -- a summery dress on.

25 Q. Were you aware of any specific injuries that she had?

1 A. No, no specific injuries, no sort of obvious injuries as  
2 such.  
3 Q. At that point, was she exhibiting any signs of life?  
4 A. No.  
5 Q. Did you or Mr Jones check her vital signs?  
6 A. We called to her to see if we could get a response.  
7 Q. Was there any response?  
8 A. No, no response.  
9 Q. Did you check her vital signs, pulse?  
10 A. We checked her pulse.  
11 Q. Was that on her arm, hand or neck?  
12 A. Neck.  
13 Q. Was there a pulse?  
14 A. No.  
15 Q. Did you do that fairly swiftly after you'd got on to the  
16 carriage?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. So again, I know it's difficult with timings, but this  
19 is going to be around about 9.13 to 9.15 perhaps. Does  
20 that sound about right?  
21 A. Yes, I mean, it's difficult to say precisely, but  
22 everything happens pretty quickly.  
23 Q. I think you then were aware of paramedics on the  
24 carriage, is that right?  
25 A. Yes, it seemed that, at that instant, there was also

1 someone from the LAS, they were green, it was  
2 a gentleman -- a green suit, rather, and he was there at  
3 the same sort of time.

4 Q. What did you ask them to do?

5 A. It was more of a case of the LAS, the gentleman, just  
6 telling us that the lady that we were examining at the  
7 time was, to the best of his knowledge, deceased.

8 Q. That paramedic, did he or she check the lady's vital  
9 signs whilst she was still lying across the people?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. As far as he could tell, she was dead?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was a decision then made to move the lady?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you assist with that?

16 A. I did. We removed the lady so that the casualties  
17 beneath her could then be escorted from the train.

18 Q. Once the lady had been moved, is it correct that she was  
19 laid on the floor of the carriage?

20 A. Initially.

21 Q. Do you recall whether or not, at that point, a paramedic  
22 also checked her for vital signs?

23 A. I can't recall that happening.

24 Q. Do you recall whether or not anyone applied an  
25 electrocardiograph to her or similar equipment?

1 A. I don't remember that.

2 Q. At this point can I just ask you, where were you  
3 standing?

4 A. In the same place that we'd laid the casualty on the  
5 floor, between the seats, between the space in the  
6 carriage between 12 and 11 and 21 and 22, in that sort  
7 of middle bit there.

8 Q. At any point, were you aware of possibly another young  
9 lady around about seats 20 and 21?

10 A. I don't recall moving another casualty. I can't recall  
11 whether there was one on the floor or anywhere. Just  
12 the lady we moved.

13 Q. Do you recall being able to see any other people lying  
14 between the bank of seats 14 to 11 and 19 to 22?

15 A. I don't recall them being -- as your diagram there,  
16 I don't believe them being exactly there. I couldn't  
17 tell you how many, it was an entangled group of people.

18 Q. But you were aware that there were people there?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Was it clear to you that those people were also dead?

21 A. I hadn't examined them, but from looking, if you see, it  
22 wasn't apparent -- signs of life weren't apparent.

23 Q. The young lady which you had moved from seats 21 and 22,  
24 did you then decide to move her out of the carriage?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. How did do that?

2 A. By a short -- part of a short extension ladder. She was

3 laid on the ladder and we removed her from the carriage.

4 Q. At that point, where did you go?

5 A. I got back out of the carriage and went round to the

6 double door D8 and then assisted with removing

7 casualties from that area.

8 Q. Did you look into the carriage through double doors D8?

9 A. I would have looked in, yes.

10 Q. Do you recall seeing anybody lying on the floor in the

11 area of the doorway?

12 A. No, I don't.

13 Q. Do you recall any paramedics being in that area?

14 A. There were people in the area carrying out first aid and

15 assessments, but I don't recall exactly who they were or

16 how many.

17 Q. Then I believe you, as you said, assisted in moving

18 casualties out of the carriage and I think you helped

19 with one particular lady, is that correct?

20 A. Yes, I know she was a female and I know she had a severe

21 wound to her left leg and she was conscious and

22 breathing.

23 Q. I think you then carried her stretcher with

24 Firefighter Osborne, is that right?

25 A. I remember carrying -- I couldn't -- I don't definitely

1 remember that Firefighter Osborne was carrying the  
2 stretcher or who else was there.

3 Q. Then, after that had happened, I think there then became  
4 a concern about secondary devices once you'd left the  
5 tunnels?

6 A. Once we'd left the tunnels, we were -- I was tasked with  
7 providing -- getting a hose down towards where the train  
8 was, and pretty much as soon as I'd finished doing that  
9 task, I was told that we were leaving because of the  
10 possibility of secondary devices.

11 Q. Can I just ask, why was it necessary to get a hose ready  
12 for where the train was at that point?

13 A. As part of our procedures, we lay out an extinguishing  
14 media to cover any eventual fire that may suddenly occur  
15 subsequently.

16 Q. It's preemptive more than anything?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR HAY: Thank you very much. I have no more questions for  
19 you, but others may.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

21 Questions by MR COLTART

22 MR COLTART: Only on that last topic, in fact. Can you  
23 recall which senior officer it was who asked you to lay  
24 out that length of hosepipe at that time?

25 A. No.

1 Q. I'll just see if I can jog your memory. As we  
2 understand it, there were three incident commanders at  
3 Aldgate on that day from the Fire Brigade: Mr Clarke,  
4 followed by Mr Rigby, followed by Mr Smith.

5 Does that assist you as to who it might have been?

6 A. No, it was a senior officer, of above Station Officer or  
7 Watch Manager level, because they had a white helmet on.  
8 But apart from that, I couldn't honestly say who it was.

9 Q. Did you express any concern or reservations at the time  
10 about performing that task at that particular moment in  
11 time?

12 A. No, I knew it was one of our procedural things to do, it  
13 hadn't been done, someone got me to do it, so that  
14 was ...

15 Q. As I understand it, because what you say in your witness  
16 statement is, "I was up and down the stairs several  
17 times with lengths of hose".

18 A. That's right.

19 Q. So it's not just a question of unrolling one length of  
20 hose and taking it down the stairs. That wasn't going  
21 to be long enough, is that right?

22 A. No, that's right. We --

23 Q. So you had to affix several different sections --

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. -- and each time back up and down the stairs to your

1 appliance to get another length of hose?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. How long do you think this took you?

4 A. I'm hazarding a guess, maybe 4, 5 minutes.

5 Q. Were you aware at the time, from discussions with  
6 colleagues who were on the carriage, the bombed  
7 carriage, of the urgent need to get stretchers to that  
8 carriage, to take the critically injured away?

9 A. Once we were on the carriage, we knew we were going to  
10 be removing casualties and, due to the length of travel  
11 from the train to a place of safety, we needed  
12 stretchers to carry those people, yes.

13 Q. But there was a shortage of stretchers, wasn't there?

14 A. At the time, on none of our Fire Brigade appliances did  
15 we carry stretchers, so we made use of what we had.

16 Q. I'm sure, and I want you to understand there's no  
17 criticism of anything which you or any of your  
18 colleagues did, but were they not conveying to you the  
19 urgent need to get further stretchers perhaps from the  
20 paramedics or otherwise down to the affected carriage?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you convey that message to the senior officer who  
23 was asking you instead to perform this procedural  
24 preemptive task?

25 A. At the time -- by the time I had assisted in taking the



1 casualty up to the top, there was lots more equipment  
2 coming down, and I can't specifically recall it, but  
3 I would assume that there would have been -- I remember  
4 extra ladders going down and there was quite a few LAS  
5 at that time with stretchers.

6 Q. So is it that some of your colleagues were performing  
7 the role of runner, as it were --

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. -- in relation to other forms of equipment?  
10 Had you seen, yourself, any sign of fire whilst you  
11 were down in the carriage?

12 A. There was -- other than the initial blast that may have  
13 caused the fireball, I saw no flame and smoke.

14 Q. Not wishing to labour this point, but one final  
15 question: did you convey to the senior officer who asked  
16 you to perform this task that there was no apparent  
17 immediate sign of fire?

18 A. No, I didn't relay that, because it's just one of our  
19 things in case it happens.

20 Q. A purely procedural task that has to be performed?

21 A. In case it happens, yes.

22 MR COLTART: Thank you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

24 MR SAUNDERS: No questions, my Lady.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

1 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

3 MS BOYD: Nothing from me.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Taylor?

5 Questions by MR TAYLOR

6 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Turner.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. I just want to take you back to when you said you saw

9 a young lady laying across, I think it was seats 18 to

10 20. Was she wrapped around a pole?

11 A. I don't recall her exact position to be honest with you,

12 sir.

13 Q. How was she laying across the seat, was she laying face

14 down or face up?

15 A. From the best of my recollection, she was on her side

16 across the persons that were sitting on that seat.

17 Q. This is by the glass partition by doors D8?

18 A. Yes, I don't remember that being there, sir, so --

19 Q. The glass partition had been blown away?

20 A. Possibly.

21 Q. We think -- we possibly think this is Carrie. We think

22 that she was laying across Bruce Lait and Crystal Main

23 and up against the pole. You said, I believe -- I think

24 I might have got this right -- what was she wearing?

25 A. A summery dress, from my recollection, sir.

1 Q. A summery dress. Did you see any injuries on the lady?

2 A. There was nothing obvious. There was no cuts or  
3 anything like that type of injury.

4 Q. Was there any blood present?

5 A. I don't recall seeing any.

6 Q. At that time, did you hear anything from the lady?

7 A. No.

8 Q. While you were in that carriage, at any time, did you  
9 see any paramedic or HEMS doctors try to administer IVs,  
10 intravenous injections?

11 A. No, I don't recall seeing that.

12 Q. Finally, you were there when the young lady was taken  
13 out on a stretcher.

14 A. I was.

15 Q. Did you observe anything fall from the stretcher, an arm  
16 or a leg?

17 A. No.

18 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor.

20 There seem to be no other questions for you,

21 Mr Turner, thank you very much. I hope the bereaved  
22 families gain some comfort from the fact that there were  
23 people like you who tried to get to the scene as quickly  
24 as you possibly could and did everything that you could  
25 while you were there. Thank you very much.

1 A. Thank you.

2 MR HAY: My Lady, there's a little bit of time before the  
3 short adjournment. I don't know whether or not you  
4 would be happy for me to read a couple of additional  
5 statements.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. Thank you, Mr Turner.

7 MR HAY: My Lady, if I may read the statement of Ian Munro,  
8 dated 14 January 2006, which again has the usual  
9 declaration of truth.

10 Statement of MR IAN MUNRO read

11 "I have been a fireman for seven years and I am  
12 based at Bethnal Green fire station on blue watch with  
13 the London Fire Brigade. On 7 July 2005, I was a crew  
14 member on pump ladder appliance assigned the call sign  
15 F261. My role during this tour of duty, which commenced  
16 at 09.00, was that of firefighter.

17 "The other crew members during this tour of duty  
18 were temporary Watch Manager Tyrone Robinson,  
19 Firefighter Jason Kirby, Crew Manager Kevin Richards and  
20 Firefighter Neil Walker.

21 "We had just taken over duty from red watch when we  
22 were deployed via teleprinter message to attend a report  
23 of smoke on Underground at Liverpool Street Underground  
24 station. We mobilised at 09.01, but during our journey  
25 we were redirected to attend at Aldgate Underground

1 station.

2 "Upon our arrival at the Aldgate station, I could  
3 see another London Fire Brigade appliance from  
4 Whitechapel, F332, was also present. However, I do not  
5 recollect seeing any London Ambulance Service crews or  
6 any police at this time.

7 "We immediately disembarked our appliance outside  
8 the station. At this time, I saw several  
9 London Underground Limited staff as well as a number of  
10 members of the public some with injuries, such as cuts  
11 and burns, what I would describe as walking wounded.  
12 I also noted that all these people had blackened faces  
13 and hands which were smoke- and soot-stained. A number  
14 of these people appeared to be suffering the effects of  
15 shock.

16 "I then grabbed one of the first aid kits from the  
17 appliance and started to tend to the passengers who were  
18 outside Aldgate station. I tended to at least six  
19 people, if not more, carrying out basic first aid,  
20 applying dresses to injuries, cuts, burns, et cetera.  
21 I also gave reassurance to those passengers, some of  
22 whom were suffering shock. I also assisted with the  
23 distribution of water.

24 "After about 10 to 15 minutes, I, along with my crew  
25 members, were redirected to start taking cutting

1 equipment and RTA gear down to the platform level where  
2 we were to form an equipment dump.  
3 Crew Manager Richards and I then descended to the  
4 platform level via the stairs where we then assisted  
5 passengers who were walking along the track away from  
6 the train to the platform. These passengers were also  
7 soot-stained, in shock and some with minor injuries or  
8 missing items of clothing. We escorted these passengers  
9 back along the platform to the stairs at street level  
10 where they were assisted further by other emergency  
11 services personnel.  
12 "Kevin and I then entered the tunnel, which was  
13 quite wide, and started to make our way towards the  
14 stationary train some 100 metres into the tunnel. At  
15 this point, I was still unaware as to the nature of this  
16 major incident we were dealing with, nor was I aware of  
17 what was happening at other locations on the  
18 London Transport system. We approached the front of the  
19 train as we walked down the tunnel. At this time,  
20 passengers were walking past me towards Aldgate station  
21 assisted by other LFB crew and LUL staff. As I walked  
22 down the left-hand side of the train, even-numbered  
23 doors D2 to D8, I noticed that there was major  
24 structural damage to the rear of carriage number 2. The  
25 doors at the end of the carriage on the left-hand side

1 had been blown off. I then realised that there had been  
2 some form of explosion on the train which had caused  
3 this damage.

4 "As I got to the door D8, I could see that there  
5 were still passengers in the carriage on which the  
6 explosion had occurred. Myself and a colleague from  
7 Shadwell station then assisted a female casualty from  
8 carriage number 2 via door D8. This passenger was  
9 covered in soot, had numerous injuries and was covered  
10 in blood. Her trousers and top had been shredded in the  
11 explosion. She was also missing her shoes. We gave  
12 this casualty a cross-armed chairlift from the train and  
13 carried her along the trackway to Aldgate station.

14 I was talking to her all the time, however, I cannot now  
15 remember what I said to her or her name. Primarily, my  
16 conversation with her would be of a reassuring nature.  
17 This person was then handed on to LAS crew at street  
18 level.

19 "I then descended back to the platform where  
20 I assisted other LFB crew to evacuate a male casualty  
21 who was naked except for a pair of boxer shorts. Again,  
22 this casualty appeared to be severely injured and was  
23 being carried on a part of a three-piece extension  
24 ladder. I do remember this casualty was quite big and  
25 heavy. It was not easy to evacuate him from the

1 platform to street level. We escorted this casualty  
2 straight to an awaiting ambulance. I returned to the  
3 train and gained entry via a window on carriage number 3  
4 where I joined my crew member Kevin Richards. We made  
5 our way into carriage number 2 where we saw our other  
6 crew member, Neil Walker. On entering carriage number 2  
7 from carriage number 3, I can only describe the scene as  
8 utter carnage. There was a hole in the floor by door  
9 D7, which is where I understand the explosion had  
10 occurred. I believe I was told that it had been a bomb  
11 attack.

12 "There were a number of deceased passengers lying on  
13 the floor along with body fluids, human tissue and  
14 detached limbs strewn about the floor, walls and ceiling  
15 of the carriage. There was also a number of living  
16 casualties, some still in their seats or on the floor.  
17 I think there were three live casualties who had been  
18 prioritised for evacuation. These casualties were in  
19 seats number 17, number 18 and one other passenger lying  
20 on the floor between doors D7 and D8."

21 He then goes on to describe the passengers in seats  
22 number 17 and 18; number 17, my Lady, being  
23 Martine Wright, number 18 being Mr Brown. The passenger  
24 on the floor he describes as follows:

25 "Female on the floor, white female, middle-aged,



1 I think blond or grey hair, wearing trousers and a top.  
2 This passenger also had extensive lower limb injuries.  
3 These three passengers had been prioritised for  
4 evacuation. It was decided to remove them as quickly as  
5 possible owing to their injuries and concerns for any  
6 secondary devices that might have been on the train.  
7 "Along with other LFB crew members, LAS and HEMS  
8 doctors we evacuated these last three remaining live  
9 casualties. Once these three passengers had been  
10 evacuated, the train was classified as a crime scene,  
11 thus we made our way back to street level, abandoning  
12 any equipment that had been used on the train."  
13 My Lady, if I may now read the statement of  
14 Darren Buckley dated 15 January 2006 which again has the  
15 usual statement of truth.  
16 Statement of MR DARREN WAYNE BUCKLEY read  
17 "I am employed by London Fire Brigade at their  
18 8 Wolseley Street, London, SE1 2BP 'Dockhead' fire  
19 station. I consent to this statement being disclosed to  
20 any other agency worldwide actively engaged in the  
21 investigation of terrorism.  
22 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty attached to  
23 the pump ladder appliance call sign E341. Just after  
24 9.00 that morning, we were ordered to attend Aldgate  
25 London Underground station London to report of smoke in

1 the tunnel. Together with the rest of my crew,  
2 Sub-Officer Murray, leading Firefighter Foster,  
3 Firefighter Austen and Firefighter Deuchars, we made our  
4 way to that location with me driving the appliance.  
5 "We arrived at the station. I put on my fire gear  
6 and began by assisting a paramedic with a female  
7 casualty who had burns to her face. There were a number  
8 of people coming out of the station itself, all showing  
9 signs of smoke inhalation with blackened faces and burn  
10 injuries.  
11 "This indicated to me that some sort of fire had  
12 occurred. I basically confronted the lady and put  
13 a water gel burns pack on her injuries. The paramedic  
14 went to obtain further equipment, then returned and  
15 resumed treating her. I then went and recovered some  
16 fire hose from the appliance and was returning into the  
17 station when a male approached me. This male had  
18 a 'blackened' face (through soot - he was a white male).  
19 He was wearing a suit. He did not identify himself to  
20 me. He said 'You won't be needing that, you don't need  
21 water'. I looked at him and said 'What do you mean?'  
22 and he said, 'It's not a fire, that was bomb'. He had  
23 burns to his face to the right-hand side. He told me  
24 that there was worse downstairs in the train. He told  
25 me he had stepped over bodies to get out. I realised it

1 was a major incident affecting a Tube train.  
2 I deposited the reels of hose at the top of the stairs  
3 and I went down to the Tube station platform where  
4 I assisted in escorting walking casualties away from  
5 a stationary Tube train and out of the Tube station to  
6 the open air street level. We recovered a fair number  
7 out to the street and then returned to the train and  
8 assisted in the removal of more seriously injured  
9 casualties on stretchers and makeshift stretchers.  
10 "The task was made difficult by the absence of light  
11 and the fact that we were travelling along an uneven  
12 surface under the tracks. I would say I assisted in  
13 carrying one male and two female casualties. While  
14 outside the station, I assisted putting casualties into  
15 ambulances. I did not actually go on to the affected  
16 train, but I did see it and saw that there was extensive  
17 damage. From the injuries and damage I saw, I could  
18 state that this was consistent with an explosive effect.  
19 "I also laid out a hose from ground level down to  
20 the platform in case of fire. After being removed from  
21 the station eventually, we were stood down and then  
22 returned to our stations after writing a short report.  
23 We were back at our stations around 2.00 pm to 3.00 pm  
24 the same day."  
25 My Lady, that completes all the reads for today.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. 2.00 please.  
2 (1.00 pm)  
3 (The short adjournment)  
4