

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 2 March 2011 - Afternoon session

1 (2.05 pm)

2 MR KEITH: Mr Payton, can we now turn to paragraph 20 of  
3 your statement, LFB99-6?

4 I asked you a little earlier about some of the  
5 measures that were taken that day to address the  
6 incipient emergency. Do you detail there some of the  
7 other steps that were taken? Appliances were moved to  
8 Shoreditch fire station as a forward mobilising point.

9 Is that right?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Is that so they could be available if the need arose?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Restrictions were placed, or moderate restrictions were  
14 placed, on attendances at any call-out, except where  
15 additional resources were specifically requested?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was that to be able to spread the resources and the  
18 appliances a little more thinly to ensure that there  
19 were enough to go round?

20 A. It's basically a common practice that, when we get  
21 a major incident, we will look towards looking for  
22 restricted attendances so that we make sure that we've  
23 got enough appliances for the immediate future within  
24 that area, while in the background we're moving  
25 appliances from outer area and bringing them closer in

1 to the point of where the incident's occurring.

2 Q. Surrounding brigades were put on alert and your own  
3 London Fire Brigade resources were all put on standby?

4 A. Yes, they were.

5 Q. All right. Now can we turn then, please, to the  
6 mobilising system itself, paragraph 9 of your statement,  
7 page 3? Could we have that on the screen? It may  
8 assist.

9 The system operated at the time was known as ProCad,  
10 was it not?

11 A. It was.

12 Q. You describe, do you not, how, depending on the  
13 information, in particular the detail of the information  
14 received from the caller, and depending on the nature of  
15 the location or the building or the premises, wherever  
16 the emergency was occurring, the control officer would  
17 type in the information and potential addresses would  
18 come up on the screen?

19 A. No, they put in detail information in the boxes to  
20 start --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- and then, once they've -- they have considered  
23 they've got sufficient information, they push a button  
24 and then it will look for potential matches, address  
25 matches.

1 Q. Right, it may be that was a distinction without  
2 a difference, in which case I apologise. The point is  
3 this: the system would judge what possible addresses  
4 might be relevant --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- based on the information inputted by the control  
7 officer?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Some places, such as King's Cross, because it is a major  
10 terminus and is both an overground station as well as  
11 a London Underground station, there could be as many as  
12 44 different addresses --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- that would come up in the system?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was there also a facility on the system whereby, once  
17 the address, a particular address, according to the  
18 system, was selected, that a map would appear?

19 A. No, not at the time. The map will only appear once  
20 you've selected the address that you want to use.

21 Q. Forgive me, that is what the question was. Once the  
22 address is selected and the system is told that is the  
23 address, a map relating to that address will then  
24 appear?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Right. There are certain other aspects of the system  
2 that we can deal with fairly briefly. We've heard  
3 a considerable amount of evidence concerning the times  
4 of calls. How did the system then judge the time of the  
5 call? At what point does the system log the time of the  
6 call?

7 A. It's not the time that you start talking to the person  
8 on the phone. The Home Office, in the 1980s, told  
9 brigades that you record the time of call when you have  
10 sufficient information to be able to get an address  
11 selection.

12 Q. So it's not the point at which the call is answered; it  
13 is when the system gets to that point?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. Right. Finally, does the system also require the  
16 control officer to select, either by way of choosing  
17 from a list of codes, or by inputting manually free  
18 text, the type of attendance that is required?

19 A. Yes, the incident type code, yes.

20 Q. All right. For our purposes, one of the most important  
21 aspects of the system was the split attendance. Where  
22 an address was selected which happened to involve  
23 a tunnel or an Underground station, the possibility of  
24 a split attendance would arise, would it not?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What was a split attendance, or what is a split  
2 attendance?

3 A. A split attendance is usually three appliances to the  
4 primary location and one to the secondary and, also, it  
5 usually sends a senior officer to the primary location  
6 as well.

7 Q. What if there is an incident in a tunnel and neither the  
8 caller nor the control officer know which is the primary  
9 and which is the secondary, they just know that there  
10 are two stations either end of the particular part of  
11 the tunnel?

12 A. Usually the information that comes out, it's either  
13 going to give you the address -- for example,  
14 King's Cross station -- in which case, if that's all the  
15 information you've got and they can't tell you the  
16 detail about which tunnel, then you'll go to  
17 King's Cross, because there's so many tunnels that come  
18 off of it, so many different stations.

19 If they'll give you -- if they decide that they'll  
20 give you two different stations, then we would do an  
21 attendance to both and, with the information they gather  
22 from the person, then you'd decide which one would be  
23 your primary.

24 Q. Let me put it a different way, if I may. A caller calls  
25 in --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- and says there is a derailment in the tunnel between  
3 King's Cross and Russell Square.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The controller works out that that's the Piccadilly Line  
6 southbound and knows that there are two stations,  
7 therefore: King's Cross and Russell Square.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. How does the system determine which is the primary and  
10 which is the secondary?

11 A. By which -- the address selection that they get offered.  
12 As you sort of said, there can be 30, 40 different  
13 address selections, so dependent on the address  
14 selection that they use for that -- for the tunnel, will  
15 make it dependent on which is the primary and which is  
16 the secondary. It's not done normally by the control  
17 officer.

18 Q. Even if there is nothing to suggest that the  
19 Fire Brigade attendance is more important and required  
20 at King's Cross as opposed to Russell Square?

21 A. If somebody says to us that the -- it's more important  
22 for us to go to King's Cross, then we would make that  
23 the primary.

24 Q. What if there is nothing to suggest which, on the  
25 evidence, on the facts, in terms of the event, is

1 actually the most important of the two stations, how do  
2 you then decide?

3 A. Then the control officer will make that decision based  
4 on the information they've got.

5 Q. If the information suggests that it could be one or  
6 other, he will be forced, or she will be forced, into  
7 saying "The system makes me select that is the primary  
8 and that is the secondary"?

9 A. What they can do is they can talk to a supervisor and  
10 they can add additional appliances to the secondary  
11 location and make it a balanced attendance at both.

12 Q. Ordinarily, a split attendance meant three appliances to  
13 one, the primary location --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- and one to the secondary?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So in our case, of course, we know that there was  
18 a primary at Euston Square --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and a secondary at King's Cross.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When was it determined that it should be three to one  
23 automatically as -- in the absence of an intervention  
24 from a supervising officer, as opposed to two at one and  
25 two at another?

1 A. It's always three and one.

2 Q. How often was that reviewed?

3 A. As far as I'm aware, it hadn't been -- it had been over  
4 a year, because we'd just changed to a new control  
5 system. So it was reviewed when it was all loaded on to  
6 the new system, but it's been common practice for years  
7 that that is the split attendance that we do for  
8 tunnels.

9 Q. There are two major disadvantages, are there not? One  
10 is the scenario that I've posited to you, which is, if,  
11 in fact, there is nothing to suggest that one station  
12 requires attendance over the other, then it is frankly  
13 a matter of happenchance that one becomes the primary  
14 and one the secondary and the primary gets more  
15 vehicles.

16 But the second problem is this, is it not: the  
17 policy relating to breathing apparatus required, for  
18 understandable reasons, that officers don't put on their  
19 breathing apparatus equipment and descend into  
20 a possibly fire- or smoke-filled tunnel in the absence  
21 of a backup, in particular, the presence of what was  
22 called an entry control officer. I'm sure you're  
23 familiar with all of this.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At King's Cross, Leading Firefighter Roche, who had

1 arrived at 09.13, was unable to send two members of his  
2 four man crew down into the tunnel with breathing  
3 apparatus because he was forced, for good reason, to  
4 wait for backup, for an entry control officer or  
5 somebody who could assist with sending down teams with  
6 breathing apparatus into the tunnel.

7 The second vehicle, which was crewed by  
8 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor, didn't arrive at  
9 King's Cross until 09.42.

10 When you put the two pieces of information together,  
11 split attendance three to one and breathing apparatus  
12 policy, no fire crew attending the secondary station can  
13 ever send anybody down with breathing apparatus to  
14 a sub-surface location, because there will only ever be  
15 one crew unless and until further resources arrive.

16 Do you follow me?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is quite a long question. Would  
18 you like --

19 MR KEITH: Sorry, it's a long question.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Shall we break it up and go back?  
21 You started off, Mr Keith, by -- you said there were two  
22 problems. If, in fact, there is no indication which  
23 should be the primary, it's happenchance which one does  
24 become the primary.

25 Do you want to comment on that first?

1 A. That is -- I mean, over all the years there has always  
2 been sufficient information to allow us to make  
3 a decision which will be the primary and which will be  
4 the secondary.

5 The normal procedure will be that the call would  
6 come from LUL. If it doesn't and it comes from a member  
7 of the public, we will push the member of the public to  
8 give us information about what the scenario is, because  
9 a member of the public would not give us a secondary  
10 location. They wouldn't tell us that it's in a tunnel  
11 between two points.

12 MR KEITH: The system didn't work very well on 7 July, did  
13 it? Because in relation to Aldgate, there was, in fact,  
14 a discussion as to whether Aldgate should be the primary  
15 and Liverpool Street the secondary, or the other way  
16 round, and one of the supervisors suggested to the  
17 control officer in the Fire Brigade control room: let's  
18 have Aldgate the primary and Liverpool Street the  
19 secondary. And it was a good judgment. Initially, it  
20 was going to be the other way round.

21 A. Yes, that was based on you can't take one incident  
22 running and that's it. There was three incidents  
23 running at the same time, three different control  
24 officers bringing information in. They'd already got  
25 information and dispatched to Aldgate, they'd dispatched

1 five appliances to Aldgate. The second call that came  
2 in was from the LAS, which was basically telling us that  
3 they had been ordered to an incident at  
4 Liverpool Street, which we reacted on and we sent an  
5 attendance to Liverpool Street.

6 The third one which come in was from LUL and the  
7 call from LUL was the one which they asked for the  
8 primary to be Liverpool Street and for Aldgate to be the  
9 secondary, if my memory serves me correctly, and based  
10 on the fact that LUL would not have known that we had  
11 already sent appliances to Liverpool Street, because we  
12 did that with the information from the LAS, that is why  
13 that primary and secondary location was swapped over,  
14 because we knew we'd got a high level of attack going to  
15 Liverpool Street already and we wanted to balance that  
16 with sending appliances to Aldgate.

17 Q. All that would be unnecessary, the debate, the time the  
18 controller took to speak to the supervising officer  
19 about rotating or reversing the primary and secondary,  
20 if you just sent two appliances to each of the two  
21 stations.

22 A. No, I disagree, because if you've already sent  
23 appliances to two locations, you've got to look then at  
24 the resources you've already deployed. You want to make  
25 best use of your resources, and that is the whole point

1 of them gaining the information.

2 For the amount of time it takes them to talk to  
3 a supervisor, to make that decision, is seconds. It's  
4 not holding -- we'd already got a deployment going to  
5 Aldgate, we'd already got a deployment going to  
6 Liverpool Street. This was in addition and was over and  
7 above what we would have done, if LUL had just asked for  
8 us and the LAS hadn't contacted us.

9 Q. All right, we'll come back to Aldgate in a moment,  
10 because we've got to look at each of the requests of the  
11 Fire Brigade at Aldgate.

12 The second of my points, the second of the points  
13 that my Lady has reiterated: is there not a problem when  
14 the protocol is applied on split attendance, requiring  
15 ordinarily three to one incident and one to the  
16 secondary incident, if breathing apparatus appears to be  
17 necessary in the secondary incident?

18 A. That's an operational procedure that the Brigade have  
19 adopted, and I don't feel that, with my position, that  
20 I'm in a position to answer that.

21 Q. Well, my Lady heard, of course, during the course of  
22 these proceedings from, in particular, I think,  
23 Assistant Divisional Officer or Senior Divisional  
24 Officer Adams, who was asked about this issue and said  
25 that his views had never been canvassed. But there was

1 certainly the impression from him -- and it must have  
2 been something that's been discussed at high levels in  
3 the Fire Brigade -- that there is an element of  
4 illogicality in automatically sending just one appliance  
5 to a sub-surface station, if it's secondary, and then  
6 expect crews to be able to use breathing apparatus in  
7 the event of smoke or fire at that sub-surface location.

8 A. That's not my understanding of what they're there to do.  
9 They're there to look at the scenario and then make  
10 a decision by reporting back to the officer that's at  
11 the primary location as to whether or not they need more  
12 resources at that end.

13 Q. Are you aware, Mr Payton, of the situation that  
14 confronted Leading Firefighter Roche at King's Cross?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Have you discussed with your colleagues or your counsel  
17 the particular position in relation to which my Lady  
18 heard evidence, which was Mr Roche saying in evidence,  
19 or rather his colleagues saying in evidence, "We  
20 couldn't use the breathing apparatus because we had to  
21 wait for a second crew, but because we were the  
22 secondary location, only one crew was there, and because  
23 of the confusion over mobilisation to King's Cross and  
24 Euston Square, a second crew didn't arrive for half an  
25 hour"? Have you addressed this issue at all? You are

1 the mobilisation expert.

2 A. The issue as far as split attendance is exactly the same  
3 now as it was before: three to one location, one to the  
4 other.

5 Q. What would happen now if a crew went to King's Cross as  
6 a secondary location and realised there was a fire or  
7 smoke and it was a four-man crew? One stays with the  
8 fire appliance, one takes up Command position, two start  
9 to put on their breathing apparatus, but there's no  
10 entry control officer, there's no backup, so according  
11 to the protocols they can't go and investigate further,  
12 they have to wait until a second appliance arrives  
13 before they can go down?

14 A. No, they still can't go down with a second appliance.  
15 They would need a number of appliances for  
16 a sub-surface. You can't just commit two people -- even  
17 if you had two machines there, you still can't commit  
18 two people into that. You've got to get safe systems of  
19 practice put in place, you've got to have forward  
20 mobilising points, you've got to have entry control  
21 officers. There is a number of officers that you need.  
22 They would have to send a priority message and that  
23 priority message they would ask for all them additional  
24 appliances to attend.

25 Q. How many appliances are required to attend an incident

1 to allow breathing apparatus to be used by anybody?

2 A. It depends on the size of the incident and location of  
3 the incident.

4 Q. Well, let's have a look at [LFB39-2], please, which is an  
5 extract from the protocols concerning breathing  
6 apparatus.

7 It's quite plain from this, Mr Payton, if we can  
8 enlarge the second half of the page, that there are  
9 a certain number of questions that have to be answered  
10 even before it is safe to start using breathing  
11 apparatus.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. For example, there has to be consideration of whether or  
14 not there are unsafe conditions, whether or not it's  
15 possible to have a command point at the sub-surface  
16 level.

17 But, at the very least, the procedures indicate that  
18 there must be an entry control officer, we can see  
19 a reference to that person at 2.2(d)?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. There must be a base control point, and then, over the  
22 page [LFB39-3], the base control point resources should consist  
23 of:

24 "A reserve BA team ..."

25 "An entry control board.

1 "A communications operator.

2 "Access to a main scheme radio.

3 "Means of recording personnel committed below  
4 ground."

5 All very sensible. That doesn't appear to indicate  
6 that you would need more than -- perhaps I'm mistaken --  
7 two appliances, because two appliances will give you  
8 eight or nine firefighters, which would give you one  
9 breathing apparatus team, an entry control officer,  
10 a communications operator, access to the main scheme  
11 radio and another couple of extra firefighters.

12 A. I'm sorry, it's certainly not enough, because you've  
13 got -- you've also got to have emergency crews in place  
14 to be able to back them up. There's a large number of  
15 people that need to be deployed before you would commit  
16 to an incident that you're describing.

17 Q. So does it then also follow, Mr Payton, that on any call  
18 to a sub-surface station, where there is a split  
19 attendance, even the primary location, which is three  
20 vehicles being sent, may not be enough to allow any of  
21 them to don their breathing apparatus kits and descend  
22 to sub-surface level?

23 It seems rather extraordinary, with respect.

24 A. Well, no, I mean the procedures were set up and they are  
25 safe procedures for a normal incident. If you start

1 getting into fire situations -- not every time you go to  
2 an Underground station is there a fire situation. You  
3 can get brakes which give off dust which set off the  
4 fire alarms and that.

5 So the first crews there will do a reconnoitre of  
6 the issues that they see, and then, the first thing they  
7 do is send a message back, and they will send a message  
8 back stating what they've got, and if they want  
9 additional appliances, they will be sent. They will  
10 start setting up all the primary work and, as soon as  
11 the other machines come, they can start committing  
12 crews.

13 But it will take them a time to be able to set up  
14 bridge heads and get the communication structure, if  
15 they needed guidelines, then -- that's all --

16 Q. So may I ask you, what is the minimum number of pump  
17 appliances or pump ladder appliances that is required to  
18 enable any firefighter to go down to sub-surface level  
19 using breathing apparatus so as to be able to set up the  
20 structure for that officer?

21 A. I can't tell you off the top of my head.

22 Q. All right. We may have to return to this issue, because  
23 it was a vital issue for Leading Firefighter Roche and  
24 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor and we haven't yet got to  
25 the bottom of what the problem was?

1 A. To be fair, you're asking me questions about operational  
2 procedures. I'm here as the head of mobilising. I do  
3 not set the procedures. The procedures are set by  
4 another group of people. What I have to do is I have to  
5 implement what they have done after doing their risk  
6 assessments.

7 Q. All right. It may be you're not the right person to ask  
8 that question of, in which case we'll try again with  
9 Mr Reason.

10 Turning to Aldgate, page 7 of your statement, and we  
11 can look in a little more detail at what happened in  
12 relation to Aldgate, firstly.

13 I must say, the statement sets out with great  
14 clarity how the events unfolded and how each of the  
15 calls was received.

16 The position, in essence, was this, was it not,  
17 Mr Payton: that the original call was to Botolph Street,  
18 EC3?

19 A. It was.

20 Q. Could we just have on the screen [INQ8396-2]? Botolph  
21 Street there. There was a reference -- it was from the  
22 police -- there was a reference to sounds of an  
23 explosion from an empty building; yes?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You recognise that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. As a result, we can see from your paragraph 23 on  
3 page LFB99-7 -- four appliances were mobilised to go to  
4 St Botolph?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. It wasn't a split attendance because there was  
7 a specific request to go to a specific address?

8 A. Exactly.

9 Q. It wasn't an Underground address; it was just St Botolph  
10 Street?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. At exactly the same time, the London Ambulance Service  
13 contacted the Brigade Control saying they had been  
14 called by the Underground or British Transport Police to  
15 Liverpool Street?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. [INQ8397-2], please:

18 "Hello, Fire Brigade, I've just been called by the  
19 Underground ... to Liverpool Street Underground  
20 station."

21 So there was a specific reference, was there not, to  
22 an Underground station?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. At the bottom of the page, the Fire Brigade control  
25 officer rightly points out that the Fire Brigade had

1 already received "Fire and explosion at  
2 St Botolph Street".

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. The position then was that the control at the Brigade  
5 Headquarters then received a further call, a third call,  
6 from London Underground itself, INQ8395 [INQ8395-2], in which the  
7 LUL caller expressly asked for Liverpool Street to be  
8 made the primary, Aldgate the secondary?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. We can see that two-thirds of the way down the page:  
11 "Let me just scroll through this, I want to make  
12 sure I've got it", says the Fire Brigade officer. "So  
13 we're going from Liverpool Street primary to Aldgate  
14 station."

15 It may be that the first reference is at the top of  
16 the page. Yes, sorry. It's the fourth or fifth line  
17 down as well:

18 "Liverpool Street, can you make Liverpool Street  
19 primary, Aldgate secondary, please."

20 If you just highlight the seventh or eighth entry,  
21 please, on the page, halfway down the screen.

22 So there was a specific request from LUL for  
23 Liverpool Street to be primary, Aldgate secondary.

24 So at that point, the Fire Brigade had received  
25 a call to St Botolph Street to which it had mobilised

1 four appliances?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. As well as, simultaneously, a call to Liverpool Street  
4 Underground station and then a call from LUL asking for  
5 primary at Liverpool Street; Aldgate, secondary. Is  
6 that right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Was the response of the Fire Brigade to send, in fact,  
9 or rather to make Liverpool Street primary, Aldgate  
10 secondary, or not? What actually happened after that?

11 A. What actually happened after that was that we'd sent  
12 the -- the call which we'd received from the London  
13 Ambulance Service had been acted on and we'd sent  
14 appliances to Liverpool Street only.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. So we'd got -- how many attending there? I think it was  
17 five attending there.

18 Q. I think it's five, yes.

19 A. Five. Five attending Liverpool Street. We then have,  
20 at the same time, another call come in, which was from  
21 LUL, and by the time that we got round to doing that  
22 one, they'd already picked up that we were going to two  
23 locations.

24 Q. Botolph Street and Liverpool Street/Aldgate; yes?

25 A. And Liverpool Street, and the decision was made that, as

1 we'd already had two calls in, and this was the third  
2 one, we would balance our attendance better, because, if  
3 we'd have only had the call come in from LUL, they'd  
4 have had three appliances going to Liverpool Street and  
5 one to Aldgate.

6 What we've done here is basically changed the  
7 balance round, so we've got five appliances going to --  
8 five from the first, plus one addition, so we've got six  
9 now going to Liverpool Street, where we would have only  
10 had three, and we've also got seven going to Aldgate.

11 Q. Because you had the original four to St Botolph plus the  
12 three from making Aldgate then the primary on the third  
13 call?

14 A. Exactly.

15 Q. Doesn't that rather highlight, though, the point I made  
16 to you earlier, which is, when you're dealing with an  
17 Underground station, you're dealing with multiple  
18 addresses; in essence, a split attendance.

19 It is sensible to balance out as best you can,  
20 rather than having an automatic three to one split.

21 A. On the information that we'd received here, it was  
22 a good call, and it was --

23 Q. It was.

24 A. It was good to balance it.

25 Q. Because you were balancing it, with respect, Mr Payton.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Balance is good. An automatic division three to one is  
3 not necessarily so helpful, is it?

4 A. I'm reluctant to answer from the point of view that the  
5 policy has been there for years and was made by people  
6 which were in a better position than myself to make the  
7 decision about the split of three and one.

8 I, as the mobilising officer, I'm putting into place  
9 what has basically been asked by the policymakers who  
10 consider this a safe system of work.

11 Now, this isn't for going down and fighting fires;  
12 this is for first, initial attack of going and looking  
13 and seeing.

14 On a number of occasions, you've worked out that  
15 where your three appliances are is where your main crews  
16 are required. The person that goes to the other station  
17 normally is because some people might come off the train  
18 and start walking the tracks going down the other end.

19 So there is at least a fire crew presence there.

20 On the occasions where there may be an issue at that  
21 station, then that officer can, not only contact the  
22 officer at the other station, but can contact control  
23 direct and request additional resources. It doesn't  
24 mean that they're being sent there to deploy -- to be  
25 deployed in breathing apparatus at that point.

1 Q. Two questions for you then, please. One is, as the  
2 Deputy Assistant Commissioner for mobilising, you must  
3 have had your own views as to the efficacy of the three  
4 to one split over the many years in which you have  
5 carried out mobilisation decisions and commanded the  
6 Brigade mobilisation system.

7 A. And I never had a problem with it, and I'm an -- I was  
8 an operational officer as well, and I attended these  
9 incidents, and there's not one occasion where I attended  
10 where it became a problem.

11 Q. The second question, then. Even if you weren't  
12 anticipating a fire, the possibility of a fire and the  
13 need for breathing apparatus must surely exist. And  
14 where you have multiple incidents such as occurred on  
15 7 July, there's a much higher chance that the initial  
16 fire crews will need to don breathing apparatus?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In that scenario, the split, the policy split between  
19 three and one is put under very severe strain, is it  
20 not, and it could happen again?

21 A. But that's why, at each of the locations, an officer  
22 requested additional appliances and got them. But I'm  
23 not aware of how much breathing apparatus was used,  
24 because it was explosions. There wasn't fire involved  
25 at the same time.

1 Q. Is not the text code "fire/explosion"?

2 A. No, you can go to an explosion.

3 Q. "Smoke in tunnel", is that not indicative of a possible  
4 fire?

5 A. Smoke in tunnel, when they go down and investigate,  
6 they've usually got to get on a train to go into  
7 a tunnel to investigate and it's usually brake pads  
8 overheating, things like that.

9 Q. All right, Mr Payton. On this occasion, during this  
10 call -- could we have [INQ8395-3] -- the LUL caller,  
11 having given the information about Aldgate, said:

12 "... we've got another one, I'm afraid."

13 Can you see that at the top of the page:

14 "Right, we've got another one, I'm afraid."

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The LFB control officer says:

17 "Hang on, I might have to ask someone else to take  
18 it. Just a second."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. When a call is received, it's quite usual and normal for  
21 the control officer, having taken the information, to  
22 take some further additional actions?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Like requesting the attendance of specialist fire  
25 officers, alerting London Ambulance Service or the MPS

1 or City of London Police or British Transport Police or  
2 whoever, and to, no doubt, make arrangements for things  
3 such as the number of thermal imaging devices or Fire  
4 Rescue Units or Command Units that might have to attend,  
5 sending the pagers out.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was that what the LFB policy -- the LFB control officer  
8 was referring to there, "I might have to let somebody  
9 else take the second part of your call because I need to  
10 get on and do these steps"?

11 A. Exactly that.

12 Q. How long did it take?

13 A. For that officer to do them additional --

14 Q. Yes, because my Lady heard this call being played at the  
15 start of these proceedings, and there was a very long  
16 gap, I think it was two and a half minutes.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: 2 minutes 14 seconds.

18 MR KEITH: I'm grateful.

19 A. But that wasn't until she could take the next call.

20 Her -- I think it was over four minutes the actions that  
21 she needed to complete and the call was handed off to  
22 another control officer when one became available.

23 Q. The other controller, the other control officer wasn't  
24 immediately available, was he or she?

25 A. No.

1 Q. So in fact, even by giving the call to another  
2 controller, there was still a delay, because there were  
3 no other controllers available, were there?  
4 A. That was the 2 minutes 14 seconds delay, because there  
5 was no other officer to give it -- to give that call to.  
6 Q. This was fairly early on in the incidents --  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. -- and this particular operator had only received, in  
9 relation to the call-out to Aldgate, the three calls:  
10 LAS, police, LUL?  
11 A. No, it's not the same caller each time, they are  
12 different.  
13 Q. I appreciate that. Well, there had been three calls we  
14 know of in relation to Aldgate.  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. No doubt, other calls were coming into the room.  
17 A. They were.  
18 Q. This was only the first ten minutes or so of the attacks  
19 in London on 7 July.  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Was it anticipated or expected that the controller, or  
22 the control room, would be so overwhelmed by calls in  
23 such a scenario that there would be delays in passing on  
24 calls to other control officers so quickly, so early on  
25 in the incident?

1 A. When you start taking calls, when they're starting to  
2 come in, even if you've got -- as you say here, there's  
3 three calls that they were dealing with at that  
4 particular time, they aren't the only calls coming into  
5 the London Fire Brigade.

6 Q. Of course.

7 A. There are others as well. So that starts taking up  
8 other officers.

9 As soon as you start taking actions, as soon as you  
10 start saying that you're sending five appliances to  
11 a location, that doesn't mean that those five are in the  
12 fire station and available. It could be that some of  
13 them are already out, so you've got people which you are  
14 now having to send radio messages. You're also sending  
15 paging messages to officers because you want them to  
16 contact you. So there will be other control officers  
17 which are dealing with the calls that are coming in from  
18 senior officers from other Controls and that, with --  
19 wanting or giving information.

20 Q. As you've described, doing all the ancillary work that  
21 has to be done to get the crews out?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Paging messages, making sure equipment is being sent to  
24 the right place, telling the right organisations of the  
25 receipt of the call and the information?

1 A. Updating specialist officers as well.

2 Q. It just seems that quite early on, Mr Payton, the  
3 control officers were overwhelmed, there were no  
4 officers available to take that second part of the call?

5 A. There was no spare capacity at that time, that's  
6 correct.

7 Q. There was very quickly no spare capacity.

8 A. Mm-hmm.

9 Q. Is that because it was a multi-incident event, four, of  
10 course, bombs?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What steps have been taken to ensure that in any future  
13 multi-incident event the control officers are not  
14 similarly overwhelmed so quickly?

15 A. I think it has to be taken into context with the fact  
16 that that is seconds that that happens, normally.

17 Q. Normally?

18 A. Yes, it's not -- you don't usually get a time limit of  
19 a couple of minutes before you can get a call handled.

20 Q. Quite. So to be fair to you, Mr Payton, that's why  
21 I said to you: what steps have been taken to deal with  
22 the possibility in the event of a multi-incident event  
23 such as this?

24 Ordinarily, this doesn't normally happen.

25 A. No.

1 Q. We accept that.

2 A. You will get people -- under normal circumstances, if  
3 you get busy with calls, if you get a lot of floodings  
4 and things like that, you will get a queue of people and  
5 that can take two, three minutes, before you'll get to  
6 them. And it doesn't matter how many control officers  
7 you have, those occasions will happen. And for this  
8 particular one, that was when there was a bottleneck.

9 As soon as they got additional control officers,  
10 they opened up additional positions and that, that then  
11 goes down.

12 The steps that London Fire Brigade have taken or are  
13 taking -- at the time that I was there, we were taking  
14 steps to have Strathclyde Fire Brigade working with us  
15 so that, if our calls started to build up, they would  
16 take our calls and pass them back to us when -- and they  
17 would sift what was a priority call.

18 The Government then brought in that they were  
19 creating Regional Controls and there was going to be  
20 nine Regional Controls and any one of those Controls  
21 would have taken the overflow calls from any brigade.

22 That's now been shelved and I'm aware that London  
23 Fire Brigade have entered into early talks with  
24 West Yorkshire Fire Brigade to set up the system where  
25 we will take theirs and they will take our calls should

1 we get into this sort of a position again.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So we have our very own domestic call  
3 centres?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR KEITH: Thank you, that's most helpful. It's not  
6 something dealt with in your statement, but you've  
7 answered, if I may say so, the question.

8 Can we then look at the second half of that call,  
9 because another controller became available to deal with  
10 the other incident that the LUL caller was reporting to  
11 the London Fire Brigade.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. [INQ9927-2].

14 We can see there LUL say:

15 "Right, King's Cross Underground ... We've got that  
16 on Euston Road.

17 "And what have we got there?

18 "Right, it's on the eastbound Piccadilly Line."

19 We'll come back to King's Cross in a moment, but  
20 that is the second half of that LUL caller?

21 A. That is, yes.

22 Q. The LUL caller stays on the line, but another LFB  
23 controller takes the second half of the message?

24 A. They do.

25 Q. All right, you set out in your statement the appliances

1 and the call-outs to Aldgate. Just to finish Aldgate,  
2 paragraph 23, page 7 of LFB99 was the mobilisation of  
3 the four appliances to Aldgate.

4 Paragraph 26 is the three to Aldgate and the one to  
5 Liverpool Street, and we know that the Whitechapel  
6 appliance arrives very speedily at 09.00.54, I think  
7 it's F331.

8 At your paragraph 33, you deal with the major  
9 incident being declared, page 9 of LFB99 and, of course,  
10 at 7 minutes past the hour, paragraph 37, a message was  
11 sent to Control "Make pumps 10". So later on in the  
12 incident there were then more calls, of course, to the  
13 London Fire Brigade headquarters for more appliances.

14 A. Calls from the incident ground, yes.

15 Q. Yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You said paragraph -- 33 is major  
17 incident? Thank you.

18 MR KEITH: 33 was the arrival of F331 Whitechapel about the  
19 major incident procedure. Major incidents were declared  
20 by the Fire Brigade at two of these sites but not the  
21 other two. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right, so that's Aldgate.

24 In relation to Aldgate, in general, the difficulty  
25 encountered by the Fire Brigade was with the bottleneck

1 that quickly became apparent in the receipt of that LUL  
2 caller's message.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Edgware Road, page 10 of your statement.

5 The first call was, of course, to a gas explosion at  
6 Praed Street, paragraph 40.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was it not? Could we see that, please, at [INQ9926-2]?

9 "I want to report what I believe to be a gas fire,  
10 explosion and fire in Praed Street."

11 We know, of course, that Praed Street was further  
12 down the line, the Circle Line, of course, away from  
13 Edgware Road towards Paddington.

14 A. Mm-hmm.

15 Q. That was the call, and so the Fire Brigade mobilised  
16 responses very quickly to Praed Street, did it not?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. We can see that, after that call, quite a few  
19 post-mobilisation actions were then carried out by the  
20 control officer. Were those the sorts of steps that you  
21 described earlier as having to take place after the call  
22 is received?

23 A. They are, yes.

24 Q. So he or she informed the Incident Liaison Officer, the  
25 Search and Rescue Urban Adviser, the Assistant

1 Divisional Officer, the ambulance, Met Police and  
2 triggered the procedures for dealing with suspect bombs?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Then at 09.07, so about nine minutes or so later, the  
5 LUL control room itself called in, did it not?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. Can we have [INQ8515-3], please.  
8 This was a call, if they'll forgive me for saying  
9 so, from the horse's mouth, it was from the LUL control  
10 room itself, was it not?  
11 A. It was.  
12 Q. This call said:  
13 "I'd like you to attend Edgware Road Underground  
14 station."  
15 Then there was a reference to Circle Hammersmith  
16 station, Chapel Street, NW1?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. So there were express references, were there not, to the  
19 Underground station and the address and the line,  
20 Chapel Street, and the line, Circle Hammersmith. Is  
21 that correct?  
22 A. The address --  
23 Q. Chapel Street.  
24 A. Oh, further down? Oh, yes, sorry, yes, Chapel Street,  
25 yes.

1 Q. "Edgware Road LUL", says the Fire Brigade officer.

2 "That's the Circle Hammersmith station,

3 Chapel Street NW1."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The controller thought that that was the same incident

6 as the call-out ten minutes before or so to

7 Praed Street, did he not?

8 A. During the questioning, they brought up about

9 Praed Street, yes. But initially they were having

10 problems finding Chapel Street as Edgware Road LUL.

11 Q. Is this because of the system that you described

12 earlier; when you type details into the computer, it

13 gives you a list of predetermined addresses?

14 A. Yes, the first information they gave them was

15 Edgware Road LUL, which is a pretty good one because, as

16 soon as you put that in, it will bring up a list of

17 possible matches, and within the matches that's what's

18 triggered her to turn round and ask about any particular

19 tunnels, because she didn't get a match on

20 Chapel Street.

21 Q. The system operated by London Fire Brigade then didn't

22 have an entry in its system for Edgware Road

23 London Underground station Chapel Street NW1, did it?

24 A. It didn't have Chapel Street, no. It did have

25 Edgware Road LUL and it did have an entrance.

1 Q. It had Edgware Road LUL, the Bakerloo Line station  
2 I believe?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Which is on the north side of the flyover of the  
5 Edgware Road?

6 A. It was.

7 Q. But it didn't have the Circle and Hammersmith stations  
8 specifically delineated within its system?

9 A. It did, but it was under Cabbell Street. That  
10 particular railway station is on a junction and  
11 Cabbell Street is the one which was on the mobilising  
12 system. If the officer had gone down to that particular  
13 booking and had been able to get it confirmed as  
14 Cabbell Street, they would have gone to the correct  
15 entrance.

16 Q. But even -- why didn't the officer ask that, "Is it  
17 Cabbell Street or Chapel Street?"

18 A. Well, that is one of the things which the officer should  
19 have done.

20 Q. But didn't?

21 A. No, they did try to get clarification, and there was --  
22 and I think it went off at a bit of a tangent, but that  
23 control officer should have been professional enough to  
24 bring the conversation back to the clarification of what  
25 she was asking.

1 Q. But the point is this: where was the Fire Brigade  
2 then -- where did the Fire Brigade think this incident  
3 concerned? Praed Street again?

4 A. No, not at that -- not while she's doing that, no. What  
5 has moved it on to Praed Street is when she went to do  
6 an address match, and the address matched, the computer  
7 then turned round and said it could be a possible  
8 duplicate call of the one that is being attended at  
9 Praed Street.

10 Q. But even then, if that's what the system suggested, the  
11 LUL caller had specifically said Edgware Road  
12 Underground station. The system was coming up with  
13 something that wasn't an Underground station, it was  
14 coming up with Praed Street, which isn't an Underground  
15 station, is it?

16 A. No.

17 Q. So surely the control officer would have thought, "All  
18 right, I haven't got an entry for Chapel Street in my  
19 system, but the caller who's calling from the Network  
20 Control Centre, is referring to an Underground station,  
21 in fact, the Circle & Hammersmith Underground station at  
22 Edgware Road."

23 How could that error have arisen?

24 A. Right, because, if you look through the top of the call,  
25 there is no mention at the start of what they are going

1 to. You come down about -- I think it's about a third  
2 of the way down and it says "Yeah, report of explosion".  
3 Q. Mr Payton, the first substantive information from LUL  
4 is:  
5 "... like you to attend Edgware Road Underground  
6 station."  
7 London Fire Brigade says:  
8 "Edgware Road London Underground station?"  
9 LUL:  
10 "That's the Circle Hammersmith station ..."  
11 So the first information was the address and the  
12 fact it was an Underground station.  
13 A. That's not the only information you take when you're  
14 going to order appliances to an incident. You need to  
15 know what type of an incident you're going to and, when  
16 you go down further and you get that they want you to go  
17 to an explosion, we was already attending the explosion  
18 just down the road, Praed Street, and that's why the  
19 mobilising system brought up that it could be a possible  
20 duplicate call.  
21 It is not a normal thing to have two explosions in  
22 the same vicinity at the same time. So we have already  
23 got crews that are on their way.  
24 Q. But they weren't going to a London Underground station  
25 in Praed Street, were they?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Did the system allow any kind of override for the  
3 control officer to say, "Well, I know the system is  
4 telling me that the London Underground station for  
5 Edgware Road is in Cabbell Street and the caller hasn't  
6 mentioned Cabbell Street, but the reference to  
7 Underground station, Circle and Hammersmith station,  
8 makes me think this is a call to an Underground station,  
9 the Circle and Hammersmith Underground station, at  
10 Edgware Road. That is what I will put into the system."

11 Was that possible then?

12 A. Yes, it is possible. They could have sent an attendance  
13 to that station.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How far is Praed Street from --

15 A. It's a few hundred yards, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

17 A. Which is why the system would offer us a duplicate call,  
18 because it's so close to the location that's been loaded  
19 in by the operator.

20 MR KEITH: Did the operator then have access to a map,  
21 either a Tube map or a street map?

22 A. No, not at that time. The system didn't bring that up.

23 Q. How many calls, roughly, a month, can you help us, in  
24 2005, were there to the London Fire Brigade from the  
25 London Underground network?

1 A. I can't tell you how many calls, but it was on a daily  
2 basis.  
3 Q. Lots?  
4 A. A lot.  
5 Q. A lot?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. But the control officers didn't even have anything as  
8 basic as a Tube map to be able to work out what the  
9 calls --  
10 A. They could look up on a -- on the atlases that they've  
11 got at their desk. They could have looked up the  
12 Underground.  
13 Q. Does the system now provide for drop-down pictures of  
14 either street maps or London Underground maps?  
15 A. The system now allows them, once they've got an address  
16 match, it will allow them to see, not only the details  
17 of the map where they're going to, it will show them the  
18 actual lines. It never showed them what was the  
19 Piccadilly Line or the Hammersmith line, that was not  
20 available on the system.  
21 Q. It is now?  
22 A. It is now.  
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just in case anybody is thinking the  
24 control officer just accepted what the machine was  
25 saying, do you say in paragraph 44 the control officer

1 referred to a supervisor?

2 A. Yes, they did, my Lady.

3 MR KEITH: To be fair, further, at the bottom of the call,  
4 if we could scroll up on that page, please, the  
5 Fire Brigade officer says:  
6 "We've actually instigated a major incident  
7 procedure at Praed Street."  
8 And LUL go:  
9 "Right, okay."  
10 Then they say:  
11 "Have you got a reference for there?"  
12 Then the LUL staff says:  
13 "They're actually attending the Underground, are  
14 they?"  
15 The Fire Brigade says:  
16 "Well, at the moment, 73 Praed Street ..."  
17 But what doesn't appear to have been appreciated by  
18 either person is the attendance at 73 Praed Street is  
19 not an Underground station attendance.  
20 A. No, it's not.  
21 Q. So they spoke at cross-purposes at that point.  
22 The London Underground caller was seeking a call-out  
23 to his or her Underground station.  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. The Fire Brigade were saying "This seems to be the same

1 call-out to Praed Street, which is not an Underground  
2 station."  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. But neither of them said, "Hang on, we're at  
5 cross-purposes"?  
6 A. No.  
7 Q. Right. Sub-Officer McKay, who was a firefighter on  
8 A211, which I think is a pump ladder -- the 1s are the  
9 pump ladders, aren't they? --  
10 A. Yes, they are.  
11 Q. -- called in to say that, after he had gone to  
12 Praed Street, there was a separate call, in fact, to  
13 Edgware Road.  
14 A. After -- the -- when the control officer made the  
15 decision that they weren't going to mobilise to the  
16 Underground station, part of the procedure is, if there  
17 is a duplicate call, they must inform the crew which is  
18 attending at the other -- at the incident and tell them  
19 that "We've received an additional call to  
20 London Underground, can it be taken as the same call?"  
21 Q. Very sensible.  
22 A. Then that officer has quite rightly got back on and has  
23 made a decision, because they're there, as saying, "No,  
24 we can't be sure that it is the same place", so that's  
25 why the Control then had to send an attendance there.

1 Q. We can see at paragraph 45, LFB99-11, you set out the  
2 contact between -- I think it was Sub-Officer McKay and  
3 the Brigade Control, in which the sub-officer said, "It  
4 is a separate call to Edgware Road station" --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- "I am at Praed Street, the one at Edgware Road  
7 Underground station is separate."

8 What does the control officer then in the London  
9 Fire Brigade communications room then do?

10 A. They take the incident -- there was an incident number  
11 assigned, even if you don't send anything -- if you  
12 don't send something to an incident, they've still  
13 assigned the incident number to it. So they go back to  
14 that incident number, open up the incident and with the  
15 information that's on there they then deploy an  
16 attendance.

17 Q. When the control officer typed in "Edgware Road,  
18 London Underground station", did they come up on the  
19 system with the Circle & Hammersmith London Underground  
20 station at Edgware Road Chapel Street?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Because the information that the officer had put in,  
24 which she -- the address that she gave back to get  
25 confirmation with the LUL, there was a conversation

1 about the address. Now, she had already put that  
2 address into the system when she closed it. So when  
3 that incident was reopened, it automatically had an  
4 address in there and that's why they sent them to that  
5 address.

6 Q. So when the first call from London Underground came  
7 through, although the London Underground caller hadn't  
8 referred to Cabbell Street at all, the London Fire  
9 Brigade control officer typed in Cabbell Street into the  
10 incident number?

11 A. No. They sent them to -- I'm trying to find the --

12 Q. It's paragraphs 45 and 46 of your statement.

13 A. Yes. It's where she sent the -- I'm trying to ...

14 Q. Let me cut through it, if I can, Mr Payton.

15 A. I'm trying to find the -- because I know she didn't send  
16 them to Cabbell Street. She sent -- I've --  
17 Edgware Road --

18 Q. She typed in Edgware Road station --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and the system this time then came up with  
21 Edgware Road, Paddington, Bakerloo Line, which was  
22 a different location?

23 A. But she wouldn't have known it was Bakerloo.

24 Q. But she would have done if there had been a map or some  
25 Tube map or she'd had the Edgware Road emergency plan

1     which says "Circle & Hammersmith, London, Edgware Road  
2     Underground station, Chapel Street"?

3     A. What map was that, sorry?

4     Q. If she'd had a Tube map, she would have seen --

5     A. If she had had a Tube map, it wouldn't have given her  
6     the address.

7     Q. No, but she would have seen that Bakerloo was separate  
8     to Circle and Hammersmith?

9     A. Yes, she would.

10    Q. But she didn't have a Tube map so she didn't realise  
11    there were two Underground stations?

12    A. Yes, that's true.

13    Q. She didn't have a street map so she couldn't work out  
14    that Chapel Street was a specific location for the  
15    Circle & Hammersmith Underground station, and she didn't  
16    realise that the first call had been to  
17    a Circle & Hammersmith call-out. She sent them to  
18    Bakerloo, the second time round.

19    A. Yes.

20    LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I'm just trying to think,  
21    if you were sitting in the control room, I mean, I take  
22    your point about the system ought to have the proper  
23    addresses, which, by the sounds of it, it may well do  
24    now.

25    MR KEITH: Indeed.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm just not sure whether it would be  
2 realistic to say the control officers can have time to  
3 look at the Tube map, as beautifully designed as it is,  
4 to actually work out where the lines are going.

5 MR KEITH: My Lady, indeed.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Isn't the best point really that the  
7 system should have had the addresses?

8 MR KEITH: The system was deficient in terms of the accuracy  
9 of the addresses and the controller was obviously placed  
10 in a very difficult position, but it's fair to say that  
11 the system now not only brings up full addresses through  
12 unique identifying numbers for locations agreed between  
13 London Underground Limited and the Fire Brigade, but  
14 a number of other steps -- perhaps could you help us --  
15 have also been taken, Mr Payton, have they not, which is  
16 that, one, the address is read back now to the caller so  
17 that there is agreement as to which address the  
18 attendance is being required at?

19 A. Yes, the most significant change is having unique  
20 reference numbers which means that London Underground  
21 have made the decision as to where they want us to  
22 attend, and if it's a split attendance as to the two --  
23 the two ends of the tunnel, so when they give the unique  
24 reference number and we put that in, it's -- it  
25 automatically populates the address fields in the

1 computer system.

2 We then confirm it by reading that back to them.

3 Q. And, when you send messages out to your crews, they get,  
4 not only the address from the system, but they get the  
5 original information, or part of the original  
6 information, that the caller provided, so that, if there  
7 is any confusion, they can see what the specific call  
8 was?

9 A. They see both --

10 Q. They see both?

11 A. -- and they would now have that it's the Bakerloo Line.

12 Q. Also, the control officer in the Brigade Headquarters  
13 now has text files and maps on drop-down screens on the  
14 system so that they can actually see the geographical  
15 location of the incident as they utilise the system?

16 A. They can.

17 Q. Finally, I think the London Underground station, when  
18 there is a reference to a sub-surface attendance or  
19 tunnels now comes up at the top of the list. So for  
20 King's Cross, it might be nearer the top of the 44  
21 addresses that were formerly in place?

22 A. The address of the Underground station comes up first  
23 now and then all the subsidiary files after that, yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I'm not following that point.

25 MR KEITH: So, my Lady, if a control officer types in

1 Edgware Road there may be, for example, say,  
2 20 references to Edgware Road in the system.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Even putting aside the reference, the unique address  
5 through the unique number system, there will be a list  
6 of Edgware Roads in your system, and the  
7 London Underground one will appear first on the top of  
8 the list.

9 A. It will appear first.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Above anything else which might  
11 happen to be in Edgware Road?

12 MR KEITH: Above everything else. But in any event, you use  
13 the unique number system so London Underground will give  
14 you a number --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- and you know what that number means exactly?

17 A. It's -- it was an agreement after the event with  
18 London Underground, so every Underground station on the  
19 system, every tunnel on the system, they have a unique  
20 reference number which they now give to us.

21 As soon as we put that in, it populates the address  
22 fields and we know exactly where we've got to go, which  
23 comes as well.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So it is the postcode system but in  
25 a different form?

1 A. In a different format, yes, my Lady.

2 MR KEITH: Was this problem -- and a whole series of  
3 problems obviously arose for the poor controller.

4 A. Mm-hmm.

5 Q. This must have happened before 7/7.

6 A. No.

7 Q. Despite the hundreds of call-outs a year, this  
8 confusion, a mixup over which Underground station the  
9 incident concerned, had never occurred before?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Could we have a look at LFB92-1, please, which is  
12 a letter to Mr Powell and to yourself from the Control  
13 Commander of blue watch.

14 Could you look at the bottom of the page, please:

15 "During the course of our immediate investigation  
16 into some of the addresses selected and attendances  
17 despatched in response to the events of 7 July, I would  
18 like to request that the following actions are taken as  
19 a matter of urgency to improve the displays returned to  
20 control operators using ProCad. Requests had already  
21 been made to alter the displays of Underground stations  
22 to make the record for the station itself to be  
23 displayed at the top followed by the tunnels to other  
24 stations.

25 "I have demonstrated that, although a perfectly good

1 address is entered by an operator, it will take up to  
2 five additional frames to be opened to make sure that  
3 the correct address record is used."

4 This would seem to indicate that the problem of  
5 confusion in the exact address had, in fact, been raised  
6 before 7/7.

7 A. It's not the confusion; it's the time that it takes to  
8 get the address match. So what this Control Commander  
9 is saying is that it would be nice if we could have --  
10 in this different order. The problem you've got is that  
11 the system, the mobilising system, is an off-the-shelf  
12 system, it's not bespoke to London Fire Brigade, so any  
13 changes that we wish to make we have to go through  
14 Motorola, we have to come up with the reasons why we  
15 want changes made. There is a cost attached to that,  
16 which isn't the top priority, but there is a cost  
17 attached to it, and it has to fit in with other  
18 services. It's not just London Fire Brigade that they  
19 actually sell the system to.

20 Q. Whether or not the full extent of the difficulties had  
21 been appreciated, had any steps been taken in relation  
22 to this limited observation on the efficiency of the  
23 computer system used by London Fire Brigade before 7/7?

24 A. We was always doing updates on the system when we found  
25 things which could be done better, but we couldn't

1 change all these things at the same time, and as there  
2 wasn't -- not been an issue with mobilising to  
3 London Underground stations, it is very, very rare that,  
4 when we talk to London Underground, that we have  
5 a problem with getting to the right stations.  
6 Usually, when they talk to each other, they're  
7 both -- talk about the information, get it confirmed,  
8 and we usually go to the right station.  
9 On this occasion, with the pressures on all sides,  
10 I think mistakes were made, certainly by our control  
11 officer in getting confirmation of where we were going.  
12 Q. And the system itself was a positive hindrance to the  
13 poor control officer because of the absence of any  
14 reference in the system to Edgware Road, Chapel Street?  
15 A. If you're the control officer, yes. The information  
16 that was there, we could have gone to the right address,  
17 but the information that LUL had provided us, which was  
18 right on their system, was different from the -- from  
19 what we had on our system.  
20 Our system showed that we was going to the entrance,  
21 the same entrance, but because the road split, LUL had  
22 used one, we'd used the other, and it just did not come  
23 up on the system.  
24 Q. Their own emergency plan refers to Chapel Street and  
25 it's a plan I think that's provided to other emergency

1 services. They'd given the Tube line, the address and  
2 the Underground station. What more could they have  
3 done, I think they would probably wish to ask you? What  
4 more could London Underground have done?

5 A. To be honest, I'm trying to sort of say that the control  
6 officer should have reconfirmed. They hadn't got the  
7 information on the system that LUL had given. They  
8 should have pushed more to find out why we hadn't got  
9 that street.

10 Q. That sounds, if I may say so, more accurate.

11 The statement, your statement, then properly and  
12 helpfully goes on to describe the further mobilisations,  
13 the appliances that are sent, and gives the times of the  
14 dispatch, but ultimately, although the  
15 London Underground call was at 9.07, the first  
16 Fire Brigade vehicles didn't arrive at Edgware Road  
17 until 9.19. So 12 minutes rather than perhaps 6 or 7  
18 minutes. Some of the mobilisations were very speedy  
19 that morning.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You could have got there within four or five minutes,  
22 but it took 12 instead.

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. King's Cross, finally.

25 Paragraph 54 of your statement. The call at

1 King's Cross was from London Underground. It was the  
2 second part of the call that we looked at earlier.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Could we have INQ9927 [INQ9927-2]?  
5 The call was King's Cross Underground, and then the  
6 London Underground member of staff said:  
7 "We've got that on Euston Road."  
8 And, of course, King's Cross Underground is on  
9 Euston Road.  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. LUL:  
12 "It's the eastbound Piccadilly Line ... smoke in  
13 tunnel ... supervisor has requested your attendance ..."  
14 There's then a short reference to "Aldgate" and then  
15 the LFB control officer says:  
16 "I think we are going to go to the explosion, isn't  
17 it? Right, got King's Cross premise Euston Square or  
18 King's Cross British Rail. You are  
19 London Underground ... So that [must be] Euston."  
20 Was that question posed because those were the only  
21 two addresses in the LFB system or were there, in fact,  
22 44 addresses?  
23 A. That was the first match. She wanted to get a first  
24 match, and then, once she'd got that match, it would  
25 have dropped down about -- I think it was 40 different

1 address matches to pick from.

2 Q. So she was trying to limit it down --

3 A. Yes, she was.

4 Q. -- from the huge number that are in the system to

5 something that was right?

6 A. She was trying to get the right building to start with.

7 Q. It is obvious to us all now, and with hindsight. Of

8 course, it was no doubt very different and very

9 difficult for the controllers. But the Piccadilly Line

10 doesn't go through Euston Square.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. But neither the Fire Brigade control officer nor the

13 London Underground caller seemed to have appreciated

14 that.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. So at King's Cross, although there was a split

17 attendance -- three to one because it was

18 a London Underground call-out -- three were sent to

19 Euston Square and one sent to King's Cross. Now the

20 system -- this wouldn't happen, because the caller would

21 give you the exact unique number for a call-out to the

22 southbound Piccadilly Line at King's Cross

23 London Underground station?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. But on this occasion the majority of the response was

1 sent to the completely wrong location.

2 A. Again, if the Brigade control officer had continued to  
3 push -- they hadn't had an answer to the question,  
4 they'd said "So that's got to be -- you're LUL, so  
5 that's got to be Euston", and they didn't get an answer  
6 because it then went off at a tangent.

7 Under normal circumstances, they would have been  
8 pushing to get clarification that that's where they were  
9 going to, and that didn't happen.

10 Q. There were two, I think, errors, and I don't use that  
11 word pejoratively. One, the London Underground caller  
12 didn't correct the understanding on the Fire Brigade  
13 part that this was a call-out to Euston Square; it  
14 wasn't, it was King's Cross Underground station.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And the Fire Brigade, for its part, hadn't understood  
17 the Piccadilly Line goes nowhere near Euston Square?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. The result was this, wasn't it, Mr Payton, that Leading  
20 Firefighter Roche, of course, attended as the single  
21 call-out to King's Cross?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That is where the issue with the breathing apparatus  
24 arose, because he was a four-man crew. He had arrived  
25 at 09.13, I think, and the second crew,

1 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor, arrived at 09.42, half an  
2 hour later, an hour, almost, after the bomb had  
3 detonated, and it all arose, didn't it, because only one  
4 vehicle was sent to King's Cross and they couldn't then  
5 use their breathing apparatus because there were  
6 insufficient vehicles there to utilise breathing  
7 apparatus?

8 A. For using breathing apparatus, yes.

9 Q. That was most unfortunate and, indeed, although  
10 subsequent appliances were sent to Euston, because the  
11 system was configured in such a way that, when further  
12 appliances were requested, they were sent to the primary  
13 address, Euston Square, they were diverted due to the  
14 initiative of individual firefighters but that took,  
15 again, some more time?

16 A. Well, there's a couple of issues there. A message was  
17 sent by the fire appliance which was at King's Cross.  
18 What they omitted to do in their message was send their  
19 location. If they had sent their location as being  
20 King's Cross, the mobilisation of the two additional  
21 appliances would have gone to King's Cross.

22 Q. But it wasn't just their fault. The system only allowed  
23 the control officer at the time to see the primary  
24 location, Euston Square. Any additional resources  
25 requested for that incident were automatically sent to

1 the primary location and not the secondary location?

2 A. If the officer at the incident --

3 Q. Didn't tell you where they were --

4 A. -- doesn't request, yes. And the second thing which  
5 happened was that there was firefighters talking on  
6 mobile phones between Euston Square and King's Cross,  
7 which is not the system which is supposed to be adopted.  
8 They should go through the main scheme radio, and they  
9 can have talk-through, which then would mean that the  
10 Control would have heard the conversations about -- that  
11 they needed the appliances at King's Cross, and not  
12 Euston.

13 So there were a couple of things there where they've  
14 sidetracked the protocols which would have led to an  
15 earlier response for us to correct the primary to  
16 King's Cross.

17 Q. Taking a step back, for whatever reason, but primarily,  
18 the mechanistic way in which the mobilisation computer  
19 system worked, the mobilisations to two out of the four  
20 incidents worked so deficiently that there was a delay  
21 in the attendance at both Edgware Road and King's Cross?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 Russell Square. There was no call on the  
25 Fire Brigade to attend Russell Square.

1 Tavistock Square, numerous calls, of course, from  
2 members of the public to the Fire Brigade, but because  
3 the explosion occurred at ground level in full view of  
4 the emergency services who were there, the ambulance and  
5 the police, there was no requirement for it to be  
6 declared a major incident by the London Fire Brigade?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Three appliances arrived, I think, at Tavistock Square  
9 very quickly between 10.00.42 and 10.05.42 and more and  
10 more senior officers were requested, as opposed to  
11 appliances, to manage the incident.

12 A. Yes.

13 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Payton, I have no more questions  
14 for you.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

16 MR COLTART: I'm in my Lady's hands. I do have a number of  
17 questions, and I see the time. I don't know whether  
18 my Lady's minded to give the stenographers a break now  
19 or --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's probably a good idea,  
21 Mr Coltart, rather than break you off midstream. Thank  
22 you.

23 (3.15 pm)

24 (A short break)

25 (3.30 pm)

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?  
2 Questions by MR COLTART  
3 MR COLTART: Mr Payton, let's see if we can agree at the  
4 outset at the number of deployments which there were  
5 which resulted in fire appliances going into  
6 Euston Square Underground station.  
7 The first was as a result of the initial deployment,  
8 wasn't it?  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Shortly after 9.00?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. The second was at 09.19 when Firefighter Wilson radioed  
13 in from King's Cross requesting two further appliances,  
14 they also went to Euston Square Underground station?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. The third wave was at 09.36 when Firefighter Wilson  
17 radioed in again on the instruction of Leading  
18 Firefighter Roche to make it an eight-pump call-out.  
19 Correct?  
20 A. Correct.  
21 Q. A number of those appliances also went to Euston Square  
22 Underground station, yes?  
23 A. I haven't got that detail to refer to, but ...  
24 Q. We can probably assist you with that shortly.  
25 The fourth was that, even after that point in time,

1 some of the senior officers who were in fast response  
2 vehicles, for example, were being paged to attend, and  
3 did attend, at Euston Square Underground station. So  
4 Divisional Officer Cowup, for example. Correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What I'd like to explore with you a little, if I may,  
7 are the opportunities which may have presented  
8 themselves to avoid that repeated deployment to the  
9 wrong Underground station, okay?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, could we have up on the screen, please, [LFB11-2]?  
12 If we enlarge the bottom half of the page, please, we're  
13 familiar with this document, this is the MOBIS report  
14 which sets out the timing of the deployments.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can we just highlight the entry for A271, please.  
17 This was a fire appliance from Clerkenwell fire  
18 station which was one of the three that was sent as the  
19 primary deployment to Euston Square Underground station?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I don't know whether it's possible to do the split  
22 screen and put a second document up there for us to have  
23 a look at, please, but if we could go to [LFB56-35], and  
24 enlarge -- can we enlarge, then, the first paragraph or  
25 first couple of paragraphs of that document?

1 This is the initial witness statement that was made  
2 by Firefighter Orrow, who was on that appliance A271.  
3 So he says this:  
4 "At 09.03 [he was] ordered to attend smoke in tunnel  
5 [at] Euston Square Tube station, Gower Street (primary  
6 address). [He] attended and liaised with Euston crew  
7 already at platform level. No evidence of any smoke or  
8 fire, although reports from pedestrians that something  
9 had occurred, as there were reports of a rush of air in  
10 the tunnels. Also hearing reports of a possible train  
11 crash at Aldgate from other members of the public."  
12 Then he says this:  
13 "Stop code 5 sent from Euston, both A271 and A272  
14 status 6 returning to A27."  
15 Now, we can deal with the language. A27, that was  
16 the code, was it not, for Clerkenwell fire station?  
17 A. A27, yes.  
18 Q. What does it mean to issue "stop code 5"?  
19 A. I'm sorry, I've been out of the Brigade nearly two  
20 years, I'm trying to remember what a code 5 is, but  
21 it's -- I think it was "alarm, good intent".  
22 Q. Sorry?  
23 A. An alarm which has been caused through good intent.  
24 They haven't found anything there. So they've basically  
25 sent a stop saying that they're finished at that end,

1 that they don't need any additional appliances, and then  
2 they booked mobile to go back home.

3 Q. Should that have overridden any further automatic  
4 deployment of fire engines to Euston Square Underground  
5 station?

6 A. This being the primary location, them sending that  
7 message means that that incident should be closed  
8 because what they're saying is there isn't an incident  
9 there.

10 Q. Exactly.

11 A. So that should then be looking towards closing it. But  
12 there must have been other appliances still in  
13 attendance. Euston's appliance must still have been  
14 there at that time.

15 Q. It's right to say that -- certainly, I can't find any  
16 record of that stop code from the MOBIS report. What  
17 might be the possible explanation for that?

18 A. You'd have to go to what they call the mobilising  
19 system, the ProCad. MOBIS extracts certain information  
20 from the system and ProCad, for me, as a mobilising  
21 officer, is the one which is accurate 100 per cent  
22 because, as you put information into the system, it will  
23 record it on the ProCad system.

24 MOBIS actually pulls extracts of information which  
25 are useful or needed by the Brigade or for preparing

1 other reports on to that MOBIS system.

2 So the only explanation I can give to that, that  
3 there's no stop recorded anywhere on MOBIS, is the fact  
4 that it hasn't come through from the ProCad, from the  
5 mobilising computer.

6 Q. All right. I'm sure if it became important that could  
7 be checked, but is it fair to assume that, in order to  
8 leave that incident at Euston Square Underground station  
9 and return to Clerkenwell fire station,  
10 Firefighter Orrow would have to have informed  
11 Brigade Control that that's what he was doing?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And it's safe to assume also, presumably, that in doing  
14 so, he would have provided an explanation as to why he  
15 felt entitled to do that?

16 A. That's the -- yes, it would have been this stop code 5.

17 Q. It's a false alarm, there's nothing here?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. If we could go back to LFB11 then, please, we know then  
20 that at page 3 [LFB11-3] -- and enlarge the middle of that page --  
21 at 09.19 that morning we see that message from A242.

22 Now, this is Firefighter Wilson, isn't it, from the Soho  
23 pump, which is at King's Cross --

24 A. At King's Cross, yes.

25 Q. -- requesting two additional appliances?

1 You deal with this issue in paragraph 61 of your  
2 witness statement where -- well, actually, in fairness,  
3 it starts at paragraph 60:

4 "At 09.19 Soho's pump sent a request for an  
5 additional two appliances and two were dispatched: A431  
6 and A421."

7 Now, we know, don't we, that they were dispatched  
8 and, indeed, arrived at Euston Underground station,  
9 Euston Square Underground station?

10 A. As a mobilising officer, I don't know that they arrived  
11 at that station, but I know they were en route and  
12 that's where they were going, yes.

13 Q. You can take it from me that they did. All right?

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. You carry on:

16 "The additional appliances were not sent to  
17 King's Cross because the primary incident location on  
18 the mobilising system was set as Euston Square station  
19 following the initial call."

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You go on to explain over the page:

22 "In order for additional appliances to be sent to  
23 King's Cross, A242, Mr Wilson, would have had to have  
24 sent an informative message stating his location along  
25 with what was required."

1 You carry on a little further in your statement:  
2 "In the absence of specifically stating their  
3 location, the control officer would not be aware that  
4 they were at the secondary as opposed to the primary  
5 location. Had he known that, he could have opened a new  
6 mobilising frame and temporarily swapped the primary and  
7 secondary locations to allow the mobilising system to  
8 select and dispatch appliances to King's Cross."

9 So on your account, as I've understood it, it was  
10 a lack of information from the firefighter at the scene  
11 about where the appliances were needed?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could we just have a look at what Mr Wilson had to say  
14 about that? It's at our reference [INQ9895-2]. If we  
15 could enlarge the middle of the page, please, at 09.19  
16 he says:

17 "From Leading Firefighter Roche at King's Cross,  
18 request two additional appliances for manpower purposes.  
19 I sent this priority message and Control informed me  
20 that a stop had already been received for this  
21 incident."

22 Just pausing there, because I don't want us to go  
23 down a blind alley, there was some confusion between  
24 Mr Colebrook-Taylor's appliance, A241, and A242, the  
25 appliance at Soho, as to which of them had previously

1 sent a stop on an unconnected incident they'd been  
2 attending.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. So let's put that to one side and ignore that. But he  
5 carries on:

6 "I informed Control there must be some sort of  
7 mistake as a stop had not [come from us] and we needed  
8 two additional appliances. Control told me to contact  
9 the officer of the watch by landline. Luckily, I had my  
10 mobile phone with me and happened to know the number.  
11 I did this and once again requested two more appliances  
12 making a point of confirming the address and explaining  
13 that we were the secondary attendance."

14 So does it appear on the firefighter's account that  
15 he did provide the information which was required to get  
16 the appliances to King's Cross rather than to  
17 Euston Square?

18 A. On this statement it does imply that, but I can  
19 guarantee you that I've looked at the mobilising logs --  
20 not the MOBIS, the ProCad logs -- and there is nothing  
21 on there which is stating that he gave his address. He  
22 just gave a priority and he asked for two additional  
23 appliances using his call sign.

24 Q. The ProCad log, is it a transcript of the telephone call  
25 or is it a summary of what was requested or the

1 information provided?

2 A. No, whatever the control officer is told and puts on to  
3 the computer system, it records it on the ProCad logs.

4 It's not transposed from -- across from somewhere. It's  
5 actually from the mobilising computer.

6 Q. Because, in fairness to Firefighter Wilson, it appears,  
7 certainly from this document, he was pretty clear,  
8 wasn't he, that he had provided that information?

9 A. That's what he's saying there, yes.

10 Q. He even goes as far, does he not, of saying:

11 "I made a point of confirming the address and  
12 explaining that we were the secondary attendance."

13 He knew what information was required, didn't he?

14 A. He did that on the phone.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. If we're talking about the first part, which is the part  
17 where he's done it over the Brigade radio --

18 Q. Oh, yes.

19 A. -- which is the part where he's saying here "at  
20 King's Cross", that is not on the system that he said  
21 "at King's Cross".

22 It does, on the system, say that he sent a priority  
23 message and he asked for two additional appliances.

24 When he made the phone call at the request of the  
25 control supervisor, yes, he did then give all this

1 information and, from the interviewing that I did, that  
2 senior control officer then started doing the correction  
3 of the locations, because it was discovered from that  
4 that the primary and secondary locations were wrong.

5 Q. Let's see if we can just assist you with that.

6 If we could have LFB170, please, on the screen, is  
7 this the supervisor you have in mind, Trish Coleman?

8 A. It is, yes.

9 Q. It's question 2, these are notes that you prepared,  
10 I think, for interviews which you had with the blue  
11 watch staff?

12 A. They were, yes.

13 Q. At paragraph 2:

14 "At 09.33, it would appear that somehow you were  
15 made aware that two appliances asked for by A242 who  
16 were at King's Cross had been sent in error to Euston  
17 station."

18 Then:

19 "From the ProCad logs it appears that you sent  
20 a message to both [of them] requesting [that] they  
21 proceed to King's Cross."

22 A. Yes, indeed.

23 Q. So by this stage, although it was too late, in fact, to  
24 stop those two appliances from getting to Euston Square,  
25 the supervisor of the watch knows that the appliances

1 are required at King's Cross and not at Euston Square  
2 Underground station?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Well, then, the next event, if we go back to LFB11,  
5 please -- forgive me for one moment -- and we turn  
6 through to page 4 [LFB11-4]. So this is at 09.36, at the top of  
7 the page, this is the eight-pump message, isn't it, from  
8 Leading Firefighter Roche --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- via Mr Wilson:

11 "Make pumps 8."

12 If we -- sorry to dart about in the documents, but  
13 if we just then look at [INQ9895-2] again, and we see he's  
14 got the entry down at 09.34:

15 "From Leading Firefighter Roche at King's Cross  
16 'make pumps 8'. Control asked me to confirm that the  
17 message read 'make pumps 8'. I confirmed this along  
18 with the address."

19 So it appears, doesn't it, that he again had made  
20 a point of saying to them: these fire engines have got  
21 to go to King's Cross Underground station, yes?

22 A. Yes, according to his statement.

23 Q. In fact, if we go back to LFB11 [LFB11-4], please, the eight  
24 appliances in question which included, didn't they, if  
25 we look halfway down that page, 020E, that was the

1 Command Unit, wasn't it --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- which had all the information technology and  
4 communication systems on it?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I think three or four entries above that, A236, that was  
7 the fire and rescue unit, which had the additional  
8 equipment on it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. These appliances were all mobilised again to  
11 Euston Square Underground station?

12 A. I can't tell from the MOBIS log.

13 Q. Well, if we go down the page to the bottom of the page,  
14 you see they're all mobilised, and it's the same  
15 address, isn't it: Euston Square Underground station,  
16 Euston Road, St Pancras, London?

17 A. Yes.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's an odd combination, actually.

19 MR COLTART: It is an odd combination.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: St Pancras takes us back to --

21 MR COLTART: Towards King's Cross. But in fact, we know --  
22 so if we go, sorry, back up the page again, can we  
23 highlight A271, please?

24 This was Mr Orrow's appliance, which has already  
25 been to Euston Square Underground station once, and he's

1 sent back there again. If we return to his statement,  
2 which is at [LFB56-35], and enlarge, at the top of that  
3 page, then, he says:

4 "A271 [which is his appliance] returned to  
5 [Clerkenwell fire station at] 09.30 amid conflicting  
6 reports of incidents occurring on the Underground  
7 system. At ..."

8 Then there's a gap before he puts the time in. It  
9 should read 09.37, okay, which is the time of the  
10 mobilisation of the eight-pump incident:

11 "At [09.37] A271 ordered to an eight pump incident  
12 at King's Cross. Rendezvous point Euston Square Tube,  
13 Gower Street. I queried this ordering by phone with  
14 CMC ..."

15 What does "CMC" stand for?

16 A. That's the Resource Management Centre.

17 Q. In Stratford?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "... before proceeding as it seemed at odds with current  
20 events, but was informed that the address was correct.

21 Very difficult driving to the address given, as many  
22 roads were now shut by the police, which caused

23 severe ... congestion ... had to [use] Euston's

24 forecourt to bypass a roadblock ... On arrival at

25 Euston Square Tube station, there was no obvious need

1 for us to be there, but getting information back from  
2 Control was impossible due to the amount of radio  
3 traffic. I liaised with the crew of A236 and also  
4 ADO Ginty as to what we should do. ADO Ginty asked me  
5 to ascertain who was present while he attempted to  
6 contact CMC by mobile phone. After some delay, several  
7 appliances were ordered via radio traffic to proceed to  
8 King's Cross whilst the remainder were similarly ordered  
9 by Mr Ginty on his finally being able to get through on  
10 his mobile [phone]."

11 So despite Mr Wilson having specified the location  
12 for the eight-pump call and despite Leading  
13 Firefighter Orrow having spoken to Gold at Stratford --

14 A. Sorry, I gave you some wrong information there. CMC was  
15 the old name for the Control. I apologise. CMC is not  
16 RMC. CMC is the old word for the main control.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 A. So he contacted Control, not RMC.

19 Q. So in fact, both Mr Wilson and Mr Orrow had spoken to  
20 the same unit, which was the main control room?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. One had specified King's Cross; yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And the other had queried it on the basis that he'd  
25 already been to Euston Square once and he knew that

1 there was no incident there; yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But nonetheless, that's where the mobilisation took  
4 place?

5 A. The only part which I can't confirm is the fact that  
6 taking information that you've given from that  
7 statement, I'm not 100 per cent sure that they did  
8 specify it was King's Cross, and again, I can only say  
9 that, if it's on ProCad -- MOBIS is not giving the  
10 information. MOBIS is giving what they sent the  
11 appliances to, I agree there. But ProCad would have  
12 actually stated what they said, and if they just came on  
13 and said "Make pumps 8", that does not give you an  
14 address, and I can't remember, when I collated all the  
15 information out together, ever seeing on ProCad where  
16 they said "at King's Cross".

17 Q. Even if that's right in relation to Mr Wilson, and even  
18 if he didn't provide the specific information which he  
19 refers to in his witness statement, it can't possibly  
20 apply, can it, in relation to Mr Orrow, because he had  
21 already been there once, which is why he phoned up to  
22 query the redeployment. Do you agree?

23 A. I agree that, yes.

24 Q. If we go back to [LFB11-4], please, at 09.37, and simply  
25 for my Lady's note, A231 also attended at Euston Square

1 Underground station which is part of the eight appliance  
2 deployment, as did A251, and that's the -- we don't need  
3 to get it up on the screen, but we have a witness  
4 statement from Earl Johnson, a firefighter at INQ4281-1,  
5 and he says this:

6 "At 09.34, our appliance was ordered to  
7 Euston Square by way of teleprinter message. I think  
8 the message made reference to King's Cross station where  
9 live casualties had been reported. We arrived at  
10 Euston Square in about six minutes. Also, there were  
11 crews from Clerkenwell, Euston, Belsize and  
12 Kentish Town, and I liaised with the station officer  
13 Clerkenwell and Kentish Town who confirmed that  
14 something had occurred at King's Cross and live  
15 casualties were being carried out."

16 So it was, can you agree, very unfortunate that,  
17 even at this relatively late stage in the incident,  
18 there were quite so many fire crews at Euston Square  
19 Underground station, notwithstanding the many warnings,  
20 perhaps, which had been given?

21 A. I can't understand why, because right at the top of this  
22 page that you're showing now it actually shows that the  
23 officer, supervisor in control is contacting by radio  
24 asking an appliance there, 431, to proceed to  
25 King's Cross station. So there's some confusion.

1 In my opinion, it looks like what's happening is  
2 they've got the information that's come in, which you  
3 was referring to earlier, and they're trying to now  
4 rectify it, they're contacting appliances on the radio  
5 because they know they're en route, and they're trying  
6 to redirect them to the correct location, but, by the  
7 time they've got into the mobilising system and  
8 transferred it across, as they did when I've looked at  
9 the logs, they did change it over to King's Cross being  
10 the primary, but it was too late for these appliances  
11 which had already been mobilised.

12 Q. That one at the top, the entry at the top to 431, that  
13 was one of the two that had been sent at 09.19?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And in relation to whom Mr Wilson had phoned the  
16 supervisor of the watch?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But, of course, by this time the stop, the code 5 stop,  
19 had already been issued by Firefighter Orrow?

20 A. By the time it had got to 8, it was found that that  
21 was -- from that other incident, and at 09.35, they're  
22 trying to correct that and they're trying to push the  
23 appliances towards King's Cross.

24 Q. Was the system in relation to mobilisation of appliances  
25 by teleprinter message, or however it was done,

1 completely separate from the messaging system in  
2 relation to pagers for the officers who were being asked  
3 to attend?

4 A. It's triggered by the same mobilising message, so if on  
5 the mobilising message it needs a number of officers to  
6 attend, it's still on the same message that was sent to  
7 the appliances. So it goes out on a pager  
8 automatically, and then the officers have to phone in.

9 Q. Because I think you mention in your statement that the  
10 last time there was any deployment to Euston Square  
11 Underground station was at 09.39, but we've had evidence  
12 from Mr Cowup that he received a pager message at 09.42  
13 sending him to Euston Square Underground station.

14 A. That could well be the case, because it depends which  
15 time he looks at on his pager. The paging system is not  
16 an inhouse system, so it goes -- it relies on an outside  
17 company. So basically, we send the messages, but it  
18 goes through a Vodafone system. So it doesn't mean that  
19 that message is instantaneous, there can be a delay  
20 built in, especially if there's heavy traffic like there  
21 was on the day.

22 Q. All right, thank you. Let's move on to a separate  
23 topic, then, please, which is declaration of a major  
24 incident and what practical impact that has, as far as  
25 mobilisation is concerned.

1 I wonder whether we could have a look, please, at  
2 LFB28 [LFB28-1]. This is your mobilising policy that, as  
3 I understand it, was in force at the time. Could we  
4 have a look, please, at page 4 [LFB28-4] ?  
5 The bottom half of that page, this is where the  
6 relevant part starts:  
7 "A special attendance represents the total number of  
8 appliances, officers and equipment that are mobilised to  
9 premises of special risk or to incidents of a defined  
10 nature.  
11 "Special attendances, using the form ... may be  
12 determined on the authority of the [D0] ... The standard  
13 attendance for incidents of defined types are as  
14 follows ..."  
15 Then if we go over the page [LFB28-5] , please, we've got the  
16 predetermined attendance for a major incident, and we  
17 can see, can't we, that it's a six-pump attendance as  
18 a matter of course?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. The Fire Rescue Unit and the Command Unit will  
21 automatically be sent?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. Brigade Command Unit, a Conference Demountable Unit --  
24 I have to confess, I'm not quite sure what that is.  
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm surprised at you, Mr Coltart!

1 A. It was a separate unit where, if needed, it can go on  
2 and be deployed for officers having meetings with  
3 interagencies.

4 MR COLTART: Thank you.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does "dismountable" mean you can --

6 A. You can take it off --

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- remove it?

8 A. -- the unit, yes, my Lady.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I won't blame you for the use of  
10 English there.

11 MR COLTART: An ambulance, which, fortunately, I think  
12 that's a little clearer, two station commanders, a group  
13 commander. So that's the predetermined attendance, and  
14 then there's a note, isn't there:

15 "The above mobilising applies to the Fire Brigade  
16 Incident Commander initiating this procedure ..."

17 Now, this is predicated, is it not, on the basis of  
18 a major incident declared by the Fire Service?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, we know that didn't happen at King's Cross and  
21 a different route was taken, an eight-pump fire was  
22 reported by Mr Roche, and that of itself carried certain  
23 predetermined consequences, didn't it?

24 A. It did, yes.

25 Q. Which is why the Fire and Rescue Unit and the

1 Command Unit were mobilised, as we've just seen.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But if we carry on in the note:

4 "If initiated by another emergency service, the  
5 Incident Commander will be contacted by Brigade Control  
6 to verify the attendance required."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, we know in this case that a major incident at  
9 King's Cross was declared at 08.58 that morning by the  
10 British Transport Police. Inspector Mingay phoned his  
11 own control room, British Transport Police control room,  
12 to declare that major incident.

13 Now, taking it in stages, perhaps, but firstly,  
14 would you have expected the declaration of that major  
15 incident to have made its way to the Fire Brigade?

16 A. Yes, I would have.

17 Q. What was the normal route by which that would have been  
18 done?

19 A. It's normally through the organisation's control room.  
20 They would go control to control. The fallback for that  
21 is that normally it would become knowledge at the  
22 incident and then your own brigade officer may inform  
23 you in a message that they've -- that another service  
24 has declared.

25 Q. There's no evidence that we can see that Mr Roche was

1 ever contacted by Brigade Control to inform him of that  
2 declaration and to ask him what resources he required.  
3 Is it a reasonable assumption that the message  
4 wasn't passed from British Transport Police to London  
5 Fire Brigade, or that's, I suppose, one possibility;  
6 correct?

7 A. Yes, it's not on the logs, and it would have been  
8 logged.

9 Q. The only other possibility is that you were informed  
10 about it, but for whatever reason, it wasn't recorded  
11 and/or it wasn't passed on to Leading Firefighter Roche?

12 A. I would say 99 per cent sure that that is not the case  
13 because, as soon as an officer -- a control officer  
14 receives a call from another control room, it  
15 automatically opens up a screen which you then complete,  
16 and no officer would have taken information in without  
17 recording it.

18 Q. Last topic, and I suspect shorter and less complicated.  
19 Back in 2005, and indeed now, if there is an incident  
20 which requires the attendance of the Fire Brigade in an  
21 Underground tunnel, there are two issues to be resolved,  
22 aren't there? The first is: which are the two  
23 Underground stations which are at either end of the  
24 tunnel in question; correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. The second is choosing the primary and the secondary  
2 location?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, as we understand matters, great strides have been  
5 made in relation to the first of those two issues  
6 because, as Mr Keith has already explored, there are now  
7 unique reference numbers, aren't there --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- for each of the London Underground stations? So the  
10 sort of confusion which we had in this case, on 7 July,  
11 is very unlikely to occur again. Correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. But the second issue still involves an element of  
14 discretion, doesn't it?

15 A. No. The unique reference numbers that are given to us  
16 by London Underground actually specify the way round  
17 that they want the attendance.

18 Q. I see.

19 A. So they will pick a tunnel and then they'll get a choice  
20 of two, they want it this way round or they want it that  
21 way round, so it's a different unique reference number  
22 for each of those events. So they are actually telling  
23 us now what they want to be the primary and what they  
24 want to be the secondary, as well as which two tunnels  
25 are involved.

1 Q. So that's mandatory now, is it, that they have to --

2 A. It's part of their normal log system. It's in their  
3 system. So when they give us a unique reference number,  
4 we will repeat that back to them, the information, so  
5 that they know where we're attending and what the  
6 primary and the secondary locations are, if it's  
7 a tunnel event, and it's for them to then confirm that  
8 that information is correct that they've given us.

9 Q. Is there a requirement now on the part of your control  
10 officers to request any further information which could  
11 assist the crews who are to attend either at the primary  
12 or the secondary location?

13 A. If they have had a unique reference number, you mean, or  
14 if we've got it from another source?

15 Q. Well, let's take perhaps both of those. But in relation  
16 to a call from London Underground "smoke issuing from  
17 a tunnel" could, well, firstly, be the result of  
18 a number of different causes?

19 A. It could, yes.

20 Q. Secondly, it may be obvious, it may not, as to which end  
21 of the tunnel is more likely to be affected. Do you say  
22 that the new system in place deals with the second of  
23 those two issues because the primary and the secondary  
24 location will now always be specified by the Underground  
25 staff?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But there was no -- and I don't mean to criticise the  
3 control officer who was on duty that day because she  
4 faced, frankly, a pretty appalling situation. But there  
5 was no attempt, was there, by her, to make any enquiry  
6 as to the nature of the incident or, for example, the  
7 amount of smoke which was visible or to ascertain any  
8 other information which might have assisted the crews  
9 who were being deployed to attend at that incident?

10 A. Yes, I mean, that is true. Normally, when you get  
11 information from LUL, it's quite precise and you -- they  
12 will -- they know what information we need and usually  
13 you're not having to pull that information out. So the  
14 normal procedure with LUL is a good one where the  
15 information flow is very good.

16 With the unique reference numbers, we've cut that  
17 side of it out. We shouldn't have to -- unless there's  
18 something where we've had another incident, there may be  
19 other incidents running, and we're trying to sort of get  
20 additional information, then, yes, the control officer  
21 would do that. But under normal circumstances, they  
22 would take the unique reference number that the LUL  
23 control staff know exactly what they want and where they  
24 want it, and we will deploy. We won't hold that up for  
25 longer than we have to. We'll just get confirmation of

1 the address and the tunnels and we'll deploy.

2 Q. Finally, this then: if the call came in from a member of  
3 the public, who of course wouldn't have access to the  
4 unique reference numbers and so on and so forth and  
5 wouldn't understand how the systems are configured, are  
6 your operators, your control officers, trained now, have  
7 they received some form of training as to the enquiries  
8 which they should make to enable them to assess which  
9 end of the tunnel gets the three fire engines and which  
10 end of the tunnel only gets the one?

11 A. It would be -- they are, they will push for as much  
12 information as possible, but for a member of the public  
13 it is very, very rare for them to actually know where  
14 a train is. It's very, very rare. They will relate to  
15 a station rather than say, you know, "There's smoke  
16 coming and it's coming from this station and it goes to  
17 another station". They wouldn't have that information.  
18 It's not viable. But what we would do is we would use  
19 information from other callers that come in to try to  
20 look and see, if we started getting calls coming in from  
21 another station, then we could maybe put them two  
22 together. But you could be working with two separate  
23 control officers, taking separate calls, and it will be  
24 up to the supervisors to pick up on it and try to bring  
25 the two together.

1 Q. But has there been, since 7 July 2005, as far as you  
2 know, any training or guidance issued to your control  
3 officers to assist them in the sort of questions or  
4 queries which they should raise with a caller in order  
5 to identify with precision where the deployment should  
6 be sent?

7 A. They've always had that, and it's been refreshed after  
8 the bombing incidents, but it's nothing -- nothing has  
9 changed. They are trained that they are supposed to ask  
10 those sorts of questions, but they wouldn't be pushing  
11 for questions about a split attendance. We don't take  
12 calls from members of the public and generally go for  
13 a split attendance. It's LUL, it's something with LUL  
14 that we'll do, but we will always send to the station  
15 which they're talking about -- if they say it's in  
16 a tunnel, we'll try to pull information out from them  
17 and certainly now we're in a better position if they  
18 said it was the Piccadilly Line, things like that. But  
19 a lot of the times you've got people which are in  
20 a station and all they've seen is some smoke coming out  
21 of the station.

22 Q. I don't mean to elongate this unnecessarily, and I'm not  
23 going to, but it appears, doesn't it, that the training  
24 which had been issued to the control officer who took  
25 this particular call on 7 July had not prepared her for

1 making the level of enquiry which in fact was necessary  
2 in order to make an informed decision?

3 Now, if there hasn't been any enhancement in that  
4 training programme since that time, is that something  
5 which the Fire Brigade should be looking at to improve  
6 the quality of its response?

7 A. It was --

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Break that down. Hypothesis followed  
9 by question. Are you accepting the hypothesis that the  
10 operator hadn't received the training?

11 MR COLTART: In fairness, the question wasn't that she  
12 hadn't received the training; it was that the training  
13 may have been deficient, if that was the level of  
14 response which was given.

15 A. The training that that officer had had was sufficient  
16 that she should have made more enquiries for that  
17 incident.

18 After the event, that officer, and all officers, had  
19 refresher training through the training department on  
20 what is expected of them, and that is ongoing. And what  
21 has also been introduced is what they call a call coach  
22 system now where every single officer, every call they  
23 take, can be looked at and can be assessed and they do  
24 their training from their live calls.

25 Q. That's very encouraging, if I may respectfully say so,

1 but are you satisfied yourself that the steps which have  
2 been taken are sufficient to ensure, as far as possible,  
3 that this scenario is not going to unfold again?

4 A. I am, yes.

5 MR COLTART: Thank you very much indeed.

6 A. Thank you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

8 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

9 MR SAUNDERS: Can I just deal with one matter, please?  
10 Equipment. Six days before this tragic incident, the  
11 London Fire Brigade came in to possession, did they not,  
12 of a casualty handling equipment lorry?

13 A. Yes, they did.

14 Q. Based at Paddington?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. It had on it a considerable number of collapsible chairs  
17 and stretchers?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It was deployed, and her Ladyship has heard evidence,  
20 initially to Edgware Road.

21 A. It was, yes.

22 Q. Can you help us? That request for the lorry, was it  
23 a specific request that was made by the  
24 Incident Commander?

25 A. It was, yes.

1 Q. Was it in fact used, the stretchers and the chairs?

2 A. It was deployed to the incident as you suggested --

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. -- and in the Resource Management Centre each of the

5 other incidents were contacted and asked if they

6 required any of that equipment that was on there.

7 My understanding -- I'm thinking back now -- it

8 wasn't required at other ones because it was slightly

9 later on in the incident and it remained at that first

10 incident. But that Incident Commander was told that,

11 when he had got the number -- the amount of equipment

12 that he required, to then let Control know so that it

13 could be released and available for the other incidents

14 that were occurring.

15 Q. So it was called out initially, I think, at 10.02.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The message goes out at 10.08 to dispatch it.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But it's not clear, I don't think, whether it was used

20 there or elsewhere, according to your --

21 A. Right, it did go to the one where requested.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. But I can't tell you if they used equipment off of it.

24 All I know is that it went there and the only thing that

25 we did was to make them aware of the fact that we had

1 other incidents running and that, if they didn't require  
2 it, or they could take what they wanted off, to let us  
3 know when it was available so we could deploy it if it  
4 was required at other incidents.

5 Q. The reason the Brigade obtained this new equipment was  
6 for an incident very much like this, wasn't it?

7 A. Yes, I'm just trying to think how we got it. I think it  
8 was through -- through a Government -- through the  
9 Government scheme. We didn't go out and purchase the  
10 equipment. I think it was actually given to us. But  
11 I honestly can't remember how we came about it.

12 Q. But presumably, it would have been to cover a major  
13 incident?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. It's got 50 stretchers on it?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. It would be something very much out of the ordinary?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It's since been done away with, or is that something  
20 I should deal with with Mr Reason?

21 A. I think you should deal with Mr Reason on that one.

22 MR SAUNDERS: All right, then I'll wait. Thank you,  
23 my Lady.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sure he can wait.

25 Right, Ms Boyd?

1 Questions by MS BOYD

2 MS BOYD: Thank you, Mr Payton. Mr Payton, can I deal first  
3 of all with the control room itself and what the control  
4 operators are doing? In normal circumstances, there's  
5 a minimum of 14?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Which is three supervisors, three main scheme radio  
8 operators --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and then eight control operators?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Those control operators, they are taking emergency calls  
13 from the public, from NCC, any other emergency?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Are they also answering internal calls from officers  
16 responding to pager alerts?

17 A. They take all other calls, administration calls as well  
18 as officers for operational reasons.

19 Q. Do they have to ensure that alerts generated by the  
20 mobilising system are acted upon?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. In terms of those alerts, perhaps you can elaborate,  
23 what exactly is an alert?

24 A. All right, alerts are generated by the mobilising system  
25 itself, and it can be for a number of different reasons.

1 It could be an alert because there is something to do  
2 with the system which needs to be dealt with. It can be  
3 to do with -- we've sent fire engines to an incident and  
4 they have left the station and they haven't booked that  
5 they're en route to the incident. So it will alert the  
6 control staff to the fact that we've got an incident  
7 where we've ordered an appliance but, as far as the  
8 computer's concerned, it hasn't left the station. So  
9 then we have to get on the radio or contact the station  
10 and make sure that it is en route.

11 Q. So those alerts are created automatically by the system?

12 A. They are.

13 Q. A sort of failsafe?

14 A. And it's the same for senior officer mobilising as well.

15 If they don't respond to the pager within a certain  
16 amount of time, it will give an alert, and if you've got  
17 an incident like we had on that day and officers are  
18 having to queue to get their order in, it will keep  
19 throwing alerts up, so it creates more and more alerts  
20 as the time goes on.

21 Q. So the busier you are, the more calls, the more likely  
22 there are more alerts?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Alerts are also created by incoming messages?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So, for instance, Firefighter Wilson from King's Cross  
2 requesting two additional appliances is an alert?

3 A. Yes, because it comes in through the radio operator, who  
4 just takes the message. Once they've done that, they  
5 push a button and then it's up to another control  
6 officer to then look and dispatch the appliances.

7 Q. On July 7, was there one control officer designated to  
8 deal with alerts, or were all the control officers  
9 dealing with emergency calls and alerts?

10 A. At the beginning, they were dealing with emergency calls  
11 and alerts, but the alerts do not take priority over an  
12 incoming 999 call. But as time went on, the alerts were  
13 getting so high that we had to put an officer on to  
14 doing just alerts for about 30 minutes to clear them  
15 down to make sure we wasn't missing any important alerts  
16 that were coming in.

17 Q. Because, effectively, there's a whole list of alerts  
18 which somebody has to get through, does that explain why  
19 there's sometimes a delay between, for instance, the  
20 incoming message from Firefighter Wilson requesting two  
21 additional appliances at 09.19 and that request being  
22 activated at 09.22?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. On 7/7, you've explained that, in fact, the recall  
25 facility was activated --

1 A. It was.

2 Q. -- just prior to 9.00.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And that by the time that was achieved, that meant there  
5 were four supervisors, still the three main scheme radio  
6 operators, because, as you've explained, there are three  
7 channels and you know it can only have one person  
8 communicating --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and 14 control operators and, in addition, two  
11 fallback positions at Stratford?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. That wasn't instantaneous, however, was it, so that, by  
14 the time you had that first call at 08.58 from  
15 Aldgate -- this is the one that was calling to Aldgate,  
16 and then went on to try to call for attendance at  
17 King's Cross, and we have that 2-minute-14-second break  
18 when another operator comes to deal with it.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But the initial call was at 08.58. You've still got all  
21 your other calls across London that you're dealing with,  
22 and although you've activated the recall facility, it  
23 presumably takes a few minutes to get everyone up and  
24 seated and in control?

25 A. No, the initial -- the initial recall is that all the

1 control staff that are on a recall should be within the  
2 room in 30 seconds. They're already logged on to the  
3 system, they've just got to take the lock off of the  
4 system. But they haven't got to log in to the whole  
5 system. It's there.

6 It's when we did the second recall through the  
7 tannoy system, they're the people which have to come in  
8 and they have to get their headsets, they have to then  
9 log on to the system, which takes more time.

10 Q. So by the time you get to that call at 08.58 -- 9.00,

11 9.02 it's eventually taken by the second operator --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- have you achieved the full complement by that stage,  
14 including the two fallback positions at Stratford?

15 A. The two fallback positions at Stratford are there 24/7,  
16 and they would have been on the system, but they're not  
17 allowed to take calls, 999 calls. It's too dangerous to  
18 do that because they need to be -- that needs to be done  
19 in the room.

20 The additional staff, the ones which were recalled  
21 from technical support group and training wouldn't have  
22 been in position at that stage.

23 Q. So hence, were the additional calls you've put in  
24 process the recall facility, but it just takes a bit of  
25 time to get the full complement up to speed?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Meanwhile, you happen to have this call at 08.58 and  
3 hence the delay of two minutes for another control  
4 operator to take it?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. I think you've listened to the transcript of the tape,  
7 I'm not going to take you to it.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you hear in the background the supervisor who is  
10 seemingly aware that there is this call waiting and  
11 she's keeping an eye on the next control operator to  
12 become free?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can I now move to deal with Edgware Road? You said in  
15 evidence a moment ago that you often get multiple calls.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is it for that reason that the system that you have does  
18 have this facility to prompt the operator to consider  
19 that it might be a duplicate, to avoid sending  
20 unnecessary appliances?

21 A. It is, yes.

22 Q. If it's something like an explosion, what you say is  
23 it's unusual to have an explosion, two explosions, in  
24 close proximity?

25 A. It is, yes.

1 Q. So although the second call was to Edgware Road station  
2 the system shows the proximity of Praed Street to  
3 Edgware Road station --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- and that, therefore, consider whether it's  
6 a duplicate?

7 A. Yes. Because the information that come in to us was  
8 that it was Praed Street, they were guessing that it was  
9 73, I think it was, Praed Street, but they weren't  
10 100 per cent sure of that. The initial crew that get  
11 there, once they start their investigation, it could be  
12 that they'd moved down the road and they'd have found it  
13 at the LUL station. So it is a common practice for us  
14 to -- if there is a duplicate call that comes in, that  
15 that's the process we would use, before deploying more  
16 appliances across London.

17 Q. What happened was that, at 09.07, you get the call from  
18 LUL. There's then -- the system prompts the possible  
19 duplication?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. There's a discussion with the supervisor whether to  
22 accept the duplicate, and an operator radios the  
23 appliance at Praed Street at 09.10.12. So within three  
24 minutes --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- it's radioing the appliance at Praed Street to  
2 ascertain effectively whether or not it is a separate  
3 incident. What they say is:  
4 "For your information, a further call to fire and  
5 explosion at Edgware Road is taken for the same."  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. In other words, they're assuming it is the same --  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. -- unless someone gets back to them?  
10 A. That's correct.  
11 Q. We know we've heard evidence from Mr Davies, who caused  
12 a message to be sent back at 09.12.21 that it was  
13 a separate incident?  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. So overall, as a result of that, you lost, effectively,  
16 six minutes?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. Because we know that appliances were then mobilised to  
19 Edgware Road, and although there was the confusion with  
20 the Bakerloo Line, the Bakerloo entrance, we know that  
21 the appliances from North Kensington, I think it was,  
22 went to Edgware Road, Hammersmith & Circle Line?  
23 A. They did, yes.  
24 Q. Moving on to another topic, dealing with, perhaps, split  
25 attendance, you've been asked a number of questions

1 about that.

2 The caller, if it's the London Underground -- and  
3 we're really in this context concerned with tunnels in  
4 the Underground system -- the London Underground may  
5 specify the primary or secondary location?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In the majority of cases, would they do that?

8 A. Yes, they would. If it was in a tunnel and they had  
9 that information, yes, they would.

10 Q. When no information is provided and no primary or  
11 secondary location specified, the system, as we  
12 understand it, does it for you. Is that right?

13 A. It will do it for you as long as there's enough  
14 information for you to try and find the match, yes.

15 Q. This system is, as you say, partly bought off the shelf  
16 but partly has add-ons, if I can call it that.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Not just you, but other brigades. Is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Has other data or information been put into the system  
21 to help influence whether a location is delegated  
22 primary or secondary?

23 In other words, for instance, if one station at one  
24 end of a tunnel has easier access than a station at the  
25 other end?

1 A. Yes, that can be taken into account, and there are  
2 certain stations where there are -- in between the  
3 stations there's access tunnels, and on the very rare  
4 occasion they can actually programme that in as well.

5 Q. Now, you've been asked a number of questions as to why  
6 the split attendance is not balanced two and two but is  
7 three and one.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. That split attendance is still going to be the first  
10 attendance, albeit three at one end and one at the  
11 other?

12 A. It is.

13 Q. Is the procedure that that first attendance does an  
14 assessment and can then ask for additional resources?

15 A. They can.

16 Q. Normally, additional resources will arrive promptly?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You've told us in your statement that the correct  
19 address for King's Cross, on this occasion, would have  
20 been, I think, number 27, scrolling down on the list?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Russell Square/King's Cross, or Russell Square tunnels  
23 King's Cross?

24 A. Tunnels, yes.

25 Q. We know, of course, there was no mention of

1 Russell Square in the telephone call from NCC and,

2 indeed, "eastbound tunnel" would denote Caledonian Road?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But having looked down that number of 44 addresses, the

5 one for that particular tunnel would be Russell Square

6 tunnels King's Cross?

7 A. It would be, yes.

8 Q. So with the split attendance, is it right that three

9 would have gone to Russell Square and one to

10 King's Cross or the other way round?

11 A. No, the other way round. It would have been three to

12 King's Cross and one to Russell Square.

13 Q. If it had been the other way round --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- you've still got three appliances at one end of the

16 tunnel attacking it from that end and one at the other?

17 A. When you say "attacking it", you would have -- they

18 would do their assessments first, and then, when they've

19 had a conversation with the machines at the other end,

20 they would ascertain where in the tunnel that train is

21 and which end is the best to do the firefighting and

22 bring all the equipment to.

23 Q. The advantage of having three at one end is that your

24 resources at that end are not diminished, you can

25 achieve a lot more at that end?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Meanwhile, call for resources, if you need additional  
3 resources, depending on the nature of the incident?

4 A. Yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I thought this was policy, Ms Boyd,  
6 that was going to go to another officer.

7 MS BOYD: My Lady, there's a difference of opinion, I think,  
8 as to -- I think it probably falls in between the two.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well.

10 MR KEITH: It's a split point.

11 MS BOYD: Thank you, Mr Keith. If Mr Payton is unable to  
12 assist on this, then I can certainly deal with it with  
13 Mr Reason tomorrow.

14 Mr Payton, are you feeling comfortable with these  
15 questions or do you think it's moving too broadly into  
16 policy?

17 A. I'm comfortable at the moment.

18 Q. I'm sorry?

19 A. I'm comfortable at the moment.

20 Q. You're comfortable at the moment. Good.

21 So we have resources at one end --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- less resources at the other, and I was saying to you  
24 that, with the resources of three appliances at one end,  
25 you've got between 12 and 18 personnel, depending on the

1 number on each appliance?

2 A. You have, yes.

3 Q. The other advantage is that you've also got a senior  
4 officer with those three appliances --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- who can then command the scene?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Whereas, if you've got a balance of two and two, there  
9 may be some question mark over who's actually in overall  
10 control of that incident?

11 A. You'd have to make it clear to them who was going to be  
12 in charge of that incident.

13 MS BOYD: Yes. Madam, I think my next question would be  
14 falling further into policy, so I think I'll leave that,  
15 thank you.

16 But perhaps, just before I leave it, in your  
17 30 years of experience in control and latterly in  
18 overall charge of mobilise and control, did it -- or was  
19 there ever any concern about that policy of a split  
20 attendance being three to one as opposed to an even  
21 balance of two?

22 A. No, it's always been a sound policy for us and, even  
23 when I've been at incidents as the Incident Commander  
24 myself, everybody knows that you're there to do an  
25 assessment to start with. You're not there to do major

1 firefighting.

2 You've got to be in a position -- nine times out of  
3 ten, you're -- with the information that's come in from  
4 Control, you've sent your main amount of appliances to  
5 the primary where you find that, nine times out of ten,  
6 that's where you need do your incident recovery and your  
7 fires and that sort of thing.

8 You still would -- you still leave that appliance at  
9 the other end because until you know that people aren't  
10 going to walk out along the tracks from the back of the  
11 train, you need to have that coordination.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Payton I've written down in my  
13 margin, "Tried, tested and trusted by experts". Would  
14 that be a fair summary of what you're saying?

15 A. That would, my Lady.

16 MS BOYD: I think I'll leave that one there, then.  
17 Perhaps not quite out of the woods, using Mr Keith's  
18 expression, with King's Cross yet. So can I move to the  
19 sequence of events, the time-line, at King's Cross, and  
20 the deployment?

21 You've been asked, first of all by Mr Coltart,  
22 questions based on the statement of Firefighter Orrow --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- who you may not be aware, but everyone else is aware,  
25 that he hasn't given evidence during these proceedings,

1 so his evidence hasn't been tested.

2 We don't know if, in fact, he actually did send  
3 a stop 5, but what you're saying is that there is no  
4 evidence on MOBIS that he sent a stop 5?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Would you expect to see it on MOBIS?

7 A. Yes, I would, because that's one of the requirements  
8 that MOBIS has got in the system, that it pulls that  
9 sort of information from ProCad.

10 Q. It's also been drawn to your attention that  
11 Firefighter Wilson at 09.19, when he requests two  
12 additional appliances, the suggestion is that, at that  
13 stage, he is saying he's at King's Cross. But from your  
14 enquiries, and your analysis of both MOBIS and ProCad,  
15 there is no mention of King's Cross at 09.19, is that  
16 right?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Is it right that the supervisor, you've told us, if we  
19 go to paragraph 62 in your statement -- perhaps we could  
20 have it up on the screen -- or dealing firstly with  
21 paragraph 61 just above it, you explain there that in  
22 order for the additional appliances to be sent to  
23 King's Cross A242 would have had to state their  
24 location, and I think that was also confirmed by  
25 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor, who was asked questions,

1 I think by Mr Coltart, and he confirmed that, as  
2 a matter of course, you would normally state your  
3 location and then give the message.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You explain and have explained why, due to the system  
6 and what is displayed, it wouldn't be obvious to the  
7 control operator where Firefighter Wilson was speaking  
8 from?

9 A. Not at that time.

10 Q. Moving to paragraph 62, the call came in at 09.22 --  
11 sorry, 09.19, it's activated at 09.22, and two  
12 appliances are then mobilised, A431 and A421 at 09.32  
13 and 09.33.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You go on in your statement to say:

16 "Shortly after the request from A242 for two  
17 additional appliances, a supervisor had a mobile  
18 telephone conversation with one of the crew of A242 ...  
19 to clarify a 'stop' message that had been sent under  
20 their call sign."

21 Now, again, we've heard the evidence about that from  
22 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor, who told us that his  
23 driver had told him that he'd sent the message as if  
24 from 242, forgetting he was riding a different  
25 appliance.

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. But he couldn't get through to Control to clarify it.

3 Do we understand it that the officer -- that the

4 supervisor you spoke to had a recollection of this

5 mixup?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So after talking to Firefighter Wilson and clarifying

8 the stop message hadn't come from 242, she then realised

9 that they were at King's Cross when Firefighter Wilson

10 got back to her. Is that right?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. She then caused a message to be sent to those two

13 appliances -- Belsize and Kentish Town? --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- to divert to King's Cross?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I think we've explained in the alerts, it wasn't her

18 that would send that message?

19 A. No.

20 Q. She would cause the main scheme radio operator --

21 A. She would get the main scheme radio operator to send

22 that message.

23 Q. The tapes are there to be heard, and I think it's LFB105

24 where you can hear the radio operator sending those --

25 I'm so sorry, not sending those messages, but after

1 redirecting A421 and A431, he then speaks to A242, and  
2 that prompts him to realise that, in fact, they are at  
3 King's Cross?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. As I say, the audio tape of those recordings is up on  
6 Lextranet, LFB105, for all to hear.

7 You have explained that the control operator having  
8 redirected those two appliances to King's Cross wouldn't  
9 supersede the address at that stage for the very reason  
10 she doesn't know what's happening at Euston Square.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. However, you go on in your statement, at paragraph 62,  
13 to say that it's likely that the radio operator would  
14 have been prompted that it was at King's Cross and  
15 that's when the -- it would have become clear that the  
16 incident was at King's Cross and the address is then  
17 superseded?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But that takes a few minutes, does it, for the alert to  
20 be activated?

21 A. Yes, because the person that's on the radio isn't the  
22 person which makes them changes. That then has to go  
23 back. And it's quite a significant change, so that  
24 would have gone back to a supervisor, and I'm unsure  
25 whether it would have been a supervisor or the control

1 officer, but they would have then gone into the system  
2 and had to do some changes to change the primary and the  
3 secondary locations.

4 Q. Should we remember that, although we've been focusing on  
5 the London bombs, these calls, these alerts, to these  
6 four incidents, there are, of course, numerous other  
7 calls and alerts happening around them?

8 A. That's correct, and also talking to surrounding  
9 brigades, which are also wanting information from us as  
10 to our situation and also offering help with appliances  
11 that they're making available.

12 Q. Perhaps again to understand the perhaps unprecedented  
13 nature and impact of these events on the control room,  
14 in terms of your experience in 30 years, you haven't had  
15 to use the fallback facility before?

16 A. Not in the way that we used it on that day, no.

17 Q. Can I now ask you to look at your statement at  
18 paragraphs 79 through to 81? I'm sorry, LFB 99, please.

19 You've set out there under "changes since 2005" --

20 I'm not going to ask you about them all, I can see what  
21 the time is and, indeed, you've been asked about the  
22 main ones, but have you set out from paragraph 79  
23 through, in fact, to the end of your statement the  
24 various changes that have taken place --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- since July 2005?

2 A. Yes.

3 MS BOYD: Thank you very much, Mr Payton.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Payton.

5 Those are all the questions we have for you. I hope

6 your being dragged out of retirement wasn't too

7 demanding for you.

8 A. Thank you very much.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Reason, I understand that you've  
10 been here all day, or all afternoon, anyway, on standby.

11 I'm very sorry to have kept you waiting, especially

12 somebody of your rank. I understand we can get to you

13 first tomorrow, but thank you for being prepared to be

14 on standby.

15 Thank you.

16 (4.45 pm)

17 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

18