

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 24 February 2011 - Morning session

1 Thursday, 24 February 2011

2 (10.00 am)

3 WITNESS G (continued)

4 Questions by MR EADIE (continued)

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Eadie?

6 MR EADIE: Good morning, my Lady. Good morning, Witness G.

7 Just before start back in on the questions, I said

8 yesterday we would try overnight to produce a schedule

9 of those paragraphs that we might want to refer to.

10 I do so with some trepidation, recognising the way the

11 wind was blowing yesterday on this topic, and

12 recognising also the wisdom of Lord Pannick's words in

13 this morning's Times, which were to the effect that, if

14 one lived in those countries in which the Government won

15 all its battles in court, they are likely to be

16 countries where no one would want to live.

17 But in any event, that is the schedule that we have

18 produced overnight with references to some paragraphs of

19 some of the statements, but I'm hoping that we can move

20 through this relatively quickly.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

22 MR EADIE: Witness G, can I start with a couple of strands

23 to be picked up from yesterday? Yesterday, at page 69

24 of the transcript, line 19, for anyone's note, you were

25 asked by Mr O'Connor this question:

1 "Question: Was there any mobile phone contact
2 between a mobile phone attributed to
3 Mohammed Sidique Khan and a mobile phone attributed to
4 Omar Khyam, which took place on 20 or 21 February?"

5 Are you in a position to answer that question?

6 A. I am?

7 Q. What is the answer to it?

8 A. No, there was not.

9 Q. I'm grateful.

10 You were asked a series of questions about what
11 material was sent to West Yorkshire Police by
12 Mr O'Connor yesterday and, again, for anyone's note, it
13 is page 38 of the transcript, in particular line 18.

14 You said in answer to questions about whether or not
15 any of the surveillance photographs from 2 February had
16 been sent to West Yorkshire, whether you knew that had
17 occurred or not, and your answer was:

18 "Answer: I don't know the answer to that. It is
19 possible that some went via joint agent sources, but
20 I do not know the answer to that."

21 Do you have any positive information, does the
22 Security Service have any positive information that such
23 photographs were, in fact, sent?

24 A. I don't.

25 Q. I'm grateful. We left it yesterday about to explore the

1 various links, as we now know them to be, and I wanted
2 to ask you some questions in relation to that next, if I
3 may.

4 You will recall a series of questions, notably from
5 Mr Keith, where he went through a great list, as it
6 were, of links that he said were available and
7 culminated, I think, on one occasion at least, with
8 my Lady saying: well, is that one also to be included
9 because it wasn't there at the time?

10 I want to ask you a bit, first of all, about
11 assessing those links.

12 Is it legitimate or fair to simply lump them
13 together, as it were, by address and name and view them
14 all as a group, or do you have to ask a series of
15 questions in relation to each of those links?

16 A. No, you would need to examine them individually.

17 Q. In relation to each individual item, presumably the
18 first question is: was it known at the time?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Then you would ask, would you, to what extent should it
21 have been known, should more have been known?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. That, as I think all are concerned are agreed, involves
24 stripping out information not available at the time?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Does it require more than that? Is it legitimate as
2 part of this exercise -- in other words, trying to
3 assess the reasonableness of the Security Service's
4 actions at the time -- is it appropriate simply to focus
5 on the material that we now know was, in fact, available
6 at the time, ie out there in the world to be discovered,
7 or do you need to ask more questions?

8 A. We have looked at this as broadly as we can.

9 Q. You would do that without the benefit of hindsight, if
10 you were trying to assess the actions at the time of the
11 Security Service?

12 A. I have tried to strip out hindsight when I look at these
13 things, yes.

14 Q. Would it be relevant to take into account in that
15 exercise -- in other words, in asking the question: what
16 should have been known? -- would it be appropriate, in
17 that circumstance, or not, to take into account the
18 nature of intelligence?

19 A. Yes, I believe very strongly that is appropriate.

20 Q. You deal with that subject in particular in
21 paragraphs 36 to 39 of your first statement, if we could
22 possibly have that on the screen [SYS11005-22].

23 Just talk me through, if you would, the points that
24 you're seeking to get over in 36(a), first of all. What
25 is the point that's being made there?

1 A. Intelligence comes in very, very large quantities and in
2 qualities. The same material can come from two
3 different sources and be about the same person, but not
4 obviously be so at the time.

5 Sometimes, the intelligence can be misleading and
6 the specific example I offer here is if a person who we
7 think should identify a photograph is shown a photograph
8 and fails to do so.

9 Q. If we go over the page [SYS11005-23] [SYS11005-24], please, in (b),
that's

10 a slightly different point, is it?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. Talk us through that point very briefly, if you would.

13 A. Trying to bring all the different strands together is
14 a difficult thing to do. This is an area in which we
15 have improved over the last few years, but as
16 I emphasise, particularly in relation to names over the
17 last few days, this is still not an easy process. The
18 requirement for desk officer intervention to bring
19 together stuff which, in hindsight, appear obviously to
20 be the same remains very important.

21 Q. In assessing the quality or nature of intelligence, is
22 it also to be taken into account that the subjects of
23 that investigation can take steps to mask their true
24 intentions?

25 A. Indeed.

1 Q. Is that the point that is being made in 37?

2 A. Yes, it is.

3 Q. You give -- is this right -- in 37(a), (b), (c) and (d)
4 examples of various steps that can be and, in your
5 experience, regularly are, taken. Is that right?

6 A. Yes, I think it's worth saying, particularly about (c)
7 there, this isn't always masking. You know, targets do
8 not spend all of their time plotting terrorist activity.
9 They do other things as well.

10 Q. Finally on this first limb of the exercise, of the
11 analysis, as it were, of trying to reconstruct the
12 Security Service's work, and what they should have
13 known, is it relevant to take into account at this stage
14 what other work might have been necessary in order to
15 make, for example, links?

16 A. Yes, that's so.

17 Q. Does that issue or set of issues engage the sorts of
18 prioritisation and resources as we discussed yesterday?

19 A. It does.

20 Q. So those prioritisation and resource issues are relevant
21 both to this first question, as it were -- is that
22 right -- and also to the what action to take question?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Finally, as a matter of generality on the analysis and
25 this first stage of it, is there a distinction between

1 knowing a person's identity -- in other words, for
2 example, that MSK is Mohammed Sidique Khan -- and
3 knowing his significance?

4 A. Yes, absolutely.

5 Q. Is that an important distinction in the
6 Security Service's work?

7 A. It's extremely important. We may have targets of very
8 great significance whose identities we do not know.

9 Q. Second question, or second series of questions, that
10 would then arise once one's answered that set of
11 questions then, is: what action should you have taken
12 and did you take?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is that a subject you touch on in paragraph 29 of your
15 first statement [SYS11005-19]?

16 A. It is.

17 Q. Again, could you very briefly, if you would, just talk
18 us through the points that you're trying to get over
19 there?

20 A. I think the first key point here is that, you know,
21 resources are limited and decisions about allocating
22 them will always have an intuitive element to them.

23 I think it's worth emphasising that not everybody
24 who is suspected of some association with
25 terrorist-related activity can become targets for the

1 Service. It would not be proportionate or sensible for
2 that to be so.

3 Nor would it be proportionate or sensible for us to
4 follow up everybody in significant detail who emerges
5 from a significant investigation.

6 Q. Thank you. Then the sort of action that you might take
7 you've covered, and I'm not going to go back over all of
8 them because some of them were covered in your
9 questioning earlier, but if you go to paragraph 47 in
10 that first statement, if you would, would the action
11 include -- the sorts of action that you might take,
12 depending upon your assessment of significance, include
13 the matters referred to at paragraphs 47(g) and (h)? [SYS11005-34] If
14 we go on a little bit, please, it's quite a long
15 paragraph.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Just to finish that section now we're there, you deal,
18 I think, is this right, in paragraphs 48 and 49, with
19 possible actions or drawing contrasts or limitations on
20 the sort of action that you might take? 48 deals, does
21 it, with the contrast between you and the police?

22 A. It does.

23 Q. And 49 [SYS11005-35] deals with control orders, which I think were
24 raised at an earlier stage of these proceedings, but you
25 make some points there?

1 A. It does.

2 Q. So once you've assessed the significance of the piece of
3 intelligence, or the various strands of intelligence,
4 and decided what action it is proportionate to take,
5 that will then feed into the third, as it were,
6 hypothetical question, which is whether or not that
7 hypothetical action might hypothetically have led to
8 a discovery of something new and interesting?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Is that, in essence, the analysis that you've done in
11 your statement in relation to each of the points of
12 contact between the Security Service and, particularly,
13 UDMS D and E?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. Can I focus, first of all, please, on Hasina Patel? We
16 now know that she had gone through an Islamic ceremony
17 of marriage with MSK. Is that right?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Did we know at the time that she was married to MSK?

20 A. No, we did not.

21 Q. How might you have discovered at the time that they had
22 gone through that marriage ceremony?

23 A. I don't know of any simple way to do so.

24 Q. Can you think of any reason at the time why you might
25 have checked whether Hasina Patel was married to MSK?

1 A. No.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So they didn't, in fact, go through
3 a civil ceremony which would be registered?

4 A. That's my understanding, my Lady.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

6 MR EADIE: We know that one of the cars which had been of
7 interest in this inquest was in fact transferred, the
8 registered keeper and named keeper of that car was
9 transferred, I think, from her to him.

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. He became the registered keeper after that transfer?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Is that an indicator or a contra-indicator that they
14 were man and wife?

15 A. I cannot see that we'd have thought at the time it was
16 a normal thing for a wife to do, to transfer her car to
17 her husband's ownership.

18 Q. They used different names, did they not?

19 A. They used their own names, yes.

20 Q. Quite. So he used Khan and she used Patel?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. She is recorded as living where?

23 A. At that time, she is recorded as living at
24 10 Thornhill Park Avenue.

25 Q. Is that in Batley?

1 A. No, that's not in Batley.

2 Q. Where is it?

3 A. That's in a different area of Leeds which I think is
4 called Thornhill Park.

5 Q. How far away roughly, in terms of miles, is that from
6 Batley?

7 A. About -- between two and three, I believe.

8 Q. If I told you it was 5.5, would that surprise you?

9 A. I'm glad I wasn't running that distance.

10 Q. Is there anything registered to Mohammed Sidique Khan at
11 10 Thornhill Road, as far as you're aware?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Were there different addresses that were, in fact,
14 linked to Mohammed Sidique Khan?

15 A. There were.

16 Q. We've seen reference to Pickles Field. We've seen
17 reference to 99 Stratford Street, and so on.

18 Can I move on, then, please, to Warlock, which was
19 the outward-bound camp. You deal with that, I think, in
20 your first statement at paragraph 50. Is that right?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Could we have paragraph 50.8 [SYS11005-38] up on the screen, please?
23 What I want to you do, if you would, please, can we
24 have 8 and 9 if possible on the screen? Can you read
25 those and confirm that they're accurate, if they are?

1 A. Yes, I can.

2 Q. We now know that a Mr McDaid was at the Warlock camp and
3 that he was the organiser.

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. I think that information was known at the time to
6 West Yorkshire Police?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. We also now know that MSK was there?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Did we know that fact until after the 7/7 bombings?

11 A. We did not know that until after the 7/7 bombings.

12 Q. You deal in the following paragraphs of your statement
13 through to the end of about paragraph 55, I think, with
14 the various steps that were taken to seek to identify
15 those who had attended that camp. Is that right?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. That included Yorkshire Police showing photographs of
18 people who they'd taken at that camp. Is that right?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. One of those was of MSK?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Was he identified at the time?

23 A. He was not.

24 Q. We saw from paragraph 50.8 that this camp, this sort of
25 camp, was not unique at the time, this wasn't, as it

1 were, a unique, one-off event?

2 A. No, absolutely not.

3 Q. Could you give us at least some indication of the broad
4 significance that was attached to McDaid who appears to
5 have organised the camps at that time? What was the
6 rough assessment of him at that time?

7 A. McDaid was known as an Islamist extremist. There was no
8 indication that he was involved in attack planning.

9 Q. Between this and the next point of contact, which
10 I think was Operation Honeysuckle, what's the length of
11 time, what's the period of time, roughly?

12 A. It's just over two years.

13 Q. Is that significant, in terms of a fair assessment of
14 whether or not you might have gone back and done further
15 things in relation to this camp?

16 A. There would have been very little else we could have
17 done, the steps having been taken properly, in my
18 opinion, at the time, by West Yorkshire Police and
19 ourselves to try to identify those who had been at the
20 camp.

21 Q. Was there any reason, either two years after or
22 thereafter up to the 7/7 bombings, to go back to all
23 these photographs that were taken at the Warlock camp
24 and seek to reactivate attempts to identify the people,
25 all the people, who had been there?

1 A. No.

2 Q. So if one is seeking fairly to remove hindsight from the
3 exercise that we're engaged in, does MSK's attendance at
4 this camp simply have to be stripped out of the
5 analysis?

6 A. If one is seeking to exclude hindsight, yes.

7 Q. Does the same apply to any link between MSK and McDaid
8 to be derived from this camp?

9 A. Yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, Mr Eadie. Not any link to
11 McDaid generally, but any link to McDaid through this
12 camp?

13 A. Through this camp.

14 MR EADIE: You were asked about Operation Atlas by Mr Keith.
15 I think you've answered the first question I had on that
16 already. Was there anything at the time -- in other
17 words, prior to July 2005 -- to indicate any need to
18 seek to go back to the events of this camp and the
19 photographs, and I think the answer you gave was "No",
20 is that right?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Was there anything at the time to link MSK or UDM E to
23 the camp that had occurred about four years earlier by
24 the time we get to Crevice?

25 A. No, there was not.

1 Q. But, as I understand it, Operation Atlas took part after
2 7/7 --
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. -- and was part of an intensive focus put on,
5 understandably, on trying to understand that event?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. As part of that, specific steps were taken by
8 West Yorkshire to investigate further this camp?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. So it was, in fact, a hindsight exercise, a specific
11 hindsight exercise to try to understand more. Is that
12 fair?
13 A. A specific and justified hindsight exercise, yes.
14 Q. Does that imply -- ie, that revisitation for that
15 purpose -- in your judgment, a failure to take
16 appropriate or enough steps at the time?
17 A. It does not.
18 Q. Does it imply that it would have been reasonable to
19 divert resources into doing more than take the steps
20 that were, in fact, taken at the time?
21 A. It does not.
22 Q. So do you accept that there was, as Mr Keith put it on
23 the first day of your examination, page 118, line 16, an
24 element in all this of the horse having bolted after the
25 stable door had been shut?

1 A. Certainly the Atlas exercise was an exercise in
2 hindsight, quite properly at the time.

3 Q. Honeysuckle, then. This was a link between
4 Sidique Khan, the person known as Sidique Khan from
5 11 Gregory Street, and McDaid?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. It was 11 Gregory Street, not Thornhill Road?

8 A. That's correct, it was 11 Gregory Street.

9 Q. How long was the lift that was given by, it appears, MSK
10 to McDaid?

11 A. Three minutes.

12 Q. Three minutes?

13 A. Three minutes' lift.

14 Q. Again, there is a temptation, of course, after the
15 event, when one is looking back, to say "Well, there's
16 a significant point of contact".

17 Is that, in your judgment, a realistic or fair view
18 of this item of intelligence as it would have been seen
19 at the time?

20 A. No, I would not expect any desk officers to judge that
21 to have been significant.

22 Q. Is there any significance, in your judgment, to be
23 attached, or that a desk officer, acting reasonably,
24 should have attached, to someone leaning into the window
25 of a car before getting in?

1 A. No, I don't believe so.

2 Q. Would you expect this sort of information to have been
3 provided to you by West Yorkshire, given the sort of
4 operation that this was?

5 A. No, I would not.

6 Q. I think Mr Parkinson, at paragraph -- just to put that
7 answer or that question into context, Mr Parkinson, at
8 paragraph 112 of his statement, the first statement,
9 says that SYS wanted WYP to inform them why they wanted
10 the surveillance undertaken. It was for a specific
11 operational purpose, but did not relate to any
12 information or intelligence about any terrorist plot or
13 other immediate risk to public safety.

14 Is that right, is that a fair summary?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. One has to be cautious, I know, about sensitive issues,
17 but that's accurate, as far as you're aware?

18 A. Mr Parkinson puts it accurately.

19 Q. Thank you. As I understand your statement, the Service
20 has no record itself of having received this
21 information?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So does it follow from your answers on this that this
24 item of intelligence -- again, if one is trying to do
25 a fair and reasonable exercise of analysis, stripping

1 out hindsight -- this reference to 11 Gregory Street and
2 Sidique Khan and so on, that also is to be stripped out
3 of future analyses of links?

4 A. If someone stripping out hindsight, yes.

5 Q. MQK next, please. You deal with that, I think, in
6 paragraphs 62 and 63 [SYS11005-43] of your first statement, and with
7 a series of calls that were made there.

8 If one is stripping out the references to MSK at the
9 Warlock camp, and if one is stripping out the
10 Honeysuckle references to Sidique Khan of
11 11 Gregory Street and so on, this is the first reference
12 that the Security Service had to anyone called
13 Sidique Khan?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Is it right, in your experience of these matters, and
16 knowing, as you do, much more about how these sorts of
17 people operate than we do, to assume that the subscriber
18 of a phone is necessarily the user of that phone?

19 A. No, it is not.

20 Q. We know that the mobiles were registered to
21 Sidique Khan, we see that on the screen at paragraph 63,
22 and that the address to which they are registered is
23 49A Bude Road; yes?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. So not Thornhill, not Gregory Street? You're shaking

1 your head, you'd better say "No" for the transcript.

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Was there anything to suggest that those calls were
4 significant?

5 A. There was not.

6 Q. We now know, of course, that 49A Bude Road was an
7 address which was linked to something called the Iqra
8 bookshop, which I'm going to come back to. Is that
9 right?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Can I jump between the levels of analysis, the three
12 questions we worked through earlier on?

13 Suppose that a link had been made during Crevice as
14 between MSK and MQK. You've said what you said about
15 that in your statement, about the reality of assuming
16 that could have been done, but assuming that had been
17 done during Crevice, what impact, in your judgment,
18 might that have had, or would that have had, on the
19 Service's assessment of MSK's priority?

20 A. If we're discussing this specific contact, not a very
21 significant increase in his priority.

22 Q. You deal, at paragraph 64 of your statement -- if we
23 could please have that up -- with a different set of
24 calls, this time between MSK and Omar Khyam.

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. How was that possible link -- I say "possible" because
2 of the answer you gave earlier on about registered
3 keepers and users of phone -- between Omar Khyam and MSK
4 actually discovered?

5 A. This was only discovered after 7 July, based on close
6 analysis of the SIM cards found at MSK's address.

7 Q. So in order to make this link, you'd have had to have
8 got the SIM cards that were ultimately found at his
9 address?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Was there any sensible or realistic way of doing that at
12 the time?

13 A. It would not have been impossible, but it would have
14 been extremely difficult.

15 Q. So is this another link which, if one's operating
16 fairly, trying to strip out the hindsight element, is
17 this an element which should stay in, as it were?

18 A. Again, if one is stripping out hindsight, this is
19 a difficult issue.

20 Q. Can I turn to Crevice, please? I'm going to take this
21 relatively shortly because you've had plenty enough
22 questioning on Crevice over the last few days, but
23 can I try to deal, just before we get into a couple of
24 bits of detail, if I may --

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just before you do, Mr Eadie,

1 I understand what you're saying about stripping out and,
2 therefore, you wouldn't have investigated further at the
3 time.

4 As far as the systems for collating information that
5 you had at the time, would it have been possible, with
6 those systems then, as it were, if you had, say, a file
7 on McDaid, that the file would have retained the
8 information that he had on occasions -- I mean, one
9 short lift in a car, registered to a man called
10 Sidique Khan. Was the system capable of retaining that
11 amount of detail on various people or is that really too
12 much detail that the system would have overloaded?

13 A. No, the system would have been capable of retaining it,
14 but the capacity to easily search for all that material
15 and put it all together doesn't exist or did not exist
16 at the time.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Didn't exist at the time?

18 A. Yes.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But, today, that would be simpler
20 with better software, can you answer that?

21 A. It would be easier, but I wouldn't want to suggest it
22 would be easy.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Eadie.

24 MR EADIE: I'm grateful. Could we have the summary of
25 Operation Crevice at tab 51 of the core bundle, which

1 I think was appended to your third witness statement
2 which we've looked at already? I say 51, I think this
3 is the one I got wrong yesterday. It's the summary of
4 Operation Crevice.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: 52.

6 MR EADIE: 52, I'm told. Can we have that up on the screen?

7 SYS11080 [SYS11080-1], I'm told. Thank you very much.

8 Paragraph 11 [SYS11080-2]I was going to ask you about first of
9 all, if I may. Perhaps to make this clear, this is an
10 operation -- this is a summary that's been prepared to
11 try to give as full a flavour as one sensibly can,
12 consistently with security concerns about what went on
13 during Operation Crevice. Is that right?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. So it, as it were, suffers from the same limitations
16 that quite a lot of the rest of the evidence does, which
17 is that there may be underlying this tip of the iceberg
18 more security-sensitive information?

19 A. There is.

20 Q. Paragraph 11, please, if you would have a look at that,
21 first of all.

22 That gives some flavour of those who were, as it
23 were, on the "might be included in the dangerous"
24 category.

25 Is there a rigid distinction between (a) and (b)?

1 A. No, there is not.

2 Q. Will you explain that a little bit?

3 A. We don't rigidly set a level to which an individual
4 might be identified or have a particular nickname as
5 opposed to an unidentified individual.

6 It would be fair to say there was a tendency, and an
7 obvious tendency, that those in category (a) are ones
8 better known to us, but some of those people better
9 known might be better known simply because, you know,
10 they are close personal contacts rather than terrorist
11 ones. There is not a rigid definition between these
12 two.

13 Q. Is paragraph 13 [SYS11080-3], perhaps, the best indication of the
14 level of resources that was, in fact, being devoted --
15 by the Security Service alone, it has to be said, but by
16 the Security Service to Crevice, is that the best --

17 A. It's the best indication I can give in open, yes.

18 Q. Right. Could we have, please, paragraph 43 of your
19 first statement on the screen [SYS11005-27]?

20 Is the point being made in paragraph 43 that, when
21 you hit a big priority, a high priority investigation,
22 as Crevice became, there is, as it were, a change in
23 working structure? Just talk us through, very briefly,
24 that. I don't want to you read the paragraph out, but
25 just talk us through. A significant change in

1 structure?

2 A. An operation of the scale of Crevice, which is
3 running -- Crevice, during its operational phase; in
4 other words, from February 2004 -- which is running on
5 a 24/7 basis, on the assumption that we are in the
6 middle of attempting to disrupt what is thought to be
7 a live terrorist attack alters our structure. We move
8 to 24-hour working and a different command system.

9 Q. 24-hour working?

10 A. Yes, I mean, not, I suspect, for every day throughout
11 the whole of Crevice, but for most of it.

12 Q. Which means what it says on the tin, does it? That
13 means there is someone working on the case in shifts, as
14 it were?

15 A. More than one person, but, yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Then 66 of the statement [SYS11005-44], please, is that
17 first sentence, as it were, a one-line summary, or
18 a one-sentence summary, of the effect of the stats that
19 we saw, the statistics that we saw at paragraph 13 of
20 the summary?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. Almost all the key resources of the Service --

23 A. It is.

24 Q. -- being directed to a single operation?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Was Crevice a success, in your judgment?

2 A. Yes, it was.

3 Q. Is that in part, in your judgment, because of the manner
4 in which the Security Service is able to switch focus of
5 its resources?

6 A. Yes, I believe that's so.

7 Q. Does that same answer apply to Operation Rhyme which
8 immediately followed Crevice?

9 A. It does.

10 Q. Is it also fair to say it's a testament to the judgments
11 that were made at the time by the officers who were
12 engaged in both of those operations about what
13 priorities needed to be accorded to which targets?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. Both of those operations saved potentially massive loss
16 of life?

17 A. They did.

18 Q. Much of the questioning, both from Mr Keith and from
19 Mr O'Connor, in relation to Crevice, was directed to
20 implying or suggesting that, if only a different
21 approach had been taken, it might have been discovered
22 that particularly UDM E was involved in Crevice to
23 a greater extent or was more dangerous than the Service
24 had assessed.

25 Can I ask you, first of all, in relation to that

1 line of questioning, or those lines of questioning, was
2 there anything by way of intelligence at the time that
3 was available, in fact, to the Security Service to
4 suggest that UDM E was, in fact, involved in plotting
5 attack planning?

6 A. There was not.

7 Q. You deal at paragraph 77 [SYS11005-51] of your first statement -- if
8 we could possibly have that briefly on screen -- with
9 why it was that he wasn't arrested.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. That is because, according to the statement:
12 "... there was and remains no basis for assessing
13 [their involvement], or had knowledge of, the Crevice
14 attack planning. No sufficient grounds for their
15 arrest..."

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. That remains your judgment now, does it?

18 A. It does.

19 Q. In paragraph 78 you go on and make the same point, is
20 that right, in relation to MQK?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. I think you've given evidence on a number of occasions,
23 in answers to Mr Keith and Mr O'Connor, that, at the
24 time, the Security Service judged that there were
25 certain contra-indicators, ie indicators that he

1 positively was not engaged in attack planning. Is that
2 right?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. I'm going to come back to the most significant of them.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, which "he", MQK or MSK?

6 MR EADIE: MSK.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

8 MR EADIE: Did such contra-indicators lead the Service, at
9 the time, to discount UDMS D and E as, as it were,
10 simply not involved? Did it reach the positive
11 conclusion they simply weren't involved?

12 A. Our judgment was that they were not involved in the
13 Crevice attack planning.

14 Q. Has that changed as a result of any information you've
15 seen subsequently?

16 A. It has not.

17 Q. Your assessment now, in the light of all the information
18 you have, could we have paragraphs 89 and 90 of your
19 first statement on the screen, please? Remind yourself
20 of those. 89 and then 90 [SYS11005-63] [SYS11005-64].

21 Does 90 perhaps most conveniently accord with your
22 assessment, even now, in the light of all the
23 information that has been gathered?

24 A. It does.

25 Q. Despite that judgment, did the Service, as a result of

1 that judgment, as it were, simply ignore UDMS D and E
2 either at the time of Crevice or thereafter?

3 A. No, it did not.

4 Q. How much work was done to seek to identify the Crevice
5 peripherals, just in broad terms, after Crevice had been
6 dealt with?

7 A. A reasonable amount of work through Operation Scraw.

8 Q. Can I deal, first of all, in terms of the detail, just
9 briefly, with 2 February? This was the journey which
10 culminated in the car driven by MSK being dropped off at
11 10 Thornhill?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. The registered owner, when checked, was?

14 A. Hasina Patel.

15 Q. That then subsequently changed, didn't it, because the
16 registered keeper changed, as we discussed earlier?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. We then found that the same car -- was it the same car
19 that was registered to Sidique Khan in
20 11 Gregory Street?

21 A. It was.

22 Q. Was there anything to indicate at the time, apart from
23 the parking of the car at 10 Thornhill, that there was
24 a connection between those two, ie those two addresses,
25 those two people?

1 A. No, there was not.

2 Q. We know from the surveillance that one of the
3 passengers -- I think you covered this in part in
4 questioning, was dropped off in Lodge Road rather than
5 Lodge Lane. I think there was a correction there. Is
6 that right?

7 A. Correct, the reporting is Lodge Road, not Lodge Lane.

8 Q. Have you looked at maps of this area? Can you give an
9 indication of the size of Lodge Lane and Lodge Road?

10 A. Lodge Lane is quite a large -- I can't say road, can I?

11 A large street. Lodge Road is a smaller one.

12 Q. I think it was suggested that a passenger had been
13 dropped off, that passenger had been dropped off in the
14 region of the Iqra bookshop, in questioning to you, do
15 you recall that question?

16 A. Yes, though I think that's a reference to the 28th
17 rather than the 2nd.

18 Q. Do you know where Shipon Ullah lived?

19 A. I do.

20 Q. Where?

21 A. He lived at 115 or 117 -- I'm afraid I can't remember
22 which one -- Lodge Lane.

23 Q. So if it was him that was dropped off, he was dropped
24 off because he was going home?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. That has nothing to do with the Iqra bookshop?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. 21 February, then, please. You deal with that at some
4 length in your statement. Paragraphs 108 to 110, first
5 of all, please.

6 I wanted particularly to ask you about -- you
7 confirm 108 and 109 are accurate, as far as you're
8 aware?

9 A. I can.

10 Q. If we go to 110, it's really the latter part of 110 that
11 I'm quite interested in, in relation to this, and it
12 deals with the potential problems, as it were, with the
13 surveillance on this occasion. Can you talk us briefly
14 through what those problems were? Was this an easy
15 surveillance?

16 A. It was not.

17 Q. Why not?

18 A. There were a number of challenges. Any new address is
19 more difficult to surveil securely than one we're
20 familiar with, and this was a new address.

21 The address itself is particularly difficult to
22 surveil because of how it is laid out, how it's
23 a cul de sac, to be able to keep control of that address
24 without being seen.

25 It was, of course, a dark February evening.

1 Q. We now know, or we now believe, that MSK,
2 Mohammed Sidique Khan, was, in fact, in the car and
3 certainly it might have been him talking during the
4 tapes that we have of that?

5 A. That's our judgment now, yes.

6 Q. You discovered that -- if we go on in the statement to
7 paragraph 114 [SYS11005-73]-- particularly you discovered that --
8 and, again, one has to be careful about a sensitive and
9 open divide here, but you discovered that after the 7/7
10 bombings, as a result of intelligence received enabling
11 him to be identified as a speaker during the
12 conversation?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. As a result, in paragraph 115, of some very, very
15 considerable and painstaking work done by
16 West Yorkshire?

17 A. That's correct, and by the Metropolitan Police.

18 Q. And by the Met. The surveillance at the time saw and
19 records only two men getting into the car which had the
20 eavesdropping device in it. Is that right?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. In the light of the difficulties that you've identified
23 about the surveillance, is that sort of mistake, if it
24 was a mistake, which it appears to be, understandable?

25 A. I believe it is.

1 Q. Much of the questioning here came down to the relevance
2 and impact of northern accents and subsequent
3 transcripts and the references to "NM" -- I'm not going
4 to go back over all that ground, you've given your
5 answers to that, but can I clarify this: that sequence,
6 those letters and references to northern accents and so
7 on, only emerged after pretty considerable work on the
8 transcripts. Is that right?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. My understanding of your evidence is that the sequence,
11 in terms of what the desk officer will actually react
12 to, is, first of all, he gets the monitor's note?

13 A. He may get the monitor's note.

14 Q. He may get the monitor's note. Then, within
15 a relatively short time thereafter, he will get the desk
16 officer version that we've seen on a number of occasions
17 now?

18 A. Yes, the more detailed transcription prepared for the
19 desk officer, correct.

20 Q. But in the real world, he's not going to get the sort of
21 detail that we see being developed subsequently as
22 a result of the further work done on this sort of
23 recording?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Were there others from the north who were linked in to

1 Op Crevice?

2 A. Yes, there were.

3 Q. Significant numbers of others?

4 A. A fair number of others, yes.

5 Q. Could we have your third statement up on the screens,
6 please? I ask for this because this part I don't think
7 has been referred to at all so far. It's the result of,
8 I think, certainly a request from the coroner for some
9 clarification which you sought to give in paragraphs 15
10 and following.

11 My Lady, I don't want to take up time on this.

12 This, unless I'm wrong, I don't think has been referred
13 to in detail in the questioning so far, but if I'm wrong
14 on that, so be it.

15 What I was going to do was to ask the witness to
16 read simply the paragraphs between 15 and the end of 21
17 which deals with this issue and to confirm that they
18 represent the answers he would like to put before you,
19 but I'm happy to do it in another way, if my Lady would
20 like me to.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, if that's the quickest way to
22 do it, although an awful lot seems to have already been
23 elicited.

24 MR EADIE: We haven't had any reference to the
25 Director General's answers or to --

1 MR KEITH: We have.

2 MR EADIE: -- those matters.

3 MR KEITH: We made express reference on Monday to the
4 Director General's evidence and the broad thrust of all
5 these paragraphs is implicit from the voluminous
6 evidence that G gave on Monday. But it does appear to
7 be a matter of --

8 MR EADIE: Detail.

9 MR KEITH: -- real concern to my learned friend.

10 MR EADIE: I'm not quite sure what the import of that
11 intervention was. Was it for me or agin me?

12 MR KEITH: I don't pursue the point against you.

13 MR EADIE: What, that I can't refer to these on the screen?

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Eadie, through me, please.

15 MR EADIE: I am sorry, my Lady. How would you like me to
16 take these paragraphs?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It seems to me -- I'm just looking at
18 the paragraphs that you want to read out. I think G has
19 done justice to all those paragraphs, but you tell me if
20 I'm wrong. You show me a paragraph where he hasn't done
21 justice to it.

22 MR EADIE: My Lady, there's a difference between doing
23 justice to something, in the sense of raising it and
24 giving a broad answer, and the level of detail which has
25 now been able to be given as a result of the request

1 that my Lady made for clarification, in particular in
2 relation to that answer from the Director General. But
3 if you feel he's done justice to it, I'll leave it.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr G, you seem to have an
5 encyclopedic knowledge of what you've been able to
6 establish and, indeed, the contents of your statements.
7 Can I ask you, are there any matters in those
8 paragraphs that you feel you haven't brought
9 sufficiently to my attention?

10 A. I can't be sure, my Lady. I haven't been reading my own
11 transcripts of the evidence, so I really can't be sure.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What point are we on, Mr Eadie?
13 We're on the surveillance on 21 February?

14 MR EADIE: The core point that we're on here is: what would
15 have been the reaction, if it had been known, if the
16 Security Service had realised that UDM E was in the car
17 on the night of 21 February?

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, this is the point that I asked
19 you to check, Witness G, about the Director General's
20 evidence about the time when the Director General and
21 the ISC appeared to be using the categorisation of
22 "desirable" and "essential" on an operational rather
23 than resource base, and I think the question I was
24 asking you to check was what the Director General had
25 said about whether MSK would have gone from, as he

1 appeared to the ISC to be, "desirable" to "essential".

2 Now, one of the problems we have is that you say

3 that he wouldn't have been categorised for these

4 purposes in that way anyway. Yes?

5 A. That's correct.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could we approach it in a different

7 way? Forget about the names of the categories that the

8 ISC and the Director General appear to have used. Would

9 his prioritisation as such have increased?

10 A. Yes, my Lady.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you would agree with the thrust of

12 what the Director General said, albeit you wouldn't

13 agree with the use of these categories?

14 A. That's correct.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But you would add all the caveats

16 that you've added about whether or not this would in any

17 way have been possible to identify him and, therefore,

18 increase his prioritisation?

19 A. As did the Director General in his evidence to the ISC.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Is there more than that you

21 require, Mr Eadie?

22 MR EADIE: One other thing, if I may. The Director General

23 also referred, I think you refer, to whether or not, if

24 the prioritisation had been -- or the priority had been

25 upped, that would realistically have led to any

1 different action to that action that was, in fact, taken
2 in relation to UDM E.

3 A. The Director General said in his evidence that it most
4 likely would not have done, and I share that view.

5 MR EADIE: Thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It might have led to his being a more
7 significant person on your database generally, so if
8 ever his name cropped up again, you might have been more
9 interested in him?

10 A. Not really on the database. There isn't a flagging
11 system here. But it would have been a sense that he was
12 more important and, hopefully, you know, the intuition
13 of the desk officer might have -- it would have rung
14 some more bells if he'd come up again.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

16 MR EADIE: 23 March, then, please, to jump forward a month.
17 This was the occasion on which there was eavesdropping
18 which recorded chat about the Madrid bombings. Is that
19 right?

20 A. (Witness nods).

21 Q. Is it clear, even now, and with all the intensive work
22 that's gone on, who is involved in that conversation?

23 A. It is not clear.

24 Q. Assume for the sake of argument that one of those
25 involved in that conversation was UDM D. What

1 significance would have been attached or would you
2 attach to that sort of chat about the Madrid bombings
3 shortly after it occurred?

4 A. Not any significance at all.

5 Q. Because?

6 A. Because these individuals were Islamist extremists.
7 This had been, from their own narrow and twisted
8 perspective, an enormous success.

9 At this time -- though I have not checked this --
10 I imagine all our targets, whether from Crevice or other
11 operations, were discussing the success of the Madrid
12 bombing.

13 Q. Mr O'Connor took you to task about one bit of this
14 transcript, which he said provided a highly significant
15 clue, which was that there was a reference to someone
16 working at a school in Leeds.

17 A. (Witness nods).

18 Q. The Security Service, the police, knew that MSK worked
19 at a school in Leeds, when?

20 A. We did not know that until after 7 July 2005.

21 Q. To get from that part of the transcript and that
22 reference to an identification of MSK at the time, you
23 would presumably have had to have made a link between
24 UDM D and Leeds, first of all. Then what?

25 A. Then there would have been a range of measures that we

1 could have taken, some of which I suggest would have
2 been highly intrusive, all of which would have not
3 appeared proportionate, to discover that he was
4 a schoolteacher.

5 Q. Mr O'Connor then invited you, as one of his major
6 themes, as it were, to deal with the compare and
7 contrast analysis; in other words, those who were
8 involved in the bomb plot at Crevice, or in Crevice, did
9 talk about attack planning, openly, on occasions, and
10 those of interest to us now, UDMS D and E, did not?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. You deal with that at paragraph 87 of your statement [SYS11005-60]
[SYS11005-61] [SYS11005-62],

13 your first statement. You've had plenty to check,
14 I know, but have you had an opportunity to check some of
15 the details in paragraph 87? Do you know now who some
16 of those conversations occurred between?

17 A. No, forgive me, I haven't checked the ones specifically
18 at (d) and (e), which are the ones I wasn't certain of
19 the other day.

20 Q. I think, if my Lady will permit me, I think researches
21 indicate -- can I do it this way --

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, certainly.

23 MR EADIE: -- that (a) is Jamal Akbar. (b) is Akbar and
24 Sandip. (c) involves Omar Khyam. (d) involves
25 Omar Khyam and Akbar.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, can we go back, so I can note
2 it, Mr Eadie?
3 MR EADIE: Yes.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, (a) is Akbar?
5 MR EADIE: (a) is Akbar. (b) is Akbar and Sandip. (c) is
6 Omar Khyam and Akbar. (d) is Omar Khyam and Akbar. (e)
7 is Akbar and Nabil Hussain. (f) is Omar Khyam and
8 Waheed Mahmood. That's referred to already in there.
9 If we go back on the screen, please, to the
10 beginning of paragraph 87, and over the page, if you
11 would, that looks like a conclusion that has been pretty
12 carefully phrased. Witness G, is that a fair conclusion
13 or a fair summary, in your view?
14 A. I'm sorry, Mr Eadie, can you direct me to which specific
15 bit?
16 Q. Paragraph 87, if we go back to the beginning of it.
17 A. The beginning of the paragraph?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. Yes, absolutely.
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Given that the Crevice plotters
21 discussed -- we haven't gone through them in detail, but
22 a vast range of potential targets and attacks upon them,
23 you say that it was positively significant that there
24 weren't these kind of conversations that can be
25 attributed to MSK or Tanweer?

1 A. They discussed a vast range, but within a narrow number
2 of people, and that's the significant part.

3 MR EADIE: So it was positively significant, as you put it,
4 but did it mean that you simply, as it were, excluded
5 them from all possibility of being involved thereafter?

6 A. We could never exclude them from all possibility.

7 Q. Because only perfect coverage of all conversations could
8 do that?

9 A. Even then, I would suggest we couldn't exclude them from
10 all possibility.

11 Q. But in the real world in which you are trying to make
12 these judgments, this was significant and not merely
13 neutral. Is that a fair way of putting it?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. That's a matter of, what, judgment based on experience,
16 intuition and so on?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Mr O'Connor suggested that too much weight had been
19 given to, as it were, the contrast between what amounted
20 to, in effect, in total, probably around about half
21 a day's worth of transcription, so far as UDMs D and E
22 and OK are concerned and a larger number of days in
23 relation to the eavesdropping or inception in relation
24 to OK himself.

25 A. (Witness nods).

1 Q. Is half a day's worth of eavesdropping good, bad, usual,
2 unusual, in terms of coverage of conversations between
3 those who at least might be potential plotters?

4 A. In many operations, we would consider that a very great
5 deal, and very unfortunate to get it.

6 Q. Was that half day, if that's the true extent of the time
7 limit, in its totality, interaction between our lot --
8 UDMS D and E -- and the person believed to be the leader
9 of the plot, Omar Khyam?

10 A. Much of it was. Others were also involved.

11 Q. But almost all those occasions involved Omar Khyam?

12 A. Yes, they all did.

13 Q. Is that significant?

14 A. It's interesting.

15 Q. Was the majority of the 40 days' worth of coverage of
16 Omar Khyam generally concerned, or did it deal with,
17 coverage of those whom the Security Service considered
18 at least might be involved in the plot?

19 A. It did.

20 Q. Having had a chance to reflect on these issues, is there
21 any reason -- or do you feel there's any reason to
22 qualify the introduction to paragraph 87 or not?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Mr O'Connor also suggested that the fact that the
25 intelligence and the eavesdropping tended to suggest

1 that UDMs D and E were involved in fraud was really
2 a matter of no significance, and also suggested that
3 there was, by contrast, huge significance to be attached
4 to there being four trips from the north. Do you recall
5 that?

6 Can I ask you this: if there are meetings between
7 people who are possible plotters, what is the
8 Security Service looking to do in relation to them? Is
9 it looking to assess possible or most likely reasons for
10 their meeting?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. If the Service positively identifies the fact that there
13 is a fraud going on -- whether through surveillance or
14 through eavesdropping -- is that of significance in that
15 context?

16 A. Yes, it is.

17 Q. Because, what, it shows what they were doing?

18 A. It shows what they were doing in circumstances where we
19 didn't believe they knew that they were being monitored.

20 Q. It provides an explanation for a meeting?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. And an explanation for trips from the north?

23 A. Correct.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably, it's also of significance
25 because bomb plots need financing.

1 A. Yes, but not very much money. You know, for both the
2 7 July attacks and these attacks, they didn't require
3 significant finance.

4 MR EADIE: Is that significance, in other words, an
5 explanation for meetings and trips from the north, to be
6 put alongside the absence of attack planning chat?

7 A. Yes, I believe so.

8 Q. Can I deal with the Scraw and Legacy Review issues next?
9 Specifically on the Legacy Reviews, first of all,
10 you answered a question, I think from Mr Keith, about
11 whether Legacy Reviews were, in general, more thorough
12 now -- or it may have been from my Lady -- and I think
13 you said that more detailed, so an opportunity to be
14 more thorough, I think was your answer to that.

15 The specific focus here, however, is on UDMS D and
16 E, whether more should have been done, whether more
17 should have been appreciated about them. I take them
18 directly.

19 If a Legacy Review system as it currently stands had
20 been in place in 2004, in your assessment, would that
21 have been likely to make a difference in the sense of
22 being likely to lead to the identification of UDMS D or
23 E?

24 A. No, I don't believe it would have done.

25 Q. Could we have paragraph 170 of the ISC's second report

1 on screen, please [INQ8305-54]?

2 Is that paragraph addressing that very issue?

3 A. It is.

4 Q. Do you agree with their conclusion?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Were significant steps taken by the Security Service to
7 seek to identify UDMs D and E in the aftermath of
8 Crevice?

9 A. Proportionate steps were taken.

10 Q. Were UDMs D and E the only ones involved on the
11 periphery of Crevice?

12 A. They were not.

13 Q. Was the assessment of the Service such that there were
14 others of greater significance?

15 A. That was the assessment.

16 Q. If one was going to achieve the result of identifying,
17 if one was looking to try to achieve that at the time,
18 and knowing what was known about them at the time, would
19 it have been simply a question of reviewing the
20 information that you had on them more thoroughly or, in
21 your judgment, would further investigative work have
22 needed to have been done?

23 A. A two-part answer to that. I believe it would have been
24 possible, by the summer of 2004, to identify UDMs D and
25 E -- no, actually, UDM E as Mohammed Sidique Khan from

1 our records.

2 Q. By name?

3 A. By name.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. UDM D would have been more difficult. Making the links
6 to other activities previously would not have been easy
7 at all.

8 Q. So far as the photographs are concerned, which were
9 a part, at least, of Operation Scraw, as I understand
10 it -- is that right -- the showing of photographs to
11 various people to try to identify?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. First of all, in relation to the photographs shown to
14 Mr Babar in April 2004, can I ask you, first of all,
15 Mr O'Connor asked you a series of questions on that
16 showing, as it were, which was designed to -- I think to
17 question why it was that photos of C and D were, in
18 fact, shown in April 2004, if they were only small-time
19 fraudsters, was I think how he put it.

20 In your judgment, was it appropriate to show those
21 photographs to Mr Babar at the time?

22 A. Yes, it was.

23 Q. Because, what? Because they were linked to Crevice?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Were they in the first division of Scraw targets, as it

1 were?

2 A. They were not.

3 Q. But they were Div 2?

4 A. Yes, Div 2.

5 Q. Our assessments, as a general matter, of individuals who

6 have been associated with other operations that the

7 Security Service has conducted, are those assessments

8 kept under review as time goes by, or do you, as it

9 were, close the file and move on?

10 A. It will depend on the individual and the significance of

11 that individual.

12 Q. By and large, if you take at least some steps, you're

13 striving to do what, to obtain a fuller picture?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. We know from the headlines, if nothing else, that

16 followed day one of your questioning, that cropped

17 photographs only were shown of Tanweer and

18 Mohammed Sidique Khan to Babar on this occasion?

19 A. No, on this occasion, a cropped photograph of Tanweer

20 was shown, not Mohammed Sidique Khan.

21 Q. I'm sorry, I stand corrected. But this was the occasion

22 on which the cropped photograph of MSK was sent and not

23 shown or a decision was made not to send it?

24 A. We can't be absolutely certain of why a photograph of

25 what was then UDM E was not included.

1 Q. You, I think, accepted from Mr Keith at least that those
2 were not, as it were, the best photographs that could
3 have been shown at the time, certainly of MSK and also
4 of Tanweer?

5 A. I did.

6 Q. I think you also indicated -- is this fair -- that there
7 was nothing, despite all your hard work, to give
8 certainty as to what had occurred that led to that
9 cropping?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. As a result of those researches, is there any indication
12 that those who did that exercise were not doing the best
13 that they could at the time?

14 A. No, I believe they were doing the best they could at the
15 time.

16 Q. Are these sorts of photographs sometimes called for at
17 pretty short notice when people are heavily engaged in
18 other things?

19 A. I would suggest they were normally called for at short
20 notice.

21 Q. Is there any reason that you can think of why they would
22 do anything other than at least attempt to produce the
23 best sorts of photographs that they could do?

24 A. No, I can't think of any such reason.

25 Q. In your judgment, is it fair to view those cropped

1 photographs, having been shown to Babar, in isolation?

2 A. It is not.

3 Q. Because the fair presentation of the photographs that
4 were shown to Mr Babar would include, would it,
5 reference to the photographs that were subsequently
6 shown to him in August 2004?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Those were the photographs that Mr Keith chose to go to
9 on Day 2 of your questioning. Is that right?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. I'm not going to go back to those photographs, we saw
12 them. There were a series of them that related to MSK,
13 in which MSK featured?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Sometimes sideways on, I think at least one, perhaps in
16 a video, full face?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Whatever may be the position in relation to the judgment
19 as between -- in terms of best photograph as between the
20 2 February and the 28 February photographs, were the
21 photographs that were taken on the 28th -- in other
22 words, those shown on this occasion to Mr Babar -- were
23 they, in your judgment, sufficient to have enabled him
24 to have identified MSK?

25 A. They were.

1 Q. Did he identify others from those photographs?
2 A. He did.
3 Q. Knowing the access that Mr Babar had to MSK, would you
4 have reasonably expected him to identify MSK from those
5 photographs?
6 A. Yes, I would.
7 Q. Does it follow from that answer that this failure to
8 identify by Mr Babar in August 2004 was not merely, as
9 it were, a neutral failure to identify, but was
10 a significant or a positive piece of intelligence?
11 A. Yes, I agree.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A positive piece of misleading
13 intelligence.
14 MR EADIE: Quite.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. We also know that photographs were shown to the second
17 detainee.
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. When did that occur?
20 A. That was in May 2004.
21 Q. So very shortly after the photographs were shown to
22 Mr Babar in April 2004?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. They were a different set of photographs?
25 A. They were the 2 February photographs, but in different

1 form.

2 Q. Yes, quite. And we saw from -- we see from the tabs in
3 the bundle, but we saw better from the screens the other
4 day, that it included what I think you fairly accepted
5 was the best photograph of MSK standing next door to
6 Tanweer in the Service station on 2 February?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Of the two -- in other words, between the second
9 detainee and Mr Babar -- whom, in your assessment, had
10 the better access to MSK?

11 A. The second detainee.

12 Q. Who was shown, ultimately, a month after the
13 photographs, the cropped photographs, the one you said
14 was the best photograph?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Same question in relation to him. Would you reasonably
17 have expected him to identify MSK from that photograph?

18 A. I would.

19 Q. Did he do so?

20 A. He did not.

21 Q. Do your answers that you gave a minute ago about
22 positive but misleading intelligence apply to him also?

23 A. They do.

24 MR EADIE: Thank you. My Lady, I need to take some
25 instructions on a couple of matters, one of which I know

1 will be known to my Lady, the other of which involves
2 the flight manifests.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well, we will take the break
4 now.

5 MR EADIE: If it takes a little longer than normal, will you
6 forgive us? I think it will save time in the long run.
7 We will let you know.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. If you could keep
9 Mr Suter informed, please, as to how long you think you
10 need. If I don't hear anything, I will come back at
11 11.40.
12 (11.20 am)
13 (A short break)
14 (11.45 am)

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Eadie?

16 MR EADIE: I'm very grateful.
17 Iqra bookshop, if I may, Witness G, please. Your
18 third statement, if we could possibly have that up on
19 the screen, paragraph 5 [SYS11082-2], and this is an expansion, in
20 effect an expansion by way of gist of what can be put
21 into open in relation to links between MSK in particular
22 and Iqra bookshop and those who were associated with
23 Iqra bookshop. Is that right?

24 A. It is.

25 Q. So these paragraphs, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, in

1 effect represent the totality of what can be said about
2 that issue when linked in, of course, with the other
3 gists that exist in the bundle. Is that right?

4 A. They are, given the short time we've had to research
5 this.

6 Q. Yes. Can I take those as read and ask you these
7 questions? Is there any intelligence to indicate -- was
8 there at the time, and is there now -- that Iqra
9 bookshop was involved as a meeting place for attack
10 planning?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Is there intelligence to suggest that it was involved in
13 matters to do with extremist literature?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Were those activities mixed in with genuine community
16 activities that it was engaged in?

17 A. Yes, they were.

18 Q. We now know that MSK was a trustee of Iqra bookshop for
19 a period of time. Is that right?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. In your assessment, could that fact reasonably have been
22 discovered at the time?

23 A. It could have been discovered, yes.

24 Q. I put the word "reasonably" in there. How much resource
25 might have needed to be devoted in order to do that?

1 A. I'd need to re-examine that, because we -- the
2 Charities Commission is not an organisation with which
3 we dealt with extensively.

4 Q. Yes. In any event, in paragraph 7 of your third
5 statement -- if we could have that up on screen,
6 please -- you indicate that the best assessment now is
7 that he ceased to be involved with the Iqra bookshop
8 when?

9 A. In 2003 -- no, sorry, 2004, I'm sorry.

10 Q. If we look at the last sentence of paragraph 7.

11 A. Oh, yes, indeed, yes, in 2003.

12 Q. We know from other material that there were subscriber
13 details in relation to the calls between MSK and MQK and
14 that the registered owner of the phone, Sidique Khan's
15 phone, was 49A Bude Road.

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. That produced, at the time, no trace on the
18 Security Service's records?

19 A. At the time, that's correct.

20 Q. When was the bookshop linked to that address, do you
21 know that date?

22 A. I think that's either November or December 2003.

23 Q. By which stage, it appears from paragraph 7 of your
24 third statement, if that is right, he was no longer
25 associated with Iqra bookshop?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Is there anything that links MSK to Iqra bookshop
3 thereafter?

4 A. No.

5 Q. The fact is that we didn't know, you didn't know, the
6 Security Service didn't know -- is this right -- of the
7 MSK/Iqra link, even the historic one at the time?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And a very considerable amount of work has now gone into
10 that issue and that has uncovered the historic links
11 that you referred to in your third statement?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. We also know that there were some links, as we now know,
14 between McDaid and MSK --

15 A. There were.

16 Q. -- and a man called McLintock and a man called
17 Taf Mohammed?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. In particular, through Warlock?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. But as we discussed earlier, we didn't know and there
22 was no reasonable way of knowing that MSK was on
23 Warlock, ie at that camp. Is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Through Honeysuckle --

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. -- which was the information, the three-minute car ride,
3 as it were; yes?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Which didn't come to the Security Service, as far as you
6 know, and there's no record of it in the
7 Security Service?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. So there is at least, as it were, now, there are now
10 some links, but so far as MSK is concerned, MSK and
11 McDaid and Taf Mohammed and that lot, the links to them
12 are only in the ways set out in your third statement, as
13 far as your researches have been able to ascertain now?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. We went through, and you've been through, the gist that
16 is provided in the core bundle, the Saddique *** gist.

17 I only have, I think, two questions in relation to that.

18 First of all, there is a reference at the end of
19 that document, we can have it up on screen, if it would
20 assist, it's in tab 47.

21 There is a reference at the end of that document --

22 if you go over the page, please -- to him being capable
23 of carrying out martyrdom operations, but it is clear,

24 is it not, from that gist, paragraph 6, if we go back

25 a page, please, that that information only arrived after

1 7/7?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. I want you to assume, if I may, jumping into questions 2
4 and 3, of the kinds we discussed earlier, I want you to
5 assume, if we may, that as a result of this sort of
6 material, in the early part of 2005, the
7 Security Service had made all these links that we've
8 been talking about and had taken some further action in
9 relation to MSK. I want you to make those assumptions.

10 A. (Witness nods).

11 Q. What, in your assessment, would have been the chances of
12 them coming across anything to do with the 7/7 bombings
13 themselves as a result of any such reasonable action?

14 A. To come across the 7/7 bombings by this point, I think
15 we would have required very highly resource-intensive
16 intrusive investigation against Mohammed Sidique Khan,
17 and I do not believe that, even if we had made all of
18 those links, he would have justified that sort of
19 resource-intensive, intrusive investigation.

20 Q. After the mass of work that has now been done by both
21 you and by the police, your best assessment, as
22 I understand it from your evidence, of the first date on
23 which the actual plot, the 7/7 actual plot, was hatched
24 was not before when?

25 A. Not before November or early December 2004.

1 Q. Is the basis for that assessment -- can we have
2 paragraphs 117 to 119 [SYS11005-74] [SYS11005-75] of your first statement,
please,
3 up on screen -- set out in those paragraphs, 117, 118
4 and 119, if you would?
5 A. It is.
6 Q. Do the police, do you know, share that view?
7 A. They do.
8 Q. Do you know whether the police have done any work on
9 that issue?
10 A. They have indeed.
11 Q. Have they produced a report on that very subject?
12 A. I believe they have.
13 Q. Have you seen it?
14 A. I have.
15 Q. Do you agree with it?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. You expressed, Witness G -- if we could go to the very
18 first page of your statement [SYS11005-1], please -- profound regret
19 that the Service did not manage to prevent the attacks
20 on 7 July 2005, and you make the point, at paragraph 10 [SYS11005-7]
21 of your statement, that responsibility for those attacks
22 lies squarely with the bombers.
23 Is there anything more that you wish to say to
24 my Lady on that subject?
25 A. Just to add, as I said on Monday, the deepest sympathy

1 of my Service for the families of those who lost people
2 on 7/7, to those individuals who were injured on 7/7,
3 and to those in any other way affected by it.

4 Q. You know, or I hope you know, or have been warned, that
5 you may have to come back at 2.00 to deal with one other
6 matter to do with flight manifests.

7 A. I have been warned, Mr Eadie.

8 Q. I'm grateful. There is also a supplemental gist that
9 has been produced in relation to the Saddique *** gist.
10 Have you seen that?

11 A. I have.

12 Q. Are you content with it?

13 A. I am.

14 Q. I'm grateful. That can no doubt be distributed in the
15 usual way.

16 Subject, therefore, to coming back on the manifests
17 point, I really only have three final questions for you.

18 It says -- my learned friend Mr Keith invites me to
19 read it, which I am very happy to do:

20 "When Witness G said there were good operational
21 reasons for no investigative steps being taken to
22 identify Saddique *** (surname not Khan), what he meant
23 was that operational reasons justified the decision not
24 to investigate the intelligence strand further. The
25 Security Service accept the reason that it cannot be

1 disclosed would not have prevented the Service from
2 combining the new gist information with information
3 already in its possession and from reassessing it
4 further.

5 "The Security Service assert that, even with the
6 benefit of hindsight, that existing information in the
7 Service's records, when combined with the gisted
8 information from the intelligence strand, would not have
9 led to the identification of MSK."

10 Is that right?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Subject, therefore, to the flight manifests, three final
13 questions.

14 Firstly, knowing what you now know after all the
15 work that the Service has done and all the researches
16 you've done, do you consider that the Service should
17 reasonably have known more about the bombers prior to
18 7/7?

19 A. I do not.

20 Q. Knowing what you know now, do you consider that more
21 steps should reasonably have been taken to investigate,
22 in particular, MSK and Tanweer?

23 A. I do not.

24 Q. Even if further steps had been taken, do you consider
25 there to have been any realistic prospect of uncovering

1 the 7/7 plot?
2 A. I do not.
3 MR EADIE: Witness G, I'm very grateful.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. No sign of Mr Taylor, so we
5 assume Mr Taylor --
6 MR KEITH: My Lady not, no.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Those, then, I think are all the
8 questions that we had for Witness G.
9 MR KEITH: They are.
10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do I have to rise for Witness G to
11 leave?
12 MR KEITH: I think that might be appropriate.
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't mind if Witness G is happy to
14 go out through the side door. Oh, we have to reconnect
15 the video anyway.
16 (12.00 noon)
17 (A short break)
18 (12.10 pm)
19 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Assistant
20 Chief Constable Parkinson, please.
21 ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE JOHN DAVID PARKINSON (sworn)
22 Questions by MR KEITH
23 MR KEITH: Good morning, could you give the court your full
24 name, please?
25 A. Yes, I'm John David Parkinson.

1 Q. You are an assistant chief constable with the
2 West Yorkshire Police, is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. You have set out, in the two witness statements which
5 you have provided, something of your professional
6 background. May I summarise it in this way, please:

7 I think your career began as a detective with the
8 West Yorkshire Police, you rose through the ranks,
9 through chief inspector, then detective superintendent
10 and, at the time of these events in July 2005, I believe
11 that you were attached to the homicide major enquiry
12 team in Bradford. You were, as I've observed,
13 a detective superintendent, and you then took on the
14 role of a senior investigating officer in
15 Operation Theseus, the investigation into the events of
16 7 July, alongside Mr Prunty from the Metropolitan Police
17 Service from whom we'll hear later?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. That's all correct. You were, in fact, I think,
20 Mr Parkinson, therefore involved in the strategic
21 planning of the arrests and the investigative steps
22 taken after 7 July in the West Yorkshire area, which
23 incorporated, of course, the searches of home addresses
24 linked to the bombers, the search of the bomb factory at
25 Alexandra Grove, the Iqra bookshop, Hamara Centre, and

1 the various steps that were taken to investigate these
2 atrocities at that time?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. Your involvement with Operation Theseus then continued
5 until 2009, when you were promoted to assistant
6 chief constable, but you have, I know, for the purposes
7 of these proceedings, gone back and researched the
8 material, the documentation, and your involvement in
9 Operation Theseus from that time?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Could I ask you, please, about the structure in relation
12 to counter-terrorism that was in place at the time of
13 these events in July 2005? We have in your witness
14 statement some detail as to how matters worked at that
15 time. Could we have on the screen, please, [WYP14-3]?
16 At paragraph 5, you refer to the position of
17 regional coordinator for counter-terrorism and how,
18 subsequently, you became head of the North-east
19 Counter-terrorism Unit.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. We'll address in detail in a moment how the structures
22 came to be reorganised, but in essence, in July of 2005,
23 what was the broad nature of the counter-terrorism
24 structure, insofar as West Yorkshire Police was
25 concerned, that was in place?

1 A. There was a Special Branch that operated in
2 West Yorkshire Police.

3 Q. Did you have experience of Special Branch activities
4 in July 2005?

5 A. Not directly.

6 Q. But you were aware of the structure and aware of the
7 role of the Special Branch in West Yorkshire Police?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You subsequently became aware, of course, because you
10 became involved directly in a number of
11 counter-terrorist operations, and I think you became
12 subsequently very familiar with the ELG process. You
13 have carried out a number of table-top exercises and
14 planning exercises. You became, in essence,
15 a specialist in counter-terrorism?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Are you now one of the 12 national Counter-terrorism
18 Commanders?

19 A. I am.

20 Q. The Special Branch to which you've just made reference,
21 was Special Branch a unit of which every police force
22 had the benefit, so every police force, including
23 West Yorkshire, would have a Special Branch attached to
24 it?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Was there in that time, in 2005, much by way of national
2 coordination of the Special Branch system?

3 A. There was some, following the introduction of the
4 regional intelligence cells.

5 Q. When was that?

6 A. During the period of 2003, it followed the HMIC report
7 "A Need to Know".

8 Q. By HMIC, do you mean Her Majesty's Inspectorate?

9 A. I do, yes.

10 Q. On a day-to-day basis, if intelligence came in to, for
11 example, West Yorkshire Police and Special Branch, would
12 it be something that would be shared with other officers
13 in the force or would it be confined to the environment
14 of Special Branch and perhaps to a small number of desk
15 officers attached to Special Branch?

16 A. It would be confined, unless there was a very good
17 operational imperative to do otherwise.

18 Q. Your statement refers to how the Special Branch operated
19 what was known as a "desk-based system".

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What do you mean by that?

22 A. Individual officers would develop a degree of expertise
23 or understanding of different areas of Special Branch
24 work, so they were allocated into individual desks.

25 Q. How much liaison was there, at that time, between

1 intelligence officers, members of Special Branch,
2 dealing with the receipt and collation and action upon
3 intelligence, and local crime-based or operational-based
4 police officers in the force?

5 A. I would say that was very limited at that time.

6 Q. There came, as you've just mentioned, though, a review
7 process, which you set out at page 10 of your witness
8 statement, do you not?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. There were a number of local and national reviews. Is
11 that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. As we can see at paragraph 27, [WYP14-10], please, was
14 there a concern by 2000 that the work of Special Branch
15 and the structures in which it operated, did not meet
16 the major changes that were occurring in relation to
17 national security generally?

18 A. Yes, that's fair.

19 Q. What did those concerns lead to?

20 A. There was limited investment, I think, in Special Branch
21 at that time, in terms of the numbers and the
22 structures, within each individual force.

23 Q. As a result, was it appreciated that there was a need
24 for an overall national inspection of the process and
25 a review?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the
3 HMIC review to which you made reference to a few moments
4 ago?

5 A. Yes, I think the previous guidelines were from 1994 and
6 there was a view that there was a need for a refresh of
7 those.

8 Q. As a result of that review, were quite substantial
9 changes made to the overall approach to intelligence at
10 local force level?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. There was the introduction of a general model, a general
13 approach, called the national intelligence model. Is
14 that correct?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Changes were made to the National Criminal Intelligence
17 Service?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Were certain statutory changes brought about by the
20 Police Reform Act?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I needn't ask you in detail about them, but were they,
23 in broad terms, designed to try to improve a response at
24 regional levels to intelligence being received,
25 collated, analysed and acted upon?

1 A. More in relation to coordination and oversight, rather
2 than dealing with specific strands of intelligence.

3 Q. So although there were no changes to the fundamental
4 role of a desk officer in reviewing and analysing
5 intelligence, the system perhaps was better designed
6 thereafter to try to fill in the gaps, enhance
7 a regional picture and make sure that the overview was
8 better?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You mentioned a few moments ago the North-East Regional
11 Intelligence Cell. Looking down more specifically at
12 the intelligence structure, between 2003 and certainly
13 2005, was there a structure called the North-East
14 Regional Intelligence Cell in place?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What was that?

17 A. It was some additional resource that came from the
18 forces that constituted the region. The police service
19 throughout England and Wales is split into nine regions,
20 and this region in the north-east, that was considered
21 the number 2 region, and a number of officers were
22 seconded to come together to provide some additional
23 analytical research and to coordinate additional
24 resource in terms of finance and other facilities when
25 required for the individual forces.

1 Q. Did those additional resources replace or supplement the
2 Special Branch structure that you've already described?

3 A. They certainly didn't replace. They supplemented.

4 Q. The NERIC, the acronym for the North-East Regional
5 Intelligence Cell structure, did it report to the head
6 of Special Branch?

7 A. Because West Yorkshire Police is the largest force in
8 the ACPO number 2 region, we were able to host, in terms
9 of accommodation, the North-East Regional Intelligence
10 Cell, and it followed that the most senior officer in
11 relation to the head of Special Branch was the person
12 that occupied the post in West Yorkshire. So the NERIC
13 aligned itself with West Yorkshire Police
14 Special Branch.

15 Q. As a result, was there a broad increase in the number of
16 officers detailed to deal with intelligence matters
17 within West Yorkshire Police between 2003 and 2005?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do we have some figures provided by you at paragraphs 51
20 and 52 of your statement, page 18 of WYP14, please [WYP14-18] ? We
21 can see that:

22 "By 2002, the total number of staff working within
23 West Yorkshire Police Special Branch was 45 ..."

24 You say something about the reporting lines, and
25 then, at paragraph 52, you refer to the increase by the

1 end of 2004 to approximately 55 officers and support
2 staff, and you go on to explain how some of it was due
3 to a perceived threat in the aviation industry or the
4 aviation area generally.

5 A. Yes, much of that additional resource was allocated to
6 the airport.

7 Q. In terms of how West Yorkshire Police dealt with
8 intelligence, would it investigate its own investigative
9 strands or would it always be in some sort of
10 relationship with the Security Service?

11 A. On any matters that related to national security, it
12 would be with the Security Service.

13 Q. Is that because they have the primary role for national
14 security?

15 A. Of course.

16 Q. That presumably includes counter-terrorism?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You describe in your statement how, as a result, in
19 general terms, although there must have been exceptions,
20 the relationship could be described as "task and
21 complete". What do you mean by that?

22 A. I mean that specific actions or requests would be made
23 by the Security Service of the Special Branch, they
24 would conduct the enquiries as outlined and reply back
25 to the Security Service. They wouldn't take independent

1 action.

2 Q. If, in the course of investigating an intelligence
3 strand, a West Yorkshire Police, at that time,
4 Special Branch officer decided that further work could
5 profitably be done on trying to identify somebody who
6 would be the subject of an investigation or a target or
7 match information together to progress an investigation,
8 he or she would presumably be able to do that on their
9 own initiative without having to liaise with the
10 Security Service first?

11 A. That's very unlikely. They would refer back to the
12 Security Service request before taking any independent
13 action.

14 Q. But they might analyse the material, would they not? We
15 have seen Special Branch branch reports, for example, in
16 the course of these proceedings, in which an officer
17 with West Yorkshire Police has obviously sat down and
18 endeavoured to bring together the thoughts, the
19 conclusions and the intelligence strands then available.

20 A. Of the information that was available to them that had
21 been supplied by the Security Service, yes.

22 Q. Is there a divide, therefore, to be established between
23 an analytical step which might be set out on the face of
24 a Special Branch report to the Security Service as
25 opposed to an operational step?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So West Yorkshire Police wouldn't undertake any
3 operations without the knowledge or liaison of the
4 Security Service?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Has that system changed? Is there a different process
7 in place now, or is that general approach still the
8 same?

9 A. The principles are the same, but there is much closer
10 and joint working and discussion in person, which does
11 make a significant difference.

12 Q. We'll come back to the intelligence structures now in
13 place and counter-terrorism units, but is there, in
14 essence, now a much closer liaison at local level?

15 Indeed members of the Security Service sit physically
16 alongside members of West Yorkshire Police?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. You describe in your statement how, in fact, the
19 communications system has also changed, because you
20 describe the traveller system which was the system by
21 which members of the Security Service visit areas in the
22 country, or formerly visited areas in the country, the
23 secure email system -- the "cluster message" system, of
24 which my Lady has heard -- and the telephone system?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. You observe that the traveller system has now been
2 substantially replaced as a result of the fact, as
3 you've just indicated, the Security Service officers now
4 sit physically alongside your own officers?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. The position, then, at that time -- pre-7 July 2005 --
7 remains then as you've described it.

8 Could I, in the light of that structure, ask you,
9 please, to look at one or two aspects of the
10 intelligence picture in these proceedings?

11 Firstly, in relation to Operation Warlock, which was
12 the operation in relation to the camp, could we please
13 have tab 1, my Lady's tab 1? It's WYP11 on the screen [WYP11-1].

14 Assistant Chief Constable, I think you have the core
15 bundle there, but also the document will appear on the
16 screen to your right as well.

17 Was this operation, Operation Warlock, therefore, an
18 operation that was instigated by the
19 West Yorkshire Police or was it an operation that was
20 brought about and pursued at the request of the
21 Security Service?

22 A. It was at the request of the Security Service.

23 Q. I may be mistaken, but the location of the training camp
24 I think is outside the West Yorkshire Police
25 geographical area. Why were West Yorkshire Police

1 carrying out this operation?

2 A. The operation was in Cumbria, which is a relatively
3 small police force area, but it was known that one of
4 the organisers was from the West Yorkshire Police area,
5 West Yorkshire Police had the capability to conduct that
6 operation and was asked to do so by the
7 Security Service.

8 Q. Was the issue of camps, by which I mean the bringing
9 together of people in outdoor activities in this way, an
10 existing concern of West Yorkshire Police, even before
11 you were tasked with Operation Warlock?

12 A. I think we were aware of the general concern from the
13 Security Service.

14 Q. Had there been intelligence to suggest that there was
15 a concern here, even before the Security Service brought
16 it to your attention?

17 A. Not that I'm aware of specifically.

18 Q. The gist -- and I must be careful not to depart from the
19 gist -- refers to a man called McDaid having been known
20 to the Security Service and West Yorkshire Police since
21 at least 1998 and of the fact that he was suspected of
22 being an Islamic extremist and of involvement in
23 extremist activities, possibly since 1998.

24 May we take it that the concerns, therefore, that
25 led to the setting up of the Operation Warlock in 2001

1 had come to your attention and had been known about and
2 pursued and addressed even before then?

3 A. I think that's fair, yes.

4 Q. From, presumably, 1998, at the earliest, on the face of
5 the gist?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. I can deal with the matter fairly briefly, because, of
8 course, it's a matter that's already been addressed
9 through Witness G and through the course of these
10 proceedings already, but in the course of
11 Operation Warlock, one photograph of a person we now
12 know to be Mohammed Sidique Khan was prepared I think
13 from a video still.

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Could we please have [INQ8305-93], which is an extract
16 from the second ISC report? It's a picture of Khan
17 coming out of what looks like a bothy of some sort.
18 That was the photograph from that time, was it not?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. There is an original colour one, which I know has been
21 provided by your force to the Inquest team.

22 Could you help us with this question: we know from
23 your witness statement that the photograph, amongst
24 other photographs, was shown to a number of sources
25 subsequently. Can you tell us whether or not it would

1 have been a colour photograph or a black and white
2 photograph, or black and white variant of the photograph
3 that would have been shown subsequently to people?

4 A. I can't say specifically.

5 Q. You make the point in your statement, do you not, that,
6 when assessing whether or not there was much likelihood
7 of this person being identified at the time, it has to
8 be remembered that the photograph was taken in remote
9 terrain with limited cover for the person taking the
10 photograph. Is that correct?

11 A. That's from a video still, so it was from a video
12 camera.

13 Q. I stand corrected. The video cameraman was in remote
14 terrain with limited cover, and were the -- or rather,
15 was the technology in relation to videos and cameras
16 somewhat different then than it is now?

17 A. It was VHS analogue, which is significantly different
18 from today's digital technology.

19 Q. The only link to Khan, the man we now know to be
20 Mohammed Sidique Khan in this photograph, is this, is it
21 not, Assistant Chief Constable: after the events of
22 7 July 2005, one of your officers was going through old
23 files and realised that this photograph matched by then
24 a very well-known image of Mohammed Sidique Khan,
25 perhaps from a press report or from other sources, and

1 he realised it was the same person?

2 A. That's correct. He wasn't identified until after
3 7 July.

4 Q. As I've asked you already, West Yorkshire Police showed
5 photographs to a source, that was a source in 2001, so
6 around about the time of Operation Warlock, and it
7 seems, does it not, that there were quite a few steps
8 taken, or rather some time was taken, to see whether or
9 not the people who had attended the camp could be
10 identified?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The ISC report refers, does it not, to the fact that
13 I think nine of the people who had attended were around
14 that time or subsequently, but certainly before 7 July,
15 identified?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. But they did not, of course, include Khan?

18 A. That's correct.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Nine out of 42 or 45, is that right?
20 You thought there were 42, but in fact --

21 A. 42 at that time. Subsequently realised 45.

22 MR KEITH: May I ask you about the significance of Warlock?
23 Because in your statement you refer to the fact that, as
24 is apparent, there was nothing, on the face of it,
25 suspicious or illegal about the camp, the training

1 activities, the outward-bound activities. Nothing of
2 immediate concern, perhaps, by way of a risk to public
3 safety or something of that sort. But it was obviously
4 deemed appropriate and proportionate to try to identify
5 the people who were there and to follow up such leads as
6 those steps gave rise to.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That indicates, does it not, therefore, Mr Parkinson,
9 albeit not something to indicate that there was anything
10 illegal or of immediate concern, something that was
11 worth following up, something that was of some concern
12 to West Yorkshire Police?

13 A. I think the best way to describe it would be, as is
14 outlined, I think, later on in the gist, which is there
15 was the desire to understand people that repeatedly
16 attended camps, or who may be people who were organising
17 the camps.

18 Q. Why, if I may ask? Why was that need felt?

19 A. Well, I think, bearing in mind Operation Warlock was
20 pre-9/11, my personal understanding would be that there
21 was less understanding of what these camps -- what was
22 happening on these camps at that time.

23 Q. I put the question perhaps inelegantly. I wasn't trying
24 to elicit what the level of understanding was then, but
25 the more broad question of: was it that there was

1 a perceived concern that the camps and these sorts of
2 activities could in some way be related to potential
3 terrorist activities that they were being investigated
4 at all?

5 A. I don't think that link was directly made like that.

6 Q. Then perhaps putting it another way, there was a concern
7 that the camps might be some indication of possible
8 extremist activity?

9 A. I think that's fair, yes.

10 Q. After 7/7, West Yorkshire Police went back and carried
11 out an operation called Operation Atlas, did it not?

12 A. It did, yes.

13 Q. What was Operation Atlas concerned with?

14 A. Operation Atlas was at my instigation. Clearly, we
15 knew, following the events of 7 July, that -- and the
16 identification of MSK on this camp, that one individual
17 had gone on to commit mass murder in these atrocities,
18 and I didn't -- I wanted to be absolutely confident and
19 sure that everything that we could do to identify
20 anybody else that had been on that camp was of great
21 importance to me.

22 Q. Was that decision, therefore, to investigate the camps
23 further by way of trying to identify who was there and
24 what activities might have been going on, wholly borne
25 out of the hindsight that one of them had happened

1 subsequently to turn into a mass murderer, as opposed to
2 an appreciation that perhaps there had all along been
3 something more to this sort of training activity or camp
4 than had initially appeared to have been the case?

5 A. It was born out of hindsight. We were horrified by what
6 had happened and we wanted to make sure that we'd done
7 everything we could to identify those that had been on
8 that camp with him.

9 Q. So it was the first of those two propositions rather
10 than the second one?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did Operation Atlas lead anywhere, in the sense of: did
13 the further identifications of any that arose out of it
14 lead to the identification of other extremist or
15 facilitative activity?

16 A. We subsequently, after much and very significant
17 resource, and detective work, identified all but one of
18 the individuals on that camp, but there's nothing of
19 significance that I could talk about in open court about
20 the others.

21 Q. Without delving behind the closed curtain, did it seem
22 to West Yorkshire Police that there had been signs of
23 activity at the camp that might have been apparent at
24 that time, which were missed -- ie, the second of the
25 two propositions I put to you -- or were you satisfied

1 that everything, in hindsight, had been done that could
2 reasonably have been done?
3 A. All of the material was reviewed and there was nothing
4 that was observed or recorded that gave us any
5 indication of anything other than as described. No
6 activities that would cause us any kind of concern about
7 public safety.
8 Q. Can I turn now then, please, to Operation Honeysuckle,
9 which we know was the operation in 2003 jointly carried
10 out with the Security Service?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Also contained in the gist which you have at tab 1.
13 This included surveillance on the man, McDaid, on
14 14 and 15 April, and, as my Lady has heard, during the
15 course of that surveillance, McDaid was given
16 momentarily a lift in a car and the car happened to have
17 been registered to a Mr Sidique Khan of
18 11 Gregory Street, Batley, in West Yorkshire.
19 Could you please describe for us how
20 West Yorkshire Police recorded that fact of the
21 interaction, the mere fact that McDaid had been given
22 a lift in that car?
23 A. It was recorded on a surveillance log.
24 Q. And thereafter?
25 A. It was recorded on to the computer systems held in the

1 West Yorkshire Police Special Branch.

2 Q. Is that the computer systems C-L-U-E, CLUE, to which you
3 refer in your statement?

4 A. I do.

5 Q. The fact of the interaction between McDaid and the car
6 obviously led to an investigation or detective work
7 concerning the registration of the car and the address
8 of the registered keeper. Correct?

9 A. It did, but it was one of a number of routine actions
10 following that operation.

11 Q. Of course. Could we please have tab 4 of your bundle,
12 [WYP12-43]? We see there, do we not, a handwritten
13 document at the bottom, or rather an action document --
14 we can see "Action" at the top -- to which there has
15 been a handwritten annotation?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. We must look over the page, must we not, at page 44 [WYP12-44] of
18 the system, the second page of your tab, please,
19 Assistant Chief Constable, to the actual check that was
20 made at the time based on the registration plate of the
21 car? Because this is the actual enquiry that was made
22 to try to reveal the registered keeper and his address.
23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The way in which it was recorded was that, of course,

1 this enquiry itself would have been taken from whatever
2 database the West Yorkshire Police had access to,
3 perhaps a police national computer or some other
4 national database?

5 A. That's from the police national computer.

6 Q. That is from the police national computer. Then the
7 significance or the substance of that enquiry was then
8 reported by way of the handwritten annotation on the
9 action on the previous page?

10 A. Yes, it's handwritten and then subsequently typed on to
11 the system.

12 Q. It is that first page, then, that was entered on to the
13 CLUE West Yorkshire Police system?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Who has access to that CLUE system thereafter, or who
16 did have access thereafter?

17 A. It would be the officers and staff within the
18 Special Branch.

19 Q. Obviously, therefore, officers of West Yorkshire Police?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What about other Special Branch officers from other
22 forces or the Security Service itself?

23 A. Not directly from other forces or from the
24 Security Service.

25 Q. But they could ask West Yorkshire Police to make

1 a relevant enquiry?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The action that was put into the CLUE computer system
4 made, itself, no reference to 11 Gregory Street, did it,
5 although that was in fact the registered address or,
6 rather, the address of the registered keeper?

7 A. No, it didn't make reference.

8 Q. So if a Special Branch officer in West Yorkshire Police
9 or another police officer elsewhere or the
10 Security Service had asked West Yorkshire Police to go
11 back into the CLUE computer system and find any trace of
12 11 Gregory Street, there would have been no match with
13 this document, would there?

14 A. No.

15 Q. They could, of course, have interrogated -- surely have
16 interrogated the police national computer as well?

17 A. They could have done, and also, you'll note the number
18 that's preceded by the letter "N" --

19 Q. The crime information sheet number?

20 A. -- which stands for "nominal", would be able to access
21 additional detail around the individual.

22 Q. If somebody contacted West Yorkshire Police, for example
23 in 2004/2005, and said "What traces do you have on
24 11 Gregory Street?", this document would not, however,
25 appear, because it had no reference to 11 Gregory Street

1 on its face?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. So how would anyone have used that additional number to
4 try to find the original check on the car in April 2003
5 which had revealed the keeper as being of
6 11 Gregory Street?

7 A. Based entirely on a check of 11 Gregory Street, it
8 wouldn't.

9 Q. Nothing would have come up, would it?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I've mentioned the police national computer. The police
12 national computer is quite separate to the DVLA system,
13 the driving licence system, held at Swansea, is it not?

14 A. It is, sir.

15 Q. The DVLA records happened to show, did they not, that
16 this BMW was registered to Sidique Khan of
17 11 Gregory Street and then he sold it or transferred it
18 to another registered keeper in July of 2003?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. The car was, however, subsequently in an accident
21 in November of 2003 and scrapped, was it not?

22 A. It was.

23 Q. In accordance with the data protection policy then in
24 force, the reference on the police national computer --
25 not on the DVLA, but on the police national computer --

1 to a man called Sidique Khan being the registered keeper
2 of that car was weeded out and deleted?
3 A. Yes, after a period of not less than one year.
4 Q. So a check on the police national computer,
5 after November 2003, when the car was scrapped,
6 until November 2004, would have revealed the last keeper
7 of the car?
8 A. Yes, the current keeper, yes.
9 Q. The final keeper before the car was scrapped?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. But it wouldn't have revealed the previous keeper
12 Sidique Khan or his address?
13 A. No, a search on the address would only reveal the
14 current registered keeper. A search on the registration
15 mark of the vehicle would reveal the keeper and would be
16 able to access the previous records through DVLA.
17 Q. I ask you the question very precisely. Only the PNC
18 check would have revealed that. In order to be able to
19 get the previous keeper, you would have to go back to
20 the DVLA records?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Which are still in existence?
23 A. Of course.
24 Q. But unless the enquirer knew that there was a link
25 between 11 Gregory Street and that car, either through

1 the PNC or the West Yorkshire CLUE system, there was no
2 way of finding the reference to 11 Gregory Street, was
3 there?

4 A. No, I think that's right.

5 Q. So any step by the Security Service or
6 West Yorkshire Police either through the PNC or the
7 West Yorkshire Police CLUE computer from 2004 onwards --
8 the end of 2004, certainly, onwards -- would have
9 revealed no link to 11 Gregory Street and that car?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. That is with hindsight, I emphasise. At the time, would
12 that meeting between McDaid and a BMW car registered to
13 someone called Sidique Khan of 11 Gregory Street been of
14 sufficient importance as to have led any officer in the
15 West Yorkshire Police to tell the Security Service about
16 it?

17 A. I don't believe it would, no.

18 Q. Even though it was a joint operation?

19 A. Yes, I don't believe it would have done.

20 Q. Why would that sort of encounter -- which was, of
21 course, noted on the surveillance log of the
22 surveillance officers, the fact of the car giving McDaid
23 a lift -- not be something that would routinely be
24 expected to be passed to the joint holder of the
25 operation the Security Service, rather the fact that you

1 had then interrogated your own systems and found out
2 that it was a registered keeper of 11 Gregory Street?
3 A. Because the activity was delineated by the operational
4 purpose.

5 Q. You'll have to forgive me, I'm not sure I follow you.

6 A. Well, I can't expand on the operational purpose that's
7 outlined in the gist, but there was -- that wasn't the
8 only event that was recorded on the log. There was
9 other activities. It proved no significance to the
10 reason for the operation.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So it was irrelevant to the --

12 A. Yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- operation --

14 A. Yes.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- as far as you were concerned at
16 the time?

17 A. Yes, my Lady.

18 MR KEITH: But of course, as happenchance would terribly
19 have it, subsequently there was no link then between
20 McDauid and Sidique Khan through the BMW on 11 April 2003
21 for anybody to see?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Can I now turn, please, then, to Crevice in 2004?

24 Crevice was an operation which we have seen from the
25 documentation. West Yorkshire Police gave and provided

1 quite a bit of information and intelligence to the
2 Security Service and responded by way of numerous
3 requests to queries from them.

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. Was that also an investigation in which
6 West Yorkshire Police regarded itself as being under the
7 general rubric of task and complete?

8 A. Yes, we assisted with enquiries. We were not part of
9 the operation.

10 Q. The ISC report, the Intelligence and Security Committee
11 report, the second report, Assistant Chief Constable,
12 referred, at a time-line in that report -- could I have
13 [INQ8305-65] -- to a check being asked of

14 West Yorkshire Police on 16 February:

15 "MI5 runs checks on the green Honda Civic which is
16 shown to be registered to Hasina Patel ... MI5 ask
17 West Yorkshire Police for any details they have on
18 Hasina Patel ... There is no record of a written
19 response to this request."

20 That was, was it not, an erroneous conclusion
21 reached by the Intelligence and Security Committee?

22 A. It was. There is a written response.

23 Q. There were responses. I won't take you to them all, but
24 were there responses -- in fact,

25 West Yorkshire Police -- we'll look at the first one,

1 please. West Yorkshire Police document 9, page 3 [WYP9-3].

2 There is a response from West Yorkshire in relation
3 to the initial request for details in relation to
4 Hasina Patel.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Then did you respond to a further request in relation to
7 details concerning 10 Thornhill Park Avenue -- page 9 of
8 the system please, of that exhibit, [WYP9-9]. There we
9 are. A further response then in relation to the above
10 address, 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, and did you also
11 respond in relation to a request concerning lock-ups,
12 page 6 of this document, WYP9 [WYP9-6], you can see references to
13 addresses there and lock-ups?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Did West Yorkshire Police have any role in the
16 assessment of the intelligence that was being gathered
17 in the course of Crevice, or any role whatsoever in
18 sitting down bluntly and trying to assess what it all
19 amounted to?

20 A. No, that was not the role of the Special Branch at the
21 time.

22 Q. After Crevice, further enquiries were made of
23 West Yorkshire Police, were they not, in the summer?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. My Lady has seen the notes, and I won't take you to

1 them, but of course, requests were made of
2 West Yorkshire Police in June and you replied, or your
3 force replied, on 14 July, on 19 July and 30 July?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. As more and more information was gathered at the
6 West Yorkshire Police end, it was then provided to the
7 Security Service.

8 But West Yorkshire Police did prepare, did they not,
9 a number of branch reports, Special Branch reports, or
10 were they Metropolitan Police Special Branch reports?

11 A. I think --

12 Q. No connection to West Yorkshire Police at all?

13 A. No.

14 Q. All right. Under the current system of arrangements
15 between Security Service at regional level, would you
16 expect, as a force, to be limited to that task and
17 complete arrangement in the course of an operation or
18 investigation which appeared to have a moderately
19 significant link to your geographical area?

20 A. Now, are you saying?

21 Q. Now.

22 A. Sorry, can you just repeat the question?

23 Q. Yes. Now, would you expect, as a force, to be limited
24 to the task and complete relationship in the course of
25 an investigation being carried out by the

1 Security Service, and possibly the Metropolitan Police,
2 when there are leads of some significance to be followed
3 up in your own geographical area?

4 A. I think, as I said earlier, I think the principle
5 remains that there would be much greater discussion and
6 dialogue because of the co-location about the
7 operational purposes and requirements.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The principle remains you would
9 inform the Security Service that you wanted to take it
10 further before you perhaps blundered in?

11 A. Yes, my Lady. I think there would be a broader
12 discussion around what the information requirement was
13 and what we could do to help and support the
14 investigation.

15 MR KEITH: To give you an example -- perhaps a practical
16 example -- requests were made of West Yorkshire Police
17 in relation to information that may have been contained
18 on your own systems about Thornhill Park Avenue,
19 Hasina Patel, Sidique Khan, lock-ups in various streets.
20 Your own operation in 2001, Operation Warlock, and
21 Operation Honeysuckle in 2003, had shown links between
22 people such as McDaid, Tafazal Mohammed, and enquiries
23 of the Iqra bookshop were made.

24 I don't suggest that putting all those pieces of
25 information together necessarily led to any particular

1 conclusion, but is the system now in place such that
2 somebody in the West Yorkshire Police end can say, "That
3 rings a bell, enquiries have been made of our force in
4 relation to these particular addresses or streets or
5 people, and there is something to be said for trying to
6 exercise our own independent analysis of that
7 intelligence and see whether or not there are other
8 leads, local leads, that might usefully be pursued"?

9 A. I don't necessarily think it would lead to independent
10 analysis, but it would lead to, as I think is evident by
11 people working much closer together, that it would lead
12 to more joint analysis.

13 Q. If I can press you a bit further, does it allow an
14 officer now in West Yorkshire Police to say, "Hang on,
15 I think there is a new line of enquiry here that we
16 could usefully pursue", without having to simply say,
17 "Well, we've given the information that we've got to the
18 Security Service. That's the end of it"?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Has it made a practical difference in the investigation
21 of counter-terrorism?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Would it be fair to say, therefore, that systemically,
24 through no fault on the part of individual
25 West Yorkshire Police officers, there was a failing in

1 the sense of an inability to be able to pursue
2 evidential needs independently?

3 A. I wouldn't describe it as a failing, more that they were
4 operating within the accepted practices of that time.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anyway, by the sounds of it, you're
6 saying it's not just the system as applied in
7 West Yorkshire, but the system as applied nationally,
8 this was how things were done at that time?

9 A. That's correct, my Lady.

10 MR KEITH: My Lady, that brings me very usefully, if I may
11 say so, on to the next point, which is, after 7/7 and
12 the perceived increase in counter-terrorism
13 requirements, have there been substantial changes in the
14 counter-terrorist system?

15 A. Yes, very significant.

16 Q. I think there was a report, again from
17 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary,
18 in October 2006, called "Intercepting Terrorism"?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Was there then a major review by the Association of
21 Chief Police Officers and, in particular, one of its
22 sub-groups which concerns itself with terrorism and
23 allied matters?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. How was the then system of regional intelligence cells

1 then altered into what we now have, which is
2 counter-terrorism units?

3 A. I was part of that review and one of the reasons was
4 because of my involvement in the events that are
5 concerned here, along with many others.

6 The view was that there needed to be significant
7 investment and resource at a regional level, not only in
8 intelligence, but also to deal with the increase in
9 operational activity for both investigative,
10 operational, intelligence development and other strands
11 and, as such, there was, as I say, significant
12 investment which resulted in a whole new national
13 counter-terrorism infrastructure from the police.

14 Q. One facet of that was, by reference to the
15 Metropolitan Police, the amalgamation of S013,
16 Anti-terrorist Branch, and S012, Special Branch, into
17 Counter-terrorism Command?

18 A. I think the Counter-terrorism Command formed the sort of
19 basis of the blueprint of the way that the
20 counter-terrorism units were established.

21 Q. There are now a number of counter-terrorism units, of
22 which yours is one, but there is West Yorks,
23 West Midlands, Greater Manchester and I think
24 Thames Valley. Is that correct?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. And Special Branch has been swept away?

2 A. In those areas where those counter-terrorism units
3 exist, essentially, yes. In the single forces that make
4 up the regions, they still have a Special Branch
5 capability, but work very closely with and to the
6 counter-terrorism units and counter-terrorism
7 intelligence units.

8 Q. I don't know how far we need to go, but in the smaller,
9 local forces there is still an intelligence-gathering
10 operation called a counter-terrorism intelligence unit
11 and in the bigger areas, such as your own, there is both
12 a counter-terrorism intelligence facility as well as
13 a counter-intelligence unit facility?

14 A. Yes, in the bigger areas, they're all as one entity,
15 which was the unit that I led in West Yorkshire in the
16 north-east region. In some of the smaller areas -- but
17 they're sort of aligned or "buddied", I think is the
18 phrase we use, with the big counter-terrorism units who
19 have a much greater resource and asset to deal with
20 investigative and surveillance and other operational
21 capability.

22 Q. Have you provided my Lady and the Inquest team with some
23 figures in relation to the current numbers of stuff in
24 the North-east Counter-terrorism Unit? Could we have
25 [WYP14-25], paragraph 79. The North-east

1 Counter-terrorism Unit has its own premises, its own
2 purpose-built headquarters and additional buildings and
3 materials. It has over 400 staff and that compares with
4 approximately 30 officers working in the Special Branch
5 for, of course, just West Yorkshire Police in 2000?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. So a very substantial increase?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, is that a convenient point?

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is. I'm conscious that I think we
11 must have kept Mr Parkinson waiting and we have other
12 senior officers waiting and I don't really wish to keep
13 people, at that level particularly, from their other
14 duties.

15 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How confident are we that we have
17 Witness G coming back at 2.00? How confident are we
18 that we're going to get through the witnesses today?

19 MR KEITH: My Lady, we have had it very much in mind for
20 days. Much depends on how long my learned friends
21 require, but I have very little more for Assistant
22 Chief Constable Parkinson. I can deal with former
23 Assistant Commissioner Clarke and Detective
24 Superintendent Prunty briefly and I'm confident,
25 dependent on others, that we will finish all today's

1 witnesses today. Including G, I should say, at 2.00.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, as I say, I hope that counsel
3 will please discuss amongst themselves, because I don't
4 want the witnesses brought here and hanging around if
5 it's not thought we can reach them today.

6 If necessary, I will have to make arrangements about
7 tomorrow. But I do wish people to discuss amongst
8 themselves.

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, indeed, it's kept under very regular
10 review.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. 2.05.

12 (1.00 pm)

13 (The short adjournment)

14

15