

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 9 February 2011 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 9 February 2011

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

4 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. May I invite you to call

5 Chief Superintendent Alexander Robertson, please?

6 CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT ALEXANDER DURIE ROBERTSON (sworn)

7 Questions by MR KEITH

8 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full

9 name, please?

10 A. Alexander Durie Robertson.

11 Q. Chief Superintendent, may I, as I did with

12 London Underground, acknowledge through you, as the

13 first senior City of London Police officer to give

14 evidence in these proceedings, the endeavours and

15 professionalism of the individual officers who responded

16 on 7 July?

17 A. Thank you.

18 Q. You are currently the head of the Specialist Support

19 Directorate of City of London Police, which has

20 responsibility for public order policing, firearms,

21 traffic, dogs, mounted units and a host of other

22 responsibilities?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. You have many years' experience with City of London

25 Police in terms of the planning that is carried out for

1 demonstrations and possible disturbances that occur in
2 the geographical area of the City of London?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. I think you were a member of the Command teams that
5 dealt variously with matters such as the Queen's Golden
6 Jubilee, the Mayday demonstration, Stop the War
7 demonstrations and, every year, the London Mayor events?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When you were promoted to superintendent in 2002 and you
10 joined your current department, did you become
11 intimately involved in those matters which had to be
12 addressed by the City of London Police in connection
13 with liaison with the London Resilience Team and
14 emergency planning?

15 A. Yes, my role necessitated me to be part of the London
16 Resilience Team and the -- and then what became the
17 London Resilience Programme Board.

18 Q. We have heard variously of the London Resilience Team,
19 the London Regional Resilience Forum, the London Local
20 Resilience Forum and LESLP.

21 Could you, just for our benefit, explain the
22 difference between the various organisations starting
23 with the London Resilience Team?

24 A. The London Resilience Team was set up within the
25 Government Office of London as a result of the

1 atrocities of New York on September 11, 2001. It was
2 brought together to ensure there would be a coordinated
3 response by every area that would need to respond to
4 a major incident, particularly something on the scale of
5 the 9/11 attacks within London.

6 It brings together, not only the emergency services
7 of police, fire and ambulance, but also utilities and
8 local authorities and -- down to the -- you might get
9 site clearance, building contractors, those sorts of
10 things, all coming in at once.

11 It's just to make sure that there is an
12 understanding of everybody's roles, responsibilities,
13 how an incident might unfold and how best to make sure
14 that we can return to as near as normality as quickly as
15 possible without getting in each other's ways.

16 Q. As part of the structure, is there a separate body
17 called the London Regional Resilience Forum which looks
18 at the minutiae of the plans that are submitted under
19 the auspices of the London Resilience Team?

20 A. The London Resilience Team has a number of
21 subcommittees, Working Groups -- Task and Finish Groups,
22 as they've more recently been called -- which would look
23 at the detail on how to do various areas, so create the
24 plans.

25 So things that have been developed by those Task and

1 Finish Groups would be the London Mass Fatalities Plan,
2 the strategic coordination and Command and Control plan,
3 site clearance plans, there would be a plan for
4 voluntary sections, a faith plan, which -- and they are
5 worked on by the groups, the people who understand it,
6 and then they would go up to the London Regional
7 Resilience Forum where they would be assessed by the
8 strategic leaders of all the various authorities and
9 organisations that have been involved in the development
10 of it to be -- become policy for all the authorities
11 that have signed up to them.

12 Q. So the London Regional Resilience Forum has the
13 overview, the strategic overview, of the plans that are
14 submitted, even if it doesn't sit all the time and even
15 if it isn't involved in the administration of that
16 process?

17 A. They have the opportunity to ask for work to be carried
18 out and they will also receive work that has been
19 carried out to make sure that it is fit for their
20 purpose.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I haven't -- I'm sure I'm
22 being slow. The London Resilience Team fits in where
23 with the London Regional Resilience Forum?

24 A. The London Regional Resilience Forum are the strategic
25 leaders for all the various areas, so my Commissioner

1 would go to the London Regional Resilience Forum. They
2 have the opportunity of tasking the London Regional --
3 the London Resilience Team with work --

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm glad you have trouble with these
5 names.

6 A. -- which would be, perhaps, to create a strategic
7 Command and Control plan for London.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So is the Forum up there, at the top?
9 A. Yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And the team --

11 A. The London Resilience Team are probably best described
12 as a Secretariat for the various Work Groups that sit
13 underneath the London Regional Resilience Forum, and
14 they will coordinate the work of the various emergency
15 services, local authorities, other utilities, in pulling
16 the plans together, and getting them into a consistent
17 format which will then go back to the London Regional
18 Resilience Forum for the strategic leaders to agree or
19 disagree with what's been proposed and for that that is
20 agreed to become policy for all partners.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think I'm there.

22 MR KEITH: Chief Superintendent Robertson has helpfully set
23 out the various differences on page 4 of COLP146. I'm
24 afraid to say I think I've only endeavoured in confusing
25 matters.

1 Chief Superintendent, there is another body called
2 the Central Local Resilience Forum of which we
3 understand from your witness statement the City of
4 London forms part?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. What are the differences between the Central Local
7 Resilience Forum and the London Regional Resilience
8 Forum?

9 A. It's probably easier to understand the chronology of
10 these various groups and, if you don't mind, I'll turn
11 it around slightly.

12 The group that has been in longest existence is the
13 London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, sometimes
14 referred to as LESLP, and that has created the major
15 incident plan for the emergency -- for the coordination
16 of the emergency services to any major incident within
17 London.

18 The people who are on that are the three police
19 forces in London, so Metropolitan Police, British
20 Transport Police, City of London Police, London
21 Ambulance Service, London Fire Brigade and various other
22 utility -- authorities that will be involved in a major
23 incident. So there will be the Coastguard, Marine, Port
24 of London Authority for River Matters, those sorts of
25 groups.

1 They have been sitting since 1973, and they have
2 been responsible for the coordination of responses to
3 major incidents.

4 At the time of July 2005, we were on the sixth
5 edition of the manual that comes out from that group.

6 They then -- there was then created a London
7 Emergency Services Liaison Forum which was, again, the
8 strategic leaders of those six or seven major players
9 within the emergency services and responders to a major
10 incident, and they again provided the strategic
11 direction for that group.

12 London Resilience Team was created within the
13 Government Office for London as a result of the 9/11
14 attacks to make sure that there would be coordination
15 across London, as a major capital city, to allow for
16 a professional and consistent and cooperative response
17 by all persons involved in responding to an incident.

18 The Civil Contingencies Act, I think it is 2004,
19 created a similar process for all of the regions within
20 the country, and they were based on the Government
21 regions. London, being the size and complexity that it
22 is, is its own region, and there are another eight
23 regions, I believe, or nine regions outside, which all
24 have a regional resilience forum, the strategic leaders
25 which we were describing earlier.

1 They then -- within London, we have some local
2 resilience fora, again to replicate the size of London,
3 so there are six within London, five outer areas and one
4 central area which includes the boroughs of the City of
5 London, Tower Hamlets, Westminster, Kensington & Chelsea
6 and Lambeth, and I've probably forgotten one, but that's
7 about right.

8 Q. Southwark?

9 A. Southwark, and Southwark, mainly because the work,
10 demographics, the location, are very similar for those
11 boroughs, that's why they've come together.

12 Other areas would be north-east, north-west and
13 there would be a number of boroughs there that work
14 together.

15 So there will be specific risks that may be
16 applicable to that area, so a Central London resilience
17 fora risk would be flooding from the River Thames.

18 Obviously, that would not necessarily be such a risk
19 for, perhaps, the north-east boroughs, and they would do
20 work to mitigate the risks from a particular risk to
21 that area.

22 They could then -- these central or these local
23 resilience fora can then identify work they believe
24 should be done on a regional basis rather than just
25 a local basis and they can push work towards the London

1 Regional Resilience Board, which was recently set up in
2 about 2007, to make sure there was coordination, again,
3 of effort from the London -- from the local fora to the
4 regional level.

5 They do most of the work at that board through the
6 Task and Finish Groups, and then, once the work is
7 finished by that, it would go up to the regional
8 resilience forum.

9 Q. Chief Superintendent, you are to be congratulated for
10 your exposition, but may I ask this, and perhaps
11 a little unfairly, because it's not something addressed
12 in your witness statement: does this profusion of bodies
13 work, in your experience?

14 There plainly are a number of bodies covering these
15 sorts of emergency issues across London, and plainly
16 they are designed to work in such a way that information
17 flows from the local to the regional to the national
18 level, but with this sheer number of bodies, is it your
19 experience that the structure works efficiently for the
20 putting into place of emergency plans and the proper
21 discussion of those plans amongst all those who may wish
22 to contribute to them?

23 A. My experience is it works surprisingly well. When
24 I just tried to describe it -- because it's not easy to
25 understand it or even to see how it works -- but it

1 works because the people who do the work are the people
2 who will be responding to incidents. They live and
3 breathe this type of work, and they know the pitfalls
4 that may occur from trying to change a protocol into
5 actual activity.

6 Generally, it is the people who are doing the work
7 through their experience of incidents who have
8 identified the issues that may arise and may be
9 escalated by a more major incident, and it generally is
10 the lower levels that identify what needs to be done to
11 provide a cohesive and consistent response across
12 London.

13 Whilst the London Regional Resilience Forum have the
14 strategic direction and have the ability to direct work,
15 it tends to be that the -- that they are content with
16 the work that is coming up and they see the results, the
17 fruits of the labour.

18 I think the testament is the fact that the Strategic
19 Co-ordination Centre is a straight lift from the London
20 Strategic Command and Control Plan. The Mortuary, the
21 Mass Fatalities Plan, which was developed and published
22 probably weeks before, if not days before, the tragic
23 occurrence on 7 July, worked seamlessly, with people
24 understanding what their roles, responsibilities were,
25 how we could get something on the size of that Mortuary

1 put together within two days.

2 I think that is testament to the work that had gone
3 on before, and continues to go on, with plans that are
4 honed, revisited, reworked and republished, but because
5 everybody has an involvement, people understand and have
6 ownership of the plans rather than suddenly trying to
7 drag something off the shelf at the wrong moment.

8 Q. So the practical considerations and the practical views
9 of those who are tasked with the heavy obligation of
10 responding in practice to emergencies across London do
11 find their way towards the various bodies and the fora
12 which have been set up to put all the planning on to
13 paper and to publish it?

14 A. That's correct. The work is created by people who are
15 actually doing the work. The London Resilience Team do
16 act as the Secretariat. They all have -- before the
17 Government Office for London was disbanded, they would
18 have civil servants and they would have secondees or
19 attached members from the emergency services and
20 utilities and local authorities working with them, and
21 they would know who to be contacting, but the actual
22 work was done by people who, on a day-to-day basis,
23 would be dealing with the type of work that they were
24 looking at.

25 Q. My Lady has heard of the manual, and you made reference

1 to it, produced by LESLP, and the evidence has indicated
2 that the sixth edition or the sixth version was in place
3 as at 7 July 2005, and has now been replaced by
4 version 7, and version 8 is currently in draft.

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Do those changes in edition, by way of example, reflect
7 real, practical and useful understanding produced by the
8 emergency services to the drafters of those documents?

9 A. It does. The reason for the new editions is that things
10 have become apparent.

11 I think you will notice -- it has been referred
12 to -- that certainly, in my experience, there aren't too
13 many revisions to the eighth edition or to the seventh
14 edition. They are perhaps just clarity on certain
15 points. The main thrust of the document hasn't changed
16 for a number of years, which is -- one, it shows that
17 the people who first drafted it did a good job, but it's
18 also the fact that it reflects that the changes that we
19 do make are based on experience and that the process
20 works and that it is doing what it needs to do, which is
21 coordinate the emergency services to provide the best
22 possible response that we can in the circumstances we're
23 dealing with.

24 I personally believe that something like the London
25 Emergency Services Liaison Panel and manual is best

1 practice for the majority of the world to be considering
2 and I think that my experience of New York is that they
3 could have done with something like that, although they
4 have --

5 Q. Do they not have an Office of Emergency Management?

6 A. They have an Office of Emergency Management, but I think
7 an understanding and an acceptance of roles and
8 responsibilities clearly before responding -- and
9 I think it's something that they have picked up on as
10 well from their own examination of 9/11 -- helps to
11 understand, so that you don't try and work out what you
12 need to do at an incident; you know exactly what you're
13 going to do at an incident and you know exactly what
14 everybody else is going to do at an incident. Then you
15 can get on with doing what is important.

16 Q. One final question on this area, if I may, again
17 slightly out of scope, for which I hope you'll forgive
18 me.

19 One of the points made by the London Assembly 7 July
20 Committee was the need to place sufficient and proper
21 emphasis on the ability of individuals to respond and on
22 the effects of individuals in London of these sorts of
23 atrocities or emergencies. Rather than concentrating
24 overmuch on generic response or on strategic planning,
25 ultimately, both in terms of the effect of such

1 incidents and in terms of the response, it is the
2 individual that in many ways matters.
3 Is it your experience, borne out of the table-top
4 exercises and the many exercises that you have done, as
5 well as the many events and incidents that you have
6 commanded, that sufficient attention is paid to the
7 ability of individual members of the emergency services
8 to respond sensibly and with common sense to whatever
9 eventualities they might be confronted with, as opposed
10 to planning, in a perhaps more generic way, the
11 structures to help them respond?

12 A. Certainly with the police service, officers are
13 encouraged to work on their initiative and work for the
14 best endeavour and to do what they think is right at the
15 time and, if they do that, they won't be criticised for
16 trying to do their best.

17 The manual is exactly that, it is guidance, and
18 often it is better for the people, perhaps one step
19 removed, the commanders, to understand exactly what
20 needs to be done and to make sure that the response is
21 coordinated and perhaps to temper excessive enthusiasm.

22 If we have -- initially, you will get people wanting
23 to respond, as we have seen on 7 July, people are
24 perhaps doing jobs that technically are not theirs.
25 That's going to happen. But as we get further into an

1 incident, the manual allows us to identify those jobs
2 that perhaps the police shouldn't be doing, to
3 concentrate on the jobs that we should be doing, to
4 allow the Ambulance Service and the Fire Brigade to do
5 the jobs that they need to be doing.

6 So there will be confusion initially, there has to
7 be -- I don't say there has to be, I think it is
8 inevitable.

9 Q. It is natural?

10 A. It is inevitable. It gives us a framework to work
11 within, but we're not going to criticise anybody for
12 doing something that they thought was the right thing to
13 do at the right time, if that was believable.

14 I don't --

15 Q. Reasonable?

16 A. Reasonable, that's it, that's the --

17 Q. Thank you very much, Chief Superintendent, that's very
18 helpful. Turning to 7 July itself, could I commence by
19 asking you about the arrangements that had been put in
20 place in connection with the G8 Summit that was, of
21 course, going on at the same time in Scotland?

22 One of the issues which has been raised is whether
23 or not the simultaneous deployment of officers to G8 had
24 any effect and, in particular, any adverse effect, on
25 the ability of City of London Police to deploy officers

1 in response to the events on the Underground and,
2 although not directly, the bus.

3 Can you assist us, please, as to whether or not the
4 emergence of the events on 7 July was hindered or
5 hampered in any way by the arrangements for the
6 G8 Summit?

7 A. I don't consider it was. There were two deployments.
8 The initial deployment was a preplanned deployment
9 arranged by the Police National Information Coordination
10 Centre, and that asked a number of forces to provide
11 officers to assist the Scottish police forces with the
12 security for the G8 Summit.

13 We sent a number of officers, both generalist police
14 officers, what we would call level 2 public order police
15 officers, firearms officers and some dog handlers as
16 well, I believe.

17 That number was perfectly manageable. It was
18 preplanned. That would not have impacted upon our
19 day-to-day resilience and we would have ensured that it
20 did not impact upon our day-to-day resilience within the
21 force area.

22 There was a subsequent deployment when the -- there
23 was a concern about the level of demonstration that was
24 occurring up in G8, and we sent an urgent request to the
25 Police National Information Coordination Centre, one

1 further Serial of what --

2 Q. Just pause there. Is that a body which allows police
3 forces to communicate with each other for the purposes
4 of seeking additional resources from outside its own
5 geographical area?

6 A. That's correct. If you have -- if one particular force
7 has an incident or an occasion occurring which they do
8 not believe they have sufficient resilience to cope
9 with, they can apply to this body, the Police National
10 Information Coordination Centre, for additional staff
11 from other forces, and other forces will then give what
12 they can or what they think is appropriate for their own
13 personal -- their own needs at that time.

14 So there had been the first initial tranche of
15 officers who went up under the auspices of that request.

16 As I say, that was a preplanned request. The
17 demonstrations became greater than they anticipated, or
18 more violent -- I can't remember which -- but certainly
19 there was a concern, so the Scottish forces made an
20 urgent request to the Police National Information Centre
21 for additional resources to be sent up immediately.

22 We sent up a further Serial, which is of a group of
23 one inspector, three sergeants, 18 PCs and three
24 drivers. So approximately 24 people in all, and they
25 went up as a matter of urgency, either on the night of

1 5 July or 6 July, I can't quite remember at the moment.
2 That group that went up is what we call our level 1
3 public order unit, they are our most highly trained
4 public order unit and they work consistently together.
5 However, on a day-to-day basis, they would be
6 deployed separately, they would be deployed as small
7 units of probably a sergeant and three, four, five or
8 six people, depending on annual leave, sickness, those
9 sorts of things. So they wouldn't have been together as
10 a body at that time.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. So on 7 July, they may or may not have been on duty,
13 under normal circumstances. I don't consider that that
14 additional Serial going up caused us any particular
15 problem for the immediate response.

16 Q. Thank you. In any event, for reasons that we'll come to
17 in a moment, there were Metropolitan Police officers
18 assigned or deployed to go to the Aldgate scene under
19 what's called Operation Benbow, which we'll come back to
20 in a moment, but did you, in any event, plan for the
21 future and plan for all eventualities by putting into
22 place administrative steps to recall to the City of
23 London geographical area those officers, or some
24 officers, who were off-duty and also to bring forward
25 officers from the next shift, so that if you needed

1 them -- although, in the event, you didn't, because
2 I think you used many of your officers from other
3 departments, not those normally associated with
4 responding to this sort of incident, to help wherever
5 they could around the area, and so all eventualities
6 were planned for?

7 A. The initial deployment of Metropolitan Police officers
8 to Aldgate would be a natural occurrence within policing
9 London.

10 Q. Because of Operation Benbow?

11 A. Not necessarily because of Operation Benbow. Because we
12 have a -- we have the same Command and Control system.
13 All 999 calls are received by the Metropolitan Police
14 because it is impossible to remove the City of London
15 that closely, geographically, for calls coming in.

16 Q. From the rest of London?

17 A. So all 999 calls are received by the
18 Metropolitan Police. Depending on where the call is, it
19 will be referred to our control room and we will assign
20 units.

21 On something that seems to be serious, it will go
22 over the radio channels, which are heard by both
23 Metropolitan Police vehicles and City of London Police
24 vehicles. There is every chance that those units heard
25 there is something serious happening at Aldgate and may

1 have been in the vicinity, because Aldgate is literally
2 a stone's throw away from the Metropolitan Police border
3 to the east.

4 I also am aware that because the Command and Control
5 system goes through New Scotland Yard they were already
6 monitoring the CADs that were happening and something
7 like the initial call came in as an explosion,
8 I believe, or it was termed as an explosion.

9 Q. Indeed.

10 A. Because of our experiences in London of terrorist
11 incidents, a CAD that -- or a message that uses the word
12 "explosion" will be circulated to a wide area within
13 London of people who will be interested in something
14 like that happening.

15 Thankfully, the majority of times, they are innocent
16 explosions, electrical explosions, build-up of gas in
17 manhole covers, those sorts of things, but they will
18 always be monitored and reviewed, and particular
19 attention paid to them.

20 So it came as no surprise that the
21 Metropolitan Police also realised we had something going
22 on, were offering up units that were close by and could
23 assist.

24 Q. So there was an additional level of resource there?

25 A. There was an additional level of resource within London

1 because they had put in an additional level of resource
2 because, at that time, the intelligence wasn't clear as
3 to whether the G8 -- if the security and protection at
4 the G8 Summit was sufficient, demonstrators may have
5 decided to come to London to demonstrate, so there was
6 a response that the Metropolitan Police had put in place
7 for G8 instances.

8 Q. We've heard of the Serial that were available to the
9 Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

10 A. That Serial was part of that G8 response, and was
11 diverted to us.

12 Q. Can I pause you there? I don't want to delve into too
13 much detail.

14 Broadly, you had also a second level of resource
15 available, which is that you, as I indicated, directed
16 that, firstly, officers should be redeployed from their
17 normal roles in the City of London Police to provide
18 immediate support to ancillary areas such as the
19 Casualty Bureau, hospital documentation and so on, but
20 also that officers, off-duty officers, who were in the
21 section house, which is police accommodation, were made
22 available, so that if further officers were needed, they
23 could be drawn upon, and also that officers due to
24 attend the next shift were contacted and steps were
25 taken to ascertain whether they could be made

1 immediately available?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Were there difficulties contacting, in general terms,
4 the officers who were either in the section house or
5 off-duty and awaiting their next shift turn?

6 A. I'm not aware of that. As you've seen from my
7 statement, I assigned a chief inspector to deal with
8 that issue reasonably quickly into the incident.

9 My understanding -- our normal process would be that
10 we would deploy officers who are on duty to the incident
11 and we would try to get as many as we could get there
12 that needed to be there.

13 We would then start the process of ringing round.

14 We have call-out lists -- sorry, to go back, because we
15 are such a small force area, we don't have the ability
16 and we don't have the luxury, almost, of being able to
17 redeploy officers who are on duty in another area that
18 is completely unconnected with the incident that's
19 taking place. Generally, a major incident in the City
20 will affect the whole of the City.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I'm sorry to interrupt,
22 I think we are going into quite a lot of detail I don't
23 need.

24 A. Sorry.

25 MR KEITH: There is material in the documents disclosed to

1 us, Chief Superintendent, that there were some
2 difficulties contacting officers by mobile phone or
3 otherwise because the details of their addresses or
4 their phone numbers weren't quite as up to date as
5 perhaps they might have been and not all the officers
6 whom your subordinates attempted to contact were
7 available or contactable. Were you aware of that?

8 A. I became aware of that through the debriefs. That is
9 not unexpected. We can't guarantee that we'll be able
10 to contact everybody. Obviously on the incident, there
11 were problems with the mobile phone network.

12 Q. These were difficulties, not with the mobile phone
13 network --

14 A. Just on the call-outs.

15 Q. It's details of the individual officers not being up to
16 date?

17 A. Yes, and we have addressed that.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. We have a system now where each officer is -- can update
20 their own details. At that time, we were on
21 a paper-based system, so that could only be -- that
22 would be updated perhaps on a monthly basis --

23 Q. But -- if you will allow me please, I'm sorry to
24 interrupt you -- the system has been re-examined and the
25 process has been tightened up, has it not?

1 A. It is a computerised system on which officers can update
2 their own individual details on a daily basis, if
3 necessary.

4 Q. All right. Putting now aside the generic issues which
5 arose as far as City of London Police was concerned in
6 the early hours of 7 July, you, yourself, were on duty
7 in uniform at Wood Street police station, which is where
8 the control office for City of London Police is
9 situated.

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. That morning, you received a telephone call from the
12 control officer who told you that there had been
13 a report of a train crash.

14 For my Lady's note, there was indeed a CAD entry at
15 09.01.24 reporting such a crash between Liverpool Street
16 and Aldgate stations.

17 You weren't aware of what exactly was concerned, but
18 you presumed that it would be a serious incident and,
19 therefore, you went to the Control Centre and you took
20 the role of Gold Commander?

21 A. I did, yes.

22 Q. The City of London Police depends to an extent, does it
23 not, on information from the British Transport Police,
24 insofar as the Underground system is concerned?

25 A. It does.

1 Q. Were you, therefore, in liaison with the British
2 Transport Police immediately on your arrival?

3 A. I recall comments from -- about the British Transport
4 Police. I personally didn't ring the British Transport
5 Police at that time as I walked in, but I was being told
6 that there were comments from the Command and Control
7 system, the CAD system, which was giving me the
8 information that I thought was -- that I needed at that
9 time.

10 Q. When you arrived, did you encounter difficulties in
11 ascertaining the exact nature of the incident of which
12 you had been told? Was there a problem with the flow of
13 information into the control room at Wood Street or were
14 you relatively easily able to understand what was going
15 on?

16 A. Knowing a little bit of the nature of the Underground
17 system, I was surprised that they were saying there was
18 a train crash, so, and as the information came in, it
19 quickly became apparent that it probably wasn't a train
20 crash, it was something more serious affecting one
21 train.

22 I can't recall exactly when I found out that there
23 had been an explosion, or a confirmed explosion, but it
24 was quite early on in the process.

25 Q. The evidence before my Lady is that there was a general

1 understanding, erroneous, as it turned out, that there
2 was a power surge.

3 How quickly were you able to get to the true cause
4 of what had happened at Aldgate, to be able to dispel
5 the myth of a power surge?

6 A. I believe that we, at Aldgate, knew that it was not
7 a power surge very quickly.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. We were hearing information from other areas that there
10 was a power surge, and I believe that that's how the
11 control systems within London Underground would have
12 reported it, because it was a loss of power as a result
13 of the explosions.

14 But I was quite happy -- not happy, obviously, but
15 I believed that it was not a power surge, that it was an
16 explosion. Why that explosion had occurred, obviously
17 I did not know, but certainly that there was an
18 explosion, and I was aware of that information quite
19 quickly.

20 Q. Could we look, please, at INQ10426 [INQ10426-1], which is
21 a time-line, Chief Superintendent, of the most important
22 events, chronologically speaking, at Aldgate.

23 At 08.51.26, over the page [INQ10426-2], you will see there a CAD
24 message on 2334 referring to a "bit of an explosion
25 opposite the Great Eastern Hotel".

1 Just to get your bearings, the CAD to which you
2 referred -- namely, the possibility of a train crash --
3 was a little later at 09.01. We'll come to that in
4 a moment.

5 At 08.53, there is a reference there in CAD 2337 to
6 the LAS being called, so all this would have been
7 available on the COLP, City of London Police CAD?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. At 09.04.43 -- I'm afraid I don't have the page numbers,
10 if you'd just keep scrolling, thank you very much --[INQ10426-6]
11 there is a reference there to Police Sergeant Kemp's
12 report from his vehicle of the possibility of an
13 electrical explosion, a reference to injuries being more
14 severe.

15 At 09.06.45, British Transport Police declare
16 a major incident through Inspector Munn.
17 I don't understand that the City of London Police
18 itself declared a major incident, but you would no doubt
19 have been aware of the declaration by the British
20 Transport Police of a major incident?

21 A. I was aware that nearly every emergency service that
22 attended were declaring a major incident.

23 Q. Yes, that was the first one, though.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So may we presume you were aware of that first one as

1 soon as it occurred?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. At 09.10.32 [INQ10426-7], PC Kemp, who, in fact, had had the call
4 sign 18CP, refers specifically to a bomb in one
5 carriage, to "multiple casualties, some possibly fatal"
6 and a further request for London Ambulance Service.

7 Were you made aware of that first reference from
8 a witness directly on the scene of the notion of a bomb?

9 A. In all honesty, I can't say that I remember -- I recall
10 that actually being told to me, but I was aware very
11 early on that we were dealing with an explosion and
12 possibly a bomb. Whether they said, "Neil Kemp has
13 called it a bomb", I can't recall, but I had no concern
14 that I was dealing with anything other than a bomb at
15 a very quick --

16 Q. It is the type of information that would -- we may
17 presume -- naturally be brought to the attention of
18 Gold?

19 A. That would have come through to one of our radio
20 operators who would have been listening to that and they
21 would have probably turned round to me and said
22 something along the lines of, "They think it's a bomb".

23 Q. The major incident having been declared, what steps, if
24 any, to respond to that declaration did the City of
25 London Police take in addition, of course, to the

1 deployment of officers who were already being deployed
2 to the scene as part of the incident having occurred?
3 A. Recognising the seriousness of the incident, I asked for
4 the chief inspector to start marshalling more resources.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. So that we could have people coming in later. There is
7 no predetermined response for police officers to a major
8 incident.

9 Q. Indeed.

10 A. We will deal with what we have and people will ask for
11 more resources if they require them. A major incident
12 for the Fire Brigade may not necessarily be a major
13 incident -- may not require us to respond in a way that
14 we might to a major incident. But we recognised that
15 that is a major incident and we will deal with it, you
16 know, giving it all seriousness and appropriate
17 response.

18 Q. Because of the reference to a bomb, did you take steps
19 to contact either specialist units of the
20 Metropolitan Police, such as S013, or to ascertain
21 whether or not the Multi-agency Initial Assessment Team,
22 of which we've heard, had been called?

23 A. I would have asked for -- I certainly would have asked
24 for S013 to be made aware, the EXPO officers to be made
25 aware, and often, with an explosion, and particularly at

1 that time, the Multi-agency Initial Assessment Team
2 would have been monitoring all CADs and anything that
3 had anything on them "explosion" they would have
4 attended as a matter of course.

5 Q. Around 9.30, you were joined by a loggist, I think he
6 was called PC Jackson and, around that time, was it also
7 determined that Commander Armstrong would assume the
8 role of Gold? You had hitherto been Gold and,
9 therefore, you, at that point, reverted to the role of
10 Silver?

11 A. Yes, Commander Armstrong wasn't in the City or wasn't in
12 the building at the time of the initial call, that's why
13 I assumed Gold Command. I had briefed him on the
14 telephone, he was making his way and it was agreed that
15 he would become the Gold Commander once he was in
16 a position to take control of the situation and
17 effective command of the situation and I would revert to
18 Silver.

19 Q. One of the observations made as part of the debrief
20 process that you properly carried out throughout City of
21 London Police after the events of 7 July was to the
22 effect that there had been a degree of confusion in
23 respect of the pan-London Command structure because, of
24 course, although you had been Gold and then you were
25 Silver of City of London Police, there was a Command

1 structure for London as a whole, the pan-London Command
2 structure, and officers weren't aware, it seems from the
3 debrief material, of who were, in fact, Gold and
4 Silver Commanders and of the changes that took place to
5 the Command structure in the course of the morning.

6 We've seen from the CAD reports that when a Gold or
7 a Silver was appointed, it appeared on the CAD. Was it
8 your view, as well as that of your fellow officers, that
9 more could have been done to tell officers on the ground
10 who the Commanders were?

11 A. At the time, I'm not sure that it would have made any
12 difference.

13 Q. That may be so, but it was obviously something picked up
14 in the debrief process.

15 A. It was picked up in the debrief process. It is an
16 anomaly for the City of London Police at that time which
17 no longer exists, because we didn't have the
18 inter-operability of the radio system.

19 Our radios would have to go through our Command --
20 our Command and Control and then any messages from that
21 would have to be transferred to the Metropolitan Police.
22 So there would have been a slight confusion around
23 the situation on the Command.

24 Having said that, the actual official Command for
25 Benbow didn't -- wasn't agreed until the meeting at

1 10.30 at the Yard. Whilst I was -- had liaised with
2 Superintendent Gomm, and I was quite -- and I was
3 convinced that this incident, now I was aware that there
4 were other incidents in London, was going to require
5 a pan-London response with a strategic command
6 overlaying it, I was quite happy and I thought it was
7 appropriate that we should have that Command structure
8 under the protocol of Benbow.

9 Q. Can I pause you there, because it's necessary to explain
10 something about Operation Benbow?

11 You've told us that Superintendent Gomm of the
12 Metropolitan Police phoned. You and he discussed the
13 possibility of putting Operation Benbow into effect. Is
14 that the operational name for the joint protocol between
15 City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police for
16 a single Command structure to take command of those
17 officers attending an incident that is plainly affecting
18 the wider geographical area than just the City of
19 London?

20 A. Also, the British Transport Police had signed up to that
21 protocol. Yes, it is.

22 Q. You discussed it at 9.30, but as you've just told us, it
23 was a matter that was formally on the agenda for the
24 pan-London Gold group meeting which was to take place at
25 10.30. You have described how you had additional

1 resources available, both from the Met and from within
2 your own force.

3 Do we take it that, although Operation Benbow wasn't
4 put practically -- or wasn't practically agreed at 9.30
5 when you spoke to Superintendent Gomm because it was
6 delayed to the 10.30 Gold group meeting, that delay, if
7 there was such a delay, really made no practical
8 difference because you had enough officers available in
9 any event?

10 A. That delay did not make any practical difference.

11 I certainly had enough officers and I considered myself
12 to be responsible for the incident at Aldgate right up
13 until the time that another more strategic command was
14 put in place.

15 So certainly, until I left the control room at
16 around about 10.15, I considered that I was the
17 strategic commander for the scene at Aldgate until it
18 had been approved. However, I was in close cooperation,
19 consultation, with my Metropolitan Police colleagues and
20 I was just concentrating on the Aldgate scene. I had
21 sufficient resources there, I was being told that there
22 were sufficient resources there from my two officers who
23 were down there, Chief Inspector Fallows and
24 Chief Inspector Roney at the time, and so I think the
25 response was appropriate for what they were dealing with

1 at the time.

2 Q. Was there any good operational reason, as far as you
3 could see, for formally putting off the decision to
4 invoke Operation Benbow for an hour to the Gold group
5 meeting at 10.30 at New Scotland Yard?

6 A. It's so that people know exactly who is in command at
7 the time, and you will always get people responding to
8 incidents and you will often -- at such incidents,
9 a spontaneous incident like that, you will find that the
10 people who are at the scene will do what they need to do
11 to coordinate the response and we will do -- and someone
12 where I was, removed from the scene, will be doing as
13 best as possible to support that response.

14 I was just dealing with Aldgate. I was aware that
15 there had been other incidents, but I wasn't focusing on
16 the other incidents. What we needed was a Command
17 structure that would focus on all incidents and make
18 sure the approach was consistent and that the available
19 resources were deployed where they were needed across
20 London.

21 Q. Does this reflect your earlier observation that, whilst
22 a Command structure is obviously of importance and will
23 become increasingly of importance during the course of
24 an incident, there is much to be said in the early part,
25 the golden hour perhaps, of leaving individual officers

1 to get on with doing what they know they have to do and
2 of making practical resources available regardless of
3 a debate as to who is Gold or Silver at the pan-London
4 level?

5 A. I was certainly content that Mr Fallows and Mr Roney,
6 down at Aldgate, were dealing with the incident in the
7 most professional way that I would expect them to deal
8 with it. There was nothing to be gained or to be added
9 that I could see from what they were actually doing.
10 They were setting up rendezvous points, they were
11 identifying their opposite numbers in the other
12 emergency services, they were coordinating responses as
13 best they possibly could. They were doing -- they were
14 providing a very professional response to that incident
15 and, if they needed anything, I would assist them from
16 where I was.

17 Q. One or two further points, please, in relation to
18 chronology. Your statement makes clear that it wasn't
19 until 10.04 that you were informed that there had been
20 an explosion at Russell Square. By "Russell Square"
21 I presume that you are referring to the explosion
22 between King's Cross and Russell Square Underground
23 stations rather than Tavistock Square. Is that right?

24 A. I don't know, it could well have been the
25 Tavistock Square explosion.

1 Q. Because, if it had been the explosion in the
2 Underground, which, of course, occurred in the tunnel at
3 around 10 to 9, it would be rather surprising that you,
4 as Gold Commander of the City of London Police, hadn't
5 been told until 4 minutes past 10.

6 A. Certainly I believe that that is a -- probably a mistake
7 in the logging of that incident, because I was aware
8 that there had been other explosions on the Underground
9 far earlier than 10.00.

10 Q. So that must have been a reference then to
11 Tavistock Square?

12 A. I presume it was a reference to Tavistock Square.

13 Q. During the course of the morning, you then attended in
14 your role as Gold, or formerly Gold but then
15 Silver Commander for the City of London Police, a number
16 of meetings, committee meetings, planning meetings,
17 security group meetings, and you continued to operate
18 tactical control on the various issues that had arisen
19 out of the incidents in London that morning, and that
20 continued throughout the day, did it not?

21 A. I went and became the representative for the City of
22 London Police at the strategic coordination group
23 meetings and the strategic Commands, the Gold Commands.

24 Q. Which was moved to Hendon?

25 A. Which was eventually moved to Hendon.

1 Q. So you went to Hendon --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and you attended, I think, three or four strategic
4 group meetings in the course of the afternoon and
5 evening?

6 A. And I would be passing back the information from those
7 meetings and receiving information to pass into those
8 meetings to ensure that the coordination was correct and
9 there was a consistent approach at all the scenes.

10 Q. In terms of the effect of the decisions taken at those
11 strategic group meetings on the deployment of individual
12 officers at Aldgate by your own force, did you encounter
13 any difficulties or problems insofar as the deployment
14 of those officers was concerned?

15 A. I personally didn't encounter any difficulties, no.

16 Q. After the events of 7 July, you were also engaged, were
17 you not, because you ordered it to be so, in the
18 arrangement and carrying out of a number of debriefing
19 processes?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. I think Superintendent Mellor, who is in court today,
22 chaired the various meetings and the groups that took
23 place to address issues that had arisen as a result of
24 the 7 July atrocities, and you also, I think, attended
25 both the London Assembly 7 July meetings as well as

1 debrief meetings attended by the City of London Police
2 involving other police forces but, in particular, the
3 Met and the other emergency services in London?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. Was that a process that went on for some months after
6 the events of 7 July?

7 A. It was, yes.

8 Q. During that process -- which Superintendent Mellor will
9 help us with in detail -- was feedback from your own
10 officers assembled and produced for the senior
11 management of the City of London Police so that you
12 could improve matters where they required improvement
13 and learn whatever lessons were required to be learned?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Are you confident, Chief Superintendent, that where
16 improvements could be made, they have now been made?

17 A. I am confident, yes.

18 Q. The final issue I want to ask you about, please, if
19 I may, is in relation to the radio system. You weren't
20 in court, I think, yesterday, but we've heard a great
21 deal about the Airwave system which is used by police
22 forces nationally and by the emergency services and
23 a variant of which is used by the London Underground
24 itself below ground, the Airwave system used by City of
25 London Police works below ground as well, of course?

1 A. It does, yes.

2 Q. Are you confident that the new system constituted by
3 Airwave has the ability to resolve many of the
4 communication difficulties that were encountered by the
5 various bodies on 7 July?

6 A. It has the ability to communicate from below ground to
7 above ground, certainly, which would be a bonus.

8 However, it's still just a radio system. You still
9 need people to speak and to listen to a radio system and
10 you can only have one person speaking at a time.

11 You can open up different talkgroups, but you have
12 to be careful about opening up too many talkgroups
13 because, otherwise, information will then be treated in
14 silos, so whilst the technical ability of Airwave is far
15 better than we've had before, the ability to talk to
16 other emergency services, to talk easily to other police
17 forces, is a huge bonus, a radio system is a radio
18 system and it has to be controlled properly to be
19 effective, and I believe that it will be controlled
20 properly and continue to be, yes.

21 Q. So there is no question of dispensing with the Command
22 structures which operate inside City of London Police or
23 with the training that goes along with the various
24 activities, the multitude of activities that your
25 officers carry out to ensure that they respond sensibly

1 and proportionately, even with the assistance of
2 Airwave?

3 A. The big difference, if we were to have this incident
4 now, using Airwave, is that the scene Commander,
5 Mr Fallows, would be able to talk directly to the
6 Silver Command at New Scotland Yard without having to go
7 through our control room. That prevents the opportunity
8 for misheard messages and it would speed up the
9 communication process, so from that point of view,
10 Airwave is a huge bonus and, also, the fact that it
11 operates seamlessly underground is also a huge bonus.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You used the future tense, "radio
13 systems will be properly controlled". Was that
14 deliberate or --

15 A. It is properly controlled, but it's not -- the way that
16 a radio system is used won't change, with analogue radio
17 or with Airwave. You will then up with what we call
18 a working channel, which will be used by people probably
19 at the sharp end, for want of a better expression. You
20 will end up with a Command channel which will be the
21 strategic Commanders.

22 A Commander like myself would have to have somebody
23 listening to both the Command channel and the working
24 channel. You can't open up too many channels because,
25 otherwise, you have everybody listening to radios and

1 nobody doing any work. So we've got to be careful about
2 what emphasis we put on it. The technological solutions
3 of Airwave do provide a far more robust system, but the
4 actual use of the radio, not a lot has changed whether
5 it's analogue or digital.

6 MR KEITH: As it happened, the Airwave system was introduced
7 fully in the City of London Police force, I think,
8 in October 2005.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But obviously the arrangements for its full
11 installation, full operation, had been in play for some
12 time?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But it coincidentally didn't come to its fruition
15 until October of that year.

16 Since then, as we've heard from other witnesses,
17 have various steps been taken to improve issues such as
18 the switching centres, the capacity of the network, its
19 resilience and we also heard from one witness, in fact
20 further improvements have been made in preparation for
21 the London Olympics, in particular, as far as you're
22 concerned, by the introduction of the ETETRA phone,
23 which has some extra capacity specifically designed for
24 the sorts of policing requirements that may be engaged
25 in the London Olympics?

1 A. It is developing all the time. It's being made more
2 resilient, it's being made more robust. As officers
3 become far more familiar with it, they are using it to
4 the best of its advantage. It is a better radio system
5 than we had, there are no two ways about it, and the
6 main bonus is the inter-operability between, certainly,
7 all police forces and all emergency services. To be
8 able to talk quite easily on a radio does assist with
9 the Command and Control.

10 Q. The one area in which the 7 July Review Committee made
11 a recommendation affecting the City of London Police
12 force was, of course, the decision to invoke ACCOLC, the
13 shutting down of one of the network provider's mobile
14 networks and to restrict it to those persons who had
15 a mobile phone with a particular SIM card in it.
16 That decision, and the issues surrounding that
17 decision, had no appreciable effect, as far as we can
18 ascertain, on those who sadly died that morning because,
19 of course, the decision was taken well after the golden
20 hour, but may we presume that the sorts of problems that
21 that decision gave rise to have been swept away by the
22 introduction of Airwave?

23 A. Airwave would certainly help. It has its own telephony
24 system and it has a greater coverage. So if you had
25 this on a national level, you could talk via radio to

1 your national counterpart somewhere else in the country,
2 which you wouldn't have been able to do on an analogue
3 radio system, so --

4 Q. The difficulty on 7 July was that people having
5 difficulty on the radio turned to their mobile networks
6 and that system became overloaded as well?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 MR KEITH: Chief Superintendent, thank you very much indeed,
9 I have no further questions.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could I just ask you one question
11 before anybody else does, Mr Robertson?

12 Inter-operability between all the emergency services
13 obviously is what's at the heart of making sure there's
14 a proper response to a major incident. I heard
15 yesterday about a project for CAD integration -- do you
16 know anything about this -- which is essentially
17 where -- I think you may have CAD integration, from what
18 you are saying, between police forces in London, but
19 it's essentially involving all the emergency services?

20 A. My understanding is that the -- well, we use the same
21 Command and Control system as the Metropolitan Police.
22 We are just another part of that system. So they can
23 see our messages, we can see their messages. British
24 Transport Police have access to that system so they can
25 see the messages of the other two forces, they have

1 their own Command and Control system for their own work.
2 But if there's anything that came up within London,
3 they would then put it on to the CAD system and dispatch
4 it to the other two forces or the appropriate force to
5 deal with it.

6 I also believe, although I'm not entirely sure, but
7 I believe that both the -- certainly I think the London
8 Fire Brigade have access to the CAD system and I believe
9 the LAS may have access to the CAD system.

10 Certainly, on an incident like this, all emergency
11 services, all the emergency services, would be looking
12 to put liaison officers into the strategic Command
13 centre which now will be held at Lambeth in
14 a Special Operations Room, so again to aid the
15 inter-operability and the dispatch of messages between
16 the various services. If, say, the radio system did
17 break down, we could have -- would have other systems,
18 a backup system.

19 So I'm content that the inter-operability between
20 the emergency services is there and works effectively.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there now?

22 A. It would have been there then as well. There are
23 a number of -- the strategic Command centre -- or the
24 Gold group that sat at 10.30 had all the emergency
25 services there, representatives from all the utilities.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: In 2005, as far as you are aware --
2 it may be I ought to ask Ms Boyd and Ms Simcock -- but,
3 did you understand that the LFB and the LAS would have
4 had access in 2005 to your CAD and the Met's CAD
5 messages?

6 A. I believe they have access. They certainly have a way
7 of receiving our messages.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: "Had", in 2005?

9 A. I think they did in 2005.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What about input? You've said
11 access; in other words, they're going to pop up on
12 a screen or some kind of machine. Is there any
13 integration of systems so that the LFB and the LAS can
14 input so that you can see what they're doing?

15 A. I don't know.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Honest, thank you.

17 MR KEITH: May I ask a question, my Lady, arising out of
18 my Lady's questions?

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Please.

20 MR KEITH: Which is this: the 10.30 meeting, there was, we
21 understand, no representative of London Underground,
22 although there was a representative, I think, of
23 CentreComm, the body that runs the bosses. You've just
24 referred to Strategic Group Centre meeting and its
25 utility because of the ability to bring all the various

1 information threads together.

2 Were you surprised, given that, by then, there were
3 known to be explosions on the Underground network that
4 there was no representative from London Underground
5 itself?

6 A. It wasn't -- didn't stick out in my recollection that
7 there wasn't a member of the London Underground, because
8 I probably would have presumed there would be someone
9 from the London Underground there.

10 Q. Take it from us, if you will, that there was no
11 representative there.

12 A. It would -- there should have been somebody from the
13 London Underground there. I don't know why there
14 wasn't.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

17 Questions by MR COLTART

18 MR COLTART: Good morning, Mr Robertson. Just one question
19 or rather one topic from me, which is the timetable for
20 the implementation of the Airwave project.

21 We heard yesterday from Chief Inspector Philip Short
22 on behalf of the British Transport Police about some of
23 the problems which bedevilled the implementation of the
24 Airwave project, contractual disputes, financing, and
25 the like, which, in the end, led to the Chief Constable

1 of the British Transport Police writing to the Minister
2 to complain about the delays and to try to speed things
3 up.

4 Can you assist us, please, with what steps the City
5 of London Police took to expedite the implementation of
6 that programme?

7 A. We were rolling out the Airwave radios. Our officers
8 had the -- the majority of our officers had the Airwave
9 radio sets. The issue that the City of London Police
10 had, which was preventing them from introducing Airwave
11 or having Airwave introduced over the events of 7 July,
12 was that there had been a contractual dispute, as
13 I understand it, with one of the suppliers for the
14 Metropolitan Police control room.

15 Because we have the same Command and Control system,
16 we had to have the -- we had to go with that contract.

17 Q. As we understand it -- it may be that there were various
18 different contracts awarded to different police forces
19 at different times -- contractual negotiations were in
20 place from 1998, but, by the summer of 2005, plainly
21 hadn't been concluded, at least in terms of
22 inter-operability and underground capability, because
23 some of your officers did have Airwave handsets on the
24 day, didn't they?

25 A. They did, but our control room was not Airwave-compliant

1 at the time.

2 Q. But were you party to or can you assist us with who
3 might have been party within your organisation to
4 correspondence with either the ministers or with the
5 contractors or with whoever it was who was responsible,
6 in your eyes, for holding up the implementation of this
7 project?

8 A. I can't say who that would have been.

9 Q. Were you aware of efforts being made to expedite that
10 progress?

11 A. Efforts would have been made, but we were working, as
12 I believe, in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police
13 who, I would presume, would be making those -- who would
14 have been making those efforts, but I cannot personally
15 say who that would have been.

16 Q. Can we just turn to look at one of the documents which
17 was produced after 7/7 by the London Regional Resilience
18 Forum? It's at COLP177 [COLP177-1] and it's a document headed
19 "LRRF (05) 27" which is simply the number of the paper
20 "London bombings - telecoms issues."

21 To put this into context for you, this was a paper
22 prepared by a man called Martin Wilkinson who worked for
23 O2/Airwave, and at the time was seconded to the London
24 Resilience Team, and it's a paper that he presented to
25 a meeting of the London Regional Resilience Forum on

1 12 October 2005. I appreciate you weren't present at
2 that meeting, I think James Hart attended on behalf of
3 the City of London Police, but that's the background to
4 which this paper relates.

5 If we go over the page [COLP177-2], please, and highlight the
6 top half of the page, we can see the areas which the
7 paper addresses. It's:

8 "An area of concern identified by the London
9 Regional Resilience Forum extraordinary meeting on
10 14 July."

11 It addressed the impact of mobile phones being
12 unavailable for significant periods, the issue of access
13 overload control and whether it was invoked.

14 The London Regional Resilience Team commissioned to
15 examine how telecommunications performed identified
16 problems and recommend solutions, and they are to
17 involve the Cabinet Office central sponsor for
18 information assurance.

19 Do you know what that body is or what it does?

20 A. No, I don't know.

21 Q. And to carry out a wider telecoms vulnerability review
22 and report back to the forum in January.

23 Now, a significant part of the report then goes on
24 to deal with issues surrounding mobile phones, texts,
25 pagers and the like and I'm not going to trouble you

1 with any of that. We've canvassed that at some length
2 already. If we need to deal with it further, we'll deal
3 with it later. But can we go to the bottom, please, of
4 page 3 [COLP177-3] of the document?

5 This is where the paper deals with radio:

6 "BTP officers, some MPS officers and some COLP
7 officers used Airwave. MPS and COLP also used their
8 older radio systems. Mutual aid specialist officers ...
9 used Airwave. MPS and COLP radio worked okay, but LAS
10 and LFB radio nets were extremely busy. The ...
11 buses ... [were] okay. Airwave performed well, with
12 underground trial solutions being deployed rapidly to
13 Russell Square and King's Cross ..."

14 Now, I think the word "rapidly" has to be used
15 advisedly because, as we heard yesterday, the assistance
16 didn't arrive until some four and a half hours after the
17 event, by which time the evacuation process had been
18 completed:

19 "The national ambulance contract has recently been
20 awarded to Airwave. The new national fire
21 communications systems [COLP177-4] contract has not yet been
22 decided."

23 Then if we go through, please, to page 5 [COLP177-5] of the
24 document, do you see at the bottom of the page, if we
25 could just enlarge that, please, the heading "Possible

1 Quick Wins"?

2 I'm sure it's self-evident, but "quick wins" in this
3 context, in other words, things that could be done
4 immediately in order to improve the situation, a holding
5 position pending a permanent solution being found.

6 Is that a fair assessment?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. It deals with what could be done in relation to mobile
9 phones, which again, perhaps, we don't need to concern
10 ourselves with, but if we go over the page [COLP177-6] to the
11 section dealing with radios:

12 "Action must be taken to make responders' primary
13 means of communications (usually radio) fully adequate
14 to meet their communications needs in a crisis. Make
15 wider use of the Airwave service for category 1 and 2
16 responders, including individual strategic level
17 executives."

18 Then underneath that, under the heading

19 "Conclusions", the third point down:

20 "An example of a quick win already implemented since
21 7/7 is that Metropolitan Police Service have issued all
22 ACPO grade officers and OCU Commanders with Airwave
23 handsets and have activated a special talkgroup."

24 This wasn't the first time, was it, that the London
25 Resilience Team had exhorted the emergency services to

1 upgrade their radio communications systems? You took
2 place, didn't you, along with the other responders, in
3 Operation Osiris in September 2003?

4 A. The City of London Police did, yes.

5 Q. You are aware, are you not, that following that exercise
6 and the debrief process which followed on from it, all
7 of the emergency responders were warned in terms that
8 their radio systems were inadequate for responding to
9 a situation almost identical in many respects to that
10 which transpired on 7 July.

11 What "quick wins" did the City of London Police seek
12 in the immediate aftermath of the findings of that
13 report in 2003?

14 A. We were working on the Airwave radio solution. That was
15 coming through. What further "quick wins", as you
16 suggest, I'm not entirely sure. We have field
17 telephones that could work between sub-surface and
18 surface areas. The --

19 Q. Just pausing there for a moment. Where were the field
20 telephones on 7 July 2005?

21 A. They would have been part of our major incident trailers
22 which were not deployed.

23 Q. Why weren't they deployed?

24 A. Because by the time that they would have been taken to
25 be deployed, my understanding is most of the casualties

1 had been evacuated from Aldgate. Also, Aldgate was not
2 a -- a sub-surface level Underground station.

3 Q. Can we come back to that particular observation in
4 a moment? Where were your mobile incident units or --
5 I'm sorry, whatever they were called, where were they
6 stationed?

7 A. They're at Wood Street.

8 Q. How far is Wood Street from Aldgate Tube station?

9 A. Three-quarters of a mile.

10 Q. So the evacuation at Aldgate wasn't completed until
11 about 10.10, an hour and 20 minutes after the bomb had
12 gone off. Why wasn't it possible to get your vehicle to
13 Aldgate within that timespan?

14 A. I'm not aware that they were necessary. There was no
15 concern that was brought to my attention about the
16 communication at Aldgate. We relied on what we would
17 normally rely on, which is either radio communication
18 or, where radio communication didn't work, by runners,
19 and that would have worked perfectly adequately.

20 Q. We've heard quite a deal of evidence about runners in
21 the course of the inquest. Is it your evidence that it
22 was just as efficient to use runners as it would have
23 been to have in place a field telephone capable of
24 working from the site of the bombing on the Tube to the
25 officers coordinating the response at the top?

1 A. It would have taken some time to deploy those resources
2 and, if it had continued, it may have been felt prudent
3 to deploy those field telephones. At the time, I did
4 not consider it prudent to deploy those field
5 telephones. I was not aware of any major comments that
6 would have required me to deploy those field telephones.

7 Q. We know that the evacuation at
8 King's Cross/Russell Square took considerably longer
9 than it had done at Aldgate, and I appreciate that that
10 was out of your jurisdiction and that your officers
11 didn't play a part in that process, but were you aware,
12 at any stage, of your field telephones being offered to
13 the emergency services who were operating at
14 King's Cross?

15 A. I'm not aware, no.

16 Q. We know --

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, going back to the operability
18 of these field telephones, where do they operate? What
19 level?

20 A. The field telephone is a hardwired system, so they --
21 it's a more technical version of two tin cans and
22 a piece of string, in all -- the easiest way to describe
23 them. They have to be hardwired, so you have to have --
24 you have two handsets with a wire running between the
25 two.

1 They would take some time to deploy and in the
2 immediate -- in the immediate incident, I did not
3 consider them.

4 MR COLTART: Leaving field telephones to one side, are you
5 aware of any other so-called "quick wins" which the City
6 of London Police put in place following
7 from September 2003?

8 A. No.

9 Q. We know that in addition to the emergency services,
10 a number of Government departments also took part in
11 Operation Osiris and the exercise on that day and were
12 part of the debriefing process too.

13 Are you aware of any further correspondence, in the
14 light of the findings of that report, between the City
15 of London Police and the relevant ministers in order to
16 expedite the radio communications programme?

17 A. I'm not aware of any such correspondence.

18 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

20 Ms Barton?

21 Questions by MS BARTON

22 MS BARTON: Just one area, please, if I may, my Lady.

23 Could I have COLP18, please, page 4 [COLP18-4] on the screen?

24 I just want to ask you about the CAD system that was
25 deployed so that we're clear about this.

1 The CAD system that was available to the
2 City Police, both in 2005 and now, is a system which
3 actually belongs to the Metropolitan Police, is that
4 right?
5 A. It is, yes.
6 Q. It is their CAD system?
7 A. It is their CAD system.
8 Q. So if an incident occurs in Oxford Street at CAD
9 number 238 and the next incident occurs at Aldgate, that
10 will continue on the Met's CAD and be given number 239?
11 A. That's correct, yes.
12 Q. All 999 calls go into the Met Police before they're
13 routed to the City Police?
14 A. They do.
15 Q. Now, the City Police control room can open a CAD
16 message, is that right, create one?
17 A. They can create a CAD message.
18 Q. But that CAD message as part of the Metropolitan Police
19 system?
20 A. Yes, it would get the next number.
21 Q. Right. We can see, can't we, from the CAD in respect of
22 this incident, that this is a CAD created -- I don't
23 want to go back to page 1, but this is CAD number 2338
24 which is created as a result of a 999 call which is
25 received by the Metropolitan Police?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. So the initial creation of this CAD is the

3 Metropolitan Police?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And it is sent, effectively, to the City Police?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Then the City Police start making entries on it?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. But the Metropolitan Police can also make entries on it

10 and, indeed, do?

11 A. They can, yes.

12 Q. We can see, can't we, on page 4, please, of the

13 document, at 09.49, at 09.08.49, sorry, halfway down the

14 page, is this an entry by the Metropolitan Police?

15 A. That is, yes, it's from an area within their Command and

16 Control complex.

17 Q. Saying:

18 "We are visually monitoring your CADs re this

19 incident"?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is the purpose of that message to alert City Police to

22 the fact that the Metropolitan Police have this CAD open

23 and are reading it and, therefore, know what is on it?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. So each organisation now knows that the material on this

1 CAD is being shared?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, you have told us about your understanding of the
4 London Ambulance Service, the London Fire Brigade and
5 others having access to CADs. May I first deal with
6 British Transport Police? They have their own CAD
7 system, is that right?

8 A. They have their own Command and Control system, which is
9 not the Metropolitan Police CAD system.

10 Q. Right. Ordinarily, are the British Transport Police
11 permitted to view the MPS and City Police CAD messages?

12 A. My understanding is they have a terminal within their
13 Command centre which has access to the CAD messages and
14 they would generally monitor those CAD messages and they
15 can write on those CAD messages.

16 Q. So the facility is there for them to view, if they want
17 to --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- or need to?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. They can also make their own entries?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, I think the London Ambulance Service, the London
24 Fire Brigade are in a rather different category, is that
25 right? They don't have available to them generally

1 a terminal on which they can view MPS and City CAD
2 messages?

3 A. I'm not entirely sure. I don't know.

4 Q. Right. What you do know, however, is that, once
5 a special incident room or Special Operations Room is
6 set up and there is a liaison officer from each of the
7 emergency organisations within that room, there are then
8 terminals which everyone is permitted to view. Is that
9 right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So what we can say is that, once we have established
12 a Special Operations Room, everyone who has an operative
13 within that room will be able to share the information
14 on the terminals?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. But what you're not so sure about is whether
17 London Ambulance Service/London Fire Brigade can read
18 any CAD messages before that stage?

19 A. The communications between those units generally don't
20 take place on CAD.

21 Q. No.

22 A. I'm not sure if they have read-only access. There is an
23 opportunity of having read-only access for CAD messages.

24 I don't know if they have that.

25 Q. No. So your experience of liaison with other

1 organisations outside the police is that, ordinarily,
2 it's not done by CAD; it's done by verbal communication?

3 A. If the Fire Brigade or the London Ambulance Service
4 become aware of an incident that's happening in the City
5 of London, they would normally contact us by telephone
6 and we would create a CAD with the details of that
7 incident.

8 MS BARTON: Thank you very much.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, as far as the special incident
10 room is concerned, do we have one on 7/7?

11 A. Yes, that was the -- it's what's been referred to as GT
12 probably.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That was set up where?

14 A. That's at New Scotland Yard.

15 MR KEITH: I think, my Lady, it was up and running for G8
16 and then the functions of Command and Control were
17 transferred to it.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's right. Can anyone remember
19 the time? No? Don't worry.

20 MR KEITH: We heard -- the name has escaped me.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Don't worry, we can look it up.

22 MR KEITH: We'll see if we can find it.

23 A. Certainly Superintendent Gomm was in GT. He contacted
24 me by 9.30, and so he would have been aware and was
25 taking --

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So he's contacted you by 9.30, so you
2 would have thought that he would have been in this room?

3 A. I think on that CAD that we've just been looking at
4 there's a comment from him earlier than that at about
5 9.10, so ...

6 MS BARTON: I think that's the comment at 09.03.56,
7 Superintendent Gomm asking if we have any requirements
8 to attend.

9 A. Yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But it's not until we have liaison
11 officers from all the various organisations that we have
12 up and running the terminals that mean that everybody
13 can see everybody else's CAD messages?

14 A. I don't know the makeup of the GT on that particular
15 occasion. If it was -- as it was set up for
16 a preplanned operation, ie, the G8, not the 7/7
17 bombings, there may well have been representatives from
18 the London Fire Brigade and the London Ambulance Service
19 in that room, but I couldn't tell you if there was or
20 not. Certainly, for any major demonstration that
21 happens within London, there would ordinarily be
22 representatives of the London Fire Brigade and London
23 Ambulance Service within that room.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any other questions?

25 Thank you very much indeed, Chief Superintendent

1 Robertson. Break?
2 (11.22 am)
3 (A short break)
4 (11.37 am)
5 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call
6 Superintendent Andrew Mellor?
7 SUPERINTENDENT ANDREW JOHN MELLOR (sworn)
8 Questions by MR HAY
9 MR HAY: Superintendent, can you give your full name to the
10 court, please?
11 A. It's Andrew John Mellor, Superintendent of the City of
12 London Police, sir.
13 Q. You joined the City of London Police in 1986?
14 A. That's correct, sir.
15 Q. In 2005, you were the public order superintendent?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you just explain briefly what responsibilities that
18 involved?
19 A. My principal responsibility was about policing public
20 ceremonial or disorder within the City and the wider
21 London area, and with supervisory responsibility for
22 specialist uniform support officers, including those
23 trained in riot police, mounted police, dogs and the
24 operational planning unit, amongst others.
25 Q. Because of the post you held, on 7 July, you weren't

1 actually in London, but you were in Scotland as part of
2 the G8 Summit?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. How many other City of London Police officers were in
5 Scotland?

6 A. There were in excess of 70. Somewhere around 8 or
7 9 per cent of the force had gone up to Scotland.

8 Q. We heard this morning from Chief Superintendent
9 Robertson that, after 7/7, you were instructed to
10 arrange the debrief process on behalf of the City of
11 London Police?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that, in 2005, the
14 force did not have an agreed or formal process to be
15 followed for debriefing staff?

16 A. No, that's correct.

17 Q. But I think, despite that, a comprehensive process was
18 put in place. Is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can you just briefly explain what process was put in
21 place?

22 A. The operational Commanders on the day had already put
23 into place debriefing of the officers who had attended
24 the Aldgate scene, and had taken the learning from that
25 to put into some immediate effect actions. My principal

1 responsibility was to see that that had been done and
2 then to chair a meeting for a debrief of officers who
3 had been in command functions or management functions on
4 the day.

5 Alongside that, there was a responsibility to
6 provide information on behalf of the force to the London
7 Regional Resilience Forum by way of the pan-London
8 debrief process.

9 Q. How long did the entire debrief process take?

10 A. Actually debriefing the officers was done reasonably
11 quickly. The command debrief took place in October.
12 The actions that came out of those have been going on
13 ever since, in effect.

14 Q. If we could have up on the screen, please, COLP39, and
15 if we could turn to the next page [COLP39-2], please, this is the
16 debrief distillation, and I think, although it's
17 headed "July 2005", it was actually prepared in August
18 2006, is that right?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. This sums up the entire debrief process, all the
21 different areas, which were covered. Is that fair?

22 A. I think it's fairly comprehensive, yes.

23 Q. We can see at the top -- if we could focus in at 1,
24 please, that area, thank you very much -- issues
25 regarding Command and Gold strategy, ensure that's

1 communicated to staff, ensure command teams are aware of
2 their responsibilities and their place in
3 Operation Benbow, ensure Command structure is
4 communicated to all staff with clarity of appointments,
5 and those areas have been touched on by
6 Chief Superintendent Robertson already.

7 If we could go to page 3 [COLP39-3], please, at 6, please
8 "Initial response/scene management", that sets out
9 specific issues relating to the control room which were
10 raised, and I just wanted to ask you, first, about
11 those, please.

12 Can we have up on screen COLP188?

13 This is a debrief of 7 July by Keith Harrison. Who
14 is Keith Harrison?

15 A. Keith Harrison was an inspector in the control room with
16 an administrative function for control staff.

17 Q. Did he conduct a debrief of the control room staff?

18 A. Yes, he did.

19 Q. Can we turn to the next page, please [COLP188-2]? If we could start
20 at the first paragraph, we can see there he says there
21 were a fair number of problems experienced which were
22 exacerbated by the chronic short staffing of the control
23 room.

24 Just pausing there, what was the staffing in the
25 control room on 7 July? Was it a normal day, normal

1 number of staff?

2 A. The control room will have a minimum number of staff
3 that it's believed is effective for operation, and my
4 understanding on 7 July is it was at minimum or close to
5 minimum staffing.

6 Q. So the problems of chronic short staffing are really due
7 to the fact that the unusual nature of the incident
8 which took place meant that there was extra pressure on
9 the control room which wasn't anticipated?

10 A. I think it was a very busy place that day, sir.

11 Q. The first point which is made was to restrict the
12 control room to critical staff only. Is that presumably
13 because of, again, the amount of pressure going on in
14 the control room, that it's best to have less people in
15 there rather than more?

16 A. I think for an effective working control room, you
17 really need to have people who are there for a purpose
18 and have a specific job to do. There has been
19 a tendency, especially in quiet times, for people to use
20 the control room as a place to get information or to see
21 what's going on, which clearly would hinder an operation
22 on a major event.

23 Q. The second point that's made is a separate working
24 channel for major incident. We heard in relation to
25 Aldgate from Chief Inspector Roney who wanted to open

1 a separate working channel, but was unable to do so
2 because of the lack of control room staff. Is that
3 something which has now been rectified as a result of
4 Airwave, effectively?

5 A. I don't think really it would make a great deal of
6 difference because, in order to operate a separate
7 talkgroup on Airwave, you'd still need additional staff
8 in the same way as you would have under the analogue
9 radio system. I think for effective working, especially
10 on a major incident, you need two people to be operating
11 the Control and logging the calls on to the
12 computer-aided dispatch, and that hasn't changed.

13 Since 2005, staffing numbers for Control have been
14 reviewed and, for example, this morning there are nine
15 officers in Control and two more officers within the
16 building available to support, and that's more officers
17 than would have been available on 7 July.

18 Q. What was the minimum number on 7 July?

19 A. Five controllers and one supervisor, so six staff.

20 Q. What's the minimum number now?

21 A. The minimum number now is seven, that includes two
22 supervisors.

23 Q. We can see at point 3:

24 "Staffing levels need to be reviewed."

25 That's exactly what you've just been telling us

1 about. Can we go down to point 10, please?

2 This is a point about the fact that there's
3 obviously business as usual going on at the same time as
4 a major incident. How is that something which has now
5 been resolved?

6 A. I can't say for sure that it has been resolved, but
7 clearly, in any major incident, an adherence to the
8 Command structure is essential, and that people who are
9 in control are people who are adding value to the event
10 and not simply information-gathering for their own part
11 of the everyday business of the organisation.

12 Certainly on other events since 7 July, a remote
13 facility has been made available in the conference room
14 so that people who wanted to see what was going on in
15 terms of City CCTV or radio channels could see that
16 without interfering with those working on the operation.

17 Q. So that enables the information to be differentiated out
18 so people can see what's going on in different parts and
19 focus on different incidents?

20 A. And so they're not asking questions that are not
21 necessarily useful or relevant to those who are trying
22 to manage and operate the main operation.

23 Q. One of the things presumably you can do is to
24 communicate out to the officers that there is a major
25 incident underway and that radio communications should

1 be restricted to those which are really necessary.

2 Is that something which would happen as part of
3 a protocol?

4 A. It's part of good training. Officers are very aware
5 that, if there is a major event going on, then they
6 should minimise their own radio traffic, non-essential
7 radio traffic ceases, and communication relating to the
8 incident itself is brief and to the point.

9 Q. I want to turn now to Command structures very briefly.
10 That's primarily already been dealt with by Chief
11 Superintendent Robertson. Can we turn to COLP153,
12 please? This is the CT section debrief. Can you help
13 us with what CT is?

14 A. Counter-terrorism.

15 Q. If we could turn to the next page [COLP153-2], please, if we could
16 focus in on the top half.

17 There were concerns raised there regarding the
18 Command structure which have been touched upon:
19 "During the early phase, there was confusion in
20 respect of the pan-London Command structure. Officers
21 did not know the names of nominated Gold and
22 Silver Commanders ..."

23 It goes on to comment about the difficulties which
24 were encountered.

25 Is one of the things, if we could turn to page 3 [COLP153-3],

1 please, which have been done to address
2 misunderstandings regarding Command structures, if there
3 had been changes in training to ensure that officers
4 understand exactly who's in command and what the
5 structure is?

6 A. I think this is a difficult question in a way, because
7 Operation Benbow works most effectively on a preplanned
8 operation where the Command structure is set before the
9 events start to take place. In a spontaneous incident
10 that later turns out to be pan-London and has
11 Operation Benbow as the Command, the structure is then
12 imposed on what is already going on, and I think that,
13 in any circumstances, then and now, there would be an
14 element of confusion, with a small "c", in relation to
15 what the nomenclature that goes with whichever Commander
16 is engaged on it.

17 That being said, I don't think that that confusion
18 with a small "c" would in any way hinder the effective
19 operation on the street of officers going about their
20 duties in relation to whatever event was going on
21 because, in many respects, it's immaterial who the
22 commanders are when the first actions are taking place.
23 Clarity comes later, and I think that clarity came
24 later, on 7 July, when Operation Benbow was operating
25 with a Gold structure and the strategy had been set from

1 the central Command and that had been then disseminated.

2 Q. We know, I think, from the London Emergency Service
3 Liaison Plan manual that there's an initial phase and
4 then a consolidation phase.

5 Are you saying that, during the initial phase,
6 what's best is that officers get on and do what needs to
7 be done, and are less concerned about the Command
8 structure and, during the consolidation phase, that's
9 the point when the Command structure really kicks in?

10 A. I think that's right, yes.

11 Q. But obviously one of the things which has been done is
12 re-issuing the major incident booklets, but also
13 refresher of major incident awareness training.

14 Can I ask you this: prior to 2005, what was the major
15 incident training in place for the City of London
16 Police?

17 A. Every officer undertook major incident training.
18 I don't have the detail of when that took place, who
19 undertook it, but it was part of -- it's part of the --
20 the history of the force is that we have had a number of
21 terrorist events that have taken place, major incidents
22 are always close to the top of our mind, and the
23 contingency planning section has always ensured that
24 either booklets or updates or training is available to
25 officers so that that corporate memory continues, so

1 that we can deal effectively with future events.

2 Q. But since 7 July, have there been improvements in major
3 incident training?

4 A. Training is always -- I mean, it's a constant learning
5 process and we will have learnt from 7 July and put that
6 into the training provided to our first responders and
7 Command officers and, as you said, the major incident
8 book has been reissued with more clarity, easier to read
9 and more information in it.

10 Q. I think you prepared a helpful annex setting out some of
11 the details of the training which has been undergone
12 since 7 July 2005. Can we have up on the screen,
13 please, COLP233?

14 If we turn to the next page [COLP233-2], please. If we could
15 focus in at the top, we can see there, first of all,
16 that in April 2006 to June 2006 officers of all rank
17 attended a one-day session and a total of 470 officers
18 attended.

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. There also appears to have been, in 2008 and 2009 --
21 presumably this year as well -- specific training for
22 sergeants?

23 A. Yes, it's part of their initial training course.

24 Q. That training for sergeants, what are the sort of extra
25 levels that they get which those at the rank below do

1 not get?

2 A. I'm afraid I don't have that detail. This was
3 information I gathered consequent to the requests of the
4 inquest, but I don't have the detail of the actual
5 syllabus.

6 Q. I think we can see there that one of the things they get
7 is people who have particular experience of 7 July
8 itself, so Chief Inspector Barnard and
9 Chief Inspector Collicott, for example, two people who
10 had come to talk to them and explained their
11 experiences, presumably, of the incidents.

12 A. Yes, and that's always been the way that we've gone
13 about the business, we've always tried to have
14 experience as recent as possible to advise on these
15 courses. For a long time, it was people who were
16 involved in the St Mary Axe or Bishopsgate bombs.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you know if you trained with other
18 agencies, so in other words, alert your officers to what
19 the roles are of other organisations?

20 A. My Lady, no, there isn't any engagement with other
21 services in this training, although there have been
22 exercises which have involved first responders, I think
23 Osiris was mentioned earlier, which would be one of
24 them.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So the general training doesn't

1 involve other organisations; the other organisations
2 come together when you have an exercise?

3 A. Yes, that's right, my Lady, although some of the
4 familiarisation that officers will undertake as
5 probationers and street officers will be to visit
6 locations which are of interest, including, for example,
7 Underground stations, familiarisation.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm just thinking about, for
9 example -- I remember some weeks ago now we heard from
10 a witness about how the first ambulance at the scene has
11 to put the lights on, as it were, take charge, but there
12 were officers -- I can't remember which force it was
13 now -- who were saying, "Come and help, come and help",
14 but of course, they had to perform a different function.
15 I just wondered whether you trained your officers
16 that other people may not necessarily immediately slip
17 into the role that you might expect of them?

18 A. Part of the training is to allow officers to understand,
19 my Lady, what are the responsibilities of others who are
20 attending, and I think there is an understanding,
21 certainly for myself, in terms of the requirement to
22 report back so that the right resources are sent to an
23 incident.

24 MR HAY: My Lady, I think the witness you're referring to is
25 Mr Cumner of the London Ambulance Service, and I think

1 he was being directed to Elizabeth Owen who had an
2 abdominal injury, I think by the Fire Brigade perhaps.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Hay.

4 MR HAY: Do you feel now that the training which the City of
5 London Police get is of a better quality than perhaps it
6 was prior to 2005?

7 A. I think that the training is appropriate for now and
8 I think that the training prior to 2005 was appropriate
9 for then. I wouldn't put a value judgment on the
10 effectiveness of that.

11 Q. Rather than saying "quality", perhaps if I say the
12 lessons which have been learned from July 2005 have now
13 been incorporated. Would that be fair?

14 A. Yes, I think that would be fair.

15 Q. Could I ask you very briefly about equipment? We heard
16 earlier about the two major incident trailers which were
17 available on 7 July, although not actually deployed. We
18 heard that they had field telephones in them. What
19 other equipment did they have in them?

20 A. Those trailers have a variety of equipment. I think
21 I listed them in one of the documents attached, but
22 include things like first aid kits, shovels, face masks,
23 plastic -- rubber gloves, and other equipment that would
24 be too heavy to carry on a foot patrol or necessarily in
25 a vehicle, but would be useful for an ongoing and

1 possibly medium- to long-term incident.

2 Q. Do you know whether there have been any changes in the
3 equipment carried since 7 July 2005?

4 A. The equipment was reviewed as part of the debrief
5 process to see that it carried the right things and
6 there was some advice relating to health and safety for
7 masks, which ensured that there were plenty of masks on
8 the trailers, if required.

9 Q. Were those masks for dust rather than for --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- CBRN?

12 A. Dust, yes.

13 Q. You also mention in your witness statement you provided
14 incident boxes. Can you just explain what those are?

15 A. I think the experience of the first responders was that
16 the equipment that they had available to them ran out
17 very quickly when there were a large number of walking
18 wounded who had injuries that needed dressing, for
19 example.

20 It was an initiative from a divisional officer that
21 it would be useful to have something that each of the
22 patrolling groups could take out to a scene which would
23 have field dressings, rubber gloves, guidance on how to
24 run the incident, incident reporting logs, and that sort
25 of equipment which might be hard to gather up if you

1 didn't know where to find it, but would be very quickly
2 deployed if it was in one place.

3 Q. Where are those incident boxes located?

4 A. Currently they're in the muster room at Bishopsgate
5 police station, one for each of the patrolling groups.

6 But obviously, depending on the scale, then there would
7 be nothing to stop people taking one, two, or more boxes
8 out with them.

9 Q. Are any kept at the entry points for the City of London
10 Police, for example, which are dotted around Central
11 London?

12 A. Yes, so each of the entry points which restrict the
13 access to the City, which were the consequence of the
14 1990s IRA attention to the City, each of those has
15 a locked cabinet and each of those has a box in as well.

16 Q. Do you know whether or not those incident boxes have
17 been widely and successfully used?

18 A. As far as I'm aware, they haven't been used since
19 7 July, but they are there and they are stocked and
20 they're up to date.

21 MR HAY: Superintendent, thank you very much. I have no
22 more questions for you, but others may.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

24 Questions by MR COLTART

25 MR COLTART: Just a few, please, Superintendent. Just going

1 back to the major incident vehicle, what it did and
2 didn't have on it, did it have any stretchers on it at
3 the time in 2005? Did it carry stretchers?
4 A. On the major incident vehicle, no, I don't believe they
5 did, sir.
6 Q. Or oxygen?
7 A. No, sir.
8 Q. So it was more low-level first aid equipment?
9 A. First aid equipment commensurate with the training that
10 police officers have, yes.
11 Q. As far as the field telephones are concerned, have you
12 been in court while Chief Superintendent Robertson gave
13 his evidence?
14 A. Yes, I heard that evidence.
15 Q. That's helpful. He helpfully described a tin can and
16 a tin can with a piece of string in between, but how
17 long is the piece of string in between the two tin cans?
18 A. I'm afraid, before yesterday, I knew nothing of the
19 field telephone, so I couldn't give you detailed answers
20 on that, sir.
21 Q. Right, but do you know more, in the light of hearing
22 about them yesterday or this morning, about field
23 telephones?
24 A. I don't know the length of the cable. I understand what
25 their utility is, but not much more than that, sir.

1 Q. I'm sure someone can supply us with the information
2 about the length of the cable and we'll make some
3 enquiries about that, but in terms of how they work, is
4 it a question of taking one half of the set, one tin
5 can, if you like, to the scene of an incident, setting
6 it up, and then the cable being unravelled and the other
7 half of it being situated wherever that needs to be and
8 then that enables the two to communicate one with the
9 other?

10 A. That would be my understanding, sir, yes.

11 Q. We can explore that as far as we need to. Can I just
12 ask you about a different topic, please? Could we have
13 back up on screen COLP188 [COLP188-2], please? Thank you. I don't
14 think we looked at item-number 6 or, if we did, I'm
15 going to ask that we revisit it:

16 "Not enough switchboard operators to deal. You end
17 up robbing Peter to pay Paul."

18 In a sense, this is part and parcel of the issues we
19 did look at, staff shortages in the control room, but if
20 we go over the page [COLP188-3], to get an idea of what radio
21 operators who were in the control room could and
22 couldn't deal with, I'm just going to look at this with
23 you, if I may. This was cut and pasted, this section,
24 by Mr Harrison into his document to illustrate the
25 difficulties faced by radio operators within the control

1 room. He says this:

2 "Below are comments and observations raised by two
3 members of civilian staff who were on duty on 29 July
4 [so nothing to do with 7 July, so we're plain about
5 that] when two women were arrested at gun point by
6 Metropolitan Police officers at Liverpool Street railway
7 station. The text is a straight lift from their
8 emails."

9 One of the operators says this:

10 "I just wanted to show my support of Martin's
11 concerns. I believe even the most capable operators
12 cannot sustain single-handedly during such an incident.
13 The amount of incoming and outgoing information, plus
14 the decision-making and associated concerns becomes
15 a huge burden. In the current climate, I believe that
16 maintaining two operators on the radio at all times
17 should supersede the needs of the FCCIB."

18 Then she raises a concern that she has about the
19 number of shifts that she's being asked to work.

20 The second operator makes similar observations
21 about:

22 "Now that the dust has settled ... [can] I make two
23 comments about the incident on Friday?"

24 "Had it been breaktime, with just one person doing
25 both jobs on the radio position, we would have lost

1 control before a second operator could have come to
2 assist - we would not have recovered the situation."

3 So this is a single incident on a single day. Can
4 we take it as read that the amount of radio traffic
5 generated by that incident was far less than the radio
6 traffic generated by the major incidents on 7 July?

7 A. I would assume so too, sir, yes.

8 Q. As night follows day, does it follow that only one radio
9 operator being left, if it were the case, simultaneously
10 to manage four major incidents would be plainly
11 inadequate?

12 A. Correct, sir, yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

14 Thank you very much indeed, Superintendent Mellor.

15 Those are all the questions that we have for you.

16 A. My Lady, thank you.

17 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Chief Inspector
18 James Strother, please.

19 CHIEF INSPECTOR JAMES ALAN STROTHER (sworn)

20 Questions by MR KEITH

21 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full
22 name, please?

23 A. James Alan Strother.

24 Q. Chief inspector, you currently serve in the Directorate
25 of Information of the Metropolitan Police Service, so

1 now we're turning to the senior witnesses in relation to
2 the Metropolitan Police.

3 What is the Directorate of Information responsible
4 for in general terms?

5 A. It's responsible for providing technology and associated
6 services to the Metropolitan Police, so it's a support
7 service, the designated information is a more sort of
8 modern way of expressing that, really.

9 Q. One of the functions that the Directorate has is the
10 obligation of ensuring that the system of Airwave
11 operated by the Metropolitan Police works, whether it's
12 upgraded and it continues to do what it is expected to
13 do?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We've heard quite considerable amounts of evidence from
16 the British Transport Police and City of London Police
17 and London Underground concerning, respectively, the
18 Airwave system, operated by the police, and the variant
19 CONNECT, operated by London Underground, both of which
20 operate below ground.

21 I'd like you, please, to explain the position
22 insofar as the Metropolitan Police is concerned,
23 starting with a very brief summary of what the position
24 was before the introduction of Airwave. What did the
25 Met used to get by with?

1 A. Before Airwave, we had two main radio systems, one VHF
2 and one UHF. The VHF one was used within -- in all our
3 vehicles, motorcycles, cars, helicopters, and the UHF
4 system, a Met radio, was used by officers carrying
5 a handset on their uniform or in their hand.

6 We did have one or two other systems, in fact
7 probably more than one or two, such as a system for
8 covert use, but for the operational uniform officer they
9 were the two systems we had.

10 Q. Was there regular inter-operability between the
11 Metropolitan Police and other police forces or other
12 emergency responders under the old system?

13 A. Not generally, no. Those systems were designed for our
14 use and we were the only people who used them.

15 Q. But plainly, at the scene of an incident or in relation
16 generally to the command of an incident, there are
17 a number of ways of course in which -- and they still
18 continue -- the Met Police would inform itself of what
19 its professional colleagues were up to by CAD,
20 face-to-face, telephone and the like?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. The position formally was that, in addition, there was
23 no Met radio coverage in the London Underground system,
24 in particular in the 122 sub-surface stations which call
25 themselves the section 12 stations, is that right?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. So the position formally was that if the Met attended
3 a London Underground station, it would seek the
4 assistance of either the British Transport Police or
5 members of staff of the London Underground in order to
6 use their system?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Their systems, I should say.

9 On 7 July, that was, in essence, the guiding
10 principle for the Metropolitan Police, because Airwave
11 had not been introduced by the time of 7 July, had it?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. So if we just look, please, for one moment at one of the
14 documents that you've produced, of which we heard
15 yesterday, the standard operating procedure for dealing
16 with incidents on the London Underground that was then
17 in force, [MPS9-22], please.

18 We can see at the bottom of the page there, at
19 paragraph 3.1, that:

20 "All incidents and crimes on London Underground
21 Limited property are dealt with by British Transport
22 Police except:

23 "Terrorism; and

24 "Murder."

25 In relation to which:

1 "The MPS will have primacy over these incidents."
2 The general position, Chief Inspector, was this, was
3 it not: that where, therefore, the Met attended, but in
4 particular where it had primacy of investigation, an
5 officer would ask a member of staff from the
6 London Underground to accompany him or her so that they
7 could use their radio if they needed to get a message
8 out, and also would rely on the member of staff to show
9 them where the incident was?

10 A. That would be the general case, yes.

11 Q. So page 24 [MPS9-24] of this document, you can see there at
12 paragraph 8.2:

13 "The LUL duty manager is the principal contact point
14 with the railway company. They have overall
15 responsibility for site safety and will help emergency
16 services and close cooperation between all parties
17 minimises the risks."

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. At page 27 [MPS9-27], we can see there a reference to radio
20 communications and, paragraph 15.1, what was plainly
21 known, but it's repeated there, is that, of course, the
22 MPS did not have their own radio communications
23 underground, and, therefore, the procedures were agreed
24 to this effect, at 15.6, that the member of staff would
25 accompany the police officer who had attended the

1 station and would make their own radio system available.

2 A. As the first bullet point says, providing they're
3 readily available and it's safe for them to do so.

4 Q. Precisely. Obviously, in an incident such as
5 7 July 2005, the number of police officers attending
6 meant plainly that there would be, and there were, an
7 insufficient number of members of staff for
8 London Underground either to accompany each attending
9 officer or to make available their own radio system?

10 A. That's correct, and also these instructions are
11 generally perhaps intended for the more day-to-day
12 incidents where an officer might attend alone or with
13 another colleague.

14 In this situation, the officers going underground
15 would be in more substantial numbers and, therefore,
16 whilst, obviously, the environment wasn't safe, the fact
17 that you are together gives you some safety in numbers,
18 and the ability to send somebody to communicate, so your
19 need for a radio system at that point isn't quite as
20 great as it would be normally.

21 Q. The point is well-made, but it was a facet, was it not,
22 of the communication difficulties that were encountered
23 that day?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. For my Lady's benefit, on page 37 [MPS9-37], we can see of this

1 document the guidance for the first emergency service
2 officer on scene.
3 This appendix set out, did it not, the basic
4 principle and we can see there repeated in various ways,
5 the first person to attend must establish immediate
6 liaison, not get involved personally in rescue work and
7 must continue the liaison and communication function,
8 and that was a very important part, was it not, of any
9 attendance at an incident?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And remains so today?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 Q. All right. The Airwave system was introduced as a first
14 national police radio system between 2001 and 2008 in
15 very broad terms, was it not?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. We've heard some evidence as to how the British
18 Transport Police went about the installation of Airwave
19 as far as it is concerned.

20 What difficulties, in general terms, were
21 encountered by the Metropolitan Police in the
22 installation of its own operation of that radio system?

23 A. Are we talking here about the early stages of getting
24 the system into place, or are we talking about the
25 difficulties we encountered later with the system?

1 Q. No, I'm talking about, in fact, the understandable
2 decision to await the introduction of the MPS Command --
3 overall communication system which was then installed
4 around about the same time.

5 A. The Metropolitan Police wasn't just taking a radio
6 system out and putting another one in. Had we only been
7 doing that, it would have been far, far simpler. What
8 we were doing was a complete root and branch overhaul
9 with the way we dealt with incoming demand, mainly
10 through telephone calls from the public and, indeed,
11 from our own officers, and other agencies, and we
12 effectively replaced, changed, upgraded, improved, most
13 of that whole environment, right from the receipt of
14 telephony to the dispatch of officers on the ground and
15 how we dealt with them on the ground.

16 The computer-aided dispatch CAD system which you've
17 heard a fair bit about, in fact in a way was one of the
18 only bits that didn't change, in that it still sits at
19 the core of our new systems.

20 As regards the introduction of Airwave, Airwave was
21 a -- an important, a very important, project, but it was
22 only one project amongst about 14 technology projects
23 that were taking place simultaneously, or at least in
24 parallel.

25 A major programme like that, a programme of 14

1 technology projects, plus all the other stuff that sits
2 around the technology, is a difficult thing to
3 accomplish and it's the biggest change management
4 programme that the Met Police have ever undertaken.
5 One of the problems that occurred was that the radio
6 system needs a radio dispatcher, so that's the computer
7 that sits on the desk in the control room, that the
8 staff use to talk to officers out on the street, and
9 that part of what we were doing needed to be replaced,
10 and it was also being centralised from 32 -- more or
11 less 32 borough control rooms to 3 much larger central
12 communication centres.

13 Q. So it was a huge project?

14 A. It was a huge project and the thing that really caused
15 most of the delay was this dispatcher terminal on the
16 desktop -- which is another acronym, I'm afraid; it's
17 referred to as an ICCS, an integrated communications
18 control system, ICCS.

19 That was meant to be delivered by a major supplier,
20 procured through the Metropolitan Police authority in
21 the normal way, and they spent -- this is before I came
22 into the programme, but 18 months, a couple of years,
23 something like that, developing this system, and just
24 after I came into the programme, in June 2004, which is
25 why I remember, they announced that they couldn't

1 deliver this system, there was no cause and effect with
2 me coming in, but they announced that they couldn't
3 deliver this system and they were going to back out of
4 the contract.

5 We then had to renegotiate or reprocur, in fact,
6 another company to do this work, which took some time
7 and then obviously they had to develop and produce the
8 system.

9 There were other factors, I can't go into them all
10 in detail, but that was the major factor that delayed us
11 by around a year and a half, two years, and we couldn't
12 implement the radio system, Airwave, without the means
13 to deal with it on the desktop.

14 Q. Then, when the communications structure had been
15 simplified and all the borough, the local borough
16 communications centres were moved to the three main
17 ones, there was a system, was there not, a rollout,
18 whereby each borough moved into the Central
19 Communications Centre?

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. In addition, although some parts of the
22 Metropolitan Police, some specialist directorates, had
23 had some Airwave handsets from the very beginning in
24 2003, the handsets themselves had to be issued in their
25 thousands to Metropolitan Police officers?

1 A. That's right, and that process took around 18 months and
2 the reason for that is logistics, the sheer volume of
3 change that had to occur, the availability of radios for
4 that matter, the training, all the other aspects that
5 you have to take cognisance of in a major change project
6 and, to reduce operational risk, it was carried out over
7 that period of about 18 months.

8 Q. Was Airwave finally operational for all parts of the Met
9 between 2007 and 2008?

10 A. Yes, that's right, or in fact by the end of 2007.

11 Q. The end of 2007. The benefits of Airwave have been
12 explored in the course of these proceedings by my Lady
13 so I won't detain you in relation to those.

14 We are aware, of course, that prior to Airwave being
15 introduced, there was no capacity for Metropolitan
16 Police officers to communicate below ground.

17 Even under the new system, however, there are some
18 limits on the ability of Airwave to operate below
19 ground, in particular there is a limit on the number of
20 simultaneous channels or talkgroups that can be utilised
21 at any one time. Is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Are steps being taken to see whether or not that
24 limitation can be reduced or removed by way of the
25 installation of further base radios or to try to make

1 further frequencies available so that the number of
2 simultaneous talkgroups can be increased?

3 A. Yes, it was always the case that the intention was to
4 have greater capacity in quite a large number of the
5 Underground stations than there is now.

6 The program -- it was decided to go ahead with the
7 programme with the reduced capacity on the basis, quite
8 simply, that something was better than nothing -- that
9 something was much better than nothing -- and that, if
10 funding could be obtained and the technical difficulties
11 could be overcome, sort of phase 2, if you like, plan B,
12 could be implemented at a later stage.

13 To date, that phase 2 hasn't been implemented, but
14 efforts are being made for perhaps a second or third
15 time over the years to get that implemented and to find
16 the funding.

17 That is being driven by the British Transport Police
18 and the NPIA-led Airwave on the Underground Programme
19 Board, which I do sit on, but the impetus is coming from
20 the British Transport Police.

21 Q. In practice, since the introduction of Airwave below
22 ground -- because obviously there are two facets to
23 this; the above-ground use and the underground use -- in
24 2008, has the limitation, such as it is, below ground,
25 had any significant adverse effect in terms of the

1 ability of the Metropolitan Police to respond
2 operationally to incidents below ground?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Has the Metropolitan Police, above ground, spent its own
5 funds, in fact, in seeking to increase the transmission
6 ability of Airwave where appropriate; for example, where
7 it deals with major events above ground?

8 A. Yes, particularly with regards to major events, the big
9 set-piece events that we run, such as Notting Hill
10 carnival and New Year's Eve, plus less planned
11 operations, G20, the papal visit, these sorts of things.
12 We recognised pretty early on that we were
13 uncomfortable with the ability of the Airwave network,
14 as delivered under the NPIA contract, to meet our needs
15 for those events and the needs of our colleagues in the
16 other police forces and the other emergency services.
17 So we have worked with the suppliers, with other
18 agencies, and, yes, we have spent our money on providing
19 an improved -- an increased capacity for those events,
20 and we are now content that we can run those events
21 effectively on Airwave.

22 Had we not done that work and spent that money, we
23 think that we would have had far more difficulty doing
24 so. But now we are content.

25 Q. Can I now turn to backup facilities?

1 In 2005, the evidence shows that an emergency
2 response vehicle was sought to be deployed at
3 Russell Square, didn't, in fact, arrive, no doubt for
4 good operational reasons, until lunchtime and, even
5 then, there were delays in running out the system at
6 Russell Square because of the need to ensure that the
7 scene was safe and that it was still under intensive
8 forensic investigation.

9 A. I think it should be said that there was no contract,
10 the vehicle was a vehicle which the supplier had and
11 used, but it wasn't designed for that purpose, there was
12 nothing in place at that time to use it for that
13 purpose. They did it because they wanted to help us
14 and, whilst it was of limited use, it was certainly
15 better than not having it and we were grateful to them
16 for doing it.

17 Q. The system now that's been fully installed has its own
18 backup system, does it not, a mirror system, so that in
19 the event of an overall failure, either regionally or
20 nationally in the system, there is a backup system that
21 should provide an alternative transmission?

22 A. This is on a macro scale, if you like, yes. There is
23 a mirror system which gives us service again within two
24 or three minutes, should there be a catastrophic failure
25 at the main system which is actually housed well outside

1 London.

2 Q. Is there also a better system, a perhaps more regulated
3 system for the use of emergency response vehicles
4 reflecting what was attempted to be done in 2005, so
5 that if local transmitters fail, or there is damage to
6 the local part of the Airwave network, there is
7 a replacement vehicle available?

8 A. There is. There are, in fact, six vehicles. There is
9 a contract which manages how they are delivered to us.
10 That contract is just being renewed this month, and/or
11 last month, this month, and we're actually getting
12 a better service for less money.

13 Q. But as my Lady heard yesterday, the standard operating
14 procedure makes it absolutely plain that the vehicles
15 cannot be relied upon for the early part of a response
16 to an incident due to the time necessary to deploy them?

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. Even if the transmitters fail, the handsets have
19 a direct mode operation function which gives officers
20 a back-to-back ability; that is to say an ability to
21 speak to one other person, provided that they are within
22 a certain distance?

23 A. Yes, or in fact more than one other person, anybody else
24 who is on the same channel in the same locality could be
25 included.

1 Q. What is the geographical limit?

2 A. It's difficult to say, it depends on the geography.

3 Above ground, if you look down the Mall or somewhere

4 like that, a wide open space, a kilometre. Inside, it

5 could be as little as from this -- from where I'm

6 sitting to the other side of the room, depending on the

7 makeup of the building, pillars, the electromagnetic

8 situation, whether inside. All sorts of things will

9 affect it.

10 Generally, you will be looking at a couple of

11 hundred yards, though, at any rate.

12 Q. That's even if the relay transmission function, the

13 ability of the channel to incorporate a great deal many

14 officers over a huge area fails, there is still that

15 limited facility back-to-back?

16 A. And it's completely independent of the network, yes.

17 Q. Finally, dealing with the approach adopted by the

18 Metropolitan Police to Command and Control with the new

19 Airwave system, does the Metropolitan Police still

20 recognise the importance of assuring that its own

21 Command and Control structures are still adhered to,

22 even though the system now permits your own officers to

23 speak to other police forces as well as other emergency

24 services through the assistance of the new Airwave

25 system?

1 A. Very much so, yes.

2 Q. Could we look at the standard operating procedure guide
3 on multi-agency Airwave inter-operability, which is
4 [MPS9-53]?

5 There is a reference on this page at paragraph 2 to
6 the guide establishing business rules for inter-agency
7 radio communication at the minimum level, but that:
8 "Nevertheless, the primary focus should be on Silver
9 (tactical) Incident Commanders. There are established
10 routes for communication in each agency, which is
11 important for effective command, control and
12 coordination of their resources."

13 In essence why, Chief Inspector?

14 A. Because each organisation needs to maintain visibility
15 of its resources, understanding of where its resources
16 are and what they're doing to be able to deploy them
17 effectively.

18 If we allowed every officer, every police officer at
19 any level, to speak to every ambulance officer, to speak
20 to every fire officer, to speak to whomever else,
21 essentially there would be chaos. We couldn't do that.
22 We need to maintain control of our resources. The other
23 organisations need to maintain control of their
24 resources, and we liaise between us at the appropriate
25 points to make sure that that resourcing is -- that

1 deployment of those resources is integrated and is
2 performing a collective function rather than just an
3 individual one.

4 There are some circumstances where we may actually
5 extend that use of Airwave to the more junior level, but
6 in general terms, that statement is absolutely correct
7 and, although I didn't write this, I certainly critiqued
8 and contributed to that document.

9 Q. Is that why the emphasis is on maintaining communication
10 at Silver (tactical) level, because if communication
11 between agencies is maintained at that level, the
12 Silvers will know what resources are being deployed and
13 can make sure that their own organisations are
14 responding properly?

15 A. Indeed. We don't want a junior officer making
16 a decision. I mean, we encourage our officers to be
17 resourceful and make decisions, but we don't want them
18 making decisions which will affect people and operations
19 outside their knowledge which the Silver Commander will
20 have knowledge on, because whilst they may be acting, in
21 their own heads, in the best interests of everybody,
22 they may actually be doing something that's
23 counterproductive to the main effort, and I think all
24 the organisations would agree with that basic principle.

25 Q. I understand from Mr Hill that you are also able to

1 assist my Lady in relation to the way in which the CAD
2 process currently works and, in particular, how the use
3 of the joint CAD system operated by the
4 Metropolitan Police does permit, in certain
5 circumstances, members of the emergency services, such
6 as the London Ambulance Service and the London Fire
7 Brigade, to see what is being inputted on to the CAD
8 system and to have some sight of it.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is the current position?

11 A. I'm not an expert on CAD, but I think I know enough to
12 be able to assist. The CAD system is owned by the
13 Metropolitan Police, it's used by the City of London
14 Police, pretty much -- no disrespect to the officers
15 sitting over the other side, but as if they were another
16 London borough.

17 In terms of geographical size, they're smaller than
18 most London boroughs. Whilst they absolutely have their
19 own Command and Control right up to their commissioner,
20 in terms of size and how they operate with us once we
21 start acting together, they use the CAD system in the
22 same way as another borough would, albeit a borough with
23 its own separate governance.

24 The British Transport Police, as I think we've
25 heard, have access to CAD, but in parallel with their

1 own system, so they have to rekey, they have to have
2 somebody looking at both systems and working between
3 them. So it's not the same as the City situation at
4 all, although, ultimately, the same information from the
5 system is available to them; it's just not as convenient
6 in the way they use it, I suppose.

7 The London Ambulance Service has a connection with
8 our CAD system, so they have their own system. We can
9 send them, from our system to theirs, for instance,
10 a demand for resources, "Can I have an ambulance,
11 please, to this location? Three people injured, these
12 are the injuries", whatever.

13 Q. That message will appear on the Central Ambulance
14 Control data system?

15 A. That's right. They can then respond to that in the same
16 way. So we can pass information between our two
17 systems, but they can't see ours and we can't see
18 theirs, and I think the rationale behind that is that
19 they're not a police service, there's data protection,
20 there's all sorts of security and associated issues
21 there. They see what they need to see and we see what
22 we need to see and it's more of a message-passing
23 system.

24 The London Fire Brigade has no CAD at all, or rather
25 has no access to our CAD at all.

1 Q. There was some reference to additional cooperation or
2 inter-operability, to use that word, in the event of use
3 of the GT, the Special Operations communications centre
4 operated by the Metropolitan Police.

5 Are you aware of any means by which a member of the
6 London Ambulance Service or the London Fire Brigade can
7 attend the GT room and see, visually, at any rate, what
8 is going down on the CAD system and be, although
9 indirectly, party to that process?

10 A. Yes, I'll just have to explain something else. Once we
11 open up the Special Operations Room or the call sign GT,
12 as you've just used, we actually move on to another
13 system called Met Ops. Now, that system is similar to
14 CAD but it works differently, and it's designed
15 particularly for dealing with large incidents and the
16 public order incidents that we deal with.

17 When a Special Operations Room is opened, depending
18 on the circumstance of the incident, whether it's
19 planned or spontaneous, the type of incident it is, but
20 certainly on all the large incidents, the planned ones
21 such as carnival, and the unplanned ones, such as 7/7,
22 ambulance, fire, BTP, City and some other agencies come
23 into Special Operations Room and they set up their own
24 pod where they can work.

25 They have access to CAD. We train their operators

1 so that they can see CAD at this point, and, indeed,
2 they have access to Met Ops. The reason there is that,
3 whereas, previously, in a day-to-day sort of incident
4 where we need an ambulance because the police are
5 dealing with somebody who has been hurt, the need to
6 know is just about that requirement.

7 When you're looking at a major incident, there is
8 a greater need for all organisations to be able to see
9 the whole picture and, if we maintain the same situation
10 where they sat in SOR but had to come and ask us
11 questions about everything that was going on, that would
12 be very counter-productive. So in that situation, they
13 are able to see what we can see.

14 Q. That liaison person, whoever it may be, can they not
15 only see what is generated on the Met Ops system, the
16 individual minute-by-minute entries?

17 Do they have access to their own data systems so
18 that they can immediately input into their own system
19 information that they are watching on the Met system, or
20 do they have to phone or, by some other route,
21 communicate with somebody in their own data centre's
22 Control Centre to relay what they are observing?

23 A. I said I wasn't an expert and that's where my knowledge
24 runs out. I'm pretty sure they have access to their own
25 systems, but I couldn't confirm that.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But it depends on the member of the
2 other emergency service getting to wherever your special
3 incident room is physically --

4 A. Yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- which presumably is not going to
6 be within the first hour or so of the events?

7 A. The target time for Special Operations Room, setting up
8 and being fully operational, from our point of view, in
9 the Met Police, is around 40 to 45 minutes. It's not
10 permanently staffed, you haven't got people sitting
11 there doing nothing waiting to be deployed.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So is it where you're getting
13 machines ready and --

14 A. And people, really --

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- people ready?

16 A. -- it's mainly about people. The other agencies,
17 I would anticipate -- I work in the room sometimes, but
18 I don't run it, but I would still anticipate that they
19 would be there in a similar timescale.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What triggers the setting up of the
21 room, do you know? How does the message go out to
22 everybody: we're setting up GT?

23 A. Again, I don't know all the details, but we have
24 a particular individual called the Chief Inspector at
25 Central Communications Command. That person has the

1 decision to set up SOR and will do so if the
2 circumstances of an incident meet certain criteria which
3 he or she is aware of and he or she will make that
4 decision: we are now opening up SOR, get on and do it.
5 At that point, the other agencies would be informed
6 of what we're doing and invited to attend, depending on
7 the type of incident and, should another agency be aware
8 of an incident that clearly requires SOR, I'm quite sure
9 they would approach us and ask us to open it, but it's
10 our decision in the end.

11 MR KEITH: Chief Inspector, thank you very much. There may
12 be some more questions for you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

14 Questions by MR COLTART

15 MR COLTART: Chief Inspector, you said, when Mr Keith asked
16 you about the vehicle which was deployed by Airwave to
17 King's Cross or Russell Square, this: that it was of
18 limited use, but better than nothing.

19 Can I just cite a short passage from a report which
20 was prepared by the BTP -- which, for my Lady's note, is
21 at BTP309 -- so that you can comment on their take of
22 the efficacy of that system.

23 They say this:

24 "Airwave have invoked their major incident plan and
25 had van-based enhancers on their way to London very

1 rapidly. The first arrived at Russell Square at 1.15 on
2 the Thursday. Engineers could not get access to the
3 tunnel until S013 had finished their preliminary work.
4 Airwave coverage was provided to the train by
5 1800 hours. A second vehicle was sent to King's Cross
6 the following day. The coverage was very good,
7 extending along the platform and through the tunnel to
8 the end of the train."

9 Now, this is the capability, isn't it, that your
10 officers now have on their Airwave radio sets?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So that would have been the position, had they had those
13 radios on 7 July?

14 A. Yes, indeed.

15 Q. They would have had that coverage through to the
16 affected carriage in that tunnel?

17 A. Yes, they would.

18 Q. The Metropolitan Police officers who attended at
19 King's Cross played an invaluable part in the evacuation
20 process and we've heard from a number of them during the
21 course of the inquest. If they had had those radios,
22 they could have reported instantaneously to the surface,
23 couldn't they, on the number of casualties, the type of
24 injuries and the equipment and resources which were
25 required to complete the evacuation?

1 A. If they'd had that when they first went down into the
2 Underground, absolutely, yes.

3 Q. Rather than run two, if not three, flights of escalators
4 up and down to the surface in order to relay the same
5 information.

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. So is it fair to say that your assessment of "limited
8 use, better than nothing" is perhaps an understatement
9 of the position as it actually stood on the day?

10 A. Yes, I mean, I suppose what I'm referring to by saying
11 that, really, is that we can't expect those vehicles to
12 provide us with an instantaneous replacement for the
13 system if the system is damaged, and that's why
14 I suppose I used the word "limited"; in that sense it is
15 limited. Once the system arrives, it's excellent,
16 absolutely, yes.

17 Q. So is the position this, in fact, that as a quick fix --
18 and we'll come on to quick fixes in a minute -- it was
19 of limited benefit because, in reality, it wasn't
20 a quick fix, was it, it was something which took a while
21 to deploy and to have in place?

22 A. I suppose it would be more accurate to say it was of no
23 use until it was actually deployed.

24 Q. Exactly.

25 A. When it was deployed, it was of great use, utility.

1 Q. I think you've been in court yesterday and this morning,
2 so you've heard the evidence which was given by
3 Chief Inspector Short and this morning by
4 Superintendent Robertson and others --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- which greatly shortens this particular topic, but as
7 far as the Met was concerned with the implementation of
8 Airwave, the position is this, isn't it, that
9 in September 2003, the Metropolitan Police was singled
10 out in a way in the debrief report from Operation Osiris
11 as not having any underground capability and the
12 difficulties which it caused during the course of that
13 exercise were made plain, weren't they, during the
14 course of the debrief?

15 A. The only knowledge I have is what I've heard in court.
16 I wasn't aware of that operation before.

17 Q. All right. Your lawyers have a copy of the document.
18 If there's anything inaccurate about this, I've no doubt
19 they'll tell me.

20 Are you aware, can you assist my Lady, on what
21 attempts the Metropolitan Police or what efforts the
22 Metropolitan Police made in the months that followed
23 through to July 2005 to have in place an interim
24 solution to resolve that position?

25 A. Sorry, up to? Between 2003 and 2005 you mean?

1 Q. Between September 2003, the day of the exercise
2 and July 2005, the day of the bombings, what steps were
3 taken to provide Metropolitan Police officers with an
4 underground capability?

5 A. I was only involved myself from -- I came into the
6 programme in June 2004, so I'm not totally familiar with
7 that period, but I'm not aware of any attempts to
8 provide any additional technical capability at all.

9 Q. In fairness to the Metropolitan Police,
10 between September 2003 and June 2004, it may have been
11 hoped that your technological issues were going to be
12 resolved sooner rather than later because you had in
13 place the contract with whoever was providing the
14 computer equipment.

15 But from June 2004, when that -- the plug was pulled
16 on that contract by the contractor -- no fault of
17 yours -- it must have been plain, wasn't it, that it was
18 going to take some time -- renegotiation, retendering
19 all the rest of it -- in order to replace that facility?
20 Is that a fair assumption?

21 A. Sorry, replace which facility? We didn't have
22 a facility to replace.

23 Q. No, I haven't phrased it very well.

24 In order to obtain a new contractor who would be
25 able to deliver the equipment that you needed, that was

1 a process which inevitably was going to take some time?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So it must have been plain, by that stage, that you had
4 no immediate end in sight, your underground capability
5 issue identified the previous year, but is it the case
6 that you are not aware of any steps taken, even at that
7 stage, to provide some sort of interim solution?

8 A. I'm not aware of any and, whilst, yes, we operate in the
9 Underground, the Underground is BTP territory, and
10 I think -- it's difficult, I can't start putting words
11 into the mouths of those people making strategic
12 decisions back then. All I can really say is that the
13 Underground was BTP's territory, and still is, and we
14 would tend to rely on them for the impetus to make
15 improvements in communications in the Underground.
16 Indeed, although we were joint players in the
17 introduction of the current Airwave in the Underground
18 system, they were still the lead on that.

19 Q. That may be so and I don't wish to labour this point,
20 but the fact is that you were fully involved, and
21 expected to be fully involved, both in the live
22 exercises and also in the event, if it actually
23 happened, and you had been found wanting, hadn't you, in
24 relation to your own radio capability?

25 A. I've certainly got no knowledge, as I've said, of any

1 effort to enable us to communicate in the Underground
2 until Airwave in the Underground, other than potentially
3 the borrowing of BTP radios or the compliance with the
4 standard operating procedure that you've already seen.

5 Q. Thank you. Final topic, field telephones. Are you
6 familiar with them?

7 A. I've never heard of them in a police context. Only in
8 a military-type context.

9 Q. Do you know, does the Metropolitan Police have any field
10 telephones?

11 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

12 Q. Do you have any major incident vehicles of the type
13 that's been described this morning by the City police
14 officers?

15 A. We do and, to my knowledge, they don't have field
16 telephones on them.

17 Q. Were they deployed, do you know, during the course of
18 the major incidents on 7 July?

19 A. I wasn't actually working on that day and -- the
20 vehicles we had at the time, they almost certainly would
21 have been, but I can't say that they were.

22 MR COLTART: All right. It may be that someone else can
23 deal with that. Thank you very much.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Mr Hill?

25 Questions by MR HILL

1 MR HILL: Can I just ask you a little more about
2 jurisdiction first, please, Chief Inspector? This takes
3 us really, at the outset, to the exhibits that you
4 produced. If we could have MPS9, please, at page 22 [MPS9-22] on
5 screen, this is -- we've already seen it, but let's be
6 absolutely clear about it -- this is the standard
7 operating procedure as we see at the top of the page, in
8 relation to the Metropolitan Police and in connection
9 with incidents on or near London Underground.
10 The first point to make being that the
11 London Underground Limited property and all of the then
12 122 Underground stations were always, with one
13 exception, which I'll come to, beyond the jurisdiction
14 of the Metropolitan Police. Is that right?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. The only exception and the only circumstance in which
17 Underground property falls within the jurisdiction of
18 the Metropolitan Police is where primacy is assumed in
19 the specific context of terrorism and murder?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. That is why we have page 22 on screen. We've seen 3.1.
22 Could we just concentrate for a moment on 3.2 because
23 primacy is specifically defined within this SOP,
24 standard operating procedure, is it not:
25 "Defined as the long-term ownership of the problem

1 or the subsequent investigation of the incident or
2 crime."

3 Does it follow that, even in cases where it
4 transpires that there has been an act of terrorism or
5 murder, or the suspicion of such an act, primacy doesn't
6 mean that the Metropolitan Police immediately take
7 precedence over all other first responders?

8 A. That's right, it's as the SOP says, it's a more
9 long-term principle.

10 Q. Right. So to take an example, away from radio
11 communications but pertinent to my Lady's proceedings,
12 we have seen in relation to all of the four bomb scenes
13 on 7 July that once crime scene managers or examiners
14 deployed by S013 -- the Anti-terrorist Branch as it was
15 at the time -- were handed control of the scenes at the
16 end of first response and the saving of life and
17 identification of those who did not survive, that was
18 when, in that context of containment of the scene,
19 investigation and the revelation of evidence, primacy
20 was taken over by the Metropolitan Police?

21 A. Yes, yes, I would say so.

22 Q. The same applies at a communications level, doesn't it,
23 and here to bring us back in the realms of
24 communication, when an incident has occurred and has
25 escalated beyond borough command, through the Central

1 Communications Command and up to central operations,
2 that's an example of primacy being identified and
3 asserted by the Metropolitan Police?

4 A. Yes, I think that's a good description.

5 Q. Right. For my Lady's note, Chief Inspector Sadowski,
6 evidence to be read tomorrow, was the chief inspector in
7 the Central Communications Command, and so he is at
8 a level above borough or CAD communications within the
9 central communications complex, and it's through him
10 that this incident, as it were, is routed at some speed,
11 then arriving at Central Ops -- Superintendent Gomm,
12 statement also to be read tomorrow -- who then became
13 the Silver Commander for London, and thereafter we see
14 that the GT logs -- in other words the Central
15 Operations Communications System -- takes over from what
16 had been a CAD system up to that point?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. That escalation in fact took place during a period up to
19 about between 10.00 and 10.30 on the morning of 7 July.
20 It is the asserting of primacy, not instantaneously, nor
21 could it ever be, but after initial response and
22 assessment of the events that day?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The document that we have on screen, the Standard
25 Operating Procedure pre-Airwave, then goes on at page

1 [MPS9-27] in the context, we remind ourselves, of
2 a situation in which the jurisdiction belongs to the
3 British Transport Police and not to the
4 Metropolitan Police and is on London Underground
5 territory. There is a specific arrangement for radio
6 communications in that scenario set out on page 27.
7 This is repetition of what Mr Keith said, but I come
8 back to it in the light of questions just asked of you.
9 There was and always was -- is this right -- a protocol,
10 an operating procedure, which gave precise instructions
11 as to how to act in circumstances where it was necessary
12 for Metropolitan officers to enter Underground premises?
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. Right, And that was in force in 2005?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Remained a Standard Operating Procedure until in very
17 large part it was overtaken by the second of the two
18 exhibits that you've provided for my Lady's proceedings?
19 A. I don't know about "overtaken".
20 Q. Use a better word, please.
21 A. The main purpose of that -- our, the Met, Standard
22 Operating Procedure -- was around safety in railway
23 premises, and that principle -- and a large part of
24 the fairly lengthy document -- remains today because
25 it's still appropriate. It's the part about

1 communications and inter-operable communications in
2 particular which have been, to use your word, overtaken
3 by the national Standard Operating Procedure.

4 Q. Yes, thank you, and it's with inter-operability in mind
5 that I'm going to come on to that second document, but
6 before doing so, within its own jurisdiction, is it or
7 is it not the case that the Met radio system and the
8 combination of a UHF and VHF facility which you told us
9 about at the start of your evidence were entirely fit
10 for their purpose throughout the Metropolitan Police
11 jurisdiction for all serving officers?

12 A. Yes, they were.

13 Q. Notwithstanding that fitness for purpose, there were,
14 there was, a lengthy procedure, no doubt at very high
15 cost and involving problems over commercial supply apart
16 from anything else, under which or as a result of which
17 Airwave was rolled out for the purposes of the
18 Metropolitan Police.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I'm not going to simply read out the section in which
21 you dealt with the period from 2003 to 2007, but as
22 Mr Coltart's asked about that period it is for my Lady's
23 note paragraph 16 of your statement. The screen
24 reference, we needn't see it on screen, but it's MPS9-8.
25 That done, we're then in the realms of Airwave

1 insofar as the Metropolitan Police are concerned, and in
2 the context of inter-operability in the Airwave era we
3 come on to your second exhibit which is the 2010
4 Standard Operating Procedure on inter-operability.
5 So at [MPS9-104], please, the position that we find
6 ourselves in now -- and I've highlighted the section 5.4
7 "Culture" -- is that the use of Airwave is primarily
8 intended at a Command and Control level rather than, for
9 want of a better phrase, a foot soldier level within the
10 Metropolitan Police.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Right, And the Command and Control culture on which
13 there's some comment in 5.4.1 means, in 5.4.2, four
14 lines down, that care is needed to analyse and evaluate
15 the utility of information prior to communication rather
16 than simply relaying it in a raw state?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. That means, a line from the bottom of the screen now,
19 that:

20 "The analytical skills of Control Centre
21 operators ... are absolutely critical to this process."
22 Is that another way of saying that greater use of
23 inter-operability, even if it were felt to be advisable,
24 might have unforeseen disadvantages simply by, as it
25 were, pushing raw communications material around a wider

1 and wider system without using Control Centre operators
2 and their skills with extreme care and in conjunction
3 with Command and Control?

4 A. Yes, and I think that's always been the case, it's just
5 perhaps more pertinent now that we can use the radio to
6 communicate with those other parties, but it's always
7 been the case, if you're communicating via CAD,
8 face-to-face or on the telephone.

9 We work in different cultures and we need to
10 interpret between the two and be careful of what we say
11 in case it's not -- in case it's misinterpreted. All
12 Airwave did, really, was make that communication or give
13 us another way to conduct those communications.

14 Q. That leads me to just ask you two final matters,
15 concentrating as it were not on the extent of the
16 technology but the importance of how you use it which is
17 what you're saying.

18 The talkgroups, we've heard a lot of evidence about
19 talkgroups and the limitation within current Airwave
20 capacity of talkgroups. Would it be right to say -- and
21 correct me if this is wrong -- that the essential
22 feature about talkgroups is not how many of them there
23 are but how they are managed?

24 A. The two go together, really.

25 Q. Right. What I mean -- and this is for to you comment

1 on -- is that provided there is a correct assessment of
2 resources, there is in other words a Command structure
3 in place, any number of officers in theory can be
4 applied to an Airwave facility with limited talkgroups.
5 The key is in ensuring how you corral or group those
6 officers to make sure that those who need access to the
7 system have it.

8 A. Absolutely. It's vital to manage the officers and the
9 talkgroups they're using, and we do put a lot of effort
10 into that and that's -- now that we've implemented
11 Airwave, is a large part of the raison d'etre for people
12 like me being in existence, because we sit between the
13 suppliers of the service and our colleagues who operate
14 the service, the operational police officers, the senior
15 people you're seeing tomorrow, and we make sure that one
16 world operates with the other world because they're very
17 different worlds. And then in doing that, yes, we
18 manage the people or we give advice on managing the
19 people and how they use those talkgroups. If we didn't
20 do it, the situation would be a lot worse.

21 Q. That leads, I think finally, to this, which is the
22 spectre of congestion, radio congestion. You have
23 covered this, as it were, in paragraph 11 of your
24 statement, MPS9-6 and we needn't bring it up on screen.
25 We might, as it were, further debate future rollout

1 of increase in capacity, new technologies even as yet
2 unthought of, and gradually moving further and further
3 into the technological age, but is it not right, as you
4 pointed out in your statement, that ultimately it's
5 simply an inevitable form of policing that the question
6 of congestion, just the overuse of a system, can never
7 be met purely by the rollout of further and better
8 technology. It can, however, be met by proper command
9 systems, control of the resources, ensuring that systems
10 which are fit for purpose are properly used and that's
11 the way to avoid congestion?

12 A. The simple answer is just "yes". Just briefly to
13 explain, I look at congestion in two different ways.
14 There is congestion technically on the technical network
15 which happens if too many people are using too many
16 talkgroups at one given point in time, and that's the
17 point we've just referred to, this is where people like
18 myself assist to make sure that doesn't happen.
19 The other side is even if your system is working
20 100 per cent and has spare capacity, you can congest it
21 by having too many people trying to say things all at
22 the same time. That's -- one of my jobs is to manage
23 the first one but to advise the operational environment
24 on the second one, and we have means of keeping the
25 numbers of officers talking on one particular talkgroup

1 down, we have instructions that we issue at the major
2 events like a carnival, where we say that unless it's
3 absolutely urgent a police constable shouldn't be
4 communicating on the radio, supervisors should do that
5 job.

6 So we put in place operational procedures which
7 complement the technical configuration and changes we
8 can make, and between the two of them we aim to reduce
9 both types of congestion to an acceptable level.

10 MR HILL: Yes, that's all I ask, thank you.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much indeed, Chief
12 Inspector. Those are all the questions that we have for
13 you. I followed most of your answers. That was
14 a technical reference, not a suggestion of any other
15 kind.

16 MR KEITH: My Lady, there are three statements left over
17 from yesterday which I can either read now, which would
18 take about ten minutes, or rather than inviting my Lady
19 to sit this afternoon, for a very short period of time,
20 I could put over to tomorrow.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm entirely happy to carry on. Does
22 anybody have any problems if we just complete this now?

23 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. The first of the three is
24 the statement from Inspector Scott dated
25 11 January 2001. He is an inspector with the British

1 Transport Police, and my Lady he responded to four
2 particular questions posed to him.
3 Statement of INSPECTOR TIMOTHY GRAEME SCOTT read
4 "At present I work in the Force Headquarters
5 Operations Department with responsibility for policy.
6 I have recently drafted a new Standard Operating
7 Procedure on track safety. In doing so, I consulted
8 with our railway partners: Network Rail,
9 London Underground, the Office of the Rail Regulator and
10 the Health & Safety Executive. The draft is currently
11 out for consultation within BTP (British Transport
12 Police) and is due to be published in the first half of
13 this year.
14 "Question 1: Whether there is any system in place to
15 ensure that the British Transport Police receives early
16 and accurate confirmation of the location of Underground
17 trains in an emergency and responds to the most
18 effective station."
19 The answer is this:
20 "The BTP control room is notified of an incident on
21 an Underground line either by the Underground line
22 controller or the Network Operations Centre which is
23 adjacent to the control room at 55 Broadway.
24 "The Underground controller provides details of
25 where the incident is and the BTP control room deploys

1 officers to the location based on that information. If
2 the incident is between two stations, the control room
3 often deploys officers to both stations.

4 "Each Underground line has its own line controller.
5 They are based at various stations across London. For
6 example, the Piccadilly Line controller has an office at
7 Earl's Court. The line controllers have mechanised
8 diagrams in their offices that plot the position of the
9 trains on their line at any given moment. The
10 individual three digit number for each train is shown on
11 the diagram.

12 "2: Whether and if so what processes are in place to
13 ensure early confirmation of traction current status to
14 the British Transport Police and dissemination of that
15 information amongst BTP officers arriving at any
16 incident.

17 "The line controller's diagram indicates the status
18 of the traction current. He is the person who says
19 whether the current is on or off and he can turn it off
20 when requested to do so. The BTP control room obtains
21 this information from the line controller and then
22 radios the information to the officers deploying to the
23 scene.

24 "Officers can also obtain the information from the
25 senior member of London Underground staff on scene. The

1 control room at each station has an emergency number to
2 the line controller. Even where confirmation is given
3 of traction current status at the scene, BTP officers
4 generally obtain confirmation from their own control
5 room also.

6 "3: Whether and if so what consideration or
7 consultation there has been for training BTP operational
8 officers in the use of CRIDs, short-circuiting devices
9 and walking on live tracks and whether BTP has available
10 its own CRIDs [which are devices for showing whether or
11 not there is current in the rail] and/or
12 short-circuiting devices.

13 "British Transport Police officers are not trained
14 to discharge the traction current on-site by using
15 circuit breakers or any other short-circuiting devices.
16 This is a very dangerous procedure that is carried out
17 by trained railway personnel only. The only way a BTP
18 officer can discharge the current at an Underground site
19 is by using the tunnel telephone. When he or she
20 presses a button on the handset the current is
21 discharged. The officer must then use the handset to
22 telephone the line controller and explain why the
23 current has been switched off and also why the line
24 controller should not turn it back on.

25 "Lastly: Whether the G8 Summit in Gleneagles on

1 6-8 July had any effect on the resources of BTP in
2 London on the 7th.
3 "The area commander for Scotland's personal
4 assistant provided me with details of the numbers of
5 officers deployed to the G8 Summit from London. On
6 6 July, the following officers were deployed to the
7 railway in Scotland: 24 from London North, 5 from London
8 South and 4 explosive search dogs. An additional 25
9 officers were deployed to Scotland to police protests
10 and other related events. The employment levels for
11 day-to-day policing in London on 7 July were not reduced
12 in the British Transport Police as a result of the
13 policing of the G8 Conference."
14 My Lady has obviously heard the analogous evidence
15 from the City of London Police.
16 The second statement is that of Adrian Dwyer who is
17 a Counter Terrorism Risk Adviser to British Transport
18 Police.
19 Statement of MR ADRIAN STEPHEN DWYER read
20 "In March 1993 I was appointed an adviser to British
21 Transport Police on all matters relating to
22 counter-terrorism. My current title of Counter
23 Terrorism Risk Adviser came into being in the late
24 1990s."
25 The first question posed was:

1 "Whether and if so what training BTP officers have
2 in detecting, assessing and determining whether an
3 incident is chemical, biological, radiological or
4 nuclear.

5 "All entry level officers into BTP receive specific
6 counter-terrorism input during the initial phase of
7 their training. That input covers the threat from
8 explosive and CBRN devices and other weapons associated
9 with terrorism.

10 "To support this direct training, there is briefing
11 material provided on the force intranet and regular
12 updates from specialist officers within the various
13 British Transport Police geographical areas. Every
14 officer carries aide-memoire cards and compliance is
15 audited.

16 "The training includes recognition of the early
17 signs and symptoms of a CBRN release. The officers are
18 taught to record and pass on the pertinent information
19 to the control room and to begin the initial evacuation.

20 "There is a second band of training for officers
21 with a specific CBRN function. These officers are
22 trained to the national standard and specifically in
23 relation to the mass transit rail environment. They are
24 trained to wear level C personal protective equipment
25 which includes an air purifying respirator. This is

1 appropriate where there is sufficient oxygen for
2 respiration and the known hazard will not defeat the
3 respirator. Integral to level C is the use of
4 protective overgarments which are resistant to chemical
5 liquids and vapours but are not gas tight.
6 "These officers carry handheld detection,
7 identification and monitoring equipment which has
8 application in the mass rail transit environment. The
9 equipment is designed to detect a range of chemical and
10 radiological hazards and also the levels of breathable
11 oxygen.
12 "There is a third level of training for specialist
13 response unit officers. They are trained as for the
14 second band but they have additional training and
15 skills."
16 My Lady, I don't think I need read out what the
17 training concerns.
18 "CBRN training is given to senior officers who
19 perform a command function. The training is provided by
20 the Police National CBRN Centre. Context-specific
21 command band training is provided by ACPO/Guardian.
22 That term relates to the three London police forces, and
23 also railway-specific training based around table-top
24 exercises is provided inhouse.
25 "BTP has a small number of officers whose sole

1 function is CBRN refresher training which is provided at
2 least annually."

3 The second question is:

4 "Whether and if so what processes are in place to
5 ensure early determination of whether an incident is
6 CBRN so as to avoid any delay in the appropriate
7 emergency response.

8 "CBRN is shorthand for four discrete hazards rather
9 than a single risk. For example, had 7/7 involved
10 a nuclear detonation, there could have been no doubt as
11 to what had happened, where it had happened and the
12 scale of the likely consequences. A chemical hazard
13 relates to manmade or natural products which tend to
14 have an immediate effect on the body. For example nerve
15 gas obstructs nerve impulses and can cause loss of
16 bodily functions leading to death. A biological hazard
17 typically relates to disease or viruses which have
18 a long incubation period, rarely less than several hours
19 and typically extending into weeks. A radiological
20 hazard involves exposure to harmful radiation. The
21 exposure will cause genetic mutation in the body which
22 typically results in cancer after a latent period.
23 Radiation is the only hazard we can reliably detect.

24 "In the context of a no notice incident, BTP
25 officers are trained to recognise the early signs and

1 symptoms of a chemical, biological or radiation
2 incident. Their reports to the control room trigger the
3 deployment of the Specialist Response Unit which carries
4 advance detection and monitoring equipment as described
5 above. The unit is maintained at no notice to move and
6 in London it typically arrives at the scene within
7 10 minutes.

8 "At vulnerable railway locations, readings from the
9 relevant equipment are routinely taken to establish
10 a usual typical range of readings. When a high reading
11 is recorded but no casualties or evidence of an attack,
12 measures are taken to reconcile that reading. The
13 control room staff are aware of signs and symptoms and
14 they look at CCTV of members of the public and the
15 general rail environment to establish whether there are
16 any credible indications that a CBRN release has
17 occurred.

18 "BTP looks closely for this kind of incident, and
19 where there are near misses or hoaxes the force treats
20 them very seriously and learns lessons from them. These
21 are promulgated in debriefing sessions and briefing
22 notes."

23 My Lady, the final statement is that of Inspector
24 Janet Doel who is with the British Transport Police's
25 Contingency Planning Department. She is the British

1 Transport Police's Contingency Planning Officer and is
2 concerned with multi-agency liaison and advising
3 management on the force's preparedness for major
4 incidents and other emergencies.

5 She deals firstly with any changes made by British
6 Transport Police since 7 July which affect the
7 interconnection of the emergency services communication
8 and liaisons at any major or large scale incident.

9 My Lady has heard of course extensive evidence on this
10 issue already, but she says:

11 Statement of INSPECTOR JANET DOEL read

12 "The long-standing system of at scene meetings
13 (Silver or Bronze) remains the same, whereby all the
14 emergency services and other key agencies meet to set
15 out aims and objectives and to agree tactics. There
16 have been improvements in technical communications which
17 are addressed elsewhere.

18 "Secondly, in relation to changes made since 7/7
19 which affect communication between the British Transport
20 Police and Gold Command at any major or large scale
21 incident, a Gold support function has been put in place
22 to facilitate the requirements of the British Transport
23 Police Gold Commander. It is designed to improve
24 efficiency and effectiveness at the top of the BTP
25 Command structure. There is a briefing note concerning

1 this. A middle management call-out system has been
2 introduced for this support function.

3 "Thirdly, in relation to whether the British
4 Transport Police has a predetermined response to the
5 declaration of a major incident by any of the emergency
6 services, BTP's response to a major incident is
7 contained in the major incident manual. The main manual
8 was written in 2005 and was subsequently amended with
9 the introduction of the Rail Accident Investigation
10 Branch in 2006. The 2011 version is in its final draft
11 and is due to be published in the spring of this year.

12 "There is also an aide-memoire on the NSPIS Command
13 and Control system which is available to control room
14 operators to use in the event of a major incident. Also
15 each police officer's pocketbook contains the SAD CHALET
16 mnemonic.

17 "In relation to the question what procedures are in
18 place to disseminate any declaration of a major incident
19 by a BTP officer within the force as well as externally,
20 a major incident is declared by contacting the
21 BTP control room which then communicates the declaration
22 to other officers and the emergency services and other
23 first responders as appropriate. The declaration
24 triggers the implementation of a Command structure which
25 is replicated within other emergency services and

1 responding agencies."

2 My Lady, she then refers to major incident training
3 that BTP officers have received both prior and since
4 7 July 2005. For my Lady's note they're set out at
5 BTP424-4 and 5.

6 Turning to debriefing, she continues:

7 "BTP's Standard Operating Procedure on debriefing
8 was introduced in August last year. It sets out the
9 processes in place. These are still bedding down within
10 the organisation."

11 In relation to LESLP, the London Emergency Services
12 Liaison Plan, she was asked this question:

13 "Whether British Transport Police as a category 1
14 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
15 consults and/or seeks advice from any category 2
16 responder such as Transport for London or
17 London Underground for the purposes of maintaining plans
18 under that Act."

19 Her response is:

20 "BTP will be requesting input from the category 1
21 and category 2 responders prior to the publication of
22 its updated major incident manual later this year. The
23 force plans, tests and exercises with partner
24 organisations in relation to emergencies on an ongoing
25 basis. For example, Exercise Harrier involved a command

1 post training incident arising out of a simulated
2 multi-sited terrorist attack in the London area. It was
3 sponsored by the Government Office for London."
4 My Lady, she then refers to the eighth edition of
5 LESLP of which my Lady has heard and repeats that it's
6 due for publication in spring or summer of this year and
7 that the British Transport Police has alerted the
8 author -- which is the Metropolitan Police Service -- to
9 the changes to the BTP system of control rooms, in
10 particular to the functionality of the operation of
11 Airwave underground.
12 My Lady, that concludes the evidence for today and
13 yesterday.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. 10.00 tomorrow,
15 please.
16 (1.10 pm)
17 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
18