

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 20 December 2010 - Morning session

1 Monday, 20 December 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

5 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you commence this  
6 morning's witnesses with William McCafferty, please?

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Before the witness is sworn,  
8 can I express my appreciation for everyone managing to  
9 get through despite the conditions. I'm very grateful.

10 CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM McCAFFERTY (sworn)

11 Questions by MR KEITH

12 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full  
13 name, please?

14 A. My name is William McCafferty.

15 Q. Mr McCafferty, did you retire as a Chief Superintendent  
16 in the British Transport Police?

17 A. I did, sir, yes.

18 Q. In 2005, in July of that year, were you the area  
19 commander of British Transport Police London North?

20 A. I was, sir, yes.

21 Q. That morning, you would have become aware of reports on  
22 the British Transport Police command net of a possible  
23 explosion at Liverpool Street?

24 A. I did, sir, yes.

25 Q. When you heard those calls, what did you decide to do?

1 A. I decided to go to Liverpool Street.

2 Q. Why was that?

3 A. I wasn't sure of the scale of the incident, but I did

4 have a young inspector who was on duty at

5 Liverpool Street and I felt that I should go there to

6 support them through what appeared to be a complex

7 incident right at the start.

8 Q. Does the role of an area commander include attendance at

9 the scenes of major incidents?

10 A. It does, sir, yes.

11 Q. You didn't make it, though, however, to Liverpool Street

12 because you went past King's Cross?

13 A. That's right, sir.

14 Q. What did you see?

15 A. Traffic was congested and there was a lot of people

16 coming out from underneath the Tube station.

17 Q. So did you stop?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, you asked one of your officers -- I think it was

20 Chief Inspector Watson -- to keep a log?

21 A. I did, sir, yes.

22 Q. Could we have, please, on the screen, [BTP195-1]? I think

23 we'll have it put up on the overhead projector, if we

24 may.

25 At the top of the page, Chief Superintendent, you'll

1 see 09.55 being the first time there recorded?  
2 A. Yes, sir, I do.  
3 Q. Before the log was commenced, do you recall, however,  
4 speaking to a British Transport Police inspector, Acting  
5 Inspector Mingay, and Inspector Shields?  
6 A. I do, sir, yes.  
7 Q. Inspector Shields in his evidence to my Lady recalled  
8 how, about 09.45, you spoke to him and told him to go  
9 down to the track and assume command.  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. So may we take it that the log was commenced perhaps  
12 a few moments after your arrival and after you'd given  
13 some preliminary instructions?  
14 A. That's not the log that was prepared on my behalf.  
15 Q. That's not the log?  
16 A. No.  
17 Q. All right.  
18 A. That is -- I believe that is the log that was prepared  
19 by a detective sergeant in support of Talbot.  
20 Q. All right, well it does actually record the decisions  
21 that you made, or the majority of them, and the meetings  
22 you attended?  
23 A. Yes, I'm happy with that.  
24 Q. Did you also see, therefore, Acting Inspector Mingay?  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. In what condition was he?  
2 A. He was devastated.  
3 Q. Were you able, however, to find out from him that there  
4 had been an explosion on the train and that there had  
5 been fatalities and a very large number of casualties?  
6 A. Yes, sir, I did, sir.  
7 Q. Did you, therefore, assume a role yourself?  
8 A. I assumed a role as the Silver Commander for the British  
9 Transport Police.  
10 Q. What did that mean?  
11 A. Well, in everyday terms, I would take responsibility for  
12 coordinating the activities of all emergency services  
13 and supporting organisations, such as British Rail,  
14 Network Rail, and the train operating companies.  
15 Q. Inspector Shields had been there already. Was there  
16 a reason why he couldn't perform that role or does the  
17 protocol envisage that the most senior officer arriving  
18 takes on that role when he or she arrives?  
19 A. He could have done it, but the protocol does suggest  
20 that I should do it, but there's also a priority of  
21 getting somebody, who was what we call a Bronze, back  
22 downstairs to deal with the rescue.  
23 Q. Did you envisage that he would go down to the train and  
24 direct operations in the carriage?  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. You also met Chief Superintendent -- you also met  
2 a number of other colleagues from other rescue services.  
3 Could we have, please, if the Trial Director system is  
4 up and running, [INQ9450-11]? Thank you very much.  
5 You will see there half, halfway down the page,  
6 a reference to Chief Superintendent McCafferty Silver,  
7 Chief Inspector Watson?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. This is a note made by a Metropolitan police officer,  
10 Inspector Nasmyth-Miller. Do you recall meeting him?

11 A. Yes, sir, I do.

12 Q. Did you, together, then attend a meeting around about  
13 10.00 at which you made a number of preliminary  
14 decisions?

15 A. I attended a meeting at 10.00, but I don't recall  
16 whether the Met inspector was actually at that meeting,  
17 or if it was the 10.30 meeting that the Met inspector  
18 attended.

19 Q. Did the meeting at 10.00 go on or was it put back to  
20 10.30 because of the exigency of the situation?

21 A. It was because of the situation, we just wanted a brief  
22 resume and get people back to doing what they were  
23 supposed to be doing.

24 Q. Could we go back then, please, to BTP195 [BTP195-1], if that's in  
25 the system. At 10.02, there is then a reference there

1 to a meeting, to a number of people?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Chief Inspector Watson, Paul Chippington, who was  
4 a London Underground duty station manager, a HEMS  
5 doctor, Dr Mackenzie, who had arrived at 9.46 --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- a Silver LAS medic, we know as Mr Sale, and you  
8 received some information, but in essence, were you  
9 still at the stage where the priority was the rescue of  
10 the living from the carriage --

11 A. That's correct, sir.

12 Q. -- and to get paramedics down in order to provide  
13 medical attention?

14 A. Yes, that was the ultimate priority.

15 Q. On that same page, page 11, we can see that at 10.07,  
16 there was an update from the London Ambulance Service of  
17 50 plus casualties. Do you recall that?

18 A. Yes, I recall the conversation. If that's the time  
19 that's been recorded, then I agree with it.

20 Q. Then at 10.25, from Chief Superintendent McCafferty we  
21 presume it is, DI Bunyard, Bronze crime scene.

22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

23 Q. Was that an appointment that you made? Did you direct  
24 him to become Bronze crime scene?

25 A. I did, sir, yes.

1 Q. At that stage, at 10.25, the casualties have not yet  
2 been removed from the train?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. What was the importance, or what was the need for Bronze  
5 crime scene to be established?

6 A. Well, the logical progression would be: remove the  
7 casualties, tend to the injured, and then the scene  
8 would be made safe and transferred to Bronze crime scene  
9 at that point. So it's just a step-by-step process.

10 Q. Then at 10.30, the Silver meeting is there recorded, and  
11 you received information from the London Fire Brigade as  
12 to how many fire engines had been ordered.

13 Also from the London Ambulance Service, as to what  
14 their response had been, and in the middle of the page,  
15 in the middle of that section, at 10.31, did you receive  
16 information from the HEMS doctor, Dr Mackenzie, as to  
17 the fact that there had been a bomb in the middle -- in  
18 a carriage he described as the middle carriage, and that  
19 there were 16 deceased at that time there recorded and  
20 five casualties were being extracted?

21 A. Yes, that seems accurate, sir, yes.

22 Q. Do you recall there being a debate about the need for  
23 lighting and a need for better ventilation to help the  
24 rescuers inside the carriage?

25 A. I recall the debate about the lighting, because we

1 managed to get some additional lighting from the  
2 Channel Tunnel site. The debate about ventilation,  
3 I don't recall the outcome of that debate, but I recall  
4 it being discussed.

5 Q. Do you recall the issue of ventilation carrying on for  
6 a while? Do you recollect that it took some time for  
7 something to be done about ventilation?

8 A. Yes, it did, because there were certain things we  
9 checked before we put ventilation on.

10 Q. Do you recall that members of the Fire Brigade went to  
11 see whether they could find some means of ventilating  
12 the carriage?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In the end, asked some of the contractors from the  
15 Channel Link project next door to King's Cross whether  
16 they could borrow some equipment from them?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Does that ring a bell?

19 A. It does.

20 Q. But that took some time, didn't it?

21 A. I think it did, sir, yes.

22 Q. At 10.50, the bottom of that page, you will see there's  
23 a reference there to one casualty, now deceased, on the  
24 concourse, to be taken to platform 1. Does that refer  
25 to a lady, Samantha Badham, who was brought up from the

1 carriage but, sadly, died following attempts to  
2 resuscitate her on the concourse level?  
3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.  
4 Q. So was a decision taken that she should be taken to  
5 platform 1, but that all other deceased, if they hadn't  
6 been brought up to the surface, should be left where  
7 they were found in the carriage?  
8 A. That's correct, sir, yes.  
9 Q. Did you take that decision, or was that decision made by  
10 the Met?  
11 A. I think I took that decision, sir.  
12 Q. It says there "Message put out by the Met"?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Did you take the decision and then ask them to circulate  
15 that news?  
16 A. They would have asked me for a location that could be  
17 used on a temporary basis.  
18 Q. Over the page -- sorry, perhaps we could stay for one  
19 moment on that page. There's a further entry at the  
20 bottom.  
21 "From PI MPS up from train. All casualties are  
22 out."  
23 This is at 11.00.  
24 "PI Shields still on scene - taking over as Bronze  
25 for some time, crime scene."

1 After the Silver meeting, were you informed that all  
2 the live casualties were out and you were informed about  
3 11.00 of that fact?

4 A. Yes, as per the log, sir.

5 Q. Then over the page, at 11.30, at the next Silver  
6 meeting, it was formally confirmed that all the live  
7 casualties were clear -- and that information came from  
8 the London Ambulance Service -- and only fatalities had  
9 been left on the scene?

10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

11 Q. So you received the information that the live casualties  
12 were out some time before it was actually confirmed at  
13 that second Silver meeting?

14 A. That's correct, sir.

15 Q. Halfway down that entry, you will see there's  
16 a reference there to "force ventilation being done,  
17 lighting in place and landline telephone".

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It seems, doesn't it, Chief Superintendent, that  
20 although lighting was in place, therefore, by 11.30, the  
21 ventilation issue had not yet been resolved because it  
22 was still being done?

23 A. Yes, I would agree with that, sir.

24 Q. It was at that Silver meeting that debate then turned to  
25 the issue of body recovery for the need for scenes of

1 crime officers to attend, and also to start ensuring  
2 that the rescue personnel had some means of refreshment  
3 and also, perhaps, to be moved around in order to ensure  
4 that those who had been in the train the longest were  
5 brought out?

6 A. That's correct, sir.

7 Q. Throughout this time, were you in touch with  
8 Inspector Shields to whom you'd spoken at about 9.45, at  
9 the time of your arrival?

10 A. No, sir, no.

11 Q. Was there any means of communicating with him -- and he,  
12 of course, was on the train, and he was your commander  
13 on the scene, if you like -- how is he able to relay  
14 information to you?

15 A. The information periodically would get relayed through  
16 London Underground staff, but I'd no direct  
17 communication with Ray Shields whilst he was on the  
18 train.

19 Q. My Lady has heard evidence of a number of British  
20 Transport Police officers who very courageously went  
21 straight into the train.

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. PC Johnson, now Inspector Johnson, Sergeant McGrotty,  
24 Police Sergeant Noon and Sergeant Betts, all British  
25 Transport Police.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you have any means of communicating with them  
3 either?

4 A. I cannot recall any direct conversations with them, but,  
5 also, I can recall getting updates as to progress,  
6 whether they needed any extra assistance.

7 Q. Were any concerns brought to your attention, as the BTP  
8 commander on the scene, in relation either to a shortage  
9 of medical equipment, stretchers, first aid and the  
10 like, or of the need for further officers in order to  
11 act as stretcher-bearers?

12 A. No, there was issues, I think, about stretchers at the  
13 Russell Square end of the tunnel, but I don't think  
14 there was anything at the King's Cross end.

15 Q. Did you have any contact with the Russell Square end, as  
16 far as you can recall?

17 A. It was very difficult to have contact because the  
18 communications radio was really busy, mobile phones  
19 weren't really working, and there was a problem with  
20 channel 2 radios.

21 Q. Channel 2 is supposed to be the --

22 A. The underground, and I don't know if that would have  
23 worked in the tunnel anyway.

24 Q. So were you reliant, throughout the time that you were  
25 in command, on runners, people coming up from below --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- to pass whatever snippets of information they could  
3 to you, and you then had to make your decisions on the  
4 basis of that information?

5 A. That's correct, sir, and those decisions would have been  
6 in my log.

7 Q. In terms of the communications and your ability to keep  
8 a view on what your officers were doing in the tunnel  
9 itself, it wasn't a satisfactory situation, was it?

10 A. No. You're obviously worried about the welfare of your  
11 officers when they're in such a dangerous situation, but  
12 equally, the officers are committed to doing as much as  
13 possible to rescue people.

14 Q. What I'm driving at with you, Chief Superintendent, is  
15 it appears that the Command and Control element was to  
16 a certain extent -- not hugely, but to a certain extent,  
17 disembodied from what was going on in the tunnel.  
18 Because they had no means of communicating with you  
19 speedily and effectively, you were reliant on people  
20 bringing information up by way of runners?

21 A. That's correct, sir. In an ideal situation, I would  
22 have been able to speak direct to the Bronze commanders,  
23 because that is the structure. I couldn't do that with  
24 Ray Shields.

25 Q. As it happened, however, and after the event, did it

1 seem to you that your officers had shown sufficient  
2 initiative and had got into the train and done what they  
3 could, notwithstanding a lack of direct communication  
4 from you?

5 A. Yes, sir, I'm -- my officers did really well, and I'm  
6 very grateful to them.

7 MR KEITH: Thank you, I've no further questions.

8 MR COLTART: No thank you.

9 MR SAUNDERS: No, thank you, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

11 MR PATTERSON: No, thank you.

12 MS GALLAGHER: No, thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

14 Mr Hill?

15 Questions by MR HILL

16 MR HILL: Just because, as Mr McCafferty may know,  
17 Inspector Nasmyth-Miller, who is having difficulty  
18 getting here because of the weather was to have been  
19 called before you, Mr McCafferty, and so we would have  
20 had his account, which no doubt you would have heard,  
21 before you came to the witness-box. As he isn't here,  
22 can I just clarify with you that the timing of events  
23 was that your inspector, Shields, was at the scene  
24 before you were there and, for the reasons you gave, you  
25 went there and assumed Silver control, as it were, from

1 him. Right so far?

2 A. I don't think that Ray Shields was ever appointed as  
3 Silver control, sir. I think I took command when  
4 I understood the complexity of what we were dealing  
5 with.

6 Q. Agreed. In your statement that you made for the  
7 purposes of these proceedings, I think you timed your  
8 assumption of Silver control at 9.45 in the morning?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. It's plain that there were Metropolitan Police officers  
11 who were at the scene, certainly by that time, and  
12 indeed before your arrival.

13 A. I recall speaking to at least two Metropolitan Police  
14 inspectors early on in the day, I think the first one  
15 I spoke to, we spoke about setting up cordons, and  
16 I think that was then passed to Inspector Nasmyth-Miller  
17 to deal with.

18 Q. It's just as to the first meeting -- it's sometimes  
19 called first Silver meeting, sometimes not -- but the  
20 10.00 am meeting at which Dr Mackenzie, the HEMS doctor,  
21 was present, when you came to make your statement, it  
22 was a handwritten statement, made long after the events,  
23 you referred in that statement -- no doubt you've seen  
24 it in preparation for today -- to Metropolitan Police  
25 officers being present at the 10.00 am meeting.

1 A. Did I?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. My apologies.

4 Q. No apology necessary, I'm just seeking to clarify. You  
5 didn't mention by name, but you did indicate that  
6 Metropolitan Police officers were present. Without  
7 bringing your statement up on screen, can I just help  
8 you by what you said:

9 "Around 10.00 am I chaired a Silver coordination  
10 meeting at the BTP office at platform 8 at King's Cross.  
11 The meeting was, as I recall, attended by  
12 representatives from the London Ambulance Service,  
13 London Fire Brigade, Metropolitan Police, HEMS and  
14 Network Rail."

15 That's what you've said in statement.

16 Now, I don't know whether that assists you at all as  
17 to whether Inspector Nasmyth-Miller was present at that  
18 meeting or whether he was present on the concourse but  
19 not in the BTP office.

20 Can you help one way or the other and then we'll  
21 hear what he says?

22 A. I can't actually recall whether he was at the meeting,  
23 but we were in discussions, so it could have been  
24 a conversation that took place on the concourse, because  
25 I think, if you look at Inspector Nasmyth-Miller, his

1 log, he actually put himself down as being Bronze  
2 initially, and then, as things got more complicated, he  
3 sort of did more of a Silver role for the Met.  
4 Q. Let me help you with that. If we could have [INQ9450-1],  
5 if that's possible? You are absolutely right,  
6 Mr McCafferty, and as you see there, two-thirds of the  
7 way down, left-hand side:  
8 "Bronze - Inspector Nasmyth-Miller. Silver -  
9 Chief Superintendent McCafferty."  
10 A. That's correct.  
11 Q. On timings, Silver could have been recorded not earlier  
12 than 9.45, which is when you assumed command.  
13 A. I would say so, sir, yes.  
14 Q. So it would follow that for that entry to have been  
15 made -- and this is made by Sergeant Probert, who was  
16 the loggist for Inspector Nasmyth-Miller for the  
17 Metropolitan Police -- that would certainly suggest  
18 a liaison or a discussion between yourself and at least  
19 including Mr Nasmyth-Miller, at some stage, I'd suggest,  
20 very shortly after 9.45.  
21 A. I would say so, sir, yes.  
22 MR HILL: Thank you.  
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr McCafferty, when you arrive and  
24 before you have your first Silver meeting, what was the  
25 setup like, as far as you could see, as far as liaison

1 between the various organisations who would be  
2 responding to an incident of this kind? Was there any  
3 structure that you could see?

4 A. Initially, no. I recall there being one ambulance at  
5 the front of the station. I recall there being a lot of  
6 Metropolitan Police officers. I recall some of the  
7 Metropolitan Police officers who are at King's Cross  
8 moving to Russell Square. I recall trying to get  
9 a handle on how do you stop people coming in to London,  
10 and also, my responsibility in addition to King's Cross  
11 and Liverpool Street, including Euston, Paddington,  
12 Marylebone and Fenchurch Street.

13 So as the events unfolded during the first hour,  
14 I had quite a lot to do in terms of trying to make sure  
15 it didn't get any worse than it was.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You then -- to get a handle on it, as  
17 you described it, you've then got to speak to the  
18 various organisations, presumably London Underground,  
19 Network Rail, whoever else?

20 A. Yes, yes.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How easy did you find it to find  
22 them? Was there any kind of --

23 A. What I did was, I asked Chief Inspector Watson -- sorry,  
24 Chief Inspector Waters, who had come on duty between  
25 9.00 and 10.00, to organise the first Silver meeting for

1 me at 9.55/10.00, and the reason I picked that time was  
2 that would have given the emergency services an hour  
3 from the sort of start of the event to try to make sense  
4 of what was happening from their perspective, and at the  
5 10.00 meeting, I made it very short because it was clear  
6 that other people needed to find out more about what was  
7 happening before we could progress.

8 So in terms of Command and Control, there was a lot  
9 going on, in terms of that there was a lack of  
10 structure. There was also a need to try and get some of  
11 the key roles that you're trained to appoint, to get  
12 them implemented and get some visibility.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Visibility, that is the exact thing,  
14 but that was my next question. If you have a major  
15 incident, as a lay person who's never been involved in  
16 planning for a dreadful event such as this, it would  
17 seem to me that you'd need to have those who are going  
18 to be exercising, whether it be a Silver, Bronze,  
19 whatever roles, it needs to be obvious to other  
20 organisations --

21 A. Yes.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- otherwise, the whole thing seems  
23 to break down. Was there any visibility when you  
24 arrived or does that only come, really, after you've had  
25 your first Silver meeting?

1 A. No, because I met Dr Mackenzie around about quarter to  
2 10, 10 to 10. I don't recall seeing the Fire Brigade  
3 senior officer until a little bit after that. But it  
4 was starting to come together. And, also, because there  
5 was other incidents, I wasn't sure how and where people  
6 had been deployed, so initially I wasn't sure --  
7 although I didn't think the ambulance and the  
8 Fire Service would be deployed to Russell Square because  
9 it's lifts that get you from the road down to the  
10 platforms, I wasn't sure what had gone to the other side  
11 and how much was coming to me to deal with what's  
12 happening at King's Cross.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: When you arrive -- you probably had  
14 a base at King's Cross anyway, but if you arrive at  
15 a major incident, how does one make sure that the base  
16 from which Command and Control is going to be exercised  
17 is visible? For example, there may well have been  
18 London Underground staff working hard in their office.  
19 How do you make sure that people know where to go to get  
20 the information, to get the structure that they need?

21 A. You would communicate that by radio and that would be on  
22 your plan, so that your traffic plan, which I'd asked  
23 the Met to do, would include your access and your egress  
24 from the rendezvous point.

25 Initially, I thought about putting the rendezvous

1 point at the back of the station, and I got a dog  
2 handler to search it to make sure there was no  
3 explosives there. But when I saw the volume of people  
4 coming up, I believe that, after discussion with  
5 Inspector Nasmyth-Miller, we decided the rendezvous  
6 point would be best at the front of the station and that  
7 it would close off Euston Road as a result of that.  
8 And if you look at it from the point of view of  
9 trying to get resources to the scene as quickly as  
10 possible to help the victims, that was the best place to  
11 be, at the front of the station.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you, in Silver police role, where  
13 was your base, where would you have been throughout when  
14 you were having your meetings and where were you based?

15 A. I spent most of the time on the concourse. As soon as  
16 I'd established -- tried to establish some contact with  
17 the railway people, I made sure that everybody who was  
18 on platform 8 was out, the police station on platform 8,  
19 and also --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is that also where you would expect  
21 other organisations to come, at your level, as it were,  
22 that people would be on the concourse so they would be  
23 visible?

24 A. Yes, I think certainly, during the first hour of the  
25 incident, I would expect them to be visible.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Thank you very much,  
2 Mr McCafferty, and thank you for struggling through the  
3 weather to get here. I don't know how far you've had to  
4 come.

5 A. Thanks, my Lady.

6 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. My Lady, may I call  
7 Senior Divisional Officer Adams, please?

8 SENIOR DIVISIONAL OFFICER TERENCE PETER ADAMS (sworn)  
9 Questions by MR KEITH

10 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full  
11 name, please?

12 A. My full name is Terence Peter Adams.

13 Q. Mr Adams, you've been employed by the London Fire  
14 Brigade for many years?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. At the time of your statement, in 2006, you'd been  
17 employed, I think, for some 31 years and, in July of  
18 2005, you were a senior divisional officer based at  
19 East Ham fire station?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. I think you attended work at 8.00 that morning, and you  
22 were due to attend a meeting at Brigade Headquarters.  
23 Is that right?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. But you received a page, a pager message. Can you

1 recall what it told you?

2 A. Yes. I was en route to Brigade Headquarters, which was  
3 Lambeth at the time, and I was paged with an incident  
4 ordering, and that is the way that people at my level  
5 are normally mobilised. We have a pager. You are given  
6 a page, incident ordering, and then you contact our  
7 Control by mobile telephone.

8 Q. And ask them what it is that you're being invited to do?

9 A. That's correct. All officers really, I suppose, from  
10 assistant divisional officer up, are paged in the same  
11 way. You're given the same information, or you can  
12 request the same information. Most of us have a list  
13 and it's just almost a tick box, really, of trying to  
14 gather information about what you're being paged for.

15 Q. What is the trigger for a notification of somebody such  
16 as yourself, a senior divisional officer, to receive  
17 a pager?

18 A. At my level, it would be an 8-pump incident, yes.

19 Q. Could we please have on the screen [LFB11-4]?

20 We can see at 9.37.50 at the bottom of the page  
21 a mobilisation call for smoke issuing in the tunnel  
22 King's Cross/Euston Square. This is the split  
23 attendance to which we'll return in a moment.

24 At the bottom of the page, you will see there's  
25 a large number of mobilisation calls.

1 Over the page, on page 5 [LFB11-5] at the top, so the same  
2 time, you will see in the second line G1 page. Were you  
3 G1?

4 A. That's right, my call sign was Golf, which is G, which  
5 was the north-west area of London, and I was 1.

6 Q. So that's the pager?

7 A. Right.

8 Q. If we could go to page 21 [LFB11-21], please, this is a list of all  
9 the officers who attended and firefighters who attended  
10 King's Cross.

11 Five or six lines down you will see 09.37.50, which  
12 is the mobilisation call, G1, which is yourself, and  
13 then a mobile time 09.40.52.

14 May we take it that you received a pager message and  
15 then phoned up or contacted the Control and were then  
16 directed to attend, and that was the point, at 09.40, at  
17 which you were then mobile?

18 A. That's correct. As far as I'm aware, the way that MOBIS  
19 works is that, as I accept the call -- and it's called  
20 booking status 2, which -- status 2 is that you're  
21 en route, and as far as I'm aware, that is the time that  
22 would have been entered on the MOBIS.

23 Q. Did you have trouble contacting Control?

24 A. I can't recall trouble, but I can recall having to wait  
25 before my call was answered. So if that is construed as

1 trouble, yes. I didn't have any difficulty in getting  
2 through, other than it took a long time to answer.

3 Q. Well, I use your wording, in fact, from your statement,  
4 because you recalled in your statement of February 2006  
5 how, having been delayed by traffic, you tried to inform  
6 the Control that you would be delayed, but you were  
7 unable to do this, that is to say to try to contact them  
8 by mobile.

9 A. That was subsequent to the ordering. Quite often, if  
10 appliances or officers are going to be delayed  
11 attending, you can put in a message to tell Control that  
12 you are going to be delayed attending and, on occasions,  
13 they may select an alternative appliance and send it.  
14 But that was the second message that I sent whilst  
15 en route.

16 Q. You had been paged because, as a senior officer, it was  
17 deemed important that you be there --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- and you were directed to attend?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You clearly thought it important to tell them that you  
22 were delayed.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I don't think you arrived until about 10.00 as a result  
25 of the traffic.

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. So it plainly wasn't satisfactory that you were unable  
3 to tell them that, although you'd been directed to  
4 attend, you were unable to comply immediately because of  
5 the traffic. You couldn't get through, could you?

6 A. I couldn't get through the traffic, that was the basis  
7 of it, yes. Well, you could get through, but it was  
8 a lot more slow than would be normal.

9 Q. A log was commenced on your arrival. Could we have  
10 [INQ9925-2]? You can see there there is a reference in  
11 the middle of the page, date/time log started  
12 approximately 10.00.

13 Over the page on page 3 [INQ9925-3], a reference to  
14 Senior Divisional Officer Adams being in the process of  
15 taking command at 10.00.

16 Is that why you've deduced that you must have  
17 arrived around about 10.00?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. The Command Unit was not set up or in operation on your  
20 arrival. What did that mean?

21 A. Well, when Command Units attend an incident, it normally  
22 takes between 10 and 15 minutes for it to become fully  
23 operational. I believe that has changed now because  
24 we've upgraded our command system. So a lot of the  
25 information is actually downloaded whilst the vehicle is

1 en route.

2 But they have to find, as an example, a site where  
3 they've parked where they get a useful signal and one  
4 that is not going to be interrupted by a blind spot.

5 They have to then upload -- it was called the command  
6 planning system. And that sets everything in place.

7 You've got a crew of -- at the time, it was five for the  
8 Command Unit, and they had to put in place various  
9 systems and, once they were ready, then they would say  
10 "We are now ready to take command -- to take over  
11 command duties".

12 Q. At 10.00, one hour and 10 minutes had elapsed since the  
13 moment of the explosion of the bomb.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The first crew from the London Fire Brigade had arrived  
16 at 9.13, three-quarters of an hour before Leading  
17 Firefighter Roche's crew, and a second appliance under  
18 the command of Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor had arrived  
19 at 9.42. We'll come back in a moment as to whether they  
20 had been able to respond as they would have wished to  
21 what was obviously a major incident.

22 But they were called upon to make decisions as to  
23 what they should do, well in advance, therefore, of your  
24 arrival, as a senior officer, at 10.00?

25 A. Certainly.

1 Q. To what effect, therefore, was this Command structure?  
2 How did it impact, what was it designed to do in  
3 relation to assisting the crews who were actually going  
4 to be attending the incident itself who were going to be  
5 in the tunnel?

6 A. All Fire Service operations start with, normally,  
7 a minimum of two pumping appliances that will attend.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. As an incident escalates, we might draw more resources  
10 on and, clearly, the more resources you have at an  
11 incident, the more potential there is for people to  
12 become unsure where they should be, how they should be  
13 directed to where they need to go, and that really is  
14 what the Command structure is designed to develop and  
15 ensure, that people are efficiently mobilised around the  
16 incident ground.

17 Q. That's very clear, if I may say so. It isn't,  
18 therefore, designed to bring a structure or to provide  
19 command to the initial response?

20 A. No, no, no --

21 Q. Firefighters are expected to use their own initiative to  
22 do what is necessary?

23 A. In some respects, yes, yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, Mr Keith, I'm sorry to  
25 interrupt. It may have been clear to you. It wasn't

1 clear to me.

2 MR KEITH: My Lady.

3 Your position, Senior Divisional Officer, is that  
4 the Command structure that you described is necessary in  
5 order to bring about a level of Command and Control when  
6 the number of attendees, the number of appliances, goes  
7 above a certain number --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- where a higher level of command is required in order  
10 to bring control to what might be a large number of  
11 appliances?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You arrived at 10.00 and, as we'll see in a moment, you  
14 asked, half an hour after your arrival, to make pumps  
15 12, so there was an increasing level of response and  
16 a large number of appliances were arriving.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is it your view, however, that prior to your arrival,  
19 there were not such a large number of appliances such as  
20 to require a senior officer to direct them? They're  
21 expected to know what to do?

22 A. We have developed operating protocols whereby a certain  
23 level of attendance, a certain level of senior officer,  
24 will be required to attend. Station-based personnel in  
25 the main, two appliances -- up to four appliances will

1 be able to deal with that. But as soon as we get to  
2 four appliances in attendance at any incident, we would  
3 send a more senior officer on.

4 Q. Were you the first senior officer to attend, as far as  
5 you recall?

6 A. No, I wasn't, no.

7 Q. Who attended before you?

8 A. Well, certainly in some respects, from memory, there  
9 were three or four of us who all arrived at the very,  
10 very same timeframe. There was group manager  
11 Peter Cowup, who I believe is going to be called later  
12 this morning.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. ADO Ginty I know was ordered, because he would have been  
15 ordered as a predetermined attendance to the incidents  
16 that they originally were called to.

17 Q. Yes, he, however, went to --

18 A. With Underground incidents, we used to send -- and  
19 I believe we still do send -- an assistant.

20 Q. He went to Euston Road -- sorry to interrupt.

21 A. Euston Square.

22 Q. Well, his statement records how he arrived at  
23 Euston Road and was then sent to Euston Square and was  
24 then sent to King's Cross. So he was delayed in his  
25 arrival at King's Cross.

1 Mr Cowup arrived more or less the same time as you?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I think Mr Ginty arrived a few moments before you?

4 A. Mm-hmm.

5 Q. So by and large, there were no senior commanders there  
6 for the first hour or so of the incident?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. So coming back to my question, before your arrival, or  
9 certainly before a few moments of your arrival, Command  
10 and Control was vested in the firefighters in the  
11 appliances who had actually attended before you?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. Therefore, is it expected that they would exercise  
14 a certain degree of judgment as to what they do and how  
15 they respond to a major incident?

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. Can I ask you, therefore, about this? Her Ladyship has  
18 heard evidence from the crew of Leading  
19 Firefighter Roche's appliance that protocol dictated  
20 that, although they arrived at 9.13, they couldn't use  
21 their breathing apparatus and descend into the tunnel  
22 until the second appliance had arrived, which turned out  
23 to be Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor's appliance, which  
24 didn't arrive until 9.42.

25 Had a senior officer been there, is it possible that

1 the senior officer could have directed the first  
2 appliance to get into the tunnel and not to wait for the  
3 second appliance, which, unbeknownst to them, didn't  
4 arrive for a further half an hour?

5 A. Well, in some respects, although you might have a more  
6 or less -- or a junior officer, we all have to follow  
7 our Brigade procedures, and our Brigade procedures are  
8 there for a very valid reason, and particularly  
9 operating around breathing apparatus.

10 Almost all of our procedures have been developed  
11 following tragedies where firefighters have lost their  
12 lives, and that is an issue that all officers, the most  
13 senior, Leading Firefighter Roche, right the way through  
14 to people who are more senior than myself, are cognisant  
15 of.

16 Q. It's absolutely plain from the evidence that the  
17 Fire Brigade attend and are expected to attend very  
18 dangerous incidents and in many ways put themselves in  
19 the face -- the line of danger in a way that the other  
20 emergency services don't.

21 But a certain degree of frustration was expressed by  
22 members of Leading Firefighter Roche's crew because,  
23 although the protocol dictated that they couldn't go  
24 down with their breathing apparatus in advance of the  
25 second appliance arriving, it was plain to them that

1 British Transport Police officers, Metropolitan Police  
2 officers and members of the public, the passengers  
3 coming off the train, were able to go up and down the  
4 tunnel, from the train to the platform, without  
5 difficulties in terms of breathing or secondary effects.  
6 It seems to indicate, rather, that, therefore, there  
7 should be a certain level of discretion, a discretion  
8 denied to them. Is this an area that you've addressed  
9 or reflected upon since 7/7, or is that not within your  
10 Command and Control review?  
11 A. Perhaps if I can put it in the terms of my own risk  
12 assessment on the day?  
13 Q. Yes, that would be very helpful.  
14 A. And I've no doubt, I would hope, that Mr Roche's risk  
15 assessment process would have been similar to mine. On  
16 arrival, I actually spoke to Mr Roche, because he was  
17 waiting at the head of the stairs to the concourse.  
18 Q. If I may interpose, that's because he is the first  
19 firefighter there or, rather, the firefighter in command  
20 of that first appliance, took upon himself the command  
21 role pending the arrival of further officers?  
22 A. That is their function, and that is what they are  
23 required to do.  
24 Q. Yes.  
25 A. I received notification from him that the information

1 that he'd been able to gather was that there had been  
2 a very serious explosion on a train in a tunnel between  
3 King's Cross and Russell Square. His assessment was  
4 that there was likely to be more than 50 fatalities and  
5 that we had a large number of casualties to remove.  
6 He hadn't fully assessed the potential for a CBRN  
7 device.  
8 Having gathered that information and looking at  
9 people who were exiting -- and that would be emergency  
10 service workers as well as casualties who were on the  
11 train -- all were suffering quite clearly from trauma,  
12 no one had streaming eyes, no one was gasping for  
13 breath, but they all looked very traumatised. But all  
14 that can do, actually, is tell you the signs and  
15 symptoms of something that was going to have an acute  
16 effect.  
17 I also looked at the potential for a chemical,  
18 biological agent, and my assessment at the time was  
19 because it was going to -- or it had been such a large  
20 device, my risk assessment was it was unlikely the --  
21 the device was unlikely to have contained a chemical or  
22 a biological agent because, with a big device, the  
23 explosion would have either incinerated or the blast  
24 would have destroyed the chemical or biological agent.  
25 And it was on that basis that I decided that we

1 would deploy people.

2 All I could do at the time was use that information  
3 and assess acute effect potential. I quite often, in  
4 the week following, wondered whether, if there had been  
5 a chemical or a biological agent involved, which then  
6 people suffered chronic effect from and, if that had  
7 been the case, and my risk assessment had been flawed,  
8 I'm sure I would be asking -- or, sorry, answering very  
9 different questions from counsel today.

10 Q. Mr Adams, when you arrived, you were given a certain  
11 amount of information.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. That information was apparent to those who had arrived  
14 before you and, in particular, there was an inspector  
15 from the British Transport Police, Inspector Mingay, who  
16 had been down to the train and back up again by 9.45 and  
17 briefed the London Fire Brigade and the  
18 London Underground staff as to what he had found.

19 There doesn't appear to have been any evidence of  
20 side effects of secondary devices from anybody coming  
21 up, therefore, from the tunnel by 9.45 and nor was it  
22 evident on the faces of the passengers.

23 The information that you had, therefore, was the  
24 same as that which was available to your predecessors in  
25 command, the firefighters who had attended on those two

1 appliances.

2 Could they not have been given the discretion or the  
3 ability to send people into the tunnel in advance of  
4 your arrival? If, perhaps, there had been delays or  
5 even greater delays than there were, could they not have  
6 said to themselves, "Right, we haven't got any senior  
7 officers here, we've got breathing apparatus, we've got  
8 five people in our crew, there are police going in and  
9 out, there are passengers coming out, British Transport  
10 Police inspector has been in and out, we can go in"?  
11 Would that not have been a sensible and  
12 proportionate response?

13 A. I don't believe, personally, it would have been, no.  
14 I think we have to be realistic, and I've looked at the  
15 transcript from Mr Shaw, I've looked at the transcript  
16 from Mr Roche --

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. -- and from Mr Colebrook-Taylor, and I think we have to  
19 be realistic what two people could potentially achieve.

20 Q. They could have found information, if you'll allow me to  
21 ask you that.

22 A. Of course.

23 Q. They could have gone down to the train at any time after  
24 9.15 and found the information that you needed to make  
25 your first command decisions when you arrived.

1 A. I understand what you're saying. I think perhaps the  
2 difference in the information I had available to me is  
3 that it had been confirmed that it was an IED involved.  
4 Mr Roche was actually called to smoke issuing, and  
5 smoke issuing to any firefighter is a fire, and that is  
6 a very, very different situation, in some respects, in  
7 that conditions when fires develop can deteriorate very,  
8 very quickly, and Mr Roche only had two people.

9 I think -- and in some respects, perhaps, what we  
10 don't necessarily take into account with our procedures  
11 sometimes is the human factors, and if I said to two  
12 people, "I want you to go down and all you're going to  
13 be doing is gathering information, aren't you?", as soon  
14 as they come across casualties, they will be diverted to  
15 the casualties, because that's what we do.

16 Q. You have to trust your officers, Mr Adams, to carry out  
17 the directions given to them. There's a difference  
18 between not trusting them to that degree and not  
19 trusting them at all so that they can't even go down and  
20 make any preliminary sort of enquiry as to what had  
21 happened.

22 A. I believe what potentially -- and actually, if we look  
23 at Mr Shaw's statement, what happened is they were  
24 deployed down to gather information, and because they  
25 were seeing people who were distressed, and the further

1 they went down they were coming across people who were  
2 more and more distressed, they got diverted to trying to  
3 care for those people. They didn't have any first aid  
4 equipment, so they ended up trying to care for those  
5 people, but probably at the back of their mind they knew  
6 "I've been committed to gather that information", and so  
7 they couldn't give the full attention to the people who  
8 had been injured.

9 By the same token, do we expect people just to walk  
10 past casualties, gather the information, turn round and  
11 then come back out and walk past the casualties?

12 And I think this is what I'm trying to say, if  
13 I may, a personal -- a personal view, but I think, from  
14 an emotional perspective, it would put a lot of pressure  
15 on the two people.

16 In contrast, with Mr Colebrook-Taylor, when he  
17 deployed with six staff, he had the flexibility to allow  
18 Mr Roche, "All you're going to be doing is gathering  
19 information", and the other five of us -- I believe it  
20 was five, it may have been six people -- we are going to  
21 be going down, we're going to be taking equipment with  
22 us and we will be able to just focus all of our attention  
23 on to the casualties because we don't need to concern  
24 ourselves with gathering information.

25 Q. Having arrived at 10.00, because you didn't have all the

1 information or because the information hadn't all been  
2 gathered because they hadn't gone down to the train, you  
3 had to take valuable time to find out what had occurred,  
4 didn't you?

5 A. I wouldn't say I needed to take valuable time, because  
6 it was becoming obvious what we were faced with, and my  
7 role at the incident actually is to establish the  
8 Command and Control function.

9 Q. The first decision that the log, the MOBIS log, shows  
10 that you took -- it may be mistaken -- is at 10.21. Can  
11 we have [LFB11-9], please?

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Before we go back to the specifics of  
13 when the decisions were taken, I understand what you're  
14 saying about not sending people in; in other words, not  
15 ordering people in. Is there any scope within the  
16 firefighting service, given the complexities and the  
17 dangers of the job you face, for allowing volunteers to  
18 go in, or are volunteers forbidden?

19 A. No, ma'am, no. No --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: There is no scope for allowing people  
21 to volunteer? "I can't order you to go down because  
22 I don't know whether there are chemical weapons,  
23 whatever, but I'm not going to stop you if you insist  
24 you wish to go down"?

25 A. No, no, we don't operate under those protocols. Our

1 protocols are strict for reasons, and the reasons are  
2 almost always, as I intimated earlier, that almost  
3 always our procedures have been developed because of  
4 accidents or injuries to firefighting personnel, and  
5 it's a means of developing and providing a safe system  
6 of work.

7 I think perhaps the other issue around the  
8 Fire Service, where it is different certainly from the  
9 ambulance and the police, is that all of our training,  
10 all of our ethos is around team-based working, and we  
11 are used to deploying as teams of four, teams of five,  
12 and we work as teams of four, teams of five.

13 And that is different in the Ambulance Service,  
14 I suspect, and with the police, I suspect. I don't  
15 think the police spend much time now alone, but  
16 certainly, in years gone by, they were very often  
17 deployed by themselves. We almost have an unwritten  
18 law, well it's almost a written law, that actually you  
19 never, ever work alone.

20 MR KEITH: Of course, Leading Firefighter Roche had five  
21 people in his appliance.

22 A. They had four. Mr Roche had four, I believe.

23 Q. Him and four, there were five altogether, were there  
24 not?

25 A. I think there were four. I think there was Mr Roche,

1 the driver and two on the back.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can I go back to your answering my  
3 question?

4 A. Sorry.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Essentially -- I understand your  
6 protocols are strict and team-based working, so there's  
7 no scope for volunteers.

8 Can I just ask: is that because the protocols have  
9 been developed in accordance with the London Fire  
10 Brigade duty under health and safety legislation to its  
11 employees, or is it because of trying to ensure the  
12 safety of the maximum number of people, or is it  
13 a combination?

14 A. Well, personally, I would say that the two are  
15 interlinked. I mean, certainly, the London Fire  
16 Brigade, as any other organisation, are subject to the  
17 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act conditions.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I appreciate that, and if they don't  
19 get sufficient protocols in place, they stand a risk of  
20 being sued by a firefighter who's injured.

21 A. That's correct and, in fairness, the London Fire Brigade  
22 have had improvement notices placed on them previously.

23 So that is something that we are mindful of.

24 But really, the whole ethos of the way that we  
25 develop our working principles are that we want to

1 deliver a safe system of work, notwithstanding the fact  
2 that we know occasionally they will be challenged.

3 MR KEITH: [LFB11-9] records a message from you. I've been  
4 passed a note. I stand corrected, there were four in  
5 pump A242, not five.

6 A. Thank you very much.

7 Q. "... Senior Divisional Officer Adams at King's Cross  
8 station London Underground. Confirmed incident ...  
9 train is approximately 200 metres into southbound  
10 tunnel. Multiple casualties confirmed. BASICS doctors  
11 on scene. Set up two triage points ... Silver meeting  
12 to be held at 10.30."

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. When you arrived, you were told, according to your  
15 witness statement, that no information had been sent to  
16 Control and no initial Command structure had been put in  
17 place?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You described the scene as chaotic. It took you until  
20 21 minutes past, having arrived at 10.00, to send that  
21 basic message to Control, and you then sent another  
22 message at 10.32, two entries further down, from SDO  
23 Adams:  
24 "Make pumps 12. All additional appliances to  
25 rendezvous at Crestfield Street."

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. In broad terms, it was another 20 minutes to half an  
3 hour before the information that you realised was not  
4 being sent to Control was sent back to Control. The  
5 reason why I ask you these questions about whether or  
6 not it might have been more sensible and wiser for the  
7 fire crews who had attended before you to exercise  
8 a higher level of independence and to try to ascertain  
9 what was happening was that, when you arrived, it took  
10 you another 20 minutes to half an hour to get a grip on  
11 the Command structure, find out what was happening,  
12 accumulate the information and then send the message  
13 back to Control for more pumps.

14 Obviously, you wouldn't have asked for more pumps  
15 unless you deemed it vital. That was a further elapse  
16 of half an hour. Could that have been avoided, do you  
17 feel, if the protocols and structures which had  
18 determined the actions of the initial firefighters had  
19 been different?

20 A. I was satisfied that, as you pointed out, I arrived  
21 around about 10.00. I suspect it might have been  
22 slightly after 10.00, between 10.00 and 5 past, perhaps.

23 Q. To be fair you said "approximately".

24 A. Yes. At the time, our communication systems were  
25 clearly overloaded. We couldn't -- my mobile signal had

1 gone, so I couldn't, as an example, book an attendance.  
2 Normally, what we do when we arrive at an incident, we  
3 would just book in with Control that we are there, so,  
4 one, they know that we've arrived and, secondly, for  
5 logging purposes, they can see when we have arrived.  
6 We were unable to send anything over the main scheme  
7 radio at the time. The Command Unit, as I've said,  
8 wasn't up and running. In fact, that informative that  
9 we put together, it was myself and Mr Cowup, we actually  
10 sent by a landline telephone from the concourse in  
11 King's Cross, and the information I received from  
12 Mr Roche when I arrived, between 10.00 and 10.05, was  
13 sufficient to allow me to draft that message, and that  
14 message wasn't physically received at Control until  
15 10.21.

16 Q. The question to you, Mr Adams, was: do you think that  
17 the protocols and the procedures which were in play  
18 could have been better operated or perhaps amended so as  
19 to allow the firefighters who had arrived first  
20 a greater deal of operational discretion so as to get  
21 the information out to Control without it having to wait  
22 for your arrival and the further elapse of 20 minutes  
23 before you could even get a message out?

24 A. Well, at the end of the day, there is always potential  
25 to do things differently --

1 Q. Of course.

2 A. -- but I think, in Mr Roche's case, he had four people,  
3 and he was trying to manage all that he was faced with,  
4 with four people, and --

5 Q. We haven't heard from Mr Roche. I must be fair to  
6 Mr Roche. We don't know why he took the decisions that  
7 he did, although they've been commented upon by  
8 Messrs Newton and Shaw who were in his appliance, but  
9 they all agree that it wasn't Mr Roche acting  
10 irrationally, he had to properly and proportionately, in  
11 as far as he was able to do under the protocols that he  
12 understood guided the use of breathing apparatus  
13 equipment?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is there not room, Mr Adams, for that guidance to be  
16 altered or amended or in hindsight to recognise that it  
17 was operated in a way that slowed down the process of  
18 getting information out and getting the order for more  
19 pumps out?

20 A. Well, I think the difficulty that Mr Roche was faced  
21 with -- I mean, clearly, in hindsight, we now know that  
22 it was an IED on a train, but he had been called to  
23 a fire in a tunnel, and that is probably one of the  
24 worst sets of conditions that firefighters can be faced  
25 with.

1 Q. But he had no evidence of a fire. There was smoke and,  
2 of course, we know that people were coming out of the  
3 tunnel and the British Transport Police inspectors were  
4 coming out and they had the information necessary to be  
5 able to inform him there was no fire.

6 A. Well, in some respects, I suppose, I'll go to the old  
7 adage, "There's no smoke without fire", and that is  
8 absolutely true. Smoke is, in fact, unburnt fire gas,  
9 and for there to be smoke, there must have been fire.  
10 I suspect, in hindsight, once we understood what we were  
11 faced with, it probably wasn't smoke, it was just the  
12 dust that had been displaced by the explosion in the  
13 tunnel and it's 40-odd years' worth of dust that looks  
14 like smoke.

15 Q. Were you aware, when you arrived, that there was  
16 a problem getting into the first carriage, that the  
17 door, the interconnecting doors between carriages 1 and  
18 2 had buckled and the assistance of the fire crews was  
19 required in order to cut the door out?

20 A. In fairness, I don't recall that, but certainly, having  
21 read through Mr Colebrook-Taylor's transcript, I suspect  
22 that had been achieved before I arrived.

23 Q. Had the fire crews been able to get down earlier because  
24 they hadn't had to wait for Mr Colebrook-Taylor to  
25 arrive, there is a possibility, is there not, that the

1 door could have been removed earlier, allowing more  
2 paramedics, more emergency personnel, into the carriage?  
3 It's a straightforward point.

4 A. Well, it's possible, but by the same token, you can only  
5 get so many people into a confined space, and sometimes  
6 it's managing that that is as much of a difficulty.

7 Q. I think all of them would have agreed, Mr Adams, that  
8 the priority was to get the door off so as to allow  
9 people into the carriage in the first place, regardless  
10 of how many could be squeezed in thereafter.

11 According to the log, [INQ9925-4], there was a Silver  
12 meeting at 10.30, which you attended.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. This was the first Silver Command meeting of the British  
15 Transport Police office. At that meeting, at 10.30, you  
16 were told that most of the walking casualties had been  
17 removed, but there were a handful of very seriously  
18 wounded casualties still inside the carriage and at  
19 least 16 people had been killed.

20 So once you'd taken command, passed messages to the  
21 Control and attended the first Silver meeting, the  
22 number of the seriously injured had been reduced to four  
23 or five?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Your officers were engaged with carrying them out, were

1 they not?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Predominantly acting as stretcher-bearers?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Do you recall there being a debate or a call for more  
6 stretchers to help them carry out that function?

7 A. It was -- from memory, it was certainly something that  
8 was discussed at that Silver meeting at 10.30 and, as  
9 I remember, it was the London Ambulance Service that  
10 mentioned that we -- it would be beneficial if we had  
11 additional stretchers.

12 Again, from memory, I am pretty sure I mentioned  
13 that -- I knew that we had placed our casualty handling  
14 and equipment lorry into service the previous week at  
15 Paddington, and the reason I know that is my partner  
16 works at Paddington. In fact, she drove the CHEL to  
17 Edgware Road that morning. So I knew that it carried  
18 stretchers and I said that we could provide stretchers.  
19 We also carry what is known as a short extension  
20 ladder which is a little three-piece thing that you can  
21 separate into three separate sections, each section is  
22 about 8-foot long, and it actually doubles up very well  
23 as an improvised stretcher. Basically, you can just put  
24 some blankets on it, or a salvage sheet, and we could  
25 bring people out that way.

1 So I was aware and took from that Silver meeting  
2 that one of our roles was to ask if we could supply  
3 additional stretchers.  
4 Q. The action at the end of the meeting you'll see on that  
5 page, right at the bottom:  
6 "Research the provision of additional forced  
7 ventilation for underground areas and the provision of  
8 additional casualty stretchers."  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Were you successful in being able to find enough  
11 stretchers or, in the end, did your firefighting  
12 colleagues simply have to improvise and make do with  
13 what they had?  
14 A. From memory, I know Control asked us that the casualty  
15 handling equipment lorry was now available and did we  
16 want it. I'd handed over command to ACO Collins at that  
17 time, and I can't ever remember the casualty handling  
18 equipment lorry attending King's Cross. But having said  
19 that, we actually got to a point relatively quickly  
20 where all casualties had been removed from the train.  
21 Q. With the equipment that was available?  
22 A. With the equipment that was actually on-site and  
23 on-scene. We'd established an equipment dump at the  
24 head of the staircase just in front of the concourse  
25 where we had short extension ladders and we had

1 stretchers available, and I don't ever recall people  
2 being desperate about there being insufficient numbers  
3 of stretchers.

4 Q. Mr Collins didn't arrive until 11.00. The meeting  
5 finished at 10.30.

6 A. That's the first meeting, yes.

7 Q. If we could have a look at [LFB11-10], we can see, at  
8 11.03, "Silver meeting now complete, next due 11.30.  
9 Command system established". Well, it had been  
10 established by you at 10.00, or starting at 10.00.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "Efforts prioritised to casualty evacuation and  
13 providing stretchers and ventilation to platforms."

14 A. Mm-hmm.

15 Q. Forgive me for asking. "Efforts prioritised", that  
16 sounds as if it just means we're now going to turn to or  
17 we're going to try to address the question of stretchers  
18 and casualty evacuation and ventilation.

19 You handed over control to Mr Collins at that point.

20 Was anything actually done about stretchers, as far as  
21 you can recall, between 10.00 and 11.00, the time when  
22 you were in command, or was it something that you were  
23 turning to when you were replaced by Mr Collins at  
24 11.00?

25 A. Certainly my first priority in that first 45 minutes

1 probably was looking at how we set up and managed the  
2 Command structure.

3 Now, clearly, people needed to be evacuated and  
4 stretchers would be part of that. But the stretcher  
5 isn't something that you place on a casualty. It is  
6 something that you can potentially re-use. So the  
7 issue -- and it came back, perhaps, to the previous  
8 informative, and that was something that was developed  
9 with the LAS, we had a triage point on the platform  
10 which was a forward triage point. Then we had a second  
11 triage point in the ticket hall, in the concourse,  
12 which, again, was developed with BTP's assistance, and  
13 it was getting people from the train to the first triage  
14 point, and then from the triage point to the ticket  
15 hall, that the stretchers would have been required for.

16 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr Adams. My Lady is concerned  
17 with the position of the deceased and the very seriously  
18 injured in the carriage.

19 The role of the Fire Service was not to apply first  
20 aid necessarily, there were paramedics there, but you  
21 did help.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. A practical issue arose concerning stretchers and  
24 ventilation concerning the train, not the concourse or  
25 the walking wounded or the priority 3s, but the train

1 and the dead and the nearly dying in carriage 1.

2 A. Mm-hmm.

3 Q. So in terms of the effect on them, what practical steps  
4 can you recall being taken between 10.00 and 11.00?

5 A. Well, between 10.00 and 11.00, as I say, we'd set up our  
6 equipment dump, and our equipment dump was --

7 Q. What is the equipment dump?

8 A. Well, it's an area where anything that we think we might  
9 need is set aside. So, for example, I suppose, as an  
10 example, we've -- you're probably all aware now of the  
11 rapid intervention set which is what they used to cut  
12 the door to allow access to the train.

13 As reinforcing appliances attended, we took all the  
14 rapid intervention sets off of the appliances and you  
15 put them in a holding area, for want of a better term.

16 Q. How is that holding area of practical use to the  
17 firefighters inside the carriage, other than the cutting  
18 equipment, which I accept was used to remove the doors?

19 A. When they asked for equipment, it was provided, and it  
20 was taken from a forward -- or from a holding area down  
21 to a forward location, which would have been the  
22 platform and then into the train, as and if it was  
23 required. I don't ever recall there being difficulty  
24 with the numbers of stretchers that were available.

25 Q. At 11.39, so on page 10 of LFB11 [LFB11-10], Mr Collins, having

1 taken over command, states at the end of his message:

2 "Lighting and forced ventilation in use."

3 Do you recall when the lighting and the ventilation  
4 was put in place?

5 A. In absolute timeframe, no, I don't. One of the  
6 difficulties we've had with the venting was -- and it  
7 was an issue that we covered at the first Silver meeting  
8 at 10.30 -- London Underground prohibit the use of  
9 petrol-driven equipment below ground, for obvious -- two  
10 obvious reasons: one, is the fire risk of petrol; but,  
11 secondly, if you're going to run any internal combustion  
12 engine for a length of time, you generate carbon  
13 monoxide and, in a confined space, that is not ideal.

14 But I actually took the decision that, if we needed  
15 to use it, we would, and if we needed to use it and  
16 needed to use it for a period of time, we would need to  
17 ventilate at the same time.

18 That was one side of it. The other side of it,  
19 there was some concern still about the potential hazards  
20 involved in the environment, the chemical and the  
21 biological agent potential, and there was some  
22 discussion between our scientific advisers as to whether  
23 it was sensible to remove product from the tunnel to  
24 free air, if we couldn't confirm that it hadn't been  
25 contaminated with whatever.

1 Q. In the end, you had to go, did you not, to the  
2 Channel Tunnel rail link contractors working next to  
3 King's Cross from whom I think some equipment was  
4 borrowed?

5 A. In fairness, we didn't have to go to them. It was --

6 Q. They offered it?

7 A. It was offered, and I thought, well, actually --

8 Q. That was a sensible option?

9 A. -- this was a pretty good call, because they're dealing  
10 with big tunnels, they're dealing with moving lots of  
11 stuff quickly, and the offer was accepted gratefully.

12 Q. Could we have [LFB16-2], please? This is a note from  
13 Mr Cowup, who we'll hear from shortly, but five or six  
14 lines down from the top:

15 "There was clearly a need for ventilation  
16 equipment ... but we were only able to provide one fan  
17 from the 12-pump incident attendance and little (if any)  
18 ducting.

19 "Fortunately, this never became an issue [due] to  
20 the exceptionally positive level of support we were  
21 provided with by contractors working on the ...  
22 Channel Tunnel rail link site ..."

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. He recognised, did he not, that the Fire Brigade would  
25 need to review their capacity to provide effective

1 ventilation of this type of incident, in terms of  
2 equipment carried by the Brigade.  
3 Providing ventilation is not an ordinary function of  
4 the London Fire Brigade, and so one perhaps can be  
5 forgiven for not expecting it to be on all appliances,  
6 but you certainly had difficulties, did you not, in  
7 trying to get ventilation down to the train and it was  
8 only the intervention of the Channel Link contractors  
9 that provided that equipment?

10 A. In some respects, we carry -- it's called smoke  
11 extractors, actually, and one of the functions of  
12 a smoke extractor is to -- if you have a fire in  
13 a building, once the fire is extinguished, quite often  
14 you've still got the building full of smoke, and the  
15 smoke extractor actually does exactly what it says on  
16 the tin: it -- you turn on a fan, and it either blows  
17 fresh air into the building, which will extract the  
18 smoke, or it can suck the smoke out.

19 So we do use those routinely. Whether we have  
20 sufficient of them, I might have a view, but at the end  
21 of the day, we have what we have for our day-to-day  
22 operations and it works effectively.

23 Q. Let's have your view. Your view is that there weren't  
24 enough?

25 A. I didn't say that there weren't enough. I personally

1 would like to see or would have liked to have seen --  
2 I've retired now -- but I would have liked to have seen  
3 smoke venting on all frontline appliances, but there is  
4 a cost implication, and some fire services in Britain  
5 have them on all frontline appliances, some have none,  
6 we are sort of in the middle really, I suppose, in  
7 London, in that we have them on our damage control -- or  
8 operational support unit now, so there are six of those  
9 assets throughout London, and it seems to provide the  
10 need.

11 Q. Attendances at London Underground stations are not  
12 infrequent. There are a large number of Tube stations  
13 and the Fire Brigade is called out very often to alarms  
14 at London Underground stations.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But smoke removal appliances, devices, are not yet  
17 routinely carried on appliances, are they?

18 A. We don't have smoke extractors on all frontline  
19 appliances, no.

20 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. I have no further  
21 questions.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

23 Questions by MR COLTART

24 MR COLTART: Good morning, Mr Adams.

25 A. Good morning.

1 Q. Can we just clear up, please, the circumstances of  
2 Mr Ginty's deployment to King's Cross that morning,  
3 because I think you said that you thought he'd been to  
4 Euston Square, Mr Keith referred to the fact that he had  
5 been to Euston Road, and I just want to deal briefly  
6 with that issue, if we may?

7 He says this in his witness statement -- for  
8 my Lady's note this is INQ4741. He said:

9 "I was on duty that morning. I was attending Euston  
10 for a meeting at about 9.00. I saw an appliance leave  
11 Euston fire station and, at 9.04, I received a pager  
12 message", the same message everyone else received,  
13 "about Euston Square Underground, smoke issuing in  
14 tunnel, King's Cross tunnels."

15 He says this:

16 "I drove on to the forecourt to Euston fire station  
17 and telephoned Control. I was advised now of an  
18 incident at Aldgate which was possibly a train crash or  
19 a power problem."

20 Just so we can get our bearings here, Euston fire  
21 station is just round the corner from King's Cross  
22 mainline station, isn't it?

23 A. It's probably about 600 metres. It's just round the  
24 corner from Euston station, actually.

25 Q. It's just off the Euston Road.

1 A. But it's about 600 metres from King's Cross station.

2 Q. Forgive me, I cut across you.

3 If you're heading west along the Euston Road, it's  
4 past King's Cross, turn right, it's about 600 metres, as  
5 you say, from the mainline station?

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. So that's where he is when he receives this message.

8 He's told about an incident at Aldgate, but no one  
9 mentions anything to him about King's Cross. He says  
10 this:

11 "I then made my way" -- forgive me:

12 "I attended Euston Square London Underground station  
13 where no incident was found. I explained to other crews  
14 attending that there was an incident at Aldgate and  
15 asked for a quick stop to get appliances available."  
16 So he's turned right rather than left on to the  
17 Euston Road, he's gone to Euston Square Underground  
18 station, where he's found the other fire crews. He's  
19 told them about an incident at Aldgate, not an incident  
20 at King's Cross.

21 Do you know whether any of those crews did, in fact,  
22 then attend Aldgate? Can you recollect?

23 A. I can't comment on that because I don't have absolute  
24 knowledge, but I would say it is extremely unlikely,  
25 extremely unlikely.

1 Q. We know that some of them did go to King's Cross from  
2 Euston Square?

3 A. King's Cross, yes, but Aldgate no.

4 Q. He says this:

5 "I then made my way again to Euston fire station."

6 So rather than going to King's Cross himself, he  
7 goes back to the fire station just off Euston Road:

8 "At about 9.35, I arrived at Euston Road and saw  
9 police officers running in the general direction of  
10 King's Cross. I was then re-sent to Euston Square by  
11 a repeat of the earlier pager message."

12 So he's gone back to the fire station off the  
13 Euston Road, he's sent back to Euston Square again:

14 "During this, I became aware of an incident at  
15 Edgware Road Underground station."

16 So he's told now about Edgware Road, he knows about  
17 Aldgate, he knows about Edgware Road, he knows there's  
18 no incident at Euston Square, but he keeps on being sent  
19 there and, at this stage, he still doesn't know about  
20 the incident, the major incident, taking place round the  
21 corner from his fire station, and he hears reports of an  
22 incident on a bus in Upper Woburn Place nearby. So he's  
23 told also about the bus incident at Tavistock Square:

24 "By this time, terrorist activity was apparent.

25 A major incident procedure had been implemented. I then

1 attended King's Cross London Underground station."

2 I think it's there that he met up with you at about  
3 the same time.

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. But the reality is that, even if he'd walked the first  
6 time, he would have been there significantly in advance  
7 of the time that he finally arrived, is that right, if  
8 he'd been provided with the correct information?

9 A. I can't comment on our mobilising protocols. Nick would  
10 have done exactly as I'd done, that you are paged and  
11 you are ordered to an incident. Our protocols are that  
12 you go where you're told to go. In fairness, I did  
13 question the ordering myself and I chose that morning,  
14 following information that I received, to attend  
15 King's Cross rather than Euston Square.

16 Q. I'm not going to criticise you or Mr Ginty for where you  
17 went that morning, you were following the information  
18 you were provided with. But can we agree on this at  
19 least: that the journey he took, in order to arrive at  
20 King's Cross, was an entirely unsatisfactory one?

21 A. He went where he was ordered to, but it was not ideal,  
22 no.

23 Q. Can you help us with this, please: which borough do the  
24 Soho crews operate under?

25 A. It would have been City of Westminster.

1 Q. Who was the borough commander for the City of  
2 Westminster at this time, can you recall?

3 A. I can't recall, no. My responsibility was the  
4 north-east of London and I managed 20 fire stations in  
5 the north-east of London. So that wasn't my area of  
6 responsibility.

7 Q. Okay, I'm sure we can obtain that information from  
8 somebody. But in the aftermath of 7/7, to what extent  
9 were you involved yourself in any form of debriefing  
10 process, whether by way of reports, whether by way of  
11 meetings you were asked to attend, what was your  
12 involvement in that process?

13 A. It's a requirement of all -- I believe it was 6-pump  
14 incidents and above that we undertake what is known as  
15 a PRC, that's a performance review of command, and  
16 I certainly attended a performance review of command.

17 Q. I will assist you with this because we've seen some  
18 material in relation to the performance review of  
19 command, meetings which took place, but I want to look  
20 at debriefings and reports which may exist outside that  
21 process. All right?

22 I'm going to ask you to look at a document with me,  
23 please, can we have LFB69 on the screen? If we just  
24 enlarge the top half for the time being, please, this is  
25 a document that's been provided to us through the

1 disclosure process from the Fire Brigade:  
2 "Incident debriefing guidance.  
3 "Further to the recent terrorist incidents on July 7  
4 and now July 21, the brigade feels that there is likely  
5 to be significant learning to be gained from the  
6 experiences of those who attended these incidents. As  
7 such, we are instigating a formal debriefing procedure  
8 to gather that information which will be carried out in  
9 two stages.  
10 "We are asking watch commanders of stations where  
11 crews attended one of the incidents to carry out  
12 structured debriefs at a local level."  
13 Just pausing there for a moment, who would have been  
14 the watch commander in relation to the Soho crews? Was  
15 that the same as the borough commander or is it someone  
16 different?  
17 A. No, the watch commander is the person who is in charge  
18 of the watch. It would have been Mr Colebrook-Taylor.  
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The shift.  
20 MR COLTART: The shift?  
21 A. That's right, Mr Colebrook-Taylor.  
22 Q. Thank you very much. Mr Colebrook-Taylor:  
23 "To assist with this, we are providing a methodology  
24 and documentation (see attached) to assist in this  
25 process.

1 "The methodology is adapted from the current process  
2 used within our own incident management training team  
3 and allows a focused approach to considering crews'  
4 operational activity at the incident."

5 So as you say, there was an existing protocol in  
6 place for, as you tell us, 6-pump incidents and above.

7 "A detailed approach as to how to carry out the  
8 debrief is provided at the end of this document ...

9 There are a range of headings provided which should be  
10 considered in relation to possible operational  
11 activities crews may have been involved in."

12 Can we agree that one of the most significant  
13 operational activities which the Soho crews were  
14 involved in was the decision to implement the breathing  
15 apparatus protocol and to maintain it until 9.45 that  
16 morning when Mr Colebrook-Taylor arrived?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It carries on in the next paragraph:

19 "In addition to the valuable insight of crews'  
20 experiences, using a standard process across all watches  
21 will enable us to record experiences in an organised way  
22 and provide a consistent record that can be used in  
23 support of a report on the Brigade's approach to these  
24 incidents and may inform any future public inquiry or  
25 inquest. We are aware that there has been some local

1 debriefing at station and borough level which has  
2 resulted in highly constructive feedback already. For  
3 those stations that have not been involved, we would ask  
4 that you still engage in this process for the reasons  
5 given above."

6 We know from the other documents that has been  
7 provided to us that this debrief process was implemented  
8 very widely across the Fire Brigade. All right?  
9 By way of simple example, the logistics department  
10 underwent a debrief. The equality and diversity  
11 department had a debrief. The internal audit department  
12 had a debrief. Why wasn't there a debrief of the Soho  
13 crews that had attended the bombed carriage?

14 A. I can't answer that question because that wasn't my area  
15 of responsibility.

16 Q. But there must have been some discussion about it,  
17 wasn't there, at management level: why wasn't there  
18 a debrief of those crews?

19 A. My understanding is that the debrief process was managed  
20 by our central service delivery officers, and that  
21 wasn't an area where I had discussion or involvement.

22 Q. You never had any conversations with your colleagues in  
23 management or you weren't in receipt of any emails or  
24 reports or other documentation which could explain why  
25 those crews weren't subject to a debrief?

1 A. Well, I certainly remember an email coming and that was  
2 concerning Mr Cowup's debriefing that he'd undertaken at  
3 King's Cross and he --

4 Q. I'm sorry to cut across you, because we're going to hear  
5 from him shortly. He did undertake a debrief, didn't  
6 he, in relation to the Islington crews who had attended?

7 A. That's right, well, Peter was the borough commander for  
8 Islington, so in line of that document there, he did  
9 what he was required to do, yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just pause there. What on  
11 earth is a central service delivery officer?

12 A. Sorry, in some respects, fire stations now are called  
13 a service delivery. Central service delivery was  
14 a central department that coordinated the  
15 Brigade-wide -- we're not fire stations anymore, we are  
16 service delivery. But that was what it was called at  
17 the time.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So a central service delivery officer  
19 would be what in old money I would call --

20 A. In old money, it was headed by a senior divisional  
21 officer and there were divisional officers working there  
22 and, from memory, there was some station officers as  
23 well. It was a team of about 10 people.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. It's perhaps not fair to  
25 press you on -- I doubt that they were your decisions to

1 use expressions of that kind.

2 MR COLTART: What attempt was made by the Fire Brigade to  
3 seek your views formally on the decision to implement  
4 the breathing apparatus protocol on that day and the  
5 decision to maintain it?

6 A. I don't recall anybody asking my views.

7 Q. You were Silver Commander --

8 A. I was, yes.

9 Q. -- at King's Cross on that day. Is your evidence that  
10 no one asked you to address a meeting or to write  
11 a report or to inform the Brigade in any other way about  
12 the decision which delayed the deployment of those crews  
13 by 30 minutes on the day?

14 A. How are you saying that it delayed deployment of crews  
15 by 30 minutes? Because, in fairness, in fairness to  
16 Mr Roche -- and I've absolutely no doubt that the  
17 mobilising protocols will come out in the new year where  
18 I understand that you will be looking at the way that we  
19 mobilised, but I don't doubt that he wasn't expecting to  
20 wait for 20 minutes for the second appliance to attend.  
21 Almost always, if you ask for additional resources,  
22 they will be there within 5 to 8 minutes, and I would  
23 say that that particular event was almost unprecedented  
24 in the time that it took for additional resource to  
25 arrive.

1 Q. Thank you for that clarification, but I'm going to press  
2 you, I'm afraid, in relation to this question which  
3 I originally asked you.

4 Is it your evidence that you were never asked to  
5 submit a report or address a meeting in relation to the  
6 breathing apparatus protocol and its implementation on  
7 that day?

8 A. No, I wasn't, no.

9 Q. Are you aware of anybody else being asked to submit  
10 a report or address a meeting in relation to that  
11 decision?

12 A. I have to say I'm unaware of that. Whether Mr Collins  
13 spoke -- because, obviously, he was at a more senior  
14 level than me, and he would have attended what was known  
15 as our principal management board, but no is the answer  
16 to that.

17 Q. Although the Logistics Department and the Equality and  
18 Diversity Department had their say, there was no review  
19 by the Fire Brigade of the protocols which actually  
20 impacted upon entry into the tunnel on that day?

21 A. I can't comment yes or no, because I don't know what was  
22 produced or provided to -- I know a report was drafted  
23 for the GLA authority and that would have been put  
24 together by central service delivery. But from  
25 a personal perspective, I wasn't asked, no, and I didn't

1 have to provide a report, no.

2 Q. Thank you. Could we just scroll down a bit further in  
3 this document, please? Under the heading "Stage two":  
4 "We will be supplementing this local debrief with  
5 facilitated sessions likely to take place in September  
6 this year where we will bring together some of the  
7 initial crews who attended each of the incidents to  
8 further draw out the key learning points in  
9 a constructive and open forum. Further details ... will  
10 be circulated in due course."  
11 Were you invited to attend one of those further  
12 sessions in September?  
13 A. No, I wasn't, no.

14 Q. Were the Soho crews, as far as you are aware, invited to  
15 attend one of those sessions?  
16 A. Soho wasn't an area of my responsibility, so I can't  
17 comment one way or the other on that, I'm afraid. But  
18 certainly, from my knowledge of the eastern stations,  
19 which I was responsible for, I don't recall having any  
20 requirement to provide that, no.

21 Q. The next paragraph:  
22 "We should clarify that the focus of these debriefs  
23 are on operational tactics and experiences of the  
24 firefighters and junior officers who attended the  
25 incidents. As such, they should be seen as

1 complementary to, and not as a replacement for, the  
2 performance review of command process which has already  
3 been carried out for these incidents."

4 In case there was any ambiguity about it, these were  
5 additional and supplementary to the performance review  
6 of command rather than a substitute for it. But you  
7 were never invited to attend one of these meetings?

8 A. No.

9 Q. If we just go over the page briefly, please, to the  
10 extent that we need to we'll look at this with Mr Cowup  
11 because it sets out the way in which the debriefs are  
12 supposed to take place and, indeed, he did follow that  
13 format --

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We're not going to do it twice,  
15 Mr Coltart.

16 MR COLTART: No, we're not.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So choose your witness.

18 MR COLTART: No, we'll deal with it through Mr Cowup, if we  
19 may. Indeed, the same applies to page 3 of that  
20 document. We'll look at that briefly with Mr Cowup.

21 I've nothing further, thank you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

23 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

24 MR SAUNDERS: Very briefly, Mr Adams. The 8-pump call that  
25 you were attending --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- who would be entitled to call 8-pump?

3 A. Well, actually, a firefighter could do it. It's almost  
4 unheard of for a leading firefighter to do it, but  
5 a firefighter could do it. It's unusual.

6 Normally, it's an -- and in fairness, that is one  
7 of -- when I was paged and I spoke to Control, that was  
8 one of the issues that -- I wasn't concerned with, but  
9 it just flags things, doesn't it? It's unusual for  
10 a leading firefighter to make pumps eight.

11 Q. Because, with your experience, for that call to have  
12 been made, it denotes that this is a serious incident?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That's why the old antennae start going up?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can I just make sure I've got the timing right? You, it  
17 was, who called it up to a 12-pump?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. I think we saw on the document earlier -- page 9 of  
20 LFB11 [LFB11-9], if we could have that, just so you could look at  
21 it yourself, Mr Adams. I think it's 10.32, third entry  
22 down, isn't it?

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. Now, we know there was a Silver meeting at 10.30.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Does this happen during the Silver meeting?

2 A. Probably what I would have done was -- and again,  
3 sometimes that's where timeframes are extended a little  
4 bit of time. I decided to increase the attendance to 12  
5 at that time. You draft out the message, you send --  
6 say, "Okay, you're going to send out ..." and then  
7 I went to the Silver meeting. So it would have been  
8 sent as I was attending the Silver meeting, yes.

9 Q. Why did you increase it to a 12-pump?

10 A. Well, we had 8 crews there and, again, having experience  
11 of working below ground, you know that conditions get  
12 quite untenable, they get hot, they get very humid and,  
13 quite often, it's useful to rotate your crews, because  
14 crews, although they don't want to come away from  
15 working with a particular casualty, particularly people  
16 who have perhaps been trapped and they've been working  
17 with them for a period of time, but you get to a point  
18 where, quite clearly, you become less effective because  
19 you are tired.

20 Q. Did it have anything to do with the numbers of people  
21 that were being requested down below to act as  
22 stretcher-bearers?

23 A. No. No, I've always worked really, I suppose, on the  
24 principle, and we have the principle, that it's always  
25 better to overestimate rather than underestimate. And

1 I've always liked to keep two or three crews spare.

2 Q. Can I then move on to the -- forgive me, I'm going to  
3 get the name wrong I'm sure -- casualty handling  
4 emergency lorry. You, I think, used a slightly --

5 A. That's it.

6 Q. That is right?

7 A. Equipment, sorry, not "emergency". Casualty handling  
8 equipment lorry, which is stretchers.

9 Q. I think you were telling us that, in fact, your partner  
10 was driving it that day?

11 A. She did, yes, she took it to Edgware Road, yes.

12 Q. We know that there was a call for more stretchers, and  
13 you were aware that that's deployed the week before to  
14 Paddington. Did you ever call for it to come to  
15 King's Cross?

16 A. From memory, I'm sure it will be on the messages, if  
17 I did. I know that Control asked us if it was now  
18 available and did we still need it at King's Cross.  
19 I don't ever recall it getting there. There was, at the  
20 time -- and it was from about -- I believe it may have  
21 been a Silver meeting at 11.30. The police were  
22 starting to get -- not concerned, but they were having  
23 a view about the potential for cross-contaminating  
24 incidents. If we'd had equipment that had been deployed  
25 to Edgware Road and now we were going to deploy it to

1 King's Cross, there was the potential for  
2 cross-contamination of evidence, and something that they  
3 were certainly mindful of, but I don't recall us ever  
4 running out of stretchers or I can't ever remember  
5 seeing the CHEL at King's Cross.

6 Q. Her Ladyship has already heard that, by 11.30, all the  
7 living casualties are out of King's Cross.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So although you are aware of it -- it's not a question  
10 of not being aware of the CHEL, you're aware of it --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- but never in a position, you can recall, where you're  
13 demanding its attendance at King's Cross, knowing that  
14 it's gone to Edgware Road?

15 A. No, that's right.

16 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much for your help.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

18 Questions by MR PATTERSON

19 MR PATTERSON: Just on that, please, could we have on the  
20 screen the incident management log which is [INQ9925-4],  
21 please? If we could zoom in on the middle of the page  
22 under the heading of "Silver meeting" on that point,  
23 Mr Adams, about the stretchers, we can see that you  
24 attended, at 10.30, that first Silver Command meeting.  
25 It was in the BTP office. Halfway down that paragraph

1 your log indicates that:  
2 "Current information is that 4/5 live casualties are  
3 still trapped on the train and require rescue."  
4 Then, at the bottom of that entry, you've been asked  
5 about the LFB action, two points to action:  
6 "Research the ... ventilation ... and the provision  
7 of [the] additional casualty stretchers."  
8 So from what you said on this point, is the position  
9 this: that, first of all, you didn't actually cause any  
10 stretchers to come to King's Cross?  
11 A. I can't remember, actually, now, and I'm sure, if we  
12 looked at my messages from MOBIS, if it was quickly  
13 available ...  
14 If I'd asked for them physically, it would have been  
15 on a message.  
16 Q. Can you remember whether you actually asked for the  
17 stretchers?  
18 A. Sitting here now, no, I can't. But certainly, if I look  
19 back through my messages, within five minutes I could  
20 tell you whether I did or not.  
21 I mean, if it was an outcome of the BT Silver, then  
22 I'm almost certain I would have actioned it, because  
23 that is what the BT Silver is designed to do, and that's  
24 what -- an outcome that's required, you either have to  
25 ensure occurs or you go back and say, "Sorry, we can't".

1 MR PATTERSON: Thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

3 MS GALLAGHER: Nothing, thank you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Ms Boyd?

5 Questions by MS BOYD

6 MS BOYD: Mr Adams, just on that last point, please, could

7 we have up on the screen [LFB11-10]? The bottom third.

8 The entry at 11.36.59, an outgoing message, that's

9 coming from Control to you:

10 "The casualty handling unit is now available. Do

11 you wish it to attend?"

12 So does that mean that a request had been made for

13 it earlier but, as we know from other evidence at

14 Edgware, it had gone to Edgware?

15 A. Well, certainly it was on the predetermined attendance

16 at Edgware Road and I knew that, so it was a question of

17 when it had been released from Edgware Road, it was now

18 available for redeployment and, in fairness, Control may

19 have sent that message to Aldgate as well. I'm unaware.

20 Q. Mr Adams, can I go back to the beginning? It goes

21 without saying that the emergency services obviously

22 have different roles, albeit at an incident like this

23 everyone is trying to save lives.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The primary role of the London Fire Brigade is

1 firefighting and rescue?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. As I think you've said, you're likely to be working in  
4 potentially very dangerous environments?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So to what extent does that influence operational  
7 procedures and the way you work?

8 A. Well, I suppose, at the end of the day, operational  
9 procedures are designed to minimise the risk that our  
10 people face, and that really is why they are there and  
11 almost always, as I have indicated earlier, my belief is  
12 that most of them were designed as a result of things  
13 going wrong previously, and one would hope that, if your  
14 procedures are robust, you can minimise -- you clearly  
15 never eliminate all injuries, but you can certainly  
16 minimise them.

17 Q. So with those factors in mind, how important is it that  
18 your operational procedures are followed and commands  
19 given are complied with?

20 A. Well I suppose I -- I like to think that, within the  
21 organisation that we work, we've got a relatively loose  
22 way of operating around the fire station. When you get  
23 to an incident, it's a very, very structured, very, for  
24 want of better terms, strict working environment, and  
25 that is appropriate because, if you need somebody to do

1 something quickly, it needs to be done quickly, because  
2 the incidents or incidents in general are very dynamic  
3 and you may have one or two minutes to make a decision  
4 and, if you don't make that decision, or it's an  
5 incorrect decision, conditions can deteriorate very  
6 quickly.

7 Q. So to that extent, you're a very disciplined  
8 organisation?

9 A. Yes. In Some respects, I suppose, there's quite  
10 a synergy with the military approach.

11 Q. You also emphasised teamwork. So crews are used to  
12 working together and carrying out operational procedures  
13 together?

14 A. Absolutely, yes. I mean, that is the real ethos of our  
15 work protocols, yes.

16 Q. Working as a crew?

17 A. Working as groups, as teams, yes.

18 Q. We know that Leading Firefighter Roche arrived at 09.13  
19 with three other firefighters and we know from the  
20 evidence of Firefighters Shaw and Nutting and the read  
21 evidence of Leading Firefighter Roche that there was  
22 simply very little information to be gleaned at that  
23 point, no criticism intended. Obviously, one of the  
24 main problems with everyone was lack of communication  
25 from the tunnel to surface. So he had no information

1 and he wanted to investigate with breathing apparatus  
2 sub-surface.

3 Would that be the correct decision to make?

4 A. Well, I think when we take into account that Mr Roche  
5 had actually been called to a fire, so absolutely.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, can we just be clear here? By  
7 "sub-surface", Ms Boyd means platform as well as tunnel?  
8 So the decision was no one goes down even to the  
9 platform without breathing apparatus protocol being  
10 employed?

11 A. Most people's understanding, my Lady, of sub-surface  
12 working would be, as soon as you went through a door and  
13 down a flight of stairs, effectively into a basement,  
14 that is sub-surface working.

15 Now, clearly if it's a building with protective fire  
16 safety measures, it's potentially safer than walking  
17 into a London Underground train station which, by its  
18 very nature, has no doors. So there is nothing to keep  
19 smoke back and it is the smoke, the fire gases, that are  
20 the problem.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

22 MS BOYD: As we know, procedures dictated that a backup crew  
23 was required before a crew could actually start up the  
24 BA set and go into the tunnel?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Within six minutes we know that Leading  
2 Firefighter Roche called for backup. So he's gone into  
3 the station, ascertained that there's little or no  
4 information and, within six minutes, he's called for  
5 backup.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Ordinarily, could he have expected that backup to arrive  
8 within a short period of time?

9 A. Absolutely, and particularly in Central London, yes.

10 Q. As we know, there was a problem with the initial  
11 mobilisation with the primary attendance being sent to  
12 Euston Square, and I'm not going to ask you about that  
13 because that's going to be dealt with in February. We  
14 also know that a combination of all the incidents --  
15 traffic was very heavy, a number of witnesses have  
16 commented on that.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So as a result, that backup that he called for and could  
19 have expected within a short period of time didn't  
20 arrive?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. We've also heard that, in fact, due to the unprecedented  
23 nature of the incident and the combination of its  
24 location deep underground, the logistics and the sheer  
25 number of passengers on that train, it was 09.28 before

1 even the British Transport Police, who were already on  
2 King's Cross station when the bomb went off, were able  
3 to discover what had occurred in that carriage and  
4 report back. So by 09.30, it appears, from the evidence  
5 of Firefighters Shaw and Newton, that they met that  
6 inspector, Inspector Mingay who had been on the train,  
7 and were informed as to the terrible scene in that  
8 bombed carriage, and their evidence was that they  
9 couldn't actually do anything without backup.

10 So in other words, they had to wait for  
11 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor and further crews to  
12 arrive.

13 Leading Firefighter Roche then made pumps eight at  
14 09.36. The backup is already on its way.

15 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor arrives at about 9.40.

16 A. 9.40.

17 Q. When you arrived, you subsequently made pumps 12, so you  
18 ordered another four appliances, but do we understand it  
19 that there were sufficient resources to deal with the  
20 situation at that stage, what concerned you was the  
21 prospect of needing to rotate crews and have relief  
22 crews standing by?

23 A. That's correct, yes, and perhaps another thing in my  
24 thought process was, under the LESLP agreement, we also  
25 have to still attend potential calls that may well have

1 resulted in the outer cordon. So we establish the outer  
2 cordon, but we may still get calls within the outer  
3 cordon, and if we have a sufficient number of fire  
4 engines available within the outer cordon, then we can  
5 attend any other calls within the outer cordon more  
6 easily, and we routinely do this at stuff like  
7 Notting Hill Carnival, where we have vehicles that are  
8 deployed within the cordon to take account of that and  
9 we mobilise more locally rather than from or through  
10 Control.

11 Q. Did you also decide to manage the incident from the  
12 King's Cross end, although I think you established  
13 a sector at Russell Square? But was the decision, the  
14 command decision, to manage it from King's Cross, as it  
15 was easier to maintain that Command structure and, of  
16 course, the access and egress?

17 A. I think certainly from my mind -- and my recollections,  
18 the first Silver meeting that I attended -- I was very  
19 keen to manage everything through King's Cross and there  
20 were two reasons for that. My experience tells me,  
21 really, that if you can keep all of your structures as  
22 simple as you can get them, you've got less chance for  
23 things to go wrong and, secondly, from local knowledge,  
24 I knew -- I think it was mentioned a little while ago --  
25 but from local knowledge I knew that the access to the

1 platform at King's Cross, very straight escalators,  
2 quite wide, wide corridors, it was quite easy to get  
3 from the platform to the concourse, from the concourse  
4 to street level.

5 Russell Square I also had local knowledge of and  
6 I know there's an antiquated lift and spiral stairs with  
7 about 150, 200 stairs. And if you want to carry  
8 stretchers up a spiral staircase, it's not ideal.

9 So from my perspective, I thought it was best to try  
10 and manage everything from King's Cross.

11 I have to say that I did perhaps overestimate the  
12 distance between King's Cross and Russell Square and  
13 that was one of my concerns on arrival. We were getting  
14 reports of an explosion or an incident at  
15 Russell Square.

16 We knew that we had a train just outside of  
17 King's Cross station and I was thinking, "Have we got  
18 two trains involved on the Piccadilly southbound?" Our  
19 call had been to Euston Square/King's Cross which I knew  
20 wasn't Piccadilly Line, that's Metropolitan/Circle --

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't think we need to go further  
22 down this line, thank you.

23 A. Sorry.

24 MS BOYD: So you, as you say, decided to manage it from the  
25 King's Cross end?

1 A. Yes, it did seem more simple to do it that way.

2 Q. Just so we're clear on it, the London Fire Brigade were  
3 not initially called to Russell Square and I think later  
4 they were called -- the first call was from the police  
5 to attend at 10.33?

6 A. That's correct, yes. I mean, subsequently I think it  
7 was S013 decided that they wanted to remove the bodies  
8 from Russell Square and we did provide -- it's called  
9 a RART trolley, I think, which is a rescue and recovery  
10 thing.

11 Q. Later on in the incident?

12 A. We did manage that later on, yes.

13 Q. Just finally on the issue of ventilation, was one of the  
14 main problems getting an atmospheric assessment and  
15 getting a positive one that would --

16 A. Yes, yes. I mean, certainly, from my perspective, the  
17 concern was the potential for a chemical or a biological  
18 agent to be present. We could discount quite early on  
19 the radiological potential.

20 Q. I think also there was an issue as to whether there was  
21 asbestos?

22 A. That's right, because -- yes, yes.

23 MS BOYD: Thank you very much, Mr Adams.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Adams?

25 Thank you very much, Mr Adams. Those are all the

1 questions that we have for you.

2 A. Thank you very much indeed, thank you.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: 12.10.

4 (11.55 am)

5 (A short break)

6 (12.10 pm)

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

8 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Deputy  
9 Assistant Commissioner Cowup, please.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I spoke to Mr Suter during  
11 the break about the number of witnesses to be dealt with  
12 today. I appreciate a number of people are suffering  
13 from bugs and people need to get home. I can sit late,  
14 if necessary, but I don't, by doing so, wish to impose  
15 upon others to any great extent, so I leave it in your  
16 hands, in discussion with everybody else, as to what we  
17 should best do to get through the witnesses.

18 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady, that's very thoughtful.

19 DAC PETER LEONARD JOHN COWUP (sworn)

20 Questions by MR KEITH

21 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full  
22 name, please?

23 A. Peter Leonard John Cowup.

24 Q. Mr Cowup, you are now a deputy assistant commissioner,  
25 is that correct, in the London Fire Brigade?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. In July of 2004, you were commander, borough commander,  
3 for the Islington borough. Is that right?

4 A. That's also correct.

5 Q. That morning, you received a pager because, as we've  
6 heard just a few moments ago from Mr Adams, there are --  
7 there can come a time where an incident is so serious  
8 where senior officers are being called to attend, and  
9 that will trigger further pager messages to other senior  
10 officers to inform them of that fact. Is that right?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. I think we can see your pager call at [LFB11-4] at  
13 09.37.50. We can see there, 09.37.50, mobilised to the  
14 King's Cross tunnels, the Euston Square, this is the  
15 split attendance, of course. Over the page, F72, was  
16 that your call sign?

17 A. That's correct, that was my call sign at the time.  
18 I was actually paged before that time to be notified  
19 that ADO Ginty was attending an incident.

20 Q. Yes, but this was your mobilisation, in fact, because  
21 you then contacted Control and made yourself available,  
22 so to speak, and then you were mobilised to attend  
23 there. Is that correct?

24 A. This was the mobilisation message, but previously I'd  
25 been informed of an officer attending.

1 Q. As a very senior officer, you no doubt wanted to try to  
2 ascertain what information was available about the  
3 incident because you'd been notified about it. Were you  
4 initially able to glean from the Control anything about  
5 the nature of the incident?

6 A. When I got through to Control, I actually got through to  
7 our fallback control, which is based at Stratford.

8 Q. What is a fallback control?

9 A. It's a secondary control for use in the event that the  
10 primary control is disabled for any reason.

11 The people that answered the phone, or the person  
12 that answered the phone was able to give me some basic  
13 information about the incident. They also told me that  
14 there were two other serious incidents in progress on  
15 the Underground system and that they were related to  
16 power surges, as it was understood at the time, and in  
17 the course of the conversation, somebody at Edgware --  
18 sorry, Aldgate, had declared a major incident.

19 So I asked questions as to whether or not there was  
20 any perception that these calls were connected, that  
21 there might be a common issue, that there might be  
22 a terrorist attack, and I wasn't given any clear answers  
23 on those.

24 Q. Did you then attempt to contact your Brigade Resource  
25 Management Centre --

1 A. I did.

2 Q. -- according to your statement, to try to find out more  
3 information?

4 A. Absolutely.

5 Q. What is the Brigade Resource Management Centre?

6 A. Well, at the time, it was called Command Support Centre,  
7 and it was based at the Brigade's headquarters, and it  
8 had an operational role, in terms of coordinating our  
9 response to incidents, and given what I'd been told from  
10 Control about other incidents in progress, I was of the  
11 opinion that they may have some information around that  
12 bigger picture and whether or not the incidents were  
13 connected.

14 Q. You were then, as you've described, mobilised to attend  
15 an 8-pump fire at King's Cross. Did you receive any  
16 particular information about King's Cross in addition to  
17 that which you'd already been told?

18 A. I was actually mobilised to Euston Square, King's Cross  
19 tunnels.

20 Q. I'm going to come on to that in just a moment. I mean,  
21 generically, the incident in that area.

22 Did you receive any more information about what it  
23 was that had led the Fire Brigade to be called to attend  
24 an incident in that area?

25 A. Not at that time.

1 Q. Were you aware that it concerned smoke coming out of  
2 a platform?

3 A. I was called to fire and explosion, so I would have  
4 envisaged smoke being part of that. I wasn't  
5 specifically told there was smoke coming out of the  
6 tunnel or at platform level, but it would have been in  
7 my thought processes that smoke would be part of it,  
8 yes.

9 Q. As we've seen from the mobilisation, the call was to  
10 King's Cross tunnels, Euston Square, London, and that's  
11 the address to which you were mobilised.

12 Did you query that address because of a suspicion on  
13 your part that, in fact, King's Cross might have been  
14 the correct location?

15 A. I actually queried it because the previous pager message  
16 that I'd referred to earlier involving ADO Ginty, I was  
17 told he was attending King's Cross station and, given my  
18 local knowledge and the fact the stations are almost  
19 adjoining, I queried whether or not they were one and  
20 the same location.

21 So I had a doubt in my mind as to whether we had two  
22 serious incidents in progress. However, I don't know  
23 what Control know, and I had no reason, at that stage,  
24 to disbelieve that there was an incident at  
25 Euston Square. So I went to where I was mobilised.

1 Q. You had no option but to follow the message on the pager  
2 which was King's Cross tunnels, Euston Square?

3 A. We've always got an option, but I chose to follow the  
4 ordering from Control, because that's what we do.

5 Q. All right. When you -- we'll hear evidence, in due  
6 course, in February, about how the split attendance  
7 mobilising system worked and I won't trouble my Lady  
8 with that now.

9 When you arrived, you came across  
10 Senior Divisional Officer Adams, did you not, call sign  
11 G1?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. He was on his way to a -- to the first Silver meeting,  
14 according to your statement.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. We know that that meeting was at 10.30, so may we take  
17 it that it was shortly before then that you arrived?

18 A. I believe I arrived somewhere shortly after 10.00.

19 Q. He had, by then, been able to ascertain that there had  
20 been an explosion and that there had been numerous  
21 casualties, and no doubt he told you that?

22 A. He gave me a very short briefing that the incident was  
23 on the southbound Piccadilly Line, that there were  
24 numerous casualties involved, and he asked me if I would  
25 make pumps 12 and request as many stretchers as were

1 available.

2 Q. If we could have [LFB11-9], at 10.21.53 a call was sent  
3 through from Mr Adams. You may have seen that appear on  
4 the screen a few moments ago during the course of his  
5 evidence. Did you actually send that message or was it  
6 him?

7 A. I actually stood next to the person who sent it. As you  
8 can see in the third column, Foxtrot 69 is the call sign  
9 of ADO Marney, and he and I arrived together and met  
10 SDO Adams together, and then Dave Marney actually made  
11 the call from a telephone that was available on the  
12 station concourse.

13 Q. Did you similarly play a part in the sending of the  
14 message at 10.32.09, two further entries on, "make pumps  
15 12"?

16 A. No, I did not. As you can see from the third column,  
17 that was sent from our Control Unit, but I am aware  
18 that, previous to that, Dave Marney had sent "make pumps  
19 12" from the landline telephone on the station  
20 concourse, and I witnessed that directly.

21 Q. Right. How did you divide up the respective roles  
22 between yourself, Mr Adams, Mr Marney, who was an  
23 assistant divisional officer and, by this stage, I think  
24 Mr Munns would have been there, as well as an Assistant  
25 Divisional Officer Vincett? Was there a plain structure

1 in place?

2 A. There wasn't a structure in place when I arrived, but  
3 I saw one of my priorities, particularly in the fact  
4 that SDO Adams was going to a Silver meeting, that we  
5 needed to put some structure on the incident so that we  
6 could coordinate our efforts.

7 So I proceeded from the station concourse to the  
8 Control Unit. I got hold of some Sector Commander  
9 tabards and a Sector Commander's coordinator's tabard  
10 for myself, and some safety officer tabards.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, where was the Control Unit,  
12 Mr Cowup?

13 A. The Control Unit was located in Euston Road adjacent to  
14 King's Cross station.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

16 A. I then made my way down to platform level where I met  
17 ADO Vincett and he was effectively in charge already of  
18 what I will determine as the rescue area, although the  
19 train was obviously 200 metres into the tunnel, and  
20 I briefed him that I would want him to take up the role  
21 of Sector Commander and that he would be in charge of  
22 the rescue site. I asked him to ascertain how many live  
23 casualties were on the train, whether or not it was one  
24 train or more trains involved, to provide a situation  
25 report to myself.

1 I then said that I would be returning to the surface  
2 in order to coordinate the provision of equipment and  
3 additional resources as required.

4 On my way back up, I met ADO Munns and I designated  
5 him as Sector Commander to take charge of the concourse  
6 area with a view to that becoming a holding area and  
7 almost a forward control point, and then, when  
8 I returned to the surface, ADO Ginty had already been  
9 arranging equipment and resources from the fire engines  
10 and I formally asked him to take control of that area on  
11 the surface and to bring all of that equipment to  
12 a holding area, which, as I say, he'd already started to  
13 do, and we also set up holding areas for Ambulance  
14 Service equipment as well.

15 Q. There were a number of senior officers there,  
16 therefore --

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. -- and you appeared to have divided out the whole of the  
19 King's Cross area into various sectors. So Mr Ginty at  
20 the top of the main staircase, Mr Munns on the concourse  
21 and Mr Vincett on the platform.

22 A. Mm-hmm.

23 Q. What were they actually doing in terms of directing or  
24 commanding the firefighters, and where were the  
25 firefighters? Do you recollect? Were they all engaged

1 on the train or were they stretchering throughout all  
2 the sectors?

3 A. When I arrived on the platform level, several seriously  
4 injured casualties were being brought from the track up  
5 onto the platform where I believed they were being  
6 triaged. I was told that we had crews on the train and  
7 I was told that Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor was in  
8 charge of those crews.

9 One of the things I gave to Steve Vincett in my  
10 brief was a view that if, when he'd told me how many  
11 lives casualties were remaining, if the incident was of  
12 sufficient size and complexity -- in other words, if  
13 there was a lot of live casualties remaining --  
14 I envisaged the need to further subdivide the train into  
15 separate sectors.

16 So at that stage, I made him in overall command of  
17 the rescue area, which included the train and the  
18 platform, but I gave him the understanding that, if the  
19 incident -- if, when he gathered more information, and  
20 when the situation became clearer, we had a more  
21 complicated scene, that I envisaged subdividing that  
22 area, probably by carriage, into separate sectors, and  
23 in fact, later on, we did establish a fourth sector at  
24 the front of the train to search for casualties that may  
25 have got off the train and then subsequently found their

1 way on to the line.

2 Q. These proceedings are primarily concerned with the  
3 deaths that occurred in the first carriage. So I'm  
4 concerned primarily with the role of the firefighters  
5 insofar as they were able to assist in that first  
6 carriage.

7 What practical benefit did the sub-division of the  
8 King's Cross area into sector commands have on the  
9 ability of the firefighters to get into the first  
10 carriage and bring out the very seriously wounded, of  
11 which my Lady has heard a great deal of evidence about  
12 how heroically and bravely the firefighters did that  
13 role?

14 A. The idea of sectorisation is to reduce people's span of  
15 control to something that's manageable. So whilst the  
16 incident was left in one big, homogenous block, it would  
17 have been difficult for SDO Adams or any other officer  
18 to take overall command. By establishing sectors, it  
19 allows people to focus their efforts and their attention  
20 on one particular aspect of the scene.

21 Now, clearly, in this case, the most important  
22 aspect was what was happening on the train and  
23 subsequently on the platform, but that wouldn't be  
24 successful if those people weren't supported by people  
25 above them, both on the concourse area and on the

1 surface.

2 Q. What practical support were those commanders bringing to  
3 bear on Mr Colebrook-Taylor inside the carriage? That's  
4 what I'm driving at.

5 A. The role of the Sector Commander is to manage that area.  
6 The practical support would have been to ask whether he  
7 had sufficient resources.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. As I've already explained, when I gave my brief to  
10 Mr Vincett, part of what I asked him to do was check how  
11 many casualties we have, check whether we had sufficient  
12 people and equipment, and that I would supply additional  
13 firefighters and equipment as required.

14 What we don't want at this kind of incident is a lot  
15 of freelancing going on and firefighters acting  
16 independently, perhaps to the detriment of the overall  
17 success of the incident.

18 Q. So did you receive requests to send extra firefighters  
19 into the carriage and the train, and did you meet those  
20 requests?

21 A. Subsequently, requests were met for both extra  
22 firefighters and equipment and they were met as and when  
23 they were received.

24 Q. In terms of equipment, your statement records how you  
25 did receive a request, an urgent request, for stretchers

1 to be brought to the incident. Do you recall who  
2 relayed that request to you? Did it come from  
3 Mr Colebrook-Taylor, and what were you able to do to  
4 meet that request?

5 A. My only recollection of a request for stretchers was  
6 from SDO Adams quite soon after I arrived at the  
7 incident. That request was relayed to our Control by  
8 ADO Marney. There was, to my recollection, no  
9 subsequent request for stretchers once I'd established  
10 the structure, the sector structure, that we've just  
11 spoken about.

12 Q. Do you know whether or not stretchers were provided to  
13 the train from equipment dumps established in the  
14 station as opposed to being brought in from outside by  
15 way of, perhaps, a casualty equipment lorry?

16 A. I never saw the casualty equipment lorry, but I am  
17 aware, as I said earlier, we had equipment areas for  
18 both Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service. I am aware  
19 that the Ambulance Service had a number of stretchers  
20 available in their equipment area and I am aware that  
21 some of that equipment went forward to assist in the  
22 removal of casualties.

23 Q. Mr Vincett, who was in charge of the sector on the  
24 platform -- Sector Commander on the platform, was asked  
25 by you to try and establish the number of live

1 casualties, the number of carriages involved and,  
2 presumably, the number of fatalities, because you knew  
3 there were fatalities on your arrival.

4 A. Mm-hmm.

5 Q. That information was being sought by you around about  
6 10.15, 10.30, when Mr Adams had gone off to the Silver  
7 meeting and you were establishing sector commands round  
8 the station. Were you surprised to have to seek that  
9 sort of basic information at 10.30, really, by now,  
10 quite a long time after the incident? Did that indicate  
11 that there had been a lack of information coming back to  
12 you from the carriage itself?

13 A. I didn't take it to mean that. The reason I asked for  
14 it, it was obviously a very dynamic incident, and the  
15 number of live casualties would have been changing -- in  
16 terms of the number of live casualties on the train,  
17 that would have been changing all the time, as  
18 casualties were rescued.

19 So my priority was: how many casualties are left on  
20 the train, are they trapped, and what resources and  
21 equipment and appliances and equipment do we need in  
22 order to release those live casualties?

23 So that's why I asked the question. It didn't --

24 Q. Right. So it was a consistent flow of information?

25 A. Exactly. It didn't imply that there had been no

1 previous assessment, because I'm sure there had.

2 Q. In essence, you were looking for updates rather than  
3 a one-off supply of information?

4 A. Absolutely.

5 Q. Did you sense that there were delays in getting  
6 information to you because of the lack of a direct  
7 communication from the carriage itself to the senior  
8 officers on the surface? Everything had to be relayed,  
9 did it not, by runners through the carriage, through the  
10 tunnel, through the platform and up?

11 A. As a result of conversations held subsequently, I am  
12 aware that there was no or very poor radio communication  
13 between the train and the platform. However, between  
14 the platform and myself there was continual radio  
15 communication. Sometimes it was direct between myself  
16 and ADO Vincett, other times, it was via ADO Munns, who  
17 was in an intermediate position.

18 I wasn't, at the time, aware that we had  
19 a particular problem with communications from the  
20 platform to the train.

21 Q. Two further matters, if I may. Firstly, did you give  
22 instructions to Assistant Divisional Officer Vincett  
23 concerning the fact that persons inside the carriage and  
24 parts of the carriage should be moved as little as  
25 possible because of the potential for it to become

1 a crime scene?

2 A. I did.

3 Q. Secondly, was there a disagreement concerning the  
4 declaration of the scene as a sterile area and for  
5 operations to be suspended on the train before you were  
6 confident that all the live casualties had been brought  
7 out?

8 A. I became aware through -- I think it was directly  
9 through ADO Vincett, that a police officer at the  
10 platform or on the train wished to declare the area  
11 sterile. I wasn't personally satisfied that all live  
12 casualties were accounted for and, in particular, I was  
13 concerned about casualties that may have self-rescued  
14 from the train and then found themselves on the track,  
15 and obviously felt it was imperative that we check, not  
16 just the train, but the track as well.

17 I wasn't satisfied that that area had been  
18 thoroughly searched. I therefore questioned that  
19 decision. I raised it through SDO Adams and  
20 ACO Collins. I believe it was discussed at one of the  
21 Silver meetings. As a result, I believe the decision to  
22 declare the train and the track a sterile area was  
23 subsequently delayed whilst that search was carried out.

24 Q. So that we're clear, this isn't an issue as to whether  
25 or not rescuers were withdrawn from the train or

1 considered to be withdrawn from the train before all the  
2 casualties were brought out. This was a question of  
3 whether or not, technically, the area was to be declared  
4 a sterile area once it was believed that the first  
5 carriage was empty.

6 There was no consideration ever given, was there, to  
7 all the rescuers being withdrawn before the live  
8 casualties were brought out of the first carriage?

9 A. The situation you're referring to occurred quite late  
10 into the incident.

11 Q. After, informally, you realised that all the walking  
12 wounded and the seriously injured were out but, before,  
13 it was technically a crime scene area?

14 A. I didn't quite see it like that. This was at a time  
15 when all of the live casualties that were readily  
16 apparent had been rescued.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. But it was also at a time when we weren't certain that  
19 all the live casualties were rescued and I wanted to be  
20 certain, or as certain as you can be in these  
21 circumstances.

22 Q. May we look, lastly, at two documents, please, with  
23 which you were concerned at the time? LFB16 [LFB16-2], which is  
24 an email dated 8 July.

25 On the bottom half of the page, "Peter Cowup". The

1 day after, you sent an email reflecting on the events of  
2 the previous day, and at number 1 you deal with the fact  
3 that a significant proportion of the resources mobilised  
4 were sent to the wrong location.

5 I'm not going to trouble you with that, because that  
6 is an issue that will be addressed in February  
7 concerning the mobilisation system.

8 But at number 2 [LFB16-1], do you make a reference there to  
9 the fact, as you've just described, that the tunnel was  
10 declared a sterile area before, in your opinion, you  
11 were absolutely certain that the live casualties were  
12 out?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Then over the page, at 3, do you deal with  
15 ventilation --

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just pausing there, tunnel  
17 actually declared a sterilised -- in fact, I think  
18 you've just told me that, because you questioned it, the  
19 decision was actually delayed?

20 A. That's correct, my Lady.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think that statement in your email,  
22 given email protocols, probably isn't exactly accurate.

23 So it wasn't actually declared --

24 A. An officer at Bronze level operating on the platform or  
25 on the train I believe unilaterally effectively declared

1 the area sterile and --

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I see. You had it revisited?

3 A. -- I had that decision revisited, yes.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That wasn't quite what I'd noted,  
5 very well, thank you.

6 A. That's correct.

7 MR KEITH: Then the ventilation, we've heard evidence from  
8 Mr Adams concerning this. You express regret that  
9 I think only one fan from the 12-pump incident  
10 attendance was made available, but that, due to the  
11 happy coincidence of contractors working on the  
12 Channel Tunnel rail link next door, further equipment  
13 was made available, including dust masks, lighting,  
14 generators, et cetera?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. After these events, do you know whether or not the  
17 provision of such equipment on appliances was revisited  
18 and re-examined by London Fire Brigade?

19 A. The Brigade has increased the number of fans available  
20 and they're now carried as part of our urban search and  
21 rescue capability, and there are fans on one of the  
22 urban search and rescue modules. So we've got a greater  
23 capacity now than we had at 7/7.

24 Q. Could we also look at LFB62 [LFB62-1], which is a document  
25 relating to the debrief on 14 July? We can see

1 14 July -- I won't take you to it -- on the last page.

2 A. The actual debrief was held on 14 July. The incident  
3 was obviously on 7 July.

4 Q. Yes, I think I said the debrief was on 14 July.

5 A. Sorry, I misheard you.

6 Q. In this document which you prepared, you summarise  
7 things you did well and things that could have been done  
8 better.

9 At the bottom of that page:

10 "En route/arrival", you make reference to  
11 mobilisation messages and Command, and delays setting up  
12 the incident command pump.

13 Could you just summarise for us what your concerns  
14 were based on the material made available in the debrief  
15 session in relation to the Command and the lack of  
16 a Command in the early stages?

17 A. These were not my comments. These were the comments of  
18 firefighters from Islington that attended the incident.

19 Q. Yes, you summarised them, you relayed them.

20 A. I recorded them.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Obviously, in this report. From -- obviously, it's not  
23 clear from the comment itself, but from the discussion  
24 that accompanied the comment, I'm aware that, when crews  
25 from Islington arrived, there was nobody on the surface

1 to provide them with any information about the incident,  
2 and the normal expectation would be that you would be  
3 met by somebody on the surface that would give some  
4 indication of the nature of the incident.

5 So that's what the second comment down refers to  
6 specifically, is that there was no Incident Commander --  
7 the abbreviation "IC" is "Incident Commander" --  
8 available on the surface to arrived crews -- and they  
9 happened to have been from Islington, but they could  
10 have been from anywhere -- that arrived at the incident.

11 The other comment relating to the Incident Command  
12 pump, again, is actually part of what you would expect  
13 in the early stages of an incident, particularly an  
14 incident such as this, which provides an early point of  
15 coordination to an incident, and my understanding from  
16 listening to the crews that were at this debrief, that  
17 Incident Command pump was not established when they  
18 arrived.

19 Q. There was, it seemed to you, based on what you were  
20 told, something of a gap, because, from reverse, between  
21 10.00 and 10.30, a substantial number of quite senior  
22 officers attended -- yourself, Mr Adams, Mr Munns,  
23 Mr Vincett, Mr Ginty. The first crew had arrived at  
24 9.13 and a second crew at 9.42. There were no senior  
25 officers present, perhaps due to the traffic and also

1 because of the mobilisation issue, officers being sent  
2 to Euston Square rather than to King's Cross. So the  
3 initial fire appliances had to make do on their own and  
4 operate their own initiative as opposed to being  
5 directed to act in a particular way by any senior  
6 commander that had first taken command.

7 That was the issue, wasn't it, there was a slight  
8 break between the arrival of the crews and the arrival  
9 of commanders who could give directions and, if  
10 necessary, override protocols or perceived ways of  
11 thinking?

12 A. As was made quite clear in the debrief document, nothing  
13 here was intended to be critical.

14 Q. No, no.

15 A. When those crews arrived, they obviously had -- they  
16 were faced with an overwhelming situation with a very  
17 short -- a very small amount of resources to deal with  
18 it. So it's difficult for me, as someone who arrived  
19 later, to pass any real judgment on that.

20 All those comments reflect is the fact that, on  
21 arrival, some of the things that we would normally  
22 expect were not in place.

23 Q. Mr Cowup, I wasn't intending to be critical and you will  
24 note that my question was phrased in terms of "Was there  
25 a gap?" I haven't sought to criticise the firefighters

1 for the decisions they took.

2 If the mobilisation system had worked perhaps a bit  
3 better -- through no one's fault, that was just the way  
4 that the computer system operated at the time -- there  
5 might have been more senior commanders on the scene  
6 earlier who could have given plainer and clearer  
7 directions to those limited firefighters who had arrived  
8 early, perhaps to tell them to get down into the tunnel  
9 or to go out and get information, in the absence of  
10 which they had to wait for a second appliance to arrive  
11 before they could depart from the breathing apparatus  
12 protocol. That's the point.

13 A. And that's understood.

14 Q. Were you aware, when you arrived, that firefighters were  
15 being called upon to remove the doors between the first  
16 and second carriages to assist getting paramedics into  
17 that first carriage?

18 A. I wasn't specifically being made aware of that  
19 particular action, no.

20 Q. But have you subsequently found out that the ability of  
21 the Fire Brigade to remove those doors, in order to get  
22 access to the first carriage, had to await the arrival  
23 of the second appliance, because no firefighters could  
24 go to the train before the second appliance arrived?

25 A. I've become aware of that in the aftermath. I was not

1 aware of that at the time.

2 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. I have no further  
3 questions.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

5 Questions by MR COLTART

6 MR COLTART: Two short matters, please, Mr Cowup.

7 Can I just check, have you been in court while Mr Adams  
8 gave his evidence earlier this morning?

9 A. I was.

10 Q. Good, thank you, that will help shorten matters.

11 Something he said in answer to questions from

12 Ms Boyd was that there was a conscious decision taken at

13 King's Cross to manage the situation from the London

14 Fire Brigade perspective from King's Cross rather than

15 Russell Square.

16 A. Mm-hmm.

17 Q. Is that how you recollect matters unfolding that  
18 morning?

19 A. Absolutely, yes.

20 Q. How much did you know about what was happening at  
21 Russell Square?

22 A. Not very much, to be honest, certainly not in the early

23 stages. I was aware that the train was headed towards

24 Russell Square. I was aware that there was the

25 possibility that casualties may have self-rescued and

1 headed in that direction as opposed to coming back  
2 towards King's Cross, and that's the reason that we  
3 established the fourth sector and that's the reason that  
4 I asked for that section of tunnel to be searched.

5 Q. Did you ever receive any information from your  
6 colleagues in the London Ambulance Service who were  
7 attending at Russell Square as to the enormous  
8 difficulties which they were facing at this time?

9 A. I personally do not recollect receiving any information  
10 from London Ambulance Service in that regard, but to be  
11 fair, if it had been expressed at the incident, it would  
12 have been expressed in the Silver meeting forum, which  
13 is not a meeting that I attended personally.

14 Q. But there was no confusion in your mind or in the mind  
15 of your colleagues that Russell Square was the other end  
16 of that tunnel rather than any other station?

17 A. I was aware from an early stage that the next station  
18 down on the line, on the tunnel that we were responding  
19 to, was Russell Square, yes.

20 Q. I just want to ask you about this passage. In the  
21 witness statement of Leading Firefighter Doig --  
22 I suspect I haven't pronounced that correctly --

23 A. You have pronounced that correctly.

24 Q. For my Lady's note, this is INQ4276. He describes the  
25 situation right at the end of the evacuation of carriage

1 number 1 -- which is, as we know, some time shortly  
2 before 11.00 -- where he's in the tunnel at the head of  
3 the train and he's just had some dealings with the body  
4 of Shelley Mather, who was one of the victims, who was  
5 lying out on a stretcher at the front of that train, and  
6 he says this:  
7 "I then saw a paramedic walking towards me from what  
8 I now know to be Russell Square station. When I asked  
9 where he had come from, he told me Euston Square.  
10 I asked if he was sure, as I had come from that station  
11 myself, but he was insistent. He said that  
12 a short-circuiting device had been laid and there was  
13 a large amount of police and paramedics waiting. With  
14 this in mind, I decided the best place to operate the  
15 rescue and recovery trolley was from what I thought was  
16 Euston Square."  
17 He then goes on to describe his journey back up to  
18 the surface. He says this:  
19 "Firefighter Daniels, who had lost her own crew,  
20 came with us and I told Divisional Officer Cowup that we  
21 needed to take the Fire and Rescue Unit to  
22 Euston Square. We relocated to Euston Square, but  
23 immediately became aware that it was, again, the wrong  
24 station. We relocated to Russell Square, by which time  
25 the Underground had been closed off."

1 Do you recall that conversation with Leading  
2 Firefighter Doig?

3 A. I don't recall that conversation, no.

4 Q. If he had informed you that he was intending to relocate  
5 to Euston Square, presumably you would have been in  
6 a position to point out the error of his ways?

7 A. Absolutely.

8 Q. But in circumstances where he'd already been there once,  
9 wrongly, at the beginning of the incident, he was going  
10 there again at the end of it.

11 Is that symptomatic of the confusion, perhaps, which  
12 reigned that day as far as your communications were  
13 concerned?

14 A. I can't really speculate on what was going through  
15 Leading Firefighter Doig's mind. I don't recollect the  
16 conversation with him and I certainly don't recollect  
17 him saying to me that he was going to go to  
18 Russell Square because -- sorry, Euston Square, because,  
19 if he had have done, I would have explained that we  
20 weren't on that line. Euston Square is not on the  
21 Piccadilly Line, as you well know.

22 So I would have definitely challenged that and not  
23 allowed him to proceed from King's Cross to  
24 Euston Square. I can't explain -- if he did that,  
25 I can't explain why he did that, because I'm assuming

1 from what you've read and the timescales -- and I know  
2 it's dangerous to assume, but I shall anyway -- that  
3 that was fairly late into the incident, when I think we  
4 were all clear that the incident wasn't at  
5 Euston Square.

6 Q. To the extent that he recalls discussing that with you  
7 before he set off, that's not something which accords  
8 with your own recollection?

9 A. I can't recall having a direct conversation with Leading  
10 Firefighter Doig.

11 Q. The second topic we can take shortly in the light of the  
12 evidence we've heard from Mr Adams this morning.

13 You undertook your own debrief, as we've seen.

14 We've just had a look at the document. That was in  
15 accordance with the procedures and the protocols which  
16 had been put in place by the London Fire Brigade. Who  
17 was your opposite number at the City of Westminster  
18 borough at that time?

19 A. I believe it was Divisional Officer Chandler, but  
20 I can't be certain that he was in post at that time.

21 Q. Did you ever have any discussions with him about  
22 a debrief for the Soho crews?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. Were you ever aware that they hadn't been the subject of  
25 any debrief?

1 A. No, I was not.

2 Q. Were you ever asked, as one of the senior officers who  
3 had attended on that day, to engage in a review of the  
4 breathing apparatus protocol which had been implemented  
5 by Leading Firefighter Roche?

6 A. I was not invited to be part of any review or protocol.

7 Q. Whether in writing or by attending any meetings?

8 A. Not in any way, shape or form, no.

9 MR COLTART: Thank you.

10 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

11 MR PATTERSON: No, thank you.

12 MS GALLAGHER: No, thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

14 Questions by MS BOYD

15 MS BOYD: Just one question in relation to that, Officer.

16 I think you attended a PRC as well as doing the  
17 debrief that we've seen the document for?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Either during the debrief and the obvious -- the answer  
20 to my question is obvious from the document itself, but  
21 also during the PRC, was the BA procedure a factor that  
22 was flagged up at all?

23 A. No, breathing apparatus -- I don't recall breathing  
24 apparatus coming up during the PRC and I don't recall it  
25 being raised as an issue during the debrief, because,

1 obviously, reasonably early on it was established that  
2 breathing apparatus wasn't required and, therefore,  
3 I don't recall anyone raising an issue about breathing  
4 apparatus or breathing apparatus policy at either the  
5 PRC or at the debrief we held at Islington.

6 Q. If it had been a factor affecting command of the  
7 operation, would you have expected it to have been  
8 raised at the PRC?

9 A. Absolutely. If it had been raised at the PRC as an  
10 issue, which is primarily about command but obviously  
11 does inevitably look at what's happened in terms of  
12 tactics, it would have gone forward as part of -- as  
13 issues always do from PRC, in terms of: do we need to  
14 review our policy or procedure?

15 I'm not aware that it was raised -- in fact, I'm  
16 very confident it wasn't raised at the PRC and it wasn't  
17 raised during the debrief at Islington.

18 Q. Thank you. Finally, having set up the Command structure  
19 that you told us about with ADO Vincett on the platform  
20 and in charge of rescue, are you satisfied that there  
21 were sufficient resources on the train and that there  
22 was a system quickly established for getting casualties  
23 up top? We've heard of a sort of pulley system of  
24 firefighters and other emergency personnel evacuating  
25 casualties up top?

1 A. I'm satisfied that we had sufficient resources on the  
2 train. One of the points I made to ADO Vincett during  
3 the briefing was that, as further resources were  
4 required, he should ask for them and I would ensure that  
5 they were brought forward. Some requests did come, but  
6 not that indicated there was any shortage of personnel  
7 or equipment on the train.

8 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can I just go back to Ms Boyd's  
10 questions about breathing apparatus, because quite a lot  
11 has been made of the decision to implement the breathing  
12 apparatus protocol.

13 Had you been sent directly there and you'd arrived  
14 and you'd found out that the decision had been taken  
15 that, before any Fire Brigade enquiries could take  
16 place, breathing apparatus was required, does an officer  
17 of your rank have the discretion to say, "Even so, given  
18 all that I'm going to see, I'm going to say, yes, my men  
19 and women must go down in breathing apparatus, but I'm  
20 not going to wait for backup", or would you, even at  
21 your rank, be obliged to wait for another appliance?

22 A. I don't think this issue is a matter of rank. I think  
23 it's a matter of safety and it's a matter of being  
24 effective as well. There's always a tension between us  
25 acting in a way that's seen to save lives quickly and us

1 acting in a way that's safe, but I think what's  
2 important is to recognise that dead or injured  
3 firefighters won't save lives.

4 So on this occasion, I have given some thought to  
5 the actions of others and, although I wasn't there and,  
6 therefore, I'm commenting with hindsight, I would say  
7 that the decision not to deploy when you've only got  
8 a crew of two was wholly the right decision.

9 It's not a decision that I would have varied in any  
10 way, shape or form, and that's not just to preserve the  
11 safety of firefighters, but it's also to ensure that  
12 those firefighters are available to carry out a more  
13 effective and safe rescue when the right level of  
14 resources is available, which clearly, for a station of  
15 the size and complexity of King's Cross, two  
16 firefighters in BA is wholly inadequate.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Those two being because one stays  
18 with the appliance, one is the man making the decision  
19 and so you only have the two available to go --

20 A. That's correct, my Lady.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Having said that -- and I do  
22 understand why you took the trouble to say that --  
23 can I go back to my question? When it comes to any  
24 protocol, presumably there is always scope for an  
25 element of discretion, where presumably it becomes

1 easier, the higher your rank, to take perhaps braver  
2 decisions?

3 A. We have a system in place called dynamic risk  
4 assessment. So all of our people, including leading  
5 firefighters upwards, are trained to make judgments.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is that because the leading  
7 firefighter is going to be on each appliance; in other  
8 words, they're going to be the one who, at the scene,  
9 will be making decisions before senior officers come?

10 A. A leading firefighter or crew manager, as we now  
11 describe that rank, is in charge of all appliances.  
12 Some appliances have watch commanders or station  
13 officers or sub-officers, as it was then, in charge.  
14 But the minimum rank in charge of an appliance is a crew  
15 manager.

16 So clearly they need to be able to make decisions.  
17 Those decisions -- I'd always expect those decisions to  
18 be informed by our policies and procedures. But to  
19 answer your question directly, have they got the licence  
20 to go outside of those policies and procedures? On the  
21 basis of a dynamic risk assessment, on the basis of  
22 a judgment at the time, if they felt it was safe and  
23 effective to do so, the answer's "yes".

24 In this particular case, given the nature of the  
25 original call, given what I've heard they were faced

1 with on arrival, which is people with blackened faces,  
2 clearly in great distress, I think it is wholly  
3 reasonable to assume that there was either fire, smoke  
4 or both in the tunnel, possibly on the train, and that  
5 you would want to make your initial reconnaissance  
6 utilising crews in breathing apparatus.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. I don't know if anybody wants  
8 to ask any questions as a result of my questioning?

9 MR KEITH: No, thank you, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Cowup.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you very much.

12 A. Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As we had a delayed mid-morning break  
14 shall we go on a little?

15 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes, we can certainly make a start on  
16 Mr Nasmyth-Miller, who is here.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As he's struggled through the  
18 weather, we'd better make it worth his while he made it  
19 before lunch.

20 MR KEITH: Quite so.

21 THE WITNESS: My Lady, please accept my apologies for being  
22 late.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No apologies are necessary. I've  
24 expressed my gratitude for everybody getting here at  
25 all, so thank you for making the effort.

1 INSPECTOR DAVID NASMYTH-MILLER (sworn)  
2 Questions by MR KEITH  
3 MR KEITH: Officer, could you give the court your full name  
4 and your rank, please?  
5 A. Inspector David Nasmyth-Miller, I'm currently attached  
6 to the Territorial Support Group's dedicated CBRN unit.  
7 Q. On Thursday, 7 July, were you in uniform as a duty  
8 officer with the call sign EK1?  
9 A. Yes, I was.  
10 Q. Based at Kentish Town police station in Camden?  
11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
12 Q. That morning, you started to hear, over your personal  
13 radio, references to smoke coming out of a tunnel at  
14 King's Cross?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Did you, therefore, get in your car and try to go  
17 straight there?  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 Q. When you arrived, there were, as we've heard, a great  
20 deal -- a great deal or many people outside the station  
21 concourse at pavement level, and I think amongst them  
22 you met some other police officers.  
23 A. Initially, when I turned up, there weren't as many  
24 people as I would have expected, there were still quite  
25 a few, being that it was a rush hour point of time, and

1 the people I actually met first were actually some of my  
2 own officers who had just arrived just in front of me.

3 Q. I'd like you to look, please, at a document INQ9450 [INQ9450-1].  
4 It's the incident management log. We can see that it  
5 was completed by Police Sergeant Probert. Towards the  
6 bottom of the page, you'll see "Incident manager Silver,  
7 Chief Superintendent McCafferty", from whom we heard  
8 this morning, "Bronze, Inspector Nasmyth-Miller".  
9 You arrived, we can see from the following page [INQ9450-2] --  
10 sorry, one more page further on [INQ9450-3] -- some time around  
11 about 09.05 because, if you look at the screen, you'll  
12 see time of arrival at scene 09.05 and your name there.

13 A. Yes, that's correct. I believe that was actually made  
14 after the event when we got back to the station. The  
15 actual start of the log was the next page on because it  
16 was very dynamic at that point in time.

17 Q. Let's go one further page on [INQ9450-4] , please. It doesn't, in  
18 fact, have a time on it. But you recollect those being  
19 the first decisions that you made?

20 A. Yes, indeed.

21 Q. We know that Chief Superintendent McCafferty didn't  
22 arrive at King's Cross until about 9.45. Were you,  
23 therefore, in essence, the commander at the scene for  
24 the first half an hour or so after your arrival?

25 A. In essence, that would be correct or, in my assumption

1 at that time, yes, I would have been. However, I know  
2 there was activity going on underneath and I didn't know  
3 what structure was in place.

4 Q. Yes. But the log records you as Bronze and him as  
5 Silver. But in truth, that was only after he had  
6 arrived. Prior to his arrival, you were effectively  
7 Silver, you were in tactical charge at the scene?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Your aims, could we have a look at those, please?  
10 [INQ9450-2], so back a page.

11 Were those aims that you had in your mind on your  
12 arrival at the scene: preservation of life; evacuation  
13 of station; cordons; reassurance; maintain integrity of  
14 crime scene?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. Were they in that sequential order, so the first  
17 priority was to save lives and rescue people from the  
18 train?

19 A. The first priority is always to protect and preserve  
20 life, and that's not always to actually do the rescuing,  
21 but quite often to make a permissive environment for the  
22 Fire Rescue Service or the Ambulance Service to conduct  
23 that.

24 Q. So what was your priority in terms of the practical  
25 steps that you were going to take on your arrival?

1 A. My first arrival was to find out actually what happened.  
2 I do recall on the route on the way down to the station  
3 I was told that it was a power surge. We didn't  
4 actually know what had actually occurred, and bear in  
5 mind, when I turned -- came out from, I think it was  
6 Eversholt Street turning in towards Euston Road, the  
7 normal flow of route that you would take was absolutely  
8 solid all the way back, so I've had to go on the  
9 opposite side. So I know that anyone else trying to  
10 attend there would have had the same difficulty. So  
11 it's trying to make a -- a sort of clear environment for  
12 vehicles to turn up and everyone to respond to -- that's  
13 the initial stage -- and clear the concourse.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: By "opposite side", you were on the  
15 wrong side of the road?

16 A. I was on the wrong side of the dual carriageway, yes,  
17 ma'am.

18 MR KEITH: What about the attendance of your fellow  
19 emergency services? Do you recollect turning your mind  
20 to whether or not the Ambulance Service had been called  
21 or whether or not there were enough ambulance personnel  
22 on-site?

23 A. When I turned up, there was no one else on-site from any  
24 other of the emergency services. I believe shortly  
25 afterwards, having viewed the CCTV, that a Fire Brigade

1 tender turned up straight behind me, and the Ambulance  
2 Service turned up shortly afterwards.

3 Q. Had you, in fact, confirmed with your control room that  
4 the London Ambulance Service was en route?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. There is another document over and above the incident  
7 log, a CAD, CAD 2376. We know that's the computer-aided  
8 dispatch record for King's Cross. Could we have  
9 [INQ10111-1]?

10 At 09.14.35, so in the middle of the page, we can  
11 see there:

12 "EK1, there's been a collision between Tube trains,  
13 Euston Road needs to be closed down, we also need LAS."

14 EK1 was you, as you've confirmed?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. Was that a message that you sent?

17 A. Yes, it was.

18 Q. Did you send that shortly after your arrival as you were  
19 grappling both with difficulties in getting traffic or  
20 emergency services to the scene and also because of your  
21 concern about the absence, at that stage, of the London  
22 Ambulance Service?

23 A. Yes, it's also to confirm that they were on their way.  
24 Because I had little information of what had actually  
25 occurred and what was happening, it was trying to

1 reconfirm that things were being put into motion.

2 Q. Perhaps we can stay with this document and we'll just  
3 establish briefly the course of the decisions that you  
4 made.

5 If you could go to the following page [INQ10111-2], 09.18.56,  
6 EK1, top line -- sorry, it's the line above, I was  
7 confused by the yellow:

8 "We will need an area nominated for injured parties,  
9 witnesses."

10 In fact, that's a follow-on from a previous message,  
11 the time for which is on the previous page. Did you,  
12 fairly soon after your arrival, start addressing the  
13 issue of triage and where the casualties were to be put  
14 while they were treated?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. At 09.23.26:

17 "EK1, any person coming out of the station to be  
18 directed to [the] ticket office for first aid."

19 You set aside, did you not, the ticket office for  
20 a sterile environment for persons to be treated?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. At 09.27.01 you ordered Euston Road to be shut down.

23 At 09.30.40, you asked for EXPO, explosives search  
24 dogs.

25 At 09.34:

1 "EK1 gold badge please."

2 What did that mean?

3 A. That's the bus service, because you also have the larger  
4 impact where buses will be out of place, people wanting  
5 to know where they're going to go to who aren't actually  
6 involved in the incident. So you try to get one of  
7 their staff to take down to take control of that.

8 Q. You were essentially trying to clear passengers from the  
9 area and trying to ensure that only the emergency  
10 services would be present at King's Cross?

11 A. That's correct, because the buses would all have to be  
12 diverted and somebody would need to take control over  
13 that.

14 Q. At 09.44.25, at the bottom of the page:

15 "3 double decker buses will be parked outside  
16 McDonalds, Euston Road ..."

17 Tell us about, please, the decision to order double  
18 decker buses?

19 A. To be honest, I actually can't take credit for that. It  
20 was actually someone from the Ambulance Service who  
21 suggested that would be the best place for some of  
22 the -- the amount of injured people who were going to be  
23 coming up. So one of the ideas was we could utilise  
24 double decker buses. So I tasked someone to find me  
25 three double decker buses and park them outside the

1 McDonalds at York Way, and so that could be a sort of  
2 overflow for people who were on the train, who may not  
3 have been injured, or minor injuries, to be taken away.

4 Q. We can see there from the computer-aided dispatch record  
5 that you were able to get messages through to the  
6 control room. Did you encounter very real difficulties  
7 with communications generally because of the sheer  
8 volume of traffic on the police network?

9 A. Yes. I'd usually, as a duty officer, use my mobile  
10 phone or the radio, quite often the mobile phone,  
11 because you could have a longer discussion and point out  
12 areas, but unfortunately, I believe after the first  
13 occasion that dropped out.

14 Then you've got everyone using the one radio link --  
15 which is very difficult to get in, it doesn't matter  
16 what rank you are -- out on the streets. So whoever  
17 cuts in, the first person who presses the button gets  
18 access first, so it is very difficult to gain access to  
19 actually give directions out.

20 Q. As the commander on the scene, you had no, as you've  
21 implied, no special or additional ability to be able to  
22 get messages through?

23 A. No.

24 Q. You had to wait your turn like everybody else?

25 A. No, there is no priority given to people.

1 Q. During this half an hour when you made these decisions,  
2 were you aware of what was going on in the tunnel?

3 A. I believe shortly afterwards I was informed there was  
4 a possibility of a collision after arrival. But it was  
5 still very, very confusing. Then, a bit later on, it  
6 was described that there may have been an explosion.  
7 I wasn't aware of the other incidents that had occurred  
8 across the capital at that point.

9 Q. A police sergeant of the British Transport Police told  
10 you that there had either been an explosion or  
11 a collision, that's the reference which you've just made  
12 a moment or two ago.

13 Did there come a time when a large number of police  
14 officers from a public order Serial commanded by  
15 Inspector Mugridge appeared?

16 A. Yes, that's correct.

17 Q. Was it you who directed some of them to go to  
18 Russell Square and some of them to stay at King's Cross?

19 A. Yes, that was the time that another incident -- at that  
20 time, I thought a completely separate incident --  
21 occurred at Russell Square, and I wasn't too sure  
22 whether it was someone giving the wrong information that  
23 they all meant it was King's Cross or whether it was  
24 a separate incident or, as we found, the same incident  
25 on the same line.

1 So when he turned up, I knew most of my officers  
2 would have been directed straight to myself and I wasn't  
3 sure of how many other officers would have been  
4 available to deal with that incident, so I asked him to  
5 send another crew, one of his sections down there, and  
6 his crew to go down and assist.

7 Q. If we could have [INQ9450-6] on the screen, we can see the  
8 incident management log, right-hand side of the page:

9 "EK1 sends 1-7 to Russell Square."

10 So that's the division?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. Then subsequently another of the Serials, Serial 110  
13 appeared as well --

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. -- under the command, I think, of Inspector Evans.

16 Do you recall an acting inspector, Inspector Mingay,  
17 of the British Transport Police coming up from the  
18 tunnel and describing what he had seen, around about  
19 9.45?

20 A. I recall someone coming up. To be honest, I still can't  
21 visualise him coming up, except that an officer came up  
22 towards us, and then, just before he approached us, he  
23 collapsed. He was caught by two of my sergeants who  
24 were there.

25 Q. Could we have [INQ9450-9], please? This is about 9.45,

1 there is a reference there to Inspector Shields of the  
2 British Transport Police. Did you receive an update  
3 from him --

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. -- as well?

6 Did he tell you that, as far as he understood it,  
7 there had been an explosion on the train?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Then was it around that time that  
10 Chief Superintendent McCafferty appeared?

11 A. I believe shortly after that, but I can't remember the  
12 time. Just before 10.00 I believe I saw him first.

13 Q. Do you recall having to give any directions in relation  
14 to the provision of police officers to the train itself  
15 over and above those under the command of  
16 Inspector Mugridge?

17 A. Initially, the -- I asked two officers, when I first  
18 turned up, to go downstairs and find out what was  
19 happening because I was aware that our radios did not  
20 work underground. So I was reluctant to go down myself,  
21 because I would have lost contact. So I asked them to  
22 go down and investigate and then report back.

23 Q. There came a time when a request for an urgent need for  
24 stretchers was passed to you. Do you recall what  
25 decision you took to meet that request?

1 A. I believe that was after the Tavistock Square incident.  
2 A radio message came over they needed more stretchers,  
3 and I made a decision that one of the vehicles, the  
4 carriers, which was a public order carrier, the only  
5 thing that I could think of at the time that could be  
6 used as stretchers were the shields because of their --  
7 by their nature, they're flat and long, so I directed  
8 one of those carriers to make their way to  
9 Tavistock Square.

10 Q. Could we have [INQ9450-11], please? Just before -- this  
11 is just after the explosion. Inspector Shields update,  
12 09.59:

13 "Appears to be explosion on train. Roof off.  
14 Multiple fatalities."

15 Then, just underneath, a reference to:

16 "Tavistock/Upper Woburn Place."

17 There is an indication of the bomb on the bus, and  
18 you'll see it then says:

19 "EK1 requests more channels for other incidents."

20 After you'd been told about the bomb at  
21 Tavistock Square, did you become even further concerned  
22 about the lack of communications on the radio and the  
23 need for another channel to be made exclusively  
24 available for it?

25 A. It's more because it started to get confusing at which

1 incident people were talking about, whether it was  
2 Russell Square, Tavistock Square or King's Cross. So  
3 for me, it was still -- my concern was it was three  
4 separate incidents, we should have three separate  
5 channels to run them.

6 Q. If we could scroll down the page, we can see there the  
7 reference to Silver, Chief Superintendent McCafferty and  
8 Chief Inspector Nicki Watson. A reference to you  
9 requesting that the incidents be dealt with separately,  
10 and then over the page [INQ9450-12], 10.00:

11 "111C", so that's one of the public order Serials  
12 "Take shields for stretchers."

13 So that's a reflection of the decision you made to  
14 send them with their launch shields to Tavistock Square?

15 A. That's correct.

16 MR KEITH: My Lady, is that a convenient point?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. 2.10 pm, please.

18 (1.10 pm)

19 (The short adjournment)

20

21

22

23

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