

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005  
Hearing transcripts - 30 November 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.05 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, we have Mr Raymond Wright on videolink.

4 Mr Wright, good afternoon. Could you give the court --

5 I'm so sorry, could you perhaps affirm or take the oath

6 and I think Mr Smith is available there to assist you

7 with that.

8 THE WITNESS: I'm taking the oath.

9 MR RAYMOND JOHN WRIGHT (sworn)

10 Questions by MR KEITH

11 MR KEITH: Thank you, and if you could give the court your

12 full name, please?

13 A. Raymond John Wright.

14 Q. It's quite hard to hear you. You may have to speak up

15 during the course of your evidence, please, Mr Wright,

16 or lean -- that may be better, thank you.

17 In July of 2005, were you a trained and qualified

18 train operator with London Underground?

19 A. I was.

20 Q. That morning, were you endeavouring to travel from

21 King's Cross to your depot at Acton?

22 A. I was.

23 Q. Acton is, of course, on towards the end of the westbound

24 Piccadilly Line before the Heathrow spur branch line

25 branches off from it. Is that right?

1 A. Correct, correct.

2 Q. Do you recall what time you arrived at King's Cross?

3 A. Just one moment, please.

4 Q. May I ask you, Mr Wright, are you referring --

5 A. It would have been about 8.30 am.

6 Q. Are you referring to your witness statement there when  
7 you looked down?

8 A. I am, yes.

9 Q. All right. For the record, I need to ask you, was that  
10 statement made when the events were still fresh in your  
11 mind?

12 A. It would have been three or four hours later.

13 Q. That's certainly good enough. When you reached  
14 King's Cross, do you recall there being any evacuation  
15 being called over the PA system at King's Cross or of  
16 any controls being put in place limiting the movement of  
17 passengers round the station?

18 A. There was certainly no evacuation going on, but there  
19 were platform controls in place because of the vast  
20 number of people trying to get onto the platform.

21 Q. Does that mean that --

22 A. The concertina gates would have been closed and manned  
23 by station staff.

24 Q. Where are those gates?

25 A. At the base of the escalators, at the eastbound and

1 westbound platforms.

2 Q. In your experience, if there are control processes in  
3 operation at the platform level, at the bottom of the  
4 escalators, would you normally expect there also to be  
5 limitations being placed on the ability to get into the  
6 station at the top?

7 A. Yes, generally, yes.

8 Q. So we may presume that the King's Cross station was very  
9 full. Do you remember there being some announcements  
10 about a defective train at Caledonian Road?

11 A. Yes, I remember there was an announcement just before  
12 then, before I joined the train itself.

13 Q. You made your way down to the westbound platform, and  
14 I think you were wearing your London Underground  
15 uniform.

16 A. I was.

17 Q. Were you able to get down onto the platform and gain  
18 access to the train that was then there?

19 A. Yes, I had spoken to one of the station staff on the  
20 concertina gates and he let me through. There was  
21 another member of staff behind me and he made the  
22 decision to wait for another train.

23 Q. When you got to the platform, was the train there or did  
24 you wait for it to arrive?

25 A. The train was there. It had just pulled in and stopped.

1 Q. Did you know the driver?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. We know, of course, that he was Thomas Nairn and he --  
4 A. That's correct.  
5 Q. -- allowed you into the cab, did he?  
6 A. That's correct.  
7 Q. So that there's no dispute about it, that's accepted  
8 practice. If a driver is on duty going somewhere, they  
9 can use a train and use the cab?  
10 A. That is the accepted practice, providing that you remain  
11 quiet and let the driver do his job.  
12 Q. We know from other evidence that my Lady has heard that  
13 the train was at King's Cross from 8.47.30 to 08.48.  
14 When it left, would you say that it was full to  
15 capacity?  
16 A. It's what you would call on the Underground crush  
17 conditions.  
18 Q. Just before the train left the westbound platform, was  
19 there an unusual event in relation to the lights going  
20 off?  
21 A. The lights went off momentarily and then came back on  
22 again.  
23 Q. Had you, in your experience, ever seen that before?  
24 A. Very, very rarely, maybe if there's lots of problems  
25 with generation or -- but not very often.

1 Q. We know from other evidence --

2 A. It is unusual.

3 Q. We know from other evidence that my Lady has heard that,  
4 when the Aldgate bomb went off, it severed an electrical  
5 supply from a power station to a distribution point in  
6 Mansell Street and the evidence from the NCC is that it  
7 caused what's known as rotating plant faults on the  
8 Piccadilly Line which seems to indicate that the power  
9 was very quickly -- or shortly interrupted and then  
10 brought back on again.

11 When the lights went out, was it consistent with  
12 there being no power momentarily?

13 A. I wouldn't be able to say there. Because it wasn't that  
14 long, we weren't in a position where the driver was  
15 going to start making texts or calls to the line  
16 controller. It wasn't there long enough.

17 Q. The platform lights went off, but do you recall whether  
18 or not the controls in the front of the driver's cab  
19 also extinguished?

20 A. No, I don't recall, sorry.

21 Q. You can't say one way or the other?

22 A. No.

23 Q. All right. Could you tell us, please, what you recall  
24 of the explosion itself?

25 A. The train was in motion. I briefly spoke to Tom

1 regarding how late he was running and he was quite some  
2 considerable time late for his -- where he should be  
3 and, without warning, there was an almighty bang and the  
4 whole train shook, the lights went out instantaneously,  
5 and the train ground to a halt.

6 Q. Which lights went out?

7 A. Everything.

8 Q. So all the lights on the train as well as any light in  
9 the cab?

10 A. Yes, that's correct. The train was completely dead.

11 Q. Do you recall how far into the tunnel the train had  
12 gone?

13 A. My initial statement claimed that it was a lot -- it  
14 hadn't got into the tunnel as far as it actually did do.  
15 I was mistaken in the initial statement. But all of the  
16 train was within the tunnel perimeter itself.

17 Q. You referred in your statement to the fact that the  
18 train went as far as the "6 car mark".

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What is the "6 car mark"?

21 A. The 6 car mark is for the driver to see that the back  
22 end of the train has just left the platform.

23 Q. Is that relevant for the --

24 A. It's relevant for emergency purposes if the emergency  
25 alarm is raised or he has a problem or she has a problem

1 with the train to know that you've actually left the  
2 platform.

3 Q. Mr Wright, I know that you have some documents there  
4 with you that you have been sent by the Inquest team or  
5 Mr Smith has provided them to you.

6 Do you have one that has on the bottom the words  
7 either "Location of explosion on the Piccadilly Line",  
8 scene 4, or "Detail showing platform to carriages on the  
9 Piccadilly Line" on the bottom right-hand corner?

10 A. Do you have a reference number, please?

11 Q. Yes, it's INQ10283-7 or INQ10283-8.

12 A. Yes, I have it here.

13 Q. If you could look at [INQ10283-8], please, the second of  
14 those two, you'll see there the final position of the  
15 train in the tunnel abridging the place where the two  
16 westbound and eastbound tunnels are linked by the  
17 interconnecting tunnel, but you will see --

18 A. In the crossover tunnel, yes.

19 Q. The crossover tunnel. You'll see that the rear of the  
20 train, the sixth carriage, is not far short of the  
21 crossover tunnel, but it is a long way past the entrance  
22 to the tunnel.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Is that why you now say that you think the train had  
25 travelled further into the tunnel than just the

1 6 car mark?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Right. The cab lights went out and all the lights went  
4 out. Do you recall there being any sort of smoke?

5 A. Yes, there was smoke already in the cab at that point  
6 and, I can only assume, the rest of the train, a very  
7 sharp, acrid smoke.

8 Q. Was there a sound from behind the driver's cab in the  
9 first carriage?

10 A. There was simply the noise of screaming by a large  
11 number of people.

12 Q. What was your initial fear as to what had occurred?

13 A. I thought we may have derailed and struck the tunnel  
14 wall or that maybe one of the 630-volt transformers had  
15 exploded causing damage to the train.

16 It was obvious that the door windows where I was  
17 sitting, which is the instructor's seat, had been  
18 smashed, the glass was smashed, and trying to get the  
19 doors open, the air doors open, there was no control  
20 over the doors whatsoever.

21 Q. Was the fact that the window had smashed in part why you  
22 thought that something might have hit the train or that  
23 you might have collided with something?

24 A. It was just -- it wasn't just the explosion. It was the  
25 severe vibration and the shuddering that occurred at the



1 time.

2 Q. We know from other evidence that, when the current is  
3 discharged, the emergency lights in the tunnel will come  
4 on. Do you recall them coming on?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. How soon after the explosion did they come on?

7 A. There were tunnel lights on. For those in the back of  
8 the train, they wouldn't have been much good, because  
9 there were so many people in those carriages that they  
10 were standing up against all of the windows and,  
11 therefore, most of the tunnel light wouldn't have been  
12 seen from inside the train itself. But the lights came  
13 on instantaneously.

14 Q. Were you able to see something in the driver's cab of  
15 the control panel and the radio?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did Mr Nairn, who, of course, was the driver of the  
18 train, try to get on the radio and call a mayday?

19 A. Tom carried out his duties to the letter. He first of  
20 all called "Mayday, mayday, mayday". He repeated it.  
21 He tried the cab-to-cab radio that goes to the back of  
22 the train, to the rear cab, and it was quite obvious  
23 that all of the controls were completely dead.

24 Q. So there was no question of any kind of signal being  
25 received on the radio --

1 A. None whatsoever.

2 Q. -- and no link on the cab-to-cab linking that cab with  
3 the one at the rear of the train? What about the PA  
4 system --

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. -- did he try that?

7 A. Yes, he tried the PA system to -- just to speak to the  
8 passengers, but it was quite obvious by then that we had  
9 no power at all.

10 Q. Did that mean that there was no ability to bring on the  
11 lights in the cab either?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Do you know whether or not the radio had been working  
14 before the explosion, had he used it for whatever  
15 reason?

16 A. I don't think he had used it, but we could certainly  
17 hear the line controller talking to other drivers.

18 Q. So when -- if you, as a driver, are using the radio, you  
19 can allow it to stay on, you can hear messages from  
20 other drivers to the line controller?

21 A. It's on all the time.

22 Q. Even if you --

23 A. It's on all the time, you can't switch it off.

24 Q. Right. So even if you don't use it to send a message,  
25 you can still hear it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But after the explosion, it was completely dead?

3 A. Completely dead.

4 Q. So what did you do next?

5 A. Tom opened the M door, at the very end of the train, and

6 I handed him the SCD, the short-circuiting device. He

7 jumped down onto the track -- I beg your pardon, sorry,

8 I've jumped myself.

9 Q. Did you open the door to --

10 A. He got down onto the track and took the emergency

11 telephone handset with him and he tried to communicate

12 with the line controller via the tunnel telephone wires,

13 they clip on the wires that run along the length of the

14 tunnel.

15 Q. Before I ask you about that, your statement seems to

16 indicate that, before he jumped out of the train with

17 the tunnel telephone, you and he managed to open the

18 J door into the first passenger car --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and shone your torch on to the passengers in the

21 first carriage?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Let me ask you --

24 A. It was very difficult to open the door because of the

25 number of people behind it.

1 Q. So it was from the number of passengers, not from  
2 a buckling in the metal?

3 A. That's right, yes.

4 Q. When you shone the torch through into the first  
5 carriage, Mr Wright, what confronted you?

6 A. What confronted us was a sea of faces, blackened,  
7 bloodied, in a state of panic, naturally, and we tried  
8 to communicate with them and the only way we could do  
9 that was by shouting for everyone to shut up because we  
10 had to make ourselves heard.

11 Q. Did that work?

12 A. It did work eventually. We tried for several times to  
13 get people to quieten down for a moment while we told  
14 them that -- it was imperative that we told them that  
15 there were staff at the front of the train.

16 Q. If, of course, the PA system had been working, is that  
17 broadly what you would have said over the PA?

18 A. Yes, absolutely.

19 Q. So having attempted to calm the passengers in the first  
20 carriage, did you then, together with Mr Nairn, try to  
21 use the emergency telephone on the cables in the tunnel?

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, just before we get there,  
23 can we get the time of when --

24 MR KEITH: I'm so sorry, my Lady, yes.

25 A. Yes, Tom jumped --

1 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Wright, I'm going to ask you a question  
2 about the timing, if I may.

3 How long elapsed, how much time passed, between the  
4 point of the explosion, do you think, and the point that  
5 you jumped down from the train onto the track in order  
6 to use the tunnel telephone?

7 A. It would be very difficult to say, but I would imagine  
8 no more than three to four minutes probably, because Tom  
9 carried out his duties to the letter. He called  
10 a mayday, he tried the PA and, when that didn't work and  
11 we had looked back into the first carriage, he took the  
12 emergency handset and jumped down onto the track,  
13 probably no more than three or four minutes.

14 Q. We know from other evidence that the way the telephone  
15 tunnel works is that you clip it on to the cables in the  
16 tunnel that can be shorted or pinched together?

17 A. Copper wires.

18 Q. Yes, the copper wires that you can short to make sure  
19 that the current in the track, that section of track, is  
20 discharged?

21 A. That's correct, that's correct.

22 Q. Were you able to make any kind of connection through the  
23 tunnel telephone with somebody else in the  
24 London Underground?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Was there any signal or any sensation of a carrier wave  
2 at all?

3 A. No, none whatsoever.

4 Q. What steps did you then take in relation to ensuring  
5 that any residual current was short-circuited in the  
6 rails?

7 A. Tom asked me to pass him the short-circuiting device  
8 which is held in a pod built into the door, the J door.  
9 I passed it to him and, by shining a torch light on to  
10 him, he put it underneath the front of the train. It's  
11 put there so that people don't trip on it when they get  
12 out the train.

13 Q. By this time, were passengers beginning to appear in the  
14 driver's cab?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So having put the short-circuiting device down, what did  
17 you do?

18 A. Tom then pulled the emergency detrainment ladder down,  
19 which has to be locked into place. It's held -- there's  
20 a part of it that goes under the driver's cab floor and  
21 the rest of it, which is like a sprung system, is  
22 located in the front of the train itself when you pull  
23 it down and it locks into place so it's stable.

24 Q. How long did this process of trying to use the tunnel  
25 telephone and locking down the ladder --

1 A. By the time that the ladders were down, I would imagine  
2 five or six minutes.

3 Q. Five or six minutes more?

4 A. Yes. No, not more, that's in total.

5 Q. From the point of the explosion?

6 A. Yes. Well, the point where the train had come to  
7 a stop, yes.

8 Q. Yes. Then what happened?

9 A. I think we made our mind up to take the walking wounded,  
10 as you would call them, on to Russell Square and Tom  
11 stayed with his train, which you would probably expect  
12 him to do. It was his responsibility. So then we made  
13 an announcement through the J door to the passengers  
14 that one of the drivers was going to stay on the train  
15 and one was going to walk through with passengers to  
16 Russell Square station.  
17 We were asked by some passengers if they could go to  
18 the back of the train and we said, "No, that's not  
19 a safe procedure".

20 Q. Can you help us with this, please, Mr Wright: is it  
21 standard operating practice, if a detrainment is put  
22 into place, that passengers should walk forwards rather  
23 than back so that the train provides them some  
24 protection?

25 A. That's correct, because the train then provides

1 protection.

2 Q. How long did it take for the passengers who alighted  
3 from the front of the train to get down and start  
4 following you?

5 A. Almost straightaway, because there were some that were  
6 obviously shocked and dazed but able to walk. I stayed  
7 at the bottom of the ladders to get a group together,  
8 and I don't know, maybe 20 or so people, and at some  
9 point I believe I was called back by Tom because he'd  
10 got a gentleman that was more severely hurt and needed  
11 assistance.

12 Q. Was that a gentleman --

13 A. And so I asked him --

14 Q. I'm sorry, please continue.

15 A. Sorry. I think I asked the group that were already on  
16 the track to stop and wait and not move while I went  
17 back to get this gentleman and I then caught back up  
18 with the gentleman to the front of the queue of  
19 passengers and we continued to walk.

20 Q. There was a gentleman who managed to make it to the  
21 front of the train, despite having had a virtually  
22 amputated leg, and he managed to make it down the steps  
23 onto the track assisted by perhaps one or two other  
24 passengers, but he stayed there.

25 Are you saying that the injured passenger whom you



1 went back to help in fact came down the track with you  
2 and you helped him down towards Russell Square?

3 A. This was clearly another passenger, yes.

4 Q. Right.

5 A. Obviously it wasn't this gentleman.

6 Q. How long do you think it took you to walk with your  
7 group of passengers from the front of the train to  
8 Russell Square?

9 A. I would hazard a guess at 10, 15 minutes. Maybe a bit  
10 less than that. Somewhere around about the 10-minute  
11 mark. There is a bend in the tunnel and, having turned  
12 that bend, you then see Russell Square in front of you.

13 Q. Mr Wright, it must have been an extremely hazardous and  
14 difficult journey on account of the light and the state  
15 of the passengers. Did that slow you down?

16 A. It slowed me down because I didn't know the extent of  
17 some of their injuries, so I just wanted to go at the  
18 slowest pace, and they were obviously very worried about  
19 stepping on the live rails, despite the fact that we had  
20 assured them that the current was off.

21 There are obstructions, there's always obstructions  
22 in the tunnels, like check rails and obviously some  
23 other bits of engineering that are left there, and so  
24 you have to stop and say to people "You're going to have  
25 to cross over the centre rail, the negative rail, to get

1 round this obstruction", and so you've got to wait for  
2 everybody to do it.

3 Q. There was obviously some dim light from the emergency  
4 lights on the tunnel walls.

5 A. That's correct, there was.

6 Q. When you arrived at Russell Square, did you see any  
7 members of London Underground staff?

8 A. There were two or three people looking down the tunnel  
9 towards our direction, yes.

10 Q. They must have been very surprised to see you?

11 A. I think they were, yes. They could see my handlamp and  
12 obviously they must have realised at some point there  
13 was something very, very wrong.

14 Q. Did you tell them what had happened?

15 A. Yes, I did, and it wasn't long after that that some of  
16 the emergency service staff started to appear. There  
17 was a paramedic who appeared and my recollection is that  
18 I don't think he actually stayed for more than long  
19 enough to ask which direction the train was in and he  
20 just made off down the tunnel on his own with all of his  
21 emergency equipment.

22 Q. Before I ask you about him, can I just ask you, please,  
23 about what the reaction was of the staff on the  
24 platform? Did they know, as far as you were able to  
25 tell, what had happened or were you the first person to

1 have told them?

2 A. No, no, I was the first person. They obviously knew  
3 there was something wrong, that current had been  
4 discharged -- well, we think so, but the safety  
5 procedures are so that staff and the emergency services  
6 wouldn't enter a tunnel unless they had been told that  
7 the current is off, because, for obvious reasons, you  
8 might suddenly find yourself looking at a train coming  
9 towards you.

10 Q. Are you saying that you gained the impression from them  
11 that they were waiting to be told formally that the  
12 current was indeed off?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. Did they know, as far as you were aware, that there had  
15 been an explosion of some sort on the train?

16 A. No, I don't believe they did.

17 Q. Can you tell us or give us your best estimate as to what  
18 time it was that you emerged at the platform at  
19 Russell Square?

20 A. I've really no idea, I'm sorry. I would say it would be  
21 certainly no more than about 15 minutes after the train  
22 had come to a stop. That's just a guess.

23 Q. Might it have been longer? We obviously have other  
24 evidence in relation to the arrival of paramedics. It's  
25 quite possible --

1 A. Yes, it may have been longer.

2 Q. If I were to --

3 A. Yes, it could -- sorry.

4 Q. Please continue, Mr Wright.

5 A. It could well be that it was longer. It's just the --

6 everything that was going on at the time, you really

7 don't take much notice of the time itself, but more of

8 what you're trying to achieve.

9 Q. Although it's not entirely clear, it may be that the

10 first paramedics to have arrived at the Russell Square

11 end did not arrive until after 9.30 or, at least, they

12 arrived but no one went down into the tunnel until about

13 after 9.30.

14 If I were to suggest some time between 9.30 and

15 9.45, would that seem to you to be about right?

16 A. Yes, I would say it was, probably.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does that include the lone paramedic?

18 A. But there certainly (inaudible) paramedic on his own.

19 MR KEITH: Yes, that's why I'm a little unsure, because we

20 don't have a clear sight as to whether or not the first

21 person to arrive was on their own or in a group of

22 people, but we have some CCTV evidence that may or may

23 not help on this.

24 Was the reaction of the staff on the platform

25 speedy? Did they immediately appreciate the severity of

1 the problem and take steps, in your judgment, to do what  
2 was required?

3 A. Not at the first instance, no.

4 Q. In what way?

5 A. I don't think that -- they would obviously be in touch  
6 with the station supervisor upstairs by radio and  
7 I don't think that the staff at Russell Square were  
8 aware at the time of the network-wide events, and so you  
9 would look at your own station in its own right and say,  
10 well, I can't do anything until I've had it confirmed  
11 the current is off and until my manager has told me that  
12 I've got to enter the tunnel. You simply wouldn't do  
13 it --

14 Q. Did you hear --

15 A. -- for safety purposes.

16 Q. Did you hear them radioing either the group station  
17 manager or the duty station manager and discussing with  
18 them either the fact that the power needed to be  
19 confirmed to be off or that, from what you had told  
20 them, the situation was so serious as to merit the  
21 declaration of a major incident?

22 A. I certainly did say to somebody there had been an  
23 explosion in the tunnel and that the train was not going  
24 to move, that it was crippled, and there was some debate  
25 as to whether or not the lifts were -- the power to the

1 lifts was cut off along with the traction current so  
2 that we could get injured passengers up to ground level  
3 quicker.

4 Q. That's a little later, I'm going to come on to the lifts  
5 in a moment. When you first arrived at the platform, do  
6 you recall there being any discussion with the train  
7 managers, the managers in the station as to what needed  
8 to be done?

9 A. No, I don't.

10 Q. It was around this time, then, you've told us, that the  
11 single paramedic set off like a hare down the tunnel.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. He obviously didn't wait for confirmation, or he must  
14 have received confirmation from somewhere else.

15 A. Yes, probably.

16 Q. Do you recall whether the station staff on the platform  
17 gave that confirmation to the paramedic or not?

18 A. No, I couldn't confirm that one way or the other, sorry.

19 Q. Your statement also records that you spoke to the line  
20 controller using the platform phone. Do you recall when  
21 that was?

22 A. I can't recall exactly when it was. I can recall the  
23 conversation, yes.

24 Q. What was it?

25 A. It was just that the train was -- train 311, as I now

1 know it to be, was still in the tunnel because it was  
2 crippled, and that there had been a large explosion and  
3 that we had a number of seriously injured passengers and  
4 that the walking wounded were making their way through  
5 to Russell Square.

6 Q. Did you receive any information back?

7 A. I think the information I got from the line controller  
8 was that we weren't on our own, there were other events  
9 occurring on the network.

10 Q. The walking wounded and the uninjured made it into the  
11 booking hall area of Russell Square?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Did they use the lifts or not?

14 A. They didn't at first because the lifts and the traction  
15 current come from the same -- well, I may be -- I think  
16 I'm correct in saying they come from the same 630-volt  
17 supply, but somebody managed to get the lifts working  
18 and they started to use the lifts to get people up a lot  
19 quicker. Up until then, we were carrying people on  
20 stretchers and blankets up the spiral staircase, which  
21 of course was very slow.

22 Q. You helped, from what you've said, with the carrying of  
23 casualties up the stairs?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. I don't know the exact number of steps, but it is a very

1 long spiral staircase, is it not?

2 A. It is, yes.

3 Q. I think you helped with carrying one particular casualty  
4 all the way up the steps?

5 A. That's right, yes, a coloured gentleman had lost the  
6 bottom half of one of his legs.

7 Q. Do you know when calls were made to try to get power in  
8 the lifts reestablished?

9 A. No, I don't, no, that would have been operational  
10 managers doing that, in conjunction with the station  
11 supervisor.

12 Q. Were you there when power was established, if it was  
13 established at all, in the lifts?

14 A. Well, I was within the confines of the station, but  
15 where I was, I couldn't tell you. I could have been at  
16 street level or I could have been --

17 Q. We know --

18 A. Sorry, I say I could have been at street level -- sorry.

19 Q. Please carry on, Mr Wright.

20 A. I would either have been at street level or making my  
21 way back down to the platform level to help with more  
22 passengers, but I couldn't tell you where exactly I was  
23 when that request or confirmation was achieved.

24 Q. We know that there were two phone calls, one at 9.47 and  
25 one at 9.59, concerning whether or not it was possible



1 to get power back on the lifts, there were calls to the  
2 Piccadilly Line control room. On the basis that those  
3 calls wouldn't have been made until such time as you  
4 arrived with the casualties and needed the lifts to get  
5 them up to ground level, it does rather seem that you  
6 wouldn't have arrived at the platform until at least  
7 9.45 or 9.50. Does that seem to be about right?

8 A. That's correct, yes. That that seems valid, yes.

9 Q. Did you go back down, Mr Wright, to the tunnel or did  
10 you remain in Russell Square helping with casualties and  
11 with the carrying of casualties up the steps?

12 A. I remained on the platform and carrying passengers  
13 upstairs.

14 MR KEITH: Mr Wright, thank you very much. There may be  
15 some further questions for you. Will you please wait  
16 there?

17 A. Thank you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

19 Questions by MR COLTART

20 MR COLTART: I have only a few questions for you, Mr Wright.  
21 Do you have a copy of your witness statement in front of  
22 you?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Would you mind just taking it for me and turning through  
25 to page 3, please? I just want to ask you one or two

1 further questions about your arrival at Russell Square.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Do you see just over halfway down the page a sentence  
4 starting:

5 "As we approached the exit of the tunnel and into  
6 Russell Square station ..."

7 A. I do, yes.

8 Q. So just carrying on from there, I'm going to read it  
9 through and then ask you a few questions along the way,  
10 if I may:

11 "... I expected to see many staff members with lamps  
12 and emergency service personnel."

13 Why did you expect to see emergency service  
14 personnel at that stage, given that you hadn't been able  
15 to make contact with anyone from the tunnel?

16 A. Well, one reason would be that back in the control room  
17 at Earl's Court they clearly could see the train was not  
18 moving, and so, having had what they would describe,  
19 I guess, as a power outage, they would want to get  
20 people down to find out what was going on.

21 Q. Was there any physical manifestation of the explosion at  
22 the platform at Russell Square? So, for example, was  
23 there smoke or dust coming out of the tunnel?

24 A. No, no, I understand from reports afterwards that the  
25 smoke actually came back down to King's Cross.

1 Q. Carrying on in your statement:

2 "I did, however, see two staff members on the  
3 platform looking down the tunnel. They saw us leave  
4 coming down the tunnel area. I told them immediately  
5 what had happened. I told them there had been an  
6 explosion and told them there were casualties. One of  
7 the staff told me they thought there had been traction  
8 current failure and they were unaware of what had  
9 happened."

10 So is it the position that they knew that something  
11 had happened, that wasn't news to them, but they didn't  
12 know what it was?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. But you were able to tell them immediately that there  
15 had been an explosion and that there were casualties?

16 A. That's correct, that's correct.

17 Q. Then you carry on to say this:

18 "They radioed for help. However, it was a full ten  
19 minutes before station staff realised the enormity of  
20 the situation and I heard one of them call on their  
21 radio that this was a major incident."

22 Can you remember now --

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Can you remember now -- you made this statement, in  
25 fact, on the day -- what it was that made you say that

1 it was a full ten minutes before they realised the  
2 enormity of the situation?

3 A. No, not really. I'm sorry, I'm just reading through the  
4 notes, just one moment.

5 Q. Please do. Take your time, please.

6 A. It was just the fact that there were more and more  
7 people coming up behind me, passengers, so I guess that,  
8 with the speed that they were walking up onto the  
9 platform, it was probably going to be five to ten  
10 minutes before they got through.

11 As you said before, they knew something was  
12 happening, but what they were waiting for, I guess, was  
13 the confirmation from somebody who was there.

14 Q. You carry on in your statement:

15 "Emergency services began to arrive however, mainly  
16 police, although did I see a paramedic go down the  
17 tunnel. At one point I confirmed everything to the line  
18 controller using the platform phone."

19 Can you recall, roughly speaking, how long after you  
20 emerged from the tunnel into Russell Square station you  
21 made that telephone call to the line controller?

22 A. Probably within the first five minutes. I'm only  
23 hazarding a guess there, but probably within the first  
24 five minutes, because obviously the first person that  
25 you want to get information to is the line controller,

1 so that he can act on it.

2 Q. Presumably you were in a position to convey to the line  
3 controller the same information you had provided to the  
4 staff on the platform: namely, that there had been an  
5 explosion and that there were casualties?

6 A. That's correct.

7 MR COLTART: Thank you very much, Mr Wright.

8 A. Thank you.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

10 Questions by MR PATTERSON

11 MR PATTERSON: I'm grateful. Mr Wright, you were aware that  
12 this was a serious episode with people possibly dying on  
13 that train, weren't you?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Presumably, when you spoke to the line controller, you  
16 conveyed the real sense of urgency and need for those  
17 people to be tended to as soon as humanly possible?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. When you emerged from the tunnel with all those  
20 survivors walking with you, again, did you impress upon  
21 those people on the platform the real sense of urgency?

22 A. That's correct, yes. I think by then they obviously  
23 realised that there were passengers walking down the  
24 tunnel, that's not a normal occurrence, so there must be  
25 something very, very wrong. But if they follow the

1 safety procedures to the letter, they have to wait for  
2 a manager to confirm they can go down the tunnel. They  
3 wouldn't do it off their own back.

4 Q. Looking back, the tenor of your statement was that there  
5 seems to have been a lack of urgency in those first ten  
6 minutes. Is that accurate? Is that what you thought?

7 A. I suppose yes, I mean, without any criticism of anybody,  
8 that's -- I think that's what it was for the first ten  
9 minutes, until somebody confirmed from management  
10 that -- over the radio, that there was a major incident.

11 Q. But you were aware of no radio difficulties at the  
12 station itself. Is that right?

13 A. Not particularly, no. No, there was certainly staff  
14 using radios, they didn't seem to have any problems.

15 Q. You, yourself, could speak to the line controller whom  
16 you regarded as the most important person to speak to?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

20 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

21 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Wright, I just have a few brief questions  
22 for you for completeness.

23 The first thing I wanted to ask you about is, when  
24 you looked into the carriage at first -- my Lady, your  
25 reference is page 142, lines 8 and 9 -- you described

1 today that you saw "a sea of faces, blackened, bloodied  
2 and in a state of panic".

3 Just to confirm, in your statement --

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. In your statement -- it's towards the bottom of  
6 page 2 -- you describe how, at that initial stage, you  
7 could see from the train light there were serious  
8 injuries, so at that initial stage, when you looked into  
9 the carriage, you were aware of serious injuries?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. You've described the attempts that you and Thomas Nairn  
12 made to make a mayday call to alert London Underground  
13 to what you'd just seen in the carriage, so you've told  
14 us about trying to use the radio, you've told us about  
15 trying to use the emergency phone, the handset on the  
16 track, and those failing.

17 Did you or Mr Nairn consider or discuss using  
18 a signal phone, a fixed phone in the tunnel, at that  
19 stage?

20 A. I believe I did -- I may well have tried to use a signal  
21 phone on the way down to Russell Square, but there would  
22 have been no power.

23 Q. Did you consider or discuss going back to the platform  
24 at King's Cross to try to alert people --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- either via the platform phone or speaking to people?

2 A. Under no circumstances would we have considered, except

3 in the most extreme conditions, like a fire in front of

4 us, to go through the train back towards King's Cross.

5 That is not normally within the safety procedures, for

6 the obvious reason that you can't guarantee that a train

7 could be coming towards you.

8 Q. You didn't consider the circumstances you were in were

9 in that very extreme category from what you'd seen?

10 A. No, no, because, as far as we were concerned, there was

11 no obstruction in the tunnel towards Russell Square, and

12 Russell Square, being the forward station, would be the

13 most logical place to go.

14 Q. Certainly. Mr Wright, from what you've said, it seems

15 that, when those methods failed -- the radio and the

16 emergency phone on the track -- your priority was safe

17 evacuation of the train?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. You assumed, as you've told Mr Coltart, one of the

20 earlier barristers, that the London Underground would be

21 aware of the difficulty because of the power being off,

22 or the current being discharged?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Just one last issue on the timing at Russell Square,

25 Mr Wright. Your initial estimate was that it would be



1 10 to 15 minutes it took you to get down the tunnel.

2 You accepted when --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- Mr Keith, the barrister for the inquests, asked you

5 whether that time could have been longer, you accepted

6 it may have been longer. Could you just turn to your

7 statement on page 3? It's about halfway down, just

8 above the piece you were taken to a little earlier?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You say:

11 "I think we must have walked about a mile. It

12 probably took us about 20 minutes at a rough guess."

13 So at that time, three or four hours after the

14 explosion, your best guess was 20 minutes rather than

15 the shorter 10 to 15 minutes you've described today?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Of course --

18 A. I accept that.

19 Q. -- you've also told us today that at least one of the

20 injured who came to Russell Square with you was missing

21 the bottom half of one of his legs, so would you say,

22 bearing that in mind, that the 20 minutes is more likely

23 to be accurate?

24 A. Yes, more -- or even longer, yes.

25 Q. That's added to the five or six minutes you've described

1 to my Lady before the ladders are taken down, so we're  
2 at kind of, at minimum --

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. -- 25 to 26 minutes from the time of the explosion when  
5 you describe, as you have to the earlier barristers,  
6 seeing those two staff members on the platform prior to  
7 that ten-minute period you've just been asked about?

8 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

9 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Wright. I've nothing  
10 further.

11 A. Thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby?

13 Questions by MS CANBY

14 MS CANBY: Mr Wright, I have some questions to ask you on  
15 behalf of Transport for London. You described how the  
16 train itself was in what you described as crush loaded  
17 capacity. I think in your witness statement you said  
18 that --

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. -- there were about 1,000 to 1,500 passengers on that  
21 train. Do you agree still with that estimate?

22 A. Yes, absolutely.

23 Q. Before the train left for King's Cross, did Mr Nairn  
24 make the usual announcements on his PA system?

25 A. He did, yes.

1 Q. So before the bomb exploded, his PA system was working?

2 A. Oh, yes, absolutely. I would say that Tom wouldn't have  
3 left the station without the PA working.

4 Q. You've told us how you put down the short-circuiting  
5 device to ensure that the power was off and remained  
6 off. Did you also secure that short-circuiting device  
7 so that it wouldn't be a trip hazard for those  
8 passengers who were coming off the train?

9 A. It is normal practice to slide it back underneath the  
10 coupler so that you can bring the emergency detrainment  
11 ladder down so that it's actually underneath the  
12 detrainment ladder itself.

13 Q. Mr Wright, can we look in a little bit more detail,  
14 please, at your timings and when it is that you think  
15 that you arrived at Russell Square station, because  
16 I appreciate that it is very difficult indeed now,  
17 looking back, to give any sort of accurate estimate as  
18 to how long it took you to get to Russell Square.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But we do have some independent evidence in relation to  
21 this in the form of recordings of telephone  
22 conversations between those members of staff who were  
23 actually at Russell Square and the line controller, and  
24 it may be that that helps us to more accurately pinpoint  
25 when you arrived at Russell Square.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. When you arrived, you say that there were two members of  
3 staff on the platform and they were looking down into  
4 the tunnel. So it was obvious to you that --

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. -- they knew that something was wrong, but they didn't  
7 know what it was.

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. You say in your witness statement that one of those  
10 members of staff radioed for help.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you know who it was that they radioed?

13 A. No, I'm sorry. It probably would have been the station  
14 supervisor, because there are only a limited number of  
15 people that they could call up on their personal radios.  
16 It would have been the control room.

17 Q. Yes, they're using their handheld station radio, and the  
18 most logical person --

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. -- the most logical person to contact, for anybody who's  
21 down at the platform, would be probably the station  
22 supervisor, wouldn't it, Mr Wright?

23 A. That's correct, that's correct.

24 Q. Because we can tell from telephone conversations from  
25 the Russell Square station supervisor going to the line

1 control that at 09.10 -- so 10 past 9 -- ambulances were  
2 requested from the Russell Square supervisor to attend  
3 at Russell Square, and the Russell Square supervisor  
4 also says, "This is a Silver incident". That sounds  
5 quite similar to what you were saying in relation to  
6 a member of staff saying, "This is a major incident".

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Could it therefore be that you were at Russell Square  
9 much earlier than you have previously estimated and that  
10 you had got to Russell Square by 9.10?

11 A. Quite possible. I wouldn't hesitate for one minute to  
12 say that my guesstimates, if you like, of the time it  
13 took to get to Russell Square are wildly out of kilter.  
14 Yes, it's quite possible.

15 Q. We also know that a man called David Boyce was one of  
16 the station supervisors at Russell Square on that day.

17 Do you know David Boyce?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Would you recognise him?

20 A. Yes, well, I would have done at the time, yes, it's been  
21 a few years since I worked there.

22 Q. He's giving his evidence tomorrow morning. What he says  
23 in his witness statement is that he was on the platform  
24 looking towards King's Cross when he sees a dim torch  
25 coming around the bend and saw the reflection of the

1 white lights on a high visibility vest.

2 Now, that sounds to me like you, Mr Wright. Were  
3 you wearing your orange high visibility vest?

4 A. Yes, yes.

5 Q. He says that he sees shadows of people following you  
6 and, at that point, they are about 75 to 100 metres away  
7 from Russell Square.

8 At that point, he says that he jumps onto the track,  
9 calls back to the duty station manager to get emergency  
10 services, and then runs towards you. Do you recall this  
11 at all, Mr Wright?

12 A. I don't, actually, no, but I'm not doubting for one  
13 minute that that's probably what happened. But I don't  
14 recall that, no.

15 Q. Is it possible that the man that you describe as being  
16 a paramedic who seemed to be in a hurry and jumped onto  
17 the track, is it possible that that wasn't, in fact,  
18 a paramedic but that that was Mr Boyce?

19 A. I'm positive in my own mind -- I'm not saying -- I could  
20 be wrong, but I remember somebody in a green coverall  
21 going down the tunnel, which would have been a paramedic  
22 was I correct.

23 Q. So the person who you think is a paramedic is wearing  
24 green, not London Underground orange?

25 A. Yes, that's right.

1 Q. We know from, again, the recordings from the  
2 Piccadilly Line controller that Mr Boyce is able to go  
3 from Russell Square station down to the bombed train and  
4 back again and make a call by 9.22, again requesting  
5 ambulances and saying that there's loss of life.  
6 Now, again, that perhaps suggests that you were in  
7 to Russell Square much earlier than you had originally  
8 thought.

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. You had two telephone conversations that day with the  
11 line controller. Is that right?

12 A. I can't recall. I know I spoke to -- I recall at least  
13 one, but I can't recall the second.

14 Q. Because I've listened to the telephone conversations.  
15 I don't think it's possible for us to listen to them in  
16 court today, but if anybody wants to listen to them,  
17 they are TFL928 and TFL969. The first of those is at  
18 09.47.58, and you say to the line controller that you're  
19 the second driver, you're Mr Nairn's friend, and you say  
20 that "There are dead and loss of limbs. It's mega  
21 serious". He says he knows. There's a conversation  
22 that the lifts aren't working at Russell Square, and the  
23 line controller said that the lifts were not working  
24 because all of the power, not just the traction current,  
25 had been turned off.

1 In that conversation, there's no reference from you  
2 about a bomb or an explosion, Mr Wright.

3 A. Yes, I've got your word for that because obviously  
4 I can't recall that. Are you talking about the second  
5 conversation?

6 Q. That was the first, and then I'll tell you about the  
7 second as well.

8 A. Sorry, right.

9 Q. The second conversation --

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. -- is at 09.59.53, and then you say that paramedics had  
12 told that you there were at least 100 walking wounded  
13 passengers and they wanted to use the lifts. The line  
14 controller states that the power to the lifts cannot be  
15 turned on in case it affects the power to the track.  
16 The line controller suggested that a senior member of  
17 the emergency services spoke to the duty operations  
18 manager to discuss further, and the line controller said  
19 that he had been trying to contact Mr Nairn, the driver  
20 of train 331, on the radio, but wasn't getting any  
21 reply, and he suggested that communication had been  
22 affected by the incident.

23 In neither of those conversations is there reference  
24 from you about an explosion or a bomb or does he say  
25 that other incidents had occurred, so is it possible



1 that it was just to the station staff that you said  
2 "explosion" and not to the line controller?

3 A. Quite possibly, yes.

4 Q. Do you recall having any other conversations with the  
5 line controller that morning or is it just those two on  
6 the platform phone?

7 A. I can't remember a second conversation. It's quite  
8 possible that I did speak to them again, but I can't  
9 recall that. As you can understand, it was a little bit  
10 confused and erratic down there.

11 MS CANBY: I appreciate that, Mr Wright, and you were  
12 confronted by unprecedented circumstances, but thank you  
13 very much for doing your best to try to remember.

14 I don't have any further questions.

15 A. Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

17 Mr Wright, it's Lady Justice Hallett here, the  
18 coroner. Could you help me a little more on the calls  
19 that you made?

20 A. I'll certainly try, my Lady.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby, who was just asking you  
22 questions, put to you that there were two telephone  
23 calls to the line controller at 09.47 and 09.59. How  
24 many calls, do you think -- can you help me -- you made  
25 in all?

1 A. I certainly can only remember making one call to the  
2 line controller, my Lady. I certainly don't remember  
3 the second.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I thought you said earlier, but did  
5 I get this right, that you thought you made one of those  
6 calls or a call to a line controller very soon after you  
7 got to the platform?

8 A. I believe I did, yes, because it's imperative that the  
9 line controller knows as quickly as possible what's  
10 going on.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I wonder if you could pursue this,  
12 Mr Keith, because Ms Canby has put to Mr Wright that he  
13 has got back to the platform before 9.10, or at 9.10,  
14 but if he makes a call soon after he's got back to the  
15 platform, we're back at 9.30 something.

16 MR KEITH: I must admit I had understood that she had put  
17 there were two calls at 9.36 and 9.47, but it may be I'm  
18 mistaken.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, I've written down 9.47 and 9.59.  
20 I checked at the time.

21 MR KEITH: The two calls I put for the lifts were 9.47 and  
22 9.59, which were later.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's the same calls, Mr Keith.

24 MR KEITH: I think, if my Lady approves, what we'll do is  
25 review, ourselves, the contents of those calls, because

1 we haven't, in fact, got them up in open court this  
2 afternoon.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not sure that's going to help.  
4 We need Mr Wright because Ms Canby has tested, quite  
5 properly, his timings and at the moment she's got him  
6 accepting that he may well have been back at the  
7 platform by about 9.10, in which case he has waited  
8 30 minutes before making a call to the line controller.  
9 That seems a little strange.

10 MR KEITH: Mr Wright, you've heard what my Lady has said  
11 there. Can you help us with any explanation as to how  
12 you came to be making those calls when you did, but  
13 having arrived back at the platform at the time that  
14 you've agreed you did?

15 A. No, I can only accept the fact that you've got the  
16 evidence in front of you, the timings, and that I was  
17 mistaken in the first instance, but that was just  
18 because of the confusion of what was happening at the  
19 time.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Wright, I'm sorry to butt in  
21 again. Do I take it the one thing you're sure of is  
22 that it's within a short time of your arriving back at  
23 the platform that you make a call to the line  
24 controller? Is that what you're saying?

25 A. As far as I recall, yes, but obviously the evidence that

1 you're giving me is different. That was my memory of  
2 what happened at the time. I may well have been wrong.  
3 It's some time since the event.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Wright, this is no criticism of  
5 you at all. I do understand how difficult it is.  
6 Sometimes we think we can rely upon the objective  
7 evidence. I'm just trying to work out where that takes  
8 us.

9 Ms Canby, is there anything else that you want to  
10 try to help with, because at the moment we do have quite  
11 an inconsistency?

12 MS CANBY: My Lady, it seems to me that Mr Wright must be  
13 wrong when he says that he makes the first call to the  
14 line controller as soon as he returns to the platform.  
15 The reason why I say that is because of the two  
16 conversations that the station supervisor has requesting  
17 ambulances, and of course there's nothing else to  
18 suggest that ambulances were required to the  
19 Russell Square station supervisor until people actually  
20 start coming through the tunnel.

21 But perhaps more importantly, it's Mr Boyce's  
22 evidence that he sees Mr Wright and then immediately  
23 goes down into the tunnel and comes back again, and we  
24 know from the telephone recordings that Mr Boyce's phone  
25 call is at 09.22 and at that point he's already seen

1 Mr Wright with the passengers, gone down to the bombed  
2 train and then come back again, and so I appreciate that  
3 Mr Wright is trying to do the best he can, but I'm  
4 afraid I think he is probably wrong.

5 I don't know, my Lady, if I can assist you any  
6 further.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, thank you, Ms Canby.

8 I understand the problems.

9 MR GIBBS: If it assists your Ladyship to sort it out now  
10 rather than later with another witness --

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think if it's going to impact on  
12 Mr Wright's evidence, that's what -- I don't want to  
13 have to ask him to return, so if you think you can clear  
14 this up ...

15 MR GIBBS: I'm not sure whether I can do it legitimately  
16 with a question, but I can certainly point your Ladyship  
17 and everyone else, perhaps your team, to a telephone  
18 call which is within the British Transport Police's  
19 evidence, timed at 09.13.06, to which we're adding  
20 a couple of minutes, which refers to the Russell Square  
21 supervisor plainly having received the information which  
22 only this witness's arrival could have communicated to  
23 him.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm very grateful, Mr Gibbs. Thank  
25 you.

1 MR KEITH: That is, in fact, the call that was put to  
2 Mr Wright by Ms Canby with reference to the phone call  
3 from the Russell Square station supervisor and it's the  
4 premise upon which we've all worked, which is that that  
5 call could only have been made if he had spoken to  
6 Mr Wright, but whether it's 09.10 or 09.13.06 plus two  
7 minutes, it appears to be the same call.

8 Mr Wright, for his part, accepts that it's quite  
9 possible, but I think that may be the most that we'll  
10 get from Mr Wright himself, given the difficulties of  
11 the position in which he found himself.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Wright, I think we've probably  
13 cleared it up. I suspect it may be that, given  
14 everything that was going on, you may have made  
15 a mistake about the time. I don't know. I'm going to  
16 wait and see and hear other evidence. We shall see  
17 whether we can pin it down any more.

18 In the meantime, thank you very much for assisting  
19 me and thank you for all you did to try to get the  
20 passengers, both injured and walking wounded, off that  
21 train and up into the station. Thank you very much.

22 A. Thank you, my Lady. Thank you.

23 MR KEITH: My Lady, we have Mr Nairn who has been here this  
24 morning but we also have a videolink booked from Utah,  
25 I think, at 3.30, so we can either start Mr Nairn or --

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think poor Mr Nairn has been on  
2 tenterhooks for the last few hours, so --  
3 MR KEITH: He has.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- shall we ask Mr Nairn? We may  
5 have to break off, Mr Nairn, but we'll see how far we  
6 can get.  
7 MR KEITH: Thomas Nairn, please.  
8 MR THOMAS DOW NAIRN (sworn)  
9 Questions by MR KEITH  
10 MR KEITH: Good afternoon, Mr Nairn.  
11 A. Good afternoon.  
12 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?  
13 A. My name is Thomas Dow Nairn.  
14 Q. In July of 2005, had you been a train operator for some  
15 seven years?  
16 A. Approximately seven years, yes.  
17 Q. I think, during that time, you'd always driven on the  
18 Piccadilly Line?  
19 A. That's correct, yes.  
20 Q. You drove that day the train set with which we are  
21 concerned?  
22 A. That's correct, yes.  
23 Q. Before I ask you about the events in the tunnel between  
24 Russell Square and King's Cross, can I ask you, please  
25 about, your own training? Your statement records how

1 you are track safety trained but you'd not been trained  
2 in how to evacuate a train.

3 A. I had been trained in how to evacuate a train, but not  
4 in the situation that I evacuated the train that day.

5 Q. I wanted to ask you about that, thank you, because there  
6 are a number of official documents describing for train  
7 operators how to detrain with the permission of the line  
8 controller, how to detrain in an emergency and what to  
9 do if there are no communications available at all to  
10 speak to the line controller and there is an emergency  
11 confronting the train.

12 Were you familiar with those protocols and those  
13 documents?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You were, right. So what you say in your statement  
16 doesn't quite describe the whole position. You knew how  
17 to evacuate a train and you were aware of the training  
18 for it?

19 A. Yes, I was.

20 Q. That morning, you had started duty, we can see from your  
21 statement, at 7.30, and you were obliged to collect your  
22 train from the Oakwood depot. Is that on the  
23 Northern Line of the Piccadilly -- the northern end of  
24 the Piccadilly Line?

25 A. Yes, it is. We call it the eastbound end of the --



1 Q. The eastbound end?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The eastbound end is the end that has Cockfosters on it  
4 and Oakwood is the second station down from Cockfosters?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. What was your planned journey?

7 A. My planned journey was from Oakwood, I believe it was to  
8 Cockfosters, Cockfosters to Heathrow, Heathrow back to  
9 Cockfosters, and I believe I then got off at Arnos Grove  
10 for lunch, but I'm not quite sure about the last part of  
11 the trip, Arnos Grove, Cockfosters, Arnos Grove, but  
12 certainly Heathrow and back.

13 Q. Were you the sole operator on the train?

14 A. Yes, I was.

15 Q. Was there a problem on the Piccadilly Line earlier that  
16 morning before the events with which we're concerned?

17 A. There was, yes.

18 Q. Do you remember what it was?

19 A. There was a smoking train at Caledonian Road on the  
20 eastbound. The eastbound is heading towards Cockfosters  
21 from Heathrow.

22 Q. Do you recall what time in the morning there had been  
23 a problem with the smoke coming from the Caledonian Road  
24 train?

25 A. I first became aware of it when I was heading down

1 towards Arnos Grove from Cockfosters. I think I heard  
2 the -- any general message that's made on -- over the  
3 radio with the line controller, any time the line  
4 controller talks to anybody over the radio, I can hear  
5 what's said, although the people can't hear -- say  
6 I speak to the line controller, they can't hear me speak  
7 to the line controller, but anything that's said by the  
8 line controller is heard over the radio. So I heard him  
9 speaking to somebody to mention that there was a problem  
10 around about Caledonian Road.

11 Q. As you got to Arnos Grove, were you told that, in fact,  
12 trains were terminating?

13 A. As I approached Arnos Grove, I should have went in --  
14 normally, I would go into the left-hand platform at  
15 Arnos Grove. There was a train already in that  
16 platform, and I was directed into the middle platform at  
17 Arnos Grove, which is reasonably unusual, but not  
18 completely unusual.

19 Q. Do you recall whether or not the other train that was in  
20 Arnos Grove was allowed to proceed or whether or not it  
21 then terminated there?

22 A. No, it was terminated there and the people from that  
23 train come over on to my train.

24 Q. Do you recall whether or not this detrainment from the  
25 other train on to yours and the delays -- I'm sorry, the

1 problem in the Caledonian Road train affected the  
2 timetable and the running of your own train?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. To what extent?

5 A. Well, by the time I got to King's Cross, I was probably  
6 about half an hour late, but at the time leaving  
7 Arnos Grove, I probably wasn't quite as late as that  
8 leaving.

9 Q. As you went down westbound along the Piccadilly Line you  
10 approached Turnpike Lane?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Was there a problem at Turnpike Lane, in that other  
13 trains before you had been detrained or terminated  
14 there, and, therefore, there were more passengers than  
15 usual waiting to board your train?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. So from Turnpike Lane through Manor House, Arsenal,  
18 Holloway Road, Caledonian Road, down to King's Cross,  
19 was your train unusually full?

20 A. Yes, unusually full. I think I was the first train  
21 through in passenger service by about 15 minutes, and  
22 I was completely full at Turnpike Lane and each platform  
23 was full as I went through it.

24 Q. At the King's Cross platform, whilst you waited for  
25 passengers to board, do you recollect meeting -- or do

1 you recollect seeing an Acton Town driver whom you  
2 recognised?

3 A. Yes, I didn't know Ray's name at the time, I knew him as  
4 an Acton Town driver, I didn't actually know his name  
5 was Ray Wright at the time.

6 Q. Did he ask you whether or not he could join you in the  
7 cab for the purposes of getting him to his depot in  
8 Acton?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Was there an unusual occurrence whilst you waited at  
11 King's Cross, insofar as the lights went out?

12 A. Very, very briefly. It went down and came back up  
13 immediately.

14 Q. Which lights were they?

15 A. I believe it was the platform lights and I've got  
16 a feeling the traction current was discharged and come  
17 back on as well.

18 Q. Is there some indication in the cab that traction  
19 current goes off?

20 A. No, not really. You can hear the alternating motors on  
21 the train, they kind of go down, then they come back up.  
22 So actually, the sound of the train, you can tell that  
23 the traction current has been discharged.

24 Q. So it may have been that it wasn't just a question of  
25 the lights going off in the station, it was affecting

1 the train itself?

2 A. It would just depend on the feeling of the train, yes,  
3 itself.

4 Q. You no doubt used the PA system as you left King's Cross  
5 because of the need to ensure that passengers were on  
6 the train safely?

7 A. I had used it earlier on at Arnos Grove when I was on  
8 the platform telling passengers that there were delays  
9 to the service. I believe I used it at King's Cross,  
10 but there was somebody on the platform making PA  
11 announcements, so I tend to try not to talk over the top  
12 of other people on the platform. Sometimes it's easier  
13 than others. So I couldn't say for definite I did use  
14 the PA, but I had used it earlier on at Arnos Grove.  
15 I heard what was said, myself saying -- making  
16 announcements.

17 Q. We know from what you've just said that your radio was  
18 also working because you'd overheard messages on the  
19 radio.

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Do you recall when you had last used the radio yourself  
22 to send a message?

23 A. I had, on a number of occasions at Arnos Grove platform,  
24 tried to contact the line controller but was unable to  
25 and I had tried to use the autophone in the platform at

1 Arnos Grove and Wood Green to contact the line  
2 controller to find out whether I was able to run through  
3 Central London or not, whether I was picking passengers  
4 up or dropping more passengers off at Turnpike Lane.  
5 But our line controller wasn't answering the phone or  
6 answering the radio.

7 Q. What happened after you left the platform at  
8 King's Cross?

9 A. We drew out of the platform and went over the crossover  
10 and there was an almighty bang, a large, really loud,  
11 metallic bang.

12 Q. How far had the train gone on its way towards  
13 Russell Square at the point of that bang?

14 A. Exact distance, I don't know. It had pulled by the  
15 6 car marker.

16 Q. It had gone past the 6 car marker?

17 A. It had gone past the 6 car marker, yes.

18 Q. We've heard from Mr Wright the 6 car mark is the point  
19 at which the train is fully in the trouble and,  
20 therefore, if someone pulls the emergency passenger  
21 alarm --

22 A. You continue to the next station.

23 Q. -- the train will continue to the next station rather  
24 than stopping at the departing --

25 A. The train will actually stop. What I do is I put my

1 foot on a treadle, which releases the brakes, and then  
2 I actually make the train go on to the next station but,  
3 yes, that's the point of no return, basically.

4 Q. So there was an almighty bang?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What happened to the lights in your cab?

7 A. Everything went out, everything died when the -- after  
8 the bang, so --

9 Q. Do you recall whether you had the cab lights on as --

10 A. I would not have had the cab lights on, no, I always  
11 have the cab lights off.

12 Q. What exactly went dead?

13 A. I lost my headlights, I lost my PA, I lost my radio and  
14 any other -- I've got a CDU that tells me any defects on  
15 the train, and it's normally lit up with red lights or  
16 orange lights or whatever.

17 Q. Could you assist us with CDU? I'm afraid I've  
18 forgotten --

19 A. I'm not quite sure whether I can remember the acronym.

20 Q. I'm sure Ms Canby will know the answer. No.

21 A. Cab display unit, I believe it's called.

22 Q. So everything went out. Do you recall whether or not  
23 the tunnel lights went on?

24 A. I believe they did go on and the train filled -- the cab  
25 filled up with a black, acrid smoke.

1 Q. Can you tell how far the train travelled from the point  
2 of the bang to coming to a complete halt?

3 A. No. I couldn't say for definite, but I do remember it  
4 coming up -- normally, if you put on the emergency  
5 brakes, it takes a little bit of time for the train to  
6 slow down, but I felt this was almost kind of  
7 immediately, but more so than putting on the emergency  
8 brakes.

9 Q. When the train stopped, what did you do first?

10 A. The first thing I did was I looked at Ray and shouted,  
11 "What happened?", I think, and then I tried to make  
12 a mayday call.

13 Q. Is that when you realised that the radio was completely  
14 dead?

15 A. That was when I found out the radio was dead. So after  
16 I made the -- tried to make the radio call, my next  
17 concern was the passengers, to let them know that I was  
18 aware that there had been a problem, so I tried to use  
19 the PA.

20 Q. And that was dead?

21 A. And that was dead.

22 Q. Could you hear from behind you in the first carriage any  
23 noise from the passengers?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What was it?



1 A. Screaming, yes, lots of screaming.

2 Q. Having tried the radio and the PA, did you open the door  
3 between the driver's cab and the first carriage?

4 A. Yes, I started shouting, in that I was aware that there  
5 was a problem, that I was going to sort it out and there  
6 was a couple of women right beside the door. I spoke to  
7 them and they seemed to kind of take control of the  
8 situation and calm people down to a certain extent.

9 Q. Do you recall whether either yourself or Mr Wright had  
10 a torch, a handlamp?

11 A. I would have had a handlamp, I definitely had  
12 a handlamp, I'm not sure whether Ray did.

13 Q. Did you shine it into the carriage?

14 A. I would imagine I would have shone it, but I can't say  
15 for definite.

16 Q. The first carriage had been extremely full from what  
17 you've said.

18 A. Extremely full.

19 Q. When you shone your torch into the first carriage, did  
20 it seem to you that the majority of the passengers had  
21 been thrown to the floor or were they seated or could  
22 you not tell in the dark?

23 A. I couldn't really tell, it was so dark. I could see  
24 a few faces round about the door. I could see they were  
25 blackened and their hair was kind of on end and frizzy.

1 But I couldn't -- no more, I couldn't really see any  
2 further into it than that.

3 Q. Having been unable to use the radio or the PA, what did  
4 you do next?

5 A. There's an emergency pod in the door of the cab. I took  
6 out the -- I believe I took out the emergency train  
7 telephone. I then went down onto the track and tried to  
8 hook it on to the tunnel telephone wires and speak to  
9 the line controller.

10 Q. Were you able to do so?

11 A. No, I wasn't.

12 Q. Was there any signal or connection in the tunnel  
13 telephone?

14 A. Not that I was aware of, no, no.

15 Q. Although the tunnel lights had come on, as you've  
16 described, and although everything was dead in the cab,  
17 did you, out of an abundance of caution, pinch and rub  
18 the telephone wires together in order to doubly ensure  
19 that the traction current was off?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. What other steps did you take to ensure that anybody  
22 outside the cab would not be electrocuted by the rails?

23 A. I asked Ray to pass down the short-circuiting device  
24 that's in the emergency pod in the driver's cab. He  
25 passed me down the emergency short-circuiting device and

1 I placed it in front of the train.

2 Q. We will, I think, hear evidence in just a moment from  
3 a gentleman called Mr Orr, a Tube Lines employee, who  
4 may describe how a little bit later he himself spoke to  
5 you because he was a Tube Lines employee and tried the  
6 TT, the tunnel telephone for himself --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- firstly, by checking the connection on the westbound  
9 copper wires, and then taking the tunnel telephone off  
10 through a passageway or a bolt hole into the eastbound  
11 tunnel to see whether or not he could use it there.

12 A. That's correct. He's quite a young person, he  
13 identified himself to me as a train -- technical officer  
14 or an apprentice technical officer and asked if he could  
15 help in any way. I said that I hadn't been able to  
16 speak to the line controller and asked him to check it  
17 to see whether he could get any -- anything out of it,  
18 and he did as you said, he first of all tried the  
19 westbound and then went through the bolt hole into the  
20 eastbound and tried the eastbound as well.

21 Q. Can you tell us, please, how long after the explosion  
22 you think that you met Mr Orr and Mr Orr attempted  
23 himself to try to speak to the line controller through  
24 the TT?

25 A. I think to -- for the first lot of people to start

1 coming out of the train, it would have been about four  
2 or five minutes, and he was one of the first lot of  
3 people out, so probably about six or seven minutes after  
4 the explosion itself.

5 Q. Going back to your own attempt to try to make  
6 a connection and finding that you were unable to do so,  
7 you put down the short-circuiting device. Then did you  
8 put down a ladder to allow passengers to detrain?

9 A. I did, yes.

10 Q. We've heard evidence from Mr Wright that you took care  
11 to try to tie the ladder down so that nobody would trip.  
12 Do you recall that?

13 A. No, I didn't tie the ladder down. The ladder, itself,  
14 when it's deployed, actually clips into position so that  
15 it can't --

16 Q. Maybe that is what he meant?

17 A. Yes, yes, but it was not tied down, no.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, it looks as if we're not  
19 going to finish Mr Nairn. I'm sorry, Mr Nairn. I'm  
20 just checking whether or not you need five minutes to  
21 set up the video.

22 If you could come and get me when you're ready for  
23 me. Thank you.

24 (3.25 pm)

25 (A short break)

1 (3.30 pm)

2 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Nairn is in luck because the witness  
3 in Utah hasn't appeared.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not sure about that. Poor  
5 Mr Nairn, one minute he's wanted, and the next minute --  
6 I'm terribly sorry about this, Mr Nairn, we do our best  
7 to avoid this kind of interference, but ...

8 MR KEITH: I think I was asking you about the ladder,  
9 Mr Nairn. Having put the ladder down, did passengers  
10 start detraining from the front of the train?

11 A. Yes, they did.

12 Q. How did you bring them to the front of the train or let  
13 them know that you were in a position to allow them to  
14 detrain from the front?

15 A. I believe Ray and myself had shouted in through the  
16 J door -- that's the door between the cab and the  
17 saloon -- and I think, because they saw a light there as  
18 well, that kind of attracted people towards the door as  
19 well. So it was just a matter everybody followed each  
20 other.

21 Q. The passengers started appearing at the front of the  
22 train.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Was it apparent to you immediately that they had  
25 sustained injuries, burns, flash burns, bleeding?

1 A. The first passengers out were more blackened and with  
2 kind of frizzy hair. As those passengers came out, it  
3 got progressively worse, the kind of state of the people  
4 that were leaving the train. So, yes, burns, splattered  
5 with blood, hair standing on end, clothes blackened,  
6 that sort of thing.

7 Q. How did you determine how many passengers Mr Wright  
8 would then lead off to Russell Square?

9 A. There was no -- there seemed to be a large amount of  
10 people there and it was what to do with them after they  
11 were all there. I didn't count anybody, if that's what  
12 you're meaning.

13 Q. They were the passengers from the front end of the first  
14 carriage, because, of course, the location of the bomb  
15 being in the middle of the first carriage prevented  
16 those behind it from getting to the driver's cab.

17 A. I wasn't aware of that at the time.

18 Q. You weren't. Did there come a time when it seemed to  
19 you that the number of people coming out from the front  
20 of the carriage began to diminish?

21 A. Yes, it did.

22 Q. Was it after that that Mr Wright then set off?

23 A. I think it wasn't after people had started. I think we  
24 had just got a large group of people. So as Ray took  
25 off the group of people -- actually the people were

1 coming off and then joined like the end of a queue  
2 almost, like joining those people heading down the track  
3 towards Russell Square.

4 Q. In your statement, you make specific reference to  
5 a passenger called Paul?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. Paul Glennerster, who had a very severe injury to his  
8 leg.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Where did you see him?

11 A. He had pulled himself out of the front of the train, so  
12 he was actually hopping out the front of the train, and  
13 he hopped down the ladders. He had one leg and one leg  
14 was missing. He had a foot and a knee and a bit of  
15 flesh connecting the two, but nothing in between.

16 Q. Do you recall anybody helping him get down the steps?

17 A. No, he did it himself.

18 Q. Did he arrive after Mr Wright had departed?

19 A. Yes, because I don't think Ray remembers. Ray doesn't  
20 remember him. I think I've spoken to Ray since then  
21 about it and he doesn't remember him being there. So it  
22 was after.

23 Q. Don't worry about what Mr Wright thought --

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. -- but do you recall in your memory --

1 A. It was after.

2 Q. -- Mr Glennerster arriving after Mr Wright had left?

3 A. Yes. Passengers were still heading off down the tunnel

4 and he wanted to head off after them, but I stopped him

5 from going any further.

6 Q. What did you tell him?

7 A. I told him that he'd lose too much blood if he headed

8 towards the platform, and I thought it would be better

9 if he waited until the emergency services arrived.

10 Q. So did you tell him, in fact, to sit down on the

11 ground --

12 A. I did, yes.

13 Q. -- and to await the arrival of emergency help?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Given how full the carriage had been, did it seem to you

16 that the number of people who came out of the front of

17 the carriage reflected that number, or were there fewer

18 than you were expecting?

19 A. There were fewer than I expected, and also I expected --

20 I actually thought that possibly the whole train would

21 come out the front of the train and that, after a while,

22 the numbers just diminished and people stopped coming

23 out, and I expected a lot more people to come out.

24 Q. Did you go then, yourself, into the cab --

25 A. I did, yes.



1 Q. -- and then back into the first carriage?  
2 A. I did, yes.  
3 Q. What did you see?  
4 A. Nothing, really, to begin with, I didn't see anything  
5 because it was so black. It was full of black, acrid  
6 smoke, and you literally, like, couldn't see your hand  
7 in front of your face.  
8 Q. Did you have your torch with you then?  
9 A. I did, but it was pretty ineffective.  
10 Q. How far back down the carriage were you able to go?  
11 A. I'd say past the first set of double doors and  
12 towards -- halfway between the first set and the second  
13 set of double doors was when I first kind of came across  
14 people badly injured.  
15 Q. Were you able to recall, do you recall, badly injured  
16 passengers lying on the seats and on the floor?  
17 A. On the seats and on the floor, but I don't remember  
18 a lot of people. My memory of this, kind of round about  
19 this area, is a bit kind of hazy. I think I have lost  
20 my memory, partially lost my memory around about this  
21 kind of area, but I do remember bits of it.  
22 There was somebody lying on the seats with one of  
23 her legs missing, or not so much missing, but hanging  
24 off and turned round the opposite way, and there was  
25 somebody attending to her, a woman who was attending to

1 her, and they introduced themselves to me. It's  
2 probably different to what I said in my statement, but  
3 I now believe them to be Jill Hicks and a woman called  
4 Alison, and they introduced themselves to me and said,  
5 "This is Jill, and my name's Alison", or something to  
6 that effect and, "Can you help us in any way? Do you  
7 have any bandages?", which I didn't have.

8 Q. Were there any medical supplies on the carriage itself  
9 in the driver's cab?

10 A. No, we don't carry medical equipment in -- on the train.

11 Q. Could you see any particular focal point in the carriage  
12 which might have been the source of whatever had  
13 occurred, or was that not apparent?

14 A. At that particular time, no. I hadn't actually reached  
15 the blast at that time.

16 Q. Did you stay in the carriage or did you go back to the  
17 driver's cab?

18 A. No, I stayed in the carriage. First of all, they had  
19 asked me for something to bandage the -- Jill's leg, so  
20 I shone my torch round and people's clothes or parts of  
21 people's clothes had been blown off, so I saw a belt and  
22 I picked up a belt and I handed it to -- I'm not quite  
23 sure whether it was Jill or whether it was Alison, and  
24 I believe they applied it to Jill's leg.

25 In front of Jill, there was another -- I think

1 I described them as an Asian male, and they had been  
2 blown up on to the back of the seats and I went to them  
3 and tried to attend to them and I thought there was  
4 a possibility that they might have broken their back, so  
5 I didn't really want to move them too much and just  
6 tried to make them a bit more comfortable and, after  
7 tended to them, I went to where the blast was.

8 Q. You went to?

9 A. Where the blast had went off.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 A. At that time, I didn't know it had been a bomb,  
12 I just -- I thought it could have been something to do  
13 with a train or I wasn't really sure what it was, and  
14 I shone my torch on it, and I just couldn't work out  
15 what had happened. It was just -- and I couldn't  
16 actually, when I was looking at it, I couldn't really  
17 make out what it was. It just completely confused me.  
18 I wasn't really sure. That's where I think my memory  
19 went a bit kind of hazy, around about that area.

20 Q. Do you recollect bodies lying on the floor that were not  
21 moving, that were showing no signs of life?

22 A. No, I don't remember that. I think I remember I saw two  
23 bodies that were down the side of the train, but I'm not  
24 quite sure about that. I think I remember thinking that  
25 there were two bodies down the side of the train, but

1 I couldn't kind of -- yes, I'm not 100 per cent sure of  
2 that.

3 Q. All right. Let's move on, then, if we may.

4 We know that at some stage you walked down the track  
5 towards Russell Square yourself.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Before you did so, do you recall somebody arriving from  
8 Russell Square --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- at the end of your train?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you know who that was?

13 A. I now know -- at the time, he introduced me as a station  
14 supervisor from Russell Square. I now know that was  
15 Dave Boyce.

16 Q. That was David Boyce?

17 A. Yes, and he did introduce me, but at the time I didn't  
18 remember his name.

19 Q. Do you know what he was doing? Was he coming to see  
20 what had happened?

21 A. He had come to assist, yes. When he came -- I think  
22 I met him at the -- I had went back and forward to the  
23 blast area a number of times and I dealt with Jill and  
24 who I said was an Asian male, who actually turned out to  
25 be a female, and she wasn't Asian either, but she was

1 blackened and her hair was black.

2 So I went back and forward a few times and it was  
3 just going back and forward, just really attending to  
4 the two people that I saw.

5 Dave then came and, at the front of the train, there  
6 was a male and a female there, so when Dave got on to  
7 the train, I asked him if he minded if I took the people  
8 off the train to the platform.

9 Q. To Russell Square?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. In your statement, you describe two London Underground  
12 employees in particular, one who was the person who  
13 appeared at the end of the train, whom you described, in  
14 fact, as being possibly a group station manager --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- but subsequently you describe how, having gone to  
17 Russell Square yourself, you went back to the train,  
18 which we'll come to in a moment --

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. -- with a station supervisor?

21 A. It was actually --

22 Q. I want to get them the right way round. You're sure  
23 that the person you saw first, who had appeared at the  
24 end of the train, was, in fact, David Boyce?

25 A. Yes, what I have managed to do is amalgamate two

1 different people together. There was another DSM that  
2 came to the train as well, his name was Gary Stephens,  
3 and Dave Boyce, but I've kind of lumped them in together  
4 as one person, so --

5 Q. Who first arrived?

6 A. Dave Boyce definitely arrived first.

7 Q. Then was it Gary Stephens, the DSM --

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. -- whom you saw later at Russell Square and then you  
10 brought him back to the train?

11 A. No, that was another DSM.

12 Q. That was a third person? Right.

13 A. Yes, a third person, yes. His name was Roy, I can't  
14 remember his --

15 Q. Roy Byrne?

16 A. That sounds about right.

17 Q. Who was a DSM?

18 A. Who was a DSM, that's correct.

19 Q. When do you think Gary Stephens appeared?

20 A. When I took the two passengers off the train, I think  
21 I passed him on the way.

22 Q. All right. So obviously a number of London Underground  
23 staff had appeared: David Boyce at the end of the train?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. You saw Roy Byrne as you went back to Russell Square --

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. -- and then, when you got to Russell Square?

3 A. When I got back to Russell Square, I saw that there was

4 London Underground staff on the platform, I think there

5 were two or three, and then Roy Byrne walked down the

6 platform, and that's where I met Roy, and it was Roy

7 that told me that there had been a blast -- there was

8 a number of blasts had went off in Central London.

9 There was also -- I think there was somebody that

10 said he was some sort of paramedic or something like

11 that, but he wasn't -- I think he said he was either

12 a police paramedic or a Fire Brigade paramedic or

13 something like that. I just think that -- I remember

14 thinking it was a bit strange that I'd never heard of

15 that role before, a paramedic for either a police or

16 Fire Brigade.

17 Q. I've jumped ahead in order to see when you first saw

18 other members of London Underground --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- but we know that you went then to Russell Square --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- together with the casualties that you were helping.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. No doubt that took you quite a while because of the

25 distance that you had to cover.

1 A. The woman wasn't -- was quite lucid. The gentleman that  
2 I was with was in severe -- deep, deep shock. He  
3 couldn't speak, he couldn't hear anything, and he just  
4 moaned and just a constant loud moan all the way. He  
5 was in severe distress.

6 Q. How long do you think it took you to get back to  
7 Russell Square?

8 A. I would have thought about ten or fifteen minutes.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You said again the gentleman was in  
10 deep, deep shock, but is this the person that you  
11 described as a gentleman that you now think is --

12 A. No, no, they were still back in. That was the one that  
13 I had thought had a broken back. No, they were still on  
14 the train. This was a different person at the front of  
15 the train.

16 MR KEITH: When you arrived at Russell Square, do you recall  
17 there being any emergency services personnel there?

18 A. There was that one person that I thought was  
19 a paramedic, but other than that, no.

20 Q. Whose description you hadn't heard before --

21 A. Yes, yes, but other than that --

22 Q. -- or whose role you hadn't heard?

23 A. -- no, there was no other emergency services.

24 Q. Did that person go into the tunnel, as far as you can  
25 recall, or was he just on the platform?



1 A. I did see him there later on, but not straightaway.  
2 I believe he helped the people -- him and his station  
3 staff helped the people up onto the platform, but he  
4 didn't come back with me, no.

5 Q. Were there a number of station staff on the platform?

6 A. There was about two or three, I think it was.

7 Q. Did you discuss with them what had happened in the  
8 tunnel, what you understood to be the position, and  
9 whether help was on the way?

10 A. I believe I asked whether they knew what had happened,  
11 there was a problem, that they need to get people down,  
12 where was everybody, that sort of thing, and asked them  
13 to -- yes.

14 Q. You asked them to get help?

15 A. To get help, yes.

16 Q. Your statement records these words:

17 "I was surprised by the absence of emergency  
18 services personnel", because you did not know why help  
19 wasn't coming?

20 A. That's right, yes.

21 Q. Do you have any sense of the time that had passed  
22 between the point of the explosion and your arrival at  
23 Russell Square for the first time?

24 A. I think between the time that the bomb had went off to  
25 the point where Dave appeared, I think it was about

1 20 minutes. Then it would be another ten minutes for me  
2 to walk up to the platform, so we're talking about half  
3 an hour to 35 minutes, I would have thought, from me  
4 getting to the platform, and then I spoke to the people  
5 on the platform and then immediately just went straight  
6 back.

7 Q. Because your role had been to get those two passengers  
8 to the platform --

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. -- and then, as soon as you did so, you then went all  
11 the way back to the train?

12 A. Back to the train, yes.

13 Q. When you got back to the train, the gentleman with the  
14 severe leg injury, Paul Glennerster was still there, was  
15 he, at the front of the train?

16 A. He was sitting on the negi rail, on the negative rail  
17 with his head down between his legs. I had said to him  
18 something like, "That's not a good idea to be sitting on  
19 the negative rail, come on, get up off of there".

20 There's always a possibility that there might be -- the  
21 traction might get recharged, so I thought it would be  
22 best if I took him off of that and what I did was I lay  
23 him on his back, kind of wedged him between the running  
24 rail and the tunnel edge, and then just elevated his  
25 leg, there was a tourniquet round the bottom of his leg,

1 and I put him on his back and I pulled it up above his  
2 head.

3 Q. Did you stay with him or did you, having returned to the  
4 train from Russell Square, go back into the first  
5 carriage at any stage?

6 A. I didn't no, I didn't go back in. I did say in my  
7 statement that I went back in, but I didn't actually go  
8 back into --

9 Q. You stayed outside looking after Paul Glennerster?

10 A. That's right. Gary Stephens was standing talking into  
11 the train, I presume that was to Dave Boyce, and  
12 I remained outside the train with Paul, I'm not sure  
13 what his surname is.

14 Q. You no doubt discussed with Paul where you had come  
15 from --

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. -- and you were Scottish, I think?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. You recalled that you come from Perth, perhaps?

20 A. I don't, no. I come from Prestwick, which is --

21 Q. Prestwick? Maybe he misheard.

22 A. Yes, not Perth, no.

23 Q. In what state was he over this time? Did his condition  
24 deteriorate as you waited?

25 A. It kind of ebbed and flowed. Sometimes he was quite

1 calm, and quite jokey. Other times, he was quite, you  
2 can imagine, upset, it was quite obvious that he'd lost  
3 his leg, and he would go in and out of consciousness and  
4 become a bit concerned, say. So it was just a matter of  
5 trying to keep him calm and let him know that people  
6 were on their way.

7 Q. You referred to a couple who you thought were  
8 a boyfriend and girlfriend?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Were they with you at some stage with Paul?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. One of them, the male, you thought was called Sean. We  
13 know of two witnesses: Travers Simmons and  
14 Julie Rowlinson, who were boyfriend and girlfriend,  
15 I think. Do either of those names ring a bell?

16 A. None at all.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. There were so many people about, the confusion, the  
19 names, just didn't really mean anything to me at all,  
20 unfortunately.

21 Q. Did help arrive?

22 A. It did, yes.

23 Q. In what form?

24 A. I believe it was about an hour after. I think it was an  
25 hour --

1 Q. After the --

2 A. After the initial blast, I believe, about an hour. The  
3 police arrived and paramedics arrived almost  
4 simultaneously. I think the police came and they kind  
5 of stood, they weren't quite sure what to do initially,  
6 and the paramedics came in and I asked them if there was  
7 any possibility of giving Paul some sort of medication  
8 to prevent -- you know, because he was in quite a lot of  
9 pain by that stage, and they said that they were  
10 tagging, they weren't giving medication, but they were  
11 only interested in tagging.

12 Q. By "tagging", you meant they were carrying out some sort  
13 of triage system and putting labels on people to see in  
14 what state they were?

15 A. To determine -- that's correct, they were going to label  
16 people up.

17 Q. Do you recall whether or not he was tagged?

18 A. I believe he must have been, yes.

19 Q. Was there some discussion between you and either the  
20 paramedics or the police, as to whether or not he could  
21 be removed from the end of the train, from the track,  
22 and taken to Russell Square? How did he come to be  
23 moved?

24 A. I remember the duty station manager, Gary Stephens,  
25 asking me if I had a stretcher on the train. I said

1 I didn't, but we have a carry sheet. He found the carry  
2 sheet. I couldn't remember where it was, my -- kind of,  
3 my head was a bit scrambled at that stage and I couldn't  
4 remember where it was, but he found it and we put Gary  
5 on the carry sheet, six toggles, I think it is, and  
6 I got one corner and the police got -- there were six of  
7 us, in total, got a toggle each, and we decided to carry  
8 him out.

9 Q. Did that take even longer than it had your first journey  
10 down the tunnel to Russell Square?

11 A. It did, yes. In London Underground, they sometimes  
12 store rails between their running rails of the track,  
13 and we were trying -- having to negotiate them on the  
14 way out, which was causing us a lot of difficulty.

15 Q. You had, before you even moved him, been holding his  
16 leg, you had been, no doubt, holding the tourniquet  
17 up --

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. -- and then having to carry him as well.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So would it be fair to say that that was an extremely  
22 demanding and difficult process for you?

23 A. It was, yes. I got about halfway and I couldn't carry  
24 it any longer. Also, my hands were all covered in blood  
25 and oil and all the kind of stuff that's lying about

1 tracks basically, and my hands kept slipping. So  
2 halfway down I said "Look, listen, it's getting too much  
3 for me", and some -- a police officer, I think it was  
4 a female police officer, came and took over from me, and  
5 I then took the people that she was -- it might have  
6 been -- no, there was a woman that she'd been helping to  
7 escort out.

8 I then escorted the woman out and she took the other  
9 end of the carry sheet.

10 Q. When you arrived at Russell Square again, now for the  
11 second time, Paul was taken away and looked after?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you go beyond the platform or did you do a quick  
14 about-turn and go back down to the train?

15 A. I think I was -- because I was so -- it was really hot  
16 underground as well, there was no movement, so because  
17 there's no train movement, it gets really, really hot.

18 So I sat on the platform for about a minute and  
19 I thought -- I wondered what I was going to do next and  
20 then I noticed there was a whole load of bottled water  
21 on the platform, so I decided to take that back to the  
22 train. So I collected as many bottles as I could,  
23 headed back towards the train.

24 But I'd taken too many with me, so I got halfway and  
25 I dumped half of them kind of thing, and then just took

1 the rest up to the train.

2 Q. When you arrived back at the train, was there a change,  
3 did you see, in terms of the number of people there  
4 helping?

5 A. Yes, there appeared to be -- when I was going down as  
6 well, when I was carrying the water, there was, like,  
7 a kind of guy dressed in, like, a surgeon's outfit, kind  
8 of thing, he was heading towards the train and there was  
9 other people kind of overtaking me going towards the  
10 train. So there was a lot more people about than what  
11 there was to begin with, you know, when I'd first  
12 initially left.

13 Q. You've told us already about the time that passed from  
14 the point of the explosion to your first trip to  
15 Russell Square.

16 Can you tell us how much time elapsed, do you think,  
17 between your first arrival at Russell Square and your  
18 second arrival? The second time was, of course, when  
19 you had got the bottles of water.

20 A. It was an hour, or an hour and 15 minutes ...

21 Q. I appreciate it's difficult.

22 A. I couldn't really tell you, to tell you the truth.

23 Probably about an hour and a half, an hour and

24 45 minutes before I got to the last time I went to the

25 train, it was about an hour and 45 minutes or so. Maybe



1 even more than that, actually.

2 Q. From the point of the explosion?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. You handed out the water when you got back to the train.

5 A. Yes. Well, outside, I can't remember actually

6 physically handing it to people -- I'm not really sure,

7 I don't remember, really, terribly well about that.

8 Q. Was there some discussion when you got back to the train

9 of whether or not casualties could, by that stage, be

10 taken out of the train towards King's Cross?

11 A. Yes, I believe they said everybody now that was going

12 was going to be taken off the train, was now going to go

13 out the King's Cross way and there would be no more

14 people coming out of the Russell Square entrance, so

15 I just thought, "Well, there's nothing more that I can

16 do", so I headed back towards the platform again.

17 Q. On that occasion, your final journey back to

18 Russell Square, did you then leave the platform area and

19 go up to the station level?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Did you take the lift up, or did you walk up the spiral

22 staircase?

23 A. Yes, I did. No, I'm sure I took the lift up.

24 Q. You arrived back at surface level. You describe in your

25 statement about how there was then an alert about

1 a suspect package and so you were moved away from the  
2 station.

3 A. I think there was a suspect vehicle outside and they  
4 asked everybody to evacuate the station. So myself,  
5 I had already met up with two other -- three. I bumped  
6 into Ray again, I spoke to him. Then I met two other  
7 train operators that had trains kind of parked round  
8 about, and myself and a guy called Ross Knight, we  
9 carried a guy out of the station and away from the  
10 station up the road to where it had been cordoned off at  
11 the end of the street.

12 Q. Your statement records how you helped some other  
13 casualties, two female casualties?

14 A. That's right, yes.

15 Q. You also helped the medical staff with carrying medical  
16 equipment --

17 A. Medical equipment --

18 Q. -- and handing it out.

19 A. -- into a triage centre, yes.

20 MR KEITH: Mr Nairn, those are all the questions that I have  
21 for you, thank you very much, but will you stay there  
22 because there will undoubtedly be some more?

23 A. Sure.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

25 Questions by MR COLTART

1 MR COLTART: Just three short matters, please, Mr Nairn, if  
2 we may.  
3 A. Sure.  
4 Q. We may hear from some other witnesses who were  
5 underground at Russell Square that they heard the bus  
6 bomb go off at Tavistock Square or they could feel the  
7 reverberations in the tunnel underneath. Were you  
8 conscious of that?  
9 A. Not at all.  
10 Q. You didn't hear the bomb go off in Tavistock Square?  
11 A. No.  
12 Q. Second matter: when you were with Paul, having been to  
13 Russell Square with Jill Hicks and come back again --  
14 A. No, it was a different Jill.  
15 Q. Forgive me.  
16 A. It was -- Jill Hicks was on the train and she wasn't  
17 able to be moved. She had actually lost both her legs,  
18 I only thought it was one, but it was actually two, so  
19 she remained on train. It was another -- I think  
20 I called her Jill, but her name was actually Alison that  
21 I took out of the train with -- which I thought was an  
22 Asian gentleman.  
23 Q. Forgive me, it's entirely my mistake.  
24 In any event, you had been up to Russell Square and  
25 you had come back again?

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. You were waiting with Paul, you'd got his leg up into an  
3 upright position?

4 A. That's right, yes.

5 Q. Then you told us that, in your perception, it was about  
6 an hour after the initial blast that the ten police  
7 officers arrived --

8 A. About that, yes.

9 Q. -- with two paramedics. Now, we know that, shortly  
10 after that, the carry sheet was taken out of the Tube  
11 carriage and was used to carry Paul back up to  
12 Russell Square station.

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Do we take it, then, that, having waited all that time  
15 for emergency services to arrive, when they did arrive,  
16 they didn't have with them any stretchers or carrying  
17 equipment?

18 A. They didn't have any equipment. I think the paramedics  
19 had equipment, but the -- a small bag or something like  
20 that, but no stretchers at all. That was one of the  
21 things that I'd said to people -- because  
22 London Underground staff were going back and forward,  
23 and I kept on saying, "Where are the stretchers, where  
24 are the stretchers?", but there was no stretchers.

25 Q. So you had conveyed a message previously before the

1 police officers arrived at the scene that stretchers  
2 were being to be required?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But when they finally arrived, they didn't have any with  
5 them?

6 A. They didn't have any stretchers, no.

7 Q. You say in your statement that, after Paul was placed in  
8 the carry sheet, it took eight or nine of you to carry  
9 him back to Russell Square?

10 A. About that. At least six, but then I changed over with  
11 a woman, so that was seven, and I don't know whether  
12 some of the other police officers changed over as well,  
13 but at least seven of us to carry him out, yes.

14 Q. Does it, in a way, come to this: of the ten people who  
15 finally arrived, most of them were then engaged in  
16 carrying one person back to Russell Square?

17 A. Quite possibly, but I'm not sure whether -- when we were  
18 carrying them out, we were paying particular attention  
19 to him, so I'm not sure whether there was quite a lot of  
20 people coming in then or -- I'm not sure who passed us  
21 while we were carrying them out, but certainly, of the  
22 people that came, most of them helped carry him out,  
23 yes, I believe so, the initial people, if you  
24 understand.

25 Q. Just one final topic, completely separate from any of

1 that. After the event -- as we understand it, some time  
2 after the event, Transport for London put in place  
3 a debrief process for the staff who had been involved on  
4 the day to obtain from them feedback, not only as to  
5 what they had done, but how they perceived things had  
6 gone.

7 Again, as we understand matters, that involved staff  
8 being asked to complete quite an extensive questionnaire  
9 and then attending a meeting with managers from the  
10 operational support team. Does this ring any bells for  
11 you?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Were you ever asked to take place in that process?

14 A. After the -- the day afterwards, I went in to see my  
15 train operations manager because I wasn't happy that the  
16 rails had been left lying and it made it really quite  
17 difficult for us to move people out from the front of  
18 the train, and I had said to them that I was really  
19 unhappy about it and I was going to speak to the unions  
20 about it, but other than that, he said it was now  
21 a police matter and it was in the hands of the police  
22 and it was up to them to -- because I said I was wanting  
23 to give a formal interview there, and he said, no, that  
24 was up to the police to do formal interviews.

25 Q. Just pausing there for a moment, who was the manager

1 that you spoke to the next day?

2 A. My train operations manager.

3 Q. Can you remember his or her name?

4 A. Simon Grove.

5 Q. Simon Grove?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Because, again, I'm afraid, this is all --

8 A. Ever since this has happened, I've said that I wanted to  
9 remain a bit anonymous, I didn't want to -- you know,  
10 any big hullabaloo around me. So I was -- Transport for  
11 London have kind of wrapped me in a cotton wool ball,  
12 kind of thing, to keep me away from people, so that's  
13 possibly why they haven't got me involved in the process  
14 that you're talking about. But I certainly was never  
15 interviewed or asked any questions by TfL or  
16 London Underground.

17 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

18 A. Thanks.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

20 Questions by MR PATTERSON

21 MR PATTERSON: Just on that last point, if we may, please,  
22 Mr Nairn. I didn't entirely understand the point you  
23 were making. I think you were saying you were unhappy  
24 that rails had made it difficult for to you remove the  
25 passengers?

1 A. That's correct. What you have is you have the -- we  
2 call it the 4-foot, that's between the two running  
3 rails. Between the two running rails there's also the  
4 negative rail and what they had done was they had stored  
5 a running rail for a replacement rail, they had actually  
6 stored them between the negative rail and a running  
7 rail. So that had then subdivided that half by half  
8 again.

9 Q. So it slowed down the speed at which somebody could walk  
10 through the tunnel?

11 A. That's correct, and we were constantly having to watch  
12 to make sure that we weren't tripping over these rails  
13 that had been laid between rails.

14 Q. I see. Two or three short points, if I may, Mr Nairn.

15 A. Sure.

16 Q. First of all, you describe how you went into the first  
17 carriage on the first occasion and spoke from your end,  
18 but didn't go any further, but then there was a second  
19 occasion when you did go further into the first  
20 carriage?

21 A. No, on the first occasion I went further as well.

22 Q. I see.

23 A. The first occasion I went in, I stopped and spoke to  
24 people and then went forward, and then came back and  
25 spoke to people at the front of the train. I was going



1 back and forward. I think I did it about two or three  
2 times, went back to the blast, but each time I went to  
3 the blast, I would stand and look at it and just  
4 couldn't -- it wouldn't -- I couldn't comprehend what it  
5 was or what I was looking at, that sort of thing.

6 Q. I appreciate how distressing it must have been, what you  
7 witnessed. As far as you got was about halfway down, is  
8 that really --

9 A. It would have been just over halfway down, I would have  
10 thought, yes.

11 Q. We know that the seat of the bomb blast was around about  
12 the second set of double doors.

13 A. Sure, yes.

14 Q. Did you approach that area?

15 A. That's what I was looking -- that's where I had went up  
16 and shone the torch, was at the blast.

17 Q. So were you actually able to see that precise area?

18 A. It was completely black inside, it was full of thick,  
19 black, acrid smoke. My torch was quite ineffective, and  
20 there was no lights on at all. So I --

21 Q. Any signs of life at that stage in that area in and  
22 around those double doors?

23 A. I couldn't see any, no.

24 Q. Or, in that particular area, any words being uttered or  
25 cries or anything like that that you could hear from --

1 A. When I went there, no. It was quite eerily silent.

2 Q. Roughly how long after the blast do you think that would  
3 have been? Was that your second occasion when you went  
4 down the carriage?

5 A. The last time I went down would have been about just  
6 before I had headed back up, so that would have been  
7 about 20 minutes. 15, 20 minutes, something like that,  
8 yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Another short point. You've said that when  
10 you were asked for first aid you weren't able to give  
11 any equipment because there were no supplies on your  
12 train. Equally, you've mentioned that you had a torch.  
13 Was there only one or possibly two torches kept in your  
14 cab?

15 A. They're not kept in the cab, no. They're actually kept  
16 in where -- it's personal issue. So we have a bag that  
17 we carry with us and we have a torch as our personal  
18 issue.

19 Q. So a driver would have a torch?

20 A. A torch, yes.

21 Q. But nothing more than that in case there's an emergency  
22 and the need for urgent lighting?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Another matter, please, Mr Nairn. You were asked  
25 questions about the occasion when you had been up to the

1 station, you came back and, after about an hour, the  
2 police arrived and some paramedics arrived.

3 Did I hear you accurately that the paramedics  
4 indicated that they weren't giving any medication to  
5 injured passengers?

6 A. They said their primary concern or principal concern was  
7 to tag.

8 Q. And they tagged Paul, the person you had been dealing  
9 with?

10 A. Yes, I believe they did, yes.

11 Q. As for these police officers, you said that they were  
12 standing around and it appeared to you as though they  
13 were not quite sure what to do.

14 A. Well, I think it was just initially getting there. It  
15 wasn't a criticism in any way, it was just that they had  
16 got there, they were all quite young and I think they  
17 were maybe a little bit startled about what they saw.

18 Q. Were they on the train or on the track?

19 A. On the track, round about where myself and Paul were.  
20 There possibly was a couple that went towards the train,  
21 but I only saw the ones kind of around about me.

22 Q. Can you remember whether they were British Transport  
23 Police or which force?

24 A. I couldn't tell you, no, sorry.

25 MR PATTERSON: Thank you, Mr Nairn. That's all I ask.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?

2 Questions by MR GIBBS

3 MR GIBBS: Just on that last point, I think we'll hear from  
4 some of those police officers probably. Did they stand  
5 to one side to allow the medically qualified people on  
6 to the train first?

7 A. I believe they stood -- they were stood and watched him  
8 being tagged. I think that didn't take long. I believe  
9 so, but I couldn't really say, to tell you the truth.

10 Q. I think we'll hear from a number of them, and then they  
11 were responsible for carrying the seriously injured  
12 people away from the train and back to Russell Square?

13 A. I didn't see that when I was there -- well, they did  
14 with myself, they did carry Paul back to Russell Square,  
15 yes, that's correct.

16 Q. It took, I think, quite a large number of them to carry  
17 Mr Glennerster?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby?

21 Questions by MS CANBY

22 MS CANBY: Mr Nairn, just a handful of questions, please.

23 A. Sure.

24 Q. Before you left the platform at King's Cross, you  
25 experienced a light there turning on and then -- turning

1 off and then back on again.

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. You thought at that point that it was a power surge?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. We now know that it was actually the bomb at Aldgate

6 damaging the high voltage cable. Had you, though,

7 experienced a power surge before?

8 A. It kind of happens now and again when you're out towards

9 Bounds Green on the east. If there's a lot of train

10 drivers start up the train at the same time, it tends to

11 make the -- the traction drops out and within a couple

12 of seconds it kicks back in, so I've had experience

13 similar to that before, but not that particular area.

14 It wasn't such a great surprise to me that it happened,

15 it was just a little bit surprising it happened in that

16 area.

17 Q. At that location?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Moving now to after the explosion, and I think you've

20 said that you went into the first carriage on at least

21 two occasions.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You told Mr Patterson that the second of those occasions

24 was about 15 to 20 minutes after the explosion.

25 A. It wasn't -- yes, yes, it would have been.

1 Q. Can you estimate -- you go much closer, after the  
2 explosion -- in time after the explosion, with Mr Wright  
3 into the first carriage, and shine your torch. Do you  
4 not recall that?

5 A. No, Ray never went into the first carriage. He stood in  
6 the cab and shone his torch in.

7 Q. He stood in the cab whilst you went into the first  
8 carriage?

9 A. No, he had left by that stage.

10 Q. Right. So the first time --

11 A. When he said -- when he gave his evidence, he said --  
12 when he gave his evidence, he said that he shone a light  
13 into the cab. That was to see what was going on inside,  
14 he didn't actually enter the cab. He stood in the  
15 driver's cab and shone his light into the saloon but  
16 didn't enter.

17 Q. How soon after the explosion was that when he was  
18 shining his --

19 A. It would have been a minute, two minutes, something like  
20 that.

21 Q. But then, am I right that it's your evidence that you  
22 had gone into the carriage after he's left?

23 A. After he's left, and people had stopped coming out of  
24 the car, the saloon, so I thought there's a lot more  
25 people on the train than has come off, I went in to

1 investigate to find out what actually the problem was.

2 Q. You had your torch at that point?

3 A. My torch, yes.

4 Q. Were you also saying to people reassuring them saying  
5 something along the lines of, "Help is on its way"?

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. Can you estimate how long after the explosion that was?

8 A. Probably about ten minutes or so after. My initial  
9 venture back into the saloon, I would say about ten  
10 minutes.

11 Q. In his witness statement Mr Wright estimates that there  
12 was about 50 to 60 passengers that left from the front  
13 driver's cab?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Does that figure sound about right to you?

16 A. I think so, yes.

17 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Nairn. I don't have any further  
18 questions.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

20 Thank you very much, Mr Nairn. It looks as if we  
21 have now completed you. We haven't had to interrupt you  
22 again.

23 Mr Wright told me that you had done everything  
24 according to the book, but, as I think you suggested  
25 yourself, the book doesn't equip you to deal with the

1 situation that confronted you. You obviously did  
2 everything according to the book, and beyond whatever  
3 the book could have expected of you, including playing  
4 a significant part in keeping Mr Glennerster alive, so  
5 thank you very much for all that you did, and I'm sorry  
6 I've had to ask you to go through it all again and  
7 I hope it hasn't been too much of an ordeal for you.

8 A. Thanks.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

10 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Nairn.

11 My Lady, we've been unable to make contact at all  
12 with Mr Orr, although the link with Utah is still open  
13 but he simply hasn't appeared at the other end.

14 I will give consideration, along with Mr O'Connor,  
15 as to whether or not, if it's not possible for Mr Orr to  
16 attend tomorrow or some future convenient date, whether  
17 his evidence can be read.

18 We have four other statements to be read on today's  
19 list, but I'm bound to say, for my part, it's been quite  
20 a long day. Tomorrow's schedule is a little bit less  
21 onerous and, if my Lady pleases, perhaps we could read  
22 those statements tomorrow?

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course. There was another witness  
24 to be called this afternoon.

25 MR KEITH: There was. Before lunch, I instructed Mr Obi to



1 be put back to tomorrow because I didn't think we would  
2 finish the oral witnesses today before 4.00.  
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, I think the provisional list was  
4 a little optimistic, so a wise move.  
5 MR KEITH: Mr O'Connor has apologised profusely to me, but  
6 I thank him for his conscientious attempt at scheduling  
7 all of King's Cross.  
8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much indeed. 10.00  
9 tomorrow, please.  
10 (4.15 pm)  
11 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)  
12