

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 19 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Friday, 19 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I have just informed
4 Mr Suter that the Divisional Court intends to give the
5 result of the hearing on Monday at 2.00 pm with reasons
6 to follow.

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. We invited them to do that because
8 my Lady's PII process clearly requires as early an
9 indication as possible.

10 May I invite Mr Hay to call the first witness?

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay?

12 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Jerry Kelly,
13 please.

14 MR JEREMIAH GERARD KELLY (sworn)

15 Questions by MR HAY

16 MR HAY: Mr Kelly, can you give your full names to the
17 court, please?

18 A. Jeremiah Gerard Kelly.

19 Q. Mr Kelly, on 7 July 2005, you were at Edgware Road
20 station?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. On that morning, I think you had a meal break between
23 about 7.50 and 8.50?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You were coming to the end of your meal break?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you then describe to us, first of all, where you
3 were at that point?

4 A. I was in the -- oh, the booking on area at Edgware Road
5 just about to go down to get my next train.

6 Q. Where's the booking on area in relation to platforms 3
7 and 4?

8 A. It's at one end of the platform, up the stairs, on the
9 left.

10 Q. Near the main foyer area?

11 A. Yes, yes, yes.

12 Q. What happened whilst you were in the booking on area?

13 A. I heard a boom sound, and I thought at the time it was
14 a bit unusual and the managers that were there didn't
15 react much, and I just -- then someone come out of the
16 canteen.

17 Q. Who were the managers that were there, do you remember?

18 A. Monica Hogan and another lady called Ayo, I don't know
19 her second name.

20 Then someone else came out, another driver came out
21 of the canteen and he said he thought it was a bomb.

22 Q. Do you remember who that driver was?

23 A. Yes. What was his name ... He's a Barking driver,
24 I can't think of his name now. Alfie, is it?

25 Q. Alfred Rogers?

1 A. Yes, I don't know his second name, but that could be --
2 I know Alf, that's his name, yes.
3 Q. So he came out and he said he thought it was a bomb?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What did you do in response to that?
6 A. I went in the canteen and put my bag down and got my
7 hi-vi vest out of my bag and put it on and, by then,
8 a lot of drivers had done the same thing and were going
9 towards the platform down the steps.
10 Q. The platform is platforms 3 and 4?
11 A. 3 and 4, yes.
12 Q. When you got platform 3 and 4, do you remember how many
13 drivers there were on the platform, approximately?
14 A. Approximately ten.
15 Q. We know from other witnesses that there was a small
16 delay or time being taken for confirmation that the
17 traction current was off?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Once you got that confirmation, what did you then do?
20 A. Walked with the other drivers towards the trains. We
21 could see the train -- the back of one of the trains in
22 the tunnel and we walked towards -- along the track
23 towards the train.
24 Q. As you were walking towards the train, do you remember
25 being able to hear anything?

1 A. No, no. At that time, I thought it was unusually quiet.
2 It was just eerily quiet, kind of, initially.
3 Q. Did there come a point when you heard someone, a man,
4 calling out for help?
5 A. That was a little while later, yes, when I got to the
6 train, yes.
7 Q. That's when you got to the train?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What do you remember that man saying?
10 A. He was screaming for help and then he went quiet and,
11 after a little while, then he screamed, "My legs are
12 gone", something to that effect.
13 Q. We know there was a westbound train, the bombed train,
14 and the eastbound train?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Which train did you go towards?
17 A. The eastbound, the -- yes, the eastbound train, the one
18 that wasn't bombed.
19 Q. Who else was with you when you got to that train?
20 A. Another driver called Craig Aylen.
21 Q. Do you recall Mr Aylen speaking to Mr Porter, the driver
22 of the train?
23 A. Yes, yes, yes.
24 Q. Do you remember what they said to one another?
25 A. I wasn't too sure. I know they spoke because Craig

1 climbed into Jeff's train and I said something to Craig
2 like, "Get the emergency ladder down, pass it down to me
3 and we'll put it in place to get the people off", and
4 he -- I'm not sure -- I don't know what he said to Jeff,
5 but I know he passed the ladder down. Then he came back
6 down and Craig and me stood one at each side of the
7 ladder.

8 Q. I think there came a point when you became aware of
9 a lady's body on the track?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. If we could have up on the screen, please, [INQ10282-10],
12 this is a plan which shows the two trains in the tunnel,
13 the eastbound train is the top train, and the bombed
14 train, the westbound train, is the lower of the two.
15 Are you able to say where approximately you recall
16 seeing the body?

17 A. She was lying on the tracks about there but, from her
18 shoulders up, was in between the two trains.

19 Q. I think you were aware that that lady wasn't moving at
20 all?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And I think it was plain that she wasn't alive, is that
23 correct?

24 A. I couldn't say that. It looked that way.

25 Q. Is it right that you positioned yourself between the

1 passengers who were coming off the train and her body?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you do that to preserve her dignity?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you recall Bryan Corbin arriving?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you remember who was with him?
8 A. It was a female doctor, it was a lady with him and he
9 said she was a doctor.
10 Q. The female doctor, was she wearing any high visibility
11 clothing or anything which would indicate that she was
12 a doctor or --
13 A. No.
14 Q. Do you remember whether or not there was a paramedic
15 with them as well?
16 A. There was only them two.
17 Q. Are you able to remember how much time had passed from
18 the explosion to when you first saw Mr Corbin and the
19 female doctor?
20 A. It was between 20 minutes and 30 minutes.
21 Q. I think you directed Mr Corbin and the doctor to the
22 body of the female?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you remain standing at the front of the train during
25 the detrainment?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Are you able to give us an indication of how long it
3 took to get everyone off the train?

4 A. By the time I got back upstairs, an hour and a half had
5 passed. It was approaching half ten when I got back
6 upstairs, so that was the most of that time.

7 Q. I know it's difficult, but are you able to give us an
8 indication of how many people were evacuated from the
9 eastbound train?

10 A. It could be, at a guess, 800 people, possibly.

11 Q. We know you saw Mr Corbin and the female doctor. When
12 do you remember other members of the emergency services
13 arriving?

14 A. It was a little time after that because, where I was
15 standing, everybody, the police and the Fire Brigade,
16 all wanted to go between the trains, so I had to stop
17 everybody because of this lady lying there.

18 Q. Where did you direct them to go instead?

19 A. I didn't, I just told them they couldn't go that way.
20 Then they tried to open the doors directly where the
21 trains had met so as they could get on the train that
22 way, but I'm not too sure what they done after that.

23 Q. Do you remember the emergency services, did they all
24 arrive together, the paramedics and the Fire Brigade, or
25 did some arrive before others?

1 A. I don't know, I don't know. Because of where the rear
2 of the other train was, there was a load of people up
3 there, so they could have been there before they come
4 down to where I was, so I'm not too sure who arrived
5 when.

6 MR HAY: Mr Kelly, thank you very much. I have no more
7 questions for you, but others may.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

9 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

10 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Kelly, you said Monica Hogan was in the
11 booking on area when you heard this unusual noise. Can
12 you help us with this: was she there when the driver
13 whom you've described as Alfie came in saying he thought
14 it was a bomb?

15 A. She would have been, yes.

16 Q. Do you remember her receiving a telephone call while you
17 were with her?

18 A. I don't know. I know the phones were ringing and there
19 were other people in the office talking to her. I don't
20 know what they done.

21 Q. Today you've told us that you reacted by getting your
22 high visibility vest, you go to the platform, and you
23 walk with the other drivers towards the train. Do you
24 recall roughly how many other drivers were with you on
25 the platform at that time?

1 A. It could be around 10.

2 Q. You did say in your statement from September 2005 you
3 thought it was 10 to 12 people. Does that sound about
4 accurate?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You also said in your statement -- and you've touched on
7 it today -- that, when you approached the damaged train,
8 you heard a man who was screaming.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Could you just assist us with his location? Could
11 I have [INQ10282-10] on screen? Now, Mr Kelly, in your
12 witness statement, the way you described this was that
13 he was under the second carriage from the rear of the
14 train. Can you see the direction of travel is towards
15 the left?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. What I'm just trying to ascertain is, did you mean the
18 second carriage from the rear, in terms of direction of
19 travel, or the second carriage from the rear as you were
20 approaching the train? So, in other words, was it the
21 fifth carriage here on the grid or the second carriage?

22 A. The fifth.

23 Q. There's just one other issue on timing. You were asked
24 today when you saw Mr Corbin with the female doctor, and
25 you said you thought it was about 20 to 30 minutes from

1 the explosion.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We know five years ago you gave a statement to the
4 police in September 2005, and at that time you had
5 a slightly more accurate view, possibly. You thought it
6 was "about 20 minutes after we started to detrain".

7 Does that sound about right?

8 A. Yes, I remember looking at my watch about that time, and
9 it was 9.20. We had started to detrain about 5 to
10 10 minutes after it happened. So it would have been
11 about 9.20, I think, they arrived.

12 MS GALLAGHER: Thanks very much, Mr Kelly. That's very
13 helpful.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Saunders?

15 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, all I seek to do is to thank Mr Kelly
16 on behalf of the Nicholson family for the efforts he
17 made in respect of both those coming off the Tube train
18 and in respect of those who were trying to pass between
19 the two lines where he prevented unnecessary people
20 seeing Jenny on that line. Thank you very much, sir.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Kelly?

22 There are no other questions for you, Mr Kelly, and
23 I echo the thanks that you received from Mr Saunders.

24 Thank you for coming to help me.

25 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you call Stephen Hickin.

1 MR STEPHEN PAUL HICKIN (sworn)
2 Questions by MR KEITH
3 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full
4 name, please?
5 A. Stephen Paul Hickin.
6 Q. Mr Hickin, in July of 2005, you were a duty manager
7 trains, were you not?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. I think you've been a duty manager for a considerable
10 number of years.
11 A. To date, 20 years, although I've just taken early
12 retirement.
13 Q. In 2005, were you based at Edgware Road station?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. That morning, on the 7th, had you arrived at about 7.30
16 and were you working with Mr King?
17 A. That's correct, yes.
18 Q. What were you doing with him?
19 A. We were undertaking the periodic speed checking of
20 trains. That was our role that day.
21 Q. Do you mean with a laser --
22 A. With a radar speed checking gun, yes.
23 Q. So Underground train operators run the same course as
24 drivers on our roads, in that there's a colleague with
25 a radar gun in the tunnel?

1 A. Well, not in the tunnel, no, we weren't in the tunnel.

2 London Underground has speed restrictions over certain

3 sections of track because of curvature and incline,

4 et cetera, and it's a requirement that the trains are

5 checked through those areas to ensure that the train

6 operators are complying with the speed restrictions.

7 Q. Where were you doing that?

8 A. We were doing that at Royal Oak.

9 Q. To get our bearings, is Royal Oak one station further on
10 from Paddington?

11 A. It's two. One from Paddington, yes, two from
12 Edgware Road, sorry.

13 Q. On the Circle Line?

14 A. Well, yes, the Hammersmith & City and Circle Line, yes.

15 Q. While you were doing the speed checking, did you begin
16 to hear a number of transmissions over your radio?

17 A. Yes, there was --

18 Q. To what effect?

19 A. There was a lot of radio activity. I think the initial
20 calls were about a problem at Aldgate and it sort of
21 aroused my interest, if you like, aroused my suspicions.

22 Q. What was being said about a problem at Aldgate?

23 A. They were talking about a power surge at that time.

24 Q. Was there any discussion of other possible causes of
25 whatever it was?

1 A. Not that I particularly heard on the radio. They
2 were -- there was a -- calls going backwards and
3 forwards between the control room and the trains he was
4 speaking to on the ground.

5 Q. Was there also discussion of an incident at
6 Edgware Road?

7 A. There was a mention of something happening at
8 Edgware Road, but there wasn't a lot of detail going on
9 on the radio that you could pick out. I think they were
10 trying to deal with two ends of something going on.

11 Q. Was it apparent, though, that something serious had
12 occurred?

13 A. Well, it concerned Alex and I enough to decide to
14 abandon what we were doing and go back to Royal Oak
15 station to contact Control to see if we could be of
16 assistance.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Had you ever come across a power
18 surge before, Mr Hickin?

19 A. Power surges do occur, yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What is usually the effect of a power
21 surge? What would you expect to see?

22 A. Well, you might see arcing and fusing from the trains if
23 there's a power surge. It's a bit like when a fuse or
24 a circuit breaker blows out at home, you know, you get
25 this sudden increase in power and everything goes off.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So it's a sudden increase in power
2 and then we've got no power?
3 A. Yes.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So in the past, with power surges,
5 have you had reports of people being hurt? Have you
6 had --
7 A. Not to my personal recollection, no.
8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's usually just everything comes to
9 a stop?
10 A. Yes. I mean, you might get a consequential injury where
11 the train stopped violently.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Indeed, if you banged your head or
13 something?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR KEITH: The reason why I've asked you what you can recall
16 of what was being said on the radio about the incidents
17 at Aldgate and Edgware is that we'll be hearing from
18 Mr King in a moment, who, in his witness statement,
19 certainly recollects that there was some talk over the
20 radio of an explosion, but you don't recall that?
21 A. No, I had a telephone conversation with the duty
22 operations manager when we got back to --
23 Q. That was a little later --
24 A. That was about two or three minutes --
25 Q. -- but certainly in relation to over the radio? Nothing

1 over the radio?

2 A. Yes, not to my recollection, no. But then there would
3 have been two radios going between the pair of us. Alex
4 would have had his radio and I had mine. So ...

5 Q. I understand.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Would you have been on different
7 frequencies?

8 A. No, but the chitchat may have overlaid each other, you
9 know, if I heard something and then I was trying to talk
10 to Alex about it and he may have not been paying
11 attention to that instead of me, while I was talking to
12 him.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

14 MR KEITH: In your statement you say that, having heard
15 these references over the radio, you tried to speak to
16 your controller. Is that because he would have been the
17 person who might have authorised you to stop what you
18 were doing and to see whether help was required?

19 A. Well, he's the central contact point. He's running the
20 railway. You would normally contact him to see if you
21 could find out what was going on and offer your
22 assistance as a duty manager.

23 Q. Were you able to use your radio to send an outlet
24 signal?

25 A. The -- I tried, a couple of occasions, to make contact

1 with the radio, but because of the radio traffic that
2 was going on, all I was calling in was just to say,
3 like, "I'm available", and he was probably -- possibly
4 dealing with another call.

5 Q. So the problem with the radio wasn't that you couldn't
6 get a signal, it was just that there was a great deal of
7 traffic and that meant that you couldn't get through?

8 A. Yes, there was a lot of radio traffic.

9 Q. Having got back to Royal Oak, you then spoke to the --

10 A. Duty operations manager.

11 Q. Duty operations manager, Mr McKinnon?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. You asked whether or not you could be made available to
14 help in some way?

15 A. Yes, I explained to Tony where we were and said, "Can we
16 be of assistance? Do you want to us make our way to
17 Edgware Road?", and he initially asked us to detrain
18 a train that was stalled between Royal Oak and
19 Paddington stations.

20 Q. Did you do that?

21 A. Yes, Alex and I went to that train. We moved it up to
22 Paddington on to the disused section of the platform and
23 detrained passengers.

24 Q. How did you do that?

25 A. Using the rules and procedures that are available for

1 moves under exceptional circumstances.

2 Q. The train had stalled, but we take it from the fact that
3 you were able to move it that there was power in that
4 section?

5 A. To say -- there was nothing physically wrong, it was
6 stalled by the fact it was standing at a red signal
7 which couldn't be cleared because there was a train
8 occupying the section ahead.

9 Q. I understand. Having moved the train to a disused part
10 of Paddington, did you then speak to the duty operations
11 manager again?

12 A. Yes, I advised the duty operations manager that we
13 completed the detrainment and passengers had been
14 evacuated from the station.

15 Q. What did he ask you to do the second time?

16 A. He said that they believed there was a train stuck in
17 the tunnel between Paddington and Edgware Road, and
18 would we go and check and, if so, detrain any passengers
19 that were on that train.

20 Q. There was traction current in the section of rails
21 between Royal Oak and Paddington?

22 A. Mm-hmm. Well, at one stage there would have been, yes.

23 Q. At one stage, because you were able to move the train.
24 How did you know whether or not there was traction
25 current in the onward section of the track and did you

1 take any steps to see whether or not the power was off?
2 A. I requested for current to be turned off.
3 Q. For what section?
4 A. For the section that the train was on.
5 Q. Where was it?
6 A. Well, there was no train there.
7 Q. So what did you do then?
8 A. We -- Alex and I continued on at track level to
9 Praed Street junction to where the two trains were
10 involved in the incident.
11 Q. Again, did you take any steps to ascertain whether or
12 not that further section of track had no current?
13 A. When I radioed in, no, I didn't get any confirmation
14 back that current was off, but it was apparent, when
15 I got round the corner, that current was off.
16 Q. Why was it apparent?
17 A. By the circumstances the trains were in.
18 Q. Meaning?
19 A. Both trains had no main car lighting on, tunnel lights
20 were on, all the indications were that traction current
21 was off, from my knowledge and experience.
22 Q. So you approached the two trains from the Paddington
23 side?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Did you meet some colleagues at the front of what was

1 the westbound train, the rear of the eastbound train?

2 A. There was a group of people there, drivers;

3 Ray Whitehurst, who was the driver of the train that had

4 the bomb on it, Dave Matthews, another one of our

5 drivers as well.

6 Q. And Jeff Porter, the driver of the other train?

7 A. Possibly so, I can't remember if --

8 Q. Certainly your statement refers to Mr Porter being

9 there.

10 A. Probably, yes.

11 Q. I think there was another gentleman who said he was from

12 Railtrack?

13 A. Yes, there was a -- this person was wandering around in

14 his shirt sleeves, looked very dazed and shocked, said

15 he was going to assist, but he started to want to wander

16 off towards Paddington, so I got Dave Matthews to take

17 him through Jeff Porter's train and on the way out

18 through that train, because he didn't look in any fit

19 condition to be left on the track.

20 Q. Do you have any recollection of what time it was that

21 you reached the two trains?

22 A. I'd say it was probably about 10 past, quarter past 9

23 maybe.

24 Q. Did you ever give an interview, do you recall, to the

25 Sunday Herald?

1 A. What, a Scottish newspaper?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Yes, that would be about a year later, I think.

4 Q. It was, July 2006. In that interview, you suggested

5 that it might have been about 9.15 to 9.20 that you

6 arrived near the trains. It's broadly in line with what

7 you've just said. That may have been a more accurate

8 recollection, given that it was nearer the time?

9 A. Possibly so, probably so.

10 Q. What did you do?

11 A. What, when we arrived at the trains? Well, apart from

12 stopping the guy going up the tunnel, we tried to assess

13 what was going on with the trains, and it was apparent

14 that the train on the westbound line was damaged from

15 looking at the side of it, and we boarded the train to

16 see if we could assist as best as possible.

17 Q. So you went on to the front of the westbound train?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. Through the M door into the driver's cab?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When you entered the carriage, that's to say the first

22 carriage, the front carriage, do you recollect whether

23 there were any members of the emergency services

24 present?

25 A. There was a person, a lady, lying on the floor towards

1 the far end of the carriage, and I believe there was
2 a paramedic had just arrived with her or to attend her,
3 but I didn't see any others at that time.

4 Q. In your statement, you say that you saw two London Fire
5 Brigade officers in the carriage and I want to ask you
6 about that because --

7 A. I think that was after.

8 Q. From other information and evidence before my Lady, it
9 may be that the Fire Brigade officers hadn't arrived by
10 that time, by 9.20, so I wanted to see whether that was
11 a correct recollection, but you think now that that was
12 after?

13 A. I believe that they were there after, because I'd gone
14 through to the second car and came back and that's when
15 I recall seeing two fire officers there.

16 Q. How were you able to help with the person who was
17 injured in the first carriage?

18 A. When they were eventually put on a stretcher, obviously
19 the need was to remove them from the train. The
20 stretcher wouldn't go out through the M door --

21 Q. The door at the front of the train?

22 A. Yes, and it was -- the idea was mooted of putting him
23 out through the side of the train, but that wasn't
24 practical because of the proximity of the tunnel wall,
25 and eventually, what we did was, where the two trains

1 were adjacent and two pairs of doors were opposite each
2 other, we paddled those doors open and the stretcher was
3 taken through on to the other train.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry to interrupt, could we just
5 go back to the timing again, Mr Hickin? You started off
6 at Royal Oak. You then had to go and evacuate the train
7 that was stationary at the red lights. How far was that
8 train -- this is all walking, is it, you're walking to
9 each of these?

10 A. Yes.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Walking trackside?

12 A. Yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So how far from where you started off
14 did you have to walk to that train?

15 A. A couple of hundred yards, I suppose.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. You then sort out -- what,
17 you tell the driver to move it to the platform, and then
18 are you there at the platform making sure the passengers
19 get off?

20 A. Yes.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Roughly how many passengers are we
22 talking about?

23 A. There was about, I'd say, 500 or 600 passengers on the
24 train. It was rush hour-type loading.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How long does that detraining, as you

1 people seem to call it, take?

2 A. Surprisingly, it didn't take that long. Once the doors
3 were opened and people were asked to leave, they got off
4 very quickly, and I was quite surprised by the time --
5 the little amount of time it took to get those people
6 out onto the platform.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So how long do we think we are at
8 this stage after you've heard the news of the problem?

9 A. About ten minutes or so, I suppose. I don't know.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You then contact Control, and then
11 you've got to walk trackside. How far?

12 A. Probably another couple of hundred yards.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt,
14 Mr Keith.

15 MR KEITH: Not at all, my Lady.

16 How long did it take to discover that it wasn't
17 possible to get the stretcher out of the front or out of
18 the tunnel wall side and, therefore, you had to open
19 doors between the two trains and then open the doors?

20 A. To be perfectly honest, I really don't know. Time --
21 I wasn't taking much notice of time then, to be honest.

22 Q. I understand.

23 A. It was just a case of time was going by sort of thing,
24 you know.

25 Q. The reason I ask is that there came a point, did there

1 not, when you were helping to get the stretcher out of
2 that westbound train, that you do notice members of the
3 Fire Brigade arriving?

4 A. Well, they were helping -- by then, they were helping
5 get the stretcher out.

6 Q. But that was then a considerable time after you'd
7 arrived, because you'd had to check which doors would
8 open?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Whether you could get a stretcher out of the front, out
11 of the back and you'd walk down the track --

12 A. It was some time later.

13 Q. It was some time later. Did you go into the bombed
14 carriage?

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. I want to ask you about that, please. Did you approach
17 from the first carriage?

18 A. Yes, I went through the connecting doors.

19 Q. Did you notice a lady lying on the floor of the carriage
20 in the first bay area, the first set of standing doors?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was it apparent, completely apparent, to you that there
23 was no sign of life?

24 A. It appeared to be so. There was no movement, there was
25 no obvious signs of anything that indicated she may be

1 alive to me at that time. But then, again, I'm not
2 a medical person. I had to make a judgment at that
3 time.

4 Q. Do you recall whether there were other people helping in
5 the carriage when you entered?

6 A. I think there was somebody going out the far end of the
7 carriage as I came in. I don't know whether that was
8 part of the evacuation or people coming in to help.

9 Q. But do you recall members of the emergency services in
10 uniform, for example, inside the carriage tending to the
11 wounded and checking those who may have died?

12 A. Not in that carriage, no.

13 Q. Did you move further down the carriage?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you see two further people who had passed away
16 further down the carriage?

17 A. Yes, there was somebody on the floor and there was
18 somebody sitting on a seat.

19 Q. Is that in the second or third set of double doors?

20 A. What, the person on the seat?

21 Q. Firstly, the one that you referred to first on the
22 floor.

23 A. If I recall correctly, that was the third set of doors.

24 Q. Are you sure about that?

25 A. It may have been -- it could have been either one.

1 Q. Could it have been the second set of doors?
2 A. Possibly.
3 Q. Do you recollect where the seats were on which you saw
4 the second -- well, the third person in total that had
5 passed away?
6 A. I believe that was just the other side.
7 Q. Could you please look at [INQ10282-9]? You approached
8 from the left-hand side, which is the front of that
9 second carriage.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You can see the red cross marks location of the bomb.
12 The first set of standing -- the first set of double
13 doors is the standing area where you saw the lady on the
14 floor?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The second set is where you may have seen the second
17 person on the floor?
18 A. Yes, that was where the hole was in the floor.
19 Q. Yes. Was that the same area in which you saw the second
20 person?
21 A. Yes, I think they were in the seat that was marked 7, if
22 I remember correctly.
23 Q. The third person lying on the seats, do you recollect
24 where that was?
25 A. That was in the next bay over, I believe.

1 Q. So the third set as you approached from the left?

2 A. Yes, and they were sitting in the seat, they were
3 actually sat up in the seat.

4 Q. On which side of the carriage if you can recollect, left
5 or right?

6 A. That would be my left.

7 Q. On your left?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. As with the young lady whom you had first seen, was it
10 apparent to you that there were no signs of life and the
11 two further people had also passed away?

12 A. Yes, the gentleman on the floor had injuries and the
13 gentleman sitting in the seat had a head injury that
14 looked quite severe.

15 Q. There were no signs of life?

16 A. Not as far as I could tell.

17 Q. I don't think you remained in the carriage for very
18 long --

19 A. No.

20 Q. -- because you went back to assist further in the first
21 carriage with the stretcher and the person who was
22 wounded.

23 A. When I returned was when I saw the fire officers already
24 in the car and one of them spoke to me about moving the
25 stretcher, and that's when the -- the trying to move the

1 stretcher occurred.

2 Q. Did you then go into the eastbound train?

3 A. Yes, I had to go across because we were looking for
4 doors that matched up to open them up to move the
5 stretcher across.

6 Q. Was that when you saw Mr Corbin, Bryan Corbin?

7 A. Yes, Bryan was coming through the train from the other
8 end.

9 Q. Was he with anybody?

10 A. No, I don't believe he was, unless they were behind him.
11 I sort of focused on him and spoke to him.

12 Q. On that eastbound train, did you start lifting up the
13 seats in order to be able to manually release the doors?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. How long did that take and were you able to succeed?

16 A. Yes, once we'd identified two sets of doors that were
17 suitably opposite each other, it takes a couple of
18 minutes to pop the seats up and lift the doors back.
19 It's called paddling them open.

20 Q. The stretcher was removed from the westbound train.

21 A. Yes. It was passed across.

22 Q. Passed across, with your help?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then do you recall a police officer attending in
25 uniform --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- to start carrying out searches for possible secondary
3 devices?

4 A. Yes, he came through the train and spoke to me. He said
5 that they had a pair of sniffer dogs coming down to the
6 train and they needed assistance with lifting the seats
7 and that.

8 Q. Did you help with that process?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. There came a time when you were then informed that the
11 whole scene had to be evacuated. Can you tell us how
12 much time you think you were in the bombsite for?

13 A. To be perfectly honest, I have -- really, to this day,
14 I have no exact recollection. It's something I've
15 puzzled over for quite some time, to be honest.

16 Q. You were able in your original witness statement
17 of August 2005 to suggest that perhaps about one and
18 a half hours had passed since you had arrived on the
19 scene. Does that still seem to you to be about right?

20 A. Yes, that's a reasonable thing, but I wasn't looking
21 anyway.

22 Q. We understand.

23 A. It's relative, isn't it? I wouldn't -- I just don't
24 know, sorry.

25 MR KEITH: Thank you for your help, Mr Hickin. If you could

1 stay there, there may be some further questions for you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

3 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

4 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Hickin, I just have some very short
5 questions for you.

6 You've described with reference to that graph,
7 [INQ10282-9], where you saw the lady lying, and also where
8 you saw these two males whom you thought were dead.

9 Could you assist us with this: how far into the
10 carriage did you go, Mr Hickin?

11 A. I went beyond the hole up to the edge of the next door
12 bay.

13 Q. So beyond the hole, you're describing the hole as being
14 between seats 6 and 27?

15 A. That's it, yes, where the X is.

16 Q. So you went up to doors D3, D4?

17 A. Well, beyond that to D6, between -- where it's 23, 22
18 seats. I went into that door bay.

19 Q. Mr Hickin, in your witness statement from August 2005,
20 which was obviously much closer to the time, you said:

21 "I did not go into the carriage further than the
22 first set of doors."

23 A. Did I? No, I distinctly remember going in further than
24 that.

25 Q. I just have one other question about the gentleman whom

1 you described seeing lying on the floor. Could you tell
2 if he was a young man or middle-aged? Could you help us
3 in any way with the description of him?

4 A. I could tell you he was very dirty, covered in filth and
5 dirt, and I wouldn't like to say how old he was.

6 Q. When you say he was very dirty, was he fully clothed?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But his clothes were covered in dirt?

9 A. Yes, and his face -- his head and face were all filthy
10 dirty.

11 Q. Could you help us with his build? Was he wide build or
12 slim?

13 A. Average, I suppose.

14 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Hickin, for your
15 help, I've nothing further.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

17 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Hickin?
19 Yes, Ms Canby?

20 Questions by MS CANBY

21 MS CANBY: Mr Hickin, just one brief point, please, on
22 behalf of Transport for London. You were asked about
23 power surges and you referred to power surges and you
24 explained that they had happened before and that you
25 would have a surge of electricity and then power would

1 go off. If power goes off, then one result of that is
2 a number of stalled trains?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. As DMT at the time, are you able to give any sort of
5 estimate as to how many stalled trains there would have
6 been on the section of track where the bombed train was?

7 We know that track section was Baker Street through to
8 Bouverie Place.

9 A. Well, there was the two trains in the tunnel, the bombed
10 train and the train adjacent, and there were two trains
11 in the platform at Edgware Road that I know of in
12 platforms 1 and 2.

13 Beyond that, I wouldn't like to say, because I --

14 Q. You didn't get that far?

15 A. I didn't go any further beyond the Edgware Road area.
16 I mean, there could have been trains at Baker Street
17 behind the incident, because of -- simply because they
18 were in that current rail section.

19 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Hickin?

21 Thank you very much, Mr Hickin. Thank you for going
22 to help those people, and thank you for coming along to
23 help me. I'm sorry I've had to ask you to relive it.

24 A. Thank you.

25 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will call the next witness.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

2 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Alexander King,
3 please.

4 MR ALEXANDER KING (sworn)

5 Questions by MR HAY

6 MR HAY: Mr King, can you give your full name to the courts,
7 please?

8 A. Alexander King.

9 Q. Mr King, on 7 July 2005, you were also duty manager
10 trains?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. We've just heard from Mr Hickin, and you were working
13 with him that morning?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. You were initially at Royal Oak --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- testing for the speed?

18 A. With the speed gun, yes.

19 Q. There came a point, I think, when you, too, became aware
20 of mayday calls on your radio. What do you recollect
21 about those calls?

22 A. Around 8.50, we heard a lot of radio traffic, mayday
23 calls and various traffic that you wouldn't normally
24 hear in terms of the number of calls that were taking
25 place. We knew that something had happened, but just

1 mayday calls and all the rest of it, and when me and
2 Steve discussed that something must have gone on, so
3 we'd see what we could do to find out more about that.

4 Q. It sounds from that like there were two things which
5 alerted you that something had gone on. One was the
6 volume of traffic on the radio, but also the fact that
7 they were mayday calls.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did the mayday calls specify what had happened in any
10 way?

11 A. Well, they didn't, because the radio system we had at
12 the time was kind of one way, so you didn't really get
13 much -- you didn't get the reply back or any details
14 back, but once you hear mayday calls, you know that
15 something has happened and we heard Aldgate mentioned
16 and then, some time afterwards, Edgware Road, a short
17 time afterwards, Edgware Road.

18 Q. When you say it's one way, can you just explain to us
19 what you mean by that?

20 A. Well, you don't always get the response that the
21 person -- the person -- you can hear someone mayday
22 calling Control, but you can't hear the response, so you
23 don't hear anything more after that.

24 Q. So you hear the mayday, but you don't hear what the line
25 controller says back?

1 A. No, not usually.

2 Q. You said initially it was concerning Aldgate --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- but then Edgware Road. What do you remember being
5 said about the cause of the mayday calls?

6 A. Well, the cause -- just listening to Steve's questioning
7 earlier, you said there that we heard on the radio about
8 an explosion or power surge being mentioned, but we
9 didn't find that out from the radio. We found that out
10 from Steve's mobile telephone call to the line
11 controller.

12 Q. So it was when Mr Hickin rang -- was it the line
13 controller or the duty operations manager,
14 Tony McKinnon?

15 A. It could have been either, I couldn't swear to which one
16 it actually is. That was when we found more full
17 information that we heard that it may have been a power
18 surge, but an explosion had been mentioned. We didn't
19 hear that through the train radio, where we were anyway.

20 Q. Was the initial reason for the mayday calls believed to
21 be a power surge and then did that change to explosion?

22 A. Yes, that's our understanding of it, that was the first
23 information we got.

24 Q. You've heard my Lady ask questions of Mr Hickin about
25 power surges. In your experience, how often do power

1 surges occur?

2 A. Well, they are relatively rare. Steve is more
3 experienced than me because he has been doing the job
4 considerably longer, but I know about them and what they
5 can do, a little bit about them. It's as he described
6 in his statement.

7 Q. When you say "relatively rare", are you able to give us
8 any idea of how often such an occurrence would happen?

9 A. Not really.

10 Q. We've heard that when a power surge happens, effectively
11 the power is lost on the line or between a section of
12 the line.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But in those circumstances, is it unusual to hear about
15 people being injured?

16 A. I hadn't heard of any instances before where people had
17 been injured, only infrastructure damage, arcing and
18 fusing, that type of stuff.

19 Q. We know from Mr Hickin's evidence that you then went to
20 Royal Oak station itself to see whether you could assist
21 in any way. You were directed to Paddington to detrain
22 a train. There then came a call understand for you to
23 go to a train which was between Paddington and
24 Edgware Road.

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Where was that train said to be?

2 A. Well, the original location was between Paddington and
3 Praed Street junction, so as that's a relatively short
4 distance, Steve stayed at Paddington and I went down the
5 track to see if I could see this train.

6 Q. Who told you to go there?

7 A. We'd spoken previously to the line controller and the
8 duty operations manager by mobile telephone or it might
9 have been autotelephone.

10 Q. The duty operations manager would have been
11 Tony McKinnon?

12 A. As far as I'm aware, yes.

13 Q. Do you remember who the line controller was that you
14 spoke to?

15 A. Possibly Paul Marks, it could be.

16 Q. They believed there was a train between Paddington and
17 Praed Street?

18 A. Yes, and they asked us to assist in any way we could.

19 Q. I think you went there. Was there a train there?

20 A. There wasn't in that particular location, so ...

21 Q. Did you then radio back or telephone back to say there
22 was no train there?

23 A. Yes, I walked back. Steve was coming already along,
24 because I hadn't arrived back at that time, so he was
25 coming towards me, so we realised there wasn't a train,

1 so obviously the next thing to do was to look round the
2 corner, which is, again, a relatively short distance, to
3 see where the trains actually were and we could see down
4 to Edgware Road where there were two trains.

5 Q. When you saw the two trains, how close were they to the
6 Praed Street junction itself?

7 A. 300 metres maybe, not much more than that, possibly
8 slightly more. Probably less than that, 200 metres.

9 Q. Was it more by chance that you continued walking down
10 there rather than actually being instructed to continue
11 going towards Edgware Road?

12 A. No, because we knew that something -- on the basis of
13 what we'd heard, we knew something had happened, so we
14 needed to go and establish exactly what. So it was
15 a logical thing to walk down towards Edgware Road, which
16 is where our understanding was that something had
17 happened.

18 Q. From what it sounds like, it sounds like either
19 Mr McKinnon or Mr Kemp weren't exactly sure of where the
20 location of the train was. They had a reasonable idea
21 of where it was but not a clear idea.

22 A. I can't comment on what they knew at that time, because
23 they would be dealing with the incident from that end,
24 and we were approaching it from the end where -- the
25 different end to Edgware Road, you see, the opposite

1 end.

2 Q. But perhaps rather than the train being described being
3 between Paddington and Praed Street, it was actually
4 really between Edgware Road and Praed Street?

5 A. Absolutely, a more accurate description certainly would
6 have been that, yes, Edgware Road to Praed Street.

7 Q. We know you made your way down to the trains. What did
8 you see when you got there?

9 A. Three or four disoriented people, which were members of
10 the public, plus also two trains, one, the right-hand
11 one, obviously the one travelling towards Paddington
12 appeared to be significantly damaged when we got to the
13 front of it. The other one not so much so.

14 Q. Are you able to say how much time had passed from when
15 you first heard the mayday call as to when you got to
16 both trains?

17 A. The mayday calls, I guess, were at 8.50, 8.55, between
18 those two times. By the time we'd done the bits that
19 Steve has already described in terms of getting round to
20 the site, I should imagine 9.15, probably not much
21 later.

22 Q. Do you remember seeing Mr Whitehurst when you got there?

23 A. Not straightaway, but I boarded his train and I saw him
24 in the foot -- the driving motor car of his train and he
25 explained what had happened.

1 Q. What did he say had happened?

2 A. He was absolutely definite in the fact that a bomb had
3 exploded and there were deceased people and injured
4 people all around, which I'd seen anyway, because you
5 could see some of what was going on.

6 Q. Did you also see Mr Matthews?

7 A. Yes, I did. He gave me a fuller account, as well as
8 Ray Whitehurst, of what had happened, so I knew from two
9 people that were there what had happened. So our
10 priority then was to see if we could get the people that
11 were in the two cars -- which is the one where the bomb
12 went off and the driving motor car -- back safely to
13 Edgware Road, which was -- the only way of doing that
14 was to go via the other train.

15 Q. The eastbound train?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. When you were on the eastbound train, did you see anyone
18 else arriving at the scene?

19 A. Not until some time later. There was a couple of my
20 colleagues, Trevor Rodgers was one that was there. Do
21 you mean in terms of --

22 Q. Do you remember seeing any of the emergency services?

23 A. Not straightaway, not straightaway.

24 Q. When was the first time you remember seeing the
25 emergency services?

1 A. Probably at least ten minutes after I got there,
2 maybe -- it's very difficult to be precise on times
3 because we went into something that was completely
4 unknown at that point, so time became not -- I realise
5 it's crucial for this, but it wasn't particularly
6 important to us at that time, so ...

7 Q. We understand.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you assume that they had been
9 called or did someone tell you that they had been
10 called?

11 A. We assumed they had been called, my Lady, because in an
12 incident of that type that would ordinarily happen. As
13 we were coming in from the opposite end to it, the
14 assumption was that had already been done by other
15 people.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So even if you had had means of
17 communication, you probably would have gone straight on
18 detraining anyway --

19 A. Yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- because you would have assumed
21 that they would have been called?

22 A. Yes, really, yes, because the priority, in all
23 circumstances, in respect of something such as this, is
24 to get people off of the trains as quickly as we can and
25 as safely as we can.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I follow.

2 MR HAY: I think there came a point when you spoke to
3 Mr Matthews -- I think you may have been in the first
4 carriage -- and he informed you not to go into the
5 second carriage. Did there come a point, though, when
6 you went into the second carriage?

7 A. Yes, there was, because, as a manager, I believed I had
8 better go and establish what exactly had happened and
9 see if anyone needed any -- or whatever help I could do
10 and work out a way of getting anybody else out that was
11 in there.

12 Q. In your witness statement, you suggest that perhaps one
13 of the reasons why you went into the second carriage,
14 the bombed carriage, was because you heard a paramedic
15 shouting from the rear of the carriage. Is that
16 correct?

17 A. There was a lot of shouting going on and all the rest of
18 it at the time. I couldn't say exactly who was
19 shouting, but it was probably shortly after that time
20 that I did encounter the first paramedic who I assume
21 was the triage first response-type person who was about
22 to assess the people that were in there.

23 Q. Had they come from the rear of the second carriage or
24 had they come through the first carriage?

25 A. They'd come through the train, because, no, they didn't

1 pass us on the way and we certainly hadn't seen them on
2 the way, so they must have come from the Edgware Road
3 end.

4 Q. So you met them in the second carriage?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. In your statement, you say that, when you went into the
7 second carriage, you became aware of three deceased?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 Q. You also go on to say that you knew that they were dead
10 because they had tags placed on them.

11 A. That was subsequently.

12 Q. That's what I wanted to establish.

13 A. That was the final confirmation, but they certainly
14 appeared to be to me.

15 Q. So at the point that you went into the second carriage,
16 they didn't have tags on them?

17 A. No.

18 Q. I want to ask you about the three deceased that you saw.
19 Can we have up on the screen, please, [INQ10282-9]? You
20 refer in your statement to seeing a lady.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Are you able to remember, using the plan in front of
23 you, where you saw her?

24 A. Well, I would say the first lady I encountered was in
25 between the doors where it's got the number "8" on the

1 diagram.

2 Q. So between doors D1 and D2?

3 A. Yes, I'd say so, yes.

4 Q. Are you able to say which way her head was and which way
5 her legs were?

6 A. Not without referring to my statement, I'd have to look.

7 Q. In your statement, you refer to her head being close to
8 the doors.

9 A. Yes, that would be right, yes.

10 Q. Would those be double doors D1 or double doors D2?

11 A. D1.

12 Q. You also refer in your statement to a young male wearing
13 a black suit and you also refer to his boxer shorts as
14 being Calvin Klein boxer shorts?

15 A. As far as I can recall, yes.

16 Q. In your statement, you refer, first of all, to that male
17 being close to the female.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That's how you initially refer to it. Then, later on,
20 you refer to that male being close to the middle doors
21 of the carriage. Are you able to help us with where you
22 believe that male was?

23 A. No, I believe he was pretty much as the diagram is
24 because there were two together there certainly.

25 Q. Perhaps rather than looking at what the diagram

1 indicates -- I know it's difficult because the numbers
2 are on there -- but you remember seeing a gentleman in
3 a suit with Calvin Klein boxer shorts?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you remember that male having any particular
6 injuries?

7 A. I didn't look too closely, other than a cursory look to
8 see that he certainly wasn't moving and all the rest of
9 it, because I had to go beyond that to find out the
10 extent of what was going on. I didn't notice too many
11 injuries around that area.

12 Q. Is it possible that -- I know it's very difficult,
13 because it's a long time ago and obviously it's a very
14 traumatic scene -- is it possible that that male, rather
15 than being in the areas by double doors D1 and D2, was
16 actually in the areas between D3 and D4, and the reason
17 why I ask that is because, in your statement, you
18 expressly later go on to say that that male was in the
19 middle -- by the middle doors, and you remember having
20 to be careful around that area?

21 A. That might be confusion at the time, because, as far as
22 I recall, the doors that we got open at the end were to
23 get the last lady out on the stretcher, were the ones
24 with the two people there.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, so the male was between D1 and

1 D2?

2 A. I believe, with hindsight, that they were together, if
3 that's ...

4 MR HAY: You also refer to a third male, who was deceased,
5 who was sitting down. Are you able to say where that
6 was?

7 A. Well, I would say he had his head against one of the
8 side partitions, so it would either be -- it was fairly
9 close to the hole, where the bomb went off and the rest
10 of it. Possibly seat 7. What was unusual about that is
11 I thought it was someone that we had to get off because
12 it just looked like he was asleep.

13 Q. I think you then noticed he had a head injury.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You also, I think, at one point, made your way towards
16 the bomb crater?

17 A. Yes, it was then that -- when -- I'd had an impression
18 of what a bomb would look like or what sort of thing
19 would -- and you have a mental picture of what's likely
20 to happen, but from what was around that -- the crater,
21 as you put it, there was no doubt about it that a bomb
22 had gone off and the various bits that were there.

23 Q. Do you recollect seeing anything particular around the
24 crater or in the crater?

25 A. I tried not to dwell on it too much, but various body

1 parts of different types.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr King, you've said that you bravely
3 went into that carriage because, as a manager, you felt
4 it was your duty to find out what had gone on.

5 So, having found out that it was the worst situation
6 and a bomb had gone off and people had been killed,
7 might it have made a difference to the way you could
8 carry out your duties, if you'd had a way to communicate
9 what you'd sadly just discovered to those on the
10 surface?

11 A. Possibly, but the thing -- by the time that that's going
12 on, full details of what had happened would have been
13 known, so having a bit more communication may have
14 assisted in terms of what I was trying to do there and
15 then. The radio system, as you know, has been upgraded
16 since then, so it's unlikely to happen in the way it did
17 then, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. But, yes, it
18 would have been better to have more decent
19 communications at the time.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Don't worry, I'm very conscious of
21 hindsight.

22 MR HAY: I just want to refer you to another person that you
23 saw in the carriage. You refer in your statement to
24 a man who had both legs missing around the knee area.
25 Can I ask you, first of all, was that person alive or

1 dead?

2 A. As far as I know, definitely dead. Anyone else that
3 I saw there was -- inside the car was dead, and I also
4 went to the outside of the car, but I don't know if
5 you're coming on to that.

6 Q. That fourth person, are you able to say where you saw
7 them?

8 A. I thought in the middle -- in the second set of double
9 doors, but I may be mistaken, but I'm fairly confident
10 it was in the second set of doors.

11 Q. Is it possible you may have seen that person between
12 doors D1 and D2 rather than that being the young male
13 you saw in the suit?

14 A. It's possible I got them confused in that, because
15 I wouldn't -- I was fairly sure it was the other way
16 round, but, yes.

17 Q. I think you then remained in either the first or second
18 carriage for a considerable period of time assisting.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. One of the things you did with Mr Matthews was to assist
21 in opening the doors?

22 A. We did, yes.

23 Q. Why did you do that?

24 A. Because we realised that access and egress was very
25 difficult, so we had to try to open more doors to allow

1 particularly the person that was going to be put on to
2 a stretcher subsequently, and other people, out.

3 Q. That particular person, was it a male or a female?

4 A. A female. If we're talking about the last lady that was
5 out, we stayed with her until the end, although we were
6 advised against it.

7 Q. Why were you advised against that?

8 A. Because they believed there would be -- when the police
9 sergeant came up to me, I believe it was -- I don't know
10 if it says it in my statement there, I'm sure it does --
11 that there may be secondary devices, so all
12 non-essential people should go out. This was some time
13 into the incident, but we said, "We won't leave until
14 the last people, the last passengers, are off".

15 Q. You do, in fact, refer in your statement to seeing two
16 plainclothes police officers with spaniels?

17 A. Yes, we assisted with them, because they wanted seats
18 opened and all the rest of it to check for secondary
19 devices. Dave Matthews and myself went through the
20 train where they wanted things opened, we opened the
21 seats with J doors and assisted with the spaniels, yes.

22 Q. You refer to them as being EXPO officers?

23 A. That's what they -- yes, yes.

24 Q. I think there came a point when you were also asked to
25 check underneath the train.

1 A. Yes, that's true, yes.

2 Q. In your statement, you refer to seeing a male underneath
3 the train.

4 A. That's right. He was -- I could get down on to the side
5 of the train, I could get down, get -- sort of crouch
6 down underneath with a torch, to see -- they asked me to
7 check if there was anyone else under there or anything
8 else.

9 Q. When you say you could get down to the side?

10 A. To the side of the train -- I don't know if you could
11 put a different diagram up, I could show you with the --
12 to the side of the tunnel wall.

13 Q. On this diagram, the tunnel wall would be on the lower
14 part of the page --

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. -- and the adjacent track would be at the top?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you able to say roughly where you recall seeing that
19 male?

20 A. It appeared to me that he had kind of gone through the
21 crater, just slightly beneath the crater, and away,
22 because there was someone else being worked on outside
23 who was the guy that had both legs amputated outside the
24 train there, so he was being worked on at the time I was
25 doing this.

1 And the people that were working on him I called to
2 say, "Yes, there's somebody else under here", and they
3 said, yes, they were aware.

4 Q. Eventually, the female casualty was removed. I think
5 you then left the scene shortly after that. Is that
6 right?

7 A. Yes, with Dave Matthews, and then, once -- that was the
8 last live casualty off the train. We made sure that had
9 happened, then we made our way back towards Edgware Road
10 via the other train, and we saw who I now know to be
11 Jenny Nicholson, because she was partially covered by
12 a tarpaulin, which I then recovered, because people had
13 obviously moved it as several people were coming in
14 afterwards.

15 Q. Do you recollect what time you finally made your way up
16 to the station?

17 A. It's hard to be precise. 11.15, 11.30.

18 MR HAY: Mr King, thank you very much. I have no more
19 questions for you, but others may.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

21 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

22 MS GALLAGHER: Mr King, I represent four bereaved families.

23 It's all the men, apart from the bomber, who died in
24 that carriage, so I'm afraid I do have some limited
25 further questions about the two men whom you described

1 seeing in the carriage. I don't have any further
2 questions about the man under the train.
3 Could we have [INQ10282-9] on screen again?
4 First of all, Mr King, you've indicated that, when
5 you came in, you see these three people, and you later
6 know they're dead because you see tags placed on them.
7 Could you assist us with this: when you see them with
8 the tags placed on them, are they in the same position
9 that you've first seen them?
10 A. Yes, yes.
11 Q. You've described two men, one of them a young man in
12 Calvin Klein underwear and a suit?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You've been asked in some detail by my learned friend
15 Mr Hay whether he could be the person sitting in seat 7
16 rather than the person lying on the floor. Do you
17 accept that you could be confused about the location of
18 those two people?
19 A. Not with the seat 7 person, because that was an older
20 gentleman.
21 Q. So you're sure the person sitting in seat 7 was older?
22 A. Yes, absolutely so.
23 Q. And you're sure that the younger man whom you've
24 described in the Calvin Klein underwear is the person
25 towards double doors D1/D2?

1 A. Well, that's what I believe, but the gentleman there is
2 suggesting he may have been in a different position, but
3 there were certainly two together there, yes.

4 Q. Of course. You've described the person whom you see
5 sitting up, the person in seat 7, as having quite severe
6 head injuries. I don't intend to get you to repeat what
7 you've said in your statement, but, my Lady, for your
8 reference, it's in his statement INQ7464-3, about
9 halfway down the page.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 MS GALLAGHER: You describe quite extensive facial injuries.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could it be that that person had burning to their face
14 rather than damage as severe as you've suggested in your
15 statement?

16 A. No, no, it was quite severe, because it was like --
17 I don't know how far you want me to go with this, but it
18 was -- one side, no problem at all to look at, but the
19 other side -- I could see that he wasn't asleep, let's
20 put it that way.

21 Q. Certainly. Could it be that the damage you've referred
22 to, the parts that were missing, were just from the ear
23 or is it as extensive as you've indicated in your
24 statement?

25 A. My recollection is it's quite extensive.

1 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, Mr King, thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher.

3 Mr Saunders?

4 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

5 MR SAUNDERS: Mr King, I simply want to ask you about those

6 tags. I represent the family of Laura Webb, who's the

7 young lady that was at D1.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. I've no difficulty at all where you place her, with her

10 head towards D1 and her legs facing down. You described

11 seeing her as you walked through from carriage 1 into

12 carriage 2.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. At that point, she has no tag on her?

15 A. Not to my -- I'm sure they came and did that afterwards,

16 a short while after, as I've described.

17 Q. As I understand it, there were none of the people who

18 were dead who had tags when you initially saw them.

19 A. That's my recollection, yes.

20 Q. Can you help us between the time when you first saw

21 people whom you believed to be dead and when you later

22 saw them with a tag on?

23 A. In terms of time elapsing between those things?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Obviously, I was advised not to go in by my colleague,

1 Dave Matthews, into the other car, so time had elapsed
2 then. I had to look to see what needed to be done, if
3 there was anybody else that didn't appear to be that
4 way. Probably ten minutes after I arrived. I don't
5 know if that ties in with -- or whether that assists
6 you.

7 Q. Thank you, that's helpful. When you refer to --

8 A. Maybe -- time does -- time gets distorted, apart from
9 certain things, if you know what I mean, it's very
10 difficult, because you've just got to -- it's hard to be
11 precise.

12 Q. For what it's worth, Mr King, we all appreciate how
13 difficult it is for you and the other witnesses to try
14 to, as it were, explain the time that's passed.

15 When you referred earlier to paramedics, were they
16 clearly paramedics because of their dress -- namely, the
17 suits -- or is it a phrase -- because a number of your
18 colleagues have used the phrase "paramedic" when, in
19 fact, one of them then corrected -- in fact, it was
20 Dave Matthews -- who said, "No, no, no, although I've
21 said 'paramedic' it was a South African", who we believe
22 to be Jason Rennie, who was a passenger but clearly
23 somebody who knew what he was doing in terms of medical
24 aid and assistance. So, when you refer to "paramedics"
25 are you meaning somebody dressed as a paramedic?

1 A. The one I'm referring to is the one that labelled them
2 afterwards and he was certainly dressed as a paramedic.

3 Q. So that's the stage that you're quite clear it is
4 a paramedic?

5 A. Yes. Dave Matthews and other people had explained that
6 everyone -- various other people were helping with the
7 casualties, alive and dead, but I didn't tune in to
8 whether they were actually medically qualified or
9 paramedics or not.

10 Q. Mr King, for what it's worth, can I assure you that --
11 Laura Webb, I represent -- there had been a number of
12 passengers who had already tried to assist and she was
13 clearly dead by the time you arrived.

14 A. It appeared so to me.

15 MR SAUNDERS: We are all aware of that, but thank you very
16 much, Mr King. Thank you, my Lady.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Saunders. Yes,
18 Ms Simcock?

19 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

20 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady.

21 Mr King, can I ask you about the arrival of
22 paramedics, please? In your statement, you deal with
23 the conversation that you have with Dave Matthews on the
24 train. Can I just refer to your statement? You say
25 there that this was now about 9.15 to 9.20. Does that

1 timing still sound about right to you?

2 A. For my arrival on scene or from --

3 Q. From when you talked -- in your statement, you deal with

4 the conversation you have with Dave Matthews on the

5 train, and you say:

6 "This was now about 9.15 to 9.20."

7 Does that sound about right?

8 A. I guess that's about right, yes.

9 Q. You then briefly describe the first carriage in which

10 you're having this conversation in your statement, and

11 you then say:

12 "I saw paramedics were in the process of arriving

13 and looked to be dealing with casualties. I saw about

14 four at this time."

15 Does that help with your recollection?

16 A. I don't know whether that refers to paramedics or

17 casualties, the four, but ...

18 Q. You then say Dave Matthews informed you that there were

19 dead people inside the second carriage and he told you

20 not to go in there unless it was necessary.

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. You then say this:

23 "A paramedic then shouted from towards the rear of

24 the second carriage for assistance in freeing jammed

25 doors and debris to help them treat casualties."

1 Do you remember that now?

2 A. Well, there were people shouting from the end of the
3 second car, the other side of where the crater was,
4 because they had been able to get free access in from
5 Edgware Road once the people were evacuated. So it may
6 have been a paramedic, there were certainly some people
7 shouting all round for assistance.

8 Q. That was certainly your recollection in August 2005. Is
9 that likely to be more accurate than now?

10 A. It could be, yes.

11 Q. When this person shouts from the rear of that train,
12 this is just shortly after your conversation with
13 Dave Matthews that you've already told us about?

14 A. Shortly is a bit -- it's difficult to say "shortly".
15 Maybe five, ten minutes, something like that.

16 Q. So between 9.25 and 9.30?

17 A. There were people shouting throughout the whole thing,
18 including people that needed treatment. So a number of
19 people were shouting for assistance, so it's hard to be
20 precise exactly who shouted what and what they said.

21 Q. Certainly from your statement this is the time period
22 that you say:

23 "I saw paramedics [plural] were in the process of
24 arriving and looked to be dealing with casualties."

25 Just dealing with that, do you think that you saw

1 a number of paramedics that were identifiable by their
2 uniform?

3 A. As I mentioned to the gentleman here, the first one
4 I saw that was identifiable by uniform was the one that
5 did the tagging.

6 Q. But again, if you were talking about paramedics arriving
7 and dealing with casualties at this time in your
8 statement, is that likely to be more accurate than your
9 recollection now?

10 A. As it was five years ago, it possibly is, but certainly
11 paramedics were attending to the person to the side of
12 the train at some point afterwards, so they were the
13 first to arrive, because there was the guy that had --
14 because we were trying to take people down the side of
15 the train, but we couldn't get through there because of
16 the person that had legs missing.

17 MS SIMCOCK: Yes, thank you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

19 Thank you very much, Mr King. Thank you for coming
20 to assist me and I'm sorry I had to ask you to relive
21 some of the horrific experiences you had that day, and
22 thank you for staying to the bitter end to help those
23 poor injured people.

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the oral witnesses for
25 the morning, so may I now read a number of statements?

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there any chance of moving the
2 witnesses for this afternoon forward? I suspect you're
3 already trying to do that?

4 MR KEITH: They are here, but their legal representatives
5 just wanted a quick chance to have a word with them and
6 introduce themselves and explain something of the
7 format, and so I thought I would read the statements,
8 and then, if I could invite my Lady to break for a few
9 moments after that, at the usual time, that will give
10 them time to discuss matters.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you for organising that at such
12 short notice.

13 MR KEITH: Mr Suter, as ever, is well ahead of us.
14 The first one, my Lady, is Mr Hunt.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

16 Statement of MR LEE HUNT read

17 "On Thursday, 7 July, I was performing my duties as
18 a train operator on the London Underground. I had
19 started work at about 6.30. I had driven two trips
20 around the Circle Line and at about 8.35 or 8.40 I took
21 a break.

22 "I had been on my break for about ten minutes or so
23 and was sitting in the smoking mess room, which is
24 situated at the western end of Edgware Road train crew
25 accommodation. The Circle Lines run almost directly

1 underneath. There were another five or six members of
2 staff in the mess room. At this time, I heard a bang
3 and the building shook. It was not a particularly loud
4 bang, perhaps best described as a thump.

5 "A minute or two later, Chris Ibrahim, who is
6 a train instructor operator opened the mess room door
7 and said something like 'A train's hit something'. We
8 all filed out to see what was going on and we made our
9 way down towards the platform and somebody said, 'It's
10 a bomb'.

11 " I ran back and got my high visibility vest and
12 torch. I went for the west end of the platform where
13 a number of staff had gathered. I could see two trains
14 in the tunnel. There was a lot of dust in the air.
15 Somebody told me to go to the front of the train and
16 place a short-circuiting device on the track which would
17 discharge traction current in the event of it being
18 recharged.

19 "Whilst I was on the way to do this, somebody told
20 me that this had already been done. Whilst I was doing
21 this, I noticed there was a westbound train stopped
22 about 100 yards inside the tunnel with an eastbound
23 train alongside it. The lighting on both trains was not
24 working, as far as I remember. I saw a woman lying on
25 the track in front of the eastbound train. This woman

1 was motionless and had suffered a severe head injury.
2 It was clear to me she was dead.
3 "I could hear screaming for help from the other side
4 of the westbound train. I looked under the train and
5 I could see a man screaming."
6 My Lady, that's plainly Danny Biddle.
7 "I had been joined by a man who had got off the
8 train and told me he was a paramedic."
9 My Lady, we presume that that is Mr Adrian Heili:
10 "We moved to the man. I could see this man had lost
11 a leg and his other leg was severely injured. There
12 were about 20 or 30 people the other side of this man
13 who had clearly got off the train. They were between
14 the train and the tunnel wall. Their way was barred by
15 the injured man and a considerable amount of debris.
16 "I could see train doors blown off, bits of seating
17 and metal on the track. I considered trying to open the
18 train doors so that these people could get on the train,
19 bypass the injured man and debris, but the doors would
20 not open. I moved towards the front of the train in
21 order to find an alternative escape route for these
22 people.
23 "In the middle of this group, I came across a woman
24 lying on the ground clearly in intense pain. There was
25 a man helping her. This man told me he had first aid

1 knowledge."

2 Possibly Alison Sayer:

3 "I tried to calm the passengers, letting them know
4 that they would have to remain there for a moment until
5 they could be safely evacuated. I had moved some of the
6 debris under the train to prevent anyone injuring
7 themselves. I returned to the paramedic who was
8 assisting the man with leg damage and he requested
9 I obtain some string and some wood and bandages."

10 Again, my Lady, we assess that is a reference to
11 Mr Heili:

12 "I made my way to the duty manager's office booking
13 on point and obtained what I could. I assisted the
14 [man] in applying the tourniquet to the man's legs.
15 I was asked to get a stretcher and went to the back of
16 the train where passengers were being detrained.
17 I obtained the stretcher from the emergency locker in
18 the train cab and returned to the paramedic, but the
19 stretcher was not suitable, due to the man having a back
20 injury. The paramedic asked me to get the woman with
21 the injured legs on to the train so that she could be
22 evacuated through the train.

23 "One of the train doors had now been opened and,
24 with the assistance of passengers, I managed to get the
25 lady on to the train. I could see that paramedics had

1 arrived and were on the train. I went back to the rear
2 of the train and told a paramedic about the man with leg
3 injuries. I tried to keep the passengers who were
4 waiting to be evacuated calm. Once the paramedics had
5 finished working on the man with leg injuries and placed
6 him on a suitable stretcher, I guided them out of the
7 tunnel.

8 "I assumed the track passengers had followed us,
9 once the man with the leg injuries had been removed.

10 I boarded the train via the car which had suffered the
11 explosion. I could see paramedics were tending injured
12 persons. I could see the train doors had been blown off
13 and there was twisted metal. I recall seeing the body
14 of a woman lying on the train floor. I think this was
15 in the aisle near the interconnecting doors at the rear
16 of the car. It was very dark on the train. I asked if
17 I could help and it was requested that lighting was
18 urgently needed. I ran out and spoke to a fireman and
19 drew a plan of the train position scene and informed him
20 of the urgent need for lighting. I returned to the
21 carriage and helped paramedics tend to the lady with the
22 injured legs. Once the lady had been moved, I helped
23 the paramedics with lighting, using my torch, and helped
24 in evacuating injured persons from the train.

25 "Whilst doing this, I recall seeing another two

1 fatalities who were lying by the set of double doors of
2 the train. The doors were not there. These bodies
3 appeared to be that of a man and a woman and were badly
4 mutilated. Once all the survivors had been evacuated,
5 I was asked by police to leave the scene."

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hunt obviously did a very great
7 deal to assist the severely injured and, had he been
8 here, I would have commended all his efforts too.

9 MR KEITH: Of course, my Lady, thank you.

10 Mr Hay and I will take it in turn to read the next
11 statements.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

13 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Simon Eyles
14 dated 2 August 2005 which has the usual declaration of
15 truth?

16 Statement of MR SIMON EYLES read

17 "I am employed by London Underground as a duty
18 manager and I work at Edgware Road station. I have been
19 working at the station for some three and a half years.
20 On 7 July 2005, I was not due into work until 2.00 but
21 had to be in by 8.00 as I had to sort out driver's
22 duties for the following week.

23 "I must have got to work at about 7.55. My office
24 is in the station above platforms 3 and 4. My office is
25 in the desk booking on point which is where the drivers

1 come to book on and off. At about 8.50, I was sat in
2 the admin office, which is above my office, when I heard
3 a loud bang and the building shook. Initially,
4 I thought a car or van had driven into the building and
5 I just ignored it. About three to four minutes later,
6 one of our other duty managers, Monica Hogan, put
7 a tannoy out asking me to contact the desk. I called
8 Monica from the phone in the admin office. She asked me
9 to assist with a train that was stuck in the tunnel.
10 I went to the incident office, which is nearby, to pick
11 up my incident bag. I then went down to the desk where
12 I met Mike Brough, the incident manager. We weren't
13 sure what had happened and we went down to the platforms
14 where I could see a train stationary in the tunnel about
15 50 yards from platform 4. This was a westbound train
16 which had just left Edgware Road.
17 "Mike Brough remained on the platform, resuming his
18 position as Silver control, as we thought we may have
19 a major incident on our hands.
20 "I assumed that the current must have been turned
21 off, as I could see about ten staff on the track and
22 three staff at the rear of the train. I could see that
23 they were already getting passengers off this train and
24 they were using one of the emergency ladders to assist
25 the passengers down from the rear doors at the very end

1 of the train.

2 "I noticed that another train was stationary next to
3 this train. This was an eastbound train and would have
4 been approaching Edgware Road and it was 30 feet further
5 into the tunnel.

6 "I spoke to a member of staff at the westbound
7 train. This was Mick Cooney. He told me there had been
8 an explosion and he believed it to be a compressor. He
9 told me people were trapped down the side of the train.

10 I made my way down the side of the train nearest the
11 wall. There is a two- to three-foot wide gap between
12 the train and the wall. The train is a six-carriage
13 train. About one and a half carriage lengths down,
14 I could see someone lying under the train. He was being
15 tended to by an off-duty paramedic who was either an
16 Australian or a New Zealander. The person under the
17 train had lost both his legs just above the knee.

18 "Further up the train, I could see that some of the
19 train doors were damaged. There were about 10 to 15
20 people who were passengers who were just ahead of me.
21 They were being prevented walking towards me, due to the
22 male who had lost both his legs blocking their path.
23 I later discovered this male was called Danny.

24 "It was dark in the tunnel. I gave my torch from my
25 incident bag to the off-duty paramedic. He asked me

1 where the paramedics were. I told him I would make
2 enquiries. I had to go back to the platforms, as my
3 phone had no service and the radio was too busy. As
4 soon as I got nearer the platforms, I had a signal on my
5 phone again. I called the operation rooms at
6 Baker Street and spoke to Tony McKinnon. I told him we
7 needed paramedics at Edgware Road as we had casualties
8 and people under the train. He told me, 'I'll get on to
9 them'. I then received a call from the train operations
10 manager at Aldgate. Her name is Hilary Signy. She
11 asked me what was going on. On hearing this, I realised
12 we were not dealing with a faulty compressor but
13 a terrorist incident.

14 "I then made my way back to where Danny was. I told
15 the off-duty paramedic that other paramedics were on
16 their way. I assisted him by holding the torch. The
17 off-duty paramedic was reassuring Danny that help was on
18 the way. He also tended to some other people who were
19 amongst the group still at the sides of the train.

20 "I went back to the platforms to look out for the
21 paramedics. On the way, I met two male paramedics.
22 They asked me about the casualties. I told them about
23 Danny and that there must be others.

24 "One of them contacted his control room for more
25 paramedics. I led them to Danny and left them to see to

1 him. I then got into the train where the emergency
2 ladder was. Myself and Mick Cooney then made our way
3 through the train. I believe most of the passengers had
4 been detained by this stage. We got to the point where
5 Danny was. Our aim was to get the group of passengers
6 stuck the other side of Danny back into the train. We
7 were unable to open the doors as they were damaged. We
8 did eventually manage to open a set of doors in the
9 third carriage and we were able to get a set of
10 emergency ladders from the middle driving cab.
11 "We then assisted passengers up into the train.
12 There were about 10 to 15 of them. They were told to
13 make their way along the train to the rear. I remember
14 an oriental lady, who was in her late 20s, who insisted
15 on taking her trolley case with her. I remember a white
16 balding male in his 30s to 40s. He had blood on his
17 face. I think he had a bandage over his eye. This was
18 over his forehead and right eye. I think he had
19 a pinstriped suit on. I also remember a male who was
20 white, who was a medium build. He appeared to have
21 learning difficulties, a passenger with him told us he
22 thought this person had severe shock.
23 "I do not recall anyone else from this side of the
24 train. I remember meeting a member of staff called
25 Paul Bloomfield. I cannot remember if he was on the

1 opposite train or whether he was on my train. I then
2 made my way to the blast carriage. Ambulance crews were
3 there in there with torches. The London Fire Brigade
4 were also on the train. They were trying to set up
5 emergency lighting. It was quite dark in the blast
6 carriage other than the torchlights. There was a dusty
7 smell in the air. It seemed quiet, which surprised me.
8 "The ambulance crews were assisting with about six
9 people. I assisted a white lady. She had a head
10 injury. She had a cut on her forehead. The paramedics
11 were in the process of putting a neck brace on her. She
12 also had an injured right knee. She was being comforted
13 by a male passenger. She was at the end of the blast
14 carriage nearest the rear of the train. I assisted to
15 get her on to a stretcher. I could not get this through
16 the carriage, as there were casualties and paramedics in
17 the way. I then went to assist on the train opposite.
18 The doors in the blast carriage were either buckled,
19 missing or hanging off the runners. I was able to jump
20 across to the other train from the blast carriage as the
21 set of doors were married up. The doors on the other
22 train were open. There were lights on on this train.
23 There was no broken glass on this train, unlike the
24 blast train. There were Fire Brigade officers on this
25 train. I made my way along the train so I could see

1 inside the blast carriage. It was carnage.

2 "I saw a colleague, Alex King. He was in the blast
3 carriage. I was able to speak to him. I could see two
4 bodies by him, by a set of doors. These doors were on
5 the right-hand side of the train. I could see that they
6 were male and female. I would say that they were in
7 their late 20s or 30s. I think the male was missing
8 a foot. I had a conversation with Alex. I then helped
9 with a male casualty who was on a stretcher. He was
10 transferred from the blast carriage into the train
11 opposite. I carried him to the end of the train to the
12 emergency ladder at the front of the train. The male
13 was white. He was unconscious. He had dark black hair.
14 I think he was in his 30s and his name was Dave,
15 I believe.

16 "I went back into the train and again assisted with
17 transferring a casualty from the blast train. I do not
18 remember anything about this casualty. I saw the
19 off-duty paramedic by the emergency ladder at the end of
20 the train. I had been given his wallet and mobile phone
21 for safekeeping by a member of staff. I handed these
22 two items back to him.

23 "By this stage, all the passengers and casualties
24 had been taken off these trains. It was now about
25 10.26. The police were then securing the trains and

1 I went back to the office."

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Another determined and courageous
3 member of London Underground who went to assist.

4 MR HAY: Grateful, my Lady.

5 MR KEITH: My Lady, the next statement of is that of
6 Paul Bloomfield dated 3 August 2005.

7 Statement of MR PAUL BLOOMFIELD read

8 "I have been employed by London Underground for
9 16 years and have been an operational task manager for
10 about four months. I had previously worked at
11 Edgware Road station as a duty manager trains for seven
12 years.

13 "On 7 July, at about 9.30, I was driving my own
14 vehicle passing Edgware Road station taking it for
15 a service, as I then intended to go straight to work at
16 Broadway in Victoria. I received a text message on my
17 work mobile, which I have since deleted, stating that
18 a train hit a tunnel at Edgware Road. I had earlier
19 heard on the car radio that there had been some sort of
20 electrical explosion on a train at Liverpool Street
21 station. I knew the Edgware Road train was
22 a Circle Line because of the train number given in the
23 text message, number 216, which came from Network
24 Control Centre.

25 "I suddenly thought, 'Hang on, two incidents,

1 something's going on here'. I then rang the crew desk
2 in the offices at Edgware Road and spoke to
3 Ms Ayo Puddicombe. I asked did they need assistance and
4 she said, 'Yes, there's been an explosion'. Ayo knew
5 I was trained as I worked with her and we knew each
6 other. I then parked my vehicle in the staff car park
7 opposite Edgware Road.
8 "A PCSO [I think a Special Constable] was just
9 putting a cordon in, but let me through when I explained
10 the situation. The car park is in Transept Street NW1.
11 I then walked along Chapel Street and into the main
12 entrance to Edgware Road. I was in my own suit.
13 I walked into the booking hall and saw in excess of 20
14 distressed passengers being dealt with. Some seemed to
15 have cuts and burns and had gel packs. They all looked
16 dirty and some crying. They all seemed shocked.
17 I didn't linger and went straight down to platforms 3
18 and 4 with my priority to get to the train. I had no
19 equipment or torch with me. I met the line standards
20 manager, Bryan Corbin. I asked what the situation was
21 before entering the tunnel. Bryan told me, 'It's
22 a bomb'. I took a quick assessment of the situation
23 from the platform and saw staff escorting passengers
24 along the track onto the platform in an orderly fashion.
25 I asked Bryan if he knew where the driver was or if he

1 was injured. He said he did not.

2 "I then took a handlamp, which is metal with
3 a reasonably powerful beam, also referred to as a Bardic
4 lamp. I also put on a orange high-vis
5 London Underground vest. Someone had laid equipment out
6 along the platform. I then walked down the westbound
7 platform 3 ramp and along the westbound track as
8 passengers were being brought up along platform 4.
9 I walked along the track into the tunnel to the rear of
10 train number 216, the westbound train. I noticed
11 a smell of cordite. It reminded me of a smell from
12 a shotgun when I had been clay pigeon shooting. I would
13 say on a guess the rear of the train 216 was about
14 20 metres inside the tunnel. The tunnel lights were on
15 and there was natural light coming from the tunnel
16 entrance. There were quite a few people about using
17 torches.

18 "There was also light from back trains. It was not
19 particularly dark. The tunnel is a double one and quite
20 wide, allowing room for two trains to pass, or a 6-foot
21 gap in the middle and about a 3-foot gap between the
22 train and the tunnel wall. I could see another train
23 eastbound facing towards me in Edgware Road station with
24 its headlights on.

25 "I saw there was debris in front of the eastbound

1 train, and about adjacent to car 5 of the incident
2 train, the westbound train.

3 "I spoke to Trevor Rodgers, duty manager, who was
4 assisting with detrainment of the eastbound train.

5 I told him I was trying to find the driver and he told
6 me I would not be able to get through inside the
7 westbound train. I took that to mean I could not get
8 through because of the flow of passengers being taken
9 off.

10 "I thought, 'I will get through' and walked from the
11 end of the carriage through the train. I noticed minor
12 damage to doors where customers had obviously tried to
13 force their way out. I got to the middle motor car,
14 which is car number 3, which was behind the blast
15 carriage. There's a driver's cab in the middle of car 3
16 which is obviously not in use. I had to get past this
17 in order to get through into car 2, then 1, the driver's
18 cab.

19 "I saw that the glass in the door had been smashed
20 and the fire extinguisher had gone. I was able to open
21 the door by its handle and, once opened, I stepped in.
22 The first thing I noticed was it was filthy.

23 A soot-like substance seemed to be over everything.

24 I was not wearing any gloves. I saw what I would
25 describe as hell. People dead and dying. People that

1 did not look like they would make it. Paramedics were
2 inside. I do not remember how many. Just inside the
3 carriage, one paramedic was doing chest pumps and
4 I thought 'They won't live'. All the windows seemed to
5 be smashed. Parts of the side of the train missing,
6 seats burnt and some missing, and a horrible smouldering
7 smell, absolutely awful.

8 "I could see other unattended people lying on the
9 floor and I assumed that they were dead. There were at
10 least two. I then saw the duty manager, Simon Eyles,
11 standing just to the left before the first doors inside
12 the carriage. I asked Simon if he was okay. He said he
13 was. It was obvious I would not get through. I asked
14 Simon if he had seen the driver, which he had not.

15 I was still concerned for the driver. I did not know
16 how far forward the damage was. I could see I was not
17 needed. I then went back to the rear, got off, and
18 walked over the debris field and got on to the eastbound
19 train to walk through. I noticed parts of the side of
20 the train, windows, doors and seats on the track. The
21 passengers were really good and calm and I reassured
22 them that we would get them off as soon as possible.

23 I went through to the rear of the eastbound train which
24 would be near the front of the bombed train.

25 "I got off and crossed to the front of the

1 westbound, which is about two cars down from the rear of
2 the eastbound. I went into the first car. I do not
3 think anyone was injured. Customers were inside in
4 shock, some with minor injuries. Duty manager
5 Steve Hickin was inside. He told me that the driver was
6 Ray Whitehurst and I found him in the first carriage.
7 He was in shock, glazed eyes and pale. I then took him
8 back to the office via the eastbound train. I left him
9 with another manager, Monica Hogan.

10 "I then went back to the eastbound train to either
11 car 3 or 4 to a set of doors which were opposite the
12 bomb-damaged car on the westbound. I assisted a fireman
13 to get the eastbound train doors open. I then assisted
14 with pulling a stretcher across from the damaged car.
15 I remember some were on drips. It was then I actually
16 realised that there were dead people. There was a guy
17 wearing a dark suit with his legs blown backwards behind
18 him. I could see all the muscles and Calvin Klein boxer
19 shorts showing above his trousers. There was another
20 body to the right of this male. I do not know if male
21 or female. It was pretty mangled up. The legs, or
22 maybe arms, in the wrong place with all the muscles
23 visible. They were next to each other. The stretchers
24 were being passed across further up. In the middle of
25 all of this, a passenger came up to me, I think with

1 a uniformed police officer, a male. He said, 'Where's
2 the way out?' I pointed down to the front and he went.
3 Someone escorted him. He was white, dark-haired and
4 I think wearing a green raincoat. The whole thing was
5 bizarre. The last one passed across was a young adult
6 female wearing cropped, light-blue trousers. I then
7 looked in the blast car from the eastbound train to
8 check if anyone else was there. It was given the all
9 clear and we left via the eastbound train, myself,
10 Bryan Corbin, plus some paramedics, firemen and police."
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Bloomfield was another gentleman
12 who, despite the fact he wasn't even on duty, went to
13 see what he could do to help. Thank you. Shall we take
14 a break there?
15 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes.
16 (11.32 am)
17 (A short break)
18 (11.47 am)
19 MR KEITH: My Lady, PCs Bird and Hill -- certainly they were
20 PCs at the time, July 2005 -- are here, so with
21 my Lady's leave, I'll call those two oral witnesses next
22 before returning to the read statements.
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.
24 You may be used to standing, Mr Bird, but I'm afraid
25 here, because of the technology, we have to have you

1 seated.

2 THE WITNESS: That's fine, my Lady, thank you.

3 PC MURRAY PAUL BIRD (sworn)

4 A. My name is Murray Bird, I'm a police constable currently
5 attached to Greenwich Borough, although, at the time of
6 this incident, I was on a diplomatic protection group,
7 my Lady.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

9 Questions by MR KEITH

10 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

11 A. My full name is Murray Paul Bird.

12 Q. Thank you very much. As you told us, you were attached
13 to diplomatic protection group S016 in July 2005.

14 A. That's correct, my Lady.

15 Q. Did that mean that you were in a vehicle attached to the
16 diplomatic protection group, with two other officers,
17 PC Hill and PC Giles?

18 A. That's correct, my Lady.

19 Q. Where were you when you first received a radio message?

20 A. At the time, we were travelling, I think, along
21 Victoria Embankment. It was a fairly routine day up
22 until then. The first we knew of anything going on was
23 a message that came over on the main channel, which is
24 within the vehicle itself. We have two radio channels;
25 we have our own personal radios, and then there's a main

1 channel, which is in all the cars, which would cover
2 a vast -- a larger area of London and, as a result of
3 that, we heard that there had been an explosion at
4 Aldgate.

5 Q. The second channel, the larger one, is that just for
6 DPG, diplomatic protection group, or is that a general
7 Met Police net?

8 A. No that would be a general, Met-wide -- I mean, the Met
9 is split into four areas, and obviously whichever area
10 you are in, it would cover all the stations within that
11 particular area.

12 Q. Do you recall what time it was that you received that
13 first message or overheard that first message about
14 Aldgate?

15 A. It was probably, I don't know, quarter to 9, something
16 like that.

17 Q. In your statement, if I could just remind you, you'd
18 said that, at about 9.15, you were on mobile patrol when
19 you received a message. I appreciate it's very
20 difficult after this amount of time to be sure, but
21 which of those two times do you think is more likely to
22 be correct?

23 A. Well, I think, if that's in my statement, then
24 I probably would have taken it off the CAD, which is --
25 obviously, would have it all timed.

1 Q. Do you recall checking the CAD record when you made your
2 statement?

3 A. When I did my statement, that's what I -- because of
4 everything happening so quickly at the time, most of the
5 times I have taken regarding this incident I've taken
6 from the CAD message.

7 Q. Were there a number of radio messages about Aldgate or
8 was there just one?

9 A. It was quite a busy -- several transmissions, obviously
10 ours would have just been the Met ones, we wouldn't have
11 been a party to the British Transport Police or
12 anything.

13 Q. Do you recall just hearing one about Aldgate or was --
14 did the information come out bit by bit over a number of
15 radio messages?

16 A. Well, initially, it sounded as though there had been an
17 electrical explosion, I do recall that coming across the
18 radio channel at some stage, and we thought at the time,
19 "Yes, that's feasible, these things do happen", bearing
20 in mind, you know, the amount of electricity on the
21 Tubes, and initially that's what we thought it was, and
22 although we sort of raised our eyebrows about it, we
23 didn't pay too much attention to it at that stage.

24 Q. But then?

25 A. Then, obviously, later on, not long after, another

1 message came out that there had been another explosion
2 on a train at Edgware Road, and it then honed our
3 concentration a little bit more then, realising that
4 there was something definitely going on out of the
5 ordinary.

6 Q. As a result, were you tasked by your own controller?

7 A. Initially, we tried to take the call because, strictly
8 speaking, it's not really within our remit to deal with
9 that type of thing, bearing in mind what was going on,
10 and our main responsibilities would be for diplomatic
11 missions, and there was nothing to know at the time
12 whether this might actually be some sort of terrorist
13 attack which may involve some other foreign missions.

14 But we did -- realising the severity of the -- what
15 was going on, we did say, "Look, we will go to
16 Edgware Road", because I could hear -- I know there was
17 at least a female voice from the scene saying, "We need
18 more help, we need more units", and we did offer up --
19 I think initially, they weren't too keen on us going,
20 but in the end, I think we did it through our own
21 control room, and said, "Look, assign us, we're going to
22 go", and in the end, that's what happened.

23 Q. So your decision to go and to put yourselves forward and
24 to offer help was as a result of a combination of
25 things: the direct call for help from the scene, because

1 you heard the lady --

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. -- saying units were required, and also because there

4 were plainly two incidents by this stage?

5 A. That's right, yes.

6 Q. And at least one of them, you had heard, involved an

7 explosion?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 Q. How long did it take you to get there?

10 A. Well, we just travelled on two-tones and blue lights

11 from Victoria Embankment, I would have said it probably

12 wouldn't have taken us more than about five minutes.

13 Q. Before I ask you about your arrival, Mr Hay, my Lady --

14 Mr Dixey's labours have found in the extraordinarily

15 long CAD message that relates to this call a reference

16 to RX501, which is Ranger 501 which is you?

17 A. Ranger 501 is our call sign, yes, or was.

18 Q. And a message at 09.17.17:

19 "LFB fire and explosion at above train station.

20 There is already a major incident. Not known."

21 So it looks as if there is a reference to a call

22 from you or to you at 9.17?

23 A. That would sound about right, yes.

24 Q. On your arrival, do you recall whether there were other

25 emergency services already present?

1 A. As far as I can recollect, I'm sure there were -- there
2 definitely were ambulance crews there, and I think --
3 I think there was at least one fire engine there.

4 Q. Might you be mistaken about that?

5 A. It is possible. I can be certain about ambulance,
6 definitely.

7 Q. That's fine. Could you see whether there were
8 passengers or members of the public who had been injured
9 in any way?

10 A. As we turned up, we drove into -- I think it's
11 Chapel Street. We all sort of got out the car and
12 pretty much did our own thing, I would say.
13 There were people coming up through the ticket
14 office. Initially, we -- well, certainly, I can only
15 speak for myself, I had a look round, I think Dave had
16 gone off and Matt had gone off and we were all literally
17 doing our own thing and I sort of -- how, I couldn't
18 tell you, but I became aware that there was a triage
19 centre had already been set up in Marks & Spencers which
20 was fairly close by.

21 Q. In Chapel Street?

22 A. In Chapel Street, yes. I'm pretty sure -- I know
23 I didn't put it in my statement, but I'm pretty sure
24 I got the first aid kit out of the back of the car and,
25 although I got that out, astonishing as it may seem,

1 I don't actually recall having to give anyone first aid
2 but I do remember taking a first aid kit out. Whether
3 I had it with me when I came across the first casualties
4 that I made contact with, I don't recall, or whether
5 I just put it down.

6 There was a lady who had come up -- there was
7 a stream of people coming up, a lot who weren't injured,
8 obviously. There was this one lady who looked
9 particularly distressed and there was another lady
10 I think had her arm around her, and I went up to her and
11 spoke to her, and I think she said her name was Abby,
12 and it looked to me as though she had some sort of --
13 sort of burns to her face, not severe ones, but it
14 looked as though there were some burns on her face.
15 I said to her, "Do you know what's happened?", and
16 she seemed to think that two trains had collided, and
17 I said, "Okay, fine". I then thought the best thing was
18 to get her as quickly as I could into the triage area,
19 which I did.

20 The other lady was obviously -- had built up a bit
21 of a rapport with her and I said to her, would she mind,
22 as she'd helped her up the train, staying with her
23 until, you know, she was in proper medical sort of hands
24 and she said, yes, that was fine.

25 Q. So there was already, as you told us, a rudimentary

1 triage system being set up?

2 A. There was, yes, yes.

3 Q. Do you recollect whether there was any kind of control
4 being operated over the arrival or exit of people at the
5 top of the station? Was there a log being kept?

6 A. There was a loggist. There was -- I'm pretty sure there
7 was a British Transport Police officer. I hadn't
8 actually got down onto the platform yet, so I hadn't
9 given him my details, because I do remember at some
10 stage I had to go and move my car because a fire
11 engine -- and where I parked the car, the fire engine
12 couldn't get by because of other vehicles and I do
13 recall at one stage having to go back to the car and
14 moving it out the way.

15 The control bit, when I -- I think I went down onto
16 the platform probably once or twice and certainly, the
17 first time I went down, I gave in my number.

18 Q. So there was somebody already keeping a log of who was
19 going in and out?

20 A. A log had already been started. As I said, I'm
21 90 per cent sure it was a British Transport Police
22 officer.

23 Q. When you arrived and you saw the injured, what was your
24 priority?

25 A. Initially, to obviously -- most people that I could see

1 had either already had treatment, because they had
2 bandages on them, so I assumed from that that the
3 paramedics were already down on the station or down on
4 the train or certainly down on the platform, as a lot of
5 the people who were injured seemed to have already been
6 treated.

7 It was really trying to direct them into the triage
8 area for them to then be dealt with for the next phase
9 of their medication or whatever procedure they needed to
10 undertake.

11 Q. Then did you realise that Mr Hill was no longer with
12 you?

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 Q. Your colleague.

15 A. Yes, I'd lost track of Dave and, bearing in mind I could
16 see Matt, because Matt was still above ground with me
17 and he was also similarly doing what I was doing, trying
18 to get people into the triage area.

19 Q. Matt Giles?

20 A. Matt Giles, that's right, sorry, apologies. Dave, in
21 the meantime, had disappeared, and I'd gone down,
22 I think, as far as the platform and still couldn't see
23 Dave.

24 Q. Why had you gone down?

25 A. Well, I was a bit concerned for him, but at the same

1 time, I also wanted to see, you know, what the condition
2 was down below ground.
3 Q. To see whether you could help?
4 A. To see if I could help, absolutely.
5 Q. Had it been possible for you to radio Mr Hill?
6 A. No, absolutely not.
7 Q. From up --
8 A. I tried contacting --
9 Q. -- at ground level?
10 A. -- him on the radio and I tried phoning him.
11 Q. And?
12 A. And absolutely nothing at all.
13 Q. Was that because there was no signal or no answer?
14 A. I think the radios we had at the time were the
15 Motorolas, I can't be 100 per cent sure about that, but
16 we now have a system called the Airwave system.
17 Q. The TETRA-based CONNECT project?
18 A. That's right. I'm not even -- since then, I've not had
19 to -- obviously I now work in a borough right on the
20 outskirts of London, so we tend not to go in the
21 Underground, and I've not had any experience of whether
22 or not the Airwaves work, but certainly the radios we
23 had at the time did not work underground at all.
24 Q. So you were unable to contact Mr Hill?
25 A. That's right, yes.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was the mobile phone problem no
2 signal?
3 A. Whatever it was, I just couldn't get through, I just
4 assumed, because Dave was underground -- I assumed he
5 was underground by then, because I wasn't able to get
6 hold of him.
7 MR KEITH: On the way down to the tracks, you no doubt saw
8 a number of London Underground employees --
9 A. That's right, yes.
10 Q. -- evacuating, detraining, the two trains?
11 A. That's right, yes.
12 Q. Did anything strike you about the way in which they were
13 carrying out that operation?
14 A. It seemed to me to be extremely efficient. There was no
15 panic at all, which I found remarkable, from either
16 staff or passengers coming off the trains. They seemed
17 to have -- whether it was coincidence or it was my
18 perception of it, they seemed to have a defined route
19 for people going towards the trains and another one for
20 them coming off the trains so that you didn't have this
21 big sort of bundle of people all bumping into one
22 another.
23 Q. Was it in a daisy chain, so that there was --
24 A. It was almost, yes.
25 Q. -- a number of members of staff standing --

1 A. I mean, people were coming off, it was like a big queue
2 of people coming off the trains. As I said, the vast
3 majority of people weren't actually injured, but they
4 did -- a lot of people were covered in soot, I noticed,
5 a lot of their faces were all covered in soot.

6 Q. You went down, we understand from your witness
7 statement, with your colleague, Mr Giles, but as you
8 approached the trains, did you both decide that he would
9 go back up to ground level and you would carry on to
10 look for Mr Hill and to offer your assistance?

11 A. That's right, yes, because obviously, normally, we'd try
12 to maintain control with our own control room, and if
13 we're all underground, obviously that wouldn't be
14 possible because of the problems with the radios.

15 So Matt decided he'd go back upstairs, back to the
16 street level, and at least then, if they tried to get
17 hold of us, he would be a linchpin and, if necessary, he
18 could come down and tell us if it was anything urgent.
19 So Matt went back up to the surface.

20 Q. As you approached the trains, did you see somebody on
21 the ground in front of the right-hand -- that's to say
22 the eastbound -- train?

23 A. I did, sadly, yes, there was the body of a lady. She'd
24 been covered, someone had -- to protect her dignity,
25 someone had covered her face, her top half of her body.

1 I think I could obviously tell it was a lady probably
2 from the clothing. She was clearly dead.
3 I then looked down the length of the trains and
4 could see that they'd sort of overlapped one another,
5 and I think the train where the bomb had gone off was
6 about two or three carriages in front of the other --
7 they'd stopped sort of askew of one another and they
8 looked as though there was this massive -- as if a giant
9 had sort of punched a hole through the roof of the --
10 which was obviously where the site of the explosion was.

11 Q. Yes. Did you board --

12 A. I then got on the train. There was a ladder --

13 Q. Which one did you get on?

14 A. The bombed train I got on to.

15 Q. The westbound, left-hand side train?

16 A. If you say it's the westbound, I don't know, it's
17 definitely the train that the bomb had gone off on.
18 I couldn't tell in which direction it was going.

19 Q. There was a ladder at the end the train for to you climb
20 up?

21 A. That's right, into the driver's compartment. I got on
22 to the train. The first couple of carriages there, all
23 the seats were up. There was lighting, this was what
24 I was a bit surprised about, there was lighting or
25 certainly, when I went on to it, there was lighting in

1 the carriages on both trains. There were sniffer dogs
2 going up and down and all the seats had been raised,
3 presumably so that the sniffer dogs can check out for
4 any secondary devices.

5 Q. In fact, my Lady has heard to reveal catches for trying
6 to open the doors as well.

7 A. That's right, that's right, yes.

8 Q. Do you know what time that was, because it's unclear to
9 us so far what time police officers boarded with sniffer
10 dogs?

11 A. The timespan, I'm afraid, I cannot be specific with at
12 all. It's one -- it's one of those situations where
13 sometimes time stands still, sometimes it just flies by.
14 I honestly couldn't give you any specific time.

15 Q. It's obvious that there were other police officers on
16 the train before you --

17 A. Yes, there were.

18 Q. -- hence the sniffer dogs.

19 A. There were police officers on the train. I know there
20 were some local officers from the local area because of
21 their shoulder numbers. I think there was a British
22 Transport Police officer, there was quite a few
23 paramedics, and there were firemen as well at this
24 stage.

25 Q. You're certain by this stage that you saw firemen there?

1 A. Yes, yes, because they -- I think they -- initially,
2 I was helping to try to get some of the casualties out
3 on stretchers, and it was extremely difficult, with the
4 uprights on the train, trying to manoeuvre stretchers
5 with people on them without tilting it, which obviously
6 some of them could have major injuries, so obviously the
7 less movement the better.

8 And I'm sure some of the firemen managed to prise
9 open -- whether it was a fireman, but there were
10 certainly firemen there, they managed to prise open one
11 of the doors so that we were then able to put the
12 stretchers out through the doors as opposed to taking
13 them through the driver's compartment, which I think is
14 what had been happening up until then.

15 Q. Which would have required you to go all the way down the
16 train --

17 A. That's right yes.

18 Q. -- and manoeuvre round the narrow confines of the cab
19 out of the door?

20 A. That's right, yes.

21 Q. Did you assist with the evacuation of one or two of the
22 casualties whom you encountered in the course of your
23 progress down the train?

24 A. That's right, yes. My role really, I suppose, at this
25 stage, was just a stretcher bearer, I would say, really,

1 because a lot of the casualties had obviously been
2 treated by the paramedics or by the ambulance crews,
3 anyway.

4 Q. I think one of the casualties you helped was an American
5 lady whose name you recalled to be Katy?

6 A. That was a slightly later on, because after we got two
7 or three persons out from the actual site of the
8 explosion, I then went into the carriage where the
9 explosion had actually gone off in, and there I met
10 Dave, and so I thought, right, "I've found Dave, thank
11 goodness, at last", and as I went into the carriage,
12 well, I mean, it was just a scene of total carnage.

13 Thankfully, I suppose, from my own point of view,
14 I wasn't actually in it for long, so I didn't have too
15 long to look around and see the total devastation, but
16 what I did see was quite mind-numbing. There were
17 certainly some body parts and stuff like that on --
18 lying on the footwell and stuff like that.

19 Q. Did you, in fact, yourself, see -- were you able to see
20 the location of the deceased passengers inside the
21 carriage?

22 A. No, that's -- I didn't see any of the bodies of any of
23 the persons that were deceased at all. All I did see
24 appeared to be sort of body parts that were just lying
25 on the floor. I mean, the whole carriage looked to me

1 as though it was a lot of sort of -- blood-spattered and
2 stuff like that, as you would expect with an explosion
3 like that.

4 And then I think, not long after I had gone in the
5 carriage, someone on the other train says, "Oh, we need
6 some help over here getting people off on stretchers",
7 and I then went through the -- I don't think I went
8 through the site of the explosion, but I think there
9 must have been a door open adjacent to the train next to
10 it, and I think I went through on to the other train
11 from there. I'm pretty sure there was a sergeant there.
12 I don't know -- I think he was probably one of the local
13 sergeants from the local division, if my memory serves
14 me correctly.

15 Q. Can I ask you one or two things about your recollection
16 of the bombed carriage, if I may?

17 A. Sure.

18 Q. Firstly, was it your impression that, by the time you
19 got there, those persons who needed assistance --
20 casualties who were still alive -- were receiving
21 assistance?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Because the stretcher process and the removal of
24 casualties had already -- was well progressed by the
25 time you arrived?

1 A. That's correct. I mean, the paramedics had obviously
2 triaged all the people that needed to be stretchered out
3 and, to my knowledge, certainly on the train -- when
4 I went into the bombed carriage, everyone who could be
5 saved had been saved, basically, or they'd done the best
6 they could for the passengers that were severely injured
7 at that stage.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. To my knowledge, they would have still been in -- if
10 there were still people that were alive and needed their
11 help, then the medics would have still been in there
12 with them.

13 Q. That leads on to the second question, which is this: did
14 you, at any stage, gain any impression as to whether or
15 not the paramedics and those who were attending to those
16 who had been saved and could be saved had sufficient
17 equipment?

18 A. Well, certainly --

19 Q. Were there calls for further material, further IV lines,
20 further saline bags and so on, or not?

21 A. I remember at least one passenger coming out with some
22 form of drip on, and obviously oxygen, because, with
23 carrying some of the stretchers, it was very heavy,
24 because I think they had the oxygen cylinders on them
25 with them, but I remember, I do recall, at least one

1 passenger had some form of IV drip into his arm --
2 I think it was a gentleman, actually, but obviously they
3 had masks on, so it was -- to my -- well, I mean, how
4 much equipment can you possibly get -- you know, you
5 could never have enough equipment for something like
6 that, I don't think. It was just unbelievable. So --
7 Q. I was less concerned with addressing the policy issue of
8 how much equipment might in theory be needed, more
9 concerned rather with whether you recollect any calls
10 for equipment. Nobody shouted out, "We need an IV line
11 now" or "We need a saline bag now", there was nothing
12 like that?
13 A. No, from what I could see, everything that they could
14 have done had been done.
15 Q. Over this period of time, do you have any recollection
16 of how long you were down in the area of the two trains?
17 A. No, I think I spent more time above ground possibly than
18 I did --
19 Q. Helping with the casualties?
20 A. Yes, than I did below ground, but, I mean, to put
21 a timespan on it, I couldn't say. I could only tell
22 you, obviously, from roughly the time when we got there
23 and obviously the time I think when we left, when we
24 would have informed our control room, I could just -- it
25 would have been within that timespan.

1 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Bird, will you stay
2 there? There may be some further questions for you.
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher? Mr Saunders?
4 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hill?
6 Questions by MR HILL
7 MR HILL: Just a little more on timing, please.
8 You referred to hearing messages coming across the
9 police radio channel asking for more assistance and you
10 referred to a female voice. I suggest, my Lady, that
11 may have been PC Nancie Powell, WPC Nancie Powell. I'm
12 not going to ask that it's brought up on screen, but for
13 your notes, INQ10114 is a CAD message with the
14 number 2495, which indicates that that officer -- whose
15 number is 414DM, which makes her a Marylebone officer,
16 radioed in at 9.17.46:
17 "Explosion in Edgware Road."
18 And at 9.18.26, the same officer radioed in:
19 "One ambulance crew on scene. More required."
20 Officer, that may have been the female voice that
21 you were hearing on the radio.
22 Insofar as you were concerned, could we bring up on
23 screen, please, [INQ10115-4]? It's one of the pages of
24 the -- a different CAD printout that Mr Keith was
25 referring to earlier.

1 On that page, we should be able to identify your
2 call sign, which is Ranger 501, which shows as RX501 in
3 the middle of that page at 9.22.53, up a little,
4 9.22.53, those two entries, and then one further entry
5 at 09.24.20:

6 "Accepted by RX501, unit shown assigned."

7 Officer, I know you've already told us that, in
8 making your eventual statement, you had access to CAD
9 messages. Does that appear sensible to you --

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. -- that you may have heard messages at around 9.17,
12 9.18, you were then effectively tasked between 9.22 and
13 9.23 and by 9.24 you had accepted the task and were on
14 way?

15 A. That sounds about right, sir, yes.

16 Q. As you've told us, being part of a diplomatic protection
17 group, it was not your remit, not your duty, that day to
18 respond to a call such as this?

19 A. That's right, that's right.

20 Q. Appreciating the seriousness, you did. Did you make
21 progress, in police terms? Did you travel fast from
22 your location to Edgware Road?

23 A. Well, we used the blue lights and two-tones to get
24 there, certainly, yes.

25 Q. So would it follow from that, that leaving

1 Victoria Embankment or thereabouts at about 9.23, 9.24,
2 would that have you on scene at Edgware Road about 9.30?

3 A. I would say that's about right, sir, yes.

4 Q. Perhaps it's difficult for the normal traveller, but in
5 your police vehicle, you could get there within ten
6 minutes comfortably?

7 A. Easily, I would say, yes.

8 Q. Right. On arrival, it was plain, is this right, that
9 there were other officers already on scene and, in
10 particular, British Transport Police officers?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Ambulance crew and Fire Brigade?

13 A. Well, I am certain there was an ambulance there, and
14 I thought that there was a fire engine as well, but you
15 know, I can't be 100 per cent about that. But
16 definitely there was definitely an ambulance crew there.

17 Q. All right. Was there a general request made of you on
18 arrival to help casualties?

19 A. There -- part of it was just -- we just -- you know, it
20 was obvious what needed to be done.

21 There was -- I remember at some stage, whether it
22 was when we were leaving or whether it was initially at
23 that first stage when we arrived, I remember there was
24 a chief inspector just outside the station ticket
25 office, and I think he was -- he may have been with an

1 inspector, whether he was the Silver or the Gold for the
2 day. He was definitely there when we left. Whether he
3 was there when we arrived, I don't recall.

4 Q. From which police force?

5 A. The Metropolitan Police, I would say.

6 Q. So certainly there on departure, not sure on arrival?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 Q. But on arrival, we are sure -- is this right -- that the
9 Transport Police were there?

10 A. The loggist, the officer that was keeping the log, I'm
11 90 per cent sure was British Transport Police.

12 Q. Right. Having arrived, having seen the situation above
13 ground on arrival, was there any other or higher
14 priority than assisting the injured?

15 A. Well, obviously, there's -- people were coming up and
16 leaving and, I mean, this is a crime scene now, and
17 you're losing hundreds, probably, of witnesses. With
18 your policeman head on you're thinking, "These people
19 are probably potential witnesses for a massive crime
20 that's taken place here". Then you go into rescue mode
21 and you think, "What's the main priority at this
22 stage?", and obviously that took the main priority, was
23 making sure people were safe.

24 Q. Thank you. That then, ultimately, took you below ground
25 and on to the damaged train. Being part of -- if I call

1 it a stretcher party, you understand what I mean?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Being one of those officers involved in assisting with

4 the removal of the casualties, the seriously injured,

5 would it be right to say that there were also local

6 officers whom you would identify as being Marylebone

7 and/or Paddington officers who were part of that

8 stretcher party?

9 A. Yes, I would say so, and I think there might even have

10 been at least one British Transport Police officer as

11 well, but I can't be certain of that.

12 Q. Identifiable by their shoulder numbers?

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 Q. For what it's worth --

15 A. And one was a woman police constable as well.

16 Q. Right. DM being the marker for Marylebone?

17 A. That's right, yes, sir.

18 Q. DP being the marker for Paddington?

19 A. That's right, sir, yes.

20 Q. Right. You've told us then the assistance you gave

21 below ground. I just want to clarify this with you.

22 Upon leaving the scene, did you return to normal duties?

23 A. We did, yes. I mean, it was absolute mayhem, to be

24 perfectly honest, and I don't think -- I mean, Dave

25 had -- I know we had to go back because Dave had a quite

1 severely bloodstained shirt.

2 Q. That's PC Hill.

3 A. PC Hill, yes, and we had to go back, because obviously
4 he couldn't carry on with that, so he had to go and get
5 changed and obviously that was going to become
6 forensics, an exhibit. But then, after that, rightly or
7 wrongly, we then maintained our normal patrol.

8 Q. I don't want to bring it up on screen, but the INQ
9 reference for my Lady's note would be INQ9774. That is
10 the pocket book entry that you made of events that day.
11 That would show -- is this right -- that certainly by
12 1.10 that afternoon, you were in the course of your
13 normal duties and making pocketbook entries about
14 entirely unrelated events?

15 A. That's right, yes.

16 Q. You then had the first opportunity to make notes as to
17 what had happened when you were diverted to
18 Edgware Road, those notes being made at 16.10, so
19 10 past 4 that afternoon?

20 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

21 MR HILL: Thank you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for PC Bird?

23 Thank you very much, PC Bird. People always expect
24 a police officer to go to assist those in trouble, but
25 you didn't have to that day, so thank you for all the

1 help you tried to give to the seriously injured, and
2 thank you for assisting me.

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call PC Hill.

4 PC DAVID HILL (sworn)

5 Questions by MR KEITH

6 A. My Lady I'm Police Constable David Hill. I'm currently
7 attached to Tower Hamlets Borough, but at the time of
8 the incident I was attached to the diplomatic protection
9 group, Central London.

10 MR KEITH: You were in a diplomatic protection group vehicle
11 with PC Bird and PC Giles?

12 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

13 Q. You were on Victoria Embankment, as we've just heard --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- when you started to hear over the radio messages
16 concerning an incident, what turned out to be an
17 explosion, firstly at Aldgate and then at Edgware Road?

18 A. The first ones to Aldgate, yes, we certainly heard
19 those, and then the messages began to indicate that it
20 was believed a power surge had basically leapt across
21 London and caused an explosion at Edgware Road.

22 Q. Would it be fair to say that that left you with
23 a somewhat confused understanding of what might have
24 happened?

25 A. Yes, to be honest, sir, we were trying to work out what

1 was going on. Obviously, trying to tune in to all the
2 radios. Obviously, we've got the main set in the car,
3 a DPG radio, and, as I was sitting in the back, I also
4 had a third radio that would link in to local police
5 stations and I was trying to tune that in to
6 Edgware Road to see what was going on there.

7 Q. Do you recall a time when you heard a radio message from
8 an officer who was actually at Edgware Road, WPC Powell,
9 asking for help from any local units or any units
10 nearby?

11 A. I certainly don't know the name of the officer, sir, but
12 there were calls for assistance for Edgware Road, yes.

13 Q. When you arrived -- we've just heard from Mr Bird that
14 you made good progress to Edgware Road -- was there
15 already a cordon and a casualty evacuation area or
16 a triage area established?

17 A. As soon as we arrived, I saw a police officer, a male
18 police officer, stood outside the entrance to the
19 station with a clipboard or a book, so I assumed that
20 was the loggist there, and I went straight to him and
21 gave him our call sign and our shoulder numbers.

22 Q. And offered to help?

23 A. Well, yes, just -- yes.

24 Q. "What can we do?"

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Did he know what had happened?

2 A. He said to me that, "It's believed there's a bomb gone
3 off".

4 Q. We know from the computer-aided dispatch record what
5 time you accepted the invitation to go to Edgware and
6 what time, therefore, you were assigned to go. But do
7 you recall what time you arrived?

8 A. Not exactly, sir, no. But --

9 Q. Roughly?

10 A. -- as soon as the calls started to come out to
11 Edgware Road, although obviously we needed to be
12 assigned, we'd already started making our way there. We
13 were already travelling towards Edgware Road.

14 Q. So a matter of a few minutes more?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You were therefore told there was a bomb, and did you
17 immediately start speaking to the casualties, the
18 passengers, who were coming up from beneath the station?

19 A. Yes, sir, as soon as we got in, there were people
20 sitting around on the floor.

21 Q. What was your main concern?

22 A. Secondary device.

23 Q. A secondary device?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Why, Officer, if I may ask, was that such an important

1 concern to you?

2 A. Because it would be put where we are and because we were
3 all sitting there waiting for it.

4 Q. It's quite hard to hear.

5 A. Sorry.

6 Q. Could I ask you to keep your voice up, if you wouldn't
7 mind, Mr Hill?

8 A. Sorry.

9 Q. Is this because of your professional experience, if
10 there is a bomb, there's been some explosive device,
11 terrorist-related, there is always present the risk of
12 a secondary device?

13 A. Yes, sir, it's happened in the past, a secondary device
14 would be where you're setting up your RV normally,
15 your -- where you're setting up your --

16 Q. Rendezvous?

17 A. -- rendezvous point, that's where it would be, so
18 I didn't want people sitting around in here, inside the
19 station, waiting for the second explosion to go off, if
20 there was one.

21 Q. Obviously, there were a great deal -- many, many people
22 coming out of the platform area at the station and up to
23 ground level and coming out of the front entrance?

24 A. Yes, yes, sir.

25 Q. So they were all in the area that you feared might have

1 been an area for a possible secondary device?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. What did you decide to do?
4 A. Well, we took our first aid kit in with us. I spoke to
5 a couple of people just trying to confirm what had
6 happened, and it was quite obvious to them what had
7 happened, that a bomb had gone off.
8 We started to break out the first aid kit. Murray
9 and Matt started doing first aid on some people, so
10 I just went in. Sorry.
11 Q. That's quite all right, Mr Hill.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Take your time. It's a very
13 distressing experience for everybody, so please don't
14 feel in any way embarrassed.
15 MR KEITH: You went in to help, to move people along,
16 perhaps, and to get them out of the scene and to see
17 what you could do?
18 A. Yes, sir, just trying to encourage people to keep
19 moving, get out, get out of the station, if possible.
20 Q. Get away?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. There were obviously members of the
23 London Underground --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- present in the station and on the platforms. Do you

1 recollect them as you went down?

2 A. Only in speaking to them. I first spoke to some staff
3 at the ticket barrier, where they were herding people
4 out, and I asked them what had happened. They obviously
5 said "It's a bomb".

6 Q. Did the system that was already in existence seem to you
7 to be well-organised?

8 A. Yes, sir, very. It was --

9 Q. Was there a clear pattern of people being brought out?

10 A. I was really surprised how good it was. Everyone seemed
11 to know what they were doing. It was calm, people were
12 being moved.

13 Q. Did one of them tell you that, not only were there
14 severely wounded on the train, but that there had been
15 fatalities?

16 A. Yes, quite a few, I think he said.

17 Q. You carried on, undaunted, towards the trains.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Why was that?

20 A. Because I was there.

21 Q. Quite so. As you approached the trains, was there
22 somebody lying on the track in front of what would have
23 appeared to you to have been the right-hand train?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. The westbound train?

1 A. A lady.

2 Q. The lady. Was it apparent to you that she was beyond
3 all help?

4 A. Yes, definitely, sir.

5 Q. When you approached, can you recall whether she was
6 covered?

7 A. She wasn't, no.

8 Q. She wasn't covered?

9 A. No, sir.

10 Q. All right. May we presume that you didn't delay because
11 it was apparent that there was nothing you could have
12 done for her?

13 A. It was obvious to me that she was dead, sir, and I just
14 knew that there was other people inside the train and,
15 with hindsight, it would have been nice to have stopped
16 and done something to cover her, but I had to get in
17 there.

18 Q. Did you go on to one or other of the trains, or did you
19 try to walk down between them?

20 A. To start off with, sir, I walked between the two trains.
21 I could see the one on the right had the lights on, the
22 one on the left didn't, so I climbed between the two
23 trains, walked down between the two of them, looking
24 underneath, seeing if there was a way I could get into
25 that train.

1 Q. Because not all the doors -- the doors were shut,
2 obviously?

3 A. Yes, sir, yes, I think so, and to see if there was
4 anyone else either under the train or near the train
5 that I could help.

6 Q. Did you come to a carriage that had obviously been
7 damaged?

8 A. Yes, sir. It was obviously -- it was blown outwards.
9 It was quite obvious what had happened, and I knew
10 that's where I needed to get into.

11 Q. Did you go into the carriage?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. As you entered the carriage, did you go through the
14 doors into the bombed carriage itself, from the side, or
15 did you go through the interconnecting door from the
16 carriage before, carriage 3?

17 A. No, from the middle of the two trains, I climbed up into
18 the carriage before the bombed carriage because there
19 was a door open there, and I went through to the other
20 side to the wall side, and then I climbed down between
21 the wall and the train and climbed along the train
22 towards the -- and that's where I first saw two people.

23 Q. Were they alive or dead?

24 A. Both alive.

25 Q. Was there a lady who'd suffered very severe leg

1 injuries?

2 A. Yes, sir, when I climbed down from the train on to the
3 tracks, I looked down and I could see a man stood there
4 with his back against the wall and he had a pair of
5 woman's legs over his shoulder supporting her legs,
6 I couldn't see her straightaway, and I went forward, and
7 he said, "Thank goodness, the police are here", so
8 I looked round to see who he was talking to and it was
9 me.

10 Q. He was helping the lady and giving rudimentary aid to
11 her?

12 A. Sorry, yes.

13 Q. Were they at the end of the carriage, do you recall?

14 A. I couldn't tell you, to be perfectly honest, sir,
15 I can't remember exactly where they were. I just
16 remember getting to him and she was sat on the floor,
17 she was obviously in a great deal of pain, and --

18 Q. At this stage, were you still outside or --

19 A. Outside.

20 Q. Trying to get along the outside of the carriage and
21 looking in?

22 A. I was outside at this point, because I had to deal with
23 these two people before I could get further in.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. And he said to me, "If you could help me get her up,

1 I can get her out."

2 Q. So what did you do?

3 A. I got -- I think I climbed in, and we basically scooped
4 her up and -- I think then some -- a member of the
5 Underground staff turned up and I just got this
6 Underground staff and this guy to take her out.

7 Q. Were they able to get her out of the side of the
8 carriage?

9 A. I think they went through the carriage, I think they
10 went through the carriage.

11 Q. Through the interconnecting door?

12 A. I think so.

13 Q. Now, I must ask you about what else you saw in the
14 carriage, Mr Hill. When she left the carriage, being
15 helped out by the member of London Underground, did you
16 see that there were a number of deceased passengers on
17 the floor and, in one case, in the seat of the carriage?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Can you help us, firstly, in general terms, with where
20 they were in the carriage or is it now impossible to
21 remember?

22 A. I think I couldn't get through the middle of the
23 carriage, so I had to go back outside and move down
24 between the wall and the carriage again, and then
25 I climbed back up into the carriage immediately in front

1 of where the hole was in the ground.

2 Q. Thank you. That's very helpful. Could we have

3 [INQ10282-9], please, on the screen?

4 That is the bombed carriage, the second carriage.

5 You were approaching from the left-hand side?

6 A. Yes, sir, I think --

7 Q. Sorry, from the --

8 A. From the bottom, if you're looking at it like this.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Towards door D4.

11 Q. I think we may be at cross-purposes. Just to get our

12 bearings, the upper side of the picture would be where

13 the other train was, and the bottom side of the picture

14 in fact was the tunnel wall.

15 A. Sorry, yes.

16 Q. So you were approaching and must have approached from

17 the upper side of this diagram, as it were, and the

18 front of the train, of the bombed train, is to the left

19 of the diagram and the rear is to the right. So you

20 must have approached --

21 A. Yes, possibly, sir. I can't remember 100 per cent.

22 I know I was between the carriage and the wall when

23 I was climbing along, if that helps at all.

24 Q. It does help, you were between the carriage and the

25 tunnel wall --

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. -- when you were climbing in, not between the two
3 trains?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. Right. I understand. So you must have been approaching
6 then from the bottom of this diagram. Do you recall
7 which set of double doors you climbed in? You thought
8 it was near the hole. The hole is where the red mark
9 is.

10 A. As I climbed up into the carriage, I could see the hole
11 right in front of me.

12 Q. Did it extend down the length of the carriage alongside
13 the bank of seats and into the standing area ordinarily
14 that there would have been?

15 A. Towards the standing area, to my left, because
16 I remember there were seats and a man still to the right
17 with his head toward the hole.

18 Q. Was that the person that you subsequently discovered was
19 called Dave, David?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. David Gardner, all right. Was there somebody in the
22 hole, Mr Hill, do you recall?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Was he dead?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. In your statement, you state -- of course, it was much
2 nearer the time -- that you could see at least three
3 deceased passengers.

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Do you recollect where they were?

6 A. As I was stood at the door, they were to the other side
7 of the carriage. So it would have been towards doors D3
8 and D1, between there. I think two of them were
9 certainly over towards D1, and the other one was where
10 seat, I think, 3 or 4 may have been. But it is
11 difficult to tell because of the condition of the inside
12 of the carriage.

13 Q. Of course. Was there anything about the persons that
14 you saw that indicated that they were alive?

15 A. No, sir. Nothing.

16 Q. If there had been any signs of life or any movement or
17 breathing, may we take it that you would have made
18 further enquiries, gone closer to them to see whether
19 there was anything you could have done to help?

20 A. Yes, sir, I did check -- I don't know if it's in my
21 statement, actually, but at one point, I did leave
22 David Gardner with another man while I went off and
23 checked to see if there was anyone else alive, and there
24 wasn't, and I came back to David and I think the chap's
25 name's Jason.

1 Q. Is he the man with no shirt?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Do you recollect going down towards the end of the
4 carriage when you made that check?

5 A. Yes, sir, I think so.

6 Q. Did you touch or attempt to feel any of the passengers
7 who were lying on the floor or was it apparent, when you
8 went down there, further down the carriage, that they
9 were indeed dead as you feared?

10 A. I don't remember touching any of them, sir. A couple of
11 them were lying on their side faced away from me, and
12 I kind of got around and looked at them and they were
13 obviously dead already.

14 Q. You helped David Gardner because, with the help of
15 another person, you applied, I think, a makeshift
16 bandage to one of his injuries and you may indeed have
17 succeeded in stemming the loss of blood.

18 A. There was already a makeshift bandage on there, but it
19 wasn't very tight, and it was quite loose when I felt
20 it, so I only had one bandage with me and I had lost
21 that climbing through the train, so I didn't really have
22 anything with me, so we just tightened up what was
23 already there and just tried to pad a bit more clothing
24 that we'd found on the floor, just pad a bit more
25 clothing in. But it was difficult -- I had a torch

1 that -- the batteries had run out by this point and,
2 although you could feel blood, you couldn't see where it
3 was coming from. It was very difficult to find out
4 where it was coming from.

5 Q. You'd obviously used your torch as you'd come through
6 the tunnel.

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. May we take it from that, on the assumption that the
9 torch wasn't a particularly old torch, the batteries
10 weren't completely dead when you turned it on, that you
11 must have used it for quite some time on the train?

12 A. Unfortunately, with the torch I was using, sir, it
13 doesn't fade like normal batteries, it lights and then
14 it just cuts out. It doesn't give you faded light. It
15 works until it dies and then it just dies within a few
16 seconds.

17 Q. Were you somewhat surprised to find that an apparently
18 working torch had --

19 A. I was very disappointed, sir.

20 Q. -- reached the end of its working life?

21 A. Yes, at that moment, yes.

22 Q. You, no doubt, spoke to Mr Gardner and reassured him and
23 tried to keep him going?

24 A. As best I could, sir, yes.

25 Q. Did you get the impression that you were forced to

1 reassure him and to help him and to give him aid for
2 quite some time before help arrived?

3 A. It really did seem a long time, but perhaps it wasn't.
4 It seemed like a very long time, and I was concerned the
5 amount of time it was taking for help to come and be
6 with us. I was quite worried about that. It may be it
7 wasn't as long as I thought it was, but it seemed a long
8 time.

9 Q. If you had a means of communicating -- and obviously we
10 know that the radios didn't work in the tunnel, and your
11 own radio wouldn't have worked -- would you have
12 attempted to try to speed up the process, to call for
13 help and to see why it wasn't yet there?

14 A. It's easy to say "Yes" when you're down there on your
15 own, but obviously I didn't know what they knew, and it
16 could have been that they knew something different to
17 what I did. If it had been a chemical incident or
18 biological, that could be why they weren't coming down.

19 Q. There may well have been a good reason.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That's for my Lady to determine.

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. But that doesn't necessarily mean that you wouldn't have
24 asked for help or tried to take steps to see where it
25 was?

1 A. I did try and ask for assistance, but the radio wasn't
2 working and my phone wasn't working.

3 Q. So you did try to use your own radio and phone?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. To see whether more help could be made available?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But, of course, it didn't work?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. After a while, you've recorded in your statement
10 a female paramedic from the London Ambulance Service did
11 arrive and she brought first aid kits with her. Do you
12 recall that?

13 A. I remember her arriving. She came down -- I was between
14 David and the -- I was leaning on a set of seats to my
15 right and she -- I didn't see where she came from, but
16 she turned up in front of us and started to try to put
17 a drip into David's arm, and she asked me to hold the
18 sticky plaster while she was putting it in.

19 Q. Your torch had died?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So how could you see what you were doing?

22 A. Just through ambient light, as best we could.

23 Q. Were you aware of members of the Fire Brigade arriving?

24 A. After that, yes, sir, but it was a short while after
25 that.

1 Q. So the first arrival was the lady paramedic, followed,
2 after that, by the Fire Brigade?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Do you have a memory or an impression of other people --
5 perhaps other paramedics -- being inside the carriage
6 helping with the wounded?

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. So there was yourself and Mr Gardner and Mr Rennie, the
9 gentleman with no shirt?

10 A. There was definitely other people in there. I could
11 hear a woman crying out. I could hear people talking.
12 But there was no panic as such. I could just hear
13 voices. But to be perfectly honest, I just wanted to
14 concentrate on Mr Gardner, because he was still alive
15 and I thought he wouldn't be for long.

16 Q. Did his condition deteriorate, as far as you were able
17 to see, in the time that you were there with him?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Again, did that concern you, because that must have
20 taken place over some amount of time?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. When the Fire Brigade arrived, did you tell them what
23 you had seen in terms of your ability to assess whether
24 there were some people who were still alive and where
25 they were, but others tragically deceased?

1 A. I think I recall I said to -- there was a fireman called
2 Tom who came to speak to me, and I said to him, "I've
3 been forward and I think everyone's dead forward of
4 here", and he went off. I didn't see him again, so
5 I don't know what happened to him, but I would imagine
6 he went forward and looked for survivors too.

7 Q. Did you help with removal of David, David Gardner, from
8 the carriage?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. How was he taken out?

11 A. Eventually, a stretcher was brought in from the
12 undamaged -- or the -- away from the bomb scene towards
13 the undamaged end of the carriage. A stretcher was
14 brought in with a blanket and we got David on to the
15 stretcher, because I remember having to hold this bag up
16 while it was being -- while he was being strapped to the
17 stretcher, and then he was carried out.

18 Q. So he was obviously given an IV line?

19 A. Yes, that's what I helped the paramedic put in.

20 Q. That was when you put the plaster on?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. In order for Mr Gardner to be moved from the carriage
23 and for, perhaps, other living casualties to be removed
24 from the carriage, was it necessary to move one or more
25 of the people who had died in order to allow the

1 Fire Brigade and those people carrying the stretchers
2 access to those who had to be taken out?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Therefore, did there come a time where one of the
5 deceased passengers had to be moved in order to allow
6 access --
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. -- to one of the living casualties?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Can you just tell us, please, where you think the person
11 was who was moved?
12 A. I think probably close to where seat number 6, door D3
13 and seat number 7 was, around that area. I can't be any
14 more specific than that, I'm afraid.
15 Q. Of course. It is obviously of great importance, of
16 great significance, to the families of the deceased to
17 know something of the last movements of their loved ones
18 and also where they died. May we take it that, when it
19 was necessary to move somebody, whomsoever it was,
20 wasn't required to be moved very far?
21 A. No, sir. I would say certainly less than a foot.
22 Q. Your statement also records, Mr Hill, how you came
23 across an American lady called Katy.
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Did you also help with moving her out of the carriage?

1 A. I tried to talk to her first, sir. She's -- she seemed
2 just to be in a trance. It looked like somebody had
3 just covered her in blood. She was covered from head to
4 toe in blood. I thought she was really badly injured,
5 but she wasn't.

6 Q. But, happily, she was able to be taken out of the
7 carriage?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Did you help carrying her stretcher out?

10 A. No, no, sir.

11 Q. Was that done by the Fire Brigade?

12 A. I think so, I don't remember. I think she sat on
13 a chair, actually, I think they wheeled her out in a car
14 with wheels on the back, but, no, I didn't go with her,
15 I stayed in the carriage.

16 Q. Were you, in fact, there in the carriage when
17 Fire Brigade officers confirmed to you that there were
18 no more living survivors left in the carriage?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Was that the time that, coincidentally, your colleague,
21 Mr Bird, appeared --

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. -- having come down to look for you and to offer his own
24 help?

25 A. By this time, I think the Fire Brigade had started

1 bringing in lights and the place was lit up and you
2 could actually see what you were doing there. It was
3 about that time everyone sort of turned up. It seemed
4 to be all at the same time. I'm sure it wasn't, but it
5 just seemed to be all at the same time.

6 Q. Then your statement records he informed you how you were
7 being tasked to attend other matters and there were
8 other bombs going off and you had to go, and so you left
9 to continue with your other duties?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Hill. Will you stay
12 there, because there may be some further questions for
13 you?

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just before I ask if there are any
15 questions, Mr Hill, is it impossible for you to give any
16 time estimates of the various stages?

17 A. My Lady, when we arrived at the station, I think
18 I pretty much went down there within a couple of minutes
19 of arriving, and I didn't come out until -- basically we
20 came out and we left and I was on the train for almost
21 all of that time. I just couldn't be certain, my Lady,
22 I'm sorry.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Now, I appreciate everything has to
24 be an estimate. You said, for example, to Mr Keith that
25 it seemed a very long time that you were waiting, and

1 you weren't sure whether it really was a very long time
2 or whether your impression was distorted.

3 A. Yes, my Lady.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is it impossible to ask you to give
5 any kind of estimate of how long you think you were
6 there, desperately waiting for help, and it didn't
7 arrive, or is --

8 A. I'd -- it would have to be a guess, my Lady. I would
9 say 15 minutes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Yes,
11 Ms Gallagher?

12 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Hill, I don't actually have any questions,
13 but I represent the bereaved families of four -- the
14 four male victims of the bomber at Edgware Road,
15 including the man of the family we believe was moved.
16 They have asked me to say that they entirely
17 understand the urgency of the need to move dead bodies
18 and the situation you found yourself in, to give
19 priority to the living and allow access for crews. So
20 they have asked me to say that to you. They very much
21 understand why you had to do what you did and they are
22 grateful for it.

23 All the families are grateful for you checking the
24 people that you saw in the carriage to check that they
25 were dead. It's reassuring to them that you took that

1 step and it reassures them there was nothing more that
2 could have been done for their loved ones, and for that
3 they thank you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher.

5 Mr Saunders?

6 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Ms Boyd?

8 Questions by MS BOYD

9 MS BOYD: Yes, Officer, can I ask you a couple of questions
10 on behalf of the London Fire Brigade?

11 When you spoke with the firefighter whom you
12 understood was called Tom, were you aware of other
13 firefighters at that stage --

14 A. Yes, ma'am.

15 Q. -- in and around the carriage?

16 A. With him, yes.

17 Q. I think you say in your statement that Tom, in fact,
18 asked you if anyone had looked under the train. Do you
19 remember that?

20 A. I think I do, ma'am, yes.

21 Q. I think he then went to check under the train. That's
22 what you say in your statement.

23 A. Yes, he walked off to my left, which would have been
24 towards the front of the train. Where he went from
25 there, I couldn't say.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 Just finally, you told us that the Fire Brigade,
3 having arrived, you were aware that they brought in
4 lights, and it became much easier to see.

5 A. Yes, ma'am.

6 Q. Was that at about the time that Katy Benton was still
7 being treated or taken off the carriage, or can't you
8 say?

9 A. The lights were there by the time I went to speak to
10 her, so it would have been just before, I would imagine.
11 I remember getting a clear view of her.

12 MS BOYD: Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hill?

14 Questions by MR HILL

15 MR HILL: It's obvious from the evidence you've given that
16 you had a first aid kit on board the vehicle in which
17 you were travelling that day.

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Is it right that, as part of your police training, you
20 had what's known as ELS training, emergency life support
21 training?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. That was -- that's training which has to be undertaken
24 and then updated on a regular basis, and your emergency
25 life support training was up to date and repeated so

1 that it was current in 2005?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. So you took the first aid kit with you from the vehicle.

4 You've said you can't assist as to actual timings, but
5 it would follow, would it, that if you and your vehicle
6 arrived on scene by 9.30, you would say that you were
7 downstairs and in the distressed carriage very shortly
8 after 9.30?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. The assistance that you gave to Mr David Gardner was in
11 company with a man we believe to be Mr Jason Rennie.
12 Did you simply introduce yourself by your first name,
13 "Dave"?

14 A. Yes, sir, I think I -- Dave or David, yes.

15 Q. Right. He didn't give his name to you, I don't think,
16 did he? This is the man without a shirt who was already
17 giving assistance to Mr Gardner.

18 A. He may have done, sir, but I didn't make a note of it.

19 Q. All right, but you stayed with him, if that was
20 Mr Rennie, and Mr Gardner for a period of time?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. The cross-reference for our note is Day 19 at page 23
23 and, through Mr Dixey, this officer's identity was put
24 at page 55.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

1 MR HILL: You assisted in trying to redress, by way of
2 pressure bandaging, Mr Gardner's serious injuries?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Would it also be right to say you kept Mr Gardner
5 talking?
6 A. Yes, sir, we were talking about all sorts -- I was
7 talking about anything, anything that I could think of.
8 Q. You identified an importance to that, did you?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. In the course of that, he gave his name, he even gave
11 you his date of birth, I think?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. And you talked to him for a period?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Having then given assistance as you did, and on leaving,
16 is it right that you returned to base with PC Bird,
17 changed your shirt and tunic, and then carried on with
18 normal duties?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 MR HILL: Thank you.
21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Hill?
22 PC Hill, you're a brave and dedicated police
23 officer. You were acutely conscious of the risk of
24 a secondary device. Nevertheless, as you put it,
25 "Because I was there", you went to help. I have no

1 doubt you played a significant part in saving the life
2 of Mr Gardner and possibly others. I'm sorry that I had
3 to ask you to relive the experience. Don't feel in any
4 way embarrassed about showing signs of distress. You
5 would not be human if you did not feel distress at
6 having to relive what you saw that day. So thank you
7 for coming to help me.

8 A. Thank you, ma'am.

9 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Hill. Mr Hay will read the next
10 witness statement.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Hay?

12 MR KEITH: My Lady, if I may read the statement of Anna Hare
13 dated 26 March 2006, which has the usual declaration of
14 truth.

15 Statement of MS ANNA HARE read

16 "I am employed as an administrative assistant for
17 London Underground based at Edgware Road Underground
18 station. I have worked there for eight and a half years
19 and worked for London Underground for 30 years. On
20 7 July 2005, I arrived at work at about 07.35.

21 "I was the first into the office and carried out my
22 usual work duties. On that day, I was working with my
23 colleague, Jennifer Ammonsah and one of the duty
24 managers called Simon Eyles. We were working on the
25 first floor.

1 "At about 08.55, I heard an extremely loud noise.
2 I would describe it as if two articulated lorries had
3 crashed into each other. I realised that the noise had
4 either come from the Underground tunnel or from
5 Edgware Road.

6 "Very soon after, there was a tannoy message from my
7 colleague called Monica Hogan asking Simon Eyles to go
8 downstairs immediately. We were not sure exactly what
9 had happened. Within five minutes, our admin manager,
10 called Ces Nathaniellsz came to our office on the first
11 floor asking us to go downstairs very quickly to help.
12 He told us there were people coming out of the tunnel
13 who were covered in blood. I am an ex-nurse so I knew
14 that I may be able to help. I went to the train
15 operative's manager's office and got myself an orange
16 high visibility jacket.

17 "Both Jennifer and I ran downstairs and went to the
18 concourse area of the station, that is at the top of the
19 stairs coming up from the platforms. There were by now
20 people coming up from the platforms who were completely
21 covered in what looked like soot. Some were also
22 covered in blood as well. I was also aware of a smell
23 of burning skin and hair.

24 "Shortly afterwards, we were joined by another admin
25 assistant called Gabriella Salvatorelli. We were also

1 joined by some of the cleaning and canteen staff as
2 well. I got them to get together water and cloths, as
3 at this time the paramedics had not yet arrived. There
4 were by now hundreds of people coming up from the
5 platforms.

6 "There was a male sat down opposite the public
7 telephones inside the station, not far from the
8 entrance, who I now know was called Chris Randall.

9 I will now refer to him as male 1. He was sat on the
10 ground and was covered in blood. His face was very
11 badly cut. He was slipping in and out of consciousness,
12 and I think he was suffering from hypothermia. Sat next
13 to him on the ground was another male, who I now know
14 was called Mohammed. I do not know his second name. He
15 was bleeding and also had burns to his hands. He was
16 about 22 years' old, I would say of Arabic descent and
17 slim-built. I will now refer to Mohammed as male 2."

18 My Lady, it may be that Mohammed is actually
19 Mustafa Khan from the description of burnt hands.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

21 MR HAY: "Also, there was another male who was about
22 17 years' old who told me he was dyslexic and was on his
23 way to some class in London. I do not know his name.

24 He was about 5' 7" to 5' 8". He had darkish fair hair.

25 He was very nervous and telling me that his father was

1 coming to pick him up. I did not see any noticeable
2 injuries that he had."

3 My Lady, it may be that's actually James Mathiason:

4 "There was a lady who was looking after him. She
5 was a black lady. She had short, just below
6 collar-length black hair. She did not appear to be
7 injured."

8 My Lady, that may be Caroline Bridgman and the
9 description may be affected by the fact that she was
10 covered in soot.

11 "I recall that there was near this group, who was
12 just opposite the public phones near to the entrance to
13 the station, another lady who was clearly in a bad state
14 of shock. She was standing up and then sitting down and
15 was screaming. Opposite this group, there was a lady
16 who I know was called Davinia and she had cuts to her
17 face. She was white. I now know this lady, who was
18 later seen on a number of television programmes and in
19 newspapers wearing a face mask made out of bandaged
20 material."

21 My Lady, that is Davinia Turrell:

22 "These people were just a few of many hundreds of
23 people who were either injured or coming through from
24 the platforms below. I cannot recall descriptions of
25 anyone else who was on the concourse to the station, but

1 know there was a very large number of people who were
2 injured and covered in blood and soot. I can remember
3 the smell of burning flesh and hair, and this was very
4 strong, and this is something that, even eight months
5 later, I still feel that I can smell it.

6 "For at least 45 minutes, there were no paramedics
7 or equipment and the only supplies we had were cloths
8 and water. We moved all the water dispensers we had to
9 the concourse area and I would also like to say that the
10 four cleaners and four canteen staff that helped were
11 extremely helpful and the help they provided was
12 excellent and that, without them, it would have been
13 a lot more difficult.

14 "When the paramedics and police arrived, we were
15 told by the police that we had to direct people to
16 a nearby Marks & Spencers store. Also, there were going
17 to be buses outside who were going to take the walking
18 wounded to the nearby St Mary's Hospital. The
19 paramedics were not really able to help us with the
20 injured on the concourse as they really needed to get
21 down to the tunnel to get to the trains to help the very
22 seriously injured. We were left with foil blankets and
23 a bandage-type face mask and also some oxygen tanks and
24 masks. I was concerned for male 1 as he was, in my
25 opinion, suffering from hypothermia and slipping in and

1 out of consciousness. We were able to give oxygen to
2 both male 1 and 2, and also put the bandage face masks
3 on both of them.

4 "All the people I have described went to
5 Marks & Spencers or to hospital. There was still
6 a great number of passengers still coming up from the
7 platforms. Where we could, we helped the ones who were
8 injured with basic first aid with limited supplies we
9 had.

10 "One paramedic said, 'Who is Anna?', I said I was.
11 He said, 'I hear you were a nurse. Do you know what
12 pressure points are?'. I said I did. He then asked
13 if I knew how to implement pressure points. I said that
14 I did. He told me they needed me to go down to the
15 platform, as there was a badly injured lady coming out
16 of the tunnel. I went down to the westbound platform
17 and this lady was brought out on a stretcher. He told
18 me to press on the inside of the lady's right upper arm
19 and on another pressure point in the upper thigh of her
20 left leg. This I did whilst running alongside her to
21 the ambulance. The stretcher she was on was one that
22 had wheels. All I can say about this lady is that she
23 was completely covered from head to toe in blood. She
24 was taken to hospital by the ambulance. I do not know
25 her name.

1 "After this, I went back to the platform to see if
2 I could help more. I saw that two paramedics were
3 bringing out a male on a stretcher. They put a drip
4 into him. He was very badly injured and a lot of his
5 flesh was ripped on his arms and legs and he was
6 completely covered in blood.

7 "I also at one point helped up onto the platform" --
8 sorry:

9 "I also at one point helped people up onto the
10 platform. These are people that had walked from the
11 tunnels. There were hundreds of people. Some were not
12 physically injured, but were in a bad state of shock.
13 I recall that some were even trying to get back into the
14 station after they had left. It was a long time before
15 most of the people were cleared from the concourse,
16 probably as late as 11.30.

17 "When most of the people had gone, we were told we
18 needed to go to Marks & Spencers and that we were given
19 permission to collect food and water for the emergency
20 staff and London Underground staff who were still at the
21 station. This we did, but shortly after we returned to
22 the station, we were told that the station was being
23 evacuated. We went to a point opposite the station and
24 a roll call was carried out. After this we went to the
25 GSM office in Edgware Road and another roll call took

1 place."

2 My Lady, Ms Hare then goes on to describe the impact
3 the bomb had on her in the days and months which
4 followed and my Lady may wish to note that she was
5 invited to meet Ken Livingstone and Bob Kiley, who was
6 the then Transport Commissioner.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Hare obviously, with her team of
8 canteen staff and cleaners, did a great deal to provide
9 first aid to those who could walk and, indeed, even to
10 those who were on stretchers. I am sure that all those
11 who were injured whom her team helped are very grateful
12 to her.

13 MR HAY: I'm grateful, my Lady.

14 MR KEITH: My Lady, the next statement is that of
15 Laurence Pilbeam, dated 18 July 2005.

16 Statement of PC LAURENCE PILBEAM read

17 "I am PC Pilbeam of the City of London Police
18 currently based at Snow Hill. On Thursday, 7 July,
19 I was off-duty in civilian clothes travelling on the
20 London Underground Circle Line. At approximately 8.50,
21 I joined the eastbound service sitting at platform 1.
22 The carriage was fairly crowded with all the seats
23 occupied and people standing close together in the
24 aisles. The train was not due to leave for a short
25 while and, as I waited in the first carriage of the

1 eastern end of the platform, I was stood in the open
2 door with a clear view of the other platform in the
3 Edgware Road station.

4 "The platform was sparsely populated and I was not
5 aware of any suspicious persons or items within my line
6 of sight. As the doors started to close, there was
7 a loud, sharp bang followed almost instantaneously by
8 a slight shockwave that seemed to come up through the
9 floor of the train and disturb the anti-pigeon netting
10 suspended in the glass canopy of the station.

11 "There was no visible damage to any structures or
12 injuries to any persons in my vicinity. Approximately
13 a second after the shockwave had passed, the lights went
14 out in the train and the train's underfloor equipment
15 stopped. Immediately after this, the emergency lighting
16 in our train came on. However, it made little
17 difference as the train was outside of the tunnel
18 sitting in daylight.

19 "There was no concern among the other people in the
20 carriage. Most appeared to be resigned merely to
21 a delay in the service, and a few commented as such.
22 Nobody moved to leave the train. Looking down the
23 platform towards the tunnel, which travelled towards the
24 west, I could see no signs of anything unusual.

25 "Approximately 20 seconds later, our train doors

1 started to close. However, they immediately opened
2 again. This happened twice more in rapid succession
3 after which the doors remained open. After a few
4 minutes, the driver announced on the tannoy that the
5 current to the train had been switched off, he did not
6 know why, and there would be a delay.

7 "At this point, a few people, including myself,
8 started to leave the train to seek alternative
9 transport. I stepped out on the platform and started
10 walking west towards the steps which led up to the
11 station entrance. The station tannoy announced that the
12 station was being evacuated and our train began to empty
13 en masse. There were no persons injured on our train
14 and everybody moved completely calmly towards the
15 station entrance.

16 "As I did so, I could see three uniformed
17 London Underground employees standing on the steps
18 overlooking the westbound entrance. They were leaning
19 over the railings speaking to three or four more staff
20 members who were walking off the platform ends opposite
21 the steps into the entrance of the tunnel.

22 "They did not appear concerned and were shouting
23 a number of comments at each other. Looking into the
24 westbound tunnel, I could see two trains stationary next
25 to each other in the tunnel, one showing white lights

1 and one showing red lights, approximately 30 metres from
2 the end of the tunnel. I could see from the lights that
3 the tunnel was full of a smoky haze, but no thick smoke
4 or flame was visible, and there were no persons moving
5 around in the vicinity of the trains in the tunnels.
6 "By this time, I would estimate 2 or 3 minutes had
7 passed since the bang and, as I passed through the
8 ticket barriers, I asked the staff in them if everything
9 was okay, and they told me that it was due to an
10 electrical fault. Upon leaving the station, I paused to
11 text a work colleague to tell him I would be late and
12 shortly after received a return text that there had been
13 other explosions, so I returned to the ticket barriers,
14 identified myself from my warrant card and explained to
15 them what I had been told.
16 "By this time, all of the people from my train had
17 left the station and a few were lingering outside the
18 station mostly using their mobile phones. No emergency
19 services had yet arrived on scene. At this point,
20 I would estimate 5 to 6 minutes had passed since the
21 explosion.
22 "People began emerging at the station entrance who
23 were blackened and visibly shaken but appeared
24 uninjured. As further casualties came up from the
25 tunnel, I placed my bag in the station office and began

1 to assist with dealing with them. My effectiveness was
2 limited, as I was in plainclothes, and many people
3 appeared to be in shock and, despite being advised to
4 wait at the station for an ambulance, some appeared not
5 to hear me and walked off into the streets.

6 "However, to go after them would have meant ignoring
7 numerous others, so I remained by the station entrance
8 where we were now placing most of the walking wounded.
9 By this time, I would estimate 30 to 40 walking wounded
10 were gathered at the station entrance. All were
11 blackened and sooty. Some had torn clothing and cuts to
12 their faces. Many had fresh blood on them or were
13 covered in glass. Some were calm. Some were crying and
14 clearly in shock.

15 "The station staff were performing efficiently,
16 still gathering the casualties near the station
17 entrance. As the number of casualties increased,
18 I walked out to the front of the station and dialled
19 999, as no emergency services had yet arrived, but
20 before the call could be put through, I saw
21 a Metropolitan Police general patrol vehicle with two
22 female officers pulling up. I identified myself to them
23 and explained what had happened. They then relayed
24 these facts to their control room. Shortly after this,
25 all three emergency services started arriving in large

1 numbers and taking control of the situation. There was
2 little further I could achieve. Therefore, I left my
3 details with a British Transport Police officer who was
4 running the incident log and, assuming that a recall
5 would have been initiated, proceeded to Snow Hill police
6 station on foot, arriving at approximately 11.00."

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay?

8 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Nancie Powell
9 dated 9 July 2005, and my Lady will note that
10 Ms Powell's collar number is PC414DM.

11 Statement of WPC NANCIE POWELL read

12 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty in full
13 uniform in company with PC Thomas. We were a crew of
14 a marked police vehicle. We were responsible for
15 checking vulnerable premises during our tour of duty.
16 At 09.12, PC Thomas drove our vehicle along
17 Cabbell Street NW1 towards Edgware Road Tube station.
18 As we reached the junction with Chapel Street, I noticed
19 there seemed to be a lot of people congregating outside
20 Edgware Road Tube station. A London Ambulance Service
21 ambulance then arrived at the Tube station. PC Thomas
22 parked our vehicle and we decided to check if everything
23 was okay. As we approached these people, I noticed
24 everyone appeared to be quite dazed. A male approached
25 me and identified himself as an off-duty British

1 Transport Police officer."

2 My Lady, it may be in fact that was Mr Pilbeam, the
3 off-duty City of London Police officer:

4 "I asked him if he was okay. He appeared to be in
5 a state of shock and appeared very pale and was shaking.

6 He told me there had been an explosion in one of the
7 tunnels of Edgware Road Tube station and there were
8 a lot of people injured and one male had lost his legs.

9 "I noticed a couple of London Underground male staff
10 wearing orange high visibility vests. I asked them what
11 was happening. One of them confirmed there had been an
12 explosion in the Tube station. The staff were not sure
13 of the cause or the exact number of casualties. By this
14 time, numerous members of the public were exiting the
15 Tube station. Lots of them appeared to have burns, cuts
16 and grazes and were covered in black soot. Numerous
17 women were crying. I immediately began speaking on my
18 personal radio, relaying the information I had received
19 to Marylebone police control room. I requested more
20 ambulances, London Fire Brigade and more police units to
21 assist as soon as possible."

22 My Lady will recall Mr Hill putting to PC Bird the
23 computer-aided dispatch references of Ms Powell at 09.17
24 and 09.18:

25 "Crews of marked police vehicles D1 and DM2 arrived

1 on the scene very shortly after my transmission.
2 I remember speaking to London Underground staff to
3 ascertain further information. Staff updated me,
4 stating they were not sure if it was an electrical
5 problem or if a train had derailed. Staff then told me
6 power had been cut to the trainlines in the station to
7 assist with Tube evacuation. PC Wood then began
8 speaking to the staff so I started to implement cordons,
9 in order that the area remained as sterile as possible
10 and to prevent further members of the public entering
11 the immediate area and putting themselves in any further
12 danger.

13 "I closed off Chapel Street at the junction with
14 Edgware Road to members of the public, thereby
15 facilitating entry and exit for emergency vehicles and
16 personnel. Some time later, it was believed a secondary
17 device was located in Marks & Spencers, which is
18 situated adjacent to the Tube station. Injured persons
19 were being treated in a makeshift triage area inside
20 Marks & Spencers. A black holdall had been found
21 unattended inside the store. I immediately began to
22 evacuate the store and directed injured persons and
23 staff across the road to the Hilton Hotel on
24 Edgware Road. This holdall was later discovered to be
25 non-suspicious. I then returned to my cordon.

1 "It soon became apparent we were dealing with
2 a critical incident and that other such incidents had
3 occurred and were still occurring at various locations
4 around Central London. Once the majority of emergency
5 vehicles had arrived, I handed the responsibility of the
6 cordon to a PCSO and went to the Underground station to
7 assist my colleagues. I began to administer first aid
8 to injured commuters at the entrance to Edgware Road
9 Tube station. The majority of injuries consisted of
10 cuts, burns, broken and lost limbs.

11 "Due to the nature of the incident, I was not able
12 to ascertain details from the members of the public
13 I assisted. PC Spiers approached me and stated further
14 units were required on the Underground track to evacuate
15 people. I entered the Tube station with PC Spiers. We
16 took the stairs to the right-hand of the station and
17 made our way down to the track. London Fire Brigade had
18 set up a few emergency lights on the track, but the
19 tunnel was still very dark. There was a strong smell of
20 burning in the air and it was very hot. There were
21 numerous London Ambulance and London Fire Brigade crews
22 already on the tracks stretchering people up to street
23 level. I walked along the train tracks in the dark
24 tunnel and entered the carriage of a Tube train using
25 a pair of wooden steps. There was also another train to

1 the right of the one I was on. I noticed there was
2 blood all over the floor and many windows of the train
3 were smashed and buckled. The smell of smoke was
4 stronger the further down the train I walked.
5 "I made my way further into the Tube train carriages
6 in the tunnel. All the seats were being pulled up so
7 police could search for any further suspicious devices.
8 I then saw my colleagues, PC Thomas, PC Wood and
9 PC Chadee inside the train further ahead of me.
10 A message was shortly passed around that there were no
11 further survivors in the train and that we had to
12 evacuate as soon as possible, in order that police
13 explosives dogs could continue searching the tunnel.
14 I could see into the carriage of the next train to the
15 one that I was on. There were numerous people being
16 treated for serious leg injuries. Some people had lost
17 their limbs.
18 "When I arrived on street level, I was told by
19 PC Brown to join PCs Thomas, Woods and Chadee at
20 a nearby church, as we were being relieved by other
21 officers."
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That officer, too, obviously played
23 her part and swung into action in the way that one would
24 hope.
25 MR HAY: Grateful, my Lady.

1 MR KEITH: My Lady, the final statement is that of Police
2 Constable Clare Richards, dated 10 July 2005.
3 Statement of WPC CLARE RICHARDS read
4 "On Thursday, 7 July, I was on duty in full uniform
5 in the company of PC Guerra in a marked police van. At
6 about 09.17, we received a radio message from
7 PC Nancie Powell stating that she was at Edgware Road
8 Tube station and that many people were coming out of the
9 Tube station and appeared to be injured, but that the
10 cause of their injuries was unknown at this time.
11 "This was believed to be connected with a call that
12 had just been put out in the main set of the vehicle
13 stating that there was believed to be an explosion in
14 the Praed Street area.
15 "PC Guerra and I were in Edgware Road at the time
16 just south of the junction with Harrow Road and,
17 therefore, were on scene with PC Powell and her
18 colleague PC Thomas, about 30 seconds after she had put
19 out the call.
20 "As we were pulling up to the station, I saw many
21 people walking out of the main entrance to the Tube
22 station that were walking wounded. Many of them were
23 covered in black soot and were bleeding as well as being
24 visibly shocked.
25 "There were also many London Underground staff in

1 their orange jackets helping the people out of the
2 station. We parked on Chapel Street next to the south
3 kerb just to the east of the junction with
4 Cabbell Street. I went to the rear of the van and got
5 out the first aid kit as well as my high-vis jacket and
6 made my way to the entrance to the station.
7 "As I got to the main entrance, I saw PC Powell, who
8 had been told that there might have been an electrical
9 fault, as many people appeared to have burn injuries.
10 As well as many people calmly walking out of the station
11 entrance with black faces and cuts, there were also many
12 people sat on the floor either side of the walkway that
13 appeared to have more serious injuries such as burns and
14 more severe cuts.
15 "I then liaised with Underground staff to find out
16 which platform was affected. I was told by an unknown
17 member of the London Underground staff that the incident
18 was on the westbound Circle and Hammersmith Line.
19 I relayed this information to the control room and was
20 then informed by an unknown BTP (British Transport
21 Police) officer, that had arrived at the scene that
22 there were two other confirmed sites across London that
23 were believed to be explosions.
24 "I informed the control room of this information and
25 then assisted London Ambulance Service, who were now

1 starting to arrive on the scene, to carry medical bags
2 and kit to the platform area via the barriers.
3 "On the platform, I informed PC857DM it may have
4 been a planned explosion and directed Underground staff
5 to search two further trains that were on the platform,
6 as we needed to be aware of secondary devices. I was
7 asked by a member of the London Ambulance Service to get
8 the police to arrange for a triage site to be
9 established as there were believed to be many injured
10 people. I could see a line of people walking from the
11 tunnel towards the platform.
12 "I returned to the main entrance to use my radio to
13 inform the control room of this request from the London
14 Ambulance Service. I then assisted LAS with first aid
15 in the main entrance area. I treated a male called
16 Mustafa ..."
17 My Lady, Mustafa Khan:
18 "... with burns to his hands and face who also had
19 a minor leg injury. I used a burns pack supplied to me
20 by the LAS and was assisted by PC236DM to cut the
21 bandages to shape for his hands and then made a mask for
22 his face. He was then wrapped in a red LAS blanket
23 around his legs and a silver blanket around his
24 shoulders to try to keep him warm as he was going into
25 shock.

1 "I stayed with this male, who stated he was on his
2 way to Oxford for a work meeting, and I think he said he
3 was an accountant of some type, for about five minutes,
4 trying to keep him talking and reassured him that he was
5 now safe. He was wearing a black shirt, black trousers
6 and had a black laptop-style bag over his right
7 shoulder.

8 "I was then requested to be a stretcher bearer.

9 London Ambulance Service had just assessed Mustafa Khan
10 again and were going to be taking him very soon to the
11 hospital. I explained to him that I would get another
12 officer to keep an eye on him but now I had to go and
13 wished him the best. He replied, 'Please don't leave
14 me'. I then informed an unknown officer to keep an eye
15 on him until the LAS took him for treatment.

16 "PC15DM then gathered together the six officers that
17 had been selected to be stretcher bearers just outside
18 the main entrance to the station. We made our way
19 through the barrier area and down the stairs to the
20 platform.

21 "As we were going down the stairs, there were still
22 many injured people walking up the tracks towards the
23 platform. They were directed to make their way to the
24 nearby Marks & Spencers store that was being used as
25 a triage area.

1 "We were then directed to the left side of the
2 platform to enter the tracks down a ramp. As we walked
3 along the tracks back under the ticket hall area, many
4 Underground staff were assisting the walking wounded.
5 In front of me in the tunnel I could see two trains side
6 by side next to the left wall of the tunnel. People
7 were still coming out of the train to the right and,
8 therefore, we entered the train to the left.
9 "We entered the left train via the end driver's cab
10 using a wooden ladder. We walked about three carriages
11 through the train before we came to a carriage with
12 London Fire Brigade in. Police Sergeant 15DM liaised
13 with the London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance
14 Service that were present. It was established that we
15 were in the carriage before the main damaged one.
16 "I was asked to make a log of who was in the
17 carriage, as this was a crime scene. I noted in my
18 pocketbook starting on page 36, that at 9.55 a number of
19 officers, London Fire Brigade from North Kensington and
20 Knightsbridge, were present.
21 "PC780DM then left briefly to relay a message to the
22 surface from another officer. At 9.57, dog handlers
23 searched the carriage around us for any secondary
24 devices. They were then assisted to search the rest of
25 the two trains as they were checking under the seats.

1 "At 10.00, further officers arrived and at 10.03
2 some more officers joined us in the carriage before the
3 damaged carriage.
4 "At 10.05, I asked another officer to continue the
5 log, as I was required to start helping with stretcher
6 bearing. She continued this in her own pocketbook. The
7 London Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade brought
8 the first stretcher to where we had gathered. She was
9 secured onto the stretcher in our carriage before four
10 officers took the female back along the train using the
11 route we had used to enter. I then assisted with the
12 second stretcher and we took this female back down the
13 train to an open side entrance where the Fire Brigade
14 and police were waiting to take her to the surface.
15 I then went back and assisted with another stretcher.
16 "On returning to where we had been gathering the
17 stretchers from, I was asked by another officer to enter
18 the damaged carriage and help from there. I made my way
19 to the first set of doors and then had to make my way
20 into the train alongside, as the injured female was to
21 be removed that way. She was again handed over to the
22 London Fire Brigade and police waiting outside the train
23 to be taken to the surface.
24 "I do not remember which order the injured were
25 taken out, but I do remember that their names were

1 Emily, Alison and Katy."
2 That would be the Benton sisters and Alison Sayer:
3 "On returning to the stretcher area, I was informed
4 at 10.27 that there were no more injured people to be
5 removed and only the deceased left. At 10.30, I was
6 asked to make my way to the far end of the right-hand
7 train and to secure it as a crime scene and make sure
8 nobody entered from that end. At 10.41, we were
9 approached by a London Fire Brigade officer who informed
10 us that the whole area was to be evacuated as far as the
11 platform area, while expo CBRN tests were carried out.
12 "Another officer and I made our way to the platform
13 area via the right-hand train and onto the tracks.
14 I was then requested by the British Transport Police to
15 attend the next level up by the ticket barriers so that
16 I could be signed back in, whereupon I was relieved.
17 I was then informed to rendezvous at the church in
18 Old Marylebone Road where we could get water. We later
19 returned to the explosion."
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: PC Richards is obviously in the same
21 category as PC Powell, another officer who, without
22 thought for their own safety, played a significant role
23 in assisting the walking wounded and, indeed, the more
24 severely injured.
25 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

1 My Lady, that concludes the evidence for this week.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, if I may say so, one of the
3 reasons that we have concluded the evidence earlier than
4 might have been expected this week is because the
5 advocates have all been extremely well-prepared and have
6 focused their questions on the issues that really
7 mattered and I am very grateful to them.

8 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, may I raise one matter?

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course.

10 MR SAUNDERS: You've already indicated that, on Monday, the
11 Divisional Court will be sitting at 2.00 pm.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: For five minutes.

13 MR SAUNDERS: Will it be in this court? Because I think
14 what is planned, I know for some, is that, instead of
15 others coming back who appeared yesterday, some of us
16 have been asked to sit in. Of course, we'll need to be
17 robed, so I'm sure we'll have a chance to, as it were,
18 unrobe.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I suspect that the Divisional Court
20 won't mind. If you weren't appearing before the
21 Divisional Court yesterday --

22 MR SAUNDERS: I wasn't yesterday, but I think Mr Coltart has
23 asked if I could do it Monday to save him coming, just
24 to receive. So if your Ladyship would bear with us for
25 the few minutes after they've risen?

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course, I will wait until I get
2 a message saying that you are ready for me.
3 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, my Lady.
4 MR KEITH: In the light of my Lady's position in
5 the judiciary, I was wondering whether you might prevail
6 upon their Lordships in the Divisional Court to ask if
7 we might be unrobed on Monday, so that those of us who
8 appear in both jurisdictions yesterday and today needn't
9 change into our wig and gown and then back out again in
10 the course of five or six minutes.
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I will do my very best, Mr Keith.
12 I shall go and do that now you and see if I can get an
13 answer for you before you leave the building.
14 MR KEITH: Thank you very much.
15 (1.20 pm)
16 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Monday,
17 22 November 2010)
18