

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Hearing transcripts - 16 November 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.00 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, the next witness, Peter Zimonjic, will
4 be giving evidence by way of videolink from Ottawa.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Good morning. Can you hear me?

6 THE WITNESS: I can now.

7 MR KEITH: Good morning, Mr Zimonjic.

8 THE WITNESS: Can you hear me?

9 MR KEITH: Yes, I can, thank you very much. You're about to
10 be given the affirmation. Could you listen to what the
11 lady reads out to you, please?

12 THE WITNESS: You emailed me a copy of it.

13 MR KEITH: Good. Then we'll commence your evidence, if we
14 may.

15 MR PETER ZIMONJIC (affirmed)

16 (Evidence given by videolink)

17 Questions by MR KEITH

18 MR KEITH: Mr Zimonjic, I'm going to ask you questions about
19 7 July 2005, of course. I do so as Counsel to the
20 Inquest. Then you will be asked some further questions
21 on behalf of the interested persons in the proceedings
22 over which Lady Justice Hallett, our coroner, presides.
23 On 7 July 2005, did you take a local train from
24 Hanwell to Paddington in Central London?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you then take a Circle Line eastbound?

2 A. From Paddington towards Edgware Road, yes.

3 Q. Yes. Could you tell us, please, what you recall of what
4 we now know to be the explosion?

5 A. I was on the eastbound train, and we left the platform,
6 went into the tunnel, and another train started to pass
7 us. Just then, there was a loud cracking sound. Can
8 you hear me okay?

9 Q. Yes, I'm just going to ask that the volume be turned up
10 here at this end, if at all possible. It's quite hard
11 to hear, but if you persevere, I'll stop you if your
12 volume dips too low.

13 A. All right, I've got this microphone here, I'll just move
14 it underneath me. Maybe that will help.

15 So we went into the tunnel, and there was a loud
16 cracking sound, which I thought might have been the
17 trains hitting each other in the tunnel that they
18 passed, and then that was quickly followed by the smell
19 of burning metal and burning oil that filled the
20 carriage, where both trains appeared to come to a stop.

21 Q. Do you recall there being a flash of light?

22 A. I didn't see one, but from where I was, I don't think it
23 was visible. I mainly heard the noise and the smoke.

24 Q. Do you recollect whether the lights stayed on in the
25 carriage?

1 A. The carriage that I was originally in, the lights stayed
2 on, yes, but within a few moments, myself and
3 Tim Coulson, who I believe you heard from earlier today,
4 who may still be in the courtroom, and I moved from our
5 carriage to the carriage behind us and then we broke
6 a window on the train and jumped into the bombed
7 carriage which obviously didn't have any lights on.

8 Q. We'll get to that in a moment, if we may. I want to ask
9 you some more questions about the start of the incident
10 from your perspective.

11 Do you recall --

12 A. Certainly.

13 Q. Do you recall how dense the smoke or dust was that came
14 into your carriage?

15 A. It didn't visually appear particularly dense, but the
16 smell was quite strong.

17 Q. Do you recall what the reaction was in general terms of
18 the passengers around you?

19 A. People were anxious. There was a young family -- well,
20 there was a family with young children that appeared to
21 be tourists, not far from me, and the children were
22 quite distraught. There was a gentleman by me who was
23 beginning to panic. People were becoming unsettled.

24 Q. Did you do anything to try to calm the people around
25 you?

1 A. Yes, I had taken a first aid course and one of the
2 things they teach you is to try to just calm people
3 down, even if you don't really know what you're talking
4 about. So I took that on board and just told people to
5 remain calm, that a train likely hit the other train
6 passing it and we would probably be okay in a few
7 minutes, and that seemed to calm people down around me.

8 Q. Do you recall there being a lady in your carriage who
9 said that she worked for the railway?

10 A. Yes, I don't know what her name was, but she was wearing
11 a shell-suit, I think, and had blond hair, I believe, at
12 the time, and she -- after I had said to people to calm
13 down, she chimed in and said that she worked for the
14 railway and, you know, that I was right, that people
15 were going to come and get us, that they knew that we
16 were stuck, that sort of thing, so together I think we
17 seemed to convince people that we knew what we were
18 talking about, even though we didn't. Or I didn't.

19 Q. May I ask you, what was the nature of the first aid
20 courses that you had previously done? How long before
21 had you done them?

22 A. It was about seven years previous. I had done
23 occupational first aid, which is a month-long course,
24 which is a -- like, a professional qualification, and
25 then prior to that I had done a wilderness adventure

1 tourism two-week course, which basically didn't help me,
2 you know, you're out in the woods learning how to make
3 stretchers out of sticks and that kind of thing, but
4 about six weeks of training in total.

5 Q. How was it that you came to move to the other carriage,
6 what made you move through from your own carriage to the
7 next one?

8 A. There was a cry for help, somebody opened the door from
9 the carriage behind ours and called out for help, and
10 Tim Coulson -- who I now know to be Tim Coulson,
11 I didn't know at the time who he was, obviously --
12 started to walk towards the cry for help and I followed
13 him.

14 Q. Did anybody else join you?

15 A. I'm not sure if anyone else joined from that carriage,
16 but once we got into the carriage behind ours, a couple
17 of people joined in our efforts to try and -- well, I'll
18 let you ask the next question.

19 Q. Was one of them Ben Thwaites?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you recall the names of any of the other people who
22 joined you in your attempts to get out of your carriage,
23 your train, into the next adjacent train?

24 A. A gentleman by the name of Steve Hucklesby.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. Then there was another guy who didn't speak English, he
2 kind of looked like Moroccan or Arabic or Spanish,
3 I don't know exactly where he was from, but he was, you
4 know, very helpful in the mix with all this.

5 Q. Once you had gone through, you'd moved down one
6 carriage?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did there come a time when somebody from the bombed
9 train appeared on the outside of your eastbound train?

10 A. Yes, as soon as you walked through the doors, just to
11 the left, there was the -- you could see someone from
12 the outside of the train was trying to pull the doors
13 apart, and it was very difficult to see anything beyond
14 this guy's bloodied hands trying to get in, because the
15 train carriage behind the lights were out, so he was
16 coming out of the darkness, so to speak, and he was
17 trying to get in, he was covered in blood. I wasn't
18 sure exactly what was wrong with him, but three or four
19 of us mucked in to try to pull the doors apart and get
20 him into our carriage.

21 Q. But was it plain that the doors simply wouldn't open
22 wider than a few inches?

23 A. Yes, there was about maybe 6 inches, maybe less, it
24 wouldn't open any more beyond that, and we were down on
25 our hands and knees, cross-bracing, trying to pull and

1 nothing was happening. So I turned to Tim and I said,
2 "If I break the window and go across, will you come
3 across with me?", and he said "Yes", and within a minute
4 or so, I think Ben Thwaites showed up with a -- some
5 kind of tool that he'd taken out of the disused driver
6 cabin that was sort of at the end of that carriage and
7 handed it to me, and then myself and the Arabic/Moroccan
8 chap smashed the windows.

9 Q. We've heard some evidence that in Tube carriages, in the
10 driver's cab -- and there was one at the end of the
11 third carriage of the eastbound train -- there are
12 devices known as short-circuiting devices which are iron
13 or metal bars coloured yellow.

14 Do you think that might have been what Mr Thwaites
15 found?

16 A. Yes, there was a couple of things. I know he found
17 a couple of things. One of them was one of those, which
18 I think they put over the tracks, it looks like some
19 kind of giant --

20 Q. Circuit breaker?

21 A. -- I don't know, circuit breaker or something. I don't
22 know what it was exactly, I forget. Then there was
23 basically a crowbar, a big long crowbar too.

24 Q. Was there an attempt to open or to smash the window with
25 a fire extinguisher first, which failed?

1 A. Might have been, yes. I think so. Well, the thing is,
2 I think, with those windows, those pressure windows, you
3 have to hit them at a sharp point. So -- I forget if it
4 was a fire extinguisher. I know we tried something with
5 the fire extinguisher, I think we tried more to prise
6 the door open with it and, if I recall correctly,
7 I think Ben provided that too.

8 Q. Having smashed the window, who was first out of the
9 train?

10 A. Who was first out of the train? I think it was Tim
11 followed by -- I'd have to review my notes, actually,
12 but I think it was Tim followed by me and then
13 Steve Hucklesby and then I think the Arabic guy after
14 that. But I'd have to look at my note, if you want me
15 to do that.

16 Q. Your statement doesn't, in fact, provide details of
17 the --

18 A. Sorry?

19 Q. Your statement, the statement you gave to the police,
20 doesn't, in fact, contain a detailed account of the
21 order in which you left the carriage. So don't worry
22 about looking at your statement for the moment.

23 A. Okay. I believe I was second across and I believe that
24 Tim was actually the first one across, because
25 I remember helping him, and then, after me,

1 I subsequently learned later I think it was
2 Steve Hucklesby and the Arabic guy came across.
3 Q. As you left your train, were you able to see anything of
4 the other train into which you were jumping?
5 A. I had no idea, really, what I was getting myself into.
6 It was dark, it was completely dark. I didn't -- it
7 didn't occur to me for some time after landing in that
8 train exactly what was going on over there.
9 Q. So --
10 A. In terms of the cause of -- sorry?
11 Q. All that you could see, then, was that the doors on the
12 other train were missing, but you had no ability to see
13 as you left your eastbound train what had happened
14 inside the other carriage?
15 A. No, no. Not really. You could see it was dark and it
16 looked damaged, but, you know, it was very difficult to
17 see.
18 Q. Mr Zimonjic, it's very apparent to us now, from what you
19 did afterwards, why you jumped out of your own train and
20 the security of that train into what was obviously
21 a very damaged train on the other track, but could you,
22 please, in your own words, tell us why you think you
23 jumped out of your own train?
24 A. Well, there was a gentleman who was trying to get into
25 our train. I believe his name was Chris Randall, he was

1 trying to get into our train and he was in a lot of
2 distress, and he was disorientated, he had difficulty
3 standing up, you could see that through the crack in the
4 door, and I was concerned, with the doors to his train
5 were being opened, that he was going to fall out of the
6 train or he was going to fall down and hurt himself and
7 I thought, unless somebody got across there and helped
8 him, his life was in danger, and so, you know, we
9 decided we had to act and so we did.

10 Q. You should have with you a copy of a plan that you
11 marked up for the Metropolitan Police when you made your
12 witness statement --

13 A. I do.

14 Q. -- which has a side elevation of the carriage and an
15 overhead elevation showing marks that you've made on the
16 plan.

17 A. I have it here, yes.

18 Q. Could we have [INQ8594-2], please? If you could enlarge
19 the bottom half, please, on our screen?

20 On the copy of the map that you have, the plan that
21 you have, can you just tell us, please, which double
22 doors you think you entered the bombed carriage by?

23 A. I believe that they were -- well, doors A, double
24 doors 5.

25 Q. When you entered those doors --

1 A. Could you hear that?

2 Q. Yes, we heard that, thank you.

3 When you entered those doors, can you recollect who
4 the first person was whom you saw?

5 A. The first person I saw and heard was a gentleman by the
6 name of John MacDonald, who was kind of standing around
7 the crater marked by an X on the diagram, and John stood
8 out because he was screaming in absolute terror, I had
9 never heard anyone scream like that before and it
10 completely freaked me out initially, and so my eyes were
11 drawn to him, who was standing next to this crater. He
12 kept saying over and over again, "Save this man, save
13 this man", pointing into the crater to
14 Michael Stanley Brewster, who was, in the last few
15 moments of his life, trapped in the crater.

16 Q. Have you marked on the plan at F -- if you could just
17 check -- where you believe Mr MacDonald first was when
18 you saw him?

19 A. Yes, that's about right, yes. I mean, he was moving
20 around a little bit, but that's pretty much where he was
21 initially.

22 Q. I'm going to come on in a moment to what you recollect
23 of Mr Brewster and what you saw in the vicinity of the
24 crater, but I want to ask you about the people marked on
25 your plan by order of the letters that you've used.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Having entered through the double doors at D5, who was
3 it who was at B?

4 A. Who was it that was at B? I'm not sure, I'll have to
5 look at B -- I think I might be guessing, I'll have to
6 look at what I marked in my police statement.

7 Q. All right. If I can help you there --

8 A. There was some movement around there.

9 Q. -- was B the person who had tried to enter the eastbound
10 train, was he sat down in a seat by Mr Coulson somewhere
11 near B, ie seats 11 and 12?

12 A. Someone who tried to enter?

13 Q. Yes, you remember you described the gentleman who tried
14 to enter the eastbound train with a bleeding face and
15 tried to get through the gap in the door?

16 A. Oh yes.

17 Q. Once you entered the train, was that where Mr Coulson,
18 having entered the train with you, reassured the man and
19 then placed him in a seat, Mr Randall?

20 A. That sounds logical to me, although, to be honest with
21 you, once I got into the train, my eyes were kind of
22 drawn to John MacDonald and to -- well, to the sheer
23 carnage around the bombsite, which was quite
24 overwhelming and quite a bit of a sensory overload, so
25 who was standing exactly next to me at that point, my

1 eyes were drawn forward in the carriage about 10,
2 12 feet, and my recollection of who may or may not have
3 been sitting there would have happened later on.

4 Q. I understand. We know from other evidence that my Lady
5 has heard that there were two sisters, the Benton
6 sisters, sitting in seats --

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. -- 9 and 10. You've marked near those two seats point

9 C. Does that accord with your recollection?

10 A. Yes, that matches about right, I'd say.

11 Q. Now at D, next to seats 7 and 8, your witness statement
12 to the police describes how you saw a man lying on the
13 floor and his head was by seat 8 and his feet by seat 7,
14 and he was completely still, with his face down, and you
15 tried to move him. Could you tell us, please --

16 A. That's right, yes.

17 Q. Could you tell us, please, what you can recall of that
18 person?

19 A. He looked to me to be -- from behind, to be a man of
20 about, I don't know, 50, sort of grey, greyish kind of
21 hair. It's difficult to tell, but a man, certainly
22 about 50s, greyish hair, quite slim build and, you know,
23 we tried to turn him over, but it was very obvious that
24 he was dead as he started to turn, so myself and someone
25 else, who I actually don't know, said "Let's just leave

1 him and move on".

2 Q. I must ask you as much as I'm able about that gentleman.
3 Why was it obvious that he was dead?

4 A. He had a lot of physical injuries about -- you know, to
5 what appeared to be the front of him. I just kind of
6 caught him from a glance, he was physically not moving,
7 incredibly heavy to move, there was a lot of blood near
8 him, that kind of thing.

9 Q. In your book -- and we obviously have a copy of your
10 book "Into the Darkness: an account of 7/7", you
11 describe at page 50 coming across a man in this general
12 area next to Mr Gardner, who we know is the man who is
13 located at H on your plan, and you describe how you
14 placed your fingers on the neck of the man whose body
15 you tried to turn over to attempt to feel for a pulse
16 but not finding anything. Is that recollection correct?

17 A. That does, yes.

18 Q. You also describe --

19 A. I've never been terribly good at feeling for a -- sorry,
20 I was going to say I've never been terribly good at
21 feeling for pulses, so, you know, but my assumption was
22 I didn't feel anything and then we tried to move him and
23 it wasn't happening.

24 Q. In a very striking passage you describe how aspects of
25 your first aid training came back to you and you

1 remembered the ABC, airway, breathing, circulation
2 mnemonic. Did you try to take any steps to see whether
3 there was any breathing or whether his airway was
4 obstructed or whether there was any circulation?

5 A. Well, to be honest with you, I felt his pulse, myself
6 and someone else tried to turn him over, I was probably
7 closer towards his waist and the other guy was probably
8 closer towards his head. When the body start to turn,
9 the guy who was helping me got a better look at his
10 face, and he turned to me and said, "Leave him, he's
11 dead", and I was terrified enough to just agree.

12 Q. It was plain, was it not, that there were no signs of
13 life and the gentleman had, in fact, passed away?

14 A. That was my assumption, that he had passed away almost
15 immediately. The way he was sort of blown on to this
16 part of the floor, it just seemed like he had been
17 thrown there, and I saw no signs of life. I mean, you
18 know, it's something I've played over in my head
19 a thousand times since, you know, was there a sign of
20 life, should I have tried harder to turn him over,
21 should I have tried to give him mouth-to-mouth, should
22 I have tried CPR, but, you know, at the time, I think it
23 was obvious to me at the time that he was dead and
24 I sort of -- that's the way I proceeded.

25 Q. Later in your book, you describe how a paramedic arrives

1 in the carriage and approaches the man who was lying on
2 the floor and asks you and Mr Rennie, Jason Rennie,
3 whether either of you had checked the man for signs of
4 life, and is it right that the paramedic then himself
5 checked for a pulse but found, as you had, no sign of
6 life?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. May I ask you this: in your book you clearly state that
9 the man whom you discovered there at D, and who showed
10 no signs of life, was Colin Morley.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. May I ask you: how do you know that?

13 A. Well, based on talking to his wife, seeing photographs
14 of him, age, what he looked like, based on who the other
15 people were that were victims there. It was kind of
16 a process of elimination.

17 Q. Could we now turn, please, to examine the position in
18 relation to E, who was a person lying in the standing
19 area in front of the double doors D3.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you recollect now anything of that person?

22 A. I only could see that person from the waist down. Their
23 upper body appeared to be either missing or covered in
24 debris. Their legs appeared to me to be blown off
25 somewhere around the thigh, and what was left of their

1 legs was seen to be hanging out of the carriage, out of
2 doors D3. I couldn't tell if it was a man or a woman,
3 to be honest with you.

4 Q. Was it, again, completely apparent that there were no
5 signs of life?

6 A. To me there was. I mean, I didn't even approach.
7 I couldn't imagine how anybody could have been alive in
8 that situation, based on the severely -- severe damage
9 to the body. If, in fact, even the whole body was
10 there. I can't tell you. I didn't get -- I was just
11 stood next to it for a long time and there was, you
12 know, debris covering what remained. I'm not sure who
13 that was.

14 Q. It is obvious, then, from what you've said, that there
15 was no movement whatsoever and nothing indicating a sign
16 of life?

17 A. No.

18 Q. In your --

19 A. There was nothing indicating a sign of life, no.

20 Q. In your witness statement to the Metropolitan Police,
21 you describe this person and you suppose that the person
22 was a woman, but in your book you describe the person in
23 the same way as you described the person for us today:
24 namely, without ascribing sex to that person and without
25 saying whether you thought it was a male or a female.

1 Is that because, as you've now told us, it was
2 impossible to tell?

3 A. I think it was impossible to tell and, also, by the time
4 I came to write my book, I had interviewed well over 100
5 people and I think about 30 or 40 of them would have
6 been -- maybe less than that, say about 25 or 30 of them
7 would have been in the carriage at Edgware Road and no
8 one else had any idea whether it was a woman either, or
9 a man. So there was no way to really tell, at the time
10 or afterwards, in my view.

11 Q. May I then ask you, please, about Mr Brewster, whose
12 position on your plan you've placed at G in the very
13 near vicinity of the bomb, that is to say in the crater.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. When you first saw him, in what condition was he?

16 A. He appeared to be barely alive.

17 Q. Why do you say that?

18 A. There was some movement, there was some effort to -- you
19 know, he was still breathing a little bit. He looked
20 like he was still breathing. But not much, shallow.
21 But there was some movement, some indication that he was
22 still alive. Very faint. It's hard to describe. He
23 appeared to me to still be alive, very briefly.

24 Q. Were there people around him trying to tend to him?

25 A. John MacDonald was standing there, screaming over him,

1 "Help this man, help this man". Then Tim Coulson,
2 I believe, jumped out of the carriage and went
3 underneath to try to free him from the carriage.
4 I remained above and, as I approached him,
5 Stanley Brewster, as I got very close and sort of right
6 next to him, he appeared to suddenly relax and fall down
7 through the crater and onto the tracks, and that to me,
8 I'm not an expert, but looking at that, I assumed that
9 he died in that exact moment.

10 Q. Do you recall anybody else trying to assist him to get
11 out of the crater to pull him out of the hole?

12 A. I know that Jason Rennie had tried to help him earlier,
13 but he was stuck. I didn't try to help him.

14 Q. From what -- is that because Jason Rennie has told you
15 that himself, or do you recollect somebody being there
16 trying to do that?

17 A. I know Jason Rennie told me that. I'm trying to think
18 whether I recollect somebody trying to help him.

19 I believe there was a couple of people around him trying
20 to help him, but it was very confusing, I'm not sure if
21 they were trying to pull him up or not. I recall
22 somebody trying to -- it's been a while since I've
23 thought about this, to be honest. I recall somebody
24 trying to help him, either check whether he was
25 breathing or something like that.

1 Q. If you were to assess how long had elapsed from the
2 moment that you entered the carriage to the point at
3 which Mr Brewster slipped through the hole and, in your
4 opinion, therefore died in the process, how long would
5 such a time be?

6 A. Only a couple of minutes. Stanley Brewster, as I said,
7 when I first came in the carriage, John MacDonald was
8 screaming and drawing a lot of attention to himself and
9 to Michael Stanley Brewster, so that's kind of the first
10 place where I went, as I sort of stepped over debris and
11 people. So by the time I got there, I mean two, three
12 minutes, so it took us maybe two, three minutes, maybe
13 four minutes, to get into the carriage after the bomb
14 went off. So maybe like seven, eight minutes, from the
15 time the bomb went off to the time he died. I mean, I'm
16 guessing, but that's my estimate.

17 Q. Did you see Mr Coulson come back inside the carriage or,
18 once he'd gone down under the train to help Mr Brewster,
19 was that the last you saw of him?

20 A. It wasn't the last I saw of him. I saw him later on
21 towards the time I was leaving the carriage, which was
22 about an hour later when the emergency services finally
23 arrived, I saw him, he was treating a woman who was
24 sitting at, I believe, door D8, and he was standing
25 outside and she was sitting up and he was helping her.

1 She was sitting on the edge of the train, I suppose.

2 Q. Now, could you tell us, please, what you can recall of
3 Mr Gardner, who was the man at H on your plan?

4 A. Yes, H. He was lying -- his head was probably closer to
5 seat 26 and his legs were 25, 24. Seats 25, 24. And
6 there was a moment after Stanley Brewster fell that
7 I looked around the carriage and, you know, everywhere
8 I looked somebody was either dead or dying or there
9 was -- it was quite horrific and I took sort of a step
10 back and I actually stood on Danny -- David Gardner's
11 leg, at which point, you know, he very politely asked me
12 to get off his leg, as is his nature, and I heard
13 a voice coming through the dark somewhere, a South
14 African voice, Jason Rennie, explaining to me that he
15 had put a tourniquet on his leg. So I got down and, you
16 know, had a closer look at it and Jason came over, and
17 that was my first sort of contact with him.

18 Q. Did you attempt to change his tourniquet or to apply
19 extra bandages to him?

20 A. Yes, I took my shirt off after a little while, being in
21 there, and ripped it up into shreds and Jason and I both
22 tried to redress the wound because Jason had used his
23 shirt and it was quite a big wound, and we managed to
24 retie another -- you know, another tourniquet, another
25 bandage sort of around it, with Jason's help, and me

1 treading on David Gardner's leg again probably once or
2 twice.

3 Q. In terms of consciousness and in terms of his condition,
4 in what state was Mr Gardner?

5 A. When we first encountered him, he seemed quite, you
6 know, quite lucid, and that progressively declined to
7 the point where, by -- by the time we'd been in there
8 for about 45 minutes to an hour, Jason Rennie and I were
9 becoming very concerned and quite panicked ourselves
10 that David Gardner was going to die on us right there in
11 the carriage, because obviously he was losing blood and
12 beginning to drift out of consciousness.

13 Q. Were you able, in the light in the carriage, to see
14 precisely the nature of his injuries or whether or not
15 the tourniquet had effectively stemmed the loss of
16 blood?

17 A. I couldn't -- we couldn't tell, to be honest, but, you
18 know, we just hoped for the best. It was so dark, so
19 incredibly dark, in that carriage that it was almost
20 impossible to see anything, which is, I think, a great
21 failing in the Tube trains, that there's no, you know,
22 emergency flashlights or emergency lighting of any kind
23 to help first aiders actually perform first aid. The
24 only light we had was the screen from our mobile phones,
25 and that was wholly inadequate and very difficult to

1 hold while you're performing first aid.

2 Q. Did you try to get assistance from a passing nurse, one
3 of whom had an American accent?

4 A. Yes, there was -- I believe there were two nurses that
5 came into our carriages, I forget where they came from,
6 one of them was Irish, I think, and one of them was
7 American, and one of the nurses certainly helped try to
8 examine the wound. We had flashlights -- not
9 flashlights, but the mobile phone display screens and we
10 were trying to shine it on the leg so she could see and
11 determine whether or not we needed to take the bandage
12 off and redress it, and she looked at it and said, "Just
13 leave it the way it is, it's too dark", basically, "to
14 start messing around".

15 Q. At this time, may we presume that you were also giving
16 assistance to the Benton girls and, of course, Mr Rennie
17 himself had suffered injuries, so did they require
18 rebandaging or assistance as well?

19 A. I rebandaged, I believe, Jason Rennie's arm. He had --
20 his wrist, I think, and in his upper arm he had some
21 wounds that he hadn't fully bandaged or they were
22 starting to bleed through. You know, Jason is a hero,
23 if you ever want to meet one, a guy who was in the
24 bombed carriage, who was wounded himself, but within
25 minutes managed to ultimately save David Gardner's life.

1 But he neglected himself and so we bandaged him up
2 a little bit. This is sort of halfway through -- well,
3 I suppose, right when I started ripping my shirt is when
4 I noticed the Benton girls, because there was a guy
5 named Andrew Ferguson who had come in from the carriage
6 behind the bombed carriage, went straight to them and
7 was helping them, and I was trying to rip my shirt and
8 I wasn't having much luck, it wasn't exactly like
9 Harrison Ford in "Indiana Jones", it just wouldn't rip.
10 So Andrew Ferguson cracked a bit of a joke about it,
11 and then, you know, we had a little giggle and then
12 I noticed they were there, so whatever bandages I had
13 left, I went down and bandaged up one of the girls'
14 feet, which was quite badly injured, and one of the
15 girl's hands.

16 Q. Was that Emily Benton's foot, perhaps?

17 A. Yes, it was quite badly -- I believe it's her, I get the
18 sisters mixed up.

19 But one of them was quite badly -- it was the front
20 of her foot and the flesh had been badly mangled, so
21 I did my best to bandage it up with my shirt.

22 Q. You've described how a considerable amount of time
23 passed, some 45 minutes. Did you start to see, or did
24 you start to contemplate having to carry Mr Gardner out
25 yourself because of the way in which his condition began

1 to deteriorate?

2 A. Yes, Jason and I discussed whether or not we could,
3 like, rip a seat out and use that as a stretcher or, is
4 there any way we could build a stretcher trying to use
5 some of the -- you know, the standing poles, the yellow
6 poles? Those things had been blown over and there was
7 some lying on the floor, but when I tried to, you know,
8 pull it off the floor to make a stretcher, it was so
9 tangled in people that were injured, that it was just
10 going to hurt someone, so we abandoned that plan.
11 But we were very, very concerned about David and
12 I thought he was going to die. It's one of the most
13 frightening moments I've ever had in my life. What's
14 ironic about it is that I believe a lot of those Tube
15 carriages actually have stretchers that are in the
16 disused driver carriages, but there's no sign marking
17 where they are or how to assemble them, and we were
18 lucky that, you know, that David managed to hang on for
19 an hour, otherwise we think we could have lost him.
20 So there could be some improvement to telling people
21 where the stretchers are, should something like this
22 happen, whether it's a terrorist attack or a train
23 crash, that would be quite useful for, you know, the
24 people that are on the train who know first aid who are
25 going to help out.

1 Q. On your plan you've also marked in the area between
2 double doors D1 and D2 a person at position I, and in
3 your statement you describe how you looked over to that
4 end of the train from where you were and you saw a man
5 performing CPR. Could you tell us, please, what you can
6 recollect of that?

7 A. It was a man, I didn't know the man, I subsequently
8 learned it was Steve Hucklesby. He was straddling who
9 I now know to be Ms Webb and trying to give her chest
10 compressions, which clearly to me seemed like a lost
11 cause. Her body wasn't responding at all, it was
12 responding unnaturally, if you will, to the fact that
13 somebody, you know, was -- it didn't look like there was
14 anyone alive. He kept trying to give her CPR and there
15 was people behind him, you could see in the carriage,
16 that were kind of calling out to him from the lit
17 carriage we had originally left.

18 Q. Was there anything about what you could see that
19 indicated that she was exhibiting signs of life?

20 A. No. It seemed -- I don't know how I know this, but it
21 seemed entirely clear to me that she had died.

22 Q. Can you help us, please, as to how long Mr Hucklesby
23 attempted to perform chest compression and
24 mouth-to-mouth resuscitation?

25 A. A couple of minutes. A couple of minutes, that's it.

1 Q. On your plan, you've also marked opposite seat 23
2 a person being present at location J. From the evidence
3 before my Lady, we know that was Professor Tulloch, you
4 didn't, of course, know his name then. Can you
5 recollect anything about him?

6 A. Well, he was quite damaged, he was being helped by
7 somebody, and he was quite bloodied and I had used -- he
8 was looking for his bag, I know that. I didn't really
9 help John Tulloch because he was sort of in the care of
10 somebody else who seemed to know what he was doing. But
11 he was certainly there and I recall him because the guy
12 who was helping him kept asking for water or something
13 to bandage him with or something like that. So his
14 presence was known there, certainly.

15 Q. Do you actually remember the moment when the first
16 paramedic appeared?

17 A. I remember I started seeing them. They all sort of
18 appeared at once, really, it seemed. All of a sudden,
19 someone came running in the carriage, then there was
20 people down the side of the train and they all sort of
21 came in.

22 Q. In your witness statement to the police, you describe
23 how they appeared very shocked by what they had found in
24 the carriage, but you then go on also --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- to say that they didn't seem to you as having much
2 equipment and messages had then to be sent back for more
3 neck collars, stretchers, intravenous bags.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. How do you know that they were short of equipment? What
6 was it that they did that made you realise that?

7 A. Well, they called out and they said, "We're short, we
8 need this, we need that, we need more neck collars, we
9 need this, we need that", and you could see people
10 running back up to try to get it. So clearly they got
11 down there and they were -- they didn't have what they
12 needed.

13 Q. How long after their arrival in the carriage did they
14 start calling back for further equipment?

15 A. Almost immediately. You know, once they'd started
16 treating people, within a couple of minutes, you know.

17 Q. Did it seem to you that there were enough paramedics so
18 as to permit each of the severely injured people in the
19 carriage to at least have one person tending to them or
20 was there a number of paramedics having to move round
21 the carriage triaging and attending to them one after
22 the other?

23 A. Initially, that was the case, and I stuck around for
24 another sort of 10 -- maybe, 10, 15 minutes, until there
25 was a paramedic with everybody that was injured, and

1 then I left.

2 Q. We know --

3 A. I was also, you know, staying close to David Gardner,
4 you know, I wanted to make sure he was okay and I wasn't
5 going anywhere until he had the help he needed, you
6 know.

7 Q. We know from your witness statement that you left the
8 carriage with, I think, the two nurses --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and you passed through the platform up to the
11 entrance to the station at ground level.

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. Did anybody ask you, when you arrived at ground level,
14 what had happened in the carriage or what the nature of
15 the incident or what was now apparent an explosion was?

16 A. A police officer I met at the exit to the Edgware Road
17 station said to me "Was it a bomb?", and I said, "Yes,
18 it was".

19 Q. Do you recollect there being emergency service vehicles
20 present in the area outside the front of Edgware Road
21 station?

22 A. Yes, it was like loads of ambulances and police cars and
23 yellow tape and that sort of thing.

24 Q. Do you know what time it was, roughly, that you came out
25 at ground level?

1 A. I don't think I checked my watch until I went into the
2 Marks & Spencers which was about 10.10, I think, around
3 there.

4 Q. Finally, may I ask you this: I think you set up, after
5 the events of 7/7, a social networking site called
6 "London Recovers"; is that right?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 Q. Was that site used by a substantial number of the
9 survivors to contact each other to be able to work out
10 who everybody was and to seek support and succour in the
11 days and the months after 7/7?

12 A. Yes, I would say there was a secure password you had to
13 use to get in, I would say I gave that out to about 200
14 people and I would say sort of, you know, half of those
15 people posted messages or paid attention to what was
16 going on and the other half were kind of reading it and
17 not posting, but sending me messages and telling me, you
18 know, "I don't feel comfortable writing, but I read that
19 guy's post and I'm wondering if you could, you know, get
20 me in touch with them", or that kind of thing. So about
21 200 people or so.

22 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. I have no further questions
23 for you, but there may be some further questions from
24 the other lawyers in the courtroom. Thank you very
25 much.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

2 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

3 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Zimonjic, I represent some of the bereaved
4 families and I just have some follow-up questions for
5 you.

6 Firstly, about the moment of the bomb, Mr Zimonjic,
7 you've said today that you didn't think the light was
8 visible, you mainly heard the noise and saw the smoke.

9 In your statement to the police in January 2006, you
10 described seeing a flash of white light at the same time
11 as a very loud crash --

12 A. Mm.

13 Q. -- like a car accident. That was in January 2006, so
14 a number of months after the bombing.

15 Do you now recall whether you saw that flash of
16 white light or was that an assumption you made when you
17 were making the statement?

18 A. You know, I can't recall now. It's been five years.
19 I'm not sure whether I saw it or whether I had been told
20 about it so many times that I -- you know, it's hard to
21 say.

22 Q. Of course. You've described today, and also in your
23 statement, a lot of detail about all the steps you took
24 before you finally made it on to the bombed train. We
25 know you were initially calming passengers. There then

1 was a request for first aid. You then moved carriage on
2 your own train with others. You then see the bloodied
3 person at the neighbouring train, you tried to pull him
4 into your carriage and failed, you tried to open the
5 doors, you've described the various implements that were
6 used to try to open the doors today and then you
7 eventually get into the carriage.

8 Have you any idea how long had elapsed between the
9 explosion and your eventual entry to the bombed train?

10 A. I'm guessing five minutes.

11 Q. So all of those steps all happened, you think, within
12 the space of about five minutes?

13 A. Yes, it was very quick.

14 Q. Could I take you to the graph that you've looked at
15 already with Mr Keith. It's [INQ8594-2], please. Could
16 I start with -- do you have it in front of you? Could
17 I start with the person --

18 A. Yes, I do, it's right here.

19 Q. Could I start with the person who you've marked at E,
20 who initially you thought was a woman, but you're now
21 clear that you couldn't tell whether it was a man or
22 a woman.

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. You've said you believe that the legs were severed above
25 the knees. Could it be that there was debris covering

1 the lower legs, or are you sure they were severed?

2 A. I mean, was I sure what did it look like to me? It was
3 dark, I was terrified, there was a lot of mangled flesh
4 in a big pile. You know, I think you're asking me about
5 a fine point which I really couldn't answer certainly,
6 but if you ask me my best guess, I would say that.

7 But --

8 Q. Of course.

9 A. -- you know, I didn't get close enough to touch them.

10 Q. Of course. So it could be that there were lacerations
11 across the thigh and damage, and covered with debris,
12 rather than actual severing, you're just not sure?

13 A. I don't know. The way -- I mean, the way it looked to
14 me from the angle I was at, it looked like at least one
15 of the legs had been blown off, and the flesh that
16 remained was hanging out of the carriage.

17 Q. Certainly. The person at D, Mr Zimonjic, who you now
18 think was Colin Morley, you've described your process of
19 elimination to arrive at that conclusion, you've
20 described him as being of slim build and about 50. Did
21 you form the conclusion that he was about 50 primarily
22 because of the colour of his hair? You've described him
23 as having grey hair today.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Could you help us with this: are you sure that the

1 actual hair colour was grey or could it be that it was
2 a different colour but it was covered in dust and
3 debris?

4 A. That's entirely possible. It's hard to tell. It was
5 very, very dark in the carriage.

6 Q. So you couldn't say whether it was greying and singed
7 hair or different coloured hair which was obscured by
8 dust?

9 A. No. It was very short hair, if that helps. About as
10 short as mine.

11 Q. That's certainly helpful. The reason I'm asking you
12 this level of detail simply is that there were a number
13 of bodies in that location. There's some confusion
14 about who it may have been. It's obviously quite
15 important to the families to try to ascertain whether
16 it's their loved one who was there or whether their
17 loved one was in a different location. So that's why
18 I'm asking you these finer points of detail,
19 Mr Zimonjic.

20 A. I agree. I believe it to have been Colin Morley,
21 though. But, you know, that's my best guess based on
22 all the evidence I managed to look at.

23 Q. Of course. And of course, we're conscious that you
24 spoke to his wife, who is in court and can hear you
25 today. The man at G --

1 A. Hello, Ros.

2 Q. The man at G, Michael Stanley Brewster, who you've
3 referred to in quite a lot of detail, today you've
4 described that, when you first saw him, you believed him
5 to be in the last few moments of his life, barely alive
6 with shallow breathing.

7 Now, when you gave your statement to the police
8 in January 2006, you say that, when you saw him:

9 "... his eyes were open but looked vacantly ahead
10 and I formed the conclusion he was dead."

11 So the impression from your statement was that you
12 actually thought he was dead when you first saw him --

13 A. Mm.

14 Q. -- but you are sure that you recall some form of
15 movement, albeit limited and albeit briefly?

16 A. When I say "movement", I mean like a facial expression,
17 you know, something like that. He was obviously too
18 weak to move himself.

19 In the context in which I said he was dead -- and,
20 you know, this might sound glib to somebody who wasn't
21 there, but there was someone screaming, "Help this guy,
22 help this guy, help this guy", I was very panicked about
23 the situation naturally, and I took one look at this guy
24 and I just didn't think there was anything that I could
25 do for Mr Brewster, I thought he was too seriously

1 injured, and so that I formed the conclusion that, if he
2 wasn't dead now, he would be within seconds or minutes.
3 Q. Of course. And, Mr Zimonjic, on behalf of the families,
4 the families feel you did as much as you possibly could.
5 There's certainly no criticism or any suggestion that
6 you could have done more. We're just trying to
7 ascertain what state he was in when you saw him.
8 Could I just ask you some brief questions --
9 A. Forgive me if some of the questions I find quite
10 difficult. I haven't actually thought about this in
11 several years.
12 Q. No, of course, it's a very long time afterwards and
13 a very difficult subject.
14 Could I ask you some brief questions about
15 Mr MacDonald, who you've marked at F on the plan which
16 is in front of you?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You've described today that, when you came in, he was
19 screaming in absolute terror, and in your witness
20 statement you also described him as being in -- I'm
21 quoting from your witness statement -- "a state of panic
22 and out of control with fear and panic". Is that an
23 accurate description of how Mr MacDonald appeared to
24 you?
25 A. Yes, it is. In my book, you know, bless him, he's

1 a nice guy, and I feel sorry for what he's been through
2 and what he saw that day, but in my book I described him
3 as the screaming man. He scared me probably more than
4 anything else did that day, simply for the reason that
5 I took a look at him in the context of the setting in
6 which I found him, and realised that, if I didn't hold
7 on to my wits, that I could risk completely losing grip
8 of reality and losing my mental capacity to do something
9 helpful, and he was -- sort of epitomised that pure
10 state of fear and panic, which I believe was quite
11 natural.

12 Q. Thank you. Just, of course, there's no suggestion that
13 we're criticising Mr MacDonald for the way in which he
14 reacted in these horrific circumstances. We're just
15 trying to ascertain what he saw and what weight we can
16 give to what he said.

17 You say later in your statement that Mr MacDonald
18 was still screaming after you'd tended to Mr Gardner and
19 was not in a fit state to assist anyone, and you say at
20 that point that you thought he was best out of the
21 train, and you passed him to two men who were standing
22 outside dealing with Michael Stanley Brewster. Is that
23 accurate?

24 A. Yes. I actually interviewed John MacDonald for my book,
25 but decided not to use any of the stuff that he told me

1 because I didn't think he was reliable. I hope that
2 doesn't reflect badly on him. I just think he had
3 a rough time on the day and I just don't think -- there
4 were a number of people that I researched for my book
5 and interviewed that fell into the category who were, in
6 my view, too traumatised for their recollection to be
7 trusted, and he was one of them.

8 Q. I don't think anyone is going to take that as
9 a criticism, given what he saw and what you saw,
10 Mr Zimonjic. But thank you for that assistance.

11 There's just two final things. You've said in
12 evidence today that you remember checking your watch
13 when you reached M&S and you think it was about
14 10.10 am. In your witness statement, you say:

15 "I got directed to a nearby Marks & Spencers but
16 only stayed ten minutes. When I left, my mobile said
17 the time was 10.20 am."

18 Do you mean when you left Marks & Spencers it was
19 10.20 am or when you left the station it was 10.20 am?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When you left Marks & Spencers?

22 A. When I left -- that's right, yes. I was in there very
23 briefly. They gave us some water and I tried to make
24 a phone call because my cellphone was jammed, and then
25 I left and looked at my watch -- well, not my watch, my

1 cellphone, I don't wear a watch.

2 Q. There's just one final thing, Mr Zimonjic. Again, in
3 your statement from January 2006, you describe getting
4 to the Marks & Spencers, you describe seeing that the
5 platform at Edgware Road was empty, and then this
6 temporary triage setup at the entrance to the station.

7 You then say:

8 "I saw more paramedics, police and Underground
9 staff. A policeman asked me if there had been a bomb.
10 They did not seem to know what had happened."

11 The "they" in your statement, were you referring to
12 the individual policemen or to the group of people at
13 the entrance to the station more generally?

14 A. Pretty much all of them. I mean, my assessment of the
15 situation was that, for whatever reason, they didn't
16 know that a bomb had gone off in the tunnel.

17 Now, that might sound quite critical of the
18 emergency services, because I think we have a tendency
19 to think that they should just know this stuff, but
20 I was in the bombed carriage for a good half an hour
21 before it occurred to me that it had been a bomb, the
22 main reason being I was so frightened and overwhelmed by
23 the scene that cause was not important to me.

24 You know, when you're trying to revive somebody or
25 you're trying to save someone's life or you're looking

1 at those kinds of scenes, you don't really think, "what
2 caused this?". I just went with my original assumption
3 that it was a crash and whatnot.

4 So the degree to which that knowledge, you know,
5 could be assessed by anyone else, ie to drivers or other
6 passengers and then transferred up to ground level, you
7 know, it's questionable. But to answer your question,
8 I don't think they knew, at least then, what had
9 happened underneath there, based on that question, based
10 on the state of the paramedics when they arrived on the
11 scene.

12 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Zimonjic, this has been extremely helpful
13 and certainly on behalf of my client families I know
14 they are very grateful for all the efforts that you made
15 on that day, so thank you.

16 A. If they are there, can I just say hello to everyone in
17 the courtroom there who's a family member? I hope
18 you're all well.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

20 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, as a result of the way in which
21 Mr Zimonjic has been able to deal with the possibility
22 of a male or female at position E and the explanation
23 that it is Mr Hucklesby who deals with Laura Webb,
24 I have nothing else to ask, thank you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Zimonjic?

1 Mr Zimonjic, can you hear me? I'm Lady Justice
2 Hallett, the coroner.
3 A. Yes, my Lady, I can hear you.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Those are all the questions that the
5 lawyers have for you. I have already commented to other
6 people how extraordinarily brave you were, those of you
7 who literally took a leap into the dark and into the
8 unknown to answer those desperate cries for help. I'm
9 sorry I've had to ask you to relive that experience, but
10 thank you for helping me and thank you for all you did
11 that day.
12 A. Thank you. Could I make one final point --
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course you may.
14 A. -- before you let me go?
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, of course.
16 A. I appreciate your kind words for myself and other
17 rescuers. What I would say is that that experience
18 taught me that the British people themselves are
19 incredibly brave and incredibly willing to help those
20 who are in trouble. There was no panic, really, there
21 were some people who panicked, but others helped them.
22 The instincts of the people there on other trains and in
23 the carriage was to help each other, and I think that's
24 something that shouldn't be overlooked in terms of how
25 to train or equip going forward with first aid equipment

1 or some type of flashlight emergency lighting, signage
2 that tells people where there is a stretcher or a first
3 aid kit.

4 It's incredibly frustrating to be in the dark with
5 nothing but a mobile phone and a ripped shirt to try to
6 save someone's life, and I realise that, you know,
7 communication is always going to be an issue that may or
8 may not ever be resolved underground, but first aid
9 kits, some type of -- I don't know if they are glow
10 sticks or if they're flashlights, and some kind of
11 equipment I feel would help save lives.

12 If you just look at the Edgware Road incident
13 itself, Danny Biddle was -- the first person to help him
14 was an army medic with extensive training. In our
15 carriage, there was -- I had first aid training,
16 Jason Rennie, who was in the military, he had first aid
17 training, and, you know, one of the best resources
18 I think that Britain has is the British people, and
19 their willingness to help. So if you provide those
20 tools -- not to say that you leave it up to passengers,
21 I'm sure, you know, that message is clear, but give the
22 people that are trapped underground something to work
23 with, that would be greatly helpful.

24 So if that's something that -- a message that
25 I could leave you with, I hope you'll take it on board.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I will indeed, Mr Zimonjic. Thank
2 you very much indeed. They were all points well made.
3 If, once you've left -- once the videolink is closed,
4 there are other matters that occur to you because we've
5 now asked you to relive the experience again, I know
6 you've been through it a lot in the past, but if any
7 other matters occur to you, please email them to my
8 Inquest team.

9 A. I will, certainly. Thank you for your time.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Thank you very much.

12 My Lady, the next witness is Ray Whitehurst.

13 MR RAY CHRISTOPHER WHITEHURST (sworn)

14 Questions by MR KEITH

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Whitehurst, I'm sorry if we asked
16 you to come forward earlier and then we didn't get to
17 you. Matters conspired against us. But thank you for
18 rushing to get here.

19 A. These things happen.

20 MR KEITH: Good afternoon. Could you give the court your
21 full name, please?

22 A. Raymond Christopher Whitehurst.

23 Q. I'm going to ask you some questions, if I may,
24 Mr Whitehurst, about the events of 7 July 2005. We
25 won't keep you here, I hope, very long. You'll have to

1 bear with us because there are a number of issues that
2 we need to address. If you need to take a break at any
3 time or have some water, there's water there.

4 In July 2005, you had been driving trains for
5 approximately 30 or so years, is that right?

6 A. Oh yes, yes.

7 Q. I think you were extremely familiar with the trains on
8 the Hammersmith & City and Circle Lines because you had
9 been driving trains on those lines for some 16 years?

10 A. Yes, and I'd also been a shunter as well in a depot. So
11 I knew them inside out.

12 Q. On that morning, you'd booked on for duty, we know from
13 your witness statement to the police, at about 6.45, and
14 just before 7.00 you took over responsibility for
15 a Circle Line train from Edgware heading westbound
16 towards Paddington.

17 A. A Circle Line train.

18 Q. That was your first job in the morning. A Circle Line
19 train. I know the position is different now with
20 whether or not the Circle Line is truly a circle, but in
21 those days, it was a circle. Would you have done one
22 entire loop?

23 A. Three loops on that particular train.

24 Q. We know from your witness statement that you did two
25 loops, one loop and then a second loop and, according to

1 your statement, you arrived back at Edgware at about
2 8.50.

3 A. I was one minute early to the time I should have been
4 there.

5 Q. Do you recollect anything about the last stop of that
6 train at Edgware Road before its departure for
7 Paddington?

8 A. Yes, most of the passengers that I had on that train
9 alighted at Edgware Road, so the train was running
10 light, to our standards, and a foreign passenger came up
11 to me -- I don't know what nationality he was -- and he
12 asked me what was the next train to Paddington, and
13 I informed him it was mine, and he jumped in the first
14 carriage.

15 Q. I don't think the train stayed at Edgware for very long,
16 did it?

17 A. No, no. The signal cleared and I departed the station.

18 Q. Is there a speed restriction between Edgware Road and
19 Paddington?

20 A. Yes, there is, yes.

21 Q. Do you recollect what it was?

22 A. Yes, it's 15.

23 Q. 15?

24 A. 15 to Praed Street junction and then 20.

25 Q. In your statement, you in fact describe the speed

1 restriction as being 20 miles an hour there. Is that an
2 error?

3 A. There's an error in the statement. It was approaching
4 the 20-mile per hour.

5 Q. Right. Is there a mark on the floor on the sleepers
6 that indicates something called a reverse point?

7 A. Yes, there is.

8 Q. What is that?

9 A. It's on a sleeper. It's where you can reverse -- if
10 a train is going to reverse into the sidings at
11 Edgware Road, they pull out of the station up to that
12 mark, and then they can reverse the train back into the
13 sidings by the side of the station.

14 Q. What was the relevancy of that reverse point,
15 Mr Whitehurst, to your recollection of the point of the
16 explosion?

17 A. I was approaching that, and it had just come within my
18 vision, as it were, when the whole world just went
19 mental on me, as it were.

20 Q. Do you recollect a movement or a physical sensation in
21 the seat in which you were sitting or the train itself?

22 A. I felt the front of the carriage raise and it was as if
23 I'd hit a brick wall. I went -- the train just stopped
24 dead in the air and came down with a thump, and I hit my
25 head on the windscreen, I was then thrown back, hit the

1 back of my head on the back and jarred my back, and
2 I thought, "This is going to hurt", and the next thing
3 I saw was all this dust just go past me very, very fast.
4 Q. Dust was coming from --
5 A. From behind me.
6 Q. -- behind your driver's cab --
7 A. From behind the driver's cab.
8 Q. -- and going past the cab outwards in front of you?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Towards Paddington?
11 A. Towards Paddington, towards both of the Paddingtons.
12 Q. Do you remember what the effect was of this bang, or
13 whatever had happened towards the rear of the train, on
14 the power and the lighting in the driver's cab?
15 A. Everything died.
16 Q. What do you mean by "everything"?
17 A. Everything, all the power just went off. There was no
18 power there, no lighting, the train radio packed up on
19 me. I lost the use of all the equipment.
20 Q. Do you know whether the electricity, the traction
21 current, the juice, from the rail is what powers
22 everything in your driver --
23 A. Yes, there's a visual indicator and that showed me
24 immediately there was no power.
25 Q. Is there any kind of -- or was there any kind of

1 emergency backup power that would supply light or any
2 kind of communication to the driver's cab?
3 A. Yes, we have a battery system.
4 Q. Did that kick in?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Do you remember there being a train going in the
7 opposite direction?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. After you'd stopped moving yourself, having been thrown
10 forward and then back, could you hear anything from
11 behind you?
12 A. I heard the worst screaming that I've ever heard in my
13 life.
14 Q. Where was it coming from?
15 A. From behind me, in the passenger carriages.
16 Q. From the screaming and from the jolt, the rising up of
17 the carriage and the dust, were you able to form any
18 kind of view as to what might have happened?
19 A. My first thought was that my train and the train beside
20 me had hit each other, so I went to that side of the cab
21 and took a look down and there was no visible signs of
22 that happening, so I went to the other side, opened the
23 other side cab door and looked down there, and I could
24 see people flailing -- what I call flailing about on the
25 track and I could see parts of the train that were on

1 the track, and my immediate thought was, "Oh no,
2 a bomb's gone off".
3 Q. Did you try to use your radio?
4 A. I did try to use the radio, and it wasn't working. It
5 had been working that day.
6 Q. When you say it wasn't working -- I'm sorry to pause you
7 there -- was it that it had power but it couldn't get
8 a signal, there was no link?
9 A. There was no power.
10 Q. You said the radio had been working earlier?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It's a radio that was designed to be used in the
13 tunnels, was it not? So it is meant to be used while
14 you're driving the train.
15 A. Well, they say it was designed to be used in the
16 tunnels.
17 Q. Did it generally work in the tunnels?
18 A. Generally, no.
19 Q. Had any kind of manual lighting come on at this stage
20 that enabled you to see where the radio was and to try
21 to use it?
22 A. I didn't need a light to see it. The button is right by
23 the side of the driver. In a dark tunnel you can see
24 it -- you know where it is, you can automatically go to
25 it.

1 Q. Did people start banging on the cab door behind you, the
2 door to your --

3 A. Several passengers started banging on that cab door,
4 yes.

5 Q. Could you hear what they were saying?

6 A. Yes, they were asking me to open the door.

7 Q. Were you able to open the door?

8 A. I got the door open about two or three inches, and then
9 they -- the passengers that were in the car had to
10 assist me. The door had buckled on the hinges by the
11 look of it.

12 Q. How were you able to see, if anything, at this stage?

13 A. I was using the light from the train by the side of us.

14 Q. Did you tell the passengers what they should do in terms
15 of staying still, calming down, not trying to get out?

16 A. Well, yes, I informed the passengers that what had
17 happened had happened and they were safer where they
18 were at that time. Because of the dust that was in the
19 tunnel, it was a bit dangerous to -- if they got out
20 into the tunnel and they breathed in that dust.

21 Q. Did everybody accept your advice or did anybody in
22 particular try to get out?

23 A. Unfortunately, there was one passenger that pushed past
24 me, jumped down on the track and then demanded that
25 I leave everybody and take him to safety.

1 Q. Do you know whether the PA system on the train was
2 working?

3 A. Yes, I know it was working for at least the first
4 carriage.

5 Q. Did you try to use it?

6 A. I used it. I used it to calm people down and told them
7 that help would be on its way. I know it did get
8 through, because, after the incident, two of the
9 passengers came up to me and thanked me for using it.

10 Q. Having made that PA, that tannoy call, did you try to
11 use the radio again?

12 A. At that moment, I thought, well, it's probably the MCB
13 that's tripped out that operates it.

14 Q. Tell us please what that is?

15 A. That's a miniature circuit breaker, basically a fuse.
16 The same sort of fuse you have in your home that trips
17 out and you can just trip it back again. But
18 I realised, if I tried using that, I could electrocute
19 people that were on the track, so I decided to try using
20 my mobile telephone.

21 Q. Did you have a signal?

22 A. For some strange reason, no. Usually, at that point,
23 I can get -- I can get a signal 90 per cent of the
24 Circle Line route, but --

25 Q. Because it's high up and not too low underground?

1 A. Yes it's not actually below ground. And usually, at
2 that point, yes, I've made telephone calls telling my
3 children that I'm on the way home from work at that
4 point. But on this occasion, there was no signal.

5 Q. Having turned it on, do you have any recollection of the
6 time that it displayed?

7 A. Yes, yes, it was 8.52, I believe, 8.51, 8.52.

8 Q. So the radio didn't work. Your mobile didn't have
9 a signal. What other means of communicating with your
10 line manager or the duty manager --

11 A. I knew there was the old standby, which was the signal
12 telephone, which was just in front of me.

13 Q. What is a signal telephone?

14 A. That signal telephone lets you talk directly to the
15 signal cabin at Edgware Road.

16 Q. Is that a box?

17 A. It's a box with a telephone in it, yes, you have to open
18 it up.

19 Q. Are such signal telephones located all the way down
20 through the tunnels?

21 A. Not through all the tunnels, no. Only in the
22 signalman's area, depending on where the signal cabin
23 is, depends which signalman you get.

24 Q. Who does that signal telephone connect you to?

25 A. It connects me to the signalman directly.

1 Q. Where is the signalman?

2 A. The signalman is at Edgware Road, there is a signal box
3 at Edgware Road.

4 Q. Do you recollect anything of the call that you made to
5 that signalman from the signal box?

6 A. Yes, I informed the signalman that a bomb had gone off
7 on my train, and he said, "No, it's all right, don't
8 worry about it, it's only a power surge".

9 Q. You had got out, of course, the front of your train --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- the westbound train and, therefore, you were between
12 your train and Paddington?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Were you able to see anything of the rear of your train
15 or the front of the other eastbound train?

16 A. Well, I was looking -- I had my back to my train and
17 I turned round as I was on the phone and I looked down
18 at my train and I could see back as far as Edgware Road
19 down the side and I could see people were on the track
20 and I could see that there were train staff from
21 Edgware Road running up towards the rear of my train.

22 Q. Did you tell the signalman, not only that there had been
23 a bomb on the train, but that the emergency services
24 were required or that people were severely injured or
25 anything of that effect?

1 A. Yes, I asked him to inform the emergency services and
2 get me assistance down there and I told him that the
3 second carriage just didn't seem to exist anymore.

4 Q. Was he able to give you some assurance as to whether or
5 not the juice, the traction current, was off, or what
6 would be done?

7 A. Yes, I did ask him, I said, "If I've got to do
8 a detrainment, is it safe to take them forward to
9 Paddington?", and he said, "Well, I can tell you that
10 the traction current is off where you are and up to
11 Edgware Road, but we've lost all contact with
12 Paddington, and I don't know if there's any trains in
13 the vicinity, and we've got no way of telling if the
14 traction current is on or off there."

15 Q. So the area of track on which your train was situated
16 and the track to the rear of it, the part you'd already
17 travelled over from Edgware Road going towards
18 Paddington was off, but there were no assurances as to
19 the condition of the track ahead of you towards
20 Paddington?

21 A. Ahead of me, going to either of the two Paddingtons
22 there, at the split in the tracks, there was no way --
23 he had no way of knowing what was happening there,
24 they'd lost all contact.

25 Q. Did you discuss whether or not you should carry out an

1 emergency detrainment or perhaps that passengers were
2 already on the track and it was too late to do anything
3 about it?

4 A. Yes, he asked me if I was going to do an emergency
5 detrainment. I said, "It's a bit late for that because
6 they're already on the track", I said, "But what I will
7 do is the passengers that are on the train I'll think
8 about it and see how best it is to get them off."

9 Q. Now, it's not in your statement, but you did prepare
10 some notes shortly after 7/7 --

11 A. Yes, when I got home.

12 Q. -- in which you set out a list of all the things that
13 you can recollect that happened to you.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can we have [INQ8578-2] on the screen?
16 You'll see at number 20:
17 "Use phone on OP11 ..."
18 Is that the signal box?

19 A. That's the signal box, yes, that's the signal actually,
20 where the telephone box is.

21 Q. "... to inform signalmen and request help. Time 08.54
22 am."

23 How did you know, when you prepared these notes,
24 what the time was of the signal call?

25 A. I looked at my -- I was still looking at my phone hoping

1 to get a signal.

2 Q. Having made the call, did you go back to your cab?

3 A. I went back to the cab and I put down the
4 short-circuiting device and the ladder, and I told the
5 passengers that the only way could I get them out, the
6 walking passengers out, was by letting them down onto
7 the track and they would have to walk down by the side
8 of the train back to Edgware Road, which they all agreed
9 to do.

10 Q. These were the passengers who were congregating around
11 your driver's cab?

12 A. These were the passengers that were in the first
13 carriage.

14 Q. Were you able to see past the first carriage into the
15 second carriage at this stage?

16 A. Not at that time, no.

17 Q. Having told them that, did you go back and speak to the
18 signalman again?

19 A. Yes, I went back and told him that I was going to
20 detrain 17 people and send them back to Edgware Road.

21 Q. Do you recall what else you said to the signalman during
22 the course of that conversation?

23 A. Not offhand at that time, no. No, but he told me it was
24 just a power surge and it had happened somewhere else as
25 well.

1 Q. Was it the same signalman that you had spoken to
2 earlier?

3 A. Yes, that second time, yes.

4 Q. Do you know the name of that signalman?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Your statement records how, having made that second call
7 to the signalman, you then went back to your cab again
8 and you made a second tannoy?

9 A. Yes, I asked people that were in the first two
10 carriages, who could walk, to come to the front and the
11 passengers that were in the rear four cars to go towards
12 the rear where staff would be there to assist them.

13 Q. How did you know that your tannoy could be heard, not
14 just in the cab and in the first carriage, but in the
15 remainder of the train?

16 A. I didn't, no, I just hoped that it was working. It was
17 the only way I had of contacting them anyway.

18 Q. You then checked and counted out, perhaps, the people
19 who were able to detrain from the front of your train.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. They then went out of your door?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. There are a number of doors in the front of a cab, in
24 the front of a train.

25 A. They went out through the centre door down the stairs

1 that I'd set for them.

2 Q. That's the one right in the middle of the front of the
3 train?

4 A. Right in the middle.

5 Q. Then they turned left and then went back down between
6 the tunnel wall and the carriage?

7 A. That's right, yes. Well, all but two of them.

8 Q. What happened to those two?

9 A. One of them was a manager from Paddington station and
10 the other one I didn't know, he had a large gash on his
11 forehead, they asked if they could stay and help me, so
12 I told them that there was a chance of a secondary
13 device going off, so I couldn't ask them to stay, but if
14 they did stay, I wouldn't stop them.

15 Q. Did you and they then yourselves walk down the carriage
16 between the wall and the --

17 A. I asked the gentleman with the gash to go round to the
18 side of the train and help those that were on the track
19 by the side of the train, and the Paddington manager, he
20 got on the train with me and we walked through the train
21 trying to get to the second carriage, which we couldn't
22 do in the end.

23 Q. Did you, yourself, go down the side of the carriage
24 between the carriage and the tunnel wall back as far as
25 the second carriage?

1 A. I went back as far as the connecting doors with this
2 gentleman and we found a man there with a hole the size
3 of a tennis ball in his leg. He was obstructing the
4 centre doors, he was across both carriages, and we gave
5 him some first aid.

6 Q. That was inside?

7 A. That was inside.

8 Q. You went inside the train, not down the outside?

9 A. No, I wasn't down the outside then. And I thought --
10 well, I tried to get across him, but I realised that, if
11 I tried jumping across him, there was a hole in the
12 floor that I could see, and I was probably going to go
13 down that hole. So I decided against trying to move
14 him, which we really couldn't do at that stage, and get
15 past him, and I decided then I'd go down by the side of
16 the train. So I left the British Rail manager with him
17 looking after him, and I went down the side of the train
18 to see what I could do.

19 Q. Did you then shortly thereafter come across a fellow
20 train operator, Mr Matthews?

21 A. Dave Matthews, yes. He managed to get through to me.

22 Q. Where did he come from?

23 A. He came from the station.

24 Q. Edgware Road?

25 A. Edgware Road.

1 Q. Would he then have gone up the tunnel between the tunnel
2 wall and the carriage to get to where you were?

3 A. I have no idea exactly how he managed to do it, but he
4 was on the side of the track coming towards me.

5 Q. Did you discuss with him what had happened?

6 A. Well, yes, we discussed what had happened and the best
7 way forward.

8 Q. His witness statement -- we'll hear evidence from him
9 tomorrow, but his witness statement and your own record,
10 in fact, how you said to him that they'd blown your
11 train up.

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. Do you recall that?

14 A. I did tell him that they'd blown my train up, it was
15 pretty obvious at that point.

16 Q. Was there a discussion between you as to where the
17 emergency services were?

18 A. Well, Dave asked me where the emergency services were,
19 and I said, "Well, I keep phoning for them and I keep
20 being told it's just a power surge and not to worry".

21 So I asked Dave to go and try the phone himself and see
22 if he could get a different answer from them.

23 Q. Did you go to the phone with him?

24 A. I went to the phone with him, yes.

25 Q. Did you speak to the same signaller as you had before?

1 A. No, I've no idea which signalman I was speaking to at
2 all at any time. It could have been one of several
3 people. The signal cabin also has the option to
4 transfer your call elsewhere. So it could have gone
5 elsewhere.

6 Q. Did you and Mr Matthews both speak to the signalman?

7 A. Yes, we both spoke to him.

8 Q. What was the general nature of what you were asking for?

9 A. He said that the emergency services had been called and
10 they were at the station. I believe Dave Matthews was
11 also told it was a power surge.

12 Q. In your statement, you describe how Mr Matthews decided
13 to phone the signal cabin but the phone went dead. Do
14 you recollect that?

15 A. Yes, the signalman put the phone down on him.

16 Q. At this stage, did a gentleman called Mr Corbin from
17 whom we've heard, Bryan Corbin, appear at the end of the
18 train and did he appear with paramedics?

19 A. No, I phoned up again, I was getting pretty annoyed that
20 there hadn't been any medical staff come down by that
21 time, and this time I was put through to
22 DMC Bryan Corbin who I'd known for years. He identified
23 himself to me, and I said, "Look, we've got no medical
24 staff down here still, Bryan, can you get someone down
25 here?", and he said he would get someone down by hook or

1 by crook, and, yes, he brought someone down.

2 Q. How long after this call did he appear?

3 A. Actually, it was very quickly. 10, 15 minutes, no more
4 than that.

5 Q. Her Ladyship has heard Mr Corbin give evidence. He says
6 he didn't speak to you on the phone, but did meet you in
7 the tunnel when he appeared with help, two paramedics
8 whom he had flagged down at station level in a passing
9 ambulance. Is it possible that your recollection may
10 have been mistaken, in that you spoke to another
11 signaller and it was Mr Corbin --

12 A. It could quite easily have been another signaller that
13 I spoke to.

14 Q. All right. Did the paramedics and Mr Corbin require
15 your help to get on to the rear of the other train,
16 that's to say the eastbound train?

17 A. They were on that train, walking through that train, so
18 I positioned the short-circuiting device in a place that
19 I could get the emergency ladder down for them and put
20 the emergency ladder down so they could get off that
21 train to get on to my train.

22 Q. They had come from Edgware Road, they'd gone into the
23 front of the eastbound train, gone along that train, and
24 emerged at the back of the eastbound train where you
25 were, if you were on the Paddington side?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You helped them down. They then went across to the
3 other train and in?

4 A. Yes, I directed a couple of them round to the side of
5 the train where I knew there were passengers that were
6 on the floor and needed help on the track, and I boarded
7 the train with Mr Corbin and a couple of the other
8 medics to see to the gentleman that was between the two
9 carriages.

10 Q. Mr Zimonjic, from whom we've just heard from Ottawa by
11 videolink, describes in his book how you went into the
12 train, the bombed train, with the paramedics and how you
13 told them to prepare themselves for a truly terrible
14 sight.

15 A. Yes, before we boarded, as we were boarding the train,
16 I said to them to be prepared because it's not
17 a normal -- "It's not normal injuries you're about to
18 see".

19 Q. So you had been able to see something of the nature and
20 severity of the devastation in the second carriage?

21 A. Yes, when I walked along the side and I met up with
22 Dave Matthews, I'd seen Peter Zimonjic in the carriage
23 helping people, I'd seen some of the people that were in
24 the carriage, but I'd noticed -- I'd taken a mental note
25 that they were all -- all had someone with them, the

1 injured, which was -- the only medical assistance we had
2 was having people there with them.

3 Q. There are two other things mentioned in his book, and
4 I don't know whether you can confirm this or not. There
5 was a reference to the fact that one of the paramedics
6 asked you to try to get more equipment, a stretcher and
7 more saline. Do you remember that? Is that right or
8 not?

9 A. I don't think that was me, that may have been
10 Dave Matthews.

11 Q. And secondly, how -- there is a reference to how, after
12 you told the paramedics to prepare themselves, that one
13 of them vomited in reaction to the sheer horror of what
14 they saw?

15 A. One of them sat down with the gentleman with the hole in
16 his leg, and he -- it appeared that he wanted to vomit.
17 I turned my back to him then.

18 Q. Did you go into the second carriage with them?

19 A. No, I was ordered off the train.

20 Q. I think, before you left the scene, did you help with
21 opening firstly the J door, which is one of the doors on
22 the end of the train and, secondly, opening some of the
23 side doors?

24 A. Yes, two duty managers had walked down from Paddington.
25 They ordered me off, out, away from the scene, but

1 I stayed, I said, "No, I'd rather stay to see my
2 passengers are all right". We climbed on the train.
3 Now, on our trains, we have a canvas stretcher in
4 each driver's cab, and we can also use the J door key,
5 it lifts off the hinges, so we can lift that off and use
6 that as a stretcher, an emergency stretcher as well.

7 Q. Which is the J door?

8 A. The J door is the door that connects the driver's cab
9 with the passenger compartment, so we tried getting that
10 door off, but it was warped a bit and it wouldn't have
11 it.

12 Q. The door was jammed --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- or the frame had been moved and you couldn't actually
15 get it off its hinges?

16 A. We couldn't get it off its hinges.

17 Q. What about the double passenger doors?

18 A. Yes, we -- if you lift the seats, there's a little catch
19 you can clip underneath with something and then the
20 doors will free and you can just open them easily.

21 Q. Can you open all the doors in the carriage or just one
22 set of the double doors?

23 A. That's all the doors. Each set of double doors has got
24 its own little catch that you have to do. So we opened
25 up a couple of them so that we had access for getting

1 people off the train.

2 Then, after we'd done that, I was once again told
3 that I had to leave and young Paul Broomfield turned up
4 and took me away.

5 Q. You went back to Edgware Road station?

6 A. I went back, yes, via platforms 1 and 2 where
7 I collapsed.

8 Q. I want to ask you about one final matter, if I may. You
9 describe in your statement how you were amazed to see
10 that, during the incident, people just got on with
11 helping each other.

12 A. Yes, I'd been kneeling down at one point helping to give
13 someone a heart massage. I don't think that gentleman
14 made it, actually.

15 Q. Where was that?

16 A. That was by the side of the train on the track. That
17 was near the bomb hole.

18 Q. May I ask you about that? The bomb hole was obviously
19 on the train itself.

20 A. Yes, it was by the side of the track by the side of the
21 tunnel.

22 Q. There was a gentleman who tragically died inside the
23 crater, he fell through from the crater onto the track
24 below, or was assisted down. There was no man lying on
25 the track alongside the train?

1 A. Well, he was still under the train, but to me that's the
2 side of the track.

3 Q. Right. At what stage was that?

4 A. I couldn't actually turn round and say at this time.

5 Q. Was this before or after the paramedics had arrived?

6 A. This was well before the paramedics had arrived, yes,
7 well before.

8 Q. Forgive me, I may have misunderstood, but I thought you
9 hadn't gone down as far as the precise point of the --

10 A. No, I'd gone as far as the second carriage when I met
11 Dave Matthews.

12 Q. Right. Was it before or after you met Dave Matthews?

13 A. It was just before I met Dave Matthews.

14 Q. For how long did you perform massage?

15 A. Only a couple of minutes. Well, a couple of moments,
16 I would say. There was a gentleman with him who wanted
17 to take over, he wanted to be with him, so I left them
18 with it.

19 Q. Do you know whether he carried on trying to --

20 A. He carried on trying.

21 Q. As far as you were aware, did the person whom you had
22 attempted to give chest compression to or massage to
23 show any signs of life?

24 A. Not at that time, no.

25 Q. Why do you say "Not at that time, no"?

1 A. Well, the gentleman that was with him said that he had
2 been alive, and he had given him massage after he
3 appeared to have died and he'd come back again. I said,
4 "Well, you can carry on, if you like. I don't think
5 he's going to survive".

6 Q. There's no reference to that in your witness statement.
7 Can you assist us at all as to why no mention is made of
8 that?

9 A. That's one of the things that I blocked out, I'm afraid.

10 Q. All right. Well, thank you for telling us. Was it with
11 reference to that person helping the man that -- you
12 said people helped each other?

13 A. Yes, I mean, I had been kneeling down and I stood up at
14 that point and I looked around, and it just seemed that
15 I've got walking wounded and other passengers helping
16 the passengers, and they were all races, all religions,
17 and I suddenly felt so humble just looking at them
18 helping people.

19 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,
20 though, please, because there may be some further
21 questions for you?

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

23 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Whitehurst, if you will excuse me for just
24 a moment, I just need to address a comment to my Lady.
25 I've raised this with Junior Counsel for the Inquests.

1 It's just a query at the outset. There are two extracts
2 from witness statements which are relatively lengthy.
3 I can, of course, read them to the witness. I do have
4 them, they are ready to go and to be put on screen.
5 I'm conscious, my Lady, that you've had some
6 concerns in the past about extracts from witness
7 statements going on screen, given that they may then go
8 on the website. I can tell you precisely what the
9 references are, if that would assist.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

11 MS GALLAGHER: It's INQ7300-3, which is just an extract from
12 Mr Whitehurst's witness statement where he describes one
13 of his conversations with the signalman, and then it's
14 an extract from the person whom we believe to be the
15 signalman he spoke to, his witness statement describing
16 the same conversation, and that's INQ7483-1. They are
17 ready to go on screen, but I didn't want to put them on
18 screen without checking with you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think it's better if you read them.
20 Otherwise, it causes complications. Thank you for
21 alerting me to it, Ms Gallagher, I'm very grateful.

22 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

23 MS GALLAGHER: No problem.

24 Well, Mr Whitehurst, you've heard that I'm going to
25 have to read out some rather lengthy extracts, I'm

1 afraid, from witness statements rather than showing them
2 to you on screen, I hope you understand.

3 Could I just start by asking you about something you
4 said earlier when you were being asked some questions by
5 Mr Keith. The reference, for anyone taking note, is
6 page 157 at lines 15 to 18.

7 You were asked about the radio and the radio not
8 working, your train radio not working. You seemed to
9 express some concern about the radio's reliability
10 generally. You said, "Well, it was designed to work in
11 the tunnels". When you were asked if it did, you said
12 "Generally, no". So was it a regular occurrence that
13 the radio would fail?

14 A. It was a regular occurrence that those radios were
15 likely to fail.

16 Q. Can you give us a rough estimation how many times out of
17 ten would the radio work?

18 A. It depends which train you got. I mean, some of them
19 worked all the time. Some of the trains just worked for
20 a few minutes and then wouldn't work on other sections
21 of the line.

22 Q. Certainly. We're going to hear evidence from another
23 driver in the neighbouring train and, according to his
24 witness statement, we know that his radio didn't work at
25 this time either, so it wasn't just yours in the bombed

1 train.

2 In your witness statement, Mr Whitehurst, you've
3 indicated that, immediately when you heard the noise,
4 you assumed it was a bomb, you thought it was a bomb,
5 and what you say is:

6 "I immediately thought that a bomb had exploded. As
7 I thought this, I heard a bang. Immediately I heard
8 screams coming from behind me. This, in my mind,
9 confirmed it was a bomb."

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You were quite certain from the outset that it was
12 a bomb that you'd heard?

13 A. Well, yes.

14 Q. Were you aware, Mr Whitehurst, of any particular steps
15 you had to take in the event of a bomb?

16 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.

17 Q. Were you aware of anything in particular you had to do
18 if there was a bomb on a train?

19 A. Just what we had to do in the 1970s with the IRA
20 bombings.

21 Q. You do make reference in a document we've seen
22 earlier -- it's [INQ8578-2] -- at item 25, after you'd
23 gone back to the signal phone, you say:

24 "The thought crossed my mind of a secondary
25 explosive device."

1 So that was very much in your mind?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could you assist us, Mr Whitehurst, with when you
4 prepared these notes?

5 A. That same evening.

6 Q. It's extremely helpful to have a contemporaneous very
7 full note, so thank you very much for doing that. It
8 makes our job much easier.

9 You've described today -- and it's clear from these
10 notes, from this page and the next page -- that you had
11 at least three conversations using the signal phone,
12 using OP11 --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and you were there when Dave Matthews tried to have
15 a fourth conversation, when you believe the phone was
16 put down on him?

17 A. Well, the phone went dead, but it was still working when
18 we tried it again.

19 Q. Before I ask you some detail about those conversations,
20 I'm just going to get the overall timing. So first of
21 all, on this same page, could we look at items 20 and
22 21?

23 So this is conversation 1 with the signaller, and
24 you say the time is 8.54 am?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. It's while you're on the phone, we can see from item 21,
2 that you turn around, you look at the train and you see
3 the extent of the devastation while you're on the
4 phone --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- and you tell the signalman.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The second conversation that you have is, I believe,
9 item 31, further down the page where you say:
10 "Went back to signal phone and asked again for
11 help."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, you haven't put a time there. Do you have any idea
14 what time that was, how much later?

15 A. No, I'm sorry.

16 Q. Please don't apologise.

17 A. I had stopped worrying about time by then.

18 Q. Of course. Now conversation 3, if we could go on to the
19 next page, and if we could go to item 38, that's the
20 third conversation you record here, where you say you
21 were transferred to Bryan Corbin.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. There you record time approximately 9.15 am.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Then, if we just look a little further down at item 42,

1 we can see you record that it's approximately 9.40 am
2 when you notice Bryan Corbin walking through the other
3 train with paramedics and you went to assist them.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was Mr Corbin walking with two individuals?

6 A. At least two, I believe more than two.

7 Q. Could I go back to that first conversation that you had,
8 Mr Whitehurst? I'm sorry to make you relive this, I'll
9 be as brief as I can.

10 You, in your witness statement, which you prepared
11 just a number of days after the bombing, described that
12 conversation in detail and I'm just going to read out
13 what you said. You said:

14 "A bomb has gone off on my train, I have dead and
15 wounded people and people on the track. I need to
16 confirm traction current is off and call for the
17 emergency services."

18 So there really were four key points: you said
19 "a bomb has gone off", so you referred to it as a bomb.
20 Number two, you made clear there were dead and wounded
21 people. Number three, you asked for confirmation that
22 traction current was off, and number four, you called
23 for the emergency services.

24 Now, we know you don't know who the signaller was,
25 but there is a witness from whom we'll hear evidence

1 later in the week who describes speaking to you,
2 a gentleman called Trevor Rogers, and he says that he
3 received a phone call from one of the drivers and he
4 describes the conversation a little differently. He
5 says:
6 "The driver told me to come down to his train as
7 there was smoke coming from his train and dead people on
8 the track. I asked Ray if the explosion had been
9 trackside or trainside. Ray told me it had definitely
10 been trainside."
11 And that is the end of it. He then says he
12 telephoned someone else to update him. So while he does
13 make a reference to there being dead people on the track
14 and an explosion, there's no reference to a bomb, no
15 reference to the traction current, and no reference,
16 importantly, to your request for the emergency services.
17 But you're certain that you told the person you
18 spoke to that it was a bomb?
19 A. I'm certain, yes.
20 Q. You're certain that you asked for clarification that the
21 traction current was off?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you're certain that you, at that point, said "We
24 must have the emergency services"?
25 A. Yes, that's standard procedure.

1 Q. Thank you. The second conversation, which is item 31 on
2 this screen, in your witness statement you say that when
3 you spoke to the signalman -- and you've told us it's
4 the same signalman -- he says, "It's okay, it's only
5 a power surge" and you said, "It's a bomb. I've dead,
6 I've injured, I've walking wounded. I require the
7 emergency services."

8 Again, you're certain that you insisted on having
9 the emergency services at the time?

10 A. I was very clear, very clear.

11 Q. Then the third conversation, Mr Whitehurst, which you
12 describe as being with Mr Corbin, although you say it
13 may have been with somebody else, is items 38 and 39
14 here, which you should see on the screen, and in your
15 witness statement at the time you say:

16 "I walked to the signal phone and again phoned the
17 signalman who put me through to Bryan Corbin who is line
18 standards manager. Bryan said, 'I hear you've got
19 a compressor gone'. I said, 'No, it's a bomb. The
20 second car is vanished.' I again requested emergency
21 help."

22 You can see that reflected in your notes here where
23 you say:

24 "DMT Corbin asked if compressor had blown up.

25 Informed him it was a bomb. Requested again emergency

1 service assistance."

2 So this is the third time you've requested emergency
3 service by telephone?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did you get the impression from that conversation that
6 it was already on the way?

7 A. I got the impression that nobody really knew what they
8 were doing.

9 Q. Just at the very bottom of this page, [INQ8578-3], the
10 very bottom of the page, it says:

11 "Arriving home, I placed my clothing in a bag in
12 case they were needed for testing. Staff were still
13 saying it was either a power surge or a compressor, but
14 anyone who saw the devastation could see it was a bomb."

15 Is that accurate, Mr Whitehurst, that even at that
16 late stage in the day, the word on the street still was
17 that it was a compressor or a power surge, even though
18 you knew differently?

19 A. Yes.

20 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, Mr Whitehurst, thank
21 you very much.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for
23 Mr Whitehurst? Ms Canby?

24 Questions by MS CANBY

25 MS CANBY: Mr Whitehurst, I have some questions to ask you

1 on behalf of Transport for London, and given you've told
2 us that you were such an experienced train driver,
3 I wondered if you could help us a little with how your
4 C stock train worked, but can we start, please, by how
5 many passengers do you think were on your train at the
6 time of the explosion?

7 A. There was no way of knowing unless I got up and counted
8 them, but it was a light train in comparison to what we
9 do. I was expecting a full train once I reached
10 Paddington again.

11 Q. Could you help us, please, because obviously you've got
12 more experience than us --

13 A. Probably about a dozen a carriage.

14 Q. And we're talking about six carriages?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. We've heard a lot throughout the evidence that's been
17 given about emergency lighting.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Could you help with us emergency lighting? When does it
20 come on?

21 A. The emergency lighting should come on when the power is
22 taken off.

23 Q. It comes on automatically, is that right?

24 A. It will come on automatically.

25 Q. So you don't have to switch it on, as a train driver?

1 A. Oh, no, no, no.

2 Q. That's true of the emergency lighting in the tunnel as
3 well as on the carriage?

4 A. Yes, that did come on.

5 Q. Is that also an indication to you that traction current
6 is off, if you see the tunnel lighting coming on and the
7 emergency lighting in your carriage?

8 A. The emergency lighting would be on all the time anyway,
9 wouldn't it?

10 Q. I was going to come on to that, because we've heard
11 about emergency lighting in the carriage and various
12 people have referred to it being turned on. That's not
13 right, is it, Mr Whitehurst?

14 A. No, no.

15 Q. Could you explain to us how it works?

16 A. The emergency lighting comes on with the normal lighting
17 when you switch the lighting on. If something happens
18 to the -- for you to lose traction current, then the
19 emergency lighting will stay on, even if the normal
20 lighting goes off, unless, of course, there is a problem
21 affecting it.

22 Q. You told us, I think, that when you opened the J door,
23 which is the door connecting your driver's cab with the
24 first carriage, there was no lighting in that carriage,
25 is that right?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Do you think that there was possibly no lighting once
3 you'd seen the extent of the damage caused by the
4 explosion because of the explosion, could it have been
5 that the battery had been damaged in the explosion?

6 A. It could have been the batteries were damaged in the
7 explosion, but to be honest with you, that was the least
8 of my worries at that time.

9 Q. I appreciate that, Mr Whitehurst. We just heard a lot
10 of evidence about it and I'm seeing whether or not you
11 can assist us with it.

12 A. I wouldn't say there was a fault with the operation of
13 the emergency lighting on any of the Underground trains.
14 It's usually pretty foolproof in most cases. Obviously
15 effects from damage, from bomb damage, will probably
16 affect it. I have no way of knowing, I'm not an expert
17 in that area.

18 Q. No, but it was unusual for emergency lighting not to be
19 working?

20 A. Very unusual for -- I've never known it before.

21 Q. Never in your 33 years as a train driver?

22 A. No, I've never known -- emergency lighting has always
23 worked.

24 Q. Could you help us, please, with how doors are opened?

25 Do you have a switch in your driver's cab to open the

1 doors for the passengers as they come on and off?

2 Presumably that's right?

3 A. I've got the normal guard's position where the guard
4 used to operate, which now a driver operates, which has
5 got the doors open and doors closed. But they can only
6 be opened and closed in stations now. There is a little
7 electronic gizmo that prevents it unless you physically
8 disconnect it.

9 Q. Is that a safety feature to prevent passengers --

10 A. That is a safety feature, yes.

11 Q. To prevent passengers getting onto the track between
12 stations?

13 A. It is indeed.

14 Q. In an emergency, there are a number of ways that the
15 doors can be opened, but again not by passengers. Is
16 that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. One of the ways from the outside is by using butterfly
19 cocks?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Could you explain to us how that works briefly?

22 A. On the outside of the trains, there is a butterfly cock.
23 It's basically a switch which, if you turn it, will open
24 one set of the double doors on that carriage.

25 Q. So that's a means of opening from the outside?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Then you've referred to a means of opening them in an
3 emergency from the inside?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Is that by using the door isolating cock?

6 A. No, there is -- they operate on a swing arm that's on
7 a latch and, if you put a paddle underneath them,
8 a wooden paddle, then you can force that over and the
9 door will then open and the wooden paddle is just
10 a piece of wood.

11 Q. It looks a bit like an oar?

12 A. It looks a bit like an oar, which is why it's called
13 a paddle.

14 Q. The paddle is one of the items that's in your emergency
15 door pod?

16 A. You get three or four of them in an emergency toolbox in
17 every driver's cab.

18 Q. So the J door that you've described, that has what we
19 call an emergency pod on it. Is that right?

20 A. That's got an emergency pod, yes.

21 Q. There are three driver's cabs in each C stock train?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So there would be three lots of emergency equipment on
24 each C stock train?

25 A. Yes, you have the potential for six stretchers on one

1 C stock train.

2 Q. Is that because you have one ladder in each cab, one
3 wooden ladder, and that can be turned into an emergency
4 stretcher, is that right?

5 A. No. That's because you can turn the J door key --
6 a J door into an emergency stretcher.

7 Q. I see, by taking off the J door as you were describing.

8 A. Yes, and the emergency pod has got a stretcher in it,
9 a canvas stretcher in it as well.

10 Q. We've heard you talk about a canvas stretcher. I think
11 we may hear some other witnesses refer to something as
12 a carry-sheet. Do you think that's the same thing?

13 A. That's it, yes, that's the same thing.

14 Q. So there would be one carry-sheet in each driver's cab.
15 Is that right?

16 A. In each driver's cab, yes.

17 Q. So you've got three of those on the train as well?

18 A. Well, if you can reach them, yes.

19 Q. Right, why wouldn't you able to reach them,
20 Mr Whitehurst?

21 A. Because a bomb has gone off between you and the other
22 two cars.

23 Q. I appreciate that, right. So not through any fault on
24 the train, but because of the explosion, you wouldn't be
25 able to?

1 A. It wouldn't be a fault on the train, no.

2 Q. Could we have please on the screen document [TFL973-1].

3 Mr Whitehurst, this is a photograph of a driver's

4 cab in a C stock train. Can you tell from that picture?

5 A. Is it?

6 Q. It may be that it's a poor angle.

7 A. Well, they've changed them since I left.

8 Q. Right, so you've not driven one, I think, since 7 July,

9 is that right?

10 A. I haven't, and, yes, they've definitely changed them.

11 Q. So that's not how it looked?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Can you see that green sticker that we see there? If

14 perhaps we move on to [TFL974-1], we have the green sticker

15 that that's there is zoomed in on. Is that a sticker

16 that was in your cab at the time of the incident? Do

17 you recognise that?

18 A. Yes, that would be there, yes.

19 Q. You were asked earlier about what the procedure would be

20 in a bomb, and I think you replied, well, it would be

21 what the procedure was when the IRA were bombing. This

22 actually sets out your mayday emergency procedure,

23 doesn't it?

24 A. Yes, that's normal procedure.

25 Q. This is what you were attempting to do on the day?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It says:

3 "Contact the control room by radio."

4 By "control room", does it mean the line controller?

5 A. That would be the line controller, yes.

6 Q. Your line controller was the Met Line controller, is
7 that right?

8 A. I believe at that time we had a dedicated line
9 controller for our line by that time, but before then,
10 yes, it would have been the Metropolitan Line
11 controller.

12 Q. They were based at Baker Street, your line controller?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So when you tell us that you were attempting to make
15 contact on your radio, this is essentially what you were
16 trying to do?

17 A. That was what I was trying to do, yes.

18 Q. You would have that reference in your cab so that, if
19 your mind did go blank, you would know what to do?

20 A. Oh yes, yes, yes, I believe every train driver knew that
21 off by heart anyway.

22 Q. I'm sure, Mr Whitehurst. You see right there at the
23 last paragraph, it tells you:

24 "In extreme emergencies, if [you are] unable to make
25 contact with line controller, put down SCDs to discharge

1 traction current."
2 We've heard?
3 A. Yes, that's wrong, but we pretend not to see that bit,
4 because we know that's wrong.
5 Q. You tend to ignore that bit. Why is that bit wrong,
6 Mr Whitehurst?
7 A. Because you've got tunnel telephone wires that you're
8 supposed to operate first and to discharge the traction
9 current. SCDS really should only be used as a last
10 resort.
11 Q. You've talked about traction current, and you referred
12 in your oral evidence to having a light on your control
13 panel. Is that the blue light that switches off when
14 you lose traction current?
15 A. Yes, yes, you've got a little light that goes -- that
16 will go off. When it's on, you know you've got power
17 supply.
18 Q. It can be turned off in a number of ways. You've just
19 given an example --
20 A. Oh, yes.
21 Q. -- by rubbing the tunnel telephone wires. The power
22 control room operators, they can also turn it off?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I'm sure you're aware also that it can be
25 unintentionally turned off, as seems to have been the

1 case, by debris?

2 A. Quite often, even vandals do it at stations.

3 Q. Do you know what the traction current section was here?

4 A. Sorry?

5 Q. The traction current section, do you know what it was?

6 A. No, all I can really tell you at that point, I mean,

7 it's been five years since I left the job --

8 Q. If I told you it looks as if it ran from Baker Street

9 through to Bouverie Place, would that help you?

10 A. Not really at this time, no.

11 Q. I appreciate that, Mr Whitehurst, I'm sure there's

12 somebody else that we can ask. You've told us that your

13 cab lights didn't come on. Again, do you think that's

14 because of the damage caused by the bomb, is that

15 a possibility?

16 A. Well, it was either damage by the bomb or the MCBs

17 tripping out.

18 Q. Would the MCB have tripped because of the damage caused

19 by the bomb, or is that for a different reason?

20 A. That could have happened, yes, easily.

21 Q. When you took over the train, and it was train set 216,

22 did the train have any reported faults?

23 A. The train was working perfectly. It was a gem to drive.

24 Q. You were on the inner rail?

25 A. I was on the inner rail.

1 Q. We know from the evidence that we've heard from the
2 power control room that tunnel telephone circuits
3 operated on the inner rail at 8.49.43, and at the outer
4 rail at 8.49.45, so that gives us a time for the
5 explosion at 8.49.43. Does that sound about right to
6 you, Mr Whitehurst?

7 A. That's quite possibly correct.

8 Q. So you heard the screams. In such circumstances as
9 that, we've seen that you would follow the mayday
10 emergency procedure. You attempted to use the train
11 radio, but it was dead. Your train radio, it had been
12 working before the explosion?

13 A. It had been working before the explosion, yes.

14 Q. So again, do you think the reason why it wasn't
15 working --

16 A. I was told I had a good train radio, actually, which was
17 rare.

18 Q. Did you have a good train radio?

19 A. As far as I was concerned, I had a good train radio.

20 Q. So this was one that you would normally be able to use
21 in tunnels?

22 A. It's the train that I would have loved to have had with
23 me under normal circumstances, yes.

24 Q. So do you think that the fact that, on this occasion,
25 a train radio didn't work again was perhaps because of

1 the explosion?

2 A. I would directly attribute it to the explosion, yes.

3 Q. You've told us that you saw some lighting from the
4 adjacent train. Would that have been emergency
5 lighting?

6 A. That wasn't emergency lighting first of all, no, that
7 was normal car lighting from the adjacent train.

8 Q. But it did eventually go down?

9 A. When they took the power off from that side, then it
10 turned to emergency lighting.

11 Q. It looks as if the power went off on that line almost
12 immediately after the power went off on your line?

13 A. No.

14 Q. That would surprise you, does it? That's what we seem
15 to be seeing from the power control room evidence.

16 A. No, it didn't go off directly immediately at the same
17 time, no.

18 Q. Are you able to say how long after it seemed to go off?

19 A. I wasn't interested in that train so much, I'm afraid.

20 Q. Your first concern was to secure the area for the
21 majority of the passengers on your train?

22 A. That was my first area of priority.

23 Q. We've seen your very helpful note that you made that
24 evening, and it has some very exact timings on it. Are
25 those timings timings that you got from your mobile

1 phone?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How do you know that your mobile phone is accurate or
4 was accurate?

5 A. Because I check it each morning before I come into work
6 and then I check it with London Transport's time, which
7 is always different to everybody else's.

8 Q. So your mobile phone, was that checked to the Atomic
9 clock?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, Ms Gallagher has asked you about the attempts that
12 you made to contact the signal cabin.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Could we have, please, back on the screen INQ8578 and
15 it's page 2[INQ8578-2]?

16 She pointed out to you that your first attempt is
17 that that we can see at 20, which is the attempt that
18 you make at 8.54, and it appears that at least part of
19 that conversation was with Mr Rogers who we are hearing
20 from later this week and he was a duty manager trains.

21 Do you know Mr Rogers?

22 A. I know Trevor very well.

23 Q. Would you have recognised his voice, do you think?

24 A. No, not on the tunnel telephones. You can't recognise
25 hardly anything on those.

1 Q. So it may be that you did have this conversation with
2 Mr Rogers and you just couldn't tell?

3 A. As I say, it could well have been anybody. Without
4 looking at them face-to-face, you can't tell with those
5 telephones.

6 Q. Is it possible that you had part of the conversation
7 with the signal operator and part of the conversation
8 with Mr Rogers?

9 A. Yes, that is highly possible as well.

10 Q. The signal cabin was actually at Edgware Road, wasn't
11 it?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [INQ10282-4]?

14 Mr Whitehurst, this is a diagram of Edgware Road
15 station, and you can see there that there are two rooms
16 marked opposite platform 1 up some stairs. Is that
17 where the signal cabin was?

18 A. It was directly opposite platform 1. It looks like that
19 little building with nothing in it.

20 Q. Yes, so the two rooms that look like they're next to
21 each other, directly opposite where we see the number 1,
22 is that where the signal cabin was?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We think that the signal cabin operator who was on duty
25 that day was Steve Gilbert. Would you have recognised

1 his voice?

2 A. I would not have known him, no.

3 Q. You wouldn't have known him. So before you made that
4 call, we know from your notes that that call was at
5 8.54. You made a -- a public announcement system on
6 the -- to the passengers in the carriage. Are you able
7 to say what time you made that first announcement?

8 A. Not -- I didn't time that announcement, no. I was
9 surprised it actually worked.

10 Q. The signal phone that you walked to was OP11. That's
11 about one carriage length away from the front of your
12 train. How long do you think it took you to walk to the
13 signal phone?

14 A. Did I walk to it? I thought I ran. I thought I ran.

15 Q. You thought you ran. How long did it take you to run?

16 A. Seconds.

17 Q. In that first conversation that you had, did he say to
18 you, "Don't worry, it's only a power surge", or may that
19 have been on one of the latter --

20 A. I can understand that, being told it's a power surge,
21 I'm thinking, when I'm the driver, I know what's
22 happening on my train, I've seen bomb-damaged C stock
23 trains before.

24 Q. So you were frustrated by that. Do you think it's
25 possible that that wasn't, though, on the first

1 conversation, but on one of the later conversations?

2 Are you sure that that was on the first conversation?

3 A. That was on the first conversation. The line controller
4 says it's only a power surge.

5 Q. The signal operator, he said to you, "I will inform the
6 line controller", when you'd asked for emergency
7 services?

8 A. Yes, he said he would inform the line controller.

9 Q. That's significant, Mr Whitehurst, because the signal
10 operator wouldn't contact the emergency services
11 directly himself, it would be done through the line
12 controller?

13 A. He said he would contact the line controller and get the
14 emergency services.

15 Q. Yes, and you've said it may well be that part of that
16 conversation was with Mr Rogers.

17 You returned to your train and you then made
18 a second call and I don't think that that call was
19 highlighted to you when we were looking at it
20 previously. So if we could have back on the screen
21 [INQ8578-2], you were taken to point number 20, which is
22 the first call. I don't think you were taken to point
23 number 25. Can you see that? That looks as if point
24 number 25 was, in fact, your second call. You say that
25 you went back to the signal phone and informed the

1 signalman that you were detrainning, and it's at that
2 stage that the thought crosses your mind of a secondary
3 device, is that right, Mr Whitehurst?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You think that you made four calls in total, and then
6 there was one further attempt by Mr Matthews?

7 A. Including one attempt by Dave Matthews.

8 Q. So the four calls include the attempt by Mr Matthews?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Mr Matthews doesn't mention the signal phone going dead
11 at any stage. You're sure that that did happen?

12 A. Yes. I was standing with him, by the side of him, when
13 it happened.

14 Q. You go back to the train and you make a second PA
15 announcement asking those that are able to go to the
16 front of the train to be detrainned and walk back to
17 Edgware Road. Do you have any idea what time you made
18 that second announcement to the passengers?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Was that after your second call? Are you able to do it
21 in that way?

22 A. It was after that I had informed the --

23 Q. The signalman?

24 A. -- whoever was on the other end of that line -- there
25 seems to be some trouble with people saying that they

1 were there. Yes, I went back to him and I -- to let him
2 know that I was sending people down there.

3 Q. At some stage did Michael Cooney, another train
4 operator, come to assist you with the detraining? Do
5 you remember him?

6 A. Mick Cooney?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. He wasn't helping me. He was helping the other train.

9 Q. So he was helping the eastbound train?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You've referred to two people wanting to go back on to
12 your train to assist the injured, and one of those you
13 referred to being a manager from Paddington station. Do
14 you mean Paddington station overground?

15 A. Overground, yes, British Rail or National Rail,
16 whichever you like to call it.

17 Q. Was he wearing -- we've heard some reference to somebody
18 in a yellow high visibility vest. Do you know whether
19 or not he was wearing one of those?

20 A. He wasn't wearing of those, no. He did tell me that he
21 had a track competence certificate. But he wasn't
22 wearing any Day-Glo equipment or anything like that.

23 Q. We've heard quite a lot about the different uniforms
24 that different companies wear. The London Underground
25 high visibility is always orange?

1 A. Well, as far as I'm aware.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. It is yellow if you're working in a depot, but --

4 Q. But for anybody on the track, it would be --

5 A. -- not on the track, no.

6 Q. There comes a stage when you see Mr Corbin walking

7 through the train and --

8 A. He didn't walk through my train.

9 Q. Sorry, walking through the eastbound to get on to your

10 train with a paramedic and a doctor.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You've said in your witness statement you think it was

13 two paramedics and one doctor. Mr Corbin has said to us

14 that he thinks it was one paramedic and one doctor.

15 A. I don't remember who -- whether it was a paramedic or

16 doctor. I mean, no one mentioned to me at all it being

17 a paramedic or doctor. All I took it was they were

18 medical people.

19 Q. Mr Matthews was with you at that stage as well as

20 Mr Corbin?

21 A. No, Dave was round the side of the train, helping.

22 Q. Was he assisting somebody within the first carriage,

23 could you see?

24 A. I don't know. I wasn't watching what he was doing, I'm

25 afraid.

1 Q. There came a point when duty manager trains Mr Hickin
2 and Mr King arrived.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Had they both walked from Paddington to your train?

5 A. They told me they had walked from Paddington. They
6 didn't tell me which Paddington station because there's
7 two.

8 Q. I appreciate there's two there.

9 A. They didn't tell me which one they'd walked from.

10 Q. Do you remember telling Mr King that there had been
11 a bomb.

12 A. Well, all the way along the line I was saying it was
13 a bomb, so I wouldn't have --

14 Q. To all the London Underground members of staff?

15 A. Yes, I wouldn't have said it was anything other than
16 what it was.

17 Q. Do you recall saying it was a bomb to any of the
18 emergency services?

19 A. Sorry?

20 Q. Do you recall telling any of the emergency services or
21 any of the paramedics or any of the Fire Brigade,
22 police, that you thought it was a bomb?

23 A. The only Fire Brigade I saw were those that were
24 refusing to go down on platform 4 and the only police
25 I saw were those that were refusing to go down into the

1 booking hall area, and I didn't speak to either of them.

2 Q. You didn't speak to them and they didn't ask you any
3 questions at that stage?

4 A. No.

5 Q. There came a point when you were asked to leave, and was
6 it Mr Hickin who asked to you leave?

7 A. Mr Hickin did ask me to leave right at the beginning,
8 yes.

9 Q. But you refused to do so?

10 A. I refused to do so.

11 Q. It is at that point you assisted massaging the man's
12 heart at the side of the --

13 A. No, I'd done that before.

14 Q. You'd done that before you were asked to leave?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. By the time that you did leave, had you been down by the
17 side of the track for about an hour and a half?

18 A. No, I'd been down on the track for about an hour and
19 about five or ten minutes.

20 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Whitehurst, I don't have any
21 further questions.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody else have any questions
23 for Mr Whitehurst?

24 Those are all the questions that anybody has for

25 you, Mr Whitehurst. I appreciate how difficult it must

1 be looking back on that time, and I'm really sorry that
2 we had to take you back over it and I'm very grateful to
3 you for coming along to tell us what you have. Thank
4 you.

5 Mr Keith, I can't sit, I'm afraid, later than 4.30
6 today.

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, I rather thought I recollected that was
8 the case. We have one further witness. But it's highly
9 unlikely that we would conclude before 4.30. In those
10 circumstances, I think it's probably better if we call
11 him in the morning, with my apologies to him for having
12 him wait this afternoon.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't know if he is in court, but
14 if he is -- Mr Porter, I'm terribly sorry, does it cause
15 you terrible inconvenience to come back tomorrow? I'm
16 afraid we do our very best not to impose and
17 inconvenience witnesses, but sometimes it happens.
18 We'll call you first thing tomorrow. 10.00, please.
19 (4.10 pm)
20 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

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