

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 4 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Thursday, 4 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Hay?

4 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Paul Rigby?

5 MR PAUL EDWARD RIGBY (affirmed)

6 Questions by MR HAY

7 MR HAY: Can you give your full names to the court, please?

8 A. Yes, my name is Paul Edward Rigby.

9 Q. Mr Rigby, currently you are a group manager employed by
10 London Fire Brigade, head of rescue skills training?

11 A. Yes, I am.

12 Q. You have worked for the Fire Brigade for some 21 years?

13 A. 21 years, yes.

14 Q. Going back to 2003, you were seconded to the police at
15 the National CBRN Centre?

16 A. Yes, I was, that was a two-year secondment.

17 Q. Your role there was to train Gold and Silver level
18 commanders?

19 A. Yes, it was. In predominantly CBRN and terrorist-type
20 events, I was part of a multi-agency training team and
21 that was a national training team.

22 Q. Can I ask, just broadly speaking, what sort of training
23 was received?

24 A. It was based on scenarios of previous terrorist events,
25 and some were then fictitious ones, with them made up at

1 fictitious parts of the country to test officers from
2 across all agencies, and, you know, quite sadly, some --
3 about a year before, we'd had the Madrid bombing, the
4 Madrid train bombing, so we had used a number of
5 scenarios involving train and transport systems as well.

6 Q. Did one of those specifically include the Underground
7 system?

8 A. Not specifically, although we made reference to trains
9 in tunnels and things, but what we tended not to do was
10 ever use realistic places. We'd always make up
11 fictitious names, fictitious towns, because that's just
12 etiquette in terms of dealing with exercises, you never
13 use real locations. You always invent names and places.

14 Q. Across the agencies, what level of officer was sent for
15 such training?

16 A. Generally around my level up to Gold level, so chief
17 executives, directors, commissioners, chief fire
18 officers, chief ambulance officers, chief constables.

19 Q. But, for example, a sub-officer wouldn't be sent?

20 A. Absolutely not, no, no.

21 Q. You were there for two years --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- before, I think, returning to Southwark fire station?

24 A. I returned to Southwark training centre, yes, and I'd
25 only been back in London about a week or ten days when

1 this -- when the incident took place at Aldgate.

2 Q. In 2005, you were a divisional officer?

3 A. Yes, I was.

4 Q. I'm going to come on to your evidence regarding Aldgate,

5 but just to put it in context, you were, for a period of

6 time, Silver in charge of the scene for the

7 Fire Brigade?

8 A. Yes, I was, yes.

9 Q. You took over that role from Sub-Officer Clarke?

10 A. I did, yes.

11 Q. You were replaced by Senior Divisional Officer Smith?

12 A. I was, yes.

13 Q. On that day, I think you were at Southwark fire station

14 or training centre?

15 A. I was at the training centre, yes, yes.

16 Q. You were the senior officer on duty?

17 A. I just happened to be the closest officer of that level

18 to Aldgate when I was paged. So in terms of the

19 mobilising system, it works that the closest appropriate

20 level officer is sent. So it was just coincidence that

21 it was me.

22 Q. If we could have up on the screen, please, [LFB23-3]

23 Mr Rigby, on the screen in front of you, you should

24 hopefully see a MOBIS report.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Your call sign on the day was E100?

2 A. Yes, it was, Echo 100, yes.

3 Q. If we could scroll down to the bottom part of the page,

4 please, we can see right at the bottom 09.08.31

5 "commit"?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. If we could turn over the page [LFB23-4] , please, and then, at

8 09.08.33, we can see there E100 is part of "Mobilise

9 mobilise", to a major incident at Aldgate.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Was that all the information you had when you were

12 paged, just simply that there was a major incident at

13 Aldgate?

14 A. No, I did make a telephone call and I managed to get

15 through to Control, although it did take me a couple of

16 minutes.

17 Q. What did they tell you?

18 A. They told me that, the only information they had, there

19 had been some sort of an electrical overload on the

20 train system or on the Underground network in general --

21 they weren't clear what the details were -- and that had

22 resulted in some sort of explosion somewhere in the

23 Aldgate area, and that a number of trains now had people

24 trapped in tunnels and everything else.

25 That in itself would have made it a major incident,

1 because it was a summer's day, so lots of people in
2 trains in tunnels actually very quickly would have
3 started suffering from the effects of the heat. So that
4 in itself made -- you know, would have made it a major
5 incident.

6 Q. Can you help us with what is the consequence of
7 declaring a major incident on the Fire Brigade?

8 A. It means a number of things. What it means is, in
9 declaring a major incident, the officer in charge at the
10 time was saying that the resources he currently had were
11 overwhelmed and that, in order to bring this incident
12 under control, a significant number of further resources
13 and a much higher level of command was needed to
14 actually resolve this incident.

15 Q. It was as a consequence of that that you were mobilised
16 as part of the high level of command?

17 A. Yes, well, I was mobilised to take charge of it. That
18 was my role and I knew that from the facts as
19 a divisional officer mobilised to a major incident,
20 I would be taking charge of that incident, yes.

21 Q. You travelled to Aldgate by car?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Unfortunately, the MOBIS report doesn't have the time of
24 your arrival.

25 A. No, it doesn't.

1 Q. I'm going to come on to that. But on your way there,
2 were you receiving any communications in the car as to
3 what had happened or what other agencies were reporting?

4 A. Not really. The only thing I would have heard in the
5 car was the informative message sent by
6 Sub-Officer Clarke, but I had arrived and was actually
7 getting my gear on, my fire gear on, when that message
8 was sent. So I didn't actually hear the message until
9 I spoke to him. So I had no other information en route,
10 and other than what I had -- the only other person
11 I spoke to, I spoke to Assistant Commissioner
12 John Anthony just before I got into my car, and he just
13 reconfirmed what Control had told me; that there was an
14 electrical overload on the railway system and that had
15 caused some sort of explosion somewhere. We weren't
16 even clear that a train was involved. It was just an
17 explosion in the system.

18 Q. So you wouldn't have been aware, for example, that, at
19 about 9.10, a City of London policeman, a Mr Kemp,
20 referred to his Control that there was a bomb which was
21 the cause of the explosion?

22 A. Right, no, I wouldn't have been, no, not at that point.

23 Q. We also know that, at about 09.11 to 09.13, a BTP
24 inspector, Inspector Munn, radioed to his control to say
25 that people would die on the train if immediate care

1 wasn't provided?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Again, that's something which you wouldn't have been
4 aware of?

5 A. Not at that point, no. No.

6 Q. That's because there's no joined up or, at the time,
7 there was no joined up communications system between the
8 City of London Police, British Transport Police and the
9 Fire Brigade?

10 A. What tends to happen is that we report back to our
11 respective controls, and where liaison often takes place
12 is between our Control Centres, so, you know, we don't
13 have joint Control Centres, so each Control Centre would
14 have contacted each other. So there would have been
15 some passage of information that way, between the Police
16 Service, the Ambulance Service and the Fire Service.

17 Q. But invariably, there's going to be a time lag?

18 A. There's going to be a time lag because that's going to
19 be taking place at our Gold -- not Gold, it's going to
20 be taking place at our control rooms.

21 Q. I think it was as you were going across London Bridge
22 that you realised that this was perhaps a very serious
23 incident?

24 A. I saw a lot more emergency vehicles crossing other
25 bridges all over the place, you know, there were

1 emergency vehicles coming from every direction almost,
2 and I started to realise, you know, this was something
3 more than an electrical overload. But I had no more
4 information than that, really.

5 Q. In your statement, you say it took you approximately
6 five minutes to drive from Southwark training centre to
7 Aldgate.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We know you were mobilised about 09.08.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. We also know that you took a telephone call or made
12 a telephone call to your Control to get further
13 information.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You also spoke to the Assistant Commissioner?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Are you able to provide some indication as to what time
18 you think you actually left Southwark training centre?

19 A. I probably left Southwark training centre about 9.12.

20 I know my arrival time because I spoke to

21 Sub-Officer Clarke, who had said to me his driver had
22 just come back to him to confirm his informative message
23 had been sent.

24 Q. What was your arrival time?

25 A. I'd say it was about somewhere between 9.20 and 9.25,

1 I can't be specific what minute it was.

2 Q. On arrival, what was your first impression of the scene?

3 A. There were a sea of people coming out the station.

4 There were hundreds of people exiting the station,

5 passengers, you know lots of smartly dressed people, but

6 with sooted faces, some with bleeding noses, some with

7 bleeding ears, which is a sign of a blast injury for

8 people that have been involved in a blast. The

9 percussion of a blast will often cause bleeding of the

10 ears, bleeding of the nose.

11 At that point, Sub-Officer -- I saw him with the

12 Incident Command tabard and there were just lots of

13 people coming towards him. I then started to realise

14 this was something significant.

15 Q. Pausing there, the Sub-Officer with the tabard, that was

16 Sub-Officer Clarke?

17 A. That was Sub-Officer Clarke, Yes.

18 Q. He was wearing a Silver tabard?

19 A. He was wearing the tabard that said "Incident Commander"

20 on it, a white tabard with "Incident Commander" on the

21 back.

22 Q. That indicated to you that he was the officer currently

23 in charge of the Fire Brigade?

24 A. He was the officer currently in charge of the

25 Fire Brigade, yes.

1 Q. Were you able to easily identify him because he was
2 wearing that tabard?

3 A. I was, because he was in a crowd of people. He was --
4 there was lots of public, and there was lots of other
5 emergency responders surrounding him, and essentially at
6 that point, he was -- what he had done prior to that,
7 you know, the very early sort of reconnaissance of what
8 was going on, declaring a major incident very quickly,
9 and actually getting the right resources en route and
10 then sending a very quick informative about what he had
11 to deal with was all excellent, you know, he had done
12 really well to that point.

13 But clearly now, through no fault of his own, this
14 was beyond his experience. It was completely beyond his
15 experience to deal with.

16 Q. That's because, as a sub-officer, he wouldn't have had
17 the training to be a Silver?

18 A. No, no. He didn't have the training to deal with that
19 number of people, with that number of conflicting
20 priorities, at that time.

21 Q. So I think you then assumed command of the scene?

22 A. I did, but I just simply had taken the tabard off him
23 and then had spoken to him afterwards, which is outside
24 of our procedures, but I felt it was necessary at the
25 time.

1 Q. What was the procedure that you should have followed?

2 A. I should have got a full and comprehensive handover from
3 him and then taken the tabard off him. I did it the
4 other way round.

5 Q. Once you had taken the tabard off him and were
6 effectively then the Incident Commander, did you then
7 speak to him immediately to get a brief from him as to
8 what had happened?

9 A. I did, and his response to me was something like "Gov,
10 it's not an electrical fault, it's a bomb, there's a big
11 hole in the side of the carriage and we've got people
12 down there, we're getting people on the train now we've
13 got people on the train dealing with it, but that's all
14 I've done so far."

15 Q. Did he pass any information to you as to, first of all,
16 whether or not there were people who were seriously
17 injured on the train?

18 A. He knew there were people seriously injured on the
19 train, but he wasn't certain of how many at that point.

20 Q. Did he pass any information to you as to what equipment
21 was required to be brought to the train?

22 A. Equipment was already being taken to the train in terms
23 of the first crews had gone down with breathing
24 apparatus because they were called to a fire and
25 explosion. That had been followed up by other crews

1 taking down cutting equipment. That was being put at
2 two points, either in the concourse at the top of the
3 stairs, or downstairs into the -- onto the platform.

4 Q. Were you aware of any priority or urgency for stretchers
5 or laerdals to be taken down to the train?

6 A. There was priority for a lot of equipment --

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, sorry, could you just pause
8 there? I think there may be a problem.

9 I'm terribly sorry, I interrupted you mid-sentence.

10 I was afraid we might be losing what you were saying.

11 MR HAY: My Lady, I believe the question I was asking was
12 whether or not there was any priority or request for
13 stretchers or laerdals to be brought down to the train?

14 A. There was still information coming back on what we were
15 dealing with. One of the first priorities for us has
16 got to be, "What are we actually dealing with?", and
17 getting some reconnaissance on that, and really -- and
18 then providing equipment to back that up. I was also
19 aware that, you know, our colleagues from the Ambulance
20 Service were now arriving in quite significant numbers,
21 and they were also starting to deploy.

22 One of the problems we had was actually getting
23 through the people coming out, because there was such
24 a crowd of people coming out and a lot of these people
25 were injured. What I was also conscious of was a lot of

1 our responders were getting pulled off by people coming
2 out because they were also injured.

3 So it was quite difficult to focus some people on
4 getting them to drive through that and go on down to the
5 train.

6 Q. What did you consider to be your immediate priorities?

7 A. My immediate priorities were to clear the access tunnels
8 to the train of injured people, do a risk assessment of
9 what problems we had down there and how we were going to
10 deal with those in terms of, now, secondary devices,
11 possible CBRN material -- CBRR material, and things like
12 that, confirm that power was off to the train, I had
13 that confirmed that it was off, and it just left me with
14 some of the other things, ie secondary devices, other
15 things, how I had to deal with those, because what I had
16 to do was make the scene safe for, not only the
17 rescuers, but for the people to be rescued. To not make
18 the scene safe for them would be a huge problem because,
19 you know, we had to rescue them into a safe environment,
20 and of course, we are actually rescuing them in what is
21 currently a hazardous environment. So part of our role
22 would be to make that as safe as possible.

23 Q. How did you propose to go about doing that?

24 A. Well, some of it had to be, you know, educated guesses
25 almost, in terms of secondary devices, the best I could

1 do was turn the radios off.

2 Q. I'm going to come back to that, if that's possible.

3 A. Okay, yes.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, before we go on at all, I want
5 to go back to something that had, I confess, occurred to
6 me during the course of the evidence, Mr Rigby. The
7 point about you're saying the responders were being
8 pulled away to deal with the walking wounded.

9 A. Yes, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I did wonder if that's one of the
11 reasons why maybe people thought help wasn't getting
12 down to the train, because they are immediately
13 confronted when they arrive with the walking wounded?

14 A. I think so, my Lady, and some passengers did need
15 treatment at the surface and so, you know, it's very
16 difficult to pass somebody who's injured to go to
17 somebody else and that's one of the problems we face, as
18 an emergency service, is getting that early
19 prioritisation.

20 So, for example, you know -- and the need to get
21 people down onto the platform simply to see what's going
22 on. Not actually to take any action, but to see what's
23 going on, so we can start to prioritise how we need to
24 deal with the incident. So that was an important thing
25 for me, as Silver Commander, what I needed was

1 a priority list of where the main problems I was facing
2 lay and what resources I needed in order to resolve
3 those as quickly as possible.

4 MR HAY: That priority list, perhaps that might be an ideal
5 document that you would receive, but how quickly did you
6 actually have that information?

7 A. It took about another five to ten minutes to get all of
8 that information in place and there was concurrent
9 activity going on, while I was talking to a police
10 officer, a chief inspector, I think -- I can't remember
11 now -- about a number of issues around control of the
12 inner cordon and that sort of thing, and safety of the
13 inner cordon.

14 Q. To gather that information, presumably it was important
15 that you were aware of who the important officers were?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Who would have that knowledge?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. The reason why I ask is that Sub-Officer Clarke was the
20 Incident Commander when you got there.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But it also appears that David Cook, a fire
23 investigation officer, may have also thought he was the
24 Incident Commander at a similar time. What I want to
25 just take you to are extracts from his witness statement

1 which was read to my Lady on Monday. Before we do that,
2 could we have up on the screen LFB23, please? Then
3 page 17 [LFB23-17] , and if we could focus on the resource status
4 change.

5 Now, Mr Cook's call sign is OK16.

6 A. Oh, right.

7 Q. Which is the third row from the top.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. We can see he arrived -- the MOBIS report has him
10 arriving at the scene at 09.13.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Just to put it in context for you, if I read you perhaps
13 some of the extracts from his statement dated
14 13 January 2006.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. He mentions, when he arrived, that he saw
17 Sub-Officer Clarke and he spoke to him and he says this:
18 "He informed me that I was the first station officer
19 to arrive at the scene and was I to take command."
20 He then goes on to say how he put together what he
21 calls a "head shed" group of the sub-officers to try to
22 establish some priorities.

23 He then goes on to say that he was then approached
24 by a station officer from E351, and perhaps if we look
25 again at the MOBIS report at 09 -- E351 is the fifth

1 from the top.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. We can see that E351 arrived at 09.18.42, so again
4 before you arrive.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. He says:

7 "At this point, we were joined by a number of other
8 station officers, E351 from the Old Kent Road station
9 and F221 from Poplar station."

10 He then goes on to say:

11 "At this point, I was approached by the senior city
12 police officer at the scene. I believed he was an
13 inspector rank but did not know his name. He asked if I
14 was the IC (Silver) at that point. I said to him that
15 it would appear that I had been given the task, although
16 I could not confirm whether officers of assistant
17 divisional officer rank were already on-site elsewhere.
18 However, I said I would remain as LFB Silver control at
19 that point outside the station."

20 He then goes on to say:

21 "By now, various requests for equipment and
22 assistance were coming in by word of mouth. Where we
23 could, I delegated various firefighters crews to locate
24 equipment and assist. Shortly after, the
25 Incident Commander of MAIAT approached me asking me if I

1 was Silver control."

2 We know from evidence yesterday that they arrived at
3 about 09.25.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. So perhaps after you arrived.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "Again, I responded that this would appear to be the
8 case. I asked what his teams needed to deploy to check
9 for any signs of a dirty bomb."

10 He then goes on to say:

11 "Shortly after this, I spoke to Divisional
12 Officer Rigby."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. From that, it does appear that there were two people who
15 believed they were Incident Commander before you took
16 over; one, Sub-Officer Clarke and, one, Mr Cook.

17 A. Okay. There's a number of things there that I could
18 probably clarify that with. One of the things is that,
19 yes, Sub-Officer Clarke still held the tabard, so
20 Sub-Officer Clarke was absolutely, in my view, the
21 Incident Commander.

22 However, it was right and proper for
23 Station Officer Cook to put in place some measures,
24 because our procedures will say, you know, if you arrive
25 at an incident and you see that immediately a rescue is

1 to be made, then you should continue to brief people to
2 make those rescues and then report to the
3 Incident Commander.

4 So what Mr Cook is doing is not outside of our
5 procedures and, indeed, if people are coming up to him
6 as a person in authority I think it's right and proper
7 that, in terms of leadership and management, that he
8 should take on that role, until we establish exactly who
9 it is.

10 I don't think that actually affected what happened.

11 In fact, it continued to support the incident, because
12 the priority and the focus of Mr Cook was still -- as
13 you've said, was still the rescues and getting the
14 equipment down to the rescues and to rescue people. So
15 I don't think it detracted from our priorities at all,
16 or was anything of a problem.

17 Indeed, as Incident Commander, I would have a number
18 of junior officers with specific tasks, and they would
19 be carrying out orders like that, so I, for example --
20 for example, I wouldn't be directing somebody on cutting
21 equipment at the scene of the incident and dealing with
22 that. I would have junior officers like Mr Cook, like
23 Mr Clarke, doing that for me. So they were within role.
24 The question of Silver Command, yes, okay, he was the
25 most senior person that officer could find. But we

1 quickly established that I was the Incident Commander.

2 Q. But do you think that, in respect of having a chain of
3 command and in terms of briefing you when you arrived,
4 it would have been of assistance to you to have spoken
5 to Mr Cook perhaps earlier than you did?

6 A. It would have been, but I then -- as he said, we did
7 meet up some time later and Mr Cook had told me a number
8 of actions that he'd taken, and obviously I incorporated
9 that into, you know, my handover of the incident,
10 because at the early stages of an incident, one of the
11 things that you need a lot of is information, especially
12 at my level. I need to gather as much information as
13 possible so I can start making an assessment of the
14 resources I've got, further resources I require, and
15 start putting a plan in place to deal with that.
16 At this point, my priority is still the rescues from
17 the trains, and everything is still working towards
18 that.

19 Q. Moving on to the rescue on the train, one of the things
20 we've heard about is whether or not there was ever
21 confirmation that the traction current was off.

22 A. Right, yes.

23 Q. It's for my Lady to determine whether or not there were
24 any delays in any of the emergency services going on to
25 the tracks.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But certainly there does appear to be a perception of
3 delay amongst, perhaps, some Fire Brigade officers.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I say "perception". Whether or not there was an actual
6 delay is a different question.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That has come, both from fire officers who are saying
9 "We waited for confirmation and it appeared to take some
10 time", and it also came from Inspector Munn, a BTP
11 inspector, who radioed a message suggesting that the
12 Fire Brigade wouldn't go onto the track, but in fairness
13 he said it probably was about 30 seconds. We've also
14 had members of the public who came off the train who
15 seem to think that the Fire Brigade weren't going onto
16 the tracks.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The real issue is whether or not, first of all, from
19 your perspective, what is the usual protocol for
20 confirmation that traction current is off?

21 A. Usual protocol to confirm traction current is off is for
22 the officer in charge of the attendance to contact our
23 control room. Our control room then contacts the LUL
24 control room. They confirm power off that way. The LUL
25 control room then supervises power off from a remote

1 location, rather than at the station. So that's done
2 then. It's then reconfirmed back to us that the power
3 is off.

4 At that point, we then put firefighters on to this
5 track, they go to the train where there's equipment on
6 the train, a couple of bars.

7 What they do is they go either side of the train,
8 they connect that to the third rail and then connect it
9 to the track, so if, for some reason, the current is
10 inadvertently energised within the area of those two
11 circuit bars the current can't reach the train.

12 Q. Were you, yourself, aware of any difficulties getting
13 confirmation that the traction current was off?

14 A. I understand there'd been some slight difficulties in
15 communicating. That was because getting through on the
16 main scheme radio to actually get the current off, and
17 a number of people were stating that the current was
18 off, but, you know, I can't deal -- or officers there
19 can't deal in supposition. We have to deal with facts,
20 and we have to know absolutely that the current is off.
21 The reason for that is, you know -- and really, to
22 look at it, imagine the horror, these people have just
23 been through the worst thing possibly they've ever been
24 through in their life. Then to see their rescuers
25 electrocuted as they tried to reach them or, worse

1 still, electrocuting casualties as we bring them off the
2 train. So it was very important.

3 It goes back to what I said earlier about making the
4 area safe so that we can carry out rescues. You know,
5 what's happened has happened and it's very tragic, but
6 what we now need to do is make the scene safe to prevent
7 this situation -- the situation getting any worse for
8 either the passengers or the rescuers.

9 Q. In a situation where there are difficulties with
10 communication, you getting through to your Control, your
11 Control perhaps getting through to Transport for London,
12 that procedure I think my Lady described as being a bit
13 of a dog-leg --

14 A. It is, yes.

15 Q. -- and it would be easier to be able to get confirmation
16 at the scene from someone.

17 A. It would be easier to get confirmation from the scene.
18 There was a number of issues around that. The
19 information we had was fairly -- initially, hadn't been
20 particularly accurate. So I had some concerns myself
21 that, having spoken to people, that it was -- you know,
22 people themselves at the station, the station personnel,
23 who had seen this, were themselves traumatised, so we
24 were dealing with traumatised people who were not
25 emergency service responders and trying to get

1 information about them from the track current and
2 things. I felt, you know, the time the judgment is made
3 the more reliable process was the process that we've got
4 in place.

5 I think the delay was minor. You know, and again
6 for me, you know, in terms of my rescue training, when
7 we -- you know, to get somebody -- release somebody from
8 a car, for example, who 's been involved in an incident,
9 can take about 45 minutes to stabilise the vehicle,
10 remove the person from the vehicle and everything else.
11 We actually cleared two trains by 10.30. So an hour and
12 a half after the first appliances arrived on scene.
13 So in relative terms, if you look at rescuing one
14 person from a car in a standard road incident,
15 stabilising the vehicle and other things, taking between
16 a half an hour and 45 minutes, and compare that to
17 a major incident, taking 90 minutes to clear everybody,
18 I think in terms of time lines, you know, it stands up
19 very well.

20 Q. I want to be very clear what I want to emphasise is
21 a perception of delay rather than actual delay.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. I don't want to appear to be unfairly criticising either
24 you or your officers?

25 A. I'm sure that's not the case.

1 Q. What I was wondering is, in the training you had done at
2 the CBRN centre, which involved trains and the like, was
3 this problem foreseen in any way in respect of
4 considering how you would inform people on the scene
5 that traction current was off quickly?

6 A. It was foreseen, along -- obviously, along with many
7 others, because the idea from us, from our side of
8 things, was to put in as many problems as possible for,
9 you know, senior commanders to deal with.

10 So it was foreseen as a problem. The difficulty is
11 the protocols in place are the ones -- because you can
12 cut the power off to the train locally. However, it can
13 very easily be reenergised locally as well, and that can
14 be a problem. Plus, the other problem with it is, if
15 you just reenergise it locally or it's just cut off
16 locally, there is a problem that other trains
17 potentially could still be moving, and that could cause
18 other problems as well.

19 Q. So in that respect, it's always a fluid situation?

20 A. Yes, it is, yes.

21 Q. Because of that, for example, you couldn't have someone,
22 for example, always standing by the entrance to the
23 platform informing people the traction current was off?

24 A. No, no, it was -- once it was off, and we knew it was
25 off, then operations commenced as they would normally.

1 But it was just that was one of the -- I mean, it wasn't
2 the only problem we faced. There was also the problem
3 of secondary devices, possible CBR material as well.

4 Q. I'm just coming on to secondary devices. Given your
5 background in CBRN training, that was obviously a very
6 real concern for you.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Not only in respect of the device which had gone off,
9 but also in respect of any possible secondary devices.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. That obviously influenced any decisions you were going
12 to make, presumably?

13 A. To a degree it did, but not to as much a degree as
14 perhaps it could have done.

15 We definitely had to take some risks and some
16 educated guesses in terms of -- the only way I could
17 mitigate the risk from secondary devices was turn the
18 radios off and minimise the numbers of people working
19 down in the station. But I was still faced with the
20 risk of a secondary device detonating.

21 Q. Turning to the decision to turn off the radios, was
22 there any protocol in place that you were aware of in
23 respect of turning off radios or mobile phones?

24 A. There is. In terms of dealing with terrorist devices,
25 it is within our procedures that, you know, radios

1 should be turned off, appliances should be moved away
2 from the immediate scene with the rear of the appliance
3 facing the incident and the windows open and all that
4 sort of thing.

5 Q. Does that only apply to London Fire Brigade?

6 A. No, it does apply to the other emergency services as
7 well, yes.

8 Q. The reason why I ask is we heard evidence yesterday from
9 Mr Travers, who's a Metropolitan Police Service
10 explosives officer, and he was directly asked about this
11 point about protocol.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. He said that protocol will normally only kick in when
14 there is a confirmed device.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In respect of the potential of secondary device, he said
17 there was no set protocol. That seems to differ from
18 your understanding of the situation.

19 A. Okay. Yes, obviously it does. My understanding of the
20 situation was there had been a detonation of a device,
21 there was a high risk of a secondary device, and I based
22 that on my knowledge of the Madrid bombings less than
23 a year before, where, indeed, secondary devices had gone
24 off as passengers were escaping from the trains.

25 At the time of that decision, I had no information

1 that there wasn't a secondary device. At that point,
2 I had nothing to say to me that there wasn't a secondary
3 device. I had no information to say that there
4 definitely wasn't radiation or a dirty bomb. I could
5 pretty much rule out C and B, chemical and biological,
6 but I couldn't rule out R, radiation.

7 Q. You could rule out chemical and biological from the
8 injuries that people were having as they were coming up
9 stairs?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Eyes weren't streaming and the like?

12 A. Yes, yes, so you know the best detector of a chemical
13 actually is the human body, and if people haven't --
14 aren't showing any signs of symptoms, then you can be
15 fairly certain they haven't got it. In terms of
16 biological, the device -- actually a fireball which the
17 device obviously produced, because people had
18 blacked-out faces, so there had been a momentary fire --
19 would have almost certainly destroyed the biological
20 material. I say "almost certainly" because I can't rule
21 it out absolutely.

22 Q. In respect of the decision you made to instruct
23 officers, fire officers, to turn off their radios,
24 without giving away anything which may be sensitive, did
25 that apply to all officers on the scene, both externally

1 outside the station but also inside the station?

2 A. It applied to all officers in terms of our fire ground
3 radios, yes. There are two types of radios we have. We
4 have the fire ground radio, which is to communicate with
5 each other, and we have also the main scheme radio which
6 is to contact our main control room.

7 Q. Were you aware if the instruction to turn off radios had
8 been made by any of the other emergency services?

9 A. I passed that to the other emergency services, that that
10 should be done, because of the risk of secondary
11 devices.

12 Now, most people there, you know, everybody I spoke
13 to, I spoke to the chief -- a chief inspector, who
14 agreed with that, and said, "Yes, that's a good point",
15 and I spoke to someone from the Ambulance Service,
16 I can't remember who.

17 Q. Do you recall who the chief inspector was?

18 A. He was a Metropolitan police officer, I've got no idea
19 who he was, no.

20 Q. I think the most senior Metropolitan police officer at
21 the scene was Inspector Wheeler. He wasn't a chief
22 inspector.

23 A. Right, okay.

24 Q. Does that --

25 A. It doesn't help me, no, no. He may well have been an

1 inspector. He had a reflective tabard on. I just
2 thought at the time he was a chief inspector, but
3 I don't remember any more than that.

4 Q. Was there any reason you thought he was
5 Metropolitan Police rather than City of London Police?

6 A. He didn't have -- his cap was black and white chequered
7 rather than red and white chequered.

8 Q. Do you know whether or not that instruction was followed
9 by any of the other emergency services?

10 A. As far as I was aware, it was. But it had to be passed
11 by word of mouth, so it took some time to implement,
12 because to implement turning your radios off by using
13 the radio is not really the way to do it. You know, you
14 have to turn your radio off and start passing it on. So
15 it would have taken some time to implement because it
16 would have had to be passed by word of mouth.

17 Q. Do you recall approximately what time you made that
18 instruction?

19 A. About 9.35.

20 Q. Just to be fair, in any event, we know that the radios
21 weren't working in the tunnels.

22 A. Well, no, and, like, mobile phones weren't working in
23 the tunnels either, I think. But the layout of Aldgate
24 and Aldgate East, I'd also had the advantage of -- I'd
25 been stationed at Whitechapel fire station for four

1 years as station officer so I knew Aldgate and
2 Aldgate East stations very well, I knew the layout of
3 the stations, I knew actually they are only just below
4 the surface, you know, they're not deeply sub-surface
5 stations. It's only 100 or 200 metres or so from the
6 surface down to the edge of the platform. So it was
7 a fairly short distance we're talking about.
8 So in terms of Aldgate, that would work quite easily
9 to turn the radios off.

10 Q. Once the decision had been made to turn the radios off,
11 and given the fact that radios weren't working in the
12 tunnel in any event, it's correct, isn't it, that you
13 were effectively relying on a system of runners to pass
14 information from the tunnel and out to the station?

15 A. Yes, which is actually within our protocols and
16 procedures to do, because there are other times when our
17 radios may fail or, indeed, we can't use our radios. So
18 there's a number of reasons why, you know, they may fail
19 because of tall buildings, line of sight, we've got
20 a new radio system since then, but the system we had at
21 the time was unable to do that.

22 Q. The other consequence of a concern about secondary
23 devices presumably was to ensure that your personnel
24 were also safe?

25 A. Yes, it was that they were safe, but that was actually

1 number two -- number one on my list was that people
2 being rescued were safe. Number two was that all
3 responders were safe. Because the fire and rescue
4 service has responsibility for safety of the inner
5 cordon at that point.

6 Q. I think you took the decision to reduce the number of
7 responders as well as to rotate crews. Is that correct?

8 A. That was part of my risk assessment, in that, if there
9 was a secondary device and it actuated, we would injure
10 the fewest people possible.

11 Q. When did you make that decision?

12 A. About the same time as I made the decision about --
13 I made a number of decisions in terms of my risk
14 assessment, and why I was going to continue to keep the
15 crews committed.

16 One of them was about the secondary devices. One of
17 them was about reducing the numbers, and also about
18 turning the radios off, but also I put across my
19 decisions in terms of chemical, in terms of biological,
20 in terms of radiological, why I was continuing to keep
21 crews down there.

22 Q. After you made the decision to restrict numbers, was
23 there ever any demand for more officers to go down to
24 the tunnel or were there a sufficient number of officers
25 already present in the tunnel?

1 A. There were sufficient numbers of officers present in the
2 tunnel because, by that time, we were starting to focus
3 down on to the actual carriage where the detonation had
4 taken place, and one of the problems there was actually
5 the size of the carriage restricted how many people
6 could be on it, in terms of working on the victims that
7 were in there, in freeing them, working with our
8 colleagues from the London Ambulance Service who were
9 triaging and treating the casualties, and what we were
10 doing was making the scene as workable as possible for
11 them to do that. So we were removing some of the seats
12 and making the area larger.

13 So we talked of people being trapped. Some of them
14 were trapped by either their injuries alone, so, you
15 know, "trapped" in our terms is really an expression; we
16 can't immediately bring the person to the surface is
17 what it means, and there are a number of reasons behind
18 that.

19 It could be that, in order to work on that
20 particular person, we had to move the seats out the way
21 to make it an effective work area to actually work on
22 them, it could be their injuries, or they could be
23 trapped simply because somebody else was in their way
24 that we had to deal with as well.

25 What we had to do was stabilise the casualty in

1 conjunction with our London Ambulance Service colleagues
2 and then what we term as "package" them, which means
3 spine boards, neck braces, and everything else, because
4 we don't want to injure people further, and then remove
5 them from the scene.

6 Q. Going back to the decision to restrict responders,
7 I think, without exception, everyone from Transport for
8 London and from the emergency services whom we have
9 heard from says that the concern of secondary devices
10 didn't prevent them going to the scene in any event.

11 A. No, it didn't prevent anyone going to the scene. What
12 needed to be done, though, I think, restricting the
13 numbers to those that were essentially needed was the
14 right thing to do, because other people down there,
15 there wasn't actually jobs for them to do, you know.
16 It's almost -- you could have too many people there and
17 then they just started getting in the way. So what you
18 needed was an effective command chain, people working on
19 the casualties, an effective command chain, people who
20 could deal with tools, passing tools forward when they
21 were needed or withdrawing tools when they weren't
22 needed. People to assist with bringing casualties to
23 the surface, and the command chain and some runners to
24 relay what was going on back to the surface.

25 Q. From your perspective, presumably any restriction on

1 communications or the number of personnel you could send
2 into the tunnel is something you would want to avoid
3 and, presumably, the quicker you get confirmation that
4 it's not a CBRN incident or there are no secondary
5 devices, the better?

6 A. The better in some ways, yes, but there were still other
7 risks beyond that. We'd had -- you know, there was also
8 the risk perhaps of a fire breaking out on the train at
9 some point. There had been a device, it had detonated,
10 that had resulted in a fireball, there were flammable
11 materials about, there was a large current of
12 electricity, the train needs oil and lubricants in order
13 to run. So there are a number of sources of fire there
14 as well. So one of the other things I also had set up
15 was lines of hose down to there as well.

16 What I have to do is look at the worst-case scenario
17 all the time. What's the worst thing that can happen,
18 and then plan for it. So that, if it does happen, I'm
19 immediately ready to deal with it. What I can't be in
20 a position is of being surprised. If I'm surprised,
21 then I'm not doing my job properly. So what I have to
22 be is in a position where I'm ready for anything -- any
23 likely event that can go wrong and then I'm able to deal
24 with it.

25 So also having people on the surface gathered, they

1 would be the rescue crews if the secondary device then
2 actuated. They would be the crews that would also be
3 use to put the fire out as well as being the crews that
4 would go down there and take other equipment, if it
5 became needed, and they were also the labourers, with
6 respect to that term to firefighters, for our London
7 Ambulance Service colleagues, because our London
8 Ambulance Service colleagues would be treating and
9 triaging the patients, and actually stabilising the
10 patients, and then we would be assisting our colleagues
11 from the London Ambulance Service in bringing those
12 people to the surface.

13 Q. Just going back to there not being -- getting the
14 information that there were no secondary devices or
15 there being a CBRN incident. Did you get that
16 information as quickly as you would have liked?

17 A. Probably not, no, because there were a number of other
18 factors that delayed that, yes. But even had I had that
19 information, it's always good practice anyway. There
20 will always be other problems to face up, and it's
21 always good practice to work with the minimum number of
22 people that you require, rather than just flood an
23 incident with people. Hold people back.

24 Because the other thing to consider as well, it was
25 a hot summer's day. In order to give the best possible

1 service and the best -- and to work to the best effect,
2 there could be recycling of the crews because they would
3 get hot and fatigued down there. So simply changing
4 people around, because they were fatigued, would also be
5 good practice.

6 Q. I just want to focus on this point about the time at
7 which you got the all-clear there were no secondary
8 devices.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The impression I have from your statement is you didn't
11 get that information as quickly as you wanted?

12 A. No, I didn't, no.

13 Q. Why was that?

14 A. It would have taken some time anyway. The realistic
15 situation was it would have taken over an hour to get
16 that information, even if someone had committed to the
17 train to do it. In terms of CBR, the same thing. To
18 carry out a comprehensive CBR sweep of that scene would
19 have taken well in excess of an hour. So I couldn't
20 have waited for it anyway. So I had to work with the
21 fact that I didn't have it because it would have taken
22 too long to get it.

23 Q. So that of itself meant that there was no actual delay
24 in any decisions you made?

25 A. No, no, they had to be made in regard to the risks faced

1 and decisions were based on the risks faced, or the
2 potential risks faced, because obviously we know now
3 that we didn't face any of those risks.

4 Q. There then came a point when, I think, Senior Divisional
5 Officer Smith arrived.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall roughly what time that was?

8 A. I think I had been there about 30 minutes, round about.
9 So somewhere around about quarter to 10.

10 Q. If we could just have up on the screen, please LFB23-8,
11 Actually, if you could just take that off the screen.
12 Once he arrived, I think he then took over as Silver
13 from you?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. A decision was made for you to be the Forward
16 Operational Commander.

17 A. Yes, we had a discussion around what was happening, what
18 was going on and what I'd focused on really was the
19 rescues and getting things in place and getting some
20 structure round that, because things were happening.
21 People were doing things -- you know, we've heard of
22 Dave Cook doing some work and Sean Clarke doing work and
23 others doing work, and so things were happening, but
24 they were now coordinated. So they'd started off in an
25 uncoordinated way, which is the same for any incident,

1 the first appliances on scene will get to work and start
2 to do things and, as the Command structure falls in
3 behind it, we start to put coordination in around that.

4 Q. How long would you say it took to have what you would be
5 happy to term a "coordinated structure"?

6 A. I'd say it took round about 10 minutes.

7 Q. From your arrival?

8 A. From my arrival, 10 to 15 minutes from my arrival until
9 I was satisfied that the structure I had in place was
10 coordinated enough for me.

11 Q. There's no doubt you must have learnt a lot from this
12 particular incident. Did you ever attend any debrief
13 with senior officers?

14 A. I held a debrief at the scene with Steve -- we spoke
15 about it afterwards and I debriefed some of the crews.
16 Immediately after this incident, or within a few days,
17 I actually went on holiday for about three weeks and all
18 the debriefs took place in my absence, so I never
19 attended a debrief, no.

20 Q. No one -- did you ever suggest that you should attend
21 a debrief?

22 A. I spoke to SDO Smith afterwards and we did have
23 a discussion about it, but I wasn't present at the
24 actual performance review of command which took place
25 afterwards, no.

1 MR HAY: Mr Rigby, thank you very much. I have no more
2 questions for you, but others might.
3 A. Thank you.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?
5 Questions by MR COLTART
6 MR COLTART: Only one or two. Just on that very last topic,
7 could we have up on the screen please [LFB21-1] ?
8 This is the limited product that we have of the
9 performance review of the command function meeting.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. As we understand it, Incident Commander 1 was Mr Clarke,
12 and we've heard from him and we've taken him through the
13 observations which he made.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If we go over to page 2 [LFB21-2], please, and just enlarge that
16 for us if you don't mind, towards the bottom. As we had
17 understood the situation from the London Fire Brigade,
18 you were Incident Commander 2 --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- and responsible for the observations which were made
21 there?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. But do we now understand, in fact, that you didn't
24 attend a performance review of the command function
25 meeting?

1 A. Not only did I not attend. I saw this document for the
2 first time yesterday.

3 Q. Right. So if we go over the page again [LFB21-3], we understand
4 that that's Mr Smith?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Incident Commander 3.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Are you able to assist us firstly with who might be
9 Incident Commander 2 and responsible for the
10 observations which were made there?

11 A. In terms of the chronology of the incident, ordinarily
12 I wouldn't have been Incident Commander 2. Ordinarily,
13 it would have gone to an assistant divisional officer
14 and then at some point I would have come on, but I was
15 Incident Commander 2.

16 Q. But you weren't responsible -- you didn't attend the
17 meeting, you couldn't have been responsible for the
18 observations which were made?

19 A. No, because normally what happens, because I am also
20 from -- I actually chair these performance reviews of
21 commands. The normal situation that takes place is, as
22 the chair, I would agree with the Incident Commander in
23 terms of chronology, I would agree their good and
24 learning points with them, and then they would be
25 recorded.

1 So I can't actually say who they are attributed to.
2 I was Incident Commander 2, but I didn't have
3 a discussion with anybody around these -- although,
4 having said that, the first one, the good points, was
5 something I did, I immediately took over in order to
6 implement a robust incident management team. That's
7 something I did. So that first comment would seem to
8 fit in with what I did.

9 Q. It's interesting you say that, and can we just look then
10 at the second comment? Because it resonates with
11 something you said in your evidence this morning:
12 "The Incident Commander should consider utilising
13 the initial Incident Commander in his command support
14 team in order to retain his knowledge of the incident
15 and the deployed operational tactics."

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. If we just get through the language barrier, does that
18 not mean it's important to hang on to the bloke who's in
19 charge when you arrive because he can tell you what's
20 going on and what he's done about it?

21 A. He could do, but if I can take you to the next page,
22 please, page 3 --

23 Q. Yes, do, please.

24 A. -- it talks about:

25 "The IC appointed the previous Incident Commander as

1 the officer responsible for the operational tactics,
2 allowing himself to focus on the strategic tasks."
3 What happened there was Mr Smith sent me forward to
4 the train to deal with the train, which is exactly what
5 I did with Incident Commander number 1. For
6 Incident Commander number 3 it's put down as a good
7 point. For me, as Incident Commander number 2, it's put
8 down as a learning point. So there's an inconsistency
9 there.

10 Q. I'm not sure we're ever going to get to the bottom of
11 it.

12 A. In terms of me, I did send the first Incident Commander
13 down to the scene, yes, I did, and I sent him down to
14 the scene because he didn't have a great deal of
15 information other than what he'd already given me to
16 give me. He had no other appreciation of the incident
17 because, as I'd previously said, he was overwhelmed.
18 Because I wasn't there to actually discuss this, it
19 was just seen in the cold light of procedures, and in
20 terms of procedures, then, yes, I would say, yes, in
21 ordinary circumstances, I would keep him with me. But
22 the procedures are there as guiding principles for me,
23 they're not absolutes. So I can either use the
24 procedures or not use them, as long as I can justify it.
25 Now, I justified it in saying he better served me by

1 going down to the scene down to the platform and putting
2 in place the structure which I'd asked him to do, which
3 he did on my behalf.

4 Q. But, in fact, it seems unlikely that this is a comment
5 attributable to you in any event, because you didn't
6 attend a performance and review meeting?

7 A. No, I didn't, but I would say, looking at that first and
8 the second point, because they are things that
9 I actually did, I can't see who else they would be. It
10 seems that, based on the chronology of the first
11 Incident Commander and possibly the third
12 Incident Commander, they have -- because I did discuss
13 with Mr Smith my actions and what I'd done, so it's
14 possible that they could have been taken to that
15 debriefing with them.

16 Q. Oh, I see.

17 A. So it's possible, but because I'm not there to actually
18 discuss in detail what I did, it's simply then looked at
19 in the cold light of just the procedures. So in terms
20 of procedures, I've got two criticisms, but actually in
21 terms of what I did and why I did it, I would have
22 explained it so I wouldn't have got those learning
23 points, if that makes sense.

24 Q. It does, I think. I'm not going to stop you from saying
25 anything important, but I think we might move on. Can

1 I just ask you this: you say that on occasion you chair
2 these meetings?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. My understanding of the policy is that the notes of the
5 meetings themselves are destroyed afterwards?

6 A. Yes, they are.

7 Q. So we're not going to get any further than what we've
8 got on this page and the next page in terms of what was
9 said and what wasn't said?

10 A. Unfortunately, the actual purpose of the performance
11 review of command is to inform a database which then
12 informs future training trends. So it's a training tool
13 more than a debriefing tool.

14 Q. These are all learning points, aren't they?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. It's supposed to be a constructive exercise?

17 A. Yes, it is, and those learning points are then fed into
18 future exercises and future events, yes.

19 Q. The idea behind this debrief process, and the other
20 debrief process, is to get accurate and honest answers
21 from the people involved so that points can be taken
22 forward for the future?

23 A. Yes, they are, yes.

24 Q. Just one last question on this topic and, in fact, last
25 question, full stop. There was an operational debrief

1 for Aldgate on 18 August. So this is about six weeks
2 after the incident.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. Can you recall now, were you back from holiday and did
5 you attend that debrief?

6 A. No, I didn't attend that debrief and I don't think I was
7 back from holiday then either. I'd booked quite
8 a long -- I'd just come back from a two-year secondment,
9 so I'd booked quite a long holiday with my family and
10 went away for quite some time.

11 Q. I quite understand. The position is this, isn't it,
12 that you played a fairly pivotal part that day?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But are we right in understanding that you didn't, in
15 fact, attend at any stage a sort of formal debrief to
16 obtain your input as to how things have gone?

17 A. It appears what happened with me is that, because I had
18 just returned from a lengthy secondment, and almost
19 immediately went on holiday, I was completely lost from
20 the system in totality. I was never interviewed by the
21 police. I've never spoken of this incident until today
22 to anybody, other than one debrief with Mr Smith on the
23 day of the incident.

24 MR COLTART: All right, thank you very much.

25 A. Okay, thank you.

1 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

2 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Rigby, can I just deal with two matters,
3 please, and it's really from the families' perception of
4 evidence I think you've given today is the reason I'm
5 asking.

6 You discussed with Mr Hay the evidence that was read
7 earlier this week on Monday I think from Mr Cook.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. May I just make sure that I've understood it? Although
10 there appears to have been some confusion as to who was
11 Silver, you or Mr Cook, is this the position: that there
12 wasn't duplication between you but, in fact, there may
13 well have been tasks that you would have allocated to
14 Mr Cook in any event?

15 A. Yes, and the tasks I would likely have allocated to him
16 were the tasks that he was carrying out under his own
17 initiative.

18 Q. Secondly, this: you've dealt also with the reduction in
19 the number of firefighters underground.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Should we understand that there was, as far as you were
22 aware, sufficient to deal with that that they were being
23 asked to deal with?

24 A. Yes, they were, and that was confirmed when I actually
25 went down underground and took charge of the scene of

1 operation underground, yes. I was satisfied that I had
2 sufficient resources to deal with that incident.

3 Q. Was it ever drawn to your attention of the request for
4 further other stretchers or ladders to be used as
5 stretchers, makeshift stretchers?

6 A. No it wasn't, because when I was there, there were
7 numerous ambulances were in attendance. They -- their
8 equipment was much better, you know. In terms of moving
9 people by ladders or our stretchers, we had -- we have
10 a stretcher on our fire rescue unit. We don't have
11 numerous stretchers, and there's -- with respect,
12 there's a little bit of mission creep there.

13 Q. A little bit of?

14 A. Mission creep between services. What you will have is,
15 in terms of rescue, we carry out rescues, but we are
16 supported very much by the London Ambulance Service.
17 The London Ambulance Service will actually treat the
18 casualties and the London Ambulance Service provide
19 stretchers to remove the casualties. So that's their
20 role and that's their function, which they carried out
21 on the day. So when I was down there, stretchers
22 were -- there was an ample provision of stretchers to
23 deal with the people we had, and they were provided by
24 the London Ambulance Service.

25 Q. You added I think, or you started by saying that, when

1 you then went to the forward control point -- can you
2 help her Ladyship as to when that would have been
3 timewise?

4 A. That would have been around about 10.00 am.

5 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Rigby.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, "forward control point", just
7 so, again, we can use plain English, do you mean the
8 train or do you mean the platform?

9 A. Both. I was in charge of the platform and the train.
10 I was in charge of all operations underground, my Lady.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was the forward control point for
12 these purposes, when you said you went down, found you
13 had sufficient resources, are we talking about the train
14 or are we talking about the platform?

15 A. I'm talking about both, sorry.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

17 A. Both, yes, my Lady.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Sheff? Yes, Ms Canby?

19 Questions by MS CANBY

20 MS CANBY: Mr Rigby, just a couple of matters on behalf of
21 Transport for London. Can we deal briefly with this
22 issue of traction current first?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. When you arrived, who confirmed to you that traction
25 current was off?

1 A. Sub-Officer Clarke.

2 Q. So he'd already got that confirmation?

3 A. He confirmed it was off, yes, he had had that

4 information by then it was off, yes.

5 Q. Were you aware that, when traction current is off, the

6 tunnel lighting automatically comes on?

7 A. Yes, that's an indicator, yes.

8 Q. Was your concern -- or would your concern generally in

9 relation to traction current be that a train may be

10 bridging a gap and it could move and it could reenergise

11 a track; is that one of your concerns?

12 A. It is a concern, yes, and that's why we use the bars

13 that are on the train as well to actually isolate the

14 train completely at either end, yes.

15 Q. Those bars are known as SCDs, short-circuiting devices?

16 A. Short-circuiting devices, yes, yes, I'm not good with

17 acronyms.

18 Q. We're trying to avoid them.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It's difficult. Are you aware that SCDs,

21 short-circuiting devices, had been put down at Aldgate?

22 A. Yes, I was -- they were confirmed to me that they were

23 down, yes.

24 Q. They were down by the time you arrived?

25 A. Yes, it was down and it was all established by the time

1 I arrived, yes, yes.

2 Q. Were you aware that there are traction current sections?

3 A. My detail on it is scant, and all I know is the power
4 needs to be off, short-circuit devices in place. The
5 actual technology that is around it, no, I don't have
6 the detail, no.

7 Q. So you wouldn't be aware that traction current being off
8 at Aldgate means it's actually off from Aldgate through
9 to Liverpool Street and going through to Moorgate?

10 A. Oh, yes, yes, sorry, I was aware of that, yes, and I was
11 aware of the consequences of that in terms of other
12 trains, and that we may have to deal with other trains
13 in tunnels, yes.

14 Q. Were you aware that traction current couldn't be
15 switched on locally, but it had to be switched back on
16 or off centrally at the power control room?

17 A. Yes, I was, yes.

18 Q. If there is found to be any difficulty in seeking
19 confirmation that traction current was off -- and that,
20 as you've heard, is a matter for my Lady -- do you think
21 that was essentially an issue in terms of communication?

22 A. It was an issue of communication within the London Fire
23 Brigade, trying to get on to our main scheme radio to
24 get it done. Once we did, and it was established very
25 quickly, I can't say if there were any communications

1 issues between our control and LUL control, because
2 I wasn't privy to that information. It took us -- there
3 was a lot of radio traffic, as you can imagine, on the
4 day. So to break in with that message -- and it was
5 a priority message, to get the power off, because it was
6 hampering rescue or potentially hampering rescue
7 operations.

8 Q. Do you think that that has now been improved by the
9 introduction of Airwave radios for the London Fire
10 Brigade and CONNECT radios for the London Underground?

11 A. I don't think it was a matter of the radios. It was
12 a matter because the -- we'd still use the same --
13 although we've got different radios, we were using
14 a main scheme radio, which was on the fire appliance,
15 which is above ground. So the main scheme radio on the
16 fire appliance wasn't affected and, yes, although
17 they've also been updated, those radios worked well on
18 the day, and we were able to get through.

19 You know, the detail -- because it had happened
20 before I arrived, so the amount -- the actual amount of
21 time it took from the radio message being sent to the
22 power being confirmed off I can't say, I could only
23 speculate. What I can say is, when I arrived, we had
24 absolute confirmation that power was off. The
25 short-circuiting devices were down and the emergency

1 lights were on in the tunnel.

2 Q. In your opinion, do you think there needs to be a change
3 in that procedure, or do you think that procedure works
4 well, seeking confirmation that traction current --

5 A. I think that procedure works well, because, as I said
6 earlier, it's necessary to do that because, you know,
7 you can't safely get on to the train or, indeed, bring
8 people off the train until you have that confirmation,
9 you know, it's a very high-voltage system, and you know,
10 that would not be -- we would not be competent as
11 rescuers if we electrocuted passengers as we brought
12 them off the train and were supposedly rescuing them and
13 we wouldn't be competent if we were electrocuting our
14 own people as we were trying to put them on the train.
15 So it's a necessary evil. We have to deal with it,
16 but it's something that we have to have, and
17 London Transport has to continue with its operations and
18 so do we and, when we do ask for the power off, in my
19 experience, it always works very well.

20 Q. Can we move on to a different topic very briefly, one of
21 radios?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You agreed, I think, in answer to questions from Mr Hay,
24 the gentleman who was asking questions first, that your
25 radios wouldn't have worked in the tunnel at Aldgate.

1 A. The radios we had at the time would have worked had we
2 deployed what's called a leaky feeder, which effectively
3 is a large aerial which goes down the stairs. We didn't
4 deploy that because there was no need to, because I gave
5 the order to turn the radios off.

6 Now, that leaky feeder is carried on our command
7 unit, so we could have laid that leaky feeder and the
8 radios would have worked, but there was no point in
9 laying it because I had given the order not to use the
10 radios.

11 Q. I appreciate you had given the order. We've heard from
12 two members of London Underground staff that their
13 station radios actually did work in the tunnel.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Do you know whether or not, before you gave your order,
16 any members of London Fire Brigade had attempted to use
17 their radios in the tunnel and whether, in fact, they
18 did in fact work?

19 A. They would have worked in line of sight. So the -- for
20 people underground, to call another station underground
21 would have worked, but it was below ground to the
22 surface is where the problem was. The same with mobile
23 phones. As soon as you go into the tunnel, the mobile
24 phones cease to work, but it's the same -- but in the
25 tunnel, in line of sight of each other, the radios would

1 have still have worked.

2 Q. Now with Airwave, your London Fire Brigade radios will
3 work in tunnels?

4 A. They will work in tunnels through to the surface and all
5 the rest of it.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, could we slow down a bit
7 there, please, Mr Rigby? They would have worked in line
8 of sight. What do you mean they would have worked in
9 the tunnel in line of sight?

10 A. If we'd have had two people in line of sight of each
11 other, so they could see each other, but they were some
12 distance apart so they couldn't hear each other by
13 talking, they could have used their radios and they
14 could have heard each other, my Lady.

15 But what wouldn't have worked is from the station to
16 the surface, unless we'd actually put the leaky feeder
17 in, which is a large aerial. Then they would have
18 worked. But there was no purpose in doing that
19 because --

20 MS CANBY: Because of your concern about secondary devices?

21 A. Yes, so not to use the radios.

22 Q. I think you then went on to confirm that your Airwave
23 radios would now work in tunnels?

24 A. Yes, they would, yes.

25 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Taylor?

2 Questions by MR TAYLOR

3 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Rigby. This may already have
4 been covered, but I want to get something -- this may
5 already have been covered, but I just want to get
6 something clear into my head. I think you said you were
7 attending a CBRN training centre?

8 A. Yes, I attended -- yes, prior to this incident, yes,
9 I had spent two years seconded from the Brigade, yes.

10 Q. That was -- but that was basically for senior management
11 level, like yourself?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. I think you said that sub-officers don't attend. Up to
14 what level attend?

15 A. It really starts around my level at sort of divisional
16 officer level.

17 Q. From these training sessions, these talks that you have,
18 you glean your policies and your procedures, this is how
19 you decide on how you would act in the event of
20 a multiple event?

21 A. I'm really sorry, could you repeat the question?

22 Q. From these training sessions, these meetings that you
23 had, this is where you would gather your information
24 about how you would work, the process that you would go
25 through, your procedures and your policies?

1 A. Well, what we did, the way we did it, was training
2 exercises, really, it's to actually give senior managers
3 other considerations. It's to get them to think a bit
4 more laterally. They've got their procedures in place
5 and, as I've said already, as senior managers, although
6 we have procedures, they are actually guiding principles
7 for us, we can decide they're not appropriate at the
8 time.

9 The idea of these exercises, really, was just to
10 give senior managers a greater understanding of
11 dealing -- and some of the challenges that they would be
12 faced with in dealing with these types of incidents.

13 Q. Is that just for the Fire Brigade or does that include
14 London Ambulance Service, police officers?

15 A. It's multi-agency. From time to time, we've actually
16 even had coroners attend these training sessions, yes.

17 Q. London Underground, would they attend?

18 A. Not necessarily London Underground, but transport
19 companies, so, you know, we may have had people from
20 London Underground, I can't recall, but we certainly had
21 transport chief executives from a number of transport
22 systems. So I'm sure that at some point over the two
23 years we would have had somebody from
24 London Underground, yes.

25 Q. I suppose the point in that is to get continuity between

1 all the services so that everyone knows who does what?

2 A. It's really an understanding of the challenges and
3 problems that each agency will face and what methods
4 they've got to overcome them. But also how each agency
5 can support each other. And I think, you know, on the
6 day, that a lot of those things were in place, a lot of
7 that support was evident, and that type of thing has
8 continued to grow since.

9 Q. How, then, is the information cascaded down to your
10 staff?

11 A. They're trained in a different way. What we have is
12 two -- it's almost like comparing chalk with cheese,
13 with respect. Our initial attendance at an incident,
14 over firefighters, our police officers and our Ambulance
15 Service staff are trained in the tactics of dealing with
16 an incident in terms of the problems they face and how
17 they coordinate that. So who does rescues, how they
18 work with the Ambulance Service, things like that.
19 That's the tactics.

20 But the strategic management and the issues faced
21 strategically are dealt with in a different way. So we
22 train our firefighters in tactics of dealing with
23 terrorist incident. We train our managers in dealing
24 with the strategy of a terrorist incident.

25 Q. Does the training for these lower officers include

1 multiple events?

2 A. Training of our junior officers, often in terms of
3 terrorist events, will always cover multiple events.
4 Now, the challenges that faces for them is they only
5 deal with the incident they're faced with. The
6 challenge that raises for them is there could be
7 a restriction in resources that they can have. Because
8 we're dealing with so many incidents, they may not have
9 all the resources they require. But we just -- with our
10 firefighters, we just deal with tactics. For our senior
11 managers, we would deal with: you haven't got one scene
12 of operation, you've got several scenes of operation.

13 Q. One further question, basically. About the power.

14 I think it's already been dealt with, basically. But if
15 a person physically stands on the third rail, the live
16 rail, and shows your officers that that is off, would
17 you expect your officers to assume that that was off?

18 A. No, I wouldn't, until we had confirmation, because just
19 putting both feet on the third rail may not -- it
20 doesn't mean to say the power is off and will stay off.

21 We need confirmation that the power is absolutely off.

22 With respect, I can't deal with conjecture or

23 supposition. I have to deal with absolutes. At my

24 level, I can only deal in absolutes wherever possible.

25 I've had to deal with some supposition in terms of

1 secondary devices, in terms of CBR. The electricity off
2 is something that I can confirm absolutely. I would be
3 negligent in my duty not to confirm that absolutely the
4 power was off. Not only for the responders, but for the
5 victims of the incident as well.

6 Q. I think you said the procedure was for you to ring your
7 control room, your control room to ring
8 London Underground?

9 A. No, it's for our -- it's for us to radio, we get on to
10 the main scheme radio and radio our control room, and we
11 request the power off at Aldgate Underground station.
12 Our control room will then contact London Underground
13 Control by phone and we'll have that confirmation made.
14 Once they have that confirmation, they come back to us
15 with that confirmation.

16 Q. How long would you say that that would take?

17 A. A matter of minutes. I can't say on the day how long it
18 took, but it could take -- you know, it normally takes
19 about three to five minutes to get that confirmation.

20 Q. Then, of course, you've got to tell your fire
21 officers --

22 A. Well, bear in mind that includes somebody physically
23 going and turning the power off. So once it goes to
24 London Underground, you know, they probably themselves
25 have to communicate with some people to actually -- who

1 run the lines and who control those lines. I don't know
2 how long that will take them. But it's done reasonably
3 quickly.

4 Q. The people actually on the carriage itself, we know they
5 were 100 yards inside the tunnel, someone has to go down
6 there and tell them as well?

7 A. Yes, in terms of the messages, people were still on the
8 train because actually there's no platform to get off
9 the train. The only way off the train would be to jump
10 down onto the tracks below. But actually it's the third
11 rail we're concerned about, it's the third rail.

12 There's two rails that the train sits on, there's
13 a third rail behind -- beside that which the power is
14 drawn from by the train, because it has shoes that lay
15 on it. So it's that that we're concerned about.

16 So at that point, the people would have been fairly
17 contained in the train unless they'd started to open the
18 doors. Now, I don't know if that happened because
19 I wasn't there in the early stages. So I can't -- I'm
20 afraid, I'm really sorry, I can't answer that.

21 MR TAYLOR: Okay, thank you.

22 A. Thank you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Hill?

24 Questions by MR HILL

25 MR HILL: Yes, please. Mr Rigby, it's just one matter. You

1 made a reasoned judgment in respect of radios at the
2 scene --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- that reasoned judgment being based on what you knew
5 of previous atrocities abroad and on what you didn't
6 know as to what may or may not still be present in that
7 tunnel.

8 Having made that judgment, you then informed other
9 response agencies, emergency responders, and I just want
10 to see if you can help us any further in terms of
11 identifying the senior police officer at the scene to
12 whom you spoke.

13 A. Right, right.

14 Q. Your best recollection is that that officer seemed to be
15 a chief inspector?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Recognisable as a chief inspector because?

18 A. Because of his rank insignia. As far as I recall, he
19 had three pips, which, for me, is a chief inspector.

20 Q. I'm not going to argue with that.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. But there are three police services actually present at
23 this scene.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. City of London Police, in whose jurisdiction this event

1 took place, British Transport Police and
2 Metropolitan Police.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. There wasn't a chief inspector of the
5 Metropolitan Police present at the scene.
6 A. Right.
7 Q. At the time I think you're referring to, which is the --
8 radio decision.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you help any further as to who it may be? May it
11 have been a British Transport Police officer or I think
12 you thought there was reason not to conclude City?
13 A. The reason not to conclude City was that his cap wasn't
14 red and white. City police have red and white checked
15 caps. So I know it wasn't a City police officer.
16 Q. What sort of cap was this officer wearing?
17 A. It was a black and white checked cap. What I can't
18 recall, I'm afraid -- the memory I have, despite what
19 you're saying to me, and it's obviously a false memory,
20 the memory I have is a Metropolitan Police chief
21 inspector, I'm really sorry.
22 Q. I'm not going to press you on it. The statement that
23 you have provided is dated 27 August of this year.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Are there documents that back that statement, notes made

1 closer to the time, that assisted you when you drew up
2 the statement two months ago?

3 A. I didn't have sight of any notes that I made at the time
4 and I haven't had sight of any notes since. I did make
5 some notes when I was in the church afterwards, there
6 was a church, and we were offered tea and coffee and
7 refreshments at the church. There was a period where we
8 were stood down, once all casualties were removed from
9 the train, all live casualties. We evacuated the scene
10 completely and, myself, I was probably the last
11 responder to leave the Underground and go to the
12 surface.

13 I then gathered together a number of firefighters
14 and we had -- we got them to start making statements.
15 Mr Smith, SDO Smith, there were a couple of fire
16 investigation officers there, and the advantage of our
17 fire investigation officers is that they regularly,
18 sadly, attend Coroners' Courts.
19 So they are very well versed in dealing with
20 Coroners' Courts and going to Coroners' Courts. So they
21 gave some guidance to the firefighters there on how to
22 write their statements and write them out and things to
23 put in.

24 Q. I'm sorry, my question is: would those notes, made by
25 you or even by anybody else, if you saw them, have

1 assisted in the making of your statement for our
2 purposes?

3 A. The notes I made were really around my decisions at the
4 time rather than the people I spoke to. So I was giving
5 a chronological order to my risk assessments and my
6 decisions because, you know, at that point, if they had
7 gone down and found secondary devices, if they had gone
8 down and found that it was, in fact, a radiological --
9 a dirty bomb, then a number of firefighters would have
10 been exposed to radiation and all that sort of thing.

11 Q. It's a matter for you, of course, but what you've just
12 said would tend to exclude there being any reference in
13 scene notes to the identity of the officer that I'm
14 asking you about.

15 A. I'm afraid not, no.

16 Q. So that leaves us with your August statement which
17 simply says "senior police officer". The statement
18 doesn't give us any help, does it, as between
19 Metropolitan, City or British Transport Police?

20 A. No, it doesn't, no. I'm afraid it doesn't, no.

21 Q. It is right in your statement that, in other parts of
22 your statement, for example in relation to cordons, you
23 refer to City of London Police being in attendance --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- marshalling members of the public out of the

1 Underground.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you do have that police service specifically referred
4 to.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. But there's nothing else, is there, that will help us as
7 between City of London, British Transport and
8 Metropolitan Police?

9 A. I'm afraid not, no.

10 MR HILL: Thank you.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Yes, Ms Boyd?

12 Questions by MS BOYD

13 MS BOYD: Thank you, Mr Rigby. If I can just clarify
14 a couple of matters.

15 First of all, the time of your arrival at the scene.

16 We know from the MOBIS report that you were mobilised at
17 09.08.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. As we understand it, you don't have the push button
20 facility on your car, unlike the appliances where they
21 push status 3 to announce their arrival?

22 A. I don't have any of the systems. I have a pager
23 message, I have a small device that gives me the
24 information. I telephone Control, get the information,
25 mobilise the incident, and then, when I arrive, I book

1 in with the Control Unit. But they don't -- once I'm at
2 the Control Unit, they know I've arrived, so they don't
3 necessarily inform Control. So there's never
4 actually -- it's not unusual not to know a time line.

5 Q. I think you say in your statement that you crossed over
6 London Bridge --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- which sounds as though that's the same route taken by
9 the Southwark appliance.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you experience any delay?

12 A. No, not really. I was -- because my response was a blue
13 light response, so I was able to, you know, make
14 progress through any traffic very quickly. Plus also
15 I -- you know, I had the advantage of knowing very well
16 where Aldgate station was, because I spent nearly five
17 years at Whitechapel fire station. So I knew the area
18 very well.

19 Q. I think you say in your statement -- and indeed in your
20 evidence earlier -- that when you arrived, there was
21 certainly an ambulance or ambulance vehicles and police
22 vehicles at the scene already?

23 A. And still arriving in large numbers, yes.

24 Q. We know that the first ambulance to arrive was 09.14,
25 I think.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Were you listening to the radio? Would you have heard
3 incoming messages from Sub-Officer Clarke in your car?

4 A. I would have done, but by the time I had arrived, I then
5 switch my car ignition off, get out of my car, go to the
6 boot of my car and I get my fire gear out of the boot of
7 my -- my protective equipment out of the boot of my car.
8 So at that point, it would seem that was the point
9 when the informative message was being sent, was when
10 I was getting rigged into my fire gear.

11 Q. So that we're quite clear, I wonder if we could briefly
12 have on the screen [LFB23-5] .

13 It's the third entry, if we could enlarge.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. 09.15.38, an incoming message from F331, which is
16 Sub-Officer Clarke.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. He's at Aldgate station:
19 "Explosion and fire on Circle Line. Train
20 approximately 100 metres ..."

21 If that was sent at 09.15, are you saying you didn't
22 hear that in your car and, therefore, you must have been
23 arriving or getting ready --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- or switching your radio on?

1 A. Yes. Although the message at 09.16 includes me as part
2 of that mobilisation, I was actually -- I was actually
3 paged at 09.08. So my -- so I was well -- by the time
4 that mobilise message came across at 09.16, I was
5 already mobile to the incident, if not actually arriving
6 by then. So -- or just shortly after anyway.

7 Q. So your timeframe, I think you gave earlier, 09.20 to
8 09.25, do you think it's more 09.15 to 09.20?

9 A. No, I don't, because I -- when I got there, the
10 driver -- because Sub-Officer Clarke wouldn't --
11 although that message went from Sub-Officer Clarke,
12 Sub-Officer Clarke wouldn't have sent it. The driver of
13 Sub-Officer Clarke's fire engine would have sent it. So
14 Sub-Officer Clarke would have dictated it to the driver,
15 the driver would have then gone off and sent it, and
16 then walked back to Sub-Officer Clarke to confirm to him
17 that the message had been sent.

18 I arrived just after the driver was arriving back to
19 confirm the message had been sent. So it's -- you know,
20 it's at least a few minutes after the message was
21 actually transmitted.

22 Q. So a few minutes after 9.15?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. We've heard that Sub-Officer Clarke was, in fact, acting
25 up, I think he was a temporary sub-officer.

1 A. Yes, yes, he was.

2 Q. But you have explained in your evidence that he had done
3 everything right up until that point?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You understood from him that there had been an explosion
6 and personnel had already been deployed into the tunnel?

7 A. Yes, by the time of my arrival, he confirmed to me power
8 was off and people were actually on the train working,
9 yes.

10 Q. So any question of difficulty with power and
11 confirmation, as far as you're concerned, by the time
12 you spoke to Sub-Officer Clarke, that hadn't caused any
13 delay?

14 A. I think the greater difficulty was, in fact, the people
15 at the surface, trying to get through and pass the
16 people at the surface. I -- for me, that caused
17 a greater delay than the actual power, because there
18 were a significant number of injured people at the
19 surface and still coming to the surface, and so
20 responders were being drawn away to deal with those
21 people.

22 Q. We know, in terms of resources, that there were two
23 appliances from Whitechapel, including I think it's
24 Leading Fireman Edwards and Sub-Officer Clarke.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. We know from the MOBIS report that they arrived at
2 09.00.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Then, were you aware that there was a separate call --
5 that was as a result of a call from the police --

6 A. Right.

7 Q. -- then there was a separate call two or three minutes
8 later from London Underground, which gave rise to
9 a second mobilisation, as opposed to a result of making
10 it a major incident?

11 A. Right, yes.

12 Q. We know from that MOBIS report that four further
13 appliances were mobilised and arrived at Aldgate, one
14 from Shadwell, that was Sub-Officer Curnick, at 09.06;
15 Bethnal Green at 09.08; Dockhead at 09.11. Southwark
16 wasn't booked, but the evidence suggests that they
17 arrived around that sort of time.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. So it looks as though resources-wise, there were some
20 five, indeed six, fire appliances at the scene --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- within ten to fifteen minutes of the initial call.

23 A. Yes, which would have given me in excess of

24 30 firefighters.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was going to ask you on that. When

1 you decided that you needed to ensure that (a) you
2 didn't have too many people down there clogging up the
3 system and (b) you wanted to rotate them, how many
4 firefighters do you remember were down trying to rescue
5 people on the trains when you took that decision?

6 A. I would estimate the whole commitment downstairs
7 including -- there were people being rescued, there were
8 people in command, there were people also running the --
9 moving the backwards and forwards of tools.

10 There were probably around about 15 to 20 people
11 below the surface. With about almost the same number at
12 the surface.

13 MS BOYD: We also know from the MOBIS report, and obviously
14 as a result of the major incident that was declared,
15 that ADO Vialls arrived on the scene and ADO Kent.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was ADO Kent made Sector Commander for the train
18 initially and ADO Vialls Sector Commander up top?

19 A. I recall two ADOs, and I knew one of them as
20 Terry Vialls. Now, I did ask him to take command of
21 rescue operations downstairs, I thought, and I also
22 wanted a second Sector Commander to ensure that all
23 tools, all equipment, and any other requirements for the
24 scene, were also managed from the surface.

25 So, yes, there were two ADOs. Mr Vialls, I can

1 remember; I can't recall the second officer. But I did
2 brief two ADOs on my requirement in terms of that
3 command chain, yes, yes.

4 Q. You've explained your decision-making in relation to
5 your concern about the threat of secondary devices,
6 ensuring a minimum personnel but not so as to hamper
7 operations.

8 A. Absolutely, yes.

9 Q. I think we've also heard evidence from those
10 firefighters who were on the train that a senior officer
11 informed them in the carriage of the threat of
12 a secondary device and that, if anyone wanted to leave,
13 they could.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We've heard that all the emergency services who were
16 there -- police, ambulance men, firefighters, LUL --
17 nobody left, they carried on --

18 A. Nobody left.

19 Q. -- with the evacuation.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I just wanted to ask, are you able to confirm that was
22 ADO Kent who was on the train and made that
23 announcement?

24 A. I'm sorry, it was either ADO Kent or ADO Vialls, they
25 were the only two ADOs and, yes, I briefed them both to

1 be Sector Commanders. I'm sorry, I can't remember which
2 way round they were.

3 MS BOYD: My Lady, I think it's the reference LFB53-69.

4 We also heard, I think, from Inspector Munn from the
5 British Transport Police that he conducted a final sweep
6 of the train with a senior fire officer?

7 A. That was me.

8 Q. I was about to say, was that you?

9 A. Yes, it was me, yes.

10 Q. In relation to the question of confirmation of power
11 whatever the procedure -- and you've explained that --
12 it does appear from the evidence that we've heard that
13 individual crews acted essentially on their own
14 judgment --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- one crew trying to seek confirmation from the
17 London Underground locally --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- others seeing people on the track and making
20 individual decisions. So would it be right that,
21 whatever the procedure, there was no effective or
22 significant delay?

23 A. No, and our procedures actually allow for individual
24 crews to carry out individual risk assessments. So
25 although there's an overall risk assessment of the

1 scene, if an individual crew is in a position where they
2 feel they can make a saveable life and they can do
3 something effective within the risks that they face, and
4 they can put a system in place to do it, then, yes, of
5 course they will, and so it doesn't surprise me that
6 individual crews would have found ways on to the train,
7 despite the fact that the power -- they didn't have
8 absolutely confirmation the power was off, yes.

9 Q. Finally, could you just explain what an FRU carries in
10 terms of equipment?

11 A. A fire rescue unit is what you're referring to. We have
12 16 in the London Fire Brigade. At the time, we had ten
13 of those vehicles. They carry large lifting and cutting
14 equipment, very -- very large equipment, and that
15 equipment is used -- so very heavy jacks to lift trains
16 up, very heavy -- capable of lifting a train. Very
17 heavy jacks in order to lift that. Very heavy cutting
18 equipment. Lifting and moving equipment. Extended
19 duration breathing apparatus, and line and water rescue
20 equipment as well.

21 So they provide most of the rescue functions in
22 which actually the team that I'm in charge of trains.
23 So it's my responsibility to train those crews.

24 Q. But, in fact, it appears that none of that equipment was
25 required in this evacuation?

1 A. That's right, it actually wasn't required. In general,
2 the equipment that we had on the fire engines, the
3 cutting equipment we had there was all that was
4 required, because, again, I go back to the term people
5 were trapped, it was actually a case of removing some of
6 the seats to make it a more effective working area, and
7 everything else, you know, to my knowledge, no one was
8 physically trapped by wreckage other than perhaps a seat
9 had been displaced by the blast or something like that.
10 So it wasn't the same as someone trapped in a motor
11 vehicle, for example.

12 Q. There's been a suggestion by Mr Foster, who's now
13 retired from the brigade, that the FRUs are equipped
14 with three stretchers and other equipment which he
15 considered could have been used and wasn't.

16 A. The fire rescue unit is equipped with one stretcher and
17 that one stretcher is actually more for use with line
18 operations. So if I wanted to lower somebody from
19 a height, it's like a huge basket stretcher. But you
20 can fit a spine board and another stretcher inside of
21 it. It's a very large and very cumbersome stretcher,
22 and, in terms of the areas where we were working, it
23 wasn't appropriate to use that at the time and, as
24 I said, our colleagues from London Ambulance Service
25 had, you know, a ready supply of that sort of equipment

1 to move -- to actually move the casualties.

2 Q. We've heard from paramedics who say that they would ask
3 firefighters on the scene to ask paramedics up top for
4 stretchers. They would then carry them down and then
5 assist with the evacuation.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is that the system that was in place?

8 A. To a large extent. Whilst we're responsible for rescue
9 operations, when it comes to the medical care of the
10 casualties, obviously our colleagues -- we defer to our
11 colleagues from London Ambulance Service, and in those
12 situations, we would work for them, almost as labourers,
13 in fact, to carry the casualties on their behalf, so
14 that they can stay on scene and continue to provide
15 medical treatment.

16 Q. Thank you. Just one final question. In relation to the
17 fire rescue unit, you've explained that none of the
18 specialist equipment was required. Are you aware or did
19 you have anything to do with ordering, I think, two of
20 their crew to go down to the platform and remain on the
21 platform to help passengers off; in other words, they
22 weren't deployed into the track or train, they were told
23 to remain on the platform?

24 A. Yes, they were, and they were really to help the walking
25 wounded, as we refer to them, to the surface. You know,

1 for the want of a better term, the people who could get
2 themselves off the train and the people who could get
3 themselves to the surface, we obviously put people in
4 place to supervise those people.

5 MS BOYD: My Lady, there is a reference; COLP132 and 136.
6 Thank you very much, Mr Rigby.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Rigby, it may sound like a very
8 basic question, but if you arrive at this kind of scene
9 and you're dealing with other agencies, if you look at
10 a police officer, the chances are you can work out what
11 level he is.

12 A. Yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They may give them rather strange
14 names for their units, but you can work out what he is,
15 whether he's a PC, a sergeant, whatever.

16 How do you, when you face the London Ambulance
17 Service or London Underground, whatever it is, when
18 you're facing other agencies, how do you work out who
19 does what job and what their level is?

20 A. Normally, my Lady, we get together and talk about it and
21 find out who. So I had a very quick and -- a very quick
22 meeting at the surface to just discuss what was going
23 on, who was doing what, and the priorities of the
24 emergency services will be slightly different to each
25 other, as I'm sure you can appreciate. So we'd have

1 that quick conversation to find out who was responsible
2 for what and who's taking charge of what, and how that's
3 going to look, and then, from that point, we would then
4 say, "Right, okay, the next thing I'm going to do now is
5 this, this is my plan for the next half hour", each one
6 of us conveys that to each other, and at that point in
7 time, that early in the incident, that was enough to be
8 getting on with, really.

9 Obviously, when Mr Smith comes on, it becomes more
10 organised, because he then focuses on the strategic
11 management of the incident while I focus on the
12 tactical.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The chain of command really is only
14 obvious physically for the uniformed services like the
15 Fire Brigade and the police force.

16 A. Yes.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You would have been obvious as
18 a senior officer because of a white helmet?

19 A. White helmet, and also, my Lady, I had a tabard on with
20 "Incident Commander" in bright red letters across the
21 back of me.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Which you had taken off Mr Clarke?

23 A. Yes, yes. All agencies to some degree have that now.

24 The police service wear a tabard as well, and also they
25 change their rank markings to red, I've seen that a few

1 times. The Ambulance Service also do a similar thing
2 where they'll put an Ambulance silver tabard on. Those
3 sorts of things have come as a result of incidents like
4 7/7.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's what I'm trying to work out.
6 What was the situation at the time of the London
7 bombings and what is the situation now? Because it
8 seems to me as if you have a whole mass of people
9 arriving with different tasks and they need to work out
10 where the chains of command are.

11 How did they, on July 7, 2005, work out chains of
12 command and how are things different now?

13 A. Well, simply, at 7 July, my Lady, the fact that
14 I donned -- I had the white helmet on and donned this
15 tabard with "Incident Commander" at the back suddenly
16 made me rather like a magnet in terms of the other
17 agencies. They quickly gravitated towards me, and we
18 had those discussions.

19 What happens now is all agencies now have some form
20 of tabard system that immediately identifies who is in
21 charge of that particular service, and what will happen
22 is they will readily come together and organise that.

23 Also, in terms of the London Fire Brigade and, in
24 fact, nationally, we work much closer now with the
25 London Ambulance Service, because we now have developed

1 hazardous area response teams, so we work very closely
2 with those and train quite regularly and, indeed,
3 I provide ten major exercises a year in which we work
4 with hazardous areas response teams from across the
5 country.

6 Also, as a result of 7 July, we increased our fire
7 rescue unit fleet from 10 to 16 vehicles. So we added
8 another 6 vehicles to the fleet, so we now have 16 fire
9 rescue units deployed across London.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You said there something about you
11 have the tabard system now. There was in place,
12 on July 7, some form of tabard system. We've heard
13 about Silver Command. Were there actually -- were they
14 silver tabards?

15 A. They were tabards and they were used. They weren't
16 immediately apparent, my Lady, although I had taken
17 a tabard off Mr -- off Sub-Officer Clarke, other
18 agencies did have tabards on, but not immediately. They
19 weren't -- I arrived quite early, unusually early, in
20 the incident, and that was due to Sub-Officer Clarke's
21 initial messages. We were able to very quickly ramp up
22 our resources due to his very early messages.

23 Ordinarily, it could have taken quite a bit longer for
24 that Silver Command to kick in.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: In fact, even if there were any -- or

1 there was any slight confusion as to the chains of
2 command of the various agencies, did it on the day, as
3 far as you can tell, make any difference to the
4 responses of those various agencies?

5 A. What I can say, my Lady, is that I was very clear who
6 was in charge of each service, although, you know, from
7 colleagues earlier, I now can't remember the police
8 officer. At the time, the police officer I was talking
9 to I knew was in charge of the police response. The
10 ambulance officer I spoke to, the LUL people and other
11 agencies I spoke to, I knew they were in charge of their
12 particular agency, and that was very clear very quickly.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The only other question I wanted to
14 ask you, given that you have such an involvement in
15 training, is, back on July 7, 2005, I have detected from
16 some witnesses from some agencies perhaps not
17 a deliberate failure, but not necessarily an
18 understanding of the roles of other agencies.

19 A. Yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was there much mutual training back
21 in July so that, if I arrived as a fireman, I would
22 understand the duty of the first ambulance person there
23 or, if I were the first ambulance person there, I'd
24 understand the duty of the Fire Brigade? Was there much
25 mutual training back then, understanding people's

1 different roles?

2 A. There wasn't as much, my Lady, and it tended to be at
3 the strategic level. So there was very little
4 understanding of each other's agencies, unless you knew
5 people from that other agency as a personal friend or
6 you'd had experience of that agency.

7 So, for example, we have some ex-ambulance staff
8 that now work for the Fire Service. We have, you know,
9 ex-police officers that work for the Fire Service and
10 vice versa. We've had people from the Fire Service
11 leave and go to other agencies.

12 What's happened since then is there's a lot more
13 joint training in terms of dealing with major incidents
14 at the grass roots level, and again, you know, some of
15 the exercises that I'm responsible for providing within
16 the London Fire Brigade involve the Ambulance Service
17 and involve the police service.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Rigby. Yes,
19 Mr Hay?

20 MR HAY: My Lady, just briefly dealing with one issue which
21 just arose from your questioning.

22 Further questions by MR HAY

23 MR HAY: In your statement, Mr Rigby, you mention how you
24 spoke to the senior police officer who we can't
25 identify. You then go on to say:

1 "I do not recall speaking to any senior officers
2 from London Ambulance Service at this time."

3 A. Not immediately, no. It was a few minutes later.

4 I came across -- my apologies, yes, I came across the
5 Ambulance Service officer as I was walking off to brief
6 some of my other officers.

7 Q. Do you recall roughly what time was the first time you
8 spoke with a senior officer from the London Ambulance
9 Service?

10 A. Very soon after I spoke to the police officer, within
11 a couple of minutes of speaking to the police officer,
12 yes, yes.

13 Q. Can you put a more definite time on that rather than
14 a couple of minutes after, in terms of 09.30, 09.40?

15 A. I'd literally walked -- from finishing my discussion
16 with the police officer, I walked no more than 50 metres
17 and I walked, so I can't say, because I can't say with
18 absolute certainty at what time I spoke to the police
19 officer. It was soon after I put the tabard on. The
20 Ambulance Service officer was actually moving towards me
21 and I was walking the other way.

22 Q. You were the magnet?

23 A. Yes, I was the magnet, yes.

24 MR HAY: Thank you very much, Mr Rigby.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Thank you very

1 much indeed, Mr Rigby. We'll take our break now.
2 (11.38 am)
3 (A short break)
4 (11.52 am)
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?
6 MR KEITH: My Lady, Stephen Smith, please.
7 DAC STEPHEN JAMES SMITH (sworn)
8 Questions by MR KEITH
9 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
10 A. Stephen James Smith.
11 Q. Mr Smith, in 2005, you were a senior divisional officer.
12 Are you now a Deputy Assistant Commander?
13 A. Deputy Assistant Commissioner.
14 Q. I'm sorry, Commissioner. I think in 2005 you were based
15 at Stratford fire station as an area manager, is that
16 correct?
17 A. That's correct, sir.
18 Q. Responsible for modernisation, implementation and
19 performance review for the whole of the London Fire
20 Brigade?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You were informed, just after 9.00, of an explosion on
23 a train at Liverpool Street?
24 A. Yes, I was.
25 Q. What was it about your function and your role in 2005

1 that required you to be so informed?

2 A. That was purely just a geographical occurrence. The
3 Resource Management Centre for London Fire Brigade is at
4 Stratford and is below my set of offices, so the calls
5 that were coming in at that time, it was just an --
6 a bit of information from one of the firefighters down
7 there who came up and told me. So it wasn't a formal
8 set of communications at that point.

9 Q. As a senior fire officer, did you have any
10 responsibility for general attendance at major incidents
11 or incidents where a particular number of pumps are
12 required?

13 A. Yes. At my level, I'm required to attend all incidents
14 where eight fire engines or more would be, or at major
15 incidents.

16 Q. What information, do you recall, did you initially
17 receive?

18 A. From the firefighter that came up, he just sort of
19 informally told me, that he'd heard that there had been
20 a fire and explosion at Liverpool Street, and that
21 I might be called out.

22 Q. The logs kept by the London Fire Brigade show that you
23 then received a pager message. Can we have [LFB23-5]. At
24 09.16.16 -- with the general mobilisation call at
25 09.16.16, we can see in the middle the lettering:

1 "F1 X page."

2 Were you F1?

3 A. Yes, that's me.

4 Q. Does that seem to indicate a pager call to you?

5 A. Yes, that's Foxtrot 1 myself, mobilised by paging, at
6 Foxtrot 21 as senior divisional officer, and Foxtrot 21
7 is Stratford, where I was based.

8 Q. What did that pager message mean to you?

9 A. It meant that I was going to -- obviously I had been
10 ordered to an incident, a major incident, and that my
11 first task is to contact our control to find out further
12 information about the incident and address, et cetera.

13 Q. We can take it from that message, forming, as it did,
14 part of the mobilisation call at the same time, that,
15 despite the fact that your initial information was that
16 there had been an explosion at Liverpool Street, this
17 pager correctly referred to Aldgate?

18 A. That is information which is on the station printer. It
19 may not match completely what's on my pager.

20 Q. But the point is that you knew it was Aldgate.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You went to Aldgate. Did you try, on the way, to gather
23 more information as to what the nature of the incident
24 was?

25 A. Yes. I tried by mobile phone to keep contacting our

1 Control, but was having great difficulty with the mobile
2 telephones.

3 Q. What was the difficulty? Was there an absence of a dial
4 tone or simply not answering?

5 A. Not getting through at all. There was no dial tone.

6 Q. Did you try on a number of occasions?

7 A. On numerous occasions en route.

8 Q. You were, as a senior officer, driven there, perhaps?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was there not a radio system in the car that would have
11 allowed you to make a connection to London Fire Brigade
12 Control?

13 A. Not that particular vehicle, no, and, at my level, we
14 don't have a radio. At that time, we didn't have
15 a radio. Our only means of communications was mobile
16 phone.

17 Q. Do you now?

18 A. We now have digital TETRA radios.

19 Q. Because, having been tasked to attend as senior
20 divisional officer, and obviously time being of the
21 essence, it would plainly have been desirable for you to
22 have gathered as much information as you could on the
23 way --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- which was dead time.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But did you somehow gather information in advance to the
3 effect that there had been an explosion on a train
4 somewhere in a tunnel?

5 A. I did, yes.

6 Q. On arrival, it was obviously apparent that there were
7 numerous people outside the station, wounded, emergency
8 service vehicles, and plainly it was a very serious
9 incident?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you immediately see Mr Rigby, who was then the
12 Incident Commander, in fact Incident Commander 2 as we
13 now know?

14 A. I did, yes.

15 Q. Was he very obvious?

16 A. He did, he had a tabard which denotes who our
17 Incident Commander is at that time.

18 Q. What command changes did your arrival on the scene
19 trigger?

20 A. I spoke to Mr Rigby to get a brief on what the incident
21 was at that time, and it was difficult, because we were
22 getting lots of other people, the other services and
23 other officers from London Fire Brigade coming up to us
24 at the same time, but I was able to get a full brief on
25 where he was at this moment in the incident.

1 Q. When you spoke to him, were you able to find out more
2 about the nature of the incident in the tunnel, what had
3 caused the explosion?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. What did you understand to be the position?
6 A. I understood that there was an explosion on the train
7 which had stopped, you know, about 100 metres from
8 Aldgate, and that there were a number of fatalities and
9 a number of rescues, and I could see plainly the amount
10 of casualties that was outside and he said that there
11 were still some rescues to undertake.
12 Q. On the train?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You arrived, I think, about 10.00.
15 A. At around 10.45.
16 Q. Could we have --
17 A. Sorry, 9.45.
18 Q. Could we have a look at [LFB23-7]?
19 At 10.01.41 we can see that there is a message:
20 "At Aldgate station London Underground SDO [Senior
21 Divisional Officer] Smith, now Incident Commander."
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. That must surely, of course, have been sent to Control
24 after your arrival?
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Not before?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Would you have expected that some notification to

4 Control would have been made as soon as you arrived to

5 reflect the fact that you were taking over command?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So does --

8 A. Sorry, not -- that's the notification at 10.01 that I am

9 taking command.

10 Q. Yes. You would have wished that a message goes to

11 Control shortly after you've taken command so that

12 everybody knows what the position is?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So do we take it, then, that you probably arrived a few

15 moments or a few minutes before that time?

16 A. I would say about at least 10 to 15 minutes before that.

17 Q. Why do you say that?

18 A. For the amount of things I had to do before that; ie,

19 finding Mr Rigby, getting the briefing. I know there

20 was lots we discussed. I know that I was then met by

21 a lot of the other emergency services. I then detailed

22 Mr Rigby what I wanted him to do and also at that time

23 said I was taking over, and part of that

24 handover/takeover does take a bit of time. I would then

25 have instructed one of the officers on the Command Unit

1 to then go away and send that message for me.

2 So there's quite a bit of time in that.

3 Q. On the basis that it's better to get things done and to
4 get the structure right and to give the appropriate
5 directions before notifying control?

6 A. Definitely, yes.

7 Q. At that time, before 10.00, as you say, perhaps quarter
8 to 10, did you know that there was a suspected bomb or
9 there had been a suspected bomb on the train?

10 A. What, that had gone off, or a secondary device?

11 Q. You knew there was an explosion. Did you know that it
12 was from a bomb?

13 A. Yes, I think I knew that at that point.

14 Q. Did you have any understanding of the needs of the
15 people who were trapped on the train in terms of whether
16 further equipment was needed down there as opposed to
17 what might have been needed by casualties, the walking
18 wounded, who were in the station entrance?

19 A. The station entrance for me was being dealt with by --
20 there was a number of firefighters there, but there were
21 also a large number of ambulance staff and I think
22 doctors and HEMS. The information I had from Mr Rigby
23 was that he thought enough resources had gone down and
24 the instruction I had given him was then to take charge
25 of the rescues on the train. Because, if I had a number

1 of -- a number of priorities came in at that same time
2 to me, which I had to give command of the rescues from
3 the train, which is usual to us, to sectorise the
4 incident into sizeable chunks. I then gave the whole
5 responsibility of the rescues from the train to him.

6 Q. Did he brief you as to whether or not there was
7 a sufficient number of, specifically, London Fire
8 Brigade crews in the carriage?

9 A. He did, and then I got subsequent briefs from him on
10 a regular basis of his progress and/or did he need more
11 resources.

12 Q. We've obviously heard some evidence about the steps that
13 he took when he was Incident Commander 2 before he was
14 replaced by you as Incident Commander 3.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was your direction to him to go down and take command of
17 the rescue position on the train --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- part of an overall attempt to ensure that whatever
20 operational knowledge he had gathered in the course of
21 being in command before your arrival wouldn't be lost?

22 A. Yes, that's part of what -- I'd worked with Mr Rigby
23 before on other incidents, so I know how he works, he
24 knows how I work. I also know he had a background of
25 and worked in rescue operations. He had taken a lot of

1 the information already from the first
2 Incident Commander on the state of operations.
3 From the amount of other tasks and priorities I had
4 to do with the other train, the secondary devices,
5 et cetera, it was a much bigger step, a better step, for
6 me to put him in charge of operations of the train,
7 which is normal.

8 Q. Because he had taken command from Sub-Officer Clarke?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Within a relatively short space of time, he was then
11 handing over command to you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. It served the purposes of nobody, did it, to have
14 detailed instructions and a debate as to the strategy
15 and the tactics debated yet again?

16 A. No.

17 Q. It was best that people got on and did their job?

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. Did he then immediately go down, so far as you are able,
20 to the track?

21 A. He did.

22 Q. Do you recollect meeting other Silver Commanders from
23 the police and London Underground at the same time?

24 A. Yes, I did. I met them at the same time I was having
25 that initial briefing with Mr Rigby and they were there

1 for the period of that, and then, once Mr Rigby had
2 left, I, or we, held a joint Silver meeting outside the
3 Underground station.

4 Q. Tell us, please, why it was sensible to have a Silver
5 meeting afterwards and only after had you given the
6 directions you did to Mr Rigby?

7 A. The priority for me -- well, I've said it before, there
8 was a number of priorities at that incident. That, for
9 me, was the first one, was to carry on the rescues and
10 casualties on the train, and then I could start dealing
11 with the rest of the priorities with the other emergency
12 services.

13 Q. We think, in fact, that the first Silver meeting was
14 around about 10.30. Does that accord with your
15 recollection?

16 A. I think it might have been a bit before that. If the
17 message went from me at 10.01 that I was in charge,
18 I think I probably would have taken over from Mr Rigby
19 already by then, because the message has gone back --
20 I think he's gone downstairs, and I know the Silver --
21 first sort of Silver meeting happened immediately at
22 that point.

23 Q. All right, we'll look at the log in a moment. Turning
24 next to the number of pumps and the number of appliances
25 you had at the station, did you make any orders in

1 relation to the need for further appliances to attend?

2 A. Yes, on discussion with Mr Rigby, he said there were
3 some extra casualties that needed rescuing from the
4 train; ie, the tracks, not just casualties removing,
5 et cetera. We have some special units which are called
6 fire rescue units which carry lots of equipment.

7 I already had two on scene, but I requested another two
8 for that. I also requested --

9 Q. Just pause there. Why?

10 A. To --

11 Q. Why do you need the further fire rescue units?

12 A. In case we needed the extra equipment.

13 Q. What sort of equipment?

14 A. It would carry lots of cutting equipment. Much the same
15 equipment you would use on very large road traffic
16 incidents, et cetera. So if people were trapped within
17 metal, behind bars, I didn't know the state of some of
18 the -- when I was told there were nine persons trapped,
19 I didn't know by what or by what means. So I thought,
20 "If I get more special fire rescue units here, at least
21 they will be on arrival whether they were needed or
22 not", and I could return them if they weren't.

23 Q. We know from other evidence that there was certainly
24 a message to the London Ambulance Service around about
25 9.50 that the final living casualties were about to be

1 brought up and, shortly, the carriage would be clear of
2 those who could be brought out alive.

3 When you spoke to Mr Rigby on your arrival, did you
4 gain a similar impression that the operation was
5 reaching the end of the stage at which living casualties
6 could be brought out, or did you have no information as
7 to how long that process would take?

8 A. No, not at 9.50. I still had the impression there was
9 nine casualties trapped, still, that needed releasing.

10 Not at 9.50. I think it was somewhere around the
11 half 10 that I had information that all live casualties
12 had been removed.

13 Q. We know that Dr Lockey, who was the HEMS doctor who
14 certified death in a number of the persons who were in
15 the carriage, returned to the surface at 10.16. Do you
16 recollect being informed by a HEMS doctor, or by anybody
17 else, of that point, at which those persons who had died
18 in the carriage had been certified dead?

19 A. No, I don't recollect that.

20 Q. Could we look, please, at [LFB23-8]? We should see, at
21 10.06.10, a message to Control:

22 "At Aldgate station LUL make pumps 10 FIUS 2."

23 Is that a reflection of your direction that there be
24 further pumps and fire rescue units?

25 A. Yes. The extra pumps were to evacuate the passengers

1 from the other train. I had enough -- I felt I had
2 enough resources, as far as pumps, to deal with the
3 bombed train. The two -- the two fire rescue units were
4 to help with the extra rescues. The extra four pumps
5 I'd asked for was to evacuate the other train to
6 Aldgate East.

7 Q. That was -- as we've heard -- a second train that was
8 near Aldgate East, which contained, I think, some 600
9 passengers.

10 A. Yes. We were getting lots of information from them that
11 a lot of them were shocked and in distress, and
12 especially there was one pregnant lady that they said
13 was suffering quite badly.

14 Q. Turning now to the issue of secondary devices, was that
15 an issue that was discussed with Mr Rigby or with your
16 fellow Silver Commanders?

17 A. It was with -- I think I did discuss with Mr Rigby at
18 one of the briefings that he sent information up, but
19 definitely with the Silvers on numerous occasions.

20 Q. Insofar as the London Fire Brigade were concerned, what
21 steps did you take to address the risk of a secondary
22 device?

23 A. I tried to get the -- our -- there was a MAIAT team and
24 a police survey team. I was trying to get them to go
25 down on to the trains and try and get that surveyed so

1 that I could get that clear. But I was having
2 difficulty with that, getting the crews to go down, and
3 I can remember -- I can't remember whether it was a BTP
4 officer or a Met Police or City Police, but someone came
5 up with a police dog and said that he would go and
6 search the train for more explosives, if that would help.

7 Q. The bombed train?

8 A. Yes, if that would help, and I asked if he could.

9 Q. Were there any other steps that you took at ground level
10 to address the possibility of a secondary device?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What were they?

13 A. With the help from the police, I started to move as many
14 of our vehicles and theirs and other emergency vehicles
15 to secure an outer cordon outside Aldgate and we moved
16 quite a few of the vehicles, including the Command
17 Units, et cetera. I also sent another message back to
18 our Control -- we are mobilised in the London Fire
19 Brigade by what we call route cards, it's a quarter of
20 a mile square, and I also sent that back to Control to
21 say that no further London Fire Brigade appliances to
22 enter into these zones because of secondary devices.

23 Q. Did any of the steps that you took to address the risk
24 of a secondary device have a direct impact on the number
25 of crews who were still down in the tunnel?

1 A. No. The crews in the tunnel were still working and we
2 didn't pull them out.

3 Q. There was no consideration of pulling them out to
4 address that risk; they were permitted to continue to
5 carry out their jobs there?

6 A. They were. I was under pressure to do that but didn't
7 pull them out.

8 Q. Where was that pressure coming from?

9 A. It was numerous places.

10 Q. Could you give us some idea?

11 A. Some from our internal. We had monitoring officers.
12 They're only doing their job to give you guidance on
13 things you should be doing, but I made a decision on the
14 information we got, and a risk-based decision, that the
15 crews should stay down.

16 Q. Some of your own colleagues were suggesting that perhaps
17 the fire crews who were in the tunnel should be
18 withdrawn and officers from other services were
19 suggesting likewise?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But in relation to your own crews, because you are the
22 Silver Commander, you declined to pull any of the crews
23 out for that reason?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. It may seem self-evident to us now, but why did you take

1 that decision?

2 A. From the information I'd have, I think at that point the
3 police dog had gone down, he only was down for about
4 ten, fifteen minutes, came back, said he couldn't
5 definitely say that the train was clear, but from the
6 information he had that he thought it was clear from any
7 further devices. I could see from the casualties and
8 from the crews that were going down that there wasn't
9 any chemical or, you know, radiological incidents, and
10 our main priority, and crews were happy to do that, was
11 to rescue the people that were down there.

12 Q. Could we have on the screen LFB23-10, please?

13 At 10.29.25 we can see Senior Divisional
14 Officer Smith at Aldgate station London Underground:
15 "All live casualties removed to surface by BA
16 crews."

17 Breathing apparatus crews is that?

18 "Removed by London Ambulance Service. Seven
19 confirmed fatalities. On advice from EXPO this is not
20 CBRN incident. One eastbound London Underground Tube
21 train being brought into Aldgate East."

22 Was that the other train?

23 A. Yes, we didn't actually do that. That was a message
24 I was -- it kept changing, what we could do, because
25 some people were saying, yes, we could move that train.

1 Others were saying we couldn't, and because of problems
2 with the reenergising the tracks, et cetera, when I sent
3 that message, the plan was that we could move it.

4 Actually, what happened after that was we didn't
5 move the train and we actually detrained the people and
6 they walked.

7 Q. This message certainly indicates that, by 10.30, all
8 live casualties have been removed to the surface as far
9 as the London Fire Brigade was aware --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- and the fatalities were confirmed on advice from EXPO
12 as well that it was not a CBRN incident?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. At that stage, was consideration given to reducing the
15 number of fire crews at Aldgate in order to allow them
16 to attend other incidents?

17 A. Yes, it was not at the Silver meeting outside Aldgate
18 station, but on -- we had all the rest of the Silvers on
19 my -- on our Brigade Command Unit, which was close to
20 the incident, and it was -- I think it was the first
21 after the one outside the station that we -- that
22 I became aware -- I wasn't aware, whilst I was outside
23 the station, that there was the other incidents
24 happening around London. When we went for the first
25 Silver meeting on the Brigade Command Unit, I think it

1 was one of the police officers that informed me there
2 had been another -- a number of other incidents around
3 London.

4 At that point --

5 Q. I'm sorry, we can see three minutes later at 10.32,
6 a further message:

7 "SDO Smith, fire rescue unit will be released as
8 soon as possible to attend other incidents. Silver
9 meeting in progress. This is anticipated at the Brigade
10 Command Unit."

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Does that therefore indicate that there had been some
13 discussion between you and you'd already made a decision
14 to release the fire rescue unit?

15 A. I think we'd stopped and I wanted to get as much away to
16 the other incidents as I could. Because I think Aldgate
17 was -- as far as the LFB was concerned, was one of the
18 first, we -- I had sort of the lion's share of all of
19 our resources, and I was conscious that I wanted to get
20 them away to the other incidents, especially for the
21 fact that we had just had all live casualties removed.

22 Q. Standing back and looking at it overall, in truth, by
23 the time that you arrived, was the position very much
24 under control, under the control, in fact, of Mr Rigby?

25 A. As far as the rescues on the train was concerned, yes.

1 As far as the rest of the incident, ie rescues from the
2 other train, securing the inner cordon, securing the
3 outer cordon, et cetera, all the rest of the priorities
4 that were going on, no, that priority for Mr Rigby was
5 the train.

6 Q. So your focus, due to the fact that you'd arrived
7 a little later, was to ensure the continuity of the
8 command chain, to address the possibility of a secondary
9 device, deal with clearing the station area and
10 cordons --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- and the second train at Aldgate East, and then,
13 fairly shortly after that, to turn your attention to
14 whether or not you could release appliances to attend
15 elsewhere?

16 A. Yes, and to put a Command structure to the incident and
17 also to facilitate all the Silver meetings.

18 Q. If we could look, please, at 11.01.04 on the same
19 document, so a bit further forward, there's an incoming
20 message there, 11.01:

21 "Silver meeting concluded. Further meeting planned
22 for 11.45. Four pumps and one BCU ..."
23 Borough Command Unit?

24 A. That's the Brigade Command Unit, sir. It's a big bus,
25 or was at the time, we haven't got it now.

1 Q. "... can be released from this incident for
2 redeployment. In relation to two FRUs, these are
3 delayed for at least one hour awaiting police clearance
4 for equipment removal."

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What is the issue of equipment removal?

7 A. Because a lot of equipment had been taken down onto the
8 track and on to the train, on discussions with the
9 police at one of the Silver meetings, that was now part
10 of the investigation and couldn't be released.

11 Q. Would that explain why some of the fire crews have given
12 evidence to the fact that they walked away from Aldgate
13 having to leave their appliances behind them?

14 A. Yes, I made that decision.

15 Q. 11.12, you report that the crews are standing down while
16 police carry out investigation of scene, resumption of
17 operations expected at 12.00.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was that due to a standdown period?

20 A. Yes, I can't remember the detail, but I know we had
21 a discussion at Silver and the police officer heading
22 the investigation, because we'd now removed all the live
23 casualties and the information we were getting from all
24 of the other Silvers that the best plan at this point
25 was to remove everybody from the tunnels and the trains,

1 and allow the police to go down and start the
2 investigation.

3 Q. Some time after the incident, I think in September, did
4 you become engaged in a process concerning debriefing of
5 officers?

6 A. Yes, immediately after the incidents, we had what we
7 call a performance review of command, but in August
8 I held debriefs for the incidents.

9 Q. We've seen the performance review of command document.
10 I think we'll have one further look at it. [LFB21-3] . Is
11 this Incident Commander 3, namely yourself?

12 A. Yes, that's myself.

13 Q. Indeed, there appears to be -- I'll spare your
14 blushes -- a large number of good points identified in
15 relation to your command. I won't address them in
16 detail.

17 Did you, in September, [LFB60-1] , address your fellow
18 officers concerning availability to attend a debrief in
19 relation to Aldgate?

20 A. Yes, that was 9 August and, yes, I was arranging
21 a debrief for the Aldgate incident for the first six
22 pumps, the FRUs that attended, MAIAT, the Command Unit
23 staff, the Brigade Command Unit staff, the three ICs and
24 the first two senior officers that attended.

25 Q. We're a little unclear as to when that debrief may

1 subsequently have occurred. Do you know when it took
2 place?

3 A. 18 August. I've said there it's the 15th. But I think
4 that date was changed and it was -- it was undertaken at
5 the 18 August.

6 Q. All right. Could we have on the screen, please,
7 [LFB64-1]. Do you recognise these notes?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Were these notes kept by a loggist or somebody attending
10 that meeting?

11 A. Yes, I had an officer taking notes of the debrief for me
12 and he passed those to a typist, because I've gone
13 through that and noticed there's quite a few typos and
14 bits and pieces, but she just typed it exactly as she
15 saw on his handwritten notes.

16 Q. I don't want to ask you about issues raised by other
17 officers who were on the scene before you, because they
18 can speak better -- and have spoken, indeed, to those
19 points -- than yourself, but were there any of these
20 points that were specifically raised by you in the
21 course of the debrief with which you had been most
22 concerned as Incident Commander 3?

23 A. Would it be possible just to enlarge it just a touch?

24 Q. Certainly. As?

25 A. Probably the video, a bad idea, photographs. What I did

1 at the start of the debrief to try and refresh
2 everybody's memory, I made a PowerPoint presentation,
3 and a part of that presentation was a few photographs
4 and a short video, and some of the crews wasn't that
5 happy. They thought it would have been better not to
6 have shown them.

7 Q. Her Ladyship has seen that document in the course of the
8 documents disclosed by London Fire Brigade, but it was
9 a time line, wasn't it, of Aldgate and some photographs?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Pictures from outside the front of the station and of
12 the train?

13 A. And then --

14 Q. A short video clip?

15 A. Yes, and then -- really, to lead them into the incident,
16 and then, what we had was a standard set of headings to
17 then go through the debrief, and these were the
18 headings, so they could -- so all the four debriefs for
19 the four bombing incidents were we took the information
20 under standard headings.

21 Q. The one -- the bullet point above "video":

22 "Procurement for first aid is too slow. It's an
23 essential piece of kit."

24 Was that an issue you raised or was it something
25 raised by officers who were attending before you?

1 A. No, it was raised by the crews, because they used large
2 amounts of their first aid kit. Our procurement process
3 wasn't very good at the time. We have improved it, but
4 they were left without first aid for a little while
5 whilst everything was being replaced.

6 Q. After the incident --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- or during it?

9 A. No, during the incident. This was -- obviously, this
10 was August, and the incident was in July, and they were
11 saying that it took quite a while for them to get
12 replacement first aid kit.

13 Q. So this concern, although part of a general debrief,
14 wasn't, in fact, something specific to their performance
15 on the day?

16 A. No, it was replacement afterwards.

17 Q. In relation to casualty handling, the laerdal
18 resuscitators, burns kits and stretchers, do you recall
19 anything specific being raised about them in addition to
20 what you can see there?

21 A. Just the frustration that there wasn't enough for the
22 amount of casualties they had, and things -- we've put
23 a lot in place since then, a lot of different --

24 Q. When you had arrived as IC3, and you'd satisfied
25 yourself that there was a sufficient number of crews in

1 the tunnel, there hadn't been raised with you any
2 concerns about a shortage of equipment?

3 A. No.

4 Q. So does that indicate, then, that although there had
5 been a problem in the tunnel, it had not been brought to
6 your attention at the time?

7 A. No, and I think this was in the very, very, very early
8 stages when the first few crews were overwhelmed by the
9 number. When I was in charge, and a number of the
10 casualties had been removed, and the number of
11 casualties left on the train were down to small numbers,
12 there was sufficient equipment down there.

13 Q. Was that something specifically raised with you by
14 Mr Rigby when he handed over tactical command to you?

15 A. No, he was happy with the resources he had.

16 Q. In relation to the bullet points under "Liaison with
17 others", were there any of those specifically arising
18 out of that time in which you had been in command?

19 A. The police EXPO dog, which I have explained, that was
20 a great help, a blessing to me really, when he offered
21 to go down and search the train.

22 Silver meetings is good, is what I said, the police
23 worked well opening roads because it was gridlocked and
24 we had to get vehicles in and get casualties out, and
25 the police worked well with that.

1 Q. Who had suffered from difficult communications?
2 A. I think that was ourselves, where all the mobile phones
3 had gone down across London and we couldn't contact
4 people that you normally do off the Command Unit.
5 Q. Have you attended subsequent incidents as
6 an Incident Commander and sought to gather information
7 about the incident in advance of arrival on the scene?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Is there now a system in place which allows you to
10 gather that information before arrival?
11 A. Yes, there is.
12 Q. Does it work?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Does that consist of the radio system that you described
15 as being in the car?
16 A. It's a secure TETRA digital radio system.
17 Q. That's available in vehicles taking senior commanders to
18 the scenes of an incident?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Over the page [LFB64-2], I think there's a second page -- yes.
21 Were a general number of concerns raised with you about
22 the adequacy of appliance equipment, for example running
23 out of stretchers, difficulties with laerdal
24 resuscitators or their availability --
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- and BA sets?

2 A. This is all subsequent, not at the incident.

3 Q. Yes. Of course, this debrief is afterwards --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- but these are comments raised by your more junior
6 colleagues in relation to their carrying out of their
7 duties on the day.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. In what way did the senior command in the London Fire
10 Brigade address the points that had been raised in this
11 debrief?

12 A. We've put on -- much like the radios, much better
13 radios, much better communications, with the laerdals
14 and the first aid equipments, much, much improved
15 equipment, much better training. With the stretchers,
16 we now have operational support units, there are six of
17 those strategically placed around London, which have at
18 least ten stretchers on each.

19 Most of the points raised on there have all been
20 dealt with and we have better procedures and better
21 equipment in place.

22 Q. Do we take it from the fact that you had -- you arranged
23 for the debrief and you had the notes typed up and you
24 satisfied yourself that they were accurate, that you
25 were responsible for taking forward the steps to address

1 the points raised in that debrief?

2 A. Yes, I did. I thought -- it's a procedure anyway that
3 we get the crews together after an incident to debrief
4 them, but I felt I owed it to them to bring them
5 altogether to get all these issues, rather than -- you
6 know, and bring them forward and take them forward as
7 issues to rectify for the future.

8 Q. In general terms, did it take some time for these points
9 to be addressed? Was it a process that carried on for
10 a number of months, perhaps years, afterwards?

11 A. Some have, yes. Like our first aid, which is much
12 improved, and our equipment. It's still rolling out at
13 this moment. But we're at 90 per cent rolled out across
14 the whole brigade.

15 Q. In relation to first aid?

16 A. But it's initial immediate care, it's a lot better
17 equipment.

18 Q. Can you give us some idea of the nature of the changes
19 that have taken place in relation to the availability of
20 first aid being carried by London Fire Brigade?

21 A. It's better -- well, we never had defibrillators before,
22 we've got those.

23 Q. You now have defibrillators?

24 A. Yes, lots of equipment for airways, better Burns Units,
25 better laerdals, lots and lots of different and better

1 first aid equipment, and also the training that they
2 undertake.

3 Q. The obvious question must be asked, Deputy
4 Assistant Commissioner, which is: this no doubt reflects
5 a counsel of perfection, one can always learn and there
6 are always lessons to be learnt and improvements to be
7 made. But from your role as Incident Commander 3, do
8 you feel that the absence of these improvements, the
9 fact that they had of course not taken place by the time
10 of 7/7, adversely affected the ability of the
11 Fire Brigade to respond to Aldgate?

12 A. No, I don't.

13 Q. Why?

14 A. I think, for what we had at that time and how we worked
15 and the speed the crews worked, what Command structure
16 we put in, et cetera, it was the best we could do at
17 that time.

18 MR KEITH: Will you stay there, please? There may be some
19 further questions for you.

20 Questions by MR COLTART

21 MR COLTART: There's no doubt that it was the best that
22 could have been done at the time, but, in fairness, that
23 wasn't really the question that you were asked, which
24 was: was it adequate at the time?

25 A. I think the bit what we were saying earlier, we can

1 always strive for improvements and the bit that -- the
2 responsibility that we had in the London Fire Brigade at
3 that point, it was the best we could do at that time.

4 Q. But does the extent of the improvements which have been
5 put into place, which are laudable, reflect the
6 inadequacies which existed on 7 July 2005?

7 A. In some cases, yes.

8 Q. Can we just have back on the screen for a moment,
9 please, [LFB64-1]? Can we enlarge the middle of the page?
10 Under the heading "Casualty handling", we've looked
11 at more laerdals, more oxygen, more and bigger burns
12 kits and stretchers.

13 When you were asked about this a minute ago, as to
14 whether that had had any impact, you said, by the time
15 you arrived, there were only small numbers of live
16 casualties and that you had sufficient resources. But
17 I think earlier in your evidence you had said that there
18 were nine live casualties still at the time that you
19 arrived.

20 The evidence which we've heard from others before
21 you is that, at the time that there were that number of
22 live casualties, they were short of stretchers and
23 oxygen in particular. Was that ever brought to your
24 attention on the scene whilst you were
25 Incident Commander?

1 A. No, it wasn't.

2 Q. Do you ever recall your predecessor in command,
3 Mr Rigby, bringing that to your attention?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Only one other matter, please. Could we turn back to
6 LFB61, please, at page 2? Forgive me, we're going to
7 start at page 1 [LFB61-1] , in fact.

8 We don't need to go through this document. It's
9 the -- whether it is a PowerPoint display or a flipchart
10 or whatever, but these are the notes for the debrief
11 that took place on 18 August. If we turn the page [LFB61-2],
12 I just want you to assist us with one thing, if you
13 would, points 3, 4 and 6, starting at 3:

14 "All the PRCs have now been held for the four
15 incidents on 7 July."

16 We know what those are. We've seen some limited
17 documentation in relation to those. But at point 4:

18 "Smaller operational crew debriefs are taking place,
19 which some of you may already have had."

20 To date, we haven't seen any record of any of those
21 meetings. Do you know, in fact, whether they did take
22 place?

23 A. I personally don't know whether they had taken place.

24 I know some had, but I haven't got a record of that. It
25 is a procedure that we do have smaller operational

1 debriefs by their own crews at their own station.

2 Q. In order to assist those who may be looking for this
3 material, when we see "crews", does that mean station by
4 station?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Right. I think in fairness, actually, we might have one
7 for the Islington crew for their attendance at
8 King's Cross. Is that the sort of operational debrief
9 to which point 4 on this document refers?

10 A. I have seen that document and I think that is the same
11 report of the one you were pulling up from mine just now
12 of the notes, it would have been the bigger debrief
13 where all the crews for that incident would have
14 attended. The point -- the one at point 4 is what you
15 said earlier, it's smaller crews at their own station.
16 It's very small debriefs.

17 Q. So the document that we were provided last week -- and
18 unfortunately, I don't think at the moment it's on
19 Trial Director -- but it refers to debrief for Islington
20 crews who attended at King's Cross. Do you think, in
21 fact, that is the equivalent of what we have here for
22 the Aldgate bombing incident?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you know if similar debriefs did, in fact, take place
25 for Tavistock Square and Edgware Road?

1 A. I don't, but I did send the emails out from our
2 Assistant Commissioner asking that they be undertaken.
3 Q. You can't assist us as to whether or not they were, in
4 fact, done?
5 A. No.
6 Q. You'd asked for it to be done?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Would you expect it to be done?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You, yourself, didn't attend any of those other
11 operational debrief meetings?
12 A. No, I organised my one, you've seen the notes, but
13 I didn't attend the others.
14 Q. Thank you. Finally this: who else of senior rank
15 attended your debrief on 18 August?
16 A. I was the most senior rank. Oh, sorry, other senior
17 officers?
18 Q. Well, to assist you with this -- and we can
19 short-circuit it too -- can we get back on screen,
20 please, your email of 9 August, which is [LFB60-1]?
21 We see the distribution list on your email.
22 Are they the others who attended that meeting or did
23 some of them attend? Can you recall?
24 A. Who that's to, I had four group managers, divisional
25 officers, who worked for me in central service delivery,

1 and they would help me facilitate the other four. So
2 this was a message to them that this is what I was doing
3 for Aldgate, could they set up the others for the other
4 four incidents. The senior officers that would have
5 attended would have been at the bottom, the three ICs,
6 sub-officer, DO, SDO and the first ADOs.

7 Q. I just want to make sure I've understood this. The
8 distribution list on the email, are these the people, or
9 some of the people, responsible for setting up the
10 debriefs for the other bombsites?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So if we wanted to know whether those debriefs did take
13 place, these would be the people to ask?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

16 A. Thank you.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

18 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

20 MS SHEFF: No, thank you, my Lady.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

22 Questions by MS BOYD

23 MS BOYD: Can I have back on the screen [LFB64-1], please?

24 Mr Smith, you were asked about the middle section
25 there, the "Casualty handling". I think in your

1 evidence earlier to Mr Keith, you explained that you
2 believed that was a reference to the early stages and
3 the fact that firefighters were overwhelmed with the
4 number of casualties emerging from the station and,
5 indeed, that is in accord with some of the evidence that
6 we've heard.

7 We also heard evidence from firefighters that the
8 injuries they faced on the train dealing with those
9 casualties were extremely serious so that there was no
10 in between, there was either minor injuries and walking
11 wounded or there were those casualties on the train with
12 very severe and traumatic injuries that they couldn't
13 possibly deal with.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So my question is: even with the better first aid and
16 equipment that you now have, would that have made any
17 difference to the firefighters on the train faced with
18 the nature of those kinds of injuries?

19 A. As I said, I don't think it would. I think they would
20 have still been overwhelmed by the number of casualties.

21 Q. The injuries that those casualties on the train had, who
22 were left, those half dozen who were left on the train,
23 they needed specialist or paramedic treatment?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Going back to the question that Mr Keith posed, there

1 are always lessons to be learned, as you've quite
2 frankly acknowledged, but do you think yourself that any
3 improvements that have been made since 7/7 would have
4 made any difference to that particular rescue at
5 Aldgate?

6 A. No, I don't think it would.

7 Q. Finally, in any of the debriefing, was there any concern
8 raised by anyone of any sense of delay in their
9 deployment or their ability to get to the train by
10 reason of any issue such as getting confirmation that
11 the power was isolated?

12 A. None whatsoever.

13 Q. So were you left with a sense that any crew or any
14 firefighters that were deployed felt able to get to the
15 scene as quickly as they felt they wanted to; in other
16 words, they weren't hampered by protocols or procedures?

17 A. No.

18 MS BOYD: Thank you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Smith?

20 Thank you very much indeed, Mr Smith. You're now
21 free to go.

22 A. Thank you.

23 MR KEITH: May I invite to you call Jonathan Edmondson?

24 MR JONATHAN DAVID EDMONDSON (affirmed)

25 Questions by MR KEITH

1 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?

2 A. Yes, it's Jonathan David Edmondson.

3 Q. Mr Edmondson, you are an emergency planning manager now
4 but, in 2005, were you then an emergency planning
5 manager?

6 A. Yes, that's correct, I was an emergency planning manager
7 for the London Ambulance Service. I'm an emergency
8 planning manager for NHS Kensington & Chelsea now.

9 Q. Can I ask you, whilst you give your evidence, to keep
10 your voice as loud as you can? It's quite hard to hear
11 sometimes in this big courtroom. The microphone won't
12 amplify your voice, it will only relay it elsewhere.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I just want to get a feel, if I may, please, for all
15 that you did on that day, and all that you did
16 afterwards, because we know that you had a substantial
17 hand in the debrief exercise that took place afterwards.
18 You attended Aldgate?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Once you had left Aldgate, you went to Russell Square?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. But at the time that you were there, it didn't appear
23 that there was a great deal going on and you moved on to
24 Tavistock Square?

25 A. Actually, it's the other way round. I went to

1 Tavistock Square to start with, which is where the bus
2 bomb was, and then, from there, I moved to
3 Russell Square Underground station.

4 Q. Right. Afterwards, you gathered together a great deal
5 of the paperwork that had been generated by the events
6 of 7 July, such as the Central Ambulance Control logs,
7 copies of the radio transmissions, debrief forms, and
8 you analysed them and examined them for the purposes of
9 drawing together in a number of documents the lessons
10 that could be learnt from the events of that day.

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. Just so that we can see whether you were the author of
13 these documents, which have been disclosed by the
14 organisation for whom you work, could we please have
15 [LAS371-2] on the screen. This is identified concerns,
16 a summary of identified concerns, with response by the
17 Central Ambulance Control. Were you the author of that
18 document?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. Could we have [LAS397-2] ? Were you the author of this
21 document, which is a summary of lessons identified from
22 a debrief?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Were you also concerned -- I needn't have it on the
25 screen -- with a freedom of information request

1 concerning the events of 7/7?

2 A. Yes, I was involved in that.

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, for your note, that's LAS354.

4 Were you also responsible for briefing or preparing
5 a draft briefing document in preparation for that
6 freedom of information request response?

7 A. As far as I can recall, yes.

8 Q. We have a further document concerned with a Millwall
9 debrief session; [LAS379-2] on the screen, please. Do you
10 recollect that?

11 A. I do recollect it. However, I wasn't involved in the
12 Millwall debrief. I collated the information from this
13 debrief into the action plan afterwards.

14 Q. But you were there?

15 A. I wasn't there.

16 Q. You weren't there. Finally, can we have, please,
17 [LAS308-2] ? This is a draft debrief document. There's
18 a further version of this document which indicates it
19 may have been edited or compiled by a man called
20 Mr Horne.

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. Whether that's so or not, do you recognise this
23 document?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. But you didn't write this one?

1 A. No, I didn't.

2 Q. It was Mr Horne?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. My Lady, in accordance with
5 the directions you've given earlier, Mr Edmondson will
6 be recalled to deal with command and control and generic
7 issues in February. Therefore, having established the
8 parameters of the evidence he's able to give, we can put
9 those documents more or less to one side.

10 On 7 July, as we've heard, you were an emergency
11 planning manager, and you received information, I think,
12 from Central Ambulance Control, just after 9.00, about
13 a number of incidents in Central London.

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. Could we have on the screen [LAS565-5] ? 09.07, we can see
16 that there is a message from a sender, EP5?

17 A. Yes, Echo Papa 5, that would be my call sign.

18 Q. That was you?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. EP05:

21 "Mobile in central sector. I'm available if you
22 want me.

23 "Are you aware of proceedings at present?

24 "Negative.

25 "We've had reports of explosions at

1 Liverpool Street. We have also just got a report of
2 people coming out of Aldgate East covered with soot and
3 believe there's also something going on at Paddington as
4 well.

5 "Roger. All received. Show me then mobile to start
6 at Liverpool Street. Start procedures in terms of ESVs
7 from Deptford."

8 What are ESVs from Deptford?

9 A. ESVs are emergency support vehicles and these are
10 operational support vehicles that the London Ambulance
11 Service had at the time. There are four of them. They
12 have bulk emergency equipment and tents and triage and
13 lifting equipment.

14 Q. Does that cover the eventuality that, in a major
15 incident, local crews will run out of equipment and you
16 need to resupply them?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. You also then refer to the need to set up safe RVP,
19 rendezvous points, for everybody. Why was that
20 necessary?

21 A. I think it was down to the fact that, at this stage, it
22 was a reported explosion, or a potential explosion, and
23 I felt that it was important to ensure that, instead of
24 running straight into the incident, that we attempted to
25 get some form of confirmation on whether it was safe for

1 ambulance crews to deploy to the actual incident sites.
2 It's fairly standard practice for any incident, whether
3 it's a major incident or not.

4 Q. You also asked for local hospitals to be put on major
5 incident standby. We've heard evidence as to the
6 declaration and the meaning of a declaration of "major
7 incident". Were you referring there to something less
8 than a major incident declaration: namely, a major
9 incident standby?

10 A. Yes, the Ambulance Service are effectively the guardian
11 of the National Health Service when it comes to major
12 incidents, so we have a responsibility, as an ambulance
13 service, to ensure that we're setting up communications
14 with our hospitals, and this standby message is the
15 first message that you would get to a hospital, or any
16 other medical care facility, to advise them that there's
17 a potential incident.

18 It doesn't actually mean that they have any action.
19 It just means that they're aware that there is an
20 incident and they could potentially get casualties from
21 this incident. So it was an information message to
22 those hospitals to make them aware.

23 Q. Obviously, all these messages were directed through
24 Central Ambulance Control?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. We can see that you then say:

2 "I will start there ..."

3 So that was a reference to Liverpool Street.

4 "... and probably go to Aldgate."

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. Now, in your witness statement that you've recently
7 prepared for her Ladyship, you've also referred to the
8 fact that you were aware that there were a number of
9 senior London Ambulance Service managers present at
10 Millwall Football Club where they were taking part in
11 a managers' conference?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 Q. We don't see any reference to that in that message, but
14 we know that you contacted them. Was that through
15 a mobile phone?

16 A. It wasn't. It was at some point on the radio message,
17 as far as I can recall, that I suggested to Central
18 Ambulance Control that there was this Millwall
19 conference taking place, and it would be advantageous to
20 deploy some of those officers. I thought that it was on
21 the radio, but it may well have been on the telephone.

22 Q. All right. Can we then move forward to page 9 [LAS565-9] ? At
23 09.15 we can see another entry, EP5, CAC, Central
24 Ambulance Control, just sent you down to Aldgate East.

25 EP5:

1 "Just the fact you got that message, can I suggest
2 that we declare this a major incident? I know you are
3 probably busy and going to start doing that for me
4 anyway, but I think we should declare this now. Put the
5 two nearest casualties on declaration ..."

6 Does that mean the two nearest hospitals?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. "... and EBS start."

9 What is EBS start?

10 A. EBS are the emergency bed service, so they are the
11 organisation -- the Health Service organisation that
12 coordinates bed states in hospitals.

13 Q. Right. This message was sent by you before you'd
14 actually got to Aldgate, was it not?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. What provoked that message?

17 A. The information that was coming from the Aldgate
18 incident site, the ambulance crew that were there,
19 a message came through on the log suggesting that there
20 were a number of casualties and a number of fatalities.
21 So that was the first thing that really indicated to
22 myself that, if there's confirmed casualties, then we
23 should certainly advise the local hospitals that there
24 was an incident.

25 Also, the fact that the information that they'd

1 already provided, that there were a number of potential
2 incidents across London already, in my mind, as an
3 emergency planner, was thinking worst-case scenario, so
4 we should start preparing for a mass casualty incident.

5 Q. We can see from the message that you don't actually
6 declare a major incident, you suggest that one be
7 declared. Can you give us some idea, please, as to why
8 you went for what might be described -- I don't mean
9 uncharitably -- as a halfway house, because we know that
10 later at 09.24 you actually did declare a major
11 incident?

12 A. It purely was the fact that I wasn't on scene of the
13 incident, and at that stage, I didn't feel that it was
14 necessarily my position to declare a major incident
15 considering I wasn't there. However, Central Ambulance
16 Control are in a position in the information that they
17 receive, they're actually able to declare a major
18 incident from their control desk. So my suggestion was
19 a strong suggestion that they should start the major
20 incident plan.

21 But, as I said, I felt that that was not my role,
22 just at this stage, until such time I had arrived at the
23 incident site.

24 Q. But they didn't actually declare a major incident, did
25 they?

1 A. No, I don't believe they did.

2 Q. Would that have made a difference? Did it make
3 a difference that they didn't take the step that you
4 thought they might take?

5 A. No, I don't believe so, because the major incident plan,
6 once you do declare a major incident, starts a process
7 of mobilising managers, mobilising emergency support
8 vehicles, moving in to what was then called the Gold
9 control, and advising the hospitals, and some of these
10 things I'd already advised them that they should start
11 doing.

12 Q. If you had thought it necessary to suggest a declaration
13 of a major incident, it must and can only have been
14 because you deemed that some of those steps were already
15 necessary?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Why did you not take the further step of actually
18 declaring it, if you believed that the steps were
19 necessary?

20 A. Purely from the fact that I wasn't at scene. I didn't
21 necessarily feel that comfortable with declaring a major
22 incident at that stage until such time as I had
23 confirmed details of casualties and what the gravity of
24 the incident was.

25 Yes, I could have declared a major incident.

1 I don't think that would have necessarily changed any of
2 their actions or the actions that we were doing as
3 a service.

4 Q. We know from a Physician Response Unit crewed by
5 Mr Parnell that he attempts to declare a major incident
6 at 09.18. We can see that on page 12 [LAS565-12] , please, of this
7 exhibit.

8 You'll see towards the bottom of the page, third row
9 up, PRU, Physician Response Unit:

10 "I am declaring this a main incident at Aldgate.
11 We've got 15 quite seriously injured patients upstairs."
12 We've heard from him in evidence he wasn't aware
13 that you had suggested already the declaration of
14 a major incident, and we may take it, I think, that,
15 when you declared one at 09.24 you were unaware of his
16 earlier declaration at 09.18?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. How is that possible?

19 A. On the log, you can see the mode, and the mode column
20 refers to him being on RT channel 7, and I was on
21 channel 10. So we were both on different radio
22 channels.

23 Q. How can something quite as important as a declaration of
24 a major incident be reported on different channels
25 precluding anybody on another channel from knowing that

1 it's been declared?

2 A. The channel 7 desk is the special incident desk. All
3 normal ambulance resources across London have their own
4 sector radio channel. The channel 7 desk is just for
5 special incident vehicles. It would be fairly normal
6 for ambulances to be sent off the sector channel and
7 also additional special incident vehicles from the
8 special incident channel. They would both be on
9 separate channels until such time the control room
10 brought that incident together and actually moved into
11 the incident control room.

12 We were only, I think, a few minutes into the
13 incident, so, therefore, we were still using our normal
14 systems. As soon as Central Ambulance Control
15 recognised this was a major incident, then they would
16 have put everybody on to one major incident channel.
17 That's what the protocol says.

18 Q. You say "brought into the control room". Are the
19 radio -- the actual radio operators in separate
20 geographical locations if they are on different
21 channels?

22 A. They're in the same building, they're in the same room.
23 However, it's a very large, large Ambulance Control. So
24 it's probably two and a half times the size of this, and
25 they would have been in separate parts of that room.

1 Once it was declared, the control room then move that
2 incident into a -- what was then called the Gold
3 control. So they move all of the resources and a small
4 team of people to manage the incident from that separate
5 location.

6 Q. Was that step taken after the declaration by the PRU, or
7 was that step only taken after you declared it at 09.24,
8 6 minutes later?

9 A. I'm not clear when they would have moved into the
10 incident control room. As far as I can recall, it was
11 starting to take place at this time. I wouldn't have
12 known that at the time. That's only because of the
13 debrief role that I had that they started moving into
14 the control room, around about this time.

15 Q. Mr Parnell, who had attended the scene before you,
16 plainly thought it sufficiently serious to try to
17 declare a major incident. He may not have been of the
18 requisite rank to declare a major incident, but he was
19 certainly the ambulance incident officer because he was
20 the first person there.

21 In hindsight, would you not have deemed it relevant,
22 when you declared at 09.24, to know that somebody who
23 had got to the scene before you had already attempted to
24 declare a major incident?

25 A. Yes, I think that it would have been advantageous to

1 have that information. However, it wouldn't have
2 changed how I responded to the incident, because the
3 initial actions that I've already recorded on the radio
4 shows that I was starting to move into a major incident
5 mode. I already, on my radio channel, knew that the
6 Waterloo ambulance was already there and they were also
7 starting to move into that mode of major incident by the
8 information that they were passing, even though they
9 hadn't declared anything at that stage.

10 Q. But the point about the declaration of a major incident
11 is it tells Central Ambulance Control and everybody else
12 on the network: we need the right number of appliances,
13 ambulances, technicians and paramedics to address what
14 is now recognised to be a major incident. It gets
15 numbers and bodies to the scene as quickly as can be
16 possibly done.

17 A. It does. However, it does require -- at this stage, it
18 required, in 2005, an incident officer to request the
19 number of ambulances and resources required. After
20 2005, it was decided to put a predetermined attendance
21 in that, when you declare a major incident, you then get
22 a number of ambulances. But in 2005, by declaring
23 a major incident, you wouldn't necessarily get
24 ambulances. The reason behind that is that the
25 definition of a major incident, for the health service,

1 was also around the threat of casualties.

2 So, for example, you could go to a train stuck in
3 tunnel, didn't have any casualties at all, but that has
4 a potential to be a major incident, and you could quite
5 rightly declare that a major incident, but only have one
6 ambulance and one officer there.

7 Q. So when Mr Parnell, the Physician Response Unit,
8 declared a major incident, his declaration would not of
9 itself have led automatically to the attendance of
10 a number of ambulances?

11 A. No, not at all. At this stage, he declared a major
12 incident, but he hadn't provided a CSCATT report, which
13 is the reporting mechanism that we use to say this is
14 the number of vehicles or the number of ambulances, the
15 command structure that we're putting in place. He
16 hadn't done that, as far as I can see from the log, and
17 hadn't provided that report.

18 Q. CAC respond to his message by saying:

19 "We have already declared this a major."

20 So it may be that they were already aware of your
21 earlier suggestion and were taking it seriously from
22 09.15.

23 A. Yes, that might be the case.

24 Q. But you weren't in a position to indicate the number of
25 ambulances either.

1 A. No, not at this stage.

2 Q. And nor was he, because he said "I need another ten
3 minutes to get further information". So despite the
4 fact that both of you thought it necessary to declare
5 a major incident, no number of ambulances had been
6 provided as being required at the scene?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Did that not impact on the ambulances who were then
9 tasked to attend?

10 A. Sorry, can you repeat the question?

11 Q. Yes, I'll put it another way. What is the point of
12 declaring a major incident, if you then have to go back
13 and give some indication of the number of ambulances you
14 require and it may then take you a few moments or maybe
15 quite a number of minutes in order to get the
16 information before you can assess how many ambulances
17 you might need?

18 A. It's because the major incident plan, once you declare
19 a major incident, is very much about being the guardian
20 of the Health Service. It isn't directly involved with
21 just ambulance resources. So it's very much about
22 passing the message out to hospitals, to our Strategic
23 Health Authority, and then starting to make some special
24 arrangements for the Ambulance Service.

25 So things like the ambulance Gold control, start

1 thinking about where your ambulances across London
2 actually are. So it isn't, at that stage, a message to
3 just say you now get a predetermined attendance.

4 Q. We know that Mr Parnell at 09.14 --

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, if you're going on, Mr Keith,
6 this is a bit important to rush through.

7 MR KEITH: Certainly.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, we're going to have to
9 break there, Mr Edmondson. That means, I'm afraid, that
10 you remain on oath during lunch, so if you could make
11 sure you don't talk to anybody about your evidence,
12 please.

13 A. Yes.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

15 (1.00 pm)

16 (The short adjournment)

17