

1 (2.00 pm)

2 MR KEITH: Good afternoon, my Lady. My Lady, we have,
3 I hope, Dr Costello joining us from Ireland in a moment.
4 Good afternoon, can you hear us?

5 THE WITNESS: I can hear you perfectly.

6 MR KEITH: Dr Costello you're about to be sworn by a lady
7 usher. I'm going to surrender the microphone to her to
8 swear you.
9 I hope you have received some papers, you should
10 have some relevant documentation and I'll ask you about
11 those in a moment?

12 THE WITNESS: I have, yes.

13 DR MORGAN JAMES COSTELLO (affirmed)

14 (Evidence given by videolink)

15 Questions by MR KEITH

16 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

17 A. It's Dr Morgan James Costello.

18 Q. Are you, or were you, a forensic medical examiner?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In 2005, did your duties include providing medical
21 services and medical assistance in relation to the
22 Metropolitan Police Service, including in relation to
23 deaths in custody?

24 A. Yes, it did. That's correct. Yes, it did.

25 Q. As a result, were you asked, after 7 July 2005, to

1 attend two scenes, Edgware Road and Aldgate, for the
2 purposes of certifying the extinction of life?

3 A. Yes, I was.

4 Q. Could we look at Edgware Road first, please? Did you
5 prepare a statement dated 27 September 2005 in relation
6 to the examinations you carried out at Edgware Road?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. Did you prepare that statement whilst the events in
9 question were still fresh in your mind?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. I think, Dr Costello, you've got copies of both
12 statements that you made with you as well as some
13 extracts from our core bundle.

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. I should have asked you also, forgive me, could you just
16 outline your professional qualifications?

17 A. I'm a forensic medical examiner with the London
18 Metropolitan Police. I qualified as a doctor in 1994.
19 I specialised in a specialty of psychiatry. I was
20 a consultant psychiatrist up until 2007. I then worked
21 full-time for the police undertaking extra
22 qualifications in forensic and legal medicine in 2008.

23 Q. Thank you very much. So turning to your first statement
24 of 27 September in relation to Edgware Road, did you go
25 to the scene at around about 00.59 in the morning of

1 8 July?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. You no doubt spoke to the police officers who were on
4 the scene, and did they escort you to the carriage?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. In relation to each of the persons whom you found in the
7 tunnel at Edgware Road, in essence, what was the purpose
8 of your examination?

9 A. It was very clearly described to me by the officers on
10 the scene that they didn't want anything other than for
11 me to pronounce life extinct on the victims.

12 Q. You understood that there was a legal obligation to
13 satisfy themselves that life was extinct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Were you allowed free rein into the carriage or were
16 there difficult considerations about giving you access
17 to everybody?

18 A. There were difficult considerations to be taken into
19 account at the time and I was very much led by the crime
20 scene manager, and there was difficulty accessing some
21 of the bodies or even seeing them clearly.

22 Q. But nevertheless, did that prevent you in any way from
23 reaching firm conclusions in relation to everybody?

24 A. No, it didn't.

25 Q. Was the first person you certified as being life extinct

1 a person whom you examined at 01.09, the body of
2 a female, and were you told that she had been moved from
3 the scene to the platform of Edgware Road station?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. I don't know whether you know the answer to this
6 question, Dr Costello. Did you know the name and the
7 identity of that person at the time?

8 A. No, I don't know the names of any of the victims, that
9 person included. I just have codes as to the code
10 numbers of the bodies involved.

11 MR KEITH: My Lady, we believe that person to have been
12 Jennifer Nicholson.

13 You then moved along the track to the train. You
14 didn't, I think, enter the train, but you viewed it from
15 the adjacent track.

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Did you then next examine a male? You didn't touch or
18 examine his body but you were able to certify his life
19 as being extinct at 01.12?

20 A. That's correct.

21 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
22 David Foulkes.

23 To his right, was there another body in relation to
24 whom you certified life extinct at 01.24?

25 A. That's correct.

1 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
2 Colin Morley.

3 Next, in relation to a lady who was slightly away
4 from the previous person, Colin Morley, but lying on the
5 floor of the bombed carriage face up, did you certify
6 her life extinct at 01.34?

7 A. That's correct.

8 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
9 Laura Webb.

10 Also on the floor of the carriage, was there a male
11 whose life was certified by you as extinct at 01.44?

12 A. That's correct.

13 MR KEITH: My Lady, Jonathan Downey.

14 Finally, did you then walk along the side of the
15 carriage in order to see a sixth person whose life you
16 certified as extinct at 01.54?

17 A. That's correct.

18 MR KEITH: My Lady, Michael Brewster.

19 In relation to that gentleman, Doctor, did you
20 notice that he still had, in fact, a tourniquet around
21 his right leg?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Thank you very much. Could we now turn to Aldgate,
24 please, and the second of your two statements, also
25 dated 27 September 2005?

1 Did you go to the Aldgate scene at 08.40 on Friday,
2 8 July?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. Prior to attending the station, did you, in fact, go
5 home to wash and completely change your clothing, so as
6 to prevent any issue of contamination between the two
7 scenes?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. You were similarly met by officers of the Metropolitan
10 Police Service, and did you proceed to carry out the
11 same exercise: namely, certifying life extinct in
12 relation to all the persons you discovered there?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Between the platform and the train, did you come across
15 a white female who was lying at the side of a track
16 covered with a towel?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Did she, in fact, have an ECG tab on her thorax?

19 A. Yes, she did.

20 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 08.55?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person is, of course,
23 Carrie Taylor.

24 Did you then see a male on the left of the train, on
25 the railtrack, lying face down and, in relation to him,

1 much of his lower clothing had been blasted off?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Did he have remnants of a pinstriped suit, shirt and

4 tie?

5 A. Yes, he did.

6 Q. Did you certify his death at 09.01?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Richard Gray.

9 Inside the carriage 6713, did you then turn to the
10 body of a male lying on the floor near to the double
11 doors D7 -- and you should have in front of you, Doctor,
12 a document entitled "Positions of deceased in second
13 carriage post-explosion".

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Was there a male lying on the floor next to the double
16 door D7 surrounded by debris?

17 A. Yes, there was.

18 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 09.05?

19 A. Yes, I did.

20 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person was Richard Ellery.

21 Also in the train, did you see a male, probably in
22 his 30s, lying face up, again most of his clothes had
23 been blown off him, and you certified life extinct at
24 09.07?

25 A. That's correct.

1 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Lee Baisden.

2 Then again, still in the carriage, slumped against
3 the seats in the carriage, did you see a lady who had
4 suffered blast injuries who was wearing jeans and a tan
5 belt near seats 21 to 22 on the plan?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 09.16?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, we assess that that person was
10 Benedetta Ciaccia.

11 I think at that stage, you were advised not to go
12 into the carriage much further?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Was there a difficulty that you faced because of the
15 location of the bodies and the way in which they lay on
16 the floor, that it was difficult, indeed, to tell them
17 apart?

18 A. You could tell how many bodies were there, but it was
19 quite difficult to tell exact, you know, body parts from
20 each other due to clothes being on the area, blast
21 matter, and the positioning of the bodies. It was quite
22 easy to assign how many individuals were there, but just
23 picking out exact details was difficult.

24 Q. But you were able to say that the next person, again
25 a female, who was lying face down, was dressed in black

1 clothing and you were able to certify life extinct at
2 09.16?

3 A. That's correct.

4 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person was Fiona Stevenson.

5 Finally, again, in the same area, did you see
6 a body, a female, lying on the floor very close to the
7 other two persons who had suffered blast damage and she
8 was wearing a black top, did you certify her life
9 extinct at 09.16?

10 A. That's correct.

11 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Anne Moffat.

12 Thank you very much, Doctor. I don't know whether
13 there are any further questions for you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Dr Costello? Any
15 other questions?

16 Dr Costello, there are no other questions for you.

17 Thank you for taking the trouble to join us via the
18 videolink.

19 A. Thank you very much. Thank you.

20 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will read a number of witnesses.

21 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Ian Collins,
22 dated 20 June 2006, which has the usual declaration of
23 truth?

24 Statement of MR IAN ANTHONY COLLINS read

25 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was employed in uniform

1 as the base sergeant for 2 Unit, Dog Support Unit,
2 Essex.
3 "I was deployed along with PC Tony Cassidy to
4 Aldgate station to assist S013 Anti-terrorist Officers
5 with the task of recovering the remains of the human
6 victims. I believe PC Cassidy and I arrived at Aldgate
7 station at approximately 7.30 and there we introduced
8 ourselves to DC Meneely, who was the S013 Exhibit
9 Officer. For the next 11 days, PC Cassidy and I,
10 assisted by the S013 officers, recovered all the
11 available human remains from both the train carriages
12 and the underground tunnel. I supervised the completion
13 of the ACPO victim label booklets and the removal of all
14 the recovered parts from the platform to the cold
15 storage unit parked outside the front of the station at
16 Aldgate High Street. I would have then obtained the
17 coroner's permission for the transfer of the remains to
18 the temporary mortuary, which had been established at
19 the Honourable Artillery Company grounds. This transfer
20 then took place by van after completion of the necessary
21 paperwork and the bag containing the remains was then
22 released to the mortuary.
23 "After consultation with DC Meneely to ensure that
24 we had not missed even a single piece, thereby ensuring
25 the integrity of our search, I organised for the victim

1 recovery dogs to attend the scene and search the area."
2 My Lady, the next statement to read is that of
3 Daniel Jones, dated 26 March 2006, which has the usual
4 declaration of truth.
5 Statement of PC DANIEL JONES read
6 "I am the above-named person and I am a constable
7 with West Yorkshire Police, currently stationed at
8 Holbeck police station. At 10.55 hours on Sunday,
9 4 April 2004, I was on duty in full uniform at Leeds
10 Bridewell when I took a DNA buccal swab from a man who
11 was booked into custody as Shehzad Tanweer, born
12 5 December 1982, of [address redacted]. Tanweer had
13 received a caution for an offence of public order under
14 section 5, for which I had arrested him earlier.
15 "Tanweer consented to giving the sample by way of
16 mouth swabs, and the buccal swabs were packaged as
17 normal and placed in the freezer at Leeds, Bridewell.
18 I then obtained the fingerprints of Tanweer on the live
19 scan machine and took a digital photograph of him."
20 My Lady, the next two statements are from
21 Andrew McDonald, a forensic scientist, the first dated
22 30 August 2005 and the second dated 16 November 2005.
23 Turning to the first statement, again both have the
24 usual declaration of truth.

1 Statements of MR ANDREW McDONALD read

2 "I hold degrees of Bachelor of Science in Zoology
3 and Master of Science in Forensic Science ... I have
4 been a forensic scientist since 1992. During the course
5 of my career, I have examined many cases using DNA
6 analysis techniques.

7 "Between 13 July 2005 and 28 July 2005, 80 recovered
8 body part samples associated with the bombings of
9 a London Underground Tube train at Aldgate on
10 7 July 2005 together with 20 reference control samples
11 from individuals known to have been present at the time
12 of the explosion were received at the laboratory. All
13 items were received in sealed packages.

14 "I was asked to carry out STR profiling tests to
15 determine whether any of the recovered body part samples
16 received in this case could have originated from
17 Shehzad Tanweer. STR profiling is a sensitive DNA
18 analysis technique. An STR profile obtained from
19 a human body fluid, such as blood or saliva, or human
20 body tissue can be compared with an STR profile of
21 a given person. If the profiles are different, then the
22 body fluid or body tissues cannot have originated from
23 the person in question.

24 "If, on the other hand, the STR profiles are the
25 same, then that individual, and anyone else who shares

1 the same STR profile, can be considered as a possible
2 source of the body fluid or body part. The significance
3 of finding such a match can then be assessed.

4 "Reference control sample. The tissue sample taken
5 from Shehzad Tanweer was used to determine his STR
6 profile.

7 "Recovered body part samples:

8 "Tissue analysed from the following recovered body
9 part samples generated full STR profiles which matched
10 that of Shehzad Tanweer."

11 And, my Lady, Mr McDonald then goes on to list 48
12 tissues which were analysed from recovered body part
13 samples:

14 "This means that the body parts could have
15 originated from him. I estimate that the probability of
16 obtaining this profile, if the tissue tested from the
17 body parts did not originate from Shehzad Tanweer, but
18 came from another unrelated person who, by coincidence,
19 had the same profile, is less than 1:1 billion. In
20 addition to these body part samples, the following
21 recovered body part samples generated incomplete STR
22 profiles which matched that of Shehzad Tanweer."

23 My Lady, four are listed.

24 "This means that these body part samples could also
25 have originated from him. I estimate that the

1 probability of obtaining these profiles, if the tissue
2 tested from the body parts did not originate from
3 Shehzad Tanweer but came from another unrelated person
4 who, by coincidence, has the same profile, is less than
5 1:1 billion ..."

6 My Lady, he lists three of the body part samples.

7 "... and approximately 1:9 million", in respect of
8 the final body part sample:

9 "These body part tissue samples could not have
10 originated from any of the other individuals for whom
11 reference control samples were analysed. None of the
12 other recovered body part samples that were analysed
13 could have originated from Shehzad Tanweer. In my
14 opinion, the STR profile results provide extremely
15 strong scientific support for the assertion that all of
16 the recovered body part samples listed above originated
17 from Shehzad Tanweer."

18 My Lady, turning to the second statement dated
19 16 November 2005, again from Mr McDonald:

20 "Between 9 September 2005 and 12 September 2005,
21 nine further recovered body part samples associated with
22 the bombing of a London Underground Tube train at
23 Aldgate on 7 July 2005 were received at the laboratory.
24 All items were received in sealed packages. I was asked
25 to carry out the STR profiling test to determine whether

1 any of the further recovered body part samples received
2 in this case could have originated from Shehzad Tanweer.
3 "Reference control sample. The tissue sample taken
4 from Shehzad Tanweer was used to determine his STR
5 profile. The results of the profiling test carried out
6 in this case are tabulated."
7 He then refers to appendix 3 to his statement.
8 "Recovered body part samples:
9 "Tissue analysed from the following recovered body
10 part samples generated full STR profiles which matched
11 that of Shehzad Tanweer."
12 My Lady, six are listed.
13 "This means that these body parts could have
14 originated from him. I estimate that the probability of
15 obtaining this profile, if the tissue tested from the
16 body parts did not originate from Shehzad Tanweer but
17 came from another unrelated person who, by coincidence,
18 has the same profile, is less than 1:1 billion.
19 "These body part tissue samples could not have
20 originated from any of the other individuals for whom
21 reference control samples were analysed. None of the
22 other further recovered body part samples that were
23 analysed and from which STR profiles were obtained could
24 have originated from Shehzad Tanweer.
25 "Conclusions:

1 "In my opinion, the STR profiling results provide an
2 extremely strong scientific support for the assertion
3 that all of the recovered body part samples listed above
4 originated from Shehzad Tanweer."

5 My Lady, the next statement is that of
6 Nathaniel Cary dated 29 April 2007. He is a consultant
7 forensic scientist:

8 Statement of MR NATHANIEL CARY read
9 "Recovered body fragment: Operation Theseus URN
10 60021972 (Shehzad TANWEER).

11 "Date of death: 7 July 2005 ...

12 "This body part was recovered from the Aldgate
13 scene. This is a fragment consisting of the lower part
14 of the thoracic spine and the upper lumbar spine
15 weighing 1.852 kilograms. There are some signs of
16 decomposition and charring. The specimen is
17 contaminated with glass. It is associated with a piece
18 of cloth.

19 "Measurements: 30 centimetres longitudinally.

20 "Up to 14 centimetres wide.

21 "Up to 10 centimetres deep.

22 "There are attached pieces of posterior rib
23 associated with posterior spinal muscles. It consists
24 of part of the sixth thoracic vertebrae, the seventh
25 thoracic to the second lumbar vertebrae in continuity

1 and part of the third thoracic vertebrae ...

2 "Clinicopathological correlation:

3 "I have subsequently seen a copy of a form entitled

4 'Matched body parts'. This relates to scene 1 Aldgate.

5 Through DNA analysis, this body part, URN 60021972, has

6 been matched to multiple other body parts identified as

7 having come from Shehzad Tanweer.

8 "The nature of this body part and the extreme level

9 of disruption implied by the nature of the other matched

10 body parts is typical of a deceased person having been

11 either in direct contact or very close to an explosive

12 device.

13 "The level of explosive disruption associated with

14 this deceased, when compared with other bodies, both

15 from this scene and other scenes of explosions also

16 occurring on July 7, is entirely in keeping with this

17 deceased having been in possession of the explosive

18 device at the time it exploded.

19 "Cause of death:

20 "A cause of death for this deceased person may be

21 recoded as 1A injuries due to an explosion."

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay, I think you said he was

23 a forensic scientist. Dr Cary is a pathologist.

24 MR HAY: My Lady, I apologise.

25 My Lady, the final statement is that of

1 Richard Hall, dated 6 June 2006, again with the usual
2 declaration of truth.
3 Statement of DC RICHARD HALL read
4 "I am a detective constable attached to the
5 Anti-terrorist Branch at New Scotland Yard where
6 I performed the role of Terrorist Forensic Scene
7 Examiner and Exhibit Officer.
8 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty when
9 a series of incidents took place in London. I was aware
10 that initially there had been explosions on
11 London Underground trains at Russell Square,
12 Edgware Road and Aldgate Underground station. A further
13 explosion had occurred on a London Transport bus at
14 Tavistock Square.
15 "I was tasked by DS Michael Jolly to act as the
16 Deputy Scene Examiner to DC Andrew Meneely, who had been
17 tasked earlier in the day to attend the scene at Aldgate
18 London Underground station.
19 "I went to the scene where I was met by DC Meneely,
20 who was carrying out tasks in relation to the initial
21 survey of the scene. DC Meneely had devised a zone plan
22 which had been used to structure the search. This was
23 later drawn by DC Neil Fretwell of the
24 Anti-terrorist Branch Bomb Data Centre and exhibited at
25 NF/7."

1 Can we have up on the screen, please, [INQ8361-1] ?
2 "My role at the scene was to record the exhibits in
3 a series of exhibit books, to examine exhibits as they
4 were produced from the scene and make an assessment of
5 them and to pass any relevant details via the control
6 vehicle initially to the Anti-terrorist Branch
7 intelligence unit, and subsequently to the
8 Anti-terrorist Branch operations room. I had joint
9 control of the exhibits with DC Meneely.
10 "Once the ticket area, zone 1, stairs to the
11 landing, lower level, walk way and platforms 3 and 4,
12 zone 3, had been cleared, I established a working area
13 at the end of the platform at the entrance to the tunnel
14 leading to Liverpool Street station. This was the point
15 at which exhibits would be removed from the tunnel for
16 recording and examination. At all times, I wore
17 forensic barrier clothing whilst handling the exhibits
18 in order to prevent cross-contamination.
19 "During the course of DC Meneely's initial
20 examination of the scene, he seized exhibit AM/11,
21 selected debris from zone 5, the open area to the left
22 of carriages 1, 2 and 3 of the train.
23 "The exhibit contained part of a wallet which
24 appeared to have been close to an explosion. I examined
25 the contents of this wallet and found that it contained

1 fragments of plastic cards, fragments of Bank of England
2 notes, business cards, and other correspondence.
3 "I recorded the following details in the 'Remarks'
4 column of the exhibit book and passed them to the
5 control vehicle for transmission to the ATBIU.
6 "On Monday, 11 July 2005, I conducted a closer
7 examination of exhibit AM/11. A decision had been taken
8 to submit the wallet to the Forensic Explosives
9 Laboratory for explosive trace work to be done. I
10 therefore opened the exhibit and removed all of the
11 fragmented parts from it. I then resealed the exhibit.
12 As a result of this examination, I created the following
13 eleven exhibits:
14 "RABH/1. Fragmented HSBC credit card in the name of
15 Mr Sidique Khan ...
16 "RABH/2. Fragments of a £10 and £5 note split from
17 AM/11 ...
18 "RABH/3. One Excelsior Snooker Club membership card
19 in the name of S Tanweer ...
20 "RABH/4. 1. Two receipts ... One PC World receipt
21 for plantronic audio 15 microph £12.99.
22 "2. B&Q receipt. Print has faded but can be read
23 in part. (H)Eeston Ring Road, Leeds ...
24 "RABH/5. One Northern Snooker Centre membership
25 card in the name of S Tanweer ...

1 "RABH/5A. One Nasim Property Investor business
2 card...
3 "RABH/7. One Halifax Current Account Switch Card in
4 the name of Mr S Khan ...
5 "RABH/8. One Optimum Fitness card in the name of
6 Yasser HALEED ...
7 "RABH/9. One business card ...
8 "Dr GREENTHUMBS Hydroponics Store ... Wakefield ...
9 "RABH/10. One business card in the name of
10 James Squires ...
11 "I also produced exhibit RABH/11 - one nylon bag -
12 for control purposes for the Forensic Explosives
13 Laboratory."
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.
15 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Ian Wheeler?
16 CHIEF INSPECTOR IAN WHEELER (sworn)
17 Questions by MR KEITH
18 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
19 A. Yes, I'm Chief Inspector Ian Wheeler of the Metropolitan
20 Police Service.
21 Q. Mr Wheeler, in July of 2005, you were Inspector Wheeler?
22 A. I was.
23 Q. We know from your witness statement that you were
24 attached to Charing Cross police station and a body
25 known as Response Team 1 and you were in charge of what

1 is called a Serial, Serial 112, from the
2 Commissioners Reserve.

3 We've heard a little bit of evidence about the
4 Commissioners Reserve and the formation of groups of
5 officers called Serials. Could you just tell us,
6 please, as simply as you are able, for us to understand,
7 what a Serial is and what the Commissioners Reserve is?

8 A. Correctly, the Commissioners Reserve is a police support
9 unit comprising three Serials. Each of those Serials
10 would be a team of either six or seven PCs supervised by
11 a sergeant, and overseeing the whole unit would be an
12 inspector.

13 Q. Were you that inspector?

14 A. I was.

15 Q. Were you part of a Serial, or were you a Serial, that
16 was classified as a level 2 Serial, that is to say
17 trained in public order?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. The relevancy of your Serial is that, later, when we get
20 to Aldgate, which we know you attended, you deployed
21 some of your officers including a sergeant,
22 Sergeant Nanasi, down into the tunnel, together,
23 I think, with two or three of your constables.

24 I want to explore with you how it was that you came
25 to be briefed to attend Aldgate and, also, what you were

1 doing at the time that you were briefed. Were you being
2 held in reserve for something? Was there a reason for
3 the deployment or putting into readiness of your
4 officers that morning?

5 A. Yes, on 6 July and 7 July, we were on duty in Central
6 London primarily to cover any potential protests linked
7 to the G8 conference in Scotland. A lot of Territorial
8 Support Group Officers had been deployed to Scotland, so
9 the Commissioners Reserve had been drawn from Borough
10 Officers and that was my unit.

11 Q. The reason that I ask is that there's been some comment
12 in the press and elsewhere, not recently, but nearer the
13 events of 7 July 2005, to the effect that, in some way,
14 the taking place of the G8 Summit in Scotland may have
15 had some adverse impact on the ability of the police, or
16 the emergency services, to respond in London.

17 Do we take it that the making available of your
18 Serial as part of the Commissioners Reserve was part of
19 a step taken by the Metropolitan Police to ensure that
20 there were additional officers on duty available to deal
21 with events in London, if they occurred?

22 A. That's correct. That's my understanding, yes.

23 Q. In the event, were there any protests arising out of the
24 G8 Summit that you were forced to attend to in London?

25 A. No.

1 Q. So you were made available then for any other
2 eventuality that might have arisen?

3 A. Yes. Our prime function was to cover any protests
4 around G8. However, we could have been deployed to any
5 incident requiring a large number of officers anywhere
6 in London.

7 Q. Indeed, as it transpired, that morning, you received
8 a call from the Special Operations Room?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. We've seen a large number of logs, Chief Inspector, as
11 you might expect, and we've become familiar with
12 computer-aided dispatch records, CAD records, relating
13 to the general carrying out of Metropolitan Police and
14 City of London Police duties.

15 Because you were assigned to the specific role of
16 being part of the Commissioners Reserve, did you receive
17 your calls from another telephone exchange, another
18 operation, called the Special Operations Room?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. They operate a different telephone system, do they?

21 A. I'm no expert on their telephony. I believe they do
22 primarily use a different command and control system
23 called Met Ops, or was called Met Ops then.

24 Q. In any event, there are different logs relating to the
25 calls made to and from their room which we know as GT

1 logs. Is that your understanding also?

2 A. Yes, it is.

3 Q. Basically, they're dedicated radio channels and means of
4 communication which are put into place to allow the Met
5 to respond to large-scale events?

6 A. Yes, my understanding is that those logs are primarily
7 around the coordination of resources.

8 Q. Could we have on the screen [INQ10587-2] ? This is such
9 a GT log. At 08.55, if you could enlarge the bottom
10 half of the page, we can see there a message under the
11 words "Event 125:
12 "Please send a CAD ..."
13 A computer-aided dispatch:
14 "... to City Police asking if they require any
15 assistance."
16 Do you recollect that message?

17 A. I would have had no involvement in that message.
18 I presume that would have gone from GT to the City of
19 London Police.

20 Q. All right. As a result of that message, do you
21 recollect that you received a call asking you to deploy
22 to, initially, Liverpool Street?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. If we go forward to page 3 of this exhibit [INQ10587-3] , please, we
25 can see under "Event 125 GT2" right at the top of the

1 page:

2 "BX1. On way to Liverpool Street station."

3 It's rather hard to discern from the way in which
4 the material is formulated, but does that ring any bells
5 with you as to whether or not you communicated to GT
6 that you were on the way to Liverpool Street?

7 A. I certainly communicated that. Whether that was from me
8 I can't say. BX1 would be the call sign of Bronze.

9 That may have been a chief inspector overseeing all the
10 Central London units.

11 Q. All right. In any event, you didn't go to
12 Liverpool Street or, if you did, I think you were asked
13 to deploy to Aldgate?

14 A. Yes, I'm not that familiar with that area of the city,
15 but we got near to Liverpool Street and we were asked
16 to, yes, redeploy.

17 Q. You reached Aldgate, we know, from the GT logs, around
18 9.30, 09.26, and I want to ask you, please, Chief
19 Inspector, about your impressions of the scene as you
20 arrived. You were the most senior Metropolitan Police
21 officer in attendance on the scene in the early part of
22 the day.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. What was your impression on arrival?

25 A. It was apparent that it was a major incident. Many

1 emergency services were there, fire engines, ambulances.
2 I saw some police officers. Several casualties. People
3 that appeared to have been injured sitting outside of
4 the front of Aldgate station, and several walking out of
5 the station across the road.

6 Q. Presumably there were a number of police vehicles in
7 your Serial?

8 A. Yes, we would have had three carriers, three minibuses.

9 Q. Did you have trouble getting into the immediate
10 environment of Aldgate London Underground station?

11 A. Yes, we drove towards Aldgate and I think we got to
12 a cordon, a police cordon, a bit of tape, and I don't
13 recall any more than one, perhaps two officers on that
14 cordon, and due to people in the road and other
15 vehicles, we got out of our carriers and ran up towards
16 Aldgate.

17 Q. Was it apparent to you that there were a large number,
18 therefore, of emergency service vehicles already in
19 attendance at the scene?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you see, when you arrived, any other emergency
22 service vehicles attempting to get into the station or
23 get near the station but failing to do so, or did it
24 seem to you that, with a bit of perseverance, you could
25 get access to the station?

1 A. I didn't see any other vehicles having difficulty
2 getting in there. We did have a problem, which is why
3 we got off and ran.

4 Q. Nearer the station, indeed the foyer of the station
5 hall, you obviously saw a large number of walking
6 wounded and casualties from the Aldgate train.

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. We know that they were being attended to by London
9 Ambulance Service personnel.

10 A. Yes, I saw LAS personnel helping people.

11 Q. In your statement, you describe the scene as, if I may
12 be fair to you, perhaps appearing chaotic, but did it
13 seem to you that, in truth, the emergency services were
14 going about doing what they were obliged to do, which
15 was to treat the people in the foyer and the station
16 hall of Aldgate?

17 A. Yes, "chaotic" was the word I used in my statement.

18 Q. It was.

19 A. But recalling what I saw, it appeared to me as everyone
20 doing their job.

21 Q. As you arrived and as the senior officer, did you try to
22 find who else might be in command at that time?

23 A. I and my sergeants went to the entrance of Aldgate with
24 the anticipation of being met and briefed, and very
25 shortly after that, I believe that a PC asked us to help

1 with triaging of casualties and escorting them away from
2 the station, gave me some details about what had
3 occurred in his view and we set about our work.

4 Q. You say in your statement how, when you arrived, no one
5 actually made themselves known to you at that stage as
6 being, we presume, in command. Was it therefore
7 a question of you seeing what you could do to assist and
8 setting priorities for you and your own men?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. What were your priorities, did it seem to you, at the
11 time?

12 A. Having spoken to this officer, I set my strategy for my
13 officers which was preserving life, assisting
14 casualties, preserving the scene and identifying
15 witnesses and evidence.

16 Q. From your viewpoint, was there any question of the main
17 priority of preserving life being made subsidiary to any
18 other consideration, such as forensic scene examination
19 or the risks of secondary devices exploding or anything
20 else?

21 A. No, that was our prime objective.

22 Q. If I may ask you this: is that one of the objectives, if
23 not the primary objective, which is carried out by the
24 police when they come to assist other emergency services
25 in responding to incidents?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. So if a Metropolitan police officer attends an incident
3 where there is a question of loss of life, must he defer
4 his usual investigatory talents to the need to preserve
5 life and to make sure that life is preserved first
6 before anything else can be done?

7 A. It does depend on the individual circumstances.

8 I couldn't say that that would always be the prime
9 concern. It would be hard to think of anything that
10 would be more important, because it's a fundamental part
11 of policing generally.

12 Q. Accordingly, I think there came a stage when one of your
13 sergeants, Sergeant Nanasi, was directed by you to go
14 down and help BTP officers who were in the bottom of the
15 station but needed more officers to help them.

16 A. Yes, I received a request to provide some resources,
17 I believe initially I was asked to provide three
18 officers.

19 Q. And they went down?

20 A. I considered that too few for their own safety and the
21 likelihood of them being effective, so I deployed
22 additional officers with a command structure, which was
23 Sergeant Nanasi, and in total I deployed nine officers.

24 Q. One further point, if I may, although unrelated to those
25 who died at Aldgate; I am more concerned with the

1 casualties who were able to be brought out alive: did,
2 a problem subsequently arise when it became plain that
3 there would be an insufficient number of ambulance
4 drivers to drive the ambulances to the
5 Royal London Hospital?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. Was that because the ambulance technicians and the
8 medical staff were still deployed in the station or
9 elsewhere?

10 A. It was communicated to me that their prime objective was
11 also to save life and treat the severely injured people,
12 that some casualties had been treated, stabilised,
13 placed in ambulances, but there were insufficient LAS
14 personnel to drive the ambulances.

15 Q. What did you do, Chief Inspector?

16 A. I deployed some of my officers who were qualified police
17 drivers to drive those ambulances to hospital.

18 Q. Can you recall how many were so deployed?

19 A. No. That request came to me and I directed that to one
20 of my sergeants. I'm aware that several officers were
21 then deployed, but my directions all went through my
22 sergeants.

23 Q. I think you also, according to your statement, deployed
24 your officers by way of a marked carrier and driver and
25 perhaps the police vehicles to escort the buses that

1 were used to escort -- to carry the injured to the
2 Royal London?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Chief Inspector. Will you
5 stay there, please? There may be some further questions
6 for you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

8 Questions by MS SHEFF

9 MS SHEFF: Can I ask you, please, Chief Inspector, about
10 your decision log scene. That's our exhibit 9757.

11 Can I ask you to look at page number 11.

12 It's a different page from the one I've got. It's
13 headed "Event Debrief Report". I'm sorry, I've given
14 the wrong first reference. It's actually, again, part
15 of your log notes, but it's [INQ10428-11] .

16 Could you highlight, please, number 3.

17 This is the report that arose out of a debriefing
18 that you had with other officers after the events of
19 7 July were able to be assessed. Is that right?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Who was present at the briefing?

22 A. All my officers, myself, the divisional commander at
23 Charing Cross and I think our HR manager as well.

24 Q. So it was just for BTP officers and staff, was it?

25 A. No, it was just for my officers, Metropolitan Police.

1 Q. Sorry, for Met police officers.

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. But it did assess the response of the other officers at
4 the scene, we can see at number 1 the BTP officers being
5 sited and 2 and 3 concern the City of London Police
6 officers.

7 Then at 4 you talk about the mid-term response which
8 you say that's between one to three hours. That
9 presumably comes after what's known as the "golden
10 hour", the first hour of response, the mid-term being
11 the period thereafter, is it?

12 A. The context of these notes, they were an amalgam of my
13 and my officers' experiences. I do recall that my
14 impression still at the time of this debrief was that we
15 had arrived later after the incident than, in fact, we
16 had, if that makes sense.

17 So one to three hours. Probably more accurately, in
18 reflection, would be an earlier start, that perhaps
19 would have been half an hour to two and a half hours.
20 More or less as soon as we arrived.

21 Q. So you're there at around 9.30ish. So are your comments
22 relevant to the period from 9.30 to, what, about three
23 hours afterwards?

24 A. Yes, I believe so, although they were a combination of
25 comments and feedback I was getting from my officers

1 during that debrief.

2 Q. You talk there about the Command structure, Bronze,
3 Silver, Gold, from COLP, the City of London Police.

4 What was that particular comment aimed at? What did it
5 reflect in terms of what your officers were telling you?

6 A. I think everything we did, either we did of our own
7 initiative or as a result of a request from colleagues
8 from BTP, City of London or the Ambulance Service.

9 My expectations, which perhaps were a little
10 unrealistic, were that we would be slotted into
11 a Command structure as soon as we arrived. Ideally,
12 turning up at a major incident such as this, one would
13 get a briefing from a senior officer around their
14 strategy, what they would like us to do, and then we
15 would have cracked on with it.

16 But that was based, I think, on an assumption that
17 we had arrived later in the event than, in fact, we had.

18 Q. What did you hope a more effective Command structure
19 would have achieved?

20 A. I believe that we acted with a degree of autonomy.

21 There would always be a risk that we weren't perhaps
22 acting or pulling the same way as colleagues. I think
23 our strategy that I set would have been consistent with
24 colleagues' strategies, but ideally, there should be
25 a defined Command structure and we would have slotted

1 into it, bearing in mind we were the
2 Commissioners Reserve, we were the contribution of the
3 Met to BTP and City of London, so I would have certainly
4 looked for a lead to make sure what I was doing wasn't
5 contrary to any of their intentions.

6 Q. So you were looking for a lead at the scene and you
7 found or you perceived that to be lacking, which you're
8 suggesting may have affected the way in which your team
9 reacted to the situation. Is that fair?

10 A. I think we were effective, and I think we were probably
11 consistent, what we did, with their intentions. But
12 there would have been a risk, the longer we acted with
13 autonomy, that we weren't doing exactly what was
14 intended.

15 Q. The fact that it is a Command structure going up to
16 Gold, the Gold Commander, we understand, is not normally
17 on the scene, the Gold Commander being somewhere in
18 Central Command assessing the feedback from the scene.
19 Does that indicate that your comments are relevant,
20 not only to what was going on at the scene and your
21 team's reactions to it, but also what was being reported
22 back to the higher commanding officers?

23 A. In such a dynamic environment as this, bearing in mind
24 what else was going on in London, roles can change very,
25 very quickly. Some of what I did when I arrived around

1 setting a strategy would normally be the role of a Gold,
2 but in reality, those roles aren't always clearly
3 defined until things bed in.

4 Certainly for a preplanned operation, it would be
5 far more distinct. So at that stage, I don't recall
6 putting any particular weight. To be honest, it's rare
7 to write Bronze, Silver, without adding Gold.

8 Q. You're suggesting that, from the point of view of your
9 team, in any event you were acting in some context as
10 a Gold officer and taking those strategic decisions that
11 a Gold officer would take, is that right?

12 A. That's correct. I was, at that time, based at
13 Charing Cross police station covering Central London, as
14 were the officers on my unit, and it was -- I wouldn't
15 say routine, but it was a frequent event for us to act
16 in relatively large numbers and, as inspectors, to set
17 strategies to deal with the sort of demand that occurs
18 in Central London, whether it be a bomb threat,
19 a suspect car or the evacuation of a nightclub.

20 In many ways, I think my officers would have been
21 well-placed to deal with this because of their
22 experiences during their everyday duties.

23 Q. Did your role as a Gold strategy officer in Central
24 London involve any responsibility for public transport,
25 the Tube lines and the buses?

1 A. Certainly buses. If a call was received to a bus, to
2 a suspect package on the bus, that would fall to myself
3 or my fellow inspectors to deal with. As far as the
4 London Underground goes, that would always be the --
5 primarily the jurisdiction of BTP.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think you are meaning a slightly
7 more strategic role in relation to whether or not the
8 chief inspector had the power to order the closure. Is
9 that what you --

10 MS SHEFF: Indeed, my Lady.

11 Obviously, if there was a suspect package, you would
12 be responsible for reacting to that?

13 A. I beg your pardon.

14 Q. I'm considering the strategic aspect, whether you had
15 any responsibility to take into account what was
16 occurring at Aldgate and what you knew of other bombings
17 at other stations and apply that to your role as
18 strategic officer with a power -- or did you have
19 a power or any input into the closing down of the
20 transport system, either the tubes or the buses?

21 A. No. Setting a strategy is an aspect of Gold's
22 traditional responsibilities, but my perception was
23 certainly that we were deployed by the Met to the City
24 of London to assist colleagues there and officers from
25 BTP. We certainly weren't aware of what else was going

1 on in London when we arrived at Aldgate. And I don't
2 recall being aware of that until the radio traffic
3 started to come through after we were up and running.

4 Q. You were in contact, via your radio, with officers
5 around London, I believe from your log, so that did
6 eventually filter through to you, did it?

7 A. Yes, all my contact would have been with the
8 Special Operations Room.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you have any responsibility for
10 any scenes or anything else going on around London other
11 than Aldgate?

12 A. No, my Lady.

13 MS SHEFF: Did you have responsibility for informing other
14 Gold Commanders of what was occurring at Aldgate in
15 relation to strategy decisions generally?

16 A. All my communications would have been with the
17 Special Operations Room where there would have been
18 a Command structure in place and communication coming
19 back to me would have been all from the
20 Special Operations Room.

21 Q. Where's the Special Operations Room based?

22 A. It depends on the event. In 2005, I'm not 100 per cent
23 sure, I think it was still based at New Scotland Yard.
24 There was a period of transition in command and control
25 during the middle of the decade, but I think it was

1 still at New Scotland Yard.

2 Q. Is this a Met Police Special Operations Room or is it
3 a body which covers all emergency responders?

4 A. It's a Metropolitan Police facility which has
5 communication pods within it for partners such as other
6 police services, occasionally armed services, other
7 emergency services as well.

8 Q. Finally this: were you the only, effectively,
9 Gold Commander, a Silver Commander acting as
10 Gold Commander and taking strategy decisions at Aldgate
11 that you were aware of, or did any other services --

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not really sure, Ms Sheff -- I'm
13 sorry to interrupt you. I'm not really sure that's
14 a fair assessment of the evidence the chief inspector
15 has been giving. I don't think he's really saying he
16 was Gold Commander in the sense that we've been talking
17 about.

18 MS SHEFF: No, I put that badly.
19 You were obviously taking strategic decisions in the
20 context of those that might be taken at Gold level. Was
21 there any -- sorry, did you want to respond to that
22 before I ask the next question?

23 A. At no time would I have considered myself Gold for
24 Aldgate or anywhere else, but by setting a strategy --
25 some people may describe it as a list of tactics -- that

1 was purely around providing direction to my officers and
2 for me to keep a check on what I was doing and making
3 sure that I was adhering to what I intended to do.
4 So I'd never consider myself as a Gold, and I don't
5 know what other senior officers may have been present at
6 Aldgate.

7 Q. Did you have any contact with anybody else who was
8 acting in the same context as you, taking those serious
9 and senior strategy decisions from other emergency
10 services?

11 A. Yes, I believe I spoke or was approached by a colleague
12 from the London Ambulance Service who asked me if
13 I could assist with the driving of ambulances to
14 hospital, and I had subsequent contact with senior
15 officers from City of London Police around what they
16 would like me to do.

17 Q. What about the London Underground, did you have any --
18 or Transport for London?

19 A. I don't recall having had any contact with
20 London Underground, no.

21 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, Chief Inspector.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Chief Inspector, what I've written
23 down is that where you refer to a strategic role, it's
24 essentially limited to the deployment of your units.

25 I prefer, I'm afraid, to call them units than Serials,

1 because Serial is another word I don't recognise in this
2 context, but you were strategically involved for
3 deploying them rather than the strategy affecting what
4 was going on generally at Aldgate?

5 A. Absolutely, my Lady. It would have been problematic for
6 me to take on any command of resources outside of my
7 unit. It was to provide them direction, and by setting
8 that list of the strategy that -- the four points, that
9 was the only element that may have been considered
10 traditionally the role of a Gold, but it was purely us
11 acting with a degree of autonomy.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You were asked about the comments at
13 the debriefing. We have had the considerable benefit of
14 hindsight, Mr Wheeler. We've seen the comments that you
15 made. Do you think, in fact, had there been the kind of
16 Command structure you say, that you might, in an ideal
17 world, have expected, do you think it would in fact have
18 made any difference to what happened?

19 A. No, I don't. The context of these comments were
20 straight after a debrief with my officers. It was still
21 an ongoing police operation. We still considered that
22 London could have been under attack and, upon
23 reflection, I think I may have been a little harsh in
24 some of them.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Wheeler?

1 Mr Hill?

2 Questions by MR HILL

3 MR HILL: Chief Inspector, it may seem odd to the
4 uninitiated, given that you're an officer of the
5 Metropolis, but there are some jurisdictional issues,
6 aren't there, particularly when we're talking about the
7 City of London as opposed to Greater London?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Those jurisdictional issues dictate, is this right, that
10 the police service who have primacy in the City of
11 London are, as the name suggests, the City of London
12 Police?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. That is why it was an offer for assistance given to the
15 City of London Police on the morning of 7 July that
16 resulted in you being deployed from your holding base
17 for the day of Buckingham Gate?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. By the same reason, because of coronial jurisdiction,
20 the jurisdiction in which this particular atrocity
21 occurred was different to the jurisdiction in which the
22 other events in London on that tragic day occurred; you
23 know about that?

24 A. That's also correct.

25 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask a couple more questions about

1 the timing of events that morning from the GT log? If
2 we could have back on screen, please, [INQ10587-2] .
3 This is, as you've told us, a separate system to the
4 computer-aided dispatch system. It's the GT or
5 Special Operations Room system which, as you correctly
6 surmise, was being run from Scotland Yard that day in
7 2005, the Special Ops Room. So the GT room, is this
8 right, having been put in place for potential events
9 emanating from the demonstrations over the previous days
10 in Scotland, therefore resulted in a dedicated radio
11 channel being set up, which, to officers like you and
12 those under your command, is GT?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. So as we look at the entries -- I'm not, of course,
15 going to take you through entries on this log that are
16 being created by others and in relation to the actions
17 of others -- we should imagine, is this right, that
18 you're one spoke in quite a large wheel of
19 communications on this day?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So there are messages that are coming down to you at the
22 end of your spoke and also being relayed back by you
23 under your Serial number?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. So when we read the GT2 log, we should look in

1 particular, is this right, for entries that are recorded
2 as coming from 112A?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Because that's your Serial number?
5 A. Yes, my whole unit was 112A, B and C, but as the
6 inspector, I would be attached to A.
7 Q. Right. Restricting myself almost entirely, then, to
8 those entries which emanate from you, we've already
9 looked on page 2 at the entry timed at 08.55. It's
10 0009, 08.55.07. That is a message that tells us that,
11 at the time, you were still at Buck Gate, next line, or
12 there's a reference to Buck Gate, where in fact you
13 were?
14 A. Yes, Buckingham Gate, I can see.
15 Q. The message then sent from SIL -- do you know what SIL
16 means in this context?
17 A. No, I don't.
18 Q. Don't worry. It's being sent from SIL to CAD:
19 "Please send a CAD to City Police asking if they
20 require any assistance.
21 "GT: Cheers."
22 That's someone in the Special Ops Room offering help
23 to City of London Police?
24 A. It would appear so. However, I wouldn't profess to be
25 an expert on communications within that room.

1 Q. No, as we've already established, that's not an entry
2 that's going to have been made by you. This an entry,
3 as it were, made centrally. If we go over to page 3 [INQ10587-3] ,
4 please, on the screen, the top of the page, do we see at
5 09.07, about six lines down the screen, there is what
6 appears to be -- is this right -- a deployment, and we
7 can see your Serial numbers, 112A, B and C, to:
8 "L pool", Liverpool Street, at the junction with
9 Broad Street?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. So that's the indication that, at 09.07, following the
12 offer for assistance, it appears to be taken up and
13 you're deployed forward to Liverpool Street?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The next entry on the same page, please, we can come
16 down to 09.09, the very bottom of the screen at the
17 moment, if we could scroll down to that, is not an entry
18 made by you, it's made by BX1. That's not you, is it?

19 A. No, I believe that would have been Elaine van Orden, who
20 was the chief inspector overseeing all the Central
21 London reserves, I believe.

22 Q. Right. That officer is recording that you, as we know,
23 and your three minibuses full of officers are "on way to
24 Liverpool Street station".

25 A. That may have been her saying that she was on way.

1 I don't know. But she wouldn't have travelled with us.
2 Q. Right. All right, thank you. That's 09.09. Could we
3 then go on, I think to page 5 [INQ10587-5] in this log, and come to
4 9.20? At 9.20, middle of the screen now, can we see an
5 entry, two entries:
6 "We are on scene at Liverpool. We've been asked by
7 CP ..."
8 Does that mean City Police?
9 A. I would presume so.
10 Q. Right.
11 "We've been asked by CP to go to rendezvous point at
12 Aldgate LT station."
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Right. So that's 9.20. Then two lines below that, at
15 the same time, 9.20 still, we see your Serial numbers,
16 "Aldgate station new location".
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. So that appears to help us, does it, to show that you
19 had reached Liverpool Street within, at most, 13 minutes
20 of being brought forward from Buckingham Gate, and then
21 you were deployed onwards at the request of City of
22 London Police to Aldgate?
23 A. Yes, I would presume that that entry would mean that we
24 were en route to Aldgate. We hadn't yet arrived.
25 Q. All right, then same page, bottom of the page, can we

1 come to 09.26? This is where you may be able to help
2 us, can we pick up here an entry recorded on this
3 Special Ops system which appears to emanate from you
4 yourself, 112A:
5 "My Serial now at Aldgate station assisting with
6 casualties."
7 Is that your message in?
8 A. That would have been me, yes.
9 Q. Right. All right. Thank you. Having established that,
10 I think we can go over to page 6 [INQ10587-6] and see the next
11 message that you radioed in. So we've been looking at
12 9.26. Ten minutes later, 09.36, is that you relaying
13 the fact that British Transport Police have, it says
14 "been asked" maybe that should read "have asked"
15 "... asked us to deploy trackside with them at Aldgate"?
16 A. I presume that is me. There is a chance that may have
17 been Sergeant Nanasi.
18 Q. If he radioed in, he might use the serial identifier?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Right. But it was you who detailed Sergeant Nanasi to
21 take the officers you had selected trackside?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. So in that ten-minute period, it's apparent, is it, that
24 there is the presence and requests continuing to be made
25 by City of London Police in relation to Aldgate and it's

1 clear that there's the presence of British Transport
2 Police officers, and you have -- would it be right to
3 say you have fed in to their structure at the scene
4 rather than setting up your own structure?

5 A. Yes, we had fed into -- well, we were there to help. We
6 would respond to any request to help. We would
7 obviously want to be as effective as possible, but the
8 reason I put a strategy in was, rather than wait to be
9 asked, there was obviously plenty to do otherwise.

10 Q. For the avoidance of doubt, there was plenty, was there,
11 for you, as the commanding officer of your Serials, and
12 the other two minibus-loads of officers, to stay
13 topside, groundside, as it were, at Aldgate, to help
14 with casualties at the top of the steps?

15 A. Yes, when we arrived, there were casualties coming out
16 and there were also what appear to have been more
17 seriously injured people prone outside of the station as
18 well. So there was plenty to do to help.

19 Q. Let's go forward another 30 minutes, page 7 [INQ10587-7] on the same
20 document, to 10.06. We've been looking at 9.36. By
21 10.06, did you -- or does it appear to be you radioing
22 in:

23 "All my PSU is back together. About to liaise with
24 BTP re what they want us to do next."

25 A. Yes, that would have been me using that term, "all my

1 PSU", yes.

2 Q. PSU means?

3 A. Police Support Unit.

4 Q. Thank you. Bottom of that same page, 10.10, four
5 minutes later, is that you again:

6 "One carrier to escort a bus full of casualties to
7 the London hospital. The rest of my Serials will be
8 driving Ambs [ambulances] to local hospitals."

9 A. That would have been me, yes.

10 Q. Is that use of initiative on your part or a result of
11 a specific tasking from somewhere to permit officers to
12 drive ambulances, how did that come about?

13 A. That was in liaising with a colleague from LAS who asked
14 us if we could help with driving ambulances. I'm not
15 certain with regards to escorting the bus. I think that
16 may have been a decision that we'd both come to.
17 Bearing in mind the trouble we had in getting to Aldgate
18 an hour beforehand, it was obvious that a bus was going
19 to need assistance.

20 Q. All right. That's all I want to ask from that log. So
21 those timings, assuming the log is accurate -- I suggest
22 it is -- give us a shape for the activities that you
23 undertook and the deployments that you made at the scene
24 at Aldgate?

25 A. Yes, there would be a slight delay once I had taken the

1 action to communicating it and then entering.

2 Q. Just in a single question and answer, did you have
3 available to you, by the time of debrief that evening,
4 the precision as to timing that we've now seen on the
5 log --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- or was the reality somewhat different?

8 A. Yes, I didn't have the precision at all. One's
9 perception of time in circumstances such as these can
10 get distorted.

11 Q. Yes. Thank you. With that, let's come on to INQ10428,
12 please, at page 11 [INQ10428-11]. I want to ask you a few questions
13 about the event debrief report.

14 In fact, this is part of a longer document. You may
15 have a copy available to you, I'm not going to ask we
16 look at every page, but in fact, were we to PTO at the
17 bottom of the screen, which I assume means to go to
18 page 12 [INQ10428-12] of this document, we see time and date, 17.55,
19 7/7/05, CX.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. CX standing for?

22 A. Charing Cross police station.

23 Q. Does that indicate that you signed off this debrief
24 report at 5.55 that evening at Charing Cross or
25 something else?

1 A. Yes, that would have been the time that I made those
2 entries which would have been directly after our debrief
3 at Charing Cross.

4 Q. As to the debrief, are we to imagine a formal,
5 agenda-led, minuted debrief or --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- was it something other than that?

8 A. No, I asked for that debrief. It was primarily around
9 support for my officers, several of whom were
10 traumatised, and I also wanted to capture any lessons
11 that we may have learnt that would assist with
12 potentially the next bomb.

13 Q. So there you are at Charing Cross as the senior officer
14 in charge of the 20-something officers on the vehicles
15 that deployed forward that day and you're marking down
16 in, as it were, your own document your thoughts at that
17 time?

18 A. That's correct, and the combination of the comments my
19 officers made to me as well.

20 Q. In relation to the efforts of your officers and in
21 particular those who deployed underground in pursuit of
22 your strategy of preserving life, did they respond to
23 your expectation as their senior officer? If they did
24 not, would you say so?

25 A. Absolutely, and they did respond magnificently.

1 Q. Sparing your blushes, is that why you wrote that it was
2 your view that they undoubtedly saved lives and dealt
3 with numerous injured people and fatalities?

4 A. It was my perception, yes.

5 Q. So the answer to the question, "Notwithstanding your
6 comments about structures at the scene, could anything
7 have been done in your view to further pursue the
8 strategy of saving life?", what's your answer?

9 A. I don't believe so. They did exactly what I asked
10 without question and showed a degree of initiative
11 themselves.

12 MR HILL: That's all I ask, thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions for
14 Chief Inspector Wheeler?

15 There are no more questions, Chief Inspector. Thank
16 you very much for coming along to help us, and thank you
17 for deploying your troops so effectively that day.

18 A. Thank you, my Lady.

19 MR KEITH: My Lady, the last witness is
20 Superintendent Lawson, please.

21 SUPERINTENDENT ALISTAIR ROBERT LAWSON (sworn)

22 Questions by MR KEITH

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do I have a statement, Mr Keith?

24 MR KEITH: My Lady is quite right, I'm so sorry, there is an
25 additional statement we prepared very recently.

1 Mr Hay I think will surrender his copy.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I will hand it back afterwards.

3 (Handed).

4 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

5 A. I am Superintendent Alistair Robert Lawson of the
6 British Transport Police.

7 Q. You are a superintendent now, but in July 2005, you were
8 a detective chief inspector?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Thank you very much for coming, Mr Lawson. You
11 appreciate that you weren't on the original list of
12 witnesses, but you've kindly come at short notice to
13 deal with some issues arising out of events at
14 Liverpool Street on the morning of 7 July 2005.

15 I understand that you've had a chance to look at
16 certain contemporaneous documents such as decision logs
17 and notes and the like?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. We know from another witness, in particular Mr Glazer,
20 who was the London Underground duty station manager,
21 that, fortuitously, you were travelling through
22 Liverpool Street with a view to catching a westbound
23 Circle Line train to King's Cross and then I think
24 walking to your office in Tavistock Square?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. But in Liverpool Street, according to your statement,
2 you heard an evacuation signal and you no doubt noticed
3 people leaving the station and that something was up?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. I believe that you met, in the bowels of
6 Liverpool Street, another police officer whom you knew?

7 A. That is correct. I met Detective Inspector
8 Simon Taylor.

9 Q. Did Mr Taylor subsequently keep a log for you when you
10 assumed control a little later, as we'll hear?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Because you were on the way to work, you didn't have
13 your radio with you?

14 A. I did not.

15 Q. Do you recollect, yourself, seeing smoke or smelling
16 smoke emanating from the Liverpool Street end of the
17 Aldgate tunnel?

18 A. I do not.

19 Q. But you spoke, I think, to the MICC, which is the
20 control room for British Transport Police?

21 A. On several occasions.

22 Q. Do you recollect when you first spoke to them?

23 A. Without referring to my statement, no.

24 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [BTP167-9]?

25 We can see at the bottom of the page at 08.51.44

1 a call from DI Taylor, that's Mr Taylor of whom you've
2 just spoken, who happens in fact to have been in the
3 Robbery Squad in London south. We can see there that he
4 calls the controller, and then over the page [BTP167-10]:
5 "Myself and DCI Alistair Lawson, who are on scene,
6 that we've got, yeah, we've got a station evacuated at
7 Liverpool Street, we've got a sound of an explosion ...
8 and there's loads of smoke in the tunnel that's all
9 we've got ...
10 "There's smoke coming from ...
11 "From the tunnel from the Aldgate end of
12 Liverpool Street.
13 "From the Aldgate end."
14 Further down the page, there's a reference to call
15 signs:
16 "But no sign of any damage or any explosion ... it
17 was loads of ... smoke."
18 Did you ask Mr Taylor to phone the control room
19 because you'd received information that there had been
20 smoke coming from the tunnel?
21 A. That's correct, Mr Taylor had spoken to me and briefed
22 me. I then asked him to contact the control room.
23 Q. As a result of what you heard from Mr Taylor, and as
24 a result of the evacuation siren, did you go to the
25 control room for London Underground at Liverpool Street?

1 A. I did.

2 Q. What did you find there?

3 A. There were members of London Underground staff in that
4 control room.

5 Q. One of them we heard was Mr Glazer, who was the duty
6 station manager. Did there come a time when you decided
7 to speak to the duty officer again at MICC, and could we
8 have page 37 of BTP167 [BTP167-37], 08.57:

9 "It's Al Lawson, DCI here.
10 "I'm at Liverpool Street ..."
11 Then over the page:
12 "We've got a problem here which you should be aware
13 about. Do you have a log running?
14 " ... I'm the only senior officer on scene just now,
15 so a quick update on what's happening. The station's
16 been closed, scene secured. I'm assuming the Alpha cars
17 are coming ..."
18 What are Alpha cars?

19 A. Alpha cars are specialist units within BTP that have got
20 experience and special equipment for dealing with
21 explosive incidents.

22 Q. So do we take it that, at this time, at 08.57, you
23 already knew, not only that it was smoke, but there was
24 the possibility of an explosive device?

25 A. That is not the case.

1 Q. That's not the case. Was this a precautionary step for
2 you, then, to ask for Alpha cars?

3 A. There was a member of staff from London Underground who
4 had witnessed what happened and the smoke and the bang
5 in the tunnel, and my aim at this point was to get my
6 specialist officers to debrief him to give a better
7 understanding of what may have happened.

8 Q. So you wanted them to come to Liverpool Street to speak
9 to him?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Is that why you say there [BTP167-38]:

12 "Where we have the Underground member of staff who
13 was on the platform waiting and ready to brief them"?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Further down the page you make a reference to being with
16 a duty station manager, and over the page, you then ask
17 to speak to the duty officer. Is the duty officer
18 somebody else, not the controller?

19 A. I was asked if I wanted to speak to the duty officer.

20 "We have an officer of inspector rank within the control
21 room".

22 Q. Could we have page 20 of this exhibit [BTP167-20]? Did you speak to
23 a man called Inspector Young?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. "I'm probably the most senior person here [at

1 Liverpool Street] ... I'm just waiting for the Alpha
2 car ... we don't know if it's an explosion under a train
3 ...
4 "... we think there's a power loss at some
5 point ..."
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Further down the page:
8 "I suspect it's an operating rather than a CT ..."
9 Is that a counter-terrorism problem?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Over the page [BTP167-21]:
12 "We've just had a report", he tells you:
13 "... or ask for an ambulance to go to Aldgate ...
14 because of 3 or 4 walking wounded."
15 When he told you that there was an ambulance going
16 to Aldgate, because of walking wounded, did that change
17 your understanding of the situation?
18 A. That absolutely changed the dynamics.
19 Q. So what, as we can see from here, did you decide to do?
20 A. I decided that I would take command at Liverpool Street
21 station.
22 Q. What about your rank and your service in the British
23 Transport Police entitled you to take command at
24 Liverpool Street?
25 A. I was the most senior officer on scene.

1 Q. The most senior British Transport Police officer on
2 scene?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the British Transport Police is the police service
5 for the Underground?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. What did you envisage you would do by way of taking
8 command and getting it sorted out, as we can see there?

9 A. By taking command, my primary aim was to bring some
10 control to the situation.

11 Q. In what way?

12 A. By making decisions that were relevant, based on the
13 information that was open to me at that point.

14 Q. You didn't know very much at that point, Superintendent,
15 because you knew there was smoke, there was
16 a London Underground member of staff --

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. -- who could talk of that. You'd heard talk of an
19 explosion or a bang and you knew there were walking
20 wounded at Aldgate.

21 Did you know that there was a train trapped
22 somewhere between Liverpool Street and Aldgate?

23 A. I assumed that I did on the ground, sir, there were
24 three or four walking wounded detraining towards
25 Aldgate.

1 Q. Can we have INQ10241, please [INQ10241-2]? At 09.11, a note was made
2 by the loggist for the London Underground staff present
3 in the control room.
4 At the top left-hand corner of the screen you can
5 see 09.11:
6 "Silver control implemented. People on train at
7 Aldgate. Supervisor at Aldgate to liaise. Are there
8 any injuries at Aldgate? Is there anybody in tunnel?
9 Need to know if train can move. Train is between
10 Aldgate and Liverpool Street. Aldgate waiting for
11 medic."
12 The first entry on the page, Superintendent, we know
13 from evidence was written in later because, at 08.55,
14 there was no knowledge of there being a bomb blast. But
15 the entry at 09.11 appears to be broadly right.
16 From your recollection, did you shortly discover
17 that there was a train in the tunnel, shortly after
18 taking command that is?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. We know that the British Transport Police log, if we
21 could have [BTP168-17]now, please, shows that at 09.14 --
22 so around about the same time, if perhaps a couple of
23 minutes later, it shows that you received a call from
24 the duty inspector at MICC, and you refer there:
25 "We've got two trains trapped between here and

1 Aldgate ... and we've got injuries ... so I'm told
2 that's getting evacuated towards Aldgate ..."

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. It seems that you did discover that there were trains,
5 in fact two trains, and you knew that there was an
6 evacuation towards Aldgate?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. With that -- I apologise -- rather lengthy introduction,
9 I want to ask you about what, if any, steps you took to
10 find out more about the nature of the incident in the
11 tunnel and what the position was for the train which you
12 knew was there.

13 A. I was reliant on a number of sources of information
14 coming in to me, primarily from London Underground and
15 the staff that were on duty there, but also from radio
16 traffic going across the airwaves.

17 Q. You were dependent on information. Present in
18 Liverpool Street, could you not have taken any steps to
19 ascertain more about what was going on in the tunnel as
20 opposed to, in addition, evacuating Liverpool Street?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Could you tell us, please, why not?

23 A. I had access to all the information sources which, at
24 that time, I believed I could have access to.

25 Q. What about the information to which you were privy

1 appeared to preclude you from taking steps to find out
2 what was in the tunnel?

3 A. No, that's not the case. I -- the information that was
4 available to me was that there was a train in the
5 tunnel, there were casualties and there was a rescue
6 operation being mounted from Aldgate.

7 Q. They were being evacuated towards Aldgate?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you consider whether or not assistance could be
10 given to the people on the train by virtue of access
11 from the other side of the train?

12 A. I would have considered that.

13 Q. Tell us, please, if you did consider it, why you
14 rejected it as an option.

15 A. In relation to the -- any rescue operation, it is
16 better --

17 Q. First, ascertaining what the position was in the tunnel
18 by way of sending somebody down to see what the position
19 was and, secondly, the rescue operation.

20 A. Sorry, could you explain it again, please?

21 Q. Yes. What was it, what factors, influenced your
22 decision-making process in leading you to decide that
23 there was nothing to be gained in either sending
24 somebody down to the tunnel to see what the position was
25 with their own eyes or, secondly, conducting a rescue

1 operation from the Liverpool Street end?

2 A. The factors were I was aware that there was a rescue
3 operation being mounted from Aldgate. I am familiar
4 with the area, having travelled on the Circle Line.

5 I was aware of the distance between Liverpool Street and
6 Aldgate and, bearing in mind that it was getting
7 evacuated towards Aldgate, one of the factors was that
8 to mount another attempt from Liverpool Street may have
9 caused confusion.

10 Q. I don't think you claimed any special interest or
11 expertise in the Liverpool Street station area, did you?

12 A. Absolutely not.

13 Q. I think you were in charge of the Association of Chief
14 Police Officers crime business area at that time?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Do you recall London Underground staff recommending that
17 somebody be sent down to investigate what was actually
18 happening in the tunnel?

19 A. No, I do not.

20 Q. We've heard evidence from the duty station manager that
21 he planned to, and started to, find out the exact
22 location of the incident but was stopped from doing so
23 by you. Do you recollect that?

24 A. I do not.

25 Q. Was there any discussion between the Silvers -- you were

1 Silver BTP, he was Silver London Underground and there
2 was a Silver LFB, I think a Mr Clarke -- as to the
3 desirability or the efficacy of sending somebody into
4 the tunnel?

5 A. I had constant discussions with all the other Silvers
6 there. In relation to the specifics about sending
7 people down the tunnel, I cannot recollect that, but had
8 there been any disagreement, that would have been
9 significant and would have been entered on to my log.

10 Q. We've heard some evidence about how the duty station
11 manager asked one of his deputies, a Mr Ray Wood, to put
12 together a group of volunteers to go down and he started
13 writing out names on a whiteboard but you intervened,
14 according to him, to say you wouldn't allow anybody to
15 go down, and we subsequently discovered from him because
16 of the risk of secondary devices. Do you recollect that
17 at all?

18 A. I have got no recollection of that whatsoever.

19 Q. Can we have on the screen [INQ10241-3]?

20 On the left-hand side, you will see there under the
21 heading of "09.22, Fire Brigade", some writing and then
22 in the middle of the page, just before 09.25:

23 "Fire Brigade to enter tunnel from
24 Liverpool Street."

25 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Do you recollect there being a discussion of the
2 Fire Brigade entering the tunnel from Liverpool Street?

3 A. If I may comment on that, I think that's referring to
4 two lines above that, the train at Moorgate.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ah, the ghost train.

6 MR KEITH: The ghost train?

7 A. Yes, my Lady.

8 Q. Was the ghost train already an issue at that time at
9 09.22?

10 A. It was.

11 Q. So did the Fire Brigade enter the tunnel from
12 Liverpool Street?

13 A. No, they did not.

14 Q. Why did they not?

15 A. I made a decision that I had to put in place some kind
16 of investigation or rescue in relation to the train that
17 I believed was trapped between Liverpool Street and
18 Moorgate, and I decided the best place to mount that
19 from would have been at Moorgate.

20 Q. Do you specifically recall setting your face against
21 there being an entrance into the Moorgate tunnel from
22 Liverpool Street because of factors such as the risk of
23 a secondary device?

24 A. There were a number of considerations, that is correct.

25 Q. Is that one of them?

1 A. That was one of them.

2 Q. Is it possible, Superintendent, that the same
3 consideration: namely, the risk of a secondary device,
4 also influenced the decision not to go the other way,
5 eastbound, into the tunnel to Aldgate?

6 A. That is not the case.

7 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Superintendent, I have no
8 further questions for you.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for
10 Superintendent Lawson? Yes, Ms Sheff?

11 Questions by MS SHEFF

12 MS SHEFF: You were in contact both directly with MICC and
13 through other officers that you directed to have contact
14 with them. Is that correct?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. We saw on the CAD message the fact that you were
17 responsible for calling the Alpha team. By 09.13 the
18 Alpha unit had arrived. You knew enough by then about
19 the situation to tell them to contact MICC and declare
20 a major incident?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. What was the purpose of you declaring that major
23 incident in terms of Command structure?

24 A. As soon as a major incident is declared, a structured
25 Command structure takes place.

1 Q. Does that involve appointment of Gold, Silver and Bronze
2 Commanders and does it also release additional
3 resources?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. In fact it's an upgrading of an emergency services
6 response, isn't it, to send more resources and to take
7 the entire situation much more seriously?

8 A. In essence, yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Your concern was with the safety and
10 security of the station at which you were then located,
11 Liverpool Street.

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Did you have any connection with or any responsibility
14 for the wider transport system generally?

15 A. No.

16 Q. But in relation to Liverpool Street, you were concerned
17 that the environment should be safe and, as a result,
18 there was the decision taken at 09.23 to evacuate the
19 station?

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Was that a decision taken under your auspices?

22 A. That was my decision.

23 Q. By 09.30, you were aware of other explosions that had
24 been reported. Can I show you that, please, on your
25 log, [BTP391-1]?

1 So 09.30, this was the log opened on your behalf by
2 DI Taylor. 09.23, we can see:
3 "Decision Liverpool Street to be evacuated."
4 09.30:
5 "More explosions reported."
6 That presumably related to the explosions at the
7 other Tube stations, the information for which was
8 coming through on the traffic, the radio traffic?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Yes. But in fact, had that information come through,
11 according to your statement, at 09.14, when you had been
12 telephoned from MICC by Gary Young who wanted an update
13 from you? You say in your statement:
14 "By that time, we knew there had been a number of
15 explosions at different locations."
16 A. I believe that is the case, yes.
17 Q. So how do you explain the difference then in the timing?
18 On your log you say that that information was available
19 at 9.30; in your statement that you were aware of that
20 at 9.14?
21 A. I don't believe there is any discrepancy there.
22 Q. So it's correct, is it, that at 9.14 the information was
23 available to you, as the senior officer at
24 Liverpool Street, about other explosions at other sites?
25 A. I believe there was a discussion around about that time

1 between myself and Inspector Young in the control room
2 which indicates that.

3 Q. Thank you. You say in your statement that at 9.23, when
4 you took that decision to evacuate Liverpool Street
5 mainline station, you realised that there had been
6 several bombs on Underground trains and the transport
7 network was under attack. Did that inform, at least in
8 part, your decision to close Liverpool Street?

9 A. Again, that was a consideration.

10 Q. Knowing, as you did then, of the threats that had in
11 fact been activated to other stations you thought it
12 would be safer to close Liverpool Street to prevent any
13 further threat to that particular station?

14 A. That was my decision, yes.

15 Q. You also say that, at 9.30, which is the time noted on
16 your log as the time more explosions were reported, that
17 you thought the transport network in London was under
18 attack?

19 A. I was aware of several bombings on the transport
20 network, yes, that is correct.

21 Q. As a senior officer aware of the running of the network
22 and the risks to it, you took the view that this was
23 a risk to the entire transport network system?

24 A. I took a decision in relation to what I was responsible
25 for, to close Liverpool Street station.

1 Q. Yes, because of the risk to the transport network in
2 general and because of what you knew of the other bombs?

3 A. I took my decision in relation to Liverpool Street
4 station, yes.

5 Q. You were regularly having Silver meetings with the other
6 Silver Commanders at the scene. The first formal
7 meeting you held at 09.39, as we can see on your log,
8 Silver meetings, but in fact, had you been regularly
9 meeting with the other Silver Commanders at
10 Liverpool Street station throughout the period that
11 you'd been there, the first formal meeting only being at
12 9.39?

13 A. The 9.39 was the first formal meeting, that is correct.

14 Q. So you'd been discussing the situation with them in
15 order to establish in your mind what was going on at
16 Liverpool Street and generally?

17 A. That is correct.

18 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, Superintendent. No further
19 questions.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any more questions for
21 Superintendent Lawson?

22 MS CANBY: Sorry, my Lady, just one matter.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Canby.

24 Questions by MS CANBY

25 MS CANBY: Just in relation to that last point, your

1 decision to close the Liverpool Street mainline station,
2 not the Underground station, I think you say in your
3 statement that that was partly based on the fact that
4 the Circle Line is a cut-and-shut?

5 A. That was one of the considerations, yes.

6 Q. Can you just explain to us the significance of that
7 consideration?

8 A. From --

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Explain the expression, first of all.

10 MS CANBY: Yes.

11 A. If I may -- and please forgive me for a lack of
12 technical knowledge around about this -- but my
13 understanding is that there are two types of tunnel on
14 London Underground, one which is deep bore, which is
15 very, very deep, and one which was a Victorian
16 construction which is called cut-and-shut.

17 Q. We also he know it's cut-and-cover.

18 A. It may well be. That's my terminology, cut-and-cover.
19 In relation to that, I understand that a hole was dug,
20 a tunnel was made, and then it was covered over and is
21 very near the surface.

22 Q. It was the fact that the Circle Line is so near the
23 surface that fed into your consideration to close
24 Liverpool Street mainline station?

25 A. That was a consideration, yes.

1 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Gibbs?

3 Questions by MR GIBBS

4 MR GIBBS: Superintendent, may we just pick up in outline

5 what you did thereafter?

6 If we go back please to [BTP168-17], this is the call

7 at 09.14. Can we look at your large paragraph there.

8 "... from what I'm told, we've got two trains

9 trapped, one between here and Aldgate ... injuries on

10 there ... that's getting evacuated towards Aldgate."

11 Pausing there, as you understood it, there was

12 a rescue operation being attempted at Aldgate in

13 relation to that train?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. Will we see, if we follow your actions through your log,

16 that you have hereafter attempted to create a safe and

17 a secure environment at Liverpool Street so as to

18 release resources to the rescue attempt at Aldgate?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. Picking up your telephone call, you say:

21 "I've got LFB here taking control cos it's a rescue

22 stage just now. They're with me just now."

23 Then the second train you speak about is:

24 "One trapped between here and Moorgate ... we've got

25 to establish at Moorgate that's safe and secure. At

1 that point. Then -- they'll -- the train will be
2 evacuated from Moorgate ..."

3 It turned out later, didn't it, about an hour or
4 more later, that actually there wasn't any such train?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. But there were no resources at the time at Moorgate but
7 you freed some up to go there, am I right?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. In particular, a BTP officer called Mr Jiggins was sent
10 there --

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. -- in order to supervise things at Moorgate?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. You were at Liverpool Street consulting, I imagine, with
15 your partners, by which I mean London Underground, the
16 London Fire Brigade, the Ambulance Service and also the
17 operators of the overground railway?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. I don't know whether they were called -- were they
20 called Network Rail at the time?

21 A. I can't recall whether it was Network Rail or Railtrack.

22 Q. But whoever was responsible for running Liverpool Street
23 mainline station?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. May we then briefly pick up what you did by going to the

1 log, which is [BTP391-1]?

2 At 09.23, a decision is made that Liverpool Street
3 be evacuated.

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. At 09.29, a decision is made that a train in the
6 platform -- was that an Underground train in the
7 platform at Liverpool Street be searched?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. That was an evacuated, empty but as yet unsearched train
10 at Liverpool Street?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. The buildings above were to be searched in liaison with
13 the City of London Police?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. You've been taken to the 9.30 entry about you picking up
16 information about further explosions, and then at 9.39
17 you have your first formal Silver meeting, and we see
18 that there are representatives from your other agencies
19 there at the meeting. Is that right?

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. The last entry on that page is:
22 "Mainline closed down."

23 A. Yes, that is correct.

24 Q. Who looked after that for you?

25 A. In what respect, sir?

1 Q. Who is in charge of closing down a mainline station?

2 A. I made the decision that the station should be closed,
3 and then Network Rail or Railtrack, whoever it was, were
4 responsible for actually closing it down.

5 Q. Did they do that promptly and efficiently?

6 A. They did, sir.

7 Q. Can we go over the page, please? City of London Police
8 were going to deal with the buildings above the station.
9 We have, again, the reference to "train trapped in
10 tunnel and people being" -- I think that's "detrained
11 elsewhere". The next meeting is fixed for 20 minutes'
12 time.

13 Can we go then to that next meeting at the bottom of
14 the page at 10.02? Again, we see who's present from the
15 other agencies, and if we go over the page, please, and
16 under the heading -- this may help us with understanding
17 Mr Glazer's evidence -- "LUL":

18 "Train between Aldgate and Liverpool Street.
19 Explosion - fatalities. Aldgate is a scene. Detrains
20 are via Aldgate. Nothing going on at Liverpool Street.
21 Nothing at Moorgate."

22 That I think, at that time, probably meant we had no
23 resources at Moorgate. Am I right?

24 A. It may, sir.

25 Q. Then your decision:

1 "London Underground relocate to Moorgate when safe
2 at Liverpool Street."
3 You're getting information from the mainline
4 operator:
5 "Trains are heading into Liverpool Street", but
6 they're being turned around outside London, is that
7 right?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. You kept, I think, the control room at MICC updated on
10 the hour at 11.00 and on the hour at noon, from
11 Liverpool Street, as to the safety and the security of
12 that mainline station?
13 A. That is correct.
14 MR GIBBS: Thank you.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Gibbs. Any other
16 questions?
17 Thank you very much, Superintendent Lawson. Thank
18 you for coming at such short notice.
19 A. Thank you, my Lady.
20 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the list of witnesses for
21 today.
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As far as tomorrow is concerned,
23 Mr Keith, how many do we have?
24 MR KEITH: My Lady, we have three in the morning, and two in
25 the afternoon, but I'm just about to enquire of my

1 learned friends whether or not their examination of the
2 afternoon witnesses, or rather the morning witnesses,
3 may allow those afternoon witnesses to be brought
4 forward.

5 I was going to do it privately, but I'm prepared to
6 do it publicly.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It was the way you looked across the
8 room.

9 MR COLTART: I'm perfectly happy to do it either way.
10 I don't anticipate being very long with either Mr Rigby
11 or Mr Smith. In relation to Mr Edmondson, he might, in
12 due course, be a lengthy witness, but he's one of those
13 who's going to come back. For the purposes of tomorrow,
14 certainly I don't propose to be very long with him at
15 all.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think, as Mr Keith said, he's happy
17 to deal with this privately. The only reason I was
18 asking, Mr Keith, is a question of timing, whether you
19 wanted me to sit at 10.00 or 10.30 tomorrow.

20 MR KEITH: My Lady, the temptation is almost too great to
21 resist, but I think if we start at 10.00 and I can bring
22 the afternoon witnesses forward, then there is some
23 chance that we may be able to use the afternoon for
24 other equally pressing matters.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. Thank you very much.

- 1 10.00 am.
- 2 (3.48 pm)
- 3 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
- 4