

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 3 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 3 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 (Draft ruling removed pending approval)

4 (11.00 am)

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Timetable?

6 Discussion re timetable

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, I hope you will allow me to say on
8 behalf of all the Bar that we are very grateful for the
9 speed and self-evident thoroughness with which my Lady
10 has given judgment.

11 In relation to timetable, my Lady, the arguments
12 have been trailed for longer in advance than those
13 in April and they are narrower in scope. In those
14 circumstances, may I invite you to invite everybody to
15 consider within one week, rather than the 14 days
16 I think we had in April, any challenge to my Lady's
17 ruling?

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Mr O'Connor?

19 MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: We agree, my Lady.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hall?

21 MR HALL: Madam, we are just taking instructions about how
22 swiftly we can move. I understand the need to go as
23 quickly as possible. Seven days is very tight.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is, but you have had quite a long
25 time to consider the various permutations, Mr Hall.

1 MR HALL: I understand. There are a lot of people to
2 consider the permutations, unfortunately. Can I just
3 wait until that call is made or perhaps get a message to
4 you? But I'm reluctant to formally concede seven days
5 at this stage until those have been taken.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody else have any
7 submissions? Right. Well, I think, Mr Hall, I will say
8 seven days subject to hearing further argument from you,
9 if you are instructed to put forward other submissions.
10 Mr Hall, could I also urge those whom you represent
11 to pursue, if my ruling stands, the possibility of
12 finding a way whereby Counsel to the Inquests could see
13 the RIPA material? I am concerned about the argument
14 which I did take very much on board that, if my counsel
15 are to do their job properly, and I am not to remain, as
16 Mr O'Connor put it, metaphorically naked, that Counsel
17 to the Inquest should see it.

18 Now, I looked through the Act. I can see how
19 prosecuting counsel get access to RIPA material in
20 a criminal trial, but I wasn't quite sure how the
21 Secretary of State's lawyers do and, if there's any way
22 through that quagmire, I would be really grateful.

23 MR HALL: I follow.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Even if it was only for the Secretary
25 of State, for example, technically to instruct counsel

1 to present the material to me, not to argue it, but just
2 to present it. It seemed to me there ought to be a way
3 through it.

4 MR HALL: I follow.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

6 Very well, back to the hearing, I think, Mr Keith.

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. May I invite you to call
8 Alan Treacy?

9 MR ALAN TREACY (sworn)

10 Questions by MR KEITH

11 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

12 A. Alan Treacy.

13 Q. Mr Treacy, at the time of the making of your statement
14 in 2005 you'd worked for the London Ambulance Service
15 for 19 years as a paramedic?

16 A. I did.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Treacy, I'm sorry you have been
18 kept waiting. I think you were here yesterday as well.

19 A. I was, yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am very sorry, I'm afraid we do our
21 best not to inconvenience witnesses, but sometimes it
22 just happens.

23 A. I understand.

24 MR KEITH: On that morning, were you crewed with
25 a Mr Philip Green in an ambulance?

1 A. I was.

2 Q. Was your call sign N, November, 315?

3 A. I believe so.

4 Q. If I may summarise it for you, I think you were called
5 to attend Liverpool Street just after 9.00, but on the
6 way you were diverted to Aldgate?

7 A. I think we actually got to Liverpool Street and we
8 diverted after we got to Liverpool Street.

9 Q. Did you speak to somebody at Liverpool Street who said
10 "There's nothing happening here"?

11 A. I believe so.

12 Q. If we could have on the screen [LAS565-6], we can see at
13 the top:
14 "N315", which is your call sign, "Redbase. CAC: No
15 reply."
16 Then at the bottom of the page at 09.11, N315:
17 "Redbase. CAC: Go ahead. You're sending us to
18 Liverpool Street, but you have also sent us another call
19 down. Which one do you want us to go on?" [LAS565-7]
20 There was plainly some debate with CAC as to where
21 you should go. If we could then look at page 17 [LAS565-17], at
22 09.21, second from the bottom, "CAC: N315 dispatched to
23 CAD 761, Aldgate."
24 Can you just tell us what that text message means,
25 as far as you understand it?

1 A. I would imagine that someone from the CAC has dispatched
2 us to Aldgate.

3 Q. Right. Does the time 09.21 seem to you to be about
4 right in relation to the time at which you were
5 dispatched to Aldgate?

6 A. I've got no idea.

7 Q. You can't say. All right.

8 When you arrived, do you recall there being already
9 in attendance another ambulance crew, crewed by
10 a Mr Cumner and a Ms Ray?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. We know they arrived somewhere around 09.14, so that
13 would put your attendance at 09.21, if it was about
14 right.

15 Did you go down to the tunnel?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you go down on your own or with somebody else?

18 A. I went down with a colleague.

19 Q. Now, do you recall who it was?

20 A. It was Craig Cassidy.

21 Q. Do you recall, when you went down with him, whether or
22 not he had already been down?

23 A. No, he hadn't.

24 Q. Or was this his first trip down?

25 A. We sort of arrived more or less together, and we went

1 down together.

2 Q. What did you take with you?

3 A. I know I took a paramedic bag, but I probably -- I must
4 have taken a defibrillator as well, and probably
5 a dressings kit.

6 Q. Could you keep your voice up, please, Mr Treacy? It's
7 very hard to hear in this large courtroom.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. What makes you think you may have taken a defibrillator?

10 A. Because I used a defibrillator on the scene, so I must
11 have taken one down with me.

12 Q. Right. Could we have on the screen [INQ8380-1]? This is
13 a plan that you marked.

14 Do you recollect through which door you entered the
15 carriage?

16 A. I think it was double doors D6.

17 Q. That's certainly the door referred to in your statement.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was the first person you saw a young female at the point
20 at which you've marked A?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you tell us, please, what you recall of her?

23 A. She was -- as I say, a young female. She was gravely
24 ill and she was in an unusual position where she was
25 more or less wrapped around a handrail that was, if

1 I recall, bent over as well.

2 Q. Was there anybody near her or helping her?

3 A. She was laying across the laps of a couple of people,
4 and I think there might have been another female helping
5 her or holding her, I can't remember exactly.

6 Q. In your statement, you say you were told that the girl
7 had been verbalising a few minutes before you arrived.

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. I don't know whether that was an expression actually
10 used at the time, but somebody must have told you that.

11 Do you recall who it was?

12 A. I think it was a female. I can't remember if it was the
13 female who was sitting or a different female.

14 Q. Or possibly the female who was assisting her and holding
15 her?

16 A. Possibly.

17 Q. When you arrived, could you see any signs of movement or
18 of consciousness?

19 A. No.

20 Q. What did you do?

21 A. I did, briefly, pulse check, checked her over briefly
22 and decided that she needed to get on to the ground to
23 render further aid, if it was necessary.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, I'm finding it hard to
25 hear. I don't know if Mr and Mrs Taylor are as well.

1 MR KEITH: I am too, Mr Treacy. Could you please keep your
2 voice up. So --

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You have to compete with the fan,
4 apart from anything else, Mr Treacy.

5 A. I'll try, I'll try.

6 MR KEITH: You checked her pulse. Was that in her wrist or
7 her neck?

8 A. In her neck.

9 Q. Do you recall what signs, if any, there were of a pulse?

10 A. There was no pulse.

11 Q. There was no pulse?

12 A. No pulse.

13 Q. You said that she needed then to be placed on the ground
14 for to you render further aid. What further aid were
15 you anticipating giving her?

16 A. I was anticipating opening her airway and seeing if
17 there was any further signs of life and, if not, then
18 she would have been deceased.

19 Q. Your statement records how she was gently removed from
20 around the pole and laid on the ground. Having laid her
21 down, what further tests did you carry out?

22 A. I decided to put an ECG on her just to make sure there
23 was nothing further I could do, rather than -- I know
24 we're only supposed to open the airway and, if they
25 don't breathe, then that's it, they're dead. But

1 I decided, because she was so young, she might be viable
2 to respond well to resuscitation efforts, but
3 unfortunately, she was in asystole, her pupils were
4 fixed and dilated, so at that point I decided that there
5 was nothing I could do, unfortunately.

6 Q. When you say that the reading was asystolic, what does
7 that mean?

8 A. There was no organised electrical activity in the heart,
9 it was just a straight line.

10 Q. No electrical activity in the heart, just a straight
11 line?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Because there was no electrical activity and a straight
14 line, did that have some bearing on whether or not she
15 could be resuscitated, for example, by use of
16 a defibrillator?

17 A. You can't defibrillate somebody if they're asystole.

18 Q. Can you give us some idea of how long you tended to the
19 young girl for?

20 A. Minutes, probably, minutes.

21 Q. In your statement -- sorry, in your plan, you have then
22 marked a person as being located at point B. We'll see
23 in a moment that, according to your statement, that was
24 a deceased male, possibly blond or fair-haired, but
25 I want to ask you first about whether you are sure that

1 B was the correct spot.

2 Is it possible that the next person you then tended
3 to was further along the carriage nearer the bomb, or
4 are you sure that they were in the double door area near
5 D6, that is quite close to the first person, the young
6 lady you tended to?

7 A. After consideration, I think I might be wrong on that
8 position.

9 Q. What makes you think you might be wrong, not just
10 because I have put it to you, but ...

11 A. No, because I remember, where Carrie was, there was
12 no -- as far as I was aware, there was no injuries
13 further in that carriage, they were all further down
14 towards the bombsite.

15 Q. Where, now, do you think person B may have been?

16 A. Further towards the -- where the bomb went off.

17 Q. In the double door area D7, D6, perhaps, nearer the
18 bomb?

19 A. The -- probably more D8.

20 Q. Sorry, I've said D7, I meant to say between D7 and D8,
21 right. Tell us, please, what you can recall of
22 person B.

23 A. From recollection, he was a young, fair-haired male with
24 a blue and white striped shirt on.

25 Q. Was he moving?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Were there any signs of life?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you again undertake a test of his pulse?

5 A. I did.

6 Q. Neck or wrist?

7 A. Neck.

8 Q. Did you again apply an ECG?

9 A. I believe so.

10 Q. What was the reading?

11 A. Again, asystole again.

12 Q. That is to say there was a flatline and no electrical

13 activity?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Does that therefore mean that there was simply no

16 purpose to be gained in applying a defibrillator

17 machine?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. In your statement, you also describe how there were

20 a number of people on the floor of the carriage adjacent

21 to seats 20 and 21, and you've marked their position as

22 C. Tell us, please, what you can recall of them.

23 A. I believe it was two people. One had severe head

24 injuries and, from recollection, the other one was --

25 had some limbs missing, and that's as far as I can

1 recall on that.

2 Q. Was their state such that there was nothing to be gained
3 in seeking evidence of a pulse?

4 A. No, they were clearly dead, they were clearly dead.

5 Q. No further steps were taken by you to ascertain whether
6 life was extinct?

7 A. No.

8 Q. You've marked on your plan, at D, the location of yet
9 a further person. Can you recall, please, what you
10 remember of D?

11 A. I can't recall too much about that at all, to be honest.

12 Q. In your statement, you say there was at least one male
13 deceased person on the floor at the position marked D.

14 So you must certainly, at the time of your statement,
15 have recollected that he was male.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you recollect anything at all about the extent of his
18 injuries?

19 A. Not now.

20 Q. Do we take it from the fact that you made an observation
21 that he was dead that there was, at the time, nothing,
22 it seemed to you, that could be done for him?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. You describe in your statement also the treatment of
25 a lady in the rear of the carriage who had lost her left

1 hand, we know that to be Kira Mason, and she was in the
2 vicinity of 15 and 16, and also a lady, Martine Wright,
3 who had -- you described them as horrific lower leg
4 injuries, who was near 18, and who had a tourniquet
5 applied and a man at 17 who also had had a traumatic
6 amputation and had a rudimentary tourniquet applied.
7 Did you tend to them?

8 A. I don't think so. I think my colleagues were attending
9 to both those.

10 Q. So after you had moved through the carriage and seen the
11 people at A, B, C and D, what did you do?

12 A. I just assisted my colleagues in extracting the people
13 out the carriage.

14 Q. That meant getting them out of the wreckage, helping
15 them being stretchered out --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and assisting the Fire Brigade in that process?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. There were obviously a number of Fire Brigade
20 firefighters there at this time. Whilst you were
21 progressing through the carriage and, firstly, looking
22 after the young lady at A, do you recall where your
23 colleagues were, in particular Mr Cassidy?

24 A. He was further down the carriage towards double doors
25 D8. He went to that side.

1 Q. So he went there first, whereas you went --

2 A. I think he came in with me at D8 -- D6 initially, and
3 I might have said to him "I can cope. You go to the
4 other carriage", because we couldn't physically get from
5 D6 to D8 without actually going out of the train because
6 of the amount of debris between.

7 Q. Do you recall any other paramedics being in the near
8 vicinity of these casualties?

9 A. I remember Steve Jones being somewhere on the train,
10 I can't, I can't --

11 Q. Do you recall whether he was there throughout or may
12 there have come a time when he left the train?

13 A. I've got no idea.

14 Q. You can't recall. Were there any other people who may
15 have been paramedics that you recall in the carriage?

16 A. I know there were other paramedics there, but I couldn't
17 tell you who they were.

18 Q. You don't know who they were. Now, one more question,
19 please, in relation to the person at B, who we now know
20 was in the vicinity of D8. You placed an ECG machine on
21 him and ascertained that he was asystolic.

22 Do you recall there being any other signs, were
23 there any signs that he had been treated; for example,
24 was there an oxygen mask on his face, of any type?

25 A. I don't recall there being one.

1 Q. Do you recollect anybody else approaching B and
2 providing medical assistance, perhaps the HEMS doctor
3 who we know was on the train?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Nobody else?

6 A. No.

7 Q. You mentioned earlier that you had taken a defibrillator
8 and you thought that you had because, as you've just
9 told us, you'd used it. On whom did you use it?

10 A. On Carrie Taylor and the gentleman at B, in figure B.

11 Q. Just so that we're clear about this, is that a different
12 piece of equipment from the ECG device --

13 A. No, it's the same, it's a small defibrillator.

14 Q. Lastly, I want to ask you about, in general terms, what
15 you did that day. Could we have, please, on the screen
16 [LAS21-4]?

17 You refer in the middle of the page to a conscious
18 decision to enter the scene, despite reservations that
19 you had for your own safety, and you felt an obligation
20 of care to the victims of the blast. If we could then
21 have it off the screen, please. Did there come a time
22 when there was some discussion of the risk of secondary
23 devices?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you recall whether that moment came whilst you were

1 still tending to casualties in the carriage?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So did you, therefore, consciously decide that,
4 notwithstanding that risk, you would stay?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,
7 please?

8 A. Thank you.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

10 Questions by MR COLTART

11 MR COLTART: Just two or three questions, Mr Treacy, if we
12 may, on timings.

13 I think we've established that you arrived at
14 Aldgate at about 9.21. We know, at that stage, that in
15 the entrance to the Tube station there were various
16 meetings going on and discussions between the various
17 members of the emergency services. Were you involved in
18 any of those discussions or meetings before you went
19 down to the platform and on to the carriage?

20 A. I had a brief discussion with my colleagues as to the
21 situation, because obviously Tony and Andrea arrived
22 first, so I just quickly spoke to them and they said
23 "There's casualties downstairs, they've declared a major
24 incident".

25 My colleague, Phil Green, I asked him to stay up to

1 triage casualties coming up, and I decided that I would
2 go down and do what I could downstairs.

3 Q. So you were pretty swiftly downstairs and onto the
4 platform?

5 A. It probably took less than 30 seconds to a minute.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Who was your colleague going to
8 triage?

9 A. Anybody coming up. There was -- by that stage, there
10 was at least three colleagues upstairs who could deal
11 with anybody coming up, so I thought I was better
12 employed downstairs on the train.

13 MR COLTART: You went with Craig Cassidy?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Are you able to recall now whether this was to be his
16 first trip down on to the carriage or whether he had
17 already been down once and come back up again?

18 A. No, this was his first trip.

19 Q. Finally this, please: are you able to estimate how long
20 you were dealing with Ms Taylor when you first got on to
21 the carriage before you went over and applied your ECG
22 machine to the young man at point B?

23 A. It would be a guess, but I would say five minutes maybe.

24 I could be wrong on that.

25 MR COLTART: We appreciate it's very difficult now. Okay,

1 thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

3 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

4 MR SAUNDERS: You've obviously had a chance, Mr Treacy, to
5 look at your statement before coming in to give your
6 evidence. At the conclusion of it, in dealing with
7 Aldgate before you then go on to deal with moving to
8 Russell Square, you say on the carriage you recall
9 seeing Steve Jones, the motorcycle paramedic. My Lady,
10 it's your page 3.

11 Your colleague, Phil Green, also came on board.

12 Now, you've just told the gentleman that was asking
13 questions, and her Ladyship, that Mr Green was triaging
14 upstairs. There was obviously a point where he moves
15 from there on to the carriage.

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. "[They] also came on board ... in addition to the HEMS
18 doctor and the colleague I initially went underground
19 with."

20 You've told us, and confirmed, that that colleague
21 would be Cassidy, Craig Cassidy?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you go underground before the HEMS doctor arrived?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. We have heard evidence already, Mr Treacy, that next to

1 Carrie Taylor, as you know her to have been, was another
2 young lady called Fiona Stevenson. You've described
3 already Carrie's position on the lap of Crystal Main who
4 was in seat number 22.

5 In seat 21, the young man called Bruce Lait, who's
6 described how he had Fiona Stevenson positioned on top
7 of him. You were responsible for removing Carrie.

8 I think that's right, isn't it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you at any stage remove the young lady next to
11 Carrie, who we know to be Fiona Stevenson?

12 A. I don't recall doing that.

13 Q. You again have -- and we appreciate it's a long time
14 ago -- mentioned that position C -- can we have back
15 your plan so that you have it in mind, [INQ8380-1]? Thank
16 you very much indeed.

17 Position A is obviously Carrie, Carrie Taylor.

18 Position C you've described as being two people, not
19 three.

20 A. From my recollection, it was two.

21 Q. Yes. We understand that there were originally two but,
22 by the end, when all of those who survived and were
23 living and able to be moved were moved, Fiona Stevenson
24 ends up in that vicinity. What the Stevensons are
25 trying to find out is who was it that may have moved

1 her. Do you understand?

2 A. I do.

3 Q. But at the time you're there, your recollection was,
4 when you made your statement on 30 November, there were
5 two at position C.

6 A. If that's what I said, yes.

7 Q. In fairness to you, you said:

8 "I saw two people on the floor of the carriage
9 adjacent to seats 20, 21."

10 That's what you've marked there. Then you go on to
11 describe them, and how badly injured, "but sufficient
12 that I could tell it was two people" is what you say.

13 But you can't help, you have no recollection of
14 maybe moving somebody to free Mr Lait who, after that
15 happens, we're told was able himself to get off the
16 carriage and to go back to the Underground?

17 A. I've no recollection of moving that lady.

18 Q. You don't remember, in fact, a male getting off the
19 carriage either?

20 A. There were a number of walking wounded who got off at
21 that time.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. And at the time, it was full of smoke, it was pitch
24 dark. I had a small torch that I was trying to work
25 with.

1 Q. Your concentration was on Carrie at that moment?
2 A. Exactly.
3 MR SAUNDERS: All right. Thank you very much indeed,
4 Mr Treacy.
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?
6 Questions by MS SHEFF
7 MS SHEFF: Just following on from that, Mr Treacy, of those
8 two people that you saw at C, was it one of them who had
9 the severe head injuries?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Was that a woman with long dark hair, can you remember?
12 A. I can't remember.
13 Q. Maybe wearing denim, a denim jacket?
14 A. I can't recall.
15 Q. You can't tell what gender that person was, but it was
16 certainly one of the two with a head injury?
17 A. Yes, possibly at the time I could have been able to tell
18 you, but five years later, I can't remember.
19 Q. Were those two bodies on top of each other?
20 A. I seem to recall them on the floor next to the seats,
21 adjacent to each other. I can't say for sure whether
22 they were on top of each other.
23 Q. Do you think the person with the severe head injury was
24 actually on top of the person underneath?
25 A. I can't remember, I can't remember.

1 Q. I know, it's very difficult after this time.
2 A. I've tried hard to forget for the last five years.
3 Q. Of course, and a hugely traumatic scene.
4 A. Yes.
5 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much for trying to assist us.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff. Any other
7 questions?
8 MS SIMCOCK: My Lady, I don't know if Mr Taylor has any?
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Taylor, would you like to ask your
10 questions now?
11 This is Mr Taylor, the father of Carrie.
12 Questions by MR TAYLOR
13 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Treacy.
14 A. Good morning.
15 Q. I'd just like to ask you a few questions about Carrie.
16 You were the person that actually saw Carrie.
17 You say when you first arrived and saw Carrie, you
18 said that she was gravely ill. That doesn't say to me
19 that she was actually passed away. Did you get the
20 sense that she had passed away straightaway or perhaps
21 at a later time?
22 A. She was certainly pulseless when I checked her
23 initially.
24 Q. She had no pulse?
25 A. She had no pulse.

1 Q. No breathing?

2 A. No breathing, no pulse.

3 Q. There was no gurgling noise, no noise coming from her at
4 all?

5 A. She made no noise at all.

6 Q. You say there was a lady doctor with her, a lady with
7 her?

8 A. There was possibly a lady with her, but she was
9 certainly across the lap of a young lady.

10 Q. Across the lap of a young lady. You didn't see a lady
11 doctor, a Dr Quaghebeur, with her, supporting her?

12 A. There were a number of people still milling around on
13 the train at that point, I'm not quite sure who -- she
14 may well have identified herself as a doctor, I can't
15 recall.

16 Q. Okay. Now, when someone is asystolic, I think the word
17 is, flatlined, basically, there's no point in using
18 a defibrillator machine because it doesn't work,
19 basically?

20 A. It doesn't work for that.

21 Q. What can you do after that? Can you use CPR on
22 a patient?

23 A. If it was an individual patient and not a major
24 incident, you could use -- for someone who is in a blunt
25 trauma cardiac arrest, you could use CPR for five

1 minutes and, if there was no pulse after five minutes,
2 we would stop.

3 Q. Obviously, this was a mass casualty incident. Can you
4 use drugs on them? Can you use a drug on them, can you
5 use atropine or --

6 A. You can use adrenalin and atropine for asystole.

7 Q. That's the normal procedure you would do if you went to
8 a single --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But in this case, obviously, you were concerned about
11 other people?

12 A. I was, and the major incident -- our protocols are just
13 to open the airway and, if there's no sign of pulse or
14 breathing after that, then we don't normally continue,
15 but because Carrie was so young, I decided to go a bit
16 further and see if there was any possibility of a pulse,
17 but, unfortunately, there was nothing.

18 Q. At that time, your other colleague was going around and
19 he was putting the triage numbers on other people, was
20 he?

21 A. I was not aware of what he was doing, sorry.

22 Q. Now, you helped remove Carrie from the pole, the metal
23 pole.

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Did anybody else help you?

1 A. From recollection, I don't remember anybody being there,
2 but that's my recollection now. It might have been
3 different at the time.

4 Q. I would imagine that would be quite difficult.
5 Had the pole pierced Carrie's body?

6 A. No.

7 Q. From there, you took Carrie and you laid her on the
8 makeshift stretcher?

9 A. We -- initially, I laid her on the floor, initially, to
10 open the airway and put the defibrillator pads on, and
11 then, from there, we put her on a stretcher and got her
12 off the train.

13 Q. Okay. Basically, what injuries did you notice with
14 Carrie?

15 A. I didn't see any -- I don't recall seeing any injuries.

16 Q. None at all?

17 A. Not from recollection. I can't remember.

18 Q. Thank you very much, sir.

19 A. Sorry I can't be more helpful than that, but I just
20 don't remember any injuries on her.

21 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much. Thank you for what you
22 did.

23 A. I'm sorry I couldn't be more useful.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Ms Simcock?

25 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

1 MS SIMCOCK: I wonder if we could clarify the timings of
2 your arrival, Mr Treacy. Could we have on screen,
3 please, [LAS565-15]?
4 There's an entry there at 9.20, third from the
5 bottom, if that could just be highlighted. Your
6 ambulance was call sign N315, is that right?
7 A. I believe so, yes.
8 Q. We see there "N315 at RVP". Timed at 9.20. When you
9 went to Aldgate station, where did you park your
10 ambulance?
11 A. We parked behind Tony Cumner's ambulance, first
12 ambulance on scene.
13 Q. Which was call sign N301, also mentioned there. When
14 you arrived on scene, how long do you think it took you
15 from attending and parking up your ambulance to getting
16 to the train? I appreciate timings are difficult.
17 A. Less than one to two minutes. Just however long it took
18 to walk down there, basically.
19 Q. Can I ask you about how you received the call to attend
20 an incident initially at Liverpool Street and then to
21 Aldgate? Were you on station at the time?
22 A. We were.
23 Q. Does that mean you were physically at the ambulance
24 station?
25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Do you remember how you received the call to attend?
2 Was it a verbal instruction?
3 A. It was via telephone.
4 Q. Was that instruction also by telephone followed up by
5 a call being sent to your mobile data terminal in the
6 ambulance?
7 A. I think the system is that both are sent simultaneously,
8 they call us and the call is sent down to the MDT as
9 well, and in the ambulance.
10 Q. Does it sometimes occur that you are given an
11 instruction on station to attend and it only later comes
12 through to your mobile data terminal when you're
13 en route?
14 A. It's possible, yes.
15 Q. Can you recall, if that was the case, on the day?
16 A. I don't recall that.
17 Q. Just dealing with when you went down to the train, then,
18 your recollection, so we're clear, is you went down with
19 Craig Cassidy a paramedic, is that right?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. You stayed on the train and never left until you leave
22 finally at the end, is that right?
23 A. I stayed on the train until it was declared a crime
24 scene by the police and we left then.
25 Q. So you're not one of the paramedics who goes back up to

1 the surface and returns to the train?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Mr Cassidy's evidence was that he also went down to the
4 train, remained on the train, and never left until he
5 finally left the scene. Do you remember him being with
6 you on the train throughout?

7 A. He was further down the carriage throughout -- he wasn't
8 physically with me, but he was on the train with me,
9 yes.

10 Q. Just finally, can we have on screen, please, [LAS-CAP-42]?
11 You've been asked about a defibrillator machine. Is
12 the top picture there the picture of the defibrillator
13 you had on the day?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. That's what you used on Carrie Taylor and
16 Richard Ellery?

17 A. That's right.

18 MS SIMCOCK: I'm very grateful, thank you, my Lady.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any other questions for
20 Mr Treacy?

21 Thank you very much, Mr Treacy. I have a question.

22 As far as you were concerned, there you were on the
23 train trying to help these desperately injured people.

24 Did you ever get the impression that there weren't
25 enough paramedics to help or that there wasn't enough

1 equipment?

2 A. We could always do with more help, obviously, but
3 I think more paramedics would probably have just got in
4 the way, basically, because a lot of the people were
5 walking wounded, so as soon as they were triaged, we got
6 them off, then it was just a case of getting people who
7 were trapped or injured off. So we probably had enough
8 resources there.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you weren't aware of calls for
10 either more people or calls for stretchers or anything?
11 Things seemed to be there when you needed them?

12 A. I asked for stretchers and the Fire Brigade conveyed
13 that to my colleagues upstairs and we got stretchers.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was there any delay in your asking
15 for stretchers and, when you actually needed them,
16 having them there?

17 A. No.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, that's all I have to ask you.
19 Thank you very much, Mr Treacy. I'm sure it's of great
20 comfort to people like Mr and Mrs Taylor, and indeed
21 others, to know that you bravely risked your life to go
22 and try and help their daughter and the other
23 desperately injured people. Thank you very much.

24 A. Thank you.

25 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will read the next statement and

1 call the next --

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am wondering whether --

3 MR KEITH: Yes, my Lady, that may be a convenient point.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am told we have a lot to do and,
5 therefore, I am being asked to shorten the break. Can
6 we survive on five or ten minutes?

7 MR KEITH: We hope to take a slightly more brutal approach
8 to some of the read evidence this afternoon, so there
9 may be a little room for manoeuvre.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: All right, I think that, given that
11 we had a long judgment to start with, we'll take
12 a ten-minute break.

13 (11.38 am)

14 (A short break)

15 (11.48 am)

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay?

17 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Kenneth Murphy
18 dated 3 December 2005, which has the usual declaration
19 of truth?

20 Statement of MR KENNETH MURPHY

21 "I am employed by the London Ambulance Service
22 NHS Trust as a team leader. I am stationed at Waterloo
23 ambulance station. I have worked for the London
24 Ambulance Service for 20 years and I have been a team
25 leader for three years, I am a fully qualified

1 paramedic.

2 "As a team leader, I am responsible for supervising
3 between 16 and 20 staff. On Thursday, 7 July 2005,
4 I was working a 6.30 am to a 3 pm shift. I was crewed
5 up with Eoin Walker on an ambulance, our call sign was
6 Echo 104 (E104). Eoin was driving the ambulance that
7 shift and I was attending. We were actually working out
8 of Bloomsbury ambulance station, which is a satellite
9 station of Waterloo.

10 "At around 9.10 that morning we were at
11 University College Hospital, Euston Road, when one of
12 the receptionists told me there had been a doctor
13 en route to work and he had been evacuated from a Tube
14 train because of a power surge. As a result of being
15 told this, I called our control room at the LAS
16 headquarters to see whether any incidents had been
17 reported. A member of control room staff told me they
18 were receiving multiple calls to incidents at Aldgate
19 and King's Cross Underground stations and I was to make
20 my way to King's Cross.

21 "Whilst en route we were listening to radio messages
22 being passed between other LAS staff attending the
23 incidents and Control. One message came over from
24 a unit at Aldgate requesting that 30 ambulances attend
25 that location, that it was a major incident with

1 multiple casualties and fatalities. I do not know who
2 passed that radio message, other than to say it was
3 a male and obviously one of the first crews to arrive at
4 Aldgate.

5 "Upon hearing the message, I told Eoin, who was
6 driving, to head for Aldgate station. We arrived at
7 Aldgate at approximately 9.20. On arrival, I recall
8 seeing Andrea Ray and Tony Cumner, colleagues from
9 Waterloo ambulance station. Andrea had been given the
10 role of Bronze parking, and I believe Tony was busy
11 triaging casualties who were emerging from the
12 Underground platforms. Within five minutes of me
13 getting to the scene, I was given a handheld radio and
14 told by Tony Parnell, who is a duty station officer with
15 the LAS, to go to the train and assess what was
16 required.

17 "I recall asking a number of firemen to accompany me
18 underground. We took with us a number of stretchers
19 from one of the LAS vehicles on the scene.

20 "We made our way to the platform. I did not see
21 many people. I believe the majority of the casualties
22 and passengers who were able to walk had by this time
23 been brought to the surface. Once I got to the
24 platform, I could not really see the train, so
25 I descended some steps onto the lines and saw the train

1 about 100 metres into a tunnel. Together with the
2 firemen I made my way towards the train. I was at this
3 stage aware that there had been an explosion on one of
4 the train carriages.

5 "I can recall that, as we made our way towards the
6 train, I was seeing human body parts along the tracks.
7 I saw part of someone's head. The hair was singed.
8 I concentrated on getting to the train to try to help
9 any casualties who were still alive.

10 "On reaching the train, I saw there were some lights
11 on in the train, but they were very dim and everything
12 seemed to be covered in soot. When we reached the
13 carriage that had been the seat of the explosion, I saw
14 that the roof had been folded back, the sides had been
15 blown out, and there was a large hole in the floor.

16 I saw one of my LAS colleagues, Steve Jones, at the
17 carriage. He told me he thought there were four live
18 casualties on the carriage. I was still on the train
19 lines when I saw Steve. He told me it was difficult to
20 assess the scene inside the carriage due to the
21 positions of the casualties and the body parts in there.

22 "I climbed on to the carriage into the area where
23 the doors had been blasted off and I saw Dave Lockey.

24 I know Dave quite well. He is a consultant at the
25 Royal London Hospital and worked on the Helicopter

1 Emergency Medical Services. Dave was wearing a red HEMS
2 flying suit. He said that I would be better positioned
3 on the tracks outside the carriage so that he could pass
4 the casualties out to me and I could organise their
5 evacuation up to the surface. I asked one of the
6 firemen to return to the main station above ground and
7 tell the senior ambulance officer that we required five
8 more medical staff at the carriage and enough firemen to
9 carry at least five stretchers.

10 "The intention was to have a paramedic or emergency
11 medical technician accompanying each casualty from the
12 train to the surface, the stretchers being carried by
13 the firemen. When I was actually standing in the
14 carriage, I can recall seeing some severely injured and
15 traumatised people, but I cannot say which casualties
16 were alive or dead and I could not say now where within
17 the carriage they were. I was concentrating totally on
18 what Dave was instructing me to do.

19 "I think there was another doctor in the carriage
20 and possibly a police officer or a fireman, but I cannot
21 be sure. I got back down onto the tracks and Dave
22 passed the first casualty out to us. The casualty was
23 male. He was not really conscious, but he was moaning.
24 This man had sustained significant lower limb injuries.
25 One of his legs, I think the right leg, had completely

1 gone below the knee. The only description I can give of
2 this man is that he looked to be in his 40s and was
3 smartly dressed in a suit, shirt and tie.
4 "He was lifted from the carriage and placed on to
5 a stretcher. I think he had already been placed on an
6 intravenous drip whilst still in the carriage. With the
7 help of firemen, this casualty was carried on
8 a stretcher along the lines and up to ground level.
9 I accompanied him.
10 "When we got into the station foyer, a female HEMS
11 doctor asked me about the casualty and I quickly briefed
12 her. She administered Ketamine to him for pain relief
13 and told us to get him to hospital. The man was put
14 into the rear of an ambulance and we took him to the
15 Royal London Hospital. I remained with the man in the
16 back of the ambulance, which was driven by a City of
17 London Police officer."
18 My Lady, Mr Murphy then goes on to explain how, once
19 he had done that, he returned to Aldgate but was then
20 sent to King's Cross where he, too, assisted with
21 a significantly injured casualty, taking that casualty
22 to hospital.
23 My Lady, the next statement which is listed to be
24 read is that of Mr Eoin Walker, Mr Murphy's crew mate
25 that day.

1 My Lady, in truth, his statement does not add very
2 much to that of Mr Murphy's. Unless there is any
3 objection, I was intending dispensing with reading that
4 statement.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. Thank you.

6 MR HAY: My Lady, may you invite to you call Tony Biles?

7 MR TONY ALEXANDER BILES (sworn)

8 Questions by MR HAY

9 MR HAY: Mr Biles, can you give your full name to the court,
10 please?

11 A. It's Tony Alexander Biles.

12 Q. Mr Biles, in 2005, you were a London Fire Brigade
13 station officer and you were attached to the
14 Multi-agency Initial Assessment Team?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Can you just explain to us what that team was?

17 A. MAIAT was a government pilot being run. It was for
18 a dedicated CBRN response to the capital. It was
19 consisting of specialist officers from the three
20 emergency services.

21 Q. How many MAIAT teams were there in London in 2005?

22 A. There was one team.

23 Q. How many officers did that comprise of?

24 A. It was consisting of 48 personnel divided into four
25 teams covering one shift for a 24-hour period.

1 Q. Can you just explain to us how that differs from the
2 Metropolitan Police EXPO officers, or explosives
3 officers?

4 A. MAIAT was an initial assessment team for CBRN, it wasn't
5 involved in explosives.

6 Q. On 7 July 2005, I think you became aware around about
7 8.50 in the morning that there had been an explosion at
8 Liverpool Street Underground station?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. I think, although you tried to gather further
11 information at that point, it was decided that you
12 should be deployed to the scene and try to gather
13 information en route?

14 A. That's correct, I took the decision to deploy the team
15 straightaway and gather further information whilst
16 en route.

17 Q. How successful were you at gathering that information
18 en route?

19 A. The initial attendance was going to be Liverpool Street.
20 Whilst en route, my deputy actually contacted the City
21 of London Police control room, confirmed that there had
22 been an explosion, which then changed to a power surge,
23 which then changed back to an explosion on a train, and
24 that was received from the City of London Police control
25 room, and we requested an RVP, which was given as

1 Liverpool Street junction at Bishopsgate.

2 Q. At any point, were you informed that there had actually
3 been a train crash rather than an explosion or a power
4 surge?

5 A. Yes, there was also information received back that there
6 was a train crash as well.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A question, an "RVP"?

8 A. Rendezvous point, sorry, my Lady.

9 MR HAY: One to add to the list of acronyms, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Not all the acronyms are as obvious
11 as that one, I'm afraid.

12 MR HAY: Did you actually arrive at Liverpool Street RVP?

13 A. Yes, we did, yes.

14 Q. Was it there that you were told to go to Aldgate?

15 A. Yes, liaised with a City of London Police sergeant who
16 instructed us that the actual incident was taking place
17 at Aldgate. Although there was persons decanting from
18 trains at Liverpool Street, they redirected us to
19 Aldgate.

20 Q. Do you recall approximately at what time you arrived at
21 Aldgate?

22 A. I suggest it was approximately 09.20 to 09.25. We did
23 start a log but, during the course of the operations, it
24 became untenable to maintain that log due to the number
25 of resources of personnel that I had available to me.

1 Q. Perhaps if we could have up on the screen [COLP18-6], and
2 I think we can see at 09.27.25, CPC3, who I believe is
3 Chief Inspector Fallows, has radioed to the control room
4 saying:
5 "MIAT coordinator with me to go to the scene."
6 Would that be referring to you?
7 A. It could possibly be.
8 Q. That seems to fit with your recollection of the time you
9 arrived at Aldgate?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. On arrival at Aldgate, what were you told had happened?
12 A. I liaised with a chief inspector from City of London
13 Police who had informed me there had been an explosion
14 on the train.
15 Q. Were you provided any further detail other than that?
16 A. Not at that time, no.
17 Q. In your role as part of the MAIAT team, presumably you
18 were concerned about both secondary devices but also the
19 prospect that the explosion or any secondary devices
20 could be CBRN?
21 A. That's correct, yes.
22 Q. Because of that, what did you do?
23 A. I instructed my team to don the appropriate personal
24 protective equipment, PPE, and make ready our detection,
25 identification and monitoring equipment that we had

1 available.

2 Q. Did you also take steps to sweep the outside of the
3 station for secondary devices?

4 A. Yes, whilst I was liaising with the inspector from the
5 City of London Police, I requested whether the front of
6 the station had been swept for secondary devices,
7 whether the area of the explosion had been swept to
8 declare it explosively safe, and secondary devices.

9 Q. Given the difference between your role and that of the
10 Metropolitan Police Service explosives officers, you
11 waited for the explosive officers to confirm there were
12 no secondary devices --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- on the train, or in the tunnel?

15 A. I had to wait before that was confirmed before
16 potentially deploying my resources.

17 Q. Now, we've heard from many members of the emergency
18 services in London Underground that, although they were
19 aware of the risk of secondary devices, the majority --
20 I think all of whom we have heard from -- opted to stay
21 in the tunnel and on the train.

22 Is it right that any concerns that there may have
23 been about secondary devices or CBRN didn't prevent
24 anyone from going down to the tunnel or train?

25 A. It did not prevent anyone going down.

1 Q. Can I just ask you briefly about communications at the
2 scene?

3 A. Mm-hmm.

4 Q. To what extent were you hindered by the mobile phone
5 network effectively being full to capacity?

6 A. Pretty soon after arrival, the Vodafone system that
7 I was operating on went down. So I had to dispense with
8 that method of communicating with my deputy team leader,
9 and use him as a runner backwards and forwards from the
10 vehicles and other emergency services personnel.

11 Q. At the time, you, yourself, didn't have a radio?

12 A. We had Metropolitan Police issue radios, which wasn't
13 sufficient at that time, because we was communicating
14 with the Command team that was in attendance. So there
15 was no requirement for me to actually communicate with
16 a control room.

17 Q. We've heard some evidence that there were concerns that
18 radios may detonate a secondary device. Is that
19 something that you were aware of at the time?

20 A. It's part of our procedures that we shouldn't use
21 handheld radios within a certain amount of distance.

22 Q. Because of that, you then need to implement a system of
23 runners to ensure that communication is effective?

24 A. No, for this incident, I used a runner solely because my
25 mobile phone had ceased to operate.

1 Q. So the same concern about radios detonating a secondary
2 device doesn't extend to mobile phones?

3 A. It does, yes, but not on this particular occasion. My
4 runner was solely because my mobile phone had crashed.

5 Q. I see. There came a point, I understand, when the
6 Metropolitan Police explosives officers informed you
7 that Aldgate wasn't a CBRN incident?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Because of that, you and your teams were redeployed to
10 the other incidents occurring in London?

11 A. Prior to that, we convened a Silver meeting, where it
12 was declared that all saveable life had ceased or any
13 rescues. It was at that time that a decision was made
14 to redeploy MAIAT to the other locations which we was
15 aware of now as multi-sited events. I had to take the
16 decision there, because of multi-sited events, to split
17 the team in two. I then contacted the special
18 operations room at New Scotland Yard to determine the
19 location of the other events, split the team in two; one
20 vehicle went to Edgware Road and I then went to
21 Tavistock Square first and then on to King's Cross
22 later.

23 Q. I just want to ask you, briefly, about Tavistock Square
24 and King's Cross. At Tavistock Square you were also
25 informed -- was it fairly quickly -- that it wasn't

1 a CBRN incident?

2 A. As soon as I approached the scene, I was notified by
3 an explosives officers driver that there was no CBRN
4 involvement there. I contacted the special operations
5 room again and informed them and I was then redeployed
6 to King's Cross.

7 Q. Are you able to say at what time approximately you
8 arrived at King's Cross?

9 A. I have no idea of the timescale.

10 Q. The Silver meeting at Aldgate, we understand, was at
11 about 10.30. Does that seem right to you?

12 A. It's possible, yes.

13 Q. Using that as perhaps a starting point, are you able to
14 say how long after that you think you might have arrived
15 at King's Cross?

16 A. I would suggest it would have been 10.50 to 11.00 at
17 Tavistock Square and then approximately 11.15, 11.20
18 King's Cross.

19 Q. When you arrived at King's Cross, there was less
20 clarity, was there, as to whether or not it may be
21 a CBRN incident?

22 A. It couldn't be confirmed, because I attended a Silver
23 meeting with a senior divisional officer, Terry Adams
24 and Assistant Commissioner Nick Collins, accompanied
25 them to a Silver meeting where that question was asked

1 and it couldn't be confirmed.

2 Q. Despite that, a large number of the emergency services
3 had already been down to the track?

4 A. Had already been, yes.

5 MR HAY: Mr Biles, thank you very much. I have no more
6 questions for you, but others may.

7 Questions by MR COLTART

8 MR COLTART: Just one matter, if I may. I want to clarify
9 this position in relation to secondary devices and the
10 use of radios. Within what radius of a potential
11 secondary device site should one not use a handheld
12 radio?

13 A. We have got certain set procedures, but, my Lady,
14 I think that's --

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was just wondering, Mr Coltart, are
16 we venturing into territory where perhaps people would
17 rather not comment? Might it assist those who plant
18 devices to know the answer to that question.

19 MR COLTART: It might do. I certainly don't want to cause
20 any difficulties. I can see that people immediately
21 have stood up to my left.

22 MR HAY: My Lady, all I was going to add to my learned
23 friend's comments was that this witness may have
24 concerns about passing sensitive information into the
25 public domain.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think that's the point --

2 MR COLTART: I think we'd gathered that, but I am grateful
3 for --

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- the witness and I were taking up,
5 weren't we, Mr Biles?

6 MR COLTART: I don't want details and I can withdraw that
7 particular question. I'm only interested, I suppose,
8 because we've had quite a lot of evidence from quite
9 a lot of emergency responders that they would like to
10 have used their radios at the carriage but they were
11 unable to do so, which is why they were running out onto
12 the platform and hoping to get a signal once they were
13 there.

14 So perhaps can I limit myself to asking this further
15 question, which is: how well-known was that policy, that
16 radios shouldn't be used in that situation? Was this
17 something which one might have expected everybody to
18 know?

19 A. We have got policies and procedures within the London
20 Fire Brigade that stipulate certain distances.

21 MR COLTART: What I'm minded to do, my Lady, is that I'm
22 conscious in the back of my mind of having read material
23 which has been disclosed in the course of the
24 proceedings which deals with radio communications in
25 more detail.

1 The better course of action might be, rather than
2 seeking to do this on the hoof, to go back and look at
3 that material again and, if it's necessary to do so, we
4 can revisit this issue in February.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The Greater London Assembly might
6 well have had information they put in the public domain
7 that might assist.

8 MR COLTART: Yes, I'll have another look at the material.
9 We can see where that takes us, perhaps.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 MR COLTART: Thank you.

12 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

13 MS SHEFF: No, thank you, my Lady.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions?

15 MS BARTON: I have, if I may, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes.

17 Questions by MS BARTON

18 MS BARTON: May I raise this point with you: it was put to
19 you that the CBRN concerns did not delay the response
20 and there was a particular point at which CBRN concerns
21 were raised by you, wasn't there? There was a City
22 police officer, Chief Inspector Fallows, outside the
23 station, to whom you spoke, do you recall?

24 A. No, I only spoke with Chief Inspector -- sorry,
25 Inspector Paul Barnard and Chief Inspector Dave Roney.

1 Q. Okay. Well, you recall speaking to Mr Roney and, at
2 that point, there was some discussion about City police
3 officers with dogs searching the track. Is that right?

4 A. That's another procedural issue, my Lady.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, the witness is suggesting he
6 feels it may be sensitive information?

7 MS BARTON: Right.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The question is coming from an
9 advocate representing the City of London Police, if
10 that --

11 A. There was specialist City of London Police officers
12 deployed in the site.

13 MS BARTON: All I wanted to ask you about was this: that
14 City of London Police officers were standing by you when
15 you had a conversation, during which you asked them
16 whether they had CBRN protective equipment --

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. -- and whether they had respirators?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. What you were doing, because that was your role, was to
21 warn them of the risks that there might be in deploying
22 into the tunnel?

23 A. That's correct, but they volunteered to go down.

24 MS BARTON: Thank you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Biles?

1 Thank you very much, Mr Biles. Thank you for coming
2 to assist.

3 A. Thank you.

4 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Richard Travers?

5 MR RICHARD WILLIAM TRAVERS (affirmed)

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Travers, if any questions are
7 asked of you which you feel would reveal sensitive
8 information, please just indicate.

9 A. I will, my Lady.

10 Questions by MR HAY

11 MR HAY: Mr Travers, can you give your full name to the
12 court, please?

13 A. Richard William Travers.

14 Q. Mr Travers, in 2005, you were an explosives officer with
15 the Metropolitan Police Service?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. Forgive me perhaps for asking an obvious question. What
18 actually is the function of an explosives officer?

19 A. Mainly, in layman's terms, bomb disposal.

20 Q. On 7 July 2005, you were notified that an explosion had
21 occurred, is that correct?

22 A. No, we had -- in our base location, when monitoring the
23 computer-aided dispatch system, we saw that there was an
24 incident that was unfolding, so preempting being
25 required at the scene, we forward deployed ourselves

1 down to that area.

2 Q. That incident, was it at Aldgate or Liverpool Street?

3 A. Initially, it was at -- being reported at
4 Liverpool Street, but it transpired that it was Aldgate,
5 and we did go direct to Aldgate eventually.

6 Q. Do you recall roughly what time you dispatched to the
7 scene?

8 A. It was round about 8.45, I believe.

9 Q. We know that the bomb appears to have been detonated
10 about 8.49.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Just to help you, in your statement dated 7 July, you
13 said at approximately 08.51. Is that more likely to be
14 accurate?

15 A. It was -- we were pre-deployed to reports coming out of
16 the CAD of smoke coming out of the ticket office at
17 Liverpool Street station. So it would have been very
18 shortly after the device had functioned, yes.

19 Q. Perhaps if we could have up on the screen [COLP21-3],
20 there we can see at the top 08.51.26:

21 "Seems to have been a bit of an explosion opposite
22 the Great Eastern Hotel."

23 Then a little bit further down, 08.55.32:

24 "Some form of explosion in the ticket office at
25 Liverpool Street station."

1 Was it the latter one at 08.55.32 that you responded
2 to?

3 A. That was the one we were looking at. We weren't
4 officially tasked at that stage. Like I said, we
5 started to forward deploy ourselves.

6 Q. Eventually, you made your way to Aldgate Underground
7 station?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Initially, you performed the role of searching for
10 secondary devices in the train in the tunnel, is that
11 correct?

12 A. That's correct. The initial role really was to identify
13 and ascertain there had been an explosion. There was
14 still some confusion as to whether it had been a power
15 surge or there had actually been an explosive device.

16 Q. Are you able to say approximately what time you
17 conducted that part of the search?

18 A. It would be round about 9.20 to 10.00.

19 Q. Once you had completed that sweep, I think there was
20 then what's referred to, I think, as a "cooling-off
21 period"?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That was at about 10.30, is that right?

24 A. It was about then, yes. I did get tasked to another
25 incident at that time.

1 Q. Which was the other incident?

2 A. It was a suspect vehicle at High Holborn, I believe it
3 was. As you can appreciate, after that one, we had many
4 calls out -- call-outs. So it was ...

5 Q. You then returned to the scene at Aldgate where you
6 conducted an examination of the second carriage.

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Can we have up on the screen [INQ10280-7], please? If we
9 could focus on the bottom.

10 That's a plan of the second carriage and the X marks
11 the area where it's believed to be the explosion
12 occurred.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Does that accord with your recollection?

15 A. It does, yes.

16 Q. We've heard lots of descriptions as to the damage which
17 was done to the carriage, but from your perspective as
18 an explosives officer, can you just explain to us what
19 you saw?

20 A. The floor of the carriage had been pushed outwards, the
21 sliding doors had been buckled and, I can't remember if
22 they were missing or not, but I think they were just
23 buckled and there was damage to the roof area as well,
24 all of which indicated that there had been an explosive
25 event there that had taken place actually on the floor

1 of the carriage.

2 Q. At that time, was there any visible evidence for you to
3 determine what type of explosive device it was?

4 A. There wasn't, no.

5 Q. Were you able to reach a view as to the amount of
6 explosive that had been used?

7 A. I was, yes. Using past experience, we have indicators
8 of damage and the like and we use amounts of military
9 plastic explosive as a comparator to say what size it
10 was, and it would appear to have been between 5 and 10
11 pounds of explosives.

12 Q. That's something which you deduce from the damage which
13 was done to the carriage?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 MR HAY: Mr Travers, thank you very much. I have no further
16 questions for you, but others may.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions?

18 Ah, Mr Hill?

19 Questions by MR HILL

20 MR HILL: Officer, may I just ask you, I think, three or
21 four matters?

22 The first is this: did you do anything at the scene
23 at Aldgate which in any way impeded the work of treating
24 casualties and assisting survivors to get out of that
25 bombed carriage?

1 A. Not at all. When I arrived there, there were lots of
2 emergency services tending to the injured down there.
3 Obviously, a lot had been made of the threat of
4 secondary devices. I made it my job to go down there
5 and check to make sure there were no secondary devices.
6 Our main priority is to save life. Life was being saved
7 at the time. If we'd found a secondary device, then
8 I would have dealt with it there and then.

9 Q. Does it follow from what you've said that your
10 procedures at the scene, from first search to subsequent
11 search, would have entitled you to demand the withdrawal
12 of all personnel from that carriage?

13 A. Normal protocols would do, yes. But in these
14 circumstances, no, it wouldn't.

15 Q. Can I just ask you this: in probably not the first but
16 the second search of the carriage -- we know you went to
17 the scene twice --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- did you have the assistance of other officers,
20 British Transport Police officers who, at your
21 deployment, helped in searching the carriages of that
22 train?

23 A. I did, but I limited them to the carriages nearer the
24 back.

25 Q. Right. Was that a search that was during the first

1 period?

2 A. That was the first period, yes.

3 Q. Right. So that was before you being withdrawn from the
4 scene at around 10.30 to attend to a suspect vehicle or
5 package elsewhere in the City?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. All right. Just can I confirm this through you: that
8 subsequently after your return to Aldgate, some time
9 around or shortly after 11.00 that morning, you then
10 effectively handed over the scene to another
11 Anti-terrorist Branch officer as the division was called
12 at the time, DC Meneely?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. Did you walk him through the scene prior to handing over
15 to him as prime scene examiner?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. So I think it was at about midday, after that
18 walk-through, that DC Meneely took control --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- partly through your handover?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR HILL: Thank you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Travers?
24 Mr Coltart?

25 MR COLTART: My Lady, forgive me for bobbing up. It just

1 occurs to me that if there is any witness who could
2 assist us with the question of secondary devices and
3 radios, and if it's proper for him to do so, then this
4 might be that witness.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Were you in court, Mr Travers, when
6 the question about using radios and the possibility of
7 secondary devices was asked?

8 A. I wasn't, my Lady, no.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You weren't. Would you feel able,
10 without revealing any kind of sensitive information, to
11 answer any questions about protocols, whatever, about
12 using radios, if there's a possibility of a secondary
13 device?

14 A. I will try to, yes.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But you must not reveal anything that
16 you think will --

17 A. No, no, I won't.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Have a go, Mr Coltart.

19 Questions by MR COLTART

20 MR COLTART: Equally, tell us if these are matters outside
21 your technical expertise as opposed to your general
22 expertise, but is there a protocol, as far as your team
23 is concerned, about the use of either radios, handheld
24 radios or mobile telephones when you are concerned about
25 secondary devices?

1 A. Protocol will normally only kick in when there is
2 a confirmed device.

3 Q. Right. So if there's just the possibility of a device,
4 and a sweep is being undertaken, as it were, in the
5 absence of either knowledge or specific information,
6 then is there no protocol about the use of radios or
7 phones; they could be used, in other words?

8 A. Again, it's really down to individuals. There is no
9 protocol for that situation.

10 Q. Just to be clear about this, there's no set protocol
11 that, at an incident such as this, where there may be
12 a danger of a secondary device, emergency responders
13 should not use either their radios or their mobile
14 phones?

15 A. There is no protocol that I'm aware of.

16 MR COLTART: That's very helpful. Thank you.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Taylor,
18 I'm sorry.

19 Questions by MR TAYLOR

20 MR TAYLOR: It's more an observation rather than a question,
21 sir. You say a radio can set off a secondary device.

22 A mobile phone can set off a secondary device.

23 Now, on the trains that day, we know there were
24 hundreds of people using the trains that day, they were
25 all trying to get through on their mobile phones. The

1 likelihood of a secondary device exploding, surely those
2 mobile phones would have set it off?

3 It is just an observation to me that, you know, the
4 protocols of using a radio or mobile phones when there's
5 a secondary device possibly there gets thrown out the
6 window.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think, first of all, Mr Travers
8 told us there is no protocol if there's only the
9 possibility of a secondary device. So it's a question
10 of, if there were a confirmed secondary device, do you
11 feel able to answer the question/observation that, given
12 everybody these days carries a mobile phone, there's no
13 point in having the protocol because they might well be
14 using them?

15 A. Without going into percentages and the total risk, it is
16 not a given that a radio or a mobile phone will set off
17 a device. There is a possibility.

18 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor.

20 Thank you very much, Mr Travers. It goes without
21 saying that you do a brave job every day of your life,
22 so on behalf of my fellow citizens, thank you.

23 A. Thank you, my Lady.

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Gary Burnham.

1 MR GARY BURNHAM (sworn)

2 Questions by MR KEITH

3 MR KEITH: Would you give the court your full name, please?

4 A. Gary Keith Burnham.

5 Q. Mr Burnham, in 2005, we know that you were employed by
6 Tube Lines as a duty manager on the Emergency Response
7 Unit.

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. There's been some debate in the paperwork that we have
10 available to us as to what the ERU, the Emergency
11 Response Unit, does. So I'd like to ask you, please,
12 firstly, what does the ERU generally deal with?

13 A. It deals with any emergencies that come up on the
14 Underground system which could be anything from minor
15 things like animals on the track to people under trains,
16 broken rails, train derailments, we've also attended
17 bigger incidents like on Network Rail Paddington,
18 Potters Bar, and different things like that. So any
19 emergencies that come up.

20 Q. We know that you, as we'll hear in a moment, were
21 directed to go to Aldgate on the morning of 7 July. But
22 it's also obvious that not all emergency services,
23 including the ERU, could be sensibly expected to go to
24 the scene of an incident, because they would interfere
25 with each other's functions and operations.

1 Is there some sort of protocol that dictates whether
2 or not you are expected to be first at the scene to deal
3 with casualties, to deal with the immediate aftermath of
4 an incident, by contrast to perhaps going a little later
5 to seeing what the impact of the incident is on the Tube
6 network?

7 A. We would get called at the same time as the London Fire
8 Brigade and the police and the other emergency services.
9 If you take, for example, when there's a person under
10 the train, we would attend at the same time. We would
11 then liaise with the Fire Brigade, who are in charge of
12 the incident, and then assist them in the removal of the
13 body, if it's somebody who's deceased or if it's a live
14 casualty, because we've got the technical knowledge of
15 the trains, obviously that's our area of expertise, and
16 we carry the equipment that can lift trains, move
17 trains, you know, we know how to open doors and check
18 that the site is safe for emergency services to work.

19 Q. Where there are severely injured or perhaps dying
20 casualties, in a situation where they are accessible,
21 would you expect to be called to the scene to assist in
22 the removal of casualties from a Tube carriage?

23 A. We would be there at the same time. Whether we would
24 be, when we actually get on scene, required to help --
25 I mean, if I use Paddington for an example, although it

1 was a Network Rail incident, we used our track trollies
2 to bring stretchers back to the platform. So obviously
3 that is a possibility, yes.

4 Q. But where your role will not actively assist in the
5 preservation of life, where the other emergency services
6 don't feel that you are needed to assist in a primary
7 response, might you, therefore, be at a scene but not be
8 called upon to assist until a bit later?

9 A. Possibly so, yes. It's never actually happened like
10 that.

11 Q. On 7 July, you were directed to go to Aldgate but we
12 understand that you may not have arrived until a little
13 later, 10.00, 10.30, it was your rest day and there was
14 a team already there?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. Was Mr Fulcher, Gary Fulcher, one of the emergency
17 response units who was there?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. When you arrived, were you aware whether or not the
20 Emergency Response Unit had already carried out any
21 functions at Aldgate?

22 A. As far as I can remember, when they had actually turned
23 up themselves, that they hadn't actually done anything
24 because the scene had already been closed, if you like,
25 as the cooling-off period, as I know it. So anybody who

1 was actually alive, who was going to come out, had
2 already come out by the time that the team had attended.

3 Q. In other words, in relation to the primary duty on
4 everybody of preserving life and saving casualties and
5 bringing out the walking wounded, there was nothing more
6 that the ERU could have done?

7 A. At that stage, no.

8 Q. You had a meeting, I think, with the Silver control for
9 London Underground and also with Scotland Yard
10 anti-terrorist officers?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Did you go down to the train and start assessing what
13 needed to be done to allow the investigation of the
14 scene to continue by the Metropolitan Police?

15 A. That's correct, yes. Myself, my colleague,
16 Gary Fulcher, a senior fire officer and the
17 anti-terrorist squad officer who was there, went down
18 and I just advised the officer who's in charge basically
19 it was safe for his investigation to carry out. He
20 asked me a few questions, you know, as to what was what,
21 making sure the train was safe, it wasn't going to move,
22 the electric was off, and we had short-circuiting
23 devices in place.

24 Q. Did you put those short-circuiting devices yourself?

25 A. My colleague, Gary Fulcher, put one of them down, I know

1 that. There were some already on the track, I believe.

2 Q. No doubt you remained on duty to assist with any
3 difficulties or issues that arose in relation to damage
4 to the tunnel, anything to do with the movement of the
5 train and so on.

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. In your observations at Aldgate, were you able to
8 ascertain whether or not there were any differences in
9 terms of the damage, the extent of the damage caused at
10 Aldgate as opposed to the other scenes which we know you
11 also examined?

12 A. The damage to the train at Aldgate to me seemed worse
13 than what it was at the other two sites, yes. The
14 difference being because of the size of the tunnel. If
15 you look at Russell Square, it's in an enclosed tunnel
16 so I'm guessing that the explosion seemed to go down the
17 train as opposed to outwards. So the train definitely
18 seemed to have more damage at Aldgate.

19 Q. Was there any damage to the tunnel structure itself at
20 Aldgate?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you recall for how long the process continued of
23 examining the tunnel, of carrying out the forensic
24 investigations that necessarily ensued?

25 A. For the whole of the incident?

1 Q. For Aldgate?

2 A. Oh, for Aldgate? I spent the whole day there, but there
3 was teams down there for at least another week or so
4 after that, but I went down on the initial assessment,
5 I was probably down there for probably 20 to 30 minutes,
6 then we came out, and then I went back down again in the
7 afternoon because there was some talk of being asbestos,
8 so I just needed to go down to let them know that wasn't
9 the case. And that was probably only about 10 or
10 15 minutes.

11 MR KEITH: All right, thank you very much, Mr Burnham.
12 Mr Burnham, will you stay there? There may be some
13 further questions for you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Burnham?
15 Mr Hill?

16 Questions by MR HILL

17 MR HILL: Just one. This may be a small point. In terms of
18 meetings you held at the scene, I think if you had an
19 initial meeting with LUL staff, it would have been
20 a slightly later meeting at which S013,
21 Anti-terrorist Branch officers, were present, does that
22 sound right to you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In your statement you referred to a meeting with LUL and
25 then later with S013 officers. I think -- I don't know

1 whether you can remember the names of officers, but --

2 A. I thought the guy's name was Riordan, but I could be
3 wrong. I mean ...

4 Q. Right. There was a team of S013 officers, including the
5 crime scene manager, DC Meneely, who we're going to hear
6 from later today, who was sent to Aldgate and who
7 arrived at about 11.00. So certainly from that time,
8 there would have been Anti-terrorist Branch officers?

9 A. Yes, that would probably be the fellow that I spoke to,
10 then.

11 MR HILL: Thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions? Just one thing,
13 I think I know who Tube Lines are, but who exactly are
14 Tube Lines?

15 A. Tube Lines are a railway infrastructure company that run
16 the Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly Line as part of
17 London Underground. We're now part of TfL, and the
18 Emergency Response Unit cover the whole of the
19 London Underground system.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

21 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Burnham. Thank you for
23 coming to assist us.

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, in the light of that evidence, and the
25 absence of any prolonged examination of what Mr Burnham

1 has told us, I don't propose to read out the statement
2 of Gary Fulcher, although he is on the list of reads for
3 this morning, because he covers virtually the same area.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was there anything -- sorry, before
5 we move on from him, was there anything in Mr Fulcher's
6 statement about putting down short-circuiting devices?

7 MR KEITH: No. From recollection, I don't think there was.
8 He simply says other structures to make sure it was safe
9 for people to work in the tunnel, but doesn't say
10 expressly that they put down short-circuiting devices.
11 I seem to recollect that the short-circuiting
12 devices are apparent from the photographs of the train
13 at Aldgate.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So he doesn't assist on what time he
15 arrived, so that doesn't help anybody.

16 MR KEITH: He says:

17 "On arrival, I met the London Underground duty
18 station manager and there were outer and inner cordons
19 and a large amount of fire, ambulance and police in
20 attendance and was joined by Gary Burnham."

21 On the basis of Mr Burnham's evidence, it doesn't
22 appear that Mr Fulcher had arrived much before him.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well, thank you. As I say,
24 I was just checking the timings. They were stood down
25 much later, so it doesn't help us.

1 MR KEITH: My Lady, thank you. May I call Andrew Meneely?

2 MR ANDREW MENEELY (affirmed)

3 Questions by MR KEITH

4 A. Andrew Meneely, detective constable attached to the
5 Counter-terrorism Command and New Scotland Yard.

6 In July 2005, I was attached to the
7 Anti-terrorist Branch where I was a forensic scene
8 examiner.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

10 MR KEITH: Your duties have not changed insofar as that
11 change of name is a technical change, is it not?

12 A. I'm no longer a forensic scene examiner and I work in
13 what's called the Bomb Data Centre.

14 Q. In July of 2005, on the 7th, I think you received
15 a phone call at about 8.55 in which you were told that
16 there had been a number of incidents around London and
17 you may need to respond to them.

18 A. Yes, I was the duty forensic examiner at that time and
19 I was informed of that by DS Asman.

20 Q. I think you were then told to go to a rendezvous point,
21 the details of which I needn't explore with you, and
22 subsequently, you received a call about 10.30 to go to
23 Aldgate Tube station because it was suspected that there
24 had been an explosion on a train there.

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Did you go there with a number of other officers?

2 A. Yes, I did. Initially, it was three officers,
3 Detective Sergeant Davies, Detective Constable Green and
4 Detective Constable Fretwell.

5 Q. What did you understand to be your primary purpose in
6 going to Aldgate?

7 A. At that stage, I was told that there had been explosions
8 and that it was going to be a scene that we would be
9 dealing with.

10 Q. In what way would you be dealing with the scene? What
11 was it you were expected to be doing?

12 A. Okay, my role would be to do the forensic recovery of
13 any evidence at the scene and to deal with any body
14 recovery of bodies that may be there.

15 Q. The issue of the bodies and their recovery and their
16 treatment is outside the scope of these proceedings by
17 order of my Lady earlier in these proceedings, but
18 I want you to tell us, please, because it's of great
19 importance to the families, what the priority was at the
20 time of your arrival.

21 You were an officer, and remain an officer, of the
22 Anti-terrorist Branch and you were, at that time,
23 a forensic scene examiner?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What was the primary strategy, what was the primary

1 point of your attendance, once all the living casualties
2 had been removed from the scene?

3 A. Okay, when I arrived at the scene, there was actually
4 a standoff period in place. Mr Travers, the explosives
5 officer, had been to the scene. I was informed that he
6 had left there about 10.30. I got to the scene about
7 11.00. He had imposed a one-hour standoff period, so
8 during that period I couldn't do anything until he
9 returned at 11.30.

10 When he returned, both he and I went into the tunnel
11 because he had informed me that he hadn't cleared the
12 carriage where the device had gone off.

13 Q. You understood that he had been down earlier and had
14 checked the other carriages but had left carriage 2 for
15 further exploration?

16 A. Yes, he was unable to do that because he had been
17 retasked to another incident.

18 Q. So you went down with him and, no doubt, you confirmed
19 that electricity had remained off?

20 A. Yes, we did, yes.

21 Q. You went down to carriage 2. Did he then check that
22 particular carriage for explosive devices?

23 A. As well as checking that, part of the normal procedure
24 would be for him to walk me through the scene, to
25 explain what he had done and as well as -- he then

1 checked the carriage itself.

2 Q. We've heard from him that there came a point at which
3 control of the scene was handed over and we know from
4 your statement that control of the scene was handed to
5 you at midday --

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. -- once everyone was satisfied that the scene was safe,
8 in terms of whether there was a possibility of
9 a secondary device.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Members of London Underground attended, we have just
12 heard from Mr Burnham, and no doubt they assisted you in
13 ensuring that working conditions in the tunnel were
14 safe, and that you could proceed with your functions?

15 A. Yes, once I had taken control of the scene at about
16 midday, I had a conversation with London Fire Brigade,
17 Mr Fulcher and Mr Burnham and went with those two
18 officers and Mr Steve Smith, who was a divisional
19 commander from London Fire Brigade. I was using their
20 expertise to tell me whether or not the conditions were
21 safe to work in.

22 Q. We know from your statement that Metropolitan Police
23 photographers entered the tunnel during the course of
24 the afternoon and we have seen some of the photographic
25 evidence from that time. Can you just confirm for us

1 that, initially, photographs were taken from the tunnel
2 and from the carriage and then subsequently there was
3 videoing?

4 A. The normal procedure would be that initial scenes
5 photography, still scenes photography, would be taken.
6 I received a phone call later in the day informing me
7 that video would also be required, which was then done.

8 Q. While that task was being carried out, was it your
9 primary role to divide up the scene into a number of
10 zones and to put into place a structure whereby it could
11 be minutely forensically examined?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. Were you assisted in that by a substantial number of
14 other officers?

15 A. Yes, initially, I limited the number of officers that
16 came into the scene, but as and when they were required.
17 There was a number of officers, I think about a dozen in
18 total, who I utilised for that purpose.

19 Q. Again, the issue of recoveries is outside the scope, but
20 did the fact that there were deceased people in the
21 tunnel have to be considered alongside the fact that it
22 was a crime scene and everything had to be forensically
23 examined?

24 A. Yes, at one stage during the day, I was given priorities
25 as to what my role was, that being recovery of explosive

1 traces, the scene examination and the recovery of
2 bodies, all on an equal par, if you like.

3 Q. Because now, of course, it's obvious to us, because we
4 now know the evidence surrounding the detonation of the
5 bomb and how it got to be on the train. But are we
6 right to presume that, at that time, no conclusions
7 could be drawn with certainty as to what the cause of
8 the explosion had been, other than that it was suspected
9 that there was a bomb on the train?

10 A. I think, after speaking to Mr Travers, we were happy
11 that there had been an explosion on the train. How that
12 had occurred, we didn't know.

13 Q. For example, you didn't know then whether or not it had
14 been placed on the train and the person who had placed
15 it had then left the train before its explosion or
16 whether it was a suicide bomber?

17 A. Exactly. So it was a crime scene in which we had to
18 gather minute evidence in case it was required later for
19 a prosecution.

20 Q. Therefore, did it follow that you could take no chances
21 on what you were searching for, the scene had to be
22 thoroughly forensically examined and that took time?

23 A. Yes, it did.

24 Q. It took a very long time, didn't it?

25 A. I was on the scene for ten days.

1 Q. We've seen in the papers some references to bomb scene
2 managers. What's the distinction between your job and
3 a bomb scene manager?

4 A. My role is the bomb scene examiner. I would be
5 responsible for the forensic recovery inside the inner
6 cordon. The bomb scene manager would be normally
7 a detective inspector or a detective sergeant who would
8 be responsible for liaising with me, the SIO and the
9 other emergency services and, if I required extra staff
10 or equipment, then they would provide that for me as
11 well as performing the liaison role.

12 Q. Also present in the scene were officers who were
13 responsible for the process of disaster victim
14 identification.

15 A. That's correct, yes, two initially.

16 Q. No doubt you discussed with them repeatedly how the
17 question of disaster victim identification should be
18 approached, bearing in mind your obligation to examine
19 the tunnel forensically?

20 A. Yes, the vast -- victim identification teams are
21 normally for mass disasters and there are a different
22 set of protocols to what would normally be used at
23 a crime scene. We came to a compromise as to what we
24 would both do.

25 Q. Let me put it this way, if I may, to you, Mr Meneely:

1 all the deceased were removed in due course?

2 A. Yes, they were.

3 Q. Were they removed with due regard to the extraordinary
4 sensitivities of the state in which they were in?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. With regard to the feelings and sensitivities of their
7 loved ones?

8 A. All of the dead, at all times, were treated with the
9 greatest of respect.

10 Q. The process continued, as you've told us, for, in your
11 case, some ten days, but it wasn't until, I think,
12 Saturday, 9 July that a significant piece of bone,
13 a piece of a backbone, was discovered in the front of
14 a rear bench seat in carriage 2?

15 A. That's correct. Officers were searching that part of
16 carriage 2 and, about 9.30 at night, I was told that
17 a piece of backbone had been recovered.

18 Q. Why was that significant?

19 A. Because all of the bodies I'd seen so far had no real
20 upper body trauma to that degree. Obviously there was
21 a lot of injuries, but everybody was relatively intact
22 in relation to the upper body.

23 Q. No doubt, the discovery of that piece of bone was
24 relevant to the investigation of the crime and
25 information about it was passed to your colleagues?

1 A. Yes, it was.

2 Q. Throughout this period, you received assistance, did you
3 not, from forensic specialists, including, I think,
4 a Ms Lancaster?

5 A. Yes, Ms Sarah Lancaster is from the Forensic Explosives
6 Laboratory which is part of the Ministry of Defence,
7 DSTL.

8 Q. The work continued very late into night --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and early again in the morning --

11 A. Yes, it did.

12 Q. -- day after day. At each night, was the scene closed
13 so as to prevent contamination?

14 A. Yes, most of the nights, the scene was closed. There
15 were a number of nights where work had to be undertaken
16 on the train which enabled the scene to stay open, but
17 effectively some of the -- the forensic examination work
18 stopped at some stage.

19 Q. It wasn't until 12 July, the Tuesday, the following
20 Tuesday, that Ms Lancaster, the forensic specialist, was
21 able to complete her examination to a degree that the
22 train could be moved and taken out by
23 London Underground?

24 A. Yes. She did an initial examination on the day, but
25 when it was realised that the train may have to be -- we

1 might have to cut up parts of the train, et cetera, she
2 had to come back to do a further examination before she
3 could complete that.

4 Q. On Thursday, 14 July, did you close the scene between
5 11.45 and 12.15 to allow officers to take part in the
6 national two minutes' silence?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. Was the scene not returned, in fact, to
9 London Underground until Saturday, 16 July when all the
10 remaining equipment was removed and arrangements were
11 made for the train to be taken to a depot in Acton that
12 night?

13 A. Yes, I handed the scene back to London Underground at
14 19.00 on Saturday night, albeit that the train remained
15 in the scene until later on that evening before it could
16 be moved.

17 Q. In terms of the complexity and difficulties that the
18 scene posed in forensic terms, can you tell us something
19 about the nature of the task you undertook?

20 A. It was a very challenging task. Basically, trying to
21 juggle all of the things. It's a bit like a project
22 manager, you have to think ahead and organise things
23 coming in, but there was a lot of difficulty with the
24 scene.

25 MR KEITH: Will you stay there, please? There may be some

1 further questions for you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions? Yes, Mr Saunders?

3 MR SAUNDERS: Would your Ladyship allow me to deal with
4 a number of the matters? I understand this is the last
5 witness of the morning and I would be very grateful if
6 your Ladyship would allow me -- having spoken with
7 Mrs Stevenson this morning, I know she is anxious about
8 the delay that there was underground.

9 Having seen, not only his statement, but also some
10 of the extra detail from Mr Meneely, I think it may
11 assist her and maybe some of the other families if they
12 understand a little more of the detail as to what the
13 problems were.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So this is going to matters that
15 I have ruled are not issues?

16 MR SAUNDERS: It will very briefly touch on -- some of which
17 we've already heard; for example, the very last witness
18 who dealt with there was a question of asbestos
19 underground and that was one of the reasons he went
20 back.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: If it would assist the families, if
22 you could, of course, limit it, because you will
23 appreciate, the timetable being so tight ...

24 MR SAUNDERS: Of course I will, my Lady. I hope I am right,
25 Mr Keith, that this is, in fact, the last witness of the

1 morning?

2 MR KEITH: He is indeed. We have a witness at 2.00 whose
3 evidence we will receive via videolink from Ireland and,
4 because of the timing of that video appointment, if we
5 don't finish Mr Meneely now, he will have to come back
6 later this afternoon, I'm afraid.

7 MR SAUNDERS: May I press on?

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Please.

9 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

10 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Meneely, I think it's right that you've
11 told us about a number of the matters and I'm obviously
12 looking principally at your statement, but I've seen
13 some of the other material as well.

14 The last witness mentioned there was a problem
15 during that first phase where there was a concern about
16 asbestos being in the tunnel.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I think that meant, for obvious reasons, that there had
19 to be a period where all work had to stop whilst it was
20 checked by the relevant team?

21 A. I think from recollection, the work carried on while the
22 team checked the -- whether there was asbestos on the
23 train or not, but then they suggested that we put on
24 white over-suits, masks, et cetera, which we didn't have
25 enough of at the time, so there was a short delay.

1 Q. In fairness to you, Mr Meneely, this is a very
2 considerable statement of some 30 pages, so I'm not
3 expecting you to know everything. I simply was taking
4 it from the advice you received. You stopped the team
5 working and cleared the tunnel area. There was then, as
6 you say, equipment necessary to continue, and I think,
7 on that first day, there were many items that were
8 recovered and the team worked well into the night
9 finishing at half past midnight.

10 A. There were a number of times where asbestos was checked
11 within the tunnels. There were a number of times where
12 work had to stop because of problems with electricity,
13 et cetera. But then we carried on when we could.

14 Q. I think you've listed over a number of pages the number
15 of items. It appears that you started at zone 5 and
16 there were a number of items recovered from there.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Before recommencing the following day, Friday, 8 July,
19 when I think and your team returned to the scene at
20 about 6.05 in the morning.

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. And again commenced -- I think it was noted that there
23 were no labels on those who had life extinct when you
24 were there, in terms of priority labels, or whether, in
25 fact, death had been pronounced.

1 A. There were no labels on the bodies. I was just about to
2 start the process of body recovery when I realised that
3 I hadn't had life pronounced extinct.

4 Q. I think that was one of the things you had to take into
5 account in relation to before any of the bodies could be
6 removed. Although it was quite plain that life was
7 extinct, part of what had happened was that that itself
8 needed a formal process?

9 A. It was, but as I put the phone call in, I was informed
10 that the coroner may have given a blanket authority
11 that, if there were bodies still there, that they should
12 be certified as dead. But the process still carried on.

13 Q. It did, and I think that consisted of the witness we're
14 going to hear later, Dr Costello --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- who was able to attend and examine the bodies, one of
17 which was the family, whose interests I represent, of
18 Fiona Stevenson.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I think that took place on the morning of the 8th as it
21 did with the other families and those others who were
22 deceased?

23 A. Yes, I think Dr Costello started his examination roughly
24 8.55 in the morning, something like that.

25 Q. I think there were also difficulties in the day and you

1 refer to problems where you received information from
2 Mr Bracken and Mr Rudkin, who I think were engineers?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Again, those are matters that had to be investigated for
5 the safety of the team you had down there, which was
6 a considerable number of people, I think, wasn't it?

7 A. Yes, I had 12, 14 people, something like that.

8 Q. 12 or 14 people you had working throughout the period.
9 You again, for the reasons of the problems -- a bomb
10 going off in a tunnel -- were advised it would be safer
11 to close the site?

12 A. Some of the cabling along the wall had been damaged.
13 I'd been given assurances initially by Mr Burnham and
14 Mr Fulcher that those cables were safe. Another
15 engineer then came along later on the Saturday to say
16 that there was a possibility that there may still be
17 20,000 volts running through those cables and,
18 therefore, it would be unsafe to continue work.

19 Q. I think there were also problems with having platforms
20 that were sufficient to ensure the work could be done?

21 A. The train itself, when you stand along it at trackside,
22 is some 5 or 6 feet high. So we had to get some sort of
23 platforms to allow us to get -- whilst we were there,
24 there was ladders up to the carriages. You can't carry
25 bodies down ladders in that form. So a platform had to

1 be built to allow access to that.

2 Q. I think there was also a problem with the obtaining of
3 a correct vehicle that had sufficient refrigeration to
4 ensure the proper removal of the bodies?

5 A. Refrigeration units were called for.

6 Q. I think there was a difficulty -- it may be somebody
7 else deals with that, but there were difficulties as to
8 when they could be provided on the scene.

9 A. I understand that the vehicles arrived some time on the
10 Saturday.

11 Q. I think the formal removal of Fiona Stevenson was --

12 A. Some time on the Friday, actually.

13 Q. -- on the Friday, I think.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So I think there were those two that were outside,
16 Carrie and Richard Gray were removed initially, and then
17 Fiona Stevenson on the Saturday.

18 A. Yes, that's correct. Ms Stevenson -- there was four
19 bodies removed on the Friday, two on the trackside and
20 two males in the rear carriage part and then the three
21 other women on the Saturday.

22 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, I'm very grateful, thank you very
23 much for that indulgence.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Sheff?

25 MS SHEFF: My Lady, may I, in the same vein, ask a couple of

1 short questions which are of great interest to those
2 families I represent?

3 Questions by MS SHEFF

4 MS SHEFF: Can I ask you, first of all, about body parts?

5 We know, for example, that there were a lot of limbs
6 which had become detached --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- from bodies. Presumably, ultimately, your aim was to
9 ensure that bodies and body parts were reunited --

10 A. Mm-hmm.

11 Q. -- so that they could be returned to the families for
12 proper burial?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How did you go about that?

15 A. Okay, each body part is still treated as a body. So the
16 same procedure as a full body would occur. So again,
17 they were all dealt with using the DVI system and
18 exhibited.

19 Q. Can you just explain how you associated a body part with
20 a body?

21 A. We wouldn't. All we would do is we would recover a body
22 piece that would be there. In the notes, we could say
23 if it was alongside a body.

24 Let's say an instance may be that there's a body
25 which has part of a limb removed, there's part of a limb

1 alongside. We may put in the notes that that was
2 alongside a body, but we couldn't say it was from that
3 one. That would be for the pathologist and the coroner.

4 Q. So your job really was just to ascertain the location of
5 bodies and body parts which may be connected?

6 A. And give them a unique number so that they could be
7 traced back later on.

8 Q. Yes, and ultimately, you would expect the forensic
9 examiners and the pathologists later on, if necessary,
10 to do DNA tests to make the further connection between
11 those parts?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Finally, can I just ask you similarly about
14 possessions. We see from your statement that there's
15 long lists of items that were found close to the bodies.
16 Was it a similar process, with you ascertaining that
17 certain possessions, which may not, for example, have
18 any identification with them, may be associated to
19 particular bodies, because of where they were found?

20 A. No, they would all be -- I mean, the location of them
21 would be given in general terms, in that they were
22 within a zone, but they would all be treated as an
23 exhibit, and then investigation would be done at a later
24 stage to try and give those back to families, if that's
25 where they were from, or if they were going to be used

1 in evidence.

2 Q. That investigation then, it seems from what you're
3 saying, was outwith your jurisdiction, as it were; yours
4 was just to make sure that the possessions were taken
5 from the scene so that they could later be sent to the
6 relevant families after the investigation had been
7 conducted by others?

8 A. At that stage, they were actually potentially evidence,
9 so I was seizing them as evidence for a potential
10 criminal trial.

11 Q. I see, so all items had to be assessed for their
12 evidential relevance to a possible prosecution?

13 A. Yes.

14 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much indeed, Officer.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff.

16 Mr Hill?

17 MR HILL: May I, noticing the time, just make an
18 observation, which is that I didn't intervene in the
19 questions either posed by Ms Sheff or by Mr Saunders
20 because it was quite apparent that the purpose of the
21 questions was to allay the concerns very properly
22 expressed on behalf of the families but, as my Lady
23 knows, a report was prepared by the Metropolitan Police,
24 dated 22 September, which we gave the title of
25 "Ancillary Issues" to, because it was intended in that

1 report, as we had first offered at the April hearing, to
2 deal with any matters of concern raised on behalf of any
3 bereaved family which were outside the scope of these
4 proceedings as per your ruling.

5 For the avoidance of doubt, that report of
6 22 September included, for example, the best answers
7 that we, the Metropolitan Police, were able to give to
8 questions raised about items of personal property
9 belonging to Mr Lee Baisden, who Ms Sheff represents.
10 So we have committed that to writing in the past.

11 But knowing that we have three scenes to go and many
12 tragic deaths to go, can I repeat that, although these
13 matters are outside scope, and in our submission
14 shouldn't delay us, should not delay your programme in
15 court, if there are any further questions on the part of
16 any represented or unrepresented bereaved that go to
17 identification issues or any other issues outside scope,
18 we'd recommend that the proper course is to bring those
19 matters, not to the attention -- not of us, but to your
20 team, Mr Smith or your counsel? We have no doubt
21 they'll be relayed to us and we'll provide, if
22 necessary, further written assistance by way of reports
23 to your order, and we submit that's the best way to
24 proceed, to provide answers to these important
25 questions.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Hill.
2 Mr Taylor, you didn't have any questions?
3 MR TAYLOR: No, thank you.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions? Thank you very
5 much, Mr Meneely. You had a horrid job, you and your
6 team, and thank you for taking so much trouble.
7 2.00 pm.
8 (1.00 pm)
9 (The short adjournment)
10
11