

1 (2.00 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Coltart?

3 Questions by MR COLTART

4 MR COLTART: Mr Clarke, I'd like to ask you about

5 a different debrief meeting that you attended, I think,

6 on 18 August which was the operational debrief for those

7 that attended the Aldgate incident. So that we can

8 refresh your memory as to what the meeting was about and

9 what might or might not have been said, can we get up,

10 please, on the screen, document [LFB61-1]?

11 In a moment or two, we'll turn to the minutes or the

12 notes of the meeting, but just to refresh your memory as

13 to why it was being held, if we turn over the page to

14 page 2 [LFB61-2], it seems that these were either the notes for

15 a PowerPoint presentation to be given at the debrief or

16 possibly a flipchart or something of that nature, but it

17 sets out the agenda:

18 "Thank you for coming.

19 "Apologies for absences."

20 Then at 3:

21 "All the PRCs have now been held for the four

22 incidents on 7 July."

23 That's the performance reviews of command meetings,

24 isn't it, that was referred to before lunch?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I think you attended one of those and we'll come back to
2 that. At point 4:

3 "Smaller operational crew debriefs are taking place
4 which some of you may have already had."

5 Do you recall, yourself, attending a smaller crew
6 debrief of that nature?

7 A. No, I don't recall that.

8 Q. Okay, at 5:

9 "Also interviews for honours and awards panel."

10 Quite properly of course. Then at 6:

11 "Today operational debrief with most of the first
12 attendance and specials."

13 Now, are you able to assist us with your independent
14 recollection, firstly, whether you attended this
15 debrief?

16 A. The only way I'll know if it was the debrief that we're
17 both talking about is if you tell me who was actually in
18 attendance.

19 Q. Well, that's where we may have to resort to a bit of
20 detective work. Can we get up the notes of the meeting,
21 because this might be the easiest way of resolving it
22 for you? That's [LFB64-1].

23 Now, it's just headed "Notes - 18 August."

24 You'll see that there are a variety of headings. If
25 we go over the page for a moment, please, to page 2,

1 more headings, but then that's the end of the document
2 so we don't know who attended.
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can we see whether Ms Simcock can
4 help?
5 MS BOYD: My Lady, I think it's me.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, it's a fire officer. I'm
7 terribly sorry. It's Ms Boyd.
8 MS BOYD: I'm not sure I can help at this moment in time,
9 but it may assist if Mr Clarke was asked who he
10 remembered being in attendance, if we did it that way
11 round.
12 A. The only two people I remember there were -- at the
13 time, he was ACO Dobson, he's now a chief, and DO Smith,
14 who I remember being there.
15 MR COLTART: In fairness to you, might that be the
16 performance review of command meeting which was held
17 with both senior officers, and they are very senior
18 officers, aren't they, both of those gentlemen?
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. This, I suspect, was more for the crew who attended on
21 the day, or the crews. Let's just see if, through the
22 document, we can jog your memory, because if we go back
23 to page 1, the first item says:
24 "No listening post or printer at RMC [which]
25 hampered knowledge."

1 Leave that to one side for a moment, but if you look
2 at the next entry:

3 "Whitechapel. Had to walk back to station. Should
4 have been given a lift."

5 You told us, I think, before lunch, that you had had
6 to leave your kit and walk back. Does that sound as if
7 that's a complaint, if it is a complaint, which relates
8 to the people who attended at Aldgate with you?

9 A. It would have come from the crews attending Aldgate with
10 me. I've got no recollection of this meeting.

11 Q. If we go over the page, let's see if we can just --
12 under "Appliance equipment and personal protection
13 equipment", towards the bottom there:

14 "Shadwell and Dockhead needed breathing apparatus
15 sets to put appliances on the run. Couldn't get them
16 from anywhere. F261", which is the Bethnal Green
17 appliance, "at the run all day."

18 So it appears as if the crews from Shadwell,
19 Dockhead, Bethnal Green, all of which attended at
20 Aldgate, were at this meeting and contributing to it.

21 Do you have any recollection of attending a meeting with
22 those individuals?

23 A. No recollection whatsoever, no.

24 Q. Can we just --

25 A. Do we know the venue of the meeting?

1 Q. I was just going to come to that.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Can we have a look at document [LFB60-1], please? This is
4 an email. It's not to you and it's not from you. So
5 I'm going to explain why it is that I'm showing it to
6 you. It's from Steve Smith to someone called
7 Tim Cutbill and various others. Subject 7/7 debrief:
8 "David Mills is arranging the Aldgate bomb incident
9 for me. At the moment, it is going to be held at the
10 Frederick Delve Suite ST/C ..."

11 Is that Stratford?

12 A. Southwark training centre.

13 Q. "... on 15 August ..."

14 Now, that's a different date from the notes, which
15 is 18 August, but it's around the same time. "Dave will
16 confirm the details". Then:
17 "We have a slight problem as this incident had
18 a mixture of blue and red watch crews ..."

19 Pausing there for a moment, tell us, what does that
20 mean?

21 A. The incident happened very near the change of shift from
22 red watch to blue watch.

23 Q. I see, red watch night shift, blue shift day?

24 A. Correct, yes.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 "... but we are hoping to get over that. Those that
2 have been invited are ..."

3 It sets out "6 first pumps. FRUs, MAIAT", and so on
4 and so forth, "three ICs". There were three ICs at
5 Aldgate on the day. You were the first one, Mr Wrigley
6 was the second one and Mr Smith was the third one. So
7 it looks as if you're on the invitation list for this
8 meeting. Do you have any recollection of it?

9 A. No, none at all.

10 After the incident, I attended one meeting at
11 Stratford, and I was invited or I was ordered to
12 Whitechapel, I believe it to meet DO Cotton,
13 Danny Cotton, to give a statement, and that's the only
14 recourse I have now.

15 Q. I'm not going to trouble you further with those notes.
16 We'll ask the next witness who's coming, who, we can
17 hope, did attend that meeting.

18 In which case, can I just ask you very briefly,
19 then, about your performance review of the command meet,
20 and perhaps we could get back up on the screen [LFB21-1]?
21 As I understand it -- and please correct me if I'm
22 wrong -- the performance review of command is a term of
23 art within the London Fire Brigade and this relates to
24 a sort of debrief process for senior officers to review
25 how things have gone from an overall strategic

1 perspective. Is that fair?

2 A. Yes, that's fair.

3 Q. You're encouraged to give your feedback at that meeting,
4 and then, again, as I understand it -- and we've been
5 provided recently with a document explaining how these
6 meetings work, I don't think we need to trouble
7 ourselves with it -- but, in theory, you would be
8 provided later with a summary of the points which had
9 arisen out of your own meeting, but I think you told us
10 this morning you don't have any recollection of seeing
11 this document?

12 A. No, I've never had this document.

13 Q. Well, it's very short, as far as you're concerned.
14 Perhaps we could just zip through it. Do you see there
15 on the first page you are -- it states "incident
16 commander 1", all right?

17 Now, as I understand it from your legal
18 representatives that denotes you, in the sense that you
19 were the first Silver Commander who had control of the
20 scene at Aldgate.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. If we go over the page [LFB21-2], we see:
23 "Incident commander 2" and, as I understand it, that
24 refers to Mr Rigby who's coming next week. We'll ask
25 him questions about that section of it. Over the page [LFB21-3]

1 again, equally, "incident commander 3", Mr Smith, who
2 again is coming next week. So we only need to trouble
3 ourselves with the first part of this document as far as
4 you're concerned.

5 So it looks as if under "incident commander 1" if we
6 could go back to page 1, please, it's a pro forma
7 document as it were, and it sets out what were the good
8 points from what happened on that day and what were the
9 learning points.

10 The first good point is that:

11 "The IC [the incident commander] readily gained
12 confirmation from the London Underground contact that
13 all power to the tracks had been isolated."

14 Can you remember, who gave you that confirmation?

15 It wasn't given to you when you first arrived, I think
16 you said, because you went up the tunnel not knowing?

17 A. The person in the tunnel wasn't sure, but the LUL rep,
18 as far as I remember, wasn't 100 per cent sure it was
19 off.

20 Q. Presumably, someone shortly after that did provide you
21 with that confirmation?

22 A. I can't remember having had it thoroughly confirmed.

23 Q. Then just some help with the terminology. The next one
24 deals with the possibility of a contaminant being
25 involved, fortunately we know that wasn't the case. The

1 third one:

2 "The IC ensured that the ICP ..."

3 Is that the incident control point?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do tell me if I have got the term wrong, because --

6 A. It's incident control pump is -- but "point" would be
7 fair.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 "... was established as soon as practicable and was
10 resourced until the CU took over the role."

11 A. Which is the control unit.

12 Q. The control unit. Is that a separate -- is there
13 a separate communications vehicle that arrives at the
14 scene of a major incident?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What vehicle is that?

17 A. It's a control unit with -- it will have -- it used to
18 have computers on board, mapping equipment, to give
19 greater control over bigger incidents, really.

20 Q. Does it contain any additional communications equipment,
21 radios or --

22 A. Yes, I've never -- I'm not control-unit-trained, but
23 I know that they can -- they will have mobile phones and
24 additional radios.

25 Q. Additional radios?

1 A. Perhaps all -- just so you can talk in two channels at
2 one time, not on different frequencies, as it were.

3 Q. I see, it just gives you a choice of channels?

4 A. Yes, a control officer, someone who rides it, would give
5 you far more information than I would know.

6 Q. I may have asked you this, in which case I apologise.

7 Do you recall whether such a vehicle did arrive at
8 Aldgate?

9 A. I don't recall seeing where it's parked, if I'm honest,
10 I can't remember seeing where it's parked.

11 Q. We may be able to explore that with someone else. The
12 next item on the list:

13 "Within 4 minutes of attending, the incident
14 commander had completed a thorough DRA and declared
15 a 'major incident'."

16 What's a DRA?

17 A. It's a dynamic risk assessment.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think I may need a list of acronyms
19 at some stage.

20 MR COLTART: I think we might, I respectfully agree. I said
21 I wasn't going to refer you to the notes of the meeting
22 you can't recall, but there is one item on it which you
23 ought to be given an opportunity to address, and that's
24 back at [LFB64-2], at the bottom of the page there under
25 the heading "Enroute-arrival", which is one of the

1 topics canvassed in that meeting. It says:

2 "F33 tried 4 times to send major incident before on
3 4th it was taken, no busy signal at time."

4 Do you recall now, looking back, any difficulty with
5 communicating the major incident call?

6 A. I was unaware that the driver had tried four times to
7 get through. It's the first time I had seen that.

8 Q. Back to 21, please, at the bottom of that page is a good
9 point:

10 "On arrival, the officer immediately established
11 contact with London Underground ... and maintained this
12 liaison whilst [you were] in charge."

13 Then over the page, top of the page:

14 "Faced with undertaking multiple extrications in an
15 environment that may contain other hazards, the incident
16 commander limited the number of personnel working at the
17 scene of operations."

18 Are you able to recall now what was meant by "the
19 scene of operations"? Was that the carriage or was that
20 inside the station generally?

21 A. I would presume it's at the carriage.

22 Q. The reason for that being, presumably -- and please tell
23 me if this is wrong -- confined space, difficult working
24 conditions, you don't need more -- you don't want more
25 people in there than is strictly necessary?

1 A. Those reasons, as well as putting more people into
2 hazardous areas. Things like that.

3 Q. Whilst you were incident commander, before you handed
4 over to Mr Rigby, was a message ever conveyed to you
5 that more personnel were, in fact, needed at the
6 carriage?

7 A. No, I never got any message like that.

8 MR COLTART: Then the last two items whilst you were in
9 charge, one deals with the establishment of an equipment
10 dump, and Mr Keith asked you questions this morning
11 about liaison with the other emergency services.

12 Thank you very much.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Saunders?

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: Just one matter, please, Mr Clarke. When you
16 referred earlier today to the equipment dump, you gave
17 a number of examples of the types of equipment that were
18 there.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can I simply confirm this, that there were no medical
21 supplies at that dump?

22 A. Absolutely, yes, just Fire Brigade equipment.

23 Q. Exactly. What you were doing was organising the
24 equipment you, the Fire Brigade had, which didn't
25 include medical supplies, but were taken as close to the

1 carriage as you thought sensible, should they be
2 required?

3 A. Yes, basic extraction equipment.

4 Q. Extraction equipment, and that that dump we're talking
5 about is at the platform?

6 A. That's where I intended the dump to be, yes.

7 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Clarke.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

9 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

11 Questions by MS BOYD

12 MS BOYD: Mr Clarke, we know that you were called at
13 08.56.49 and, by the time you were mobilised, you
14 arrived at 09.00. So under five minutes. You mentioned
15 earlier that there was a change of shift. Was that at
16 9.00?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. So the call was 8.56?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Does that mean you were on the night shift coming off or
21 were you on the day shift coming on?

22 A. I was on the night shift due to go off-duty at 9.00.

23 Q. That would apply to both crews from Whitechapel?

24 A. Yes, apart from my driver, which I think was blue watch,
25 blue watch staff.

1 Q. Can I also ask you to help us set the scene so far as
2 resources and personnel that was available to you during
3 the first 10 to 20 minutes on your arrival?

4 Could I have on the screen, please, [LFB23-2]?

5 I think we can see bottom of the page, please, that
6 committed with the Whitechapel crews, that's F331 and
7 F332, was E216, which is described as an FRU. Could you
8 just tell us what that is?

9 A. Pardon? Could you repeat the question?

10 Q. An FRU, is that an appliance that carries specialist
11 equipment?

12 A. Yes, it's a fire rescue unit which carries bigger and
13 better rescue equipment.

14 Q. Thank you. And OK16, is that a fire investigation unit?

15 A. I don't know what OK16 is. I'm not sure.

16 Q. If we could go over the page, please, to page 3, as
17 a result of requesting a major incident procedure, that
18 resulted in further appliances being committed and the
19 attendance of various higher ranking officers. Is that
20 right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I think we can see the top of the page E331 -- sorry,
23 E351, that's Old Kent Road, and I think that's
24 Station Officer Spier, who I know is going to have his
25 evidence read to the court, and then there's F311,

1 that's Kingsland. F312 and F221. So that's four
2 further appliances which are mobilised. Is that right?
3 A. I can't see where you're reading it from. I would
4 presume it is correct, yes.
5 Q. I think we've got the top page up and it's further down
6 the page. If we scroll down.
7 A. Okay, yes, I've got it.
8 Q. We can see that at 09.08.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Just at the bottom of the page, that last entry, E100,
11 I think that relates to Divisional Officer Rigby.
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. If we just go over the page to page 4 [LFB23-4], top of the page,
14 again we can see some senior officers being committed.
15 Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, I see that, yes.
17 Q. Just about halfway down the page, there's an entry
18 09.13.39, A301, is that another appliance that's been
19 committed?
20 A. I would presume so. Alpha 30 -- it could be -- I'm not
21 sure if they're officers from the station or the station
22 itself that's been committed.
23 Q. I think I can probably help you, in that it's
24 a compliance which Mr Magyar, who's also going to be
25 giving evidence was crewing.

1 A. Okay, yes, in which case that would be --

2 Q. So he's been called or his crew is called at 09.13.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can I now ask you to look at page 17 [LFB23-17], if we could have

5 page 17 up on the screen, please? We can see here, if

6 we look down the bottom of the page, bottom half,

7 please, this is called "resource status changes". Can

8 you -- I think you've told us already that, when you

9 arrive at an incident, you give your status to Control

10 so that they know that you've arrived.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. If we look down the fifth column, is that the call sign

13 for the appliance? In the top row we can see F331.

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. That's your appliance?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. If we look in the fifth column along, under "Arrival",

18 is that when you have booked status, I think you call it

19 booked status 3?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. That means that you've arrived?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So that's where we get your arrival time of 09.00.54?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I think you've told us that F332 doesn't have an arrival

1 time. Can I just ask you, is it sometimes the case that
2 a driver forgets to give his status?

3 A. That can happen and the data system sometimes worked, it
4 sometimes didn't. So --

5 Q. Does it also happen that, if there's a lot of radio
6 traffic, it takes much longer for the status 3, although
7 the button has been pushed, it takes longer to actually
8 get to the other end?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But we know from your evidence earlier that F332 in fact
11 arrived just before you?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. I'm not going to go through all of them -- I'm sure the
14 court will be relieved -- but we can see the fifth row
15 down, E351, I think that's Mr Spear, he arrives at 09.18
16 and, by that stage, another -- the FRU appliance and
17 also the fire investigation had also arrived, we can see
18 those just above. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. Then just if we can go halfway -- no, I think we'll
21 leave that one because I think it's going to get far too
22 complicated for everyone, Mr Clarke.

23 However, can I ask you this: are you aware that, in
24 fact, although you were called, I think, as a result of
25 a police call, the London Underground also made a call

1 as a result of which other appliances were mobilised?
2 A. I wasn't aware of that, no.
3 Q. If we could just have on the screen, please, LFB17,
4 I think if we concentrate on the bottom half, we can see
5 that that is opened at 08.58.45.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Immediately following that, the first four lines we've
8 got four further appliances being committed at 09.01?
9 A. Yes, yes, I can see that.
10 Q. If we just look at page 2 of LFB17 [LFB17-2], and again towards
11 the bottom of the page, "resource changes", we can see
12 E341, which is the top one, arrives at 09.11?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I think that's the Dockhead crew?
15 A. Mm-hmm.
16 Q. F251 arrives at 09.06?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. That's the Shadwell crew I think you've referred to.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Then E331 hasn't registered, and F261, fifth line down,
21 09.08.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I think that's Bethnal Green.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So within the first ten minutes, it looks as though five

1 appliances have arrived and, within 20 minutes, a number
2 of additional appliances.

3 A. The second call, was that to Liverpool Street or at
4 Aldgate?

5 Q. No, it was to Aldgate and we can see that from the front
6 of the MOBIS. We can see, if we look at page 1, top of
7 the document, "Aldgate station". It's just that there
8 were two separate calls as a result of which a number of
9 appliances were mobilised.

10 A. To clarify, then, are you saying that there was
11 a separate call to St Botolph's Street and a separate
12 call to Aldgate station?

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. Okay, yes.

15 Q. For each appliance, what is the minimum crew?

16 A. For each appliance, just the pumping appliances is
17 a minimum of four people, four firefighters per
18 appliance, that's pumping appliances.

19 Q. Do some appliances take five?

20 A. Some appliances can have five. FRUs would have more
21 than four, and the likes of.

22 Q. Thank you. Now moving on, on your arrival, you've
23 explained how you immediately went down to the train to
24 make an assessment and, at that stage, you've told us
25 that casualties were emerging from the front of the

1 station. I think you gave the description that your
2 crew were engulfed by casualties.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that a fair description of what was happening?

5 A. Yes, without a doubt, yes.

6 Q. We've already heard of Emma Brown, whose statement was
7 read to the court, and she's the one who had severe
8 abdominal injuries, and I think in her statement she
9 described being helped by a fireman called Darren.

10 Would that be Darren McGee of your crew?

11 A. Yes, that would be about right.

12 Q. Firefighter -- I think he's Leading Firefighter Edwards,
13 whose statement is to be read this afternoon, says that
14 both McGee and, in fact, Firefighter Taylor were helping
15 the most serious casualties along with himself.

16 Are you aware, were there people with severe facial
17 burns?

18 A. I don't remember. My recollection of the incident is
19 people with lower limb injuries for some reason.

20 I didn't remember people with facial burns.

21 However, I do remember Taylor and McGee, in the
22 corner of my eye, kneeling down with the lady for some
23 considerable time.

24 Q. So I think as you've said earlier in your evidence, the
25 Whitechapel crews were immediately taken up with the

1 situation that presented itself at the front of the
2 station?

3 A. Yes. I really don't know, I could only presume the
4 others -- I didn't see the others, they were just
5 helmets on the floor and working away.

6 Q. They were able to give first aid, apply burns kits and
7 oxygen?

8 A. Yes, I presume so, yes.

9 Q. Although your crews were tied up, you were able to
10 deploy the Shadwell crew, that's Mr Curnick, I think?

11 A. That was the first contact I had with -- I think
12 Mr Curnick was senior to myself, and he said, "What's
13 going on?" That was the first contact I'd had with any
14 other Fire Brigade officers, and I explained what was
15 happening, and he said, "Leave it to me" and I did so.

16 Q. We've seen that Shadwell appliance arrived at 09.06.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So he went down on to the track, because I think his
19 crew was made up of Messrs Clarke, Sudbury and Kelly --

20 A. I wouldn't know that.

21 Q. -- but you wouldn't know them individually?

22 A. I wouldn't have that information.

23 Q. We know from the evidence that other crews were
24 deployed, and we know from Station Officer Spier, whose
25 evidence, again, is going to be read to the court, that

1 he says that he spoke to you and you told him there had
2 been an explosion on a train and that some crews had
3 been committed, but you were still unaware of the number
4 of casualties.

5 Do you recall talking to Station Officer Spier?

6 A. The only person I recall talking to was Watch
7 Manager Curnick, and I'm not sure where I got the figure
8 of 12 people. I'm pretty convinced it was the initial
9 contact with the LUL officer who told me there was about
10 12 people on the carriage, and it was -- the only people
11 I remember, or the only person I remember talking to was
12 Mr Curnick.

13 Q. Is your recollection of events -- I know it's some five
14 and a half years ago -- is it fairly hazy or do you have
15 a distinct --

16 A. Some parts are hazy. Earlier, the ambulance person who
17 was giving evidence earlier, I don't remember talking to
18 him, but, yet, he remembered talking to me. And
19 likewise, I don't remember talking to anybody else,
20 apart from --

21 Q. You don't remember talking to Station Officer Spier?

22 A. No.

23 Q. We know that his crew -- because we're going to hear
24 from some of them -- were deployed down to the station,
25 and we know that a crew from Dockhead and Bethnal Green

1 were also deployed. Do you remember having any
2 conversation with either of the sub-officers of -- or
3 watch managers of those crews?

4 A. No, I don't.

5 Q. Do you remember at the time whether there was any
6 concern that there may be secondary devices?

7 A. I think it -- it's there. There was -- it's just in the
8 back of your mind that there may be secondary devices.

9 I think, for the record, secondary devices don't mean
10 lesser devices, they can be more powerful than the
11 primary device. So it is in your mind.

12 Q. Is that one reason to restrict deployment of a minimum
13 that you think is necessary to do the job?

14 A. Well, when Watch Manager Curnick turned up, we had this
15 brief conversation about the carriage that was involved,
16 and with his crews, I presumed that that would be a good
17 starting point, so ...

18 Q. Were you aware of any crews being held back by either
19 protocols or the fear of secondary devices?

20 A. No.

21 Q. As far as you are concerned, they deployed under your
22 command?

23 A. As far as I was concerned, they -- people deployed as
24 they should have done.

25 Q. Can I ask you about the handover? I think you've

1 already told us that you don't really recollect the
2 handover to DO Rigby.

3 A. No. I remember a brief handover with DO Smith and that
4 was inside Aldgate station. He was the more senior
5 officer that I spoke to on the day. After which, at
6 that time, I realised that I was being stood down from
7 incident commander and I was detailed to muster people,
8 for want of a better word.

9 Q. Finally, can I just ask you about the procedure
10 regarding confirmation of power being off?

11 You told us that there was a standard procedure
12 which was to ask Brigade Control. Is that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is the situation that Brigade Control then seek
15 confirmation from the line controller?

16 A. I believe so.

17 Q. And the line controller then communicates it back to
18 Brigade Control, and then on to yourself?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is it also possible to secure confirmation locally from
21 the London Underground, but they then have to themselves
22 ask the line controller and then communicate it back?

23 A. Yes. Having said that, we -- if we get it locally, I'm
24 not sure who I'm talking to locally, so it's like when
25 we went on to -- initially down the stairs and on to the

1 track, it was assumed to be off.

2 Q. Is the purpose to ensure that the power is off between
3 stations, to ensure that there's no section that can
4 reenergise or a train can't bridge two sections and
5 reenergise what was a safe section?

6 A. Pardon? Could you repeat the question?

7 Q. Is the purpose of getting in touch with the line
8 controller to put off the power between stations to
9 ensure that every section between stations is shut
10 down --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- so that you don't have this reenergising?

13 A. Yes, I believe so.

14 Q. But in any event, as you've told us, procedure went out
15 the window?

16 A. In the early stages, I think so.

17 Q. Because of the immediacy of the situation that faced
18 you?

19 A. Yes.

20 MS BOYD: Thank you.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions for Mr Clarke?
22 Yes, Mr Taylor?

23 Questions by MR TAYLOR

24 MR TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Mr Clarke.

25 A. Good afternoon.

1 Q. I think you've told us that you are now retired.
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Previous to 2005, you were how long in the service?
4 A. Pardon?
5 Q. How long were you in the service, the Fire Service?
6 A. I was in it for 30 years.
7 Q. 30 years?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So you must have undertaken a load of training in that
10 30 years that you've been employed?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Previous to 2005, I think there was a very large test of
13 our resilience, the Fire Brigade, the Ambulance Service,
14 the police officers were all involved in a test. Were
15 you aware of that?
16 A. I'm not sure what venue. When you say a test, are
17 you --
18 Q. A rather large one in London previous to 2005, July,
19 that looked at mass incidents.
20 A. Could you -- do you know the venue that the test took
21 place?
22 Q. I don't know where it took place.
23 A. We used to take part in combined incidents, as it were,
24 where the most -- the only one that sticks out in my
25 mind would have been at, perhaps, Monument, round

1 Monument station, but that would have been a long time
2 ago.
3 Q. No, I don't think that was the one.
4 A. Apart from that, if there are these combined incidents
5 that we attend, there is a one-in-four chance that we
6 would be off-duty, so I don't have any recollection of
7 attending any others after that.
8 Q. Right. So you and your crew would -- in a daily
9 routine, you and your crew would practise firefighting?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You would also spend your time looking after your kit --
12 making sure your kit was in good order?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. How long is a night shift? How many hours is a night
15 shift?
16 A. 15 hours.
17 Q. What time were you due to finish?
18 A. What time did I --
19 Q. What time were you due to finish?
20 A. 9.00, 3 minutes before --
21 Q. So you were almost clocking off then?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. When you went down -- when you first arrived at Aldgate,
24 and you went straight down, obviously after a very long
25 shift, you say that there was -- you thought there could

1 have been a secondary device down there?

2 A. What I said was it's in the back of your mind that, you
3 know, if there's been one explosion, there could be two.
4 That's part of our training, that we're told to be aware
5 of secondary devices.

6 Q. What happens when you go to an ordinary call, a fire in
7 a building or something like that and the building is on
8 fire and there are people trapped in that building and
9 you know you've got to go in there straightaway? Is
10 a dynamic risk assessment made then?

11 A. Yes, you make a risk assessment of the situation and the
12 Brigade policy is that you can take certain risks to
13 save saveable lives, so it can -- there are -- for the
14 policies, there are sort of ways to read it where you
15 can take reasonable risk to save saveable lives.

16 Q. If there is a person trapped in that building, you can
17 see them trapped in that building --

18 A. It would depend on the risk assessment.

19 Q. Someone's at the window shouting "Help, help, help" and
20 there's a possibility of, say, I don't know, a propane
21 gas cylinder is involved in it?

22 A. Again, if I were the incident commander, you'd have to
23 make an assessment there and then. If you stick to the
24 protocols, then it depends what type of gas it is, what
25 type of cylinder it is, whether it's involved in the

1 fire, how close it is to the fire, whether or not you
2 could get cooling spray on to it to keep it cool.
3 There's many things you can do to mitigate the risk and
4 still carry out the rescue.
5 So it would depend entirely on each individual
6 situation.

7 Q. But on the day you and your team -- I won't say ignored
8 the risk, but you took that risk into consideration when
9 you decided that you needed to go down and save lives?

10 A. The -- well, yes, for the early part of the incident, it
11 would appear that way.

12 Q. Communications, did you come across any problems with
13 communications while you were down in the tunnel or by
14 the carriages?

15 A. Again, communications, I actually decided to go back to
16 the appliance to tell the driver to send the message.
17 Again, it's -- because of the risk of secondary devices
18 and using our handheld radios, we are advised that
19 you're better not to use your handheld radio, with the
20 thought of secondary devices. So that helped me to go
21 back and give him the instruction rather than -- and to
22 manage the incident from the outside. I was heading
23 back there anyway, so --

24 Q. I've inferred that, I think, from Inspector Munn the
25 other day. That must have took some time. How many

1 times did you go backwards and forwards, can you
2 remember?

3 A. In the early stages or --

4 Q. Yes, in the early stages, yes.

5 A. I went down, assessed the situation, came up, sent the
6 message and then in and out many times after that
7 assisting people, taking equipment to where they'd have
8 it, yes, I couldn't count how many times. Quite a few
9 times.

10 MR TAYLOR: I think we'd all agree that a fire officer's job
11 is sometimes very difficult and very dangerous, and
12 I thank you very much.

13 A. Thank you very much.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any more
15 questions for Mr Clarke?

16 Just one from me, Mr Clarke. When you went down to
17 the train, I detected from what you said earlier that
18 you faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the firefighter
19 in you wanted to help rescue the people; on the other
20 hand, you knew that somebody had to take control if the
21 greater number of people were going to be rescued.

22 A. Yes.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You had to leave the scene because
24 you took the decision someone had to take control and
25 you had to use your radio.

1 I was just wondering, do you feel that, had you had
2 a different system of communications, it might have made
3 your decision easier or don't you think it would have
4 made any difference?

5 A. No, I think it's quite a big step for a fairly junior
6 officer to take to instigate a major incident and you
7 need to be out the front to manage the incident anyway
8 and to deploy who you've got and what you've got.

9 So that's what we're taught, as a junior officer,
10 that -- to sort of stay out and manage people rather
11 than be involved at the front. So it was -- even to
12 reassure people that help was on the way. I had no
13 appliances with me, but just it would have been nice to
14 get a message to them to say "We're here and we'll get
15 you out soon", but that wasn't possible, I'm afraid.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Clarke. I'm
17 very grateful to you for coming along.

18 A. Thank you.

19 MR KEITH: I invite to you call James McPartland, please.

20 MR JAMES STUART MCPARTLAND (sworn)

21 Questions by MR KEITH

22 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

23 A. My name is James Stuart McPartland, I'm a firefighter
24 with the London Fire Brigade attached to Foxtrot 33,
25 Whitechapel.

1 Q. In July 2005, you were similarly at Whitechapel and you
2 were attached to the pump ladder F332.

3 A. Foxtrot 332 is the pump, sir.

4 Q. That's the pump.

5 A. Foxtrot 331 is the pump ladder. Foxtrot 332 is the
6 pump.

7 Q. You received a message to attend a fire and explosion at
8 St Botolph's Street in Aldgate.

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Could we have on the screen [LFB23-2]? You can see at the
11 bottom of the page, 08.57.37, F332 commit, and over the
12 page, 08.37.39, right at the top, "mobilise" and one of
13 the appliances mobilised was F332, and you recognise
14 your call sign there, do you?

15 A. I recognise the call sign, sir, yes, but the actual
16 piece of paper that you -- or the text that you've shown
17 me is not normally visible to us, we get a different
18 type when it comes over the teleprinter, but yes.

19 Q. Do you recall, when you approached Aldgate, how you came
20 to a halt? Were you flagged down or did you drive up
21 and park somewhere?

22 A. When we received -- initially received the call, it was
23 fire and explosion to St Botolph's Street. St Botolph's
24 is a one-way street, so normally the pumps crew and the
25 ladders crew, if it's in a street that we know via prior

1 knowledge, we'll take an approach from either end of it,
2 but in this particular instance because St Botolph's
3 Street is on a one-way system, we couldn't do that.
4 The pump ladder went first. I was driving the pump.
5 As the pump ladder turned to go into St Botolph's
6 Street, I approached Aldgate station with the blue
7 lights and the two-tones on. As I did, I noticed
8 a member of LUL staff coming from the Underground
9 entrance wearing a high-vis jacket, and he was waving
10 quite frantically at us. I slowed the vehicle down. He
11 leaned up to the cab and shouted that "There's been an
12 incident in the station". Immediately, I put two and
13 two together to think that St Botolph's Street and
14 Aldgate were both linked at that point. We parked the
15 vehicle up.

16 Q. There's a device in the cab that allows to you press
17 a button to tell the control that you've arrived.

18 A. The MDS data system, yes.

19 Q. Nothing turns on it, but the records show, in fact, no
20 arrival time for F332, so it may be that in the hurry to
21 get out --

22 A. That piece of kit we don't use anymore. It used to be
23 quite unreliable at some times. You could press the
24 button and wait, and it still wouldn't recognise that
25 you were in attendance at an incident.

1 Q. Because the machinery was supposed to show a light to
2 show that your message had been received?

3 A. Status 3 would be that we've booked in at the incident.
4 It was -- nine times out of ten, it's the officer in
5 charge to press the button, but if he hasn't done, he'll
6 say to the driver "Can you book us in?", and you press
7 a button, but I can't recall being asked to do that that
8 day.

9 Q. All right. Just so that we can get our bearings for
10 which firefighters were in which appliance, do you
11 recall that the appliance commander was Leading
12 Firefighter Edwards?

13 A. Jeff Edwards, that's right, yes.

14 Q. When you arrived, did you see Sub-Officer Clarke?

15 A. At that point, no, because he was in charge of
16 Foxtrot 331, which had travelled round to St Botolph's
17 Street.

18 Q. So you didn't immediately see him?

19 A. No.

20 Q. So what did you do when you left the appliance?

21 A. We dismounted the appliance. As the LUL member of staff
22 had said to me "There's been an incident", directly over
23 his shoulder I then became aware of a large amount of
24 people coming out from the entrance in quite some
25 straits of distress covered in soot, dirt. Then I could

1 notice bodily injuries.

2 We dismounted the machine. The crew on the back
3 tended to a casualty who was holding her abdomen area,
4 I believe. They responded to her.

5 Q. Just pause there, if you would. By that you mean they
6 provided first aid to her or --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- did they take her away or place her down on the
9 pavement or something of that sort?

10 A. They put her down on to the pavement for stability, but
11 I don't know what happened after that, because there
12 was -- as you can imagine, there was a lot going on.

13 Q. Of course. Where did you go?

14 A. I tried to stay in the area of the pump. Because I'd
15 already known that it was fire and explosion, I believe
16 I laid a reel out for the protection of crews if there
17 was a fire.

18 I then tried to corral the members of the public
19 that were coming out from the station. A lot of them
20 were in a distressed state, very confused, very
21 disorientated, and some with obvious degrees of injury.
22 I done my best to try and -- with another firefighter,
23 try to keep them in that area so that they could get
24 medical attention, but that was a task we couldn't
25 achieve for the -- purely for the volume of people that

1 were coming out.

2 Q. You were overwhelmed by the number of people coming out
3 of the station?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You've made a reference to the fact you knew it was
6 a fire and explosion. Could we just have on the screen
7 [LFB23-3]? When you receive a mobilisation message, there
8 are a number of categories of incident, are there not,
9 which could be brought to your attention, and one of
10 them is a fire and explosion?

11 A. Fire and explosion, if we see that, as a firefighter,
12 then obviously there's some urgency placed with that.

13 Q. We can see that at the top of the page, if you could
14 just expand, thank you, "Fire and explosion at
15 St Botolph Street."

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you know or would you normally be provided with more
18 detail than that, that it was a fire and explosion?

19 A. Not from an initial point. From when a 999 call comes
20 in and then it comes over at the teleprinter at the
21 station, we would -- as you're looking at that screen
22 now, that top half from 08.57, that first part, the
23 informative part there, that's about as much as we get
24 on the teleprinter sheet to let us know what incident
25 we're going to.

1 Q. Given the number of people coming out of the station,
2 and given the number of firefighters on your appliance,
3 could you deal with them all?

4 A. No way.

5 Q. Were you aware of other fire appliances arriving around
6 the same time?

7 A. I believe I saw on the call slip that Echo 216 had
8 already been mobilised, but because that's an eastern --
9 a southern command station, I knew they would take some
10 time to get to us, and we were the first two initial
11 motors and, no, there wasn't enough crew to deal with
12 the amount of people that were coming out, no.

13 Q. We've heard that more appliances and more crews arrived
14 shortly thereafter, but certainly, as far as you were
15 aware, all your crew and the crew of the fellow
16 appliance were all engaged in looking after members of
17 the public and doing all that they could --

18 A. Immediately.

19 Q. -- as soon as you arrived?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But did there come a time when you went down to the
22 tunnel?

23 A. That was a little while into the incident.

24 Q. But until that point, you had remained up at the top,
25 helping with the --

1 A. Yes, and sending radio messages as well.

2 Q. In your statement, you do refer to the fact that you
3 made a call, because you say:

4 "Sub-officer told me to tell Control to implement
5 major incident procedure."

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. We've just heard evidence from retired
8 Sub-Officer Clarke that he went to the cab of the
9 appliance and he authorised the sending of a message to
10 ask for the major incident procedure to be invoked.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Was it you, in fact, who made that call?

13 A. It was, sir.

14 Q. On his direction?

15 A. It was sir, yes.

16 Q. Although you weren't his driver, you were actually the
17 one who made that call?

18 A. I believe the other driver of the other appliance was
19 dealing with some casualties at the time, so, as my
20 appliance, Foxtrot 332, was the main appliance outside
21 the station, everything seemed to hub around from our
22 vehicle first.

23 Q. You were closest?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Tell us, please, about what you did in the tunnel and

1 what you were asked to go down to do?

2 A. I was tasked upstairs, outside the main entrance, by an
3 ADO.

4 Q. An ADO?

5 A. Assistant divisional officer.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. I don't know his name. There was myself and another two
8 firefighters. He ordered us to take down three short
9 extension ladders, down to the tunnel, immediately, and
10 to get to work down there.

11 Myself and the two other firefighters, we done that,
12 we got the short extension ladders, went down into the
13 station, went down on to the platform, where I recall
14 there being a -- I think it was either one or two LUL
15 guys at the end of the platform. I instinctively asked
16 one of them was the power off on the tracks and he said
17 "Yes". We got down on to the tracks, there was still
18 some people coming towards us coming out from the
19 tunnel.

20 At that time, I noticed there wasn't any type of
21 panic, as you could possibly imagine, but they were
22 quite calm, walking. Obviously in some sort of
23 shell-shocked state. We ushered them over to one side
24 to keep on, so that, as they walked out of the tunnel,
25 they would be then on the platform edge and walk up to

1 the platform.

2 Q. Just pause there, if you would. Did the member of
3 London Underground staff confirm straightaway that the
4 power was off or was there any sort of delay while he --

5 A. No, no --

6 Q. -- established it was off?

7 A. -- no. When I asked him, it was an instinctive thing to
8 do, by going on there, but he come back and said to me,
9 "yes", straightaway, it was off, "Yes, power is off".

10 Q. The number of people coming out, was it a constant
11 stream of people or were they coming out in --

12 A. At that point, yes.

13 Q. A constant stream at that stage?

14 A. By the time we got from the platform edge to the
15 beginning or the front of the train, there must have
16 been between 50 to 80 people passed us.

17 Q. In various states of injury and distress?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Inside the tunnel, did you discover or see two bodies
20 alongside the train?

21 A. I don't recall two bodies, sir, I recall one.

22 Q. You describe in your statement a male body and a female.
23 Do you recollect there being two?

24 A. I recall the male casualty was a white male casualty.

25 I noticed him because, as I got to the train, I got up

1 sort of about chest-to-waist height to the carriage, and
2 it was obvious that, if I had got into that carriage,
3 I would have hampered anything, because there was far
4 too many firefighters in there at the time already.

5 Q. We know a number of appliances had arrived by this
6 stage.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But we are unclear as to the identity of the exact
9 firefighters who first entered the carriage. Can you
10 tell us whether you can recollect the identities of the
11 firefighters who were already in the carriage when you
12 went down to the tunnel?

13 A. By face, I could recognise one of them, but not by name.

14 Q. All right. Can you tell us how many there were, you
15 think?

16 A. I saw at least four.

17 Q. At least four. Thank you very much.

18 A. And there were some other -- there were some other
19 people in there as well, but I didn't look at them or
20 got --

21 Q. From what they were doing, plainly members of the
22 emergency services of some description.

23 A. One was in casual clothes, I believe.

24 Q. Yes, a police officer in plainclothes, perhaps.

25 A. It was a female.

1 Q. A female?

2 A. It was a woman.

3 Q. Was she tending to another lady?

4 A. Yes, I believe she was, yes.

5 Q. Dr Gerardine, all right. Dr Gerardine Quaghebeur.

6 Did you go into the carriage yourself --

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. -- at any stage?

9 A. No, I got about chest-to-waist high up to the step of
10 the train as you would normally enter it, but I didn't
11 enter the carriage. The sub-officer that was in the
12 carriage at the time I said to him, "Where do you want
13 me?", and he said "Don't come in here, we've got enough
14 going on", he said, "Sort out what's going on out
15 there".

16 As he said that, I noticed a flickering of some
17 description out of my left eye. That's when I turned
18 and I saw the white adult male lying on the tracks off
19 to my left-hand side.

20 Q. Was he moving?

21 A. No, sir.

22 Q. Was there anything to indicate that he was alive?

23 A. Not from where I was positioned at the ladder but I got
24 off from the ladder, went over to him, went to feel for
25 a pulse immediately, couldn't feel for a pulse in the

1 wrist, went for his neck to feel for a pulse there, and
2 I couldn't feel a pulse there. It was then I heard
3 a voice saying to me, "He's gone, he's already dead",
4 I looked around and I couldn't see anybody that was
5 saying it to me, and then below the step of the next
6 carriage I noticed a gentleman underneath the train just
7 underneath the train tending to a casualty just
8 underneath the train, which was a female.

9 Q. The gentleman whom you saw who had been tending to the
10 female under the carriage, when he said "He's gone, he's
11 gone" it seemed to you he'd been referring to the male
12 person, the body, which you had --

13 A. He was referring to the gentleman --

14 Q. -- first seen and whose pulse you had checked?

15 A. -- yes.

16 Q. We have heard evidence of a gentleman called
17 Philip Duckworth who was on the track and unconscious
18 and he's described how he heard somebody saying "He's
19 gone, he's gone" and shortly after that, he was able to
20 show that he was alive by moving and calling out.

21 A. The gentleman I felt, sir, was -- I would presume to be
22 dead, sir.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. Plus --

25 Q. Is it possible, therefore, that the person, the other

1 male person who said "He's gone, he's gone" might not
2 have been referring to the person whose pulse you had
3 checked for but to a third person, to another body?

4 A. No, sir, when I then ascertained where the voice was
5 coming from, I looked over and he was looking directly
6 to me.

7 Q. He was?

8 A. I then went over to him to assist the casualty he was
9 with, and he identified himself as a British Transport
10 Police officer called Tony, and he was --

11 Q. He was looking after a lady who we know to be
12 Thelma Stober?

13 A. Thelma, yes.

14 Q. Did you assist him in looking after that lady?

15 A. I sort of took over first aid care of her at that point.
16 I noticed that -- from a primary inspection of her, she
17 was covered with a coat. I lifted the coat and could
18 see that there was some quite severe injuries there and
19 what looked -- they looked like some sort of object or
20 something on her left upper thigh. There was a lot of
21 blood coming out, so my main concern for her was, if we
22 didn't have a doctor there, or an ambulance, was to get
23 her out as quickly as possible, but after talking to her
24 and reassuring her, she said that she had some pains in
25 her back as well. So I was very conscious of the fact

1 of not moving her in case she had some sort of spinal
2 injury.

3 Q. Do you recall a HEMS doctor arriving?

4 A. I do, sir, yes.

5 Q. Can you say how long after?

6 A. From the first point when I have -- when I came across
7 the lady, probably ten minutes, ten to fifteen minutes.

8 Q. As a result of what the HEMS doctor told you, did you
9 then have to try to improvise a stretcher of some kind
10 to take the lady out --

11 A. Yes, sir, I did.

12 Q. -- and up to ground level? How did you go about that?

13 A. Because of the ladders that we'd already brought down,
14 we're trained to improvise and take a ladder apart and
15 make a stretcher out of it. That's what I tried to do
16 at that point, getting it as close to her as possible so
17 it would be easier to get over. The priority becoming
18 very apparent, once the HEMS doctor had said to me
19 "I want her out of here now", so obviously I was trying
20 to do it as quickly as possible.

21 It became quite awkward to try and get her on to the
22 makeshift stretcher and it was at that point that
23 a uniform -- I believe he was a uniformed police officer
24 came over and pulled out what turned out to be like
25 a canvas-type stretcher, like a --

1 Q. Could be rolled out?

2 A. Rolled out with handles and grasps on it, so we used
3 that.

4 Q. And a number of you assisted in the process of taking
5 her via the stretcher upstairs?

6 A. Yes there was one police officer standing there with
7 a torch, so I took control of extricating her from the
8 scene. We got everyone to walk in unison and I got the
9 police officer with the torch to lead off ahead so that
10 he could see for any obstructions so we wouldn't trip
11 over them.

12 Q. Do you recall that there was a City of London police
13 officer also helping at that time and who accompanied
14 you upstairs along with the lady you were carrying,
15 Thelma Stober?

16 A. I can't remember the people that was helping us,
17 apart --

18 Q. There were a number of people around you?

19 A. Apart from the British Transport Police man.

20 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, will you stay there, please?

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

22 Questions by MR COLTART

23 MR COLTART: Mr McPartland, were you in court when Mr Clarke
24 gave his evidence?

25 A. Not this morning, sir, no.

1 Q. Were you here this afternoon?

2 A. This afternoon, sir, yes.

3 Q. You heard me ask him some questions about a debrief, an
4 operational debrief which we seem to have placed on
5 18 August. Can you recall now, was that a meeting which
6 you attended?

7 A. I did attend a debrief, but I can't remember the date,
8 is sir.

9 Q. What I'd like to do with you, if I may, is just have
10 a quick look at the notes of that meeting. I'm going to
11 ask you to explain some of the technical terms in the
12 notes and to expand as you feel necessary on any of the
13 items contained within those minutes.

14 Could we then go to, please, document [LFB64-1]?

15 We could see, if it became necessary, that the
16 various headings in bold which appear on this page
17 relate to the topics which, according to the debrief
18 document, were to be discussed at this meeting. All
19 right? So these appear to be the separate topics which
20 were the subject of discussion on that day.

21 It starts with a heading "Other":

22 "No listening post or printer at RMC."

23 Are you able to assist us with what RMC means?

24 A. RMC is a Regional, as it were, Control Centre where
25 standbys and vehicle movements are made from, and where

1 sometimes senior officers can be based to be mobilised
2 to incidents.

3 Q. There's a suggestion here that no listening post or
4 printer at that station hampered knowledge in some way.
5 Can you now recall -- firstly, who made that
6 observation?

7 A. I wouldn't know, sir.

8 Q. No. Can you recall in general terms why it was made or
9 in what way the Brigade might have been hampered by not
10 having that listening post or printer?

11 A. A listening post is, in layman's terms, pretty much
12 a radio, really, for listening in to, but you can't
13 transmit from. So obviously whenever an incident is
14 heard of or we know of, people tune into the listening
15 post to see what's happening, how far the incident is
16 escalating, et cetera, or if there's a possibility that
17 we might be called on to it.

18 Q. Thank you. The third item under "Other":
19 "Procurement for first aid is too slow. It's an
20 essential piece of kit."

21 Were you, yourself, aware, on the day, of a shortage
22 of first aid kits? Was that a subject of discussion?

23 A. Obviously for the amount of casualties that there was,
24 we were short of first aid kits, yes. Purely for the
25 volume of people, yes.

1 Q. "Video - bad idea - photographs."
2 I think we'll hear in due course that the
3 Fire Brigade did take contemporaneous video footage.
4 That may or may not be important. Then there's some
5 observations about welfare, they were straight on the
6 phone to you to make sure that you were all right.
7 Can we go down to the heading "Casualty handling",
8 please:
9 "More laerdals on the run."
10 Can you explain to us, please, what is a laerdal
11 resuscitator?
12 A. A laerdal resuscitator is a cylinder of air which is
13 administered to a casualty via a face mask for the
14 administration of oxygen.
15 Q. I see. Thank you. "On the run", does that have
16 a specific term?
17 A. "On the run" means having it there available to work.
18 Q. I see. So can you recall now -- and tell us if you
19 can't -- but can you recall, was the suggestion that it
20 would be helpful to have more of those oxygen cylinders
21 available to you?
22 A. I do remember someone mentioning there about laerdals,
23 having more laerdals, but not necessarily in the
24 terminology it's placed there, having them on the run.
25 Q. "More and bigger burns kits" I think speaks for itself.

1 "Stretchers - police have canvas stretchers which
2 pack small and unroll to full length [which are]
3 better."

4 In fact, you witnessed that yourself on the day,
5 didn't you, because I think it's PC Tilley who was with
6 you had a roll-mat that he was able to put Ms Stober
7 onto.

8 The next topic for discussion was liaison with
9 others; in other words, other emergency services.

10 Secondary device was mentioned, liaised with police, and
11 then -- I'm not going to go through all of these items
12 in detail, but there's some discussion about the speed
13 with which the police and the Ambulance Service were
14 evacuating the casualties.

15 "Silver meetings were good. Police opened roads.
16 Difficult comms. Didn't know much about what had
17 happened."

18 Did you, yourself, on that day, experience
19 communication difficulties?

20 A. At the initial point, sir, yes, because obviously there
21 was a possibility, once it was known what it was, that
22 there could have been a secondary device, so we weren't
23 using our handheld radios at that point.

24 Q. Were you conscious of people working in the tunnel at
25 the carriage itself having difficulty communicating with

1 people at the surface in terms of more equipment and
2 that sort of thing?

3 A. I wasn't. By the time I got to the scene of the train,
4 I wasn't aware of that, no.

5 Q. "Used police support to fetch and carry equipment."
6 Then there's a reference to "MALT". Can we take it
7 in fact that that's a reference to MAIAT?

8 A. Yes, it could quite possibly be.

9 Q. Multi-agency liaison?

10 A. Multi-agency incident liaison.

11 Q. "Detrained other train.
12 "Police helped in rescues."
13 There's an observation about the first aid
14 proficiency of the BTP crews.
15 But more importantly perhaps, over the page, there
16 was an observation, it seems, made by someone about
17 running out of stretchers. Do you recall that
18 observation being made or why it was made?

19 A. I can't remember why it was made, but at the time when
20 I was down there, it was relevant to me because there
21 wasn't any stretchers. We had to improvise.

22 Q. Then I would like to just understand with you the terms
23 in this next entry, which may be particularly
24 significant as far as my client is concerned:
25 "Used BA cylinder ..."

1 Is that a breathing apparatus cylinder?
2 A. Breathing apparatus, yes.
3 Q. "... on casualty for confidence of casualty. Ran out of
4 laerdal and FRU ..."
5 I'm not even going to try to pronounce that next
6 word.
7 A. I can presume that says -- that should be "maintain".
8 Q. Oh, "FRU maintain wasn't brought down."
9 What's an FRU?
10 A. Fire rescue unit.
11 Q. In everyday language, what's a fire rescue unit?
12 A. It's a specialist machine that -- to the London Fire
13 Brigade, whereby it's got specialist cutting gear on
14 there, extra cutting gear that's not normally carried on
15 frontline appliances.
16 Q. I see, so it's got nothing to do with the BA cylinder,
17 it's a completely separate piece of kit?
18 A. They carry a different BA set to what's on normal fire
19 engines, yeah, they carry a longer one.
20 Q. "FRU scoop stretcher not used."
21 Just going back to that, the first sentence of that
22 bullet point "Used BA cylinder on casualty for
23 confidence of casualty", if you had someone who needed
24 oxygen in front of you, and you had an unfettered choice
25 between using the mask from your breathing apparatus to

1 put over their face or using a mask from a laerdal
2 resuscitator to put over their face, which of those
3 pieces of equipment would you use?
4 A. Sorry, could you repeat that, sorry?
5 Q. Yes. It appears, doesn't it, you "used BA cylinder on
6 casualty for confidence of casualty", that a casualty
7 was assisted in his or her breathing by the use of some
8 breathing apparatus?
9 A. No, the BA cylinder there, if it was mentioned, a BA
10 cylinder is a stand-alone item on its own.
11 Q. Right.
12 A. I do recall that, at the debrief, somebody did mention
13 that they had used a BA cylinder to crack open slightly
14 to allow the air to escape from the cylinder blowing in
15 the direction of a casualty because there wasn't
16 a laerdal mask available or a laerdal available.
17 Q. Oh, I see. So it's not a question of putting a mask --
18 A. You can't.
19 Q. You can't do that.
20 A. You can't. There's a one-way fitting on a BA cylinder
21 that only will fit on to a BA set.
22 Q. Oh, I see.
23 A. So it's not adaptable with any other piece of kit.
24 Q. So is it a question of sort of turning the tap and
25 giving it a blast of air from the cylinder to --

1 A. You can turn it on to give a blast, if you so wanted to,
2 but you can restrict its flow by the turning of the
3 handle on it. So you can let out a gentle breeze of
4 air, or you can crack it open all the way and let
5 a blast out.

6 Q. So as far as you recall this observation being made, it
7 was a question of a little extra oxygen being provided
8 in the immediate vicinity of this casualty --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- through the mechanism you've described?

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. That was because there wasn't a laerdal resuscitator
13 immediately available. The next item:

14 "Committed in breathing apparatus not started up.

15 No need, no smoke, took them off."

16 Then an observation about poor lighting equipment:

17 "Mobile halogen rechargeable battery."

18 Is that standard Fire Brigade kit?

19 A. It might be on an FRU, sir, I don't know. But we carry
20 one that's a portable lighting kit that's powered by
21 a generator.

22 Q. Is that different from what's described here?

23 A. Yes, it's not with a rechargeable battery. Firefighters
24 themselves have a handheld light, a Wolf light, which
25 has batteries in, which is intrinsically safe, but the

1 rechargeable ones, I'm not familiar with them.

2 Q. Okay, and then just some terminology, please, in the

3 next item:

4 "Lack of awareness of SOG equipment."

5 What's SOG? Does that mean anything to you?

6 A. I'm afraid not.

7 Q. We might have to ask someone else about that one:

8 "No one knew CHEL existed."

9 Again, does that mean anything to you?

10 A. No.

11 Q. You can't remember who was taking the notes at this

12 meeting, can you, by any chance?

13 A. There was a lot of senior officers there, so it could

14 have been any of them.

15 Q. Out of interest, and if you can recall, who did chair

16 this meeting, can you remember?

17 A. I believe our chief, who is now Ron Dobson, I believe he

18 was at it and there was, like, a video presentation put

19 on as well for it.

20 Q. What was the video presentation?

21 A. It was clips of London and the firefighters and --

22 Q. On the day, as it were?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Right. Back to where we were, we can finish this quite

25 quickly, I think:

1 "Got crews away as soon as possible to redeploy
2 [elsewhere]."
3 There was an issue between Shadwell and some of the
4 other appliances about their breathing apparatus.
5 In the last item under that heading:
6 "BCU ..."
7 Can you help us with that?
8 "BCU ordered to RMC to help MTL RMC."
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You're going over my head,
10 Mr Coltart. I'm sorry, I have had a surfeit of
11 acronyms.
12 MR COLTART: I only ask in case it's important. It may not
13 be, but if we can get to the bottom of it, do you have
14 any idea?
15 A. A BCU will probably be the Brigade Command Unit.
16 Q. Thank you. And RMC or MTL, any ideas?
17 A. MTL, I don't know what it is. But RMC is the Regional
18 Management Centre.
19 Q. The?
20 A. The Regional Management Centre, which I believe at the
21 time was at Stratford.
22 Q. Thank you. Then under the heading "Previous
23 training" -- we could see, if we needed to, that the
24 object was to see to what extent your previous training
25 had assisted you. The observation that's made is that

1 "all that training out the window", and in fairness,
2 does that reflect the difficulties of replicating what
3 happened on that day in some sort of dry run?

4 A. I think all the training that I've done would never
5 replicate what we saw and done on that day.

6 Q. No.

7 A. So the statement there that all the training went out
8 the window, I'd say that's quite applicable in this
9 case. We are trained for it, but until you actually get
10 it, and it actually happens, you overcome and adapt.

11 Q. Then only this last one, under the heading "Enroute -
12 Arrival", did you have difficulties sending or
13 transmitting that major incident message, can you now
14 remember?

15 A. Yes, I sent the message to incident management procedure
16 under the instruction from Sub-Officer Clarke. I tried
17 it first time, there's a set protocol for passing
18 a priority message, as we call it, priority message,
19 which means urgent assistance required.

20 I did try to pass it once and there was no reply
21 came back from Control. I passed it again, as
22 a priority, and then I got a response back from the
23 controller at Brigade Control.

24 Q. If it was suggested here that it took four times to send
25 it, that might be an exaggeration?

1 A. I think it was twice at the most, sir, I believe.

2 MR COLTART: Thank you very much. I have no further
3 questions for you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

5 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

7 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

9 Questions by MS BOYD

10 MS BOYD: You described how you were relayed by a large
11 number of casualties at the entrance of the station.
12 Were you aware at the time that four other appliances
13 had been mobilised on a different call to yourself?

14 A. I wasn't, no.

15 Q. Did there come a time when you saw a large number of
16 appliances arriving?

17 A. I did, yes. One of them pulled up behind our pump and
18 I recognised the sub-officer in charge of it. He asked
19 me who was in charge and I told him it was
20 Sub-Officer Clarke, and I pointed to the vague direction
21 where I'd last seen him, and said he was in that
22 direction, so he was going to liaise with him.

23 Q. So although you were waylaid by a large number of
24 casualties, there were other fire appliances arriving
25 and other crews who were able to be deployed?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I think you've told us there came a time when you were
3 asked by an ADO to take some equipment down to the
4 train?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Presumably at the request of somebody at the train.
7 Now, you arrived, we know, at 09.00. Are you able to
8 estimate at what time you went down to the train with
9 those extension ladders?

10 A. About 15 to 20 minutes.

11 Q. Were you aware or did you become aware of the
12 possibility of secondary devices?

13 A. Once I entered the tunnel, I could see the train off to
14 my right-hand side and, the closer I got to the
15 carriage, I could see that it -- the initial reports
16 that we heard from LUL upstairs was that it could have
17 possibly been a power surge, but once I got down to the
18 train and saw the train myself, I knew it wasn't a power
19 surge. There was no way it could be.

20 Sorry, I've lost the question now, I beg your
21 pardon.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Take your time.

23 A. Could you ask me the question again, sorry?

24 MS BOYD: Yes, of course, I was just asking if you were
25 aware or if you became aware of the threat of secondary

1 devices?

2 A. Once I'd got down off the ladder where I'd looked into
3 the carriage, I saw the casualty on the train tracks to
4 the left of me. After I'd felt for a pulse and couldn't
5 find one and I'd liaised with this other guy who was --
6 he said he was a policeman called Tony, I believe it was
7 another policeman turned up in what looked like body
8 armour and a helmet, and he came over and I said to him
9 "Have you checked the rest of the train?" and I believe
10 it was Tony said "Yes, it's been checked, I've checked
11 it", but I said to the guy in the body armour, "Can you
12 check this carriage to make sure? Because we're working
13 underneath it. Can you somehow get in there and check
14 it?", and he said, "Yes, okay", and he went and I didn't
15 see him again after that.

16 Q. So you became aware of that into your consciousness when
17 you were down in the tunnel?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. At any time before that, whilst you were up at platform
20 or station level, were you aware of that, or did anyone
21 make you aware of it?

22 A. No, because we'd heard bits and pieces flying through
23 the air, the LUL staff saying it had been a power surge
24 and, up until the point where I'd got to the tunnel,
25 I was still under the impression that it was a power

1 surge.

2 Q. On your way down to the tunnel with those extension
3 ladders, were you aware of any crews being held back or
4 waiting?

5 A. I didn't see none on the platform, ma'am, no. Once
6 I got -- as I said before, once I got down to the train,
7 there were already firefighters in the carriage itself.

8 Q. The reason I'm asking you is that there has been some
9 evidence given by one or two passengers who came from
10 the train, and who were understandably very distressed
11 and desperate for help for those still on the train, and
12 their perception was that there were crews holding back
13 and they appeared to be hampered by protocol or concern
14 for secondary devices. I just want to ask you whether
15 you were aware of that or did you feel or witness any
16 crews --

17 A. I wasn't aware of that, but we do have a set protocol
18 that we don't go on the train tracks unless that power
19 has been confirmed that it's been turned off. But under
20 the circumstances, where we was, I made the conscious
21 decision to say to the LUL guy at the end of the
22 platform "Are you sure the power is off?", and he said
23 "Yes", and at the time that was good enough for me.

24 Q. So there was no question of you, yourself, delaying.
25 I think what I was trying to ask you was whether you

1 saw or were aware of any crews, either waiting on the
2 mezzanine level or in the station, and being held back
3 for any reason?

4 A. No, I didn't see any, no.

5 MS BOYD: Yes, thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for
7 Mr McPartland?

8 No, there are no more questions, Mr McPartland.

9 Given the publicity that has attached to some parts
10 of the evidence in this inquest, I think it's important
11 to point out that we all know there are many
12 firefighters all over London, all over the country, like
13 you, who that day, and every day, were prepared to put
14 their lives on the line for the sake of others. So
15 thank you very much for what you did, and thank you for
16 coming to tell me about it.

17 I think we'll continue, Mr Keith.

18 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. The last witness for today, in
19 fact, is Firefighter Michael Curnick.

20 MR MICHAEL CURNICK (sworn)

21 Questions by MR KEITH

22 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

23 A. Michael Curnick, sir.

24 Q. On Thursday, 7 July, you were the officer in charge of
25 appliance F251?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. I shan't make the mistake of trying to suggest what sort
3 of appliance it was. Perhaps you could tell us what
4 appliance it was.

5 A. Foxtrot 251 is a dual-purpose pump ladder.

6 Q. What does that mean?

7 A. It means it carries all the ladders and all the
8 equipment.

9 Q. Right. You presumably had a number of crew on your
10 appliance with you?

11 A. There was five of us altogether, sir.

12 Q. If we could have LFB17, please, on the screen, page 1 [LFB17-1],
13 we can see that Foxtrot 251, halfway down the page, is
14 committed -- was committed at 09.01.59, was mobilised
15 09.02.03 at the bottom half, if you could scroll further
16 down the page a little bit, we can see Foxtrot 251
17 towards the bottom, and if we could then, please, have
18 page 2, the following page, and if you could enlarge in
19 the middle of the page the "Resource status changes"
20 box, we can see F251 is the second row, 09.02.03, F251
21 arrive 09.06.49.

22 So it seems that you arrived really very quickly
23 after you were mobilised.

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. On the way to Aldgate, did you hear something about the

1 nature of the incident, fire and explosion, to which you
2 were being called?

3 A. Yes, just as we negotiated the one-way system towards
4 Aldgate station, I heard the "Initiate major incident
5 procedure". It was actually as we pulled up.

6 Q. How did that affect you and your crew, if at all?

7 A. Well, obviously, we knew we was going to a serious
8 incident and, as we approached the station, I actually
9 leant back to my crew and said, "This is a train crash".
10 That's what it looked like to me with the people coming
11 out the station.

12 Q. Because, as you arrived, you saw wounded, injured
13 passengers coming out --

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. -- from the station. You parked in Aldgate High Street,
16 is that right?

17 A. Yes, sir, we was actually opposite the station on the
18 other side of the road to leave the entrance clear.

19 Q. When you arrived, did you meet a number of your
20 colleagues from one of the other appliances?

21 A. Yes, we dismounted the appliance, made our way over to
22 the station, and I was met by Crew Manager Edwards and
23 Firefighter Garside from Whitechapel fire station.

24 Q. They are from the appliance -- the same appliance to
25 which Mr McPartland, from whom we've just heard, was

1 attached?

2 A. I know Crew Manager Edwards was, but I don't know if
3 Firefighter Garside was on the pump or the pump ladder
4 from Whitechapel.

5 Q. I think Leading Firefighter Edwards was the appliance
6 commander on that occasion?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Did they tell you what they had learnt, which was that
9 there had been an explosion?

10 A. Yes, I was approached by Crew Manager Edwards who said
11 "There looks to have been an explosion on the train".
12 At that time, we was totally overwhelmed with the amount
13 of people coming out.

14 Q. Was that because the first priority, it seemed to you,
15 was to try to give first aid to the passengers coming
16 out?

17 A. Yes, I mean, Whitechapel's crew, pretty much all their
18 crew was already committed to tending the casualties
19 coming out.

20 Q. Who was in charge when you arrived?

21 A. Sub-Officer Clarke.

22 Q. Was he giving instructions to yourself and your
23 colleagues as to who was to do what?

24 A. No, at that stage, I believe Sub-Officer Clarke was
25 actually in the ticket concourse of the station.

1 Q. You describe how you instructed arriving crews -- this
2 is in your statement -- to give first aid, as you've
3 told us, but also to lay out hoses?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Why did you feel that was a necessary step?

6 A. Well, we was obviously called to a fire and explosion,
7 and if we had a fire on the Underground, we're going to
8 need a lot of water. I instructed the crews to set into
9 a hydrant, ie connect our hoses to the street hydrant,
10 to the appliances, and supply a firefighting jet, which
11 was done.

12 Q. It was already apparent that there were people in the
13 booking hall who had come up from the tunnel and could,
14 therefore, tell you whether there was a fire or any
15 indicator of there being a likely fire.

16 Did you receive any information from them as to --

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. -- what sort of explosion it was or what the position
19 was in the tunnel?

20 A. No, sir. The information was very sketchy at this
21 stage.

22 Q. Is it standard training, as well as, if I may suggest,
23 common sense, that, if there is a call out to a fire and
24 explosion, laying hoses down to cover the eventuality
25 that they will be used and needed is the first step?

1 A. Yes, sir, it is standard procedure.

2 Q. I think you were also approached by a police officer who
3 discussed with you, or you told him that there was,
4 because of the possibility of a fire, a need to evacuate
5 people from the front of the station?

6 A. Yes, sir, because we had reports, sketchy reports of an
7 explosion and a fire, he asked me what he could do and
8 I said "Evacuate the area as best you can to a 200-metre
9 radius", which is a -- it's basically a default
10 exclusion zone that we would use.

11 Q. This was all before Sub-Officer Clarke had come back
12 from the track and the tunnel?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. We've heard in evidence how he went down to see what the
15 position was before coming back up.

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. When he came back up, did the position change?

18 A. When Sub-Officer Clarke came out the station, which was
19 probably only a minute or so after my arrival, the
20 officers got together, Sub-Officer Clarke told us what
21 we had, and it was at that stage that we decided that we
22 needed to get a crew down there as soon as possible.

23 I had all my crew together, so we went.

24 Q. I'll come back to that in one moment. What he told you,
25 in essence, was it wasn't a question of a fire; it was

1 actually a question of an explosion and it had left
2 people trapped. So the priority shifted, did it not,
3 from tackling a possible fire to getting bodies down
4 there to help with the trapped people?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Did you and your entire crew volunteer?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Could you help us with that, please, Officer? Why is it
9 a question of volunteering as opposed to simply saying
10 "That's the order and that's what we're going to do"?

11 A. It wasn't a case of volunteering as such. It was just
12 that I had my crew all together and it's easier to work
13 with your own crew, you know, your familiar faces and
14 stuff, so it wasn't a matter of finding volunteers.

15 I think in the end it was -- we struggled to keep people
16 out the station in the end, you know.

17 Q. I want to be clear about this. It wasn't a question of
18 protocol or any kind of training preventing you from
19 going down and then you then had to volunteer in order
20 to circumvent any sort of protocol?

21 A. No, sir, no.

22 Q. By "volunteer", you mean you were ready, so you went?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Right. You went downstairs with your crew, still five
25 of them?

1 A. Yes, sir, six of us actually, sir. We was joined by
2 a firefighter from Bethnal Green.

3 Q. Right. What equipment did you take down with you?

4 A. We took -- we each took a BA set, we took first aid
5 kits, laerdals and I believe we took a short extension
6 ladder with us.

7 Q. Did it take time to put that together, or did you have
8 that all with you at the moment and you said "We're
9 ready, we're off"?

10 A. It didn't take time at all.

11 Q. Did you have to go back to the appliances?

12 A. We just had to walk across the road, put our BA set on,
13 we put those on as we walked down, it took no time at
14 all.

15 Q. When you got to the platform level, the issue arose as
16 to whether the power was off?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Whom did you ask?

19 A. I asked a member of LUL staff who was standing at the
20 end of the platform, as it dipped down on to the lines
21 itself.

22 Q. Did he tell you straightaway that the power was off?

23 A. No, sir.

24 Q. What happened?

25 A. I asked him could he confirm that the power to the lines

1 was off, and he said, "I'm not sure".

2 Q. We've heard evidence that, at that moment, a British
3 Transport Police inspector, a gentleman called
4 Inspector Munn, came out of the tunnel and he saw you
5 there waiting with your crew for the London Underground
6 staff to answer your query.

7 Was his presence on the rails and, if you recollect
8 it, his giving to you of the information that the power
9 was off sufficient, or did you have to wait for
10 confirmation?

11 A. I don't recollect him being there. I was liaising with
12 the LUL staff. But even if I did see him there,
13 I wouldn't take his word for it, jumping up and down on
14 the lines. I'd go through an LUL member of staff.

15 Q. There were a number of people, at that stage, on the
16 track.

17 A. There was people evacuating on the opposite side of the
18 platform walking along the gravel.

19 Q. So not the same track that you were intending to go
20 down?

21 A. No, sir.

22 Q. Was that relevant to whether or not the presence of them
23 in the tunnel at all was sufficient to satisfy you that
24 the power was off?

25 A. No, sir. We need to get confirmation either at local

1 level, ie at the station of the power off, or we do it
2 from our Brigade Control. We need to get confirmation
3 of power off and trains stopped, because moving trains
4 can bridge gaps in lines and transfer the power back on.

5 Q. We've heard it can reenergise a section of track.

6 A. It can reenergise the lines, yes.

7 Q. Do you recall, whilst you were there waiting for
8 confirmation to come through, being approached by two
9 passengers who had come from the train who were asking
10 you why you were waiting?

11 A. No, sir. There was passengers passing, but they may
12 have spoken to the crew, but I was -- I basically had
13 hold of the LUL staff chap to get this confirmation.

14 Q. Do we take it, from how you've described that
15 discussion, that it took a little longer than you would
16 have liked?

17 A. No, it didn't. It was quick.

18 Q. How long did it take?

19 A. I believe in my statement I said three minutes or so.
20 But it was actually probably quicker than that.

21 Q. Using the phrase "three minutes" does seem to indicate
22 a certain passage of time.

23 A. Yes. There was a time.

24 Q. You must have recollected --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- that a certain amount of time had passed, and it was
2 a noticeable amount of time.

3 A. Yes. It felt like a lifetime, but it wasn't.

4 Q. Because you recollected, and you felt, that you were
5 being impeded, that you couldn't get on to do what you
6 wanted to do?

7 A. I wouldn't use "impeded" as the word. I mean, we was --
8 he wasn't stopping us going on the line, the LUL staff.
9 He was just waiting for the confirmation.

10 Q. But time was of the essence, was it not?

11 A. Of course.

12 Q. You no doubt felt that time was perhaps being wasted
13 because you had to wait? You couldn't go straight down
14 on to the track?

15 A. We couldn't, no, we couldn't go straight down until the
16 confirmation was received.

17 Q. Inside the tunnel, you came across the bombed carriage?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. It was obviously apparent to you that the bomb had
20 severely damaged the train and there were severe
21 casualties present?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. How did you first appreciate that there must have been
24 dead people there as well?

25 A. Well, when we approached the train, there was two people

1 on the lines outside the train. One appeared to be dead
2 and the other one, I believe, was groaning, making some
3 noises. I looked into the carriage. The doors were
4 blown out on both sides of the carriage. The rear of
5 the carriage was up against a wall.

6 However, the doors were blown out and, having
7 casualties on the line inside the tunnel, I assumed that
8 there may be casualties blown out the other side. So
9 I committed a firefighter up to the end of the train and
10 round the back to search the back of the train.

11 Q. To go behind the train?

12 A. To go behind the train.

13 Q. Between the train and the tunnel wall?

14 A. Yes, and I detailed another firefighter to attend to the
15 casualties on the line.

16 Q. Do you recollect that you were the first firefighters to
17 reach that point?

18 A. Yes, we was.

19 Q. In your statement, you say that you believe you were the
20 first brigade member on to the carriage. Do we take it
21 from that that you climbed into the carriage?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Through that first or second set of double doors?

24 A. The furthest set of doors from the platform.

25 Q. From?

1 A. From the platform.

2 Q. The furthest set from the platform.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So the end set of doors in the carriage, the first set
5 of rear doors in that second carriage?

6 A. As I approached the train in the tunnel, I had to walk,
7 basically, the length of the involved carriage to the
8 last set of doors and I climbed in there.

9 Q. In your statement, you describe how you were able to
10 assess very approximately the number of seemingly dead
11 people inside the carriage.

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Did you walk round the carriage as far as you were able
14 yourself, or was it a question of staying in the doorway
15 and trying to see what was there?

16 A. I did move up and down the carriage.

17 Q. If we put on the screen in front of you [INQ10280-9], can
18 you please tell us -- just to get your bearings on this,
19 Officer, you will see there is an arrow on the bottom
20 part of the plan, the direction of travel is to the
21 right, so the bomb is towards the rear of this second
22 carriage and it's marked by the red cross.

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. So if you were approaching from Aldgate, you would be
25 coming from right to left?

1 A. Yes, I would be approaching from double doors D2 towards
2 double doors D8.

3 Q. Exactly, so we can take it from your evidence that you
4 went in D8?

5 A. I did, yes.

6 Q. Can you tell us, please, in general terms, where you
7 recollect the bodies whom you described as being, in
8 your opinion, dead and how you know that they were dead?

9 A. Certainly, in close proximity to the X, there was a body
10 there, half a body. There was -- I've got to get this
11 right here. There was casualties I believe in seats 17,
12 18 and 16.

13 Q. Just pause there. When you say "casualties"?

14 A. Live casualties.

15 Q. Live casualties.

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. In fact, do you recall a lady near 16 we now know to be
18 Kira Mason -- you wouldn't know that -- and a man and
19 a woman near 17 and 18?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. The first person you described in respect of whom there
22 was, as you describe, only half a body, was that because
23 part of the body was concealed by debris in that area in
24 the location of the bomb or because you could see that
25 the body had been severed in some way?

1 A. It had been severed.

2 Q. Please continue.

3 A. There was a person laying -- where you see double doors

4 D8, and it's got "draught screen" written, there was

5 a body there which, my first assumption, I thought was

6 dead, but wasn't.

7 Q. Why was your assumption corrected?

8 A. Because he was laying there not moving at all, just he

9 appeared dead. However, in a short space of time, he

10 moved.

11 Q. Can you recollect in what way he moved?

12 A. He tried to get up on all fours.

13 Q. Did he succeed?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Could you assess the nature, in broad terms, of his

16 injuries?

17 A. No. He hadn't -- he didn't have any real physical

18 injuries, if I recollect. However, he --

19 Q. His legs were intact?

20 A. Yes, his legs and arms, but his clothes were gone.

21 Q. Did he seem to you to be responsive?

22 A. Very minor response. I tried to ask him his name, but

23 he couldn't reply.

24 Q. In relation to all the people you came across, did you

25 try to shout at them or talk to them to see what sort of

1 response you could get?

2 A. Yes, I tried to reassure everyone on the train that help
3 was on the way.

4 Q. Were you able, yourself, to provide any sort of medical
5 aid to that person who was not responsive but was
6 moving?

7 A. Yes, I managed to get him back down into the recovery
8 position as best I could.

9 Q. Could you just tell us, please, what the recovery
10 position is?

11 A. It's just to make sure the person is laying down with an
12 open airway. That's basically what it boils down to.
13 You make sure their airway is open.

14 Q. As you did so, were you able to see whether or not his
15 eyes were open?

16 A. His eyes did open, but, you know, it was sort of -- he
17 seemed to be drifting in and out of consciousness, yes.

18 Q. He was obviously severely injured.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But in a way that you couldn't tell?

21 A. I couldn't tell, sir.

22 Q. Do you remember anything of his clothing?

23 A. If I recollect, I think he just had his underwear on.

24 Although there may have been shreds of other clothing,

25 by I seem to remember him being almost naked.

1 Q. Who else did you see?
2 A. There was two people sitting in seats 21 and 22.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. They were supporting an injured person who was actually
5 laying across them.
6 Q. Was that a lady?
7 A. It was a lady I believe, sir, yes.
8 Q. If you were in door D8, were her feet towards you and
9 her head the other way?
10 A. Yes, sir, her feet was towards D8 and her head was
11 towards D6.
12 Q. Away from you?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Do you recollect a second person lying across one or
15 both of the laps of the people in seats 21 and 22?
16 A. No, sir, I don't.
17 Q. Tell us what you can recall of the lady lying across the
18 laps of the people in 21 and 22.
19 A. She was obviously very severely injured.
20 Q. Why do you say "obviously"?
21 A. She looked -- I didn't actually approach that close
22 because there was -- there appeared to be what looked
23 like body parts on the floor.
24 Q. In the standing area between the two banks of seat?
25 A. Between -- yes, between sort of 19 and 14.

1 Q. Yes, but was it something about her position or some
2 part of her injuries that led you to think that she was
3 obviously very severely injured?

4 A. It was the people sitting in seats 21 and 22 sort of
5 called over to me and said, you know, "We really need to
6 help her", you know, I think they may have said words
7 like "She's dying".

8 Q. Were you able to see what her injuries consisted of from
9 where you were?

10 A. No, I wasn't, no.

11 Q. Could you see, for example, any throat or neck injury?

12 A. No, sir, she was -- I believe she was actually face
13 down.

14 Q. In relation to the area of the train where you describe
15 seeing body parts, were you able to form any view as to
16 the number of people who were in that part of the train?

17 A. I tried, but I believe I underestimated.

18 Q. How did you try?

19 A. I tried to sort of count how many parts there was to
20 make an assessment of how many people there was.

21 Q. Was there any movement at all in that group of people?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. Was there anything to indicate that, whomsoever may have
24 been in that part of the carriage, they were alive at
25 all?

1 A. Sorry, sir, could you repeat?

2 Q. Was there anything about the people who were in that

3 part of the carriage on the floor between 14 and 19 to

4 indicate that they may have been alive at all?

5 A. No, sir.

6 Q. How close did you get to the people who were there?

7 A. As close as I am to this screen.

8 Q. Did you move debris around to be able to form a view as

9 to how many people there were? You've described how you

10 described body parts.

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. Was there anything you could do for either them or the

13 lady who was across the laps of the people in 21 and 22?

14 A. The lady who was across the people in 21 and 22, she was

15 attended by another member of my crew who joined me on

16 the train, although I can't be sure as to who it was,

17 but it was a member of my crew who joined me on the

18 train.

19 Q. Did you see in that same area a lady not wearing the

20 apparel of emergency services, in fact she was an

21 off-duty doctor called Dr Gerardine Quaghebeur?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you see her?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. So she was there alongside the member of your crew who

1 was tending for that young lady?

2 A. I believe so, sir, yes.

3 Q. There came a time when a member of the crew, a member of
4 your crew who was looking after the young lady on the
5 lap of the man and the woman at 21 and 22 left. Do you
6 recall them leaving at all?

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. Do you recall a paramedic arriving?

9 A. Yes, the paramedics and the HEMS doctors seemed to
10 arrive together in force.

11 Q. How long after you had been inside the carriage, though?

12 A. I couldn't give a time on it, but we waited a time, and
13 then, when they did arrive, they arrived in force.

14 Q. When they arrived, did they seem to you to stay in the
15 location of the lady who was lying across the lap or did
16 they move on through the carriage to look after and to
17 assess and triage other people?

18 A. No, they moved on through the carriage.

19 Q. What was your last recollection of the lady, the young
20 lady, lying face down, who was she being tended by when
21 you last saw her?

22 A. I believe she was being tended by London Ambulance
23 Service and Fire Brigade.

24 Q. So this must have been before the -- was this after
25 a paramedic had been and then moved on?

1 A. I'm not sure, sir.

2 Q. What I'm getting to, Officer, is this: it may be that
3 she was tended to by a paramedic who looked at her and
4 then moved on before the arrival of a HEMS doctor, or it
5 may be that she was tended to continuously.

6 Can you recall whether there was always somebody
7 with her or whether there was a time when the emergency
8 personnel around her left to triage and look after other
9 people?

10 A. I can't recall, sir, whether she was left or treated
11 continuously.

12 Q. Did you see her being taken out of the carriage?

13 A. No, sir. I ended up sort of committed to the other end
14 of the carriage, you know, 17, 18 -- 15, 16, 17, 18,
15 area.

16 Q. All right. Did you see anybody being moved from the
17 area of 21 and 22 out of the carriage?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. In your statement, you describe how you were
20 subsequently informed that there was a live member of
21 the public who had been alive when you arrived in the
22 carriage but who had subsequently died.

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Do you know which of the people you've described whom
25 that refers to?

1 A. It was the person laying just inside doors D8 where it
2 says "draught screen" in that area there.

3 Q. The gentleman whom you put into a recovery position?
4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. You then turned your attention to the people who were
6 near 17 and 18, Mr Brown and Ms Wright, who had very
7 severe leg injuries. Do you recall that?
8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Was that where you stayed?
10 A. I stayed with the gentleman by the draught screen for
11 quite some time, directing the crews from there.

12 Q. The gentleman you'd put into a recovery position?
13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Did a paramedic or any paramedics come to you to assist
15 in the care of that gentleman?
16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Tell us what happened.
18 A. They arrived, assessed him and said to me "He's gone".

19 Q. How did they know?
20 A. They checked him over.

21 Q. In what way?
22 A. Physically, you know, they made a thorough sort of check
23 of him, physical assessment of him, and their words to
24 me were "He's gone".

25 Q. Sorry to press you --

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They checked his vital signs,
2 I assume --
3 A. Yes.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- taking his pulse?
5 A. Yes, my Lady.
6 MR KEITH: Was that conclusion consistent with what you had
7 observed, which was presumably that there had been no
8 movement and no signs of life at that time?
9 A. Up until that time, there was signs of life. He was
10 making noises, there was a slight physical movement but
11 it appeared, literally, as the ambulance crew arrived,
12 he died.
13 Q. Do you recall whether the paramedics attempted to apply
14 any sort of mask or oxygen mask to him or was it
15 a question of them arriving and immediately seeing from
16 checking his vital signs that he had already died?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. It was the latter?
19 A. It was the latter.
20 Q. You didn't see a mask being applied?
21 A. No, sir.
22 Q. Did he remain there?
23 A. No. After the man was pronounced dead, I moved on.
24 Q. Did he remain there, though, or was he moved?
25 A. Sorry, yes, he remained.

1 Q. He remained there. Did you move on to 17 and 18?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Did you stay there tending for them, whilst, no doubt,
4 your colleagues assisted? Do you remember an off-duty
5 police officer, a lady we now know to be called
6 Elizabeth Kenworthy?

7 A. Yes, sir, there was some civilians, I'll use the term
8 "civilians", they was in civilian clothing, who were
9 helping.

10 Q. They were all taken off in sequence, were they not --

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. -- later? In your statement, you describe how there
13 came a time, though, during this -- during the time you
14 were in the carriage that you had attempted to request
15 further equipment but were unable to do so because of
16 the radio.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Do you remember at what time you were requesting
19 equipment and, if so, what it was?

20 A. That was very shortly after my arrival stepping on to
21 the train, I attempted to request further personnel,
22 extrication equipment and further first aid kits and
23 laerdals.

24 Q. It seems obvious that you did so because you had seen
25 how many severely injured people there were, including

1 a number of possible fatalities.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Why did you feel the need to call for equipment and for
4 medical equipment? Could you not assume that there
5 would be paramedics shortly behind you or that your
6 colleagues could come and assist?

7 A. I wouldn't assume. I'd rather be sure that the
8 equipment was coming.

9 Q. Was that because you appreciated that due to the number
10 of possible fatalities and the number of severely
11 injured, however much equipment yourself and your
12 colleagues had, it could never be enough to deal with
13 the number of people you were confronted by?

14 A. No, we didn't have enough between us at that time.

15 Q. Did you know before that there were paramedics on the
16 way?

17 A. I didn't -- no one actually told me paramedics are on
18 the way, but --

19 Q. That's why you then felt the need to make a call?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Did you make that call?

22 A. I did, using a runner, eventually.

23 Q. Did you try on a number of occasions to use your radio?

24 A. I tried. Our main channel on the radios that we had at
25 the time is channel 1. I tried channel 1. It was

1 ineffective. I switched to channel 5, which would use
2 a leaky feeder system, if it was fitted. That was
3 ineffective. I tried the BA channel, which is
4 channel 6. That was ineffective.

5 Q. I'm sorry, what is BA the acronym for?

6 A. Breathing apparatus, we've got a separate radio channel
7 for breathing apparatus.

8 Q. If you need it, if you need to call for it?

9 A. No, sir.

10 Q. Oh, I see, it's inside the piece of equipment?

11 A. If we use breathing apparatus at an incident, we switch
12 to channel 6 for BA, and normally at an incident,
13 someone would be on channel 6, so I tried all the used
14 channels.

15 Q. The channel that you referred to in connection with the
16 leaky feeder, channel 5, that requires a piece of
17 equipment called a leaky feeder, which is a long wire
18 which allows you to use a channel because it provides an
19 extra antenna?

20 A. Yes, but basically a leaky feeder is just -- in layman's
21 terms, all it is, is it's an aerial cable, stretched
22 between the tunnel or wherever and it's got holes in it
23 and it leaks radio waves and you can pick it up.

24 Q. But there was no leaky feeder antenna, was there?

25 A. It didn't work. Whether there's one fitted at Aldgate

1 or not. At that time, I don't know.

2 Q. We know one was provided at -- there was one asked for
3 in one of the other bombsites, but it didn't arrive,
4 I think it was King's Cross, it didn't arrive for
5 several hours.

6 A. What, a portable?

7 Q. Yes, a portable one.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. So there was no radio contact?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Therefore, did you call one of your colleagues over and
12 say "You've got to run to the end"?

13 A. Yes, sir, I used Firefighter Clarke for that purpose.

14 Q. Did you come out of the tunnel and track with the
15 injured passengers whom you'd been tending for at the
16 end of the carriage, or did you wait until everyone had
17 gone and then come out yourself?

18 A. I waited until everyone had gone. Sorry, that was until
19 all the live casualties were gone.

20 MR KEITH: Of course. Thank you, Mr Curnick. Will you stay
21 there? There may be some further questions for you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

23 Questions by MR COLTART

24 MR COLTART: Mr Curnick, I represent the interests of
25 Richard Ellery who was the young man who died in the

1 doors of D8 that morning. Firstly, thank you for your
2 efforts on his behalf. I've only got a very few
3 questions for you.

4 You've told us that, at the time that the paramedics
5 and the HEMS doctor arrived, he was pronounced dead at
6 that point and inevitably, therefore, no oxygen was
7 administered at that stage.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Did you see at any stage before that anyone
10 administering any oxygen to Mr Ellery?

11 A. I don't recall it, no.

12 Q. I don't know whether you were present when Mr McPartland
13 gave his evidence a short while ago, but he recollected
14 one casualty on the train being made more comfortable
15 through the release of oxygen from a breathing
16 apparatus, because there wasn't a laerdal available.
17 Were you ever aware of that treatment as far as
18 Mr Ellery was concerned?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. If you had had further equipment available to you at
21 that time, if there had been, for example, more laerdal
22 resuscitators available on the carriage, would you have
23 sought to have deployed any of that equipment as far as
24 Mr Ellery was concerned?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Was that part of the reason why you were making requests
2 for further equipment to be brought down to the
3 carriage?

4 A. Yes, sir. As a whole, we needed more equipment for
5 people.

6 Q. So not just for him, but for others as well?

7 A. For everyone.

8 Q. Finally this, just on the issue of timing: are you able
9 to assist us with how long you were on the carriage for
10 after he had passed away and been certified dead by the
11 doctors?

12 A. As I say, we waited a time for the Ambulance Service to
13 arrive, although I couldn't put a specific time on that.
14 I would say from after Mr Ellery being pronounced dead,
15 I imagine -- well, I returned to Shadwell fire station
16 at 2.30 in the afternoon.

17 Q. But after you came up out of the station, were you one
18 of those that went for a cup of tea and some
19 refreshments in a church nearby?

20 A. I was taken into a church but told to write a statement.

21 Q. Right. No cup of tea and biscuits for you.

22 I said "finally", but in fact, just one more thing.

23 You can't be specific as to how long after you arrived
24 at the carriage the paramedics followed, and no one is
25 expecting you to be specific, it's impossible after this

1 elapse of time. But can you give us an idea, do you
2 have any estimate as to what that gap might have been?
3 A. I would say -- this is an estimate -- I would say at
4 least ten minutes, although I can't be sure, but it was
5 a time, we waited a time.

6 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just pursuing one of Mr Coltart's
8 questions, Mr and Mrs Taylor aren't here this afternoon,
9 and it may be that you saw their daughter lying across
10 the laps of two people.

11 Was there anything, had you had any other equipment,
12 that you think you might have been able to do for her,
13 or weren't your attentions focused on her, other people
14 were dealing with her?

15 A. At that stage, my Lady, I don't think there was anything
16 more we could have done.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Saunders?

18 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

19 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Curnick, I would like to try, if I can, to
20 understand the time -- it's following on from her
21 Ladyship's questions -- all right -- about that lady,
22 Carrie Taylor?

23 Can we have, please, on the screen so that we can
24 put it into perspective the plan of the carriage
25 [INQ10280-8].

1 You've described two people who were sitting at
2 seats 18 and 20 with a lady across their lap.
3 A. Yes, I believe that's where they was.
4 Q. All right, now you're looking down the carriage from the
5 position of about D8 --
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. -- back along. I just want to make sure I understand
8 the timings. You and your team are still mobile at the
9 time the major incident call goes out?
10 A. Yes, we was just arriving.
11 Q. So --
12 A. Sorry, it was mentioned earlier, the system that the
13 fire appliances used at the time, what we commonly
14 called the "button box", was very temperamental at the
15 best of times, so those times are probably a little bit
16 delayed.
17 Q. All right. We know that was about 9.05.
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. You get there we think just after 9.06. In your
20 statement, what you in fact say is that you entered the
21 station -- my Lady's page 2 of Mr Curnick's statement,
22 first paragraph:
23 "We entered the station approximately five minutes
24 later."
25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. So we're now at about 9.11.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. There is then the delay -- and I'm not passing any
4 criticism at all -- about whether the power is off --

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. -- that you think could have been about 3 or 4 minutes.

7 A. At the very most. I've overestimated.

8 Q. I appreciate that, but what I'm trying to do is to
9 understand, so that's about 9.14, if it's three minutes?

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. So by the time you reach carriage 2, it's a good couple
12 of minutes after that, is it?

13 A. No, it was only 70 yards into the tunnel. And we was --
14 we had a bit of a hop on, as we went down the tunnel.

15 Q. Sorry, a bit of a ...?

16 A. A bit of a run on, as we went down the tunnel. Sorry.

17 Q. No, that's all right, I just didn't hear you, I'm not
18 criticising at all. So we're at about a minute after?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. You then go into the carriage and obviously you're
21 trying to survey everything you see.

22 A. Yes, sir. I was trying to make an assessment of what
23 we -- because we hadn't a clear picture of what had
24 happened at that stage.

25 Q. I think we quite understand. So by this stage, we've

1 heard evidence, you see, following the explosion to this
2 point, that there were two ladies on or across the laps
3 of the people seated at seats 18 and 20. All right?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. One was Carrie Taylor, who everybody thought was face
6 upwards. So facing up towards the ceiling. The other
7 lady was a family that I represent, the Stevensons, who
8 was across more the gentleman at seat 18, Bruce Lait.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Now, did you ever see two ladies in that vicinity?

11 A. I can only recall one.

12 Q. At some point, Fiona Stevenson is moved from
13 Bruce Lait's lap to free him so that he can move. Did
14 you see that happen at all?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. But by this stage, we're nearly 25 minutes after the
17 explosion?

18 A. Yes, sir, the explosion was at 08.50 or 08.51.

19 Q. Exactly, about 08.48, 08.49, 08.50.

20 A. Yes.

21 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Curnick, I don't have anything else, thank
22 you very much.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

24 Questions by MS SHEFF

25 MS SHEFF: I just want to ask you one question about the

1 second carriage, the scene obviously, as you've told us,
2 there were casualties, there were body parts, there were
3 lifeless bodies, and there was one lifeless body, part
4 of which you said you saw severed.

5 A. Yes, ma'am.

6 Q. Was it the leg of that body that you saw severed?

7 A. Yes, ma'am, the lower half.

8 MS SHEFF: The lower half, yes, that's just what I wanted to
9 ask you, thank you very much, Officer.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Ms Canby?

11 Questions by MS CANBY

12 MS CANBY: Mr Curnick, just a couple of points on behalf of
13 Transport for London.

14 You were asked in relation to your enquiries as to
15 whether or not the traction current was off, and you
16 said to Mr Keith, the gentleman who was asking you
17 questions first, that you couldn't remember a BTP
18 inspector being there. That's certainly what you say in
19 your witness statement, and that's from November 2005.

20 Do you remember -- and it may, in fact, be the
21 witness statement that you've just referred to, that you
22 had to make rather than getting your cup of tea --
23 making a handwritten note on the day on 7 July?

24 A. I did make a handwritten statement, yes.

25 Q. We've had that recently on Lextranet, which is our

1 electronic system, I'm not sure if it has made its way
2 on to Trial Director, but let's see if we can find it.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just prompt him with the entry to see
4 if it reminds his memory. I think we're going too much
5 to the documents, to be honest, unless we have to.

6 MS CANBY: Yes, my Lady.

7 To help you, Mr Curnick, in your handwritten
8 document you say:

9 "At platform level confirmed BTP that power to lines
10 was shut down."

11 So certainly on that day, you do seem to remember
12 having a conversation with the BTP that the power on the
13 lines had been shut down. Does that help to jog your
14 memory?

15 A. It doesn't. I'm sorry, no. I don't remember speaking
16 to a British Transport Police officer on the platform.

17 MS CANBY: All right. Thank you very much, Mr Curnick.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, any other questions?

19 Ms Simcock?

20 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

21 MS SIMCOCK: Just one, my Lady. You were there when the
22 paramedic arrived to deal with Mr Ellery. Do you
23 remember if that paramedic was dressed in green?

24 A. My immediate thought was that it was a HEMS doctor.

25 Q. In an orange jumpsuit?

1 A. I can't remember what colour they was wearing, but my
2 immediate thought was that it was a HEMS doctor.

3 MS SIMCOCK: I'm grateful, thank you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

5 Questions by MS BOYD

6 MS BOYD: Mr Curnick, Sub-Officer Curnick, I should say,
7 just on the issue of timing and, in particular, the time
8 that you were waiting for confirmation that the power
9 was off, you've given various estimates up to 3,
10 4 minutes in your statement, but you say that was an
11 overestimate.

12 Can you compare it to the length of time of
13 questions of Ms Sheff, Ms Canby and Ms Simcock, did it
14 seem that length of time?

15 A. It was probably about the length of time I just spoke to
16 the last lady.

17 Q. Thank you. You have explained how you were the first
18 crew, full crew, and that's how you came to "volunteer",
19 in inverted commas, down on to the train.

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. Can I analyse the time that it took you before you
22 arrived at the carriage? Because you've said that you
23 arrived, according to the status resources, pushing the
24 button, 09.06, but you think that's not necessarily
25 reliable.

1 A. It wasn't reliable at all.

2 Q. So it could have been 09.06 at the latest?

3 A. At the very latest.

4 Q. Your estimate, your time estimate, for between arriving
5 and going down to the platform is how long?

6 A. Five minutes.

7 Q. It does seem from your evidence that you were the first
8 fireman into the crew, or at least with your crew, into
9 the carriage?

10 A. Yes, I was.

11 Q. We've had evidence from Inspector Munn of the BTP that,
12 by the time he made a call at 09.11 -- and I think we
13 probably have to add a couple of minutes on to that, so
14 09.13 -- there were firemen by or on the train. So that
15 would seem to suggest, if you were the first fireman or
16 with your crew on the carriage, that had to be you
17 before he made his call at 09.13.

18 A. Yes, it would.

19 Q. Leaving aside time estimates for a second, from the
20 moment that you arrived, realised that you were faced
21 with a very serious incident -- indeed, you'd been
22 called to an explosion and a fire -- was there any delay
23 on your part, or that of your crew, in going down to the
24 train?

25 A. None whatsoever.

1 Q. In relation to the issue of uncertainty as to whether or
2 not the power was off and you wanted confirmation, are
3 you also, in your position as responsible for your crew,
4 conscious of that responsibility and their lives as well
5 as your own in making any judgment?

6 A. Of course, yes. Crew safety is my responsibility.

7 Q. If you were faced with those circumstances again, would
8 you have done anything differently?

9 A. No, I wouldn't, I'd do exactly the same.

10 Q. In terms of when you got on to the train, I think you've
11 told us how you directed Mr Kelly to search the track by
12 the train and underneath to make sure there were no more
13 casualties?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I think in your statement you describe Sudbury and
16 Clarke as runners. Did Clarke, in fact, make his way
17 through all the carriages to the rear to check for
18 casualties on other carriages in the train?

19 A. Yes, I did direct a firefighter to check all remaining
20 carriages, but I couldn't be sure as to which one it
21 was.

22 Q. You've explained the difficulties you had with radios
23 and how you used Firefighters Clarke and Sudbury as
24 runners. Therefore, were they effective in
25 communicating messages?

1 A. Yes, they was. It was Firefighter Clarke I used as
2 a runner.

3 Q. Given the location of Aldgate and the train, that was an
4 efficient way of communicating?

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. You've talked about the arrival of another fire crew
7 through door 6, who dealt with the casualties further
8 down the carriages. Do you know who they were?

9 A. I believe they was Southwark's crew. It may have been
10 a mixture of Southwark and Dockhead.

11 Q. So I think Southwark is Mr Turner, Mr Jones and other
12 firefighters, but I can't recall their names at the
13 moment.

14 A. No, I can't either.

15 Q. When you were in the carriage -- and obviously your
16 focus was on Richard Ellery, so you may not be able to
17 answer this question -- were you aware of another watch
18 manager, Station Officer Spier, speaking to you from the
19 outside of the carriage and asking for your assessment,
20 because we've got a written statement from him, which is
21 going to be read to the court?

22 A. Yes, I was spoken to by various officers who was
23 actually in the tunnel. I couldn't confirm the station
24 officer's name, but I certainly spoke to Assistant
25 Divisional Officer Kent down there.

1 Q. I think it was Station Officer Spier who actually led
2 the Southwark crew down to the train.

3 Before you went down to the train, I think you also
4 said you were in conversation with
5 a Sub-officer Robinson from Bethnal Green.

6 A. Yes, I was.

7 Q. Was it your understanding that he was going to get
8 a crew together and also come down?

9 A. I wasn't sure at that stage. He remained upstairs at
10 that stage. I wasn't sure --

11 Q. So you're not sure what his movements were?

12 A. I wasn't sure of his movements, no.

13 Q. Finally, whilst you were in the bombed carriage, or at
14 any stage, were you made aware or did you become aware
15 of any particular risk of a secondary device?

16 A. We was -- at some time into the incident, we was
17 approached by Assistant Divisional Officer Kent, which
18 was Shadwell's station manager, and he said -- he
19 informed us that there was devices actuating over
20 London, and there's a possibility of a secondary device
21 on a train.

22 We was asked if we wanted to leave or stay, and
23 everybody stayed. Fire Service, you know, Ambulance
24 Service, everyone stayed.

25 MS BOYD: Thank you very much, Sub-Officer Curnick.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions for Mr Curnick?
2 Mr Curnick, whatever may be said about the protocol
3 on the power, there is absolutely no doubting the
4 personal courage of you and your crew. I think it was
5 for about an hour and a half you laboured tirelessly and
6 fearlessly in appalling conditions to help those
7 severely injured people and I commend you for your
8 actions.

9 A. Thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 MR KEITH: My Lady, thank you. I'm not tempted by the
12 prospect of inviting you to have a further five
13 statements read this evening.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's a good job, you'd have needed
15 a hard hat, I think, Mr Keith.

16 MR KEITH: It won't be the first.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you all very much. 10.00 am
18 Monday, please.

19 (4.17 pm)

20 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Monday,

21 1 November 2010)

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23