

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 27 October 2010 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 27 October 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. May I invite you to call
4 Antonio Silvestro.

5 MR ANTONIO MARIO SILVESTRO (sworn)

6 Questions by MR KEITH

7 A. My Lady, my name is Antonio Mario Silvestro. I'm
8 a detective constable with the British Transport Police.
9 I currently work with their National Crime Team at the
10 force headquarters. At the time of the London bombings
11 I was based at Aldgate on the Race Hate Crime Unit.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

13 MR KEITH: Your full name is Antonio Silvestro, but is it
14 fair to say, Mr Silvestro, that occasionally people
15 refer to you as "Tony"?

16 A. Most of the time it's Tony, sir, yes.

17 Q. I ask that because a number of people have spoken of
18 a BTP officer in the tunnel and they've called him by
19 the name of Tony, so we've presumed that that must have
20 been you?

21 A. That's correct, everyone who knows me calls me Tony.

22 Q. Right. On Thursday, 7 July, you were, I think, at the
23 British Transport Police office in Aldgate, we know
24 where it is, we've hear some evidence about it. Is that
25 right?

1 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

2 Q. I think you had booked on duty about 8.00 that morning,
3 and you were on the computer doing your emails?

4 A. That's it, that's correct, sir, yes.

5 Q. When what happened?

6 A. I was in the office, Ian Baker was in the office with
7 me. All of a sudden, just before 9.00, there was a loud
8 bang, immediately followed by a big -- basically, the
9 building shook. The next conversation was words to the
10 effect of "What was that?"

11 Q. No doubt mixed in with an expletive or two?

12 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.

13 Q. I think you ran out of the office with DI Baker?

14 A. That's correct. Immediately, we ran down the stairs to
15 the street level, where there's a -- some glass doors,
16 and went through the doors.

17 Q. When you came into the station, was it apparent that
18 something had happened?

19 A. That's correct, the -- we call them Bostwick gates, they
20 were closed, slightly ajar, there was a -- members of
21 Underground staff milling around stopping people from
22 entering the station. We forced our way through,
23 identified ourselves as police officers, and entered the
24 station.

25 Q. Just pause there. Were they ajar because they'd failed

1 to shut properly, or ajar because they'd been kept open
2 in some way?

3 A. They were just kept open. In those circumstances,
4 normally Underground staff sort of close them as far as
5 they can go, just to let them -- it was wide enough to
6 allow one person to go through at a time.

7 Q. No doubt you asked the staff of London Underground what
8 had happened. Did you receive any information that
9 explained what the source of the bang had been?

10 A. Yes, the only information we had, it was some sort of
11 power surge, an electrical power surge, that was it.

12 Q. Because it was plain that the station was being
13 evacuated and because you didn't know what the source of
14 the bang was, did you go down to the platforms to make
15 sure that everybody was out?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. We've heard evidence that there were two trains at the
18 platforms: one in platform 3 in its entirety; and one at
19 platform 2 just slightly off the end of the platform,
20 that had been pulling out when the power had gone off.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you remember seeing those stationary trains?

23 A. I do, yes.

24 Q. You assisted in evacuating people from the station and
25 I think you cleared one of the platforms while DI Baker

1 cleared the other platform?

2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. Did you then go back up to ground level to get some
4 paper or a log of some sort to try to keep a record of
5 what was going on?

6 A. Basically, having cleared all the trains, we had a final
7 clean sweep, making sure that everyone was out, out of
8 the trains and off the platforms. We went back up to
9 the ticket hall area. There was a slight conversation.
10 We decided there and then that it was some sort of
11 incident that needed recording, so I left the booking
12 hall area, went up to the office, picked up the notepad,
13 and there were a couple of other officers there,
14 DC Burnell, DS Kevin Thomas. I said to them something
15 had happened down there, get down there quick, and it
16 was in full flow. So basically, my conversation was as
17 I was leaving the office and I went back down to the
18 station.

19 Q. Around that time, did you begin taking details of one of
20 the drivers, in fact a Mr Mark Williams?

21 A. That's right. Having got back down to the booking hall
22 area, we started taking details of who was there.

23 I just started to write Neil Williamson. As I did so,
24 immediately someone said "There's people in the tunnel"
25 or words to that effect.

1 Q. Could you see them?

2 A. No, I mean, we were in the booking hall area. It was
3 quite a distance down the stairs along the platform.

4 Q. So what did you do when you heard that?

5 A. As soon as they said "There's people in the tunnel",
6 there was an Underground member of staff, I don't know
7 his name, he was wearing an orange vest, I said "Give us
8 your vest", he gave it to me, he had a torch, I grabbed
9 the torch and just ran through the barriers.

10 As I was running, I said words to the effect of --

11 to Ian Baker -- "You stay here, I'll go down", and

12 I then ran down the stairs and along platform 1.

13 I think I was guided by someone towards platform 1.

14 I don't know why I actually went down there, but it must
15 have been a member of Underground staff just guiding us
16 towards platform 1.

17 Q. On the way, did you ask anybody whether the power was
18 off?

19 A. I got to the end of the platform and, prior to going on
20 to the tracks, I just turned to a member of Underground
21 staff -- it was just pure instinct, really, we're
22 trained like that in the Transport Police, that you just
23 don't go onto the tracks until you know the power is
24 off, so it was just a reaction to that, "Is the power
25 off?" And that was it.

1 Q. You had already seen people coming out of the tunnel at
2 that moment?

3 A. Yes, faintly, as I was near -- as I was running along
4 the platform, I mean, the smoke at this stage, billowing
5 out of the tunnel -- I mean, I can best describe it as,
6 when a volcano erupts, and you see that really thick
7 smoke, that white smoke. This wasn't pure white, it was
8 greyish, but it was really thick.

9 As I got to the end of the platform, that's when
10 I sort of turned and said, "Is the power off?", and as
11 you started looking into the tunnel, you could actually
12 see silhouettes of people coming, within seconds they
13 were close and you could see that, you know, they were
14 obviously injured, I couldn't -- there's no specific
15 injuries, but I mean I've described in my statement that
16 it was like Michael Jackson's Thriller video, they were
17 just covered in soot, their hair was all over the place,
18 you just basically saw the whites of their eyes.

19 Q. You had a torch?

20 A. I had a torch.

21 Q. You had a hi-vi vest on?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. As they came towards you, was there anything you were
24 able to do to shepherd them, to encourage them to come
25 towards the platform?

1 A. I just shouted to them -- I kept shouting "Police"
2 I mean, that was one thing I kept doing throughout the
3 incident, was that I'm a police officer. I was aware
4 that I was in plainclothes, I had an orange vest, rather
5 than a police vest, so I just shouted at them "Police,
6 come towards the light", by this time I was actually on
7 to the tracks themselves, I'd stepped off the platform,
8 and just started beckoning them towards me, "Just keep
9 going", just telling them to keep going.

10 Q. When you stepped on to the tracks, could you see the
11 train ahead of you?

12 A. No, no, not at all.

13 Q. Did you then go further into the tunnel?

14 A. I just ran in. I mean, I have to say it was very hard
15 to see. The smoke was very thick. It was hard to
16 breathe. You shone the torch, but it sort of reflected
17 back on you, so -- but unfortunately, on the left,
18 I recall, platform more there was emergency lighting
19 that was on, although it was faint, it was enough to
20 guide you along the platforms. I just carried on
21 running up the platform -- up the tunnel, you know,
22 avoiding the tracks, basically.

23 As I got towards, there's a slight bend on the track
24 itself, and as I got round the bend, you could actually
25 see the train and, by this time, my eyes were focusing

1 a bit more and I could see there was a bombed out -- or
2 a carriage full of debris, the doors had been blown out,
3 and people milling around.

4 Q. All the time, there were people still coming down the
5 track towards you?

6 A. Yes, there was a constant -- well, at this time it was
7 like a steady flow of people milling around. They were
8 dishevelled, they were dazed. People were shouting
9 "Help". It was pretty much chaotic, really.

10 Q. Could you see any London Underground staff ahead of you
11 or behind you?

12 A. Underground staff, I remember two guys came down with
13 me, because, when I did turn round, there was -- and
14 went down the tunnel, there was an Underground member of
15 staff, two of them I believe. I don't know their names.
16 I just -- as soon as I saw the devastation, the people,
17 I just turned round and just told him words to the
18 effect of "Just go and get all the emergency services,
19 get everyone".

20 Q. You told the London Underground staff with you to go and
21 get more help, to get emergency services?

22 A. More help. I mean, I knew Ian Baker was upstairs,
23 I knew he didn't come down with me. I knew, having seen
24 the people step onto the platform, come out, that he
25 would have called the emergency services anyway.

1 I mean, it's not rocket science. I just --

2 Q. Do you happen to know whether one or other of the two
3 members of the London Underground staff left the tunnel
4 to go and make a call or they stayed with you?

5 A. One of them, I believe, did --

6 Q. One of them actually left?

7 A. No, no, I was aware of one of them. He turned -- as
8 I spoke to him, he turned and actually went up the
9 tunnel away from the bombed carriage.

10 Q. You continued to reassure people coming out of the
11 tunnel or along the track, and you no doubt told them to
12 head for the lights?

13 A. That's right. I just told them --

14 Q. Natural daylight and whatever light there was in the
15 Aldgate area, in the platform area?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. I think at that stage you met a passenger, whose name
18 was Colin, who was helping people to find their way
19 along the track?

20 A. Yes. I mean, that's all I know him by is "Colin". He
21 seemed quite reassured, he seemed in control of what he
22 was doing.

23 Q. Did he have an injury to his face, do you recall?

24 A. I don't recall, sir, no. Like I say, it was very hard
25 to see anything, it was very dark down there.

1 Q. If I said the name Colin Pettit, would that mean
2 anything to you?

3 A. Not at all, sir, all I know is "Colin".

4 Q. All right. You, no doubt, told them that you were
5 a police officer and you told him to carry on doing what
6 he was doing, if he felt up to it and he was all right.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did there come a stage when you got to the carriage
9 itself, carriage 2?

10 A. Yes, I mean, I had spoken to Colin, I'm happy that he
11 can assist in evacuating the tunnel as quickly as we
12 could. I got to the bombed-out carriage, I got close to
13 it, the door was hanging, there was still people milling
14 around, there was lots of people screaming for help.
15 I looked into the carriage itself.

16 Q. Just pause there. Could we please have on the screen
17 [INQ10280-9]?

18 You'll see there a diagram of the carriage with the
19 seats numbered. For our purposes, the doors, more
20 importantly, are numbered, and you'll see that the
21 left-hand door is D8, D6, D4.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The bomb was in the location of D8. Can you tell us,
24 please, which doors you looked in through?

25 A. The doors that were hanging off was at D6.

1 Q. So D6 was one you looked in on?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could we also then have, please, [BTP86-9], and rotate it?

4 Is this a diagram that you made shortly afterwards?

5 A. That's right, it's whilst I was being interviewed I made

6 that diagram.

7 Q. You made notes of the people that you saw. We can see

8 there that you've marked an area as "seats" --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- which we've presumed is the first bank of four seats

11 rather than the two seats right at the end of the

12 carriage?

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 Q. So the box to the left of seats is the first door and

15 the box to the right is the second set of double doors?

16 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

17 Q. When you looked in, did you see a white male, therefore

18 to your right, on the right-hand side of the second set

19 of double doors?

20 A. Yes, there was -- it was a young chap. He was anywhere

21 between 20 and 30 years of age. I believe he was

22 wearing dark trousers, a light-coloured shirt, and this

23 guy just kept trying to stand up, basically, he was sort

24 of half up, half down, and I mean, there was no speech

25 from him, he didn't really know -- you could see he was

1 totally -- I'd say -- I mentioned it once like
2 World War I victims, the old trench warfare, where they
3 have those shakes. This guy was totally out of it, but
4 his instinct was trying to get up all the time, and
5 I was concerned that, if he did get up and came towards
6 the doors, that he would fall on to the track, because
7 at Aldgate, because you're in the tunnel, it was about
8 neck level on myself -- I'm not the tallest, so it was
9 about neck level.
10 So he was trying to get up and I just was holding
11 him back, basically.
12 Q. You leant into the carriage to hold him --
13 A. That's it, I was trying to push him back down to stop
14 him falling out. Again, all along shouting "Police, sit
15 down, mate, sit down".
16 Q. One of the issues with which her Ladyship is concerned
17 is the location of each of the deceased who died in the
18 carriage and the way in which they died.
19 In your statement, there is a suggestion to the
20 effect that that person, you were subsequently informed,
21 had died.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. May I ask you this: did he, in fact, appear to have any
24 obvious injuries?
25 A. No. Again, a quick examination when -- from that stage,

1 there was no obvious injuries. When I stepped into the
2 carriage and actually dealt with him and sat him down
3 physically, there were no injuries.

4 Q. Where did you sit him down?

5 A. When did I sit him down?

6 Q. No. Where?

7 A. I sat him down against where there would have been the
8 glass partition, it was just sat down --

9 Q. On the floor?

10 A. On the floor, yes.

11 Q. So there was no suggestion that this person was a person
12 lying on the floor rocking back and forth in a foetal
13 position; he was trying to get up, falling down and then
14 you held him up to stop him falling out of the Tube?

15 A. That's right. That's correct at that stage, yes.

16 Q. I don't think that you saw him again later, did you?

17 A. No. The only other time I dealt with him was when
18 I actually climbed into the carriage and, like --

19 Q. Sat him down?

20 A. And sat him down, and physically sat him down.

21 Q. But you didn't see him, for example, being attended by
22 paramedics or anything of that sort and nor did you see
23 in fact him being taken out or lying motionless in a way
24 that might have indicated that he had subsequently died?

25 A. Not at all, sir, no.

1 Q. Certainly, from your diagram, he is indicated as being
2 on the right-hand side of that set of double doors, the
3 second set of double doors, and, therefore, there's no
4 question that he was in the locality of the first set of
5 double doors?

6 A. No. He was --

7 Q. Towards the end of the carriage?

8 A. It's where I've marked him as number 1 and circled it,
9 that's the male IC1 we're talking about.

10 Q. As you looked in, did you see a male and a female
11 sitting down in their seats to your left, whom you've
12 marked down here as 2 and 3?

13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

14 Q. Did you see them when you initially looked in or after
15 you'd gone in to help the male?

16 A. No, as I looked into the carriage, I saw the male and
17 female sat down.

18 Q. Tell us about them, please.

19 A. As I looked in, they were sat down. There was debris
20 everywhere, there was twisted metal. They were sat.

21 Draped across their lap was a young female and her head
22 was pointing downwards. So, as they would be sat in --

23 if I'm sat on the seats that they are, I can't remember

24 if the male or female was the first one, but the female

25 was draped down with her head back and she was being

1 supported by another female, who I understood was
2 a doctor, because she told me at the scene that she was
3 a doctor, and she was supporting the young female, head
4 and shoulders.

5 Q. The young female, you said her head was down, do we take
6 it that her head was nearest you and her feet were in
7 the other direction away from you to your left?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. She was lying across the two people, the male and the
10 female. Could you see whether she was moving at all?

11 A. She wasn't moving, no. Her legs were entangled.

12 I mean, you could see it was entangled in the metal and
13 whatever else there was.

14 Q. Could you see what injuries she had from where you were?

15 A. No, I couldn't, it was still very dark to see.

16 Q. Could you hear any noise or anything to indicate that
17 she was talking or emitting any sort of speech?

18 A. No, sir, no.

19 Q. The doctor, we know, was Dr Gerardine Quaghebeur.

20 A. Right.

21 Q. She had come into the carriage, and we've heard evidence
22 that she held the lady, Carrie Taylor, up by the upper
23 torso and also held her head to try to keep her airway
24 open.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Initially, you weren't able to get in there to help her
2 yourself, were you, because of the carriage being up --
3 A. That's right, it was too hard --
4 Q. -- too high?
5 A. -- I tried to climb in several times, it was too high.
6 I couldn't get any sort of leverage on it, but I put in
7 my statement there was some blood, but I can't really
8 say it was blood, but it was like a sticky matter.
9 Q. But a ladder appeared?
10 A. Yes, at some stage during that, a member of Underground
11 staff shouted out "Shall I get a ladder? They've got
12 them at the front of the train". So whilst I'm dealing
13 and pushing the guy down, he's gone off and he reappears
14 at some stage with a ladder and I just propped it up.
15 And I propped it up against the train, and then managed
16 to climb in.
17 Q. Did you go straight to the young lady who was being
18 assisted by the doctor?
19 A. Yes. At this stage, as I've climbed in, the guy is
20 still trying to get up, so I've sat him back down, told
21 him to "Stay there, mate", and the doctor then started
22 saying "This girl needs urgent assistance". Throughout,
23 I have to say that I kept saying I was a police officer
24 and that help was on its way. Like I say, the doctor,
25 I said that help is going to come, but, you know, I was

1 trying to tell her there's loads of other things to do,
2 you know, it was chaotic.

3 Q. But you judge from the fact that she was telling you
4 that the young lady needed serious help that she was
5 still alive.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did she describe in any further detail what sort of help
8 was needed or what would happen if help wasn't
9 immediately forthcoming?

10 A. No, all she said to me was words to the effect of "This
11 woman needs urgent medical assistance". I told her that
12 help was on its way. "If you can stay with her" --
13 I basically said "It's your call, Doctor, we either move
14 her or we don't". She said "Well, I can support her,
15 I just need to make myself more comfortable and I can
16 support her until extra help comes".

17 So I said "If we can do that" -- we did actually try
18 to move her, but she was entangled, there was no way we
19 could move her at all, so there was no way we could
20 actually move her from the position she was in. All we
21 could do was support her as best we could so that the
22 doctor could remain in a comfortable position awaiting
23 emergency services, basically.

24 Q. Having reassured yourself that the doctor could continue
25 to hold her and the position was preserved until further

1 help could arrive, did you take a moment to look around
2 the rest of the carriage?
3 A. I --
4 Q. Did you shine your torch around?
5 A. I shone the torch around. Like I say, it was very hard
6 because the light kept reflecting off the dust because
7 it was still very thick, it was very hard to see. The
8 carriage was blackened, there were wires hanging down,
9 there was twisted metal everywhere. I had a quick shine
10 in both directions. I didn't see anything, and just
11 jumped back down on to the track.
12 Q. Having jumped down on to the tracks, did you see
13 somebody in the tunnel on the floor?
14 A. I did. I jumped back on to the tracks. Again, there
15 were people everywhere. It was chaos. I was aware of
16 people in the carriages screaming their heads. I shone
17 the torch into the carriage just to tell them that
18 a police officer was there, help was on its way, calm
19 down. As I moved along the carriage, as I was shining
20 the torch into the carriage --
21 Q. This is still carriage 2, is it?
22 A. This is the next carriage on from the bombed carriage.
23 Q. So this is carriage 3. Going towards the rear of the
24 train.
25 A. That's it. I've stepped out on to the tracks, I've

1 moved along towards the rear, got to the first set of
2 double doors and just shone the torch in telling
3 everyone I was a police officer. I then turned around
4 and shone the torch again. There was still people
5 milling around. I kept telling them to go towards the
6 light and, as I looked down, I saw or heard a black
7 woman shouting, "Help me, help me". I know her name to
8 be Thelma, because I dealt with her later, but it was
9 Thelma lying in -- she was probably about 15 feet away
10 from the bombed-out carriage. She was alongside the
11 train carriage, not right the way underneath the
12 carriage, but next to the track. Very close to it.

13 Q. Obviously you reached the view that she must have been
14 blown out of the train by the force of the explosion,
15 but the train had then moved on before coming to
16 a complete halt?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you immediately go to Thelma and see what her
19 position was and what her state was, or did you look
20 around the area around her?

21 A. I went to Thelma. I mean, throughout I'm looking
22 around, shouting to people that I'm a police officer.
23 I went to Thelma, got close to her. She kept shouting
24 "Help me, help me". I said "Stay calm, I'm a police
25 officer. Help is on its way, just stay there". There

1 was nothing really I could do for her. She was there,
2 she wasn't going to go anywhere.

3 Q. She was obviously conscious?

4 A. She was conscious. Behind her, I remember being --
5 there was a load of debris, I think, and there was
6 a body. I examined it briefly, but it was lifeless.

7 Q. Just pause there, please, Officer. When you say you
8 examined the body, how did you do that? Did you try to
9 seek a pulse, for example?

10 A. I just -- I recall -- I didn't put it in my statement,
11 but I just touched a wrist, and the body was -- it was
12 dead to me, the body was dead.

13 Q. Can you recall whether or not the person whose body it
14 was was lying face down on the track or face up?

15 A. I can't recall to be honest, sir. I tried to -- going
16 through my statement and trying to go back to that
17 situation, but I can't honestly say.

18 Q. Can you recall whether or not the person was male or
19 female?

20 A. Not at all, sir, no.

21 Q. All right. The person was, you thought, dead. Did you
22 see anything notable or anything that particularly stood
23 out in your mind in the debris around Thelma and that
24 person?

25 A. I recall standing on a foot. It was weird, because

1 you're in a tunnel standing on debris, metal, whatever
2 it was, and all of a sudden there's something quite
3 soft. I shone the torch down and I recall it was a --
4 the remains of a foot.

5 Q. All the time, there were no doubt people still in
6 carriage 3 screaming "Let us out of here", screaming for
7 help, screaming to get out?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you continue, as you'd done before, to shine your
10 torch into the carriage to try to calm things down and
11 to reassure them that there was a presence -- namely,
12 yourself -- outside?

13 A. That's correct, sir. I shone it in that carriage and it
14 really seemed to have an effect, and they were aware
15 that somebody was on the track. I had the orange
16 visibility vest, so they were aware of that, I was
17 shouting "Police" and, because they'd calmed down, I ran
18 the whole length of the train towards the rear and did
19 the same thing, shouting "Police", and then came back.
20 I mean, they were like sardines in there, basically,
21 there was a lot of smoke in there, and they were
22 panicking and screaming.

23 Q. Of course.

24 A. But they did calm down when they realised that there was
25 somebody on the tracks to help.

1 Q. It may be obvious, but I ask nevertheless, from the fact
2 that they were still packed in there and screaming to be
3 let out, the doors were not open?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did you try to see whether they could be opened?

6 A. I did at some stage. I think, prior to that, I'd met up
7 with -- the timescales, I haven't a clue, but prior to
8 that, I think I met up with Neil Kemp from the --
9 a City of London police officer. It was basically, as
10 I was running up and down and came back towards where
11 the bombed carriage was, we virtually bumped into each
12 other. It was along the lines of, you know, "Who are
13 you?" and it was "Who are you?" and "Well, I'm ..." and
14 that's when he mentioned that there's the possibility of
15 a secondary device or a fire starting.

16 Our conversation was along the lines, "Well, you
17 deal with the casualties, I'll get everyone out", and so
18 it just became -- from that moment then, it just became
19 some sort of like -- like a rescue mission, really,
20 I was aware --

21 Q. Racing against time to get people out of the carriages?

22 A. Yes, it never entered my mind it was a bomb, I knew
23 there was an explosion, it never entered my mind of
24 a secondary device. It was only until Neil said the
25 possibility of a secondary device that the urgency sort

1 of went to another level then. We had to get them out
2 as quick as we can.

3 Q. You describe in your statement how you initially tried
4 to prise one set of doors open with a member of staff
5 and then you tried using a handrail to jemmy open the
6 doors.

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. You also tried a carriage key?

9 A. Yes, I mean, people inside the carriage were frantically
10 trying to open the doors, and it probably opened about
11 an inch or so, so I thought, with them from the inside
12 and me from the outside, we could actually prise it
13 open, but the doors weren't playing, so that wasn't
14 happening, and a member of Underground staff, I believe,
15 came back with a long handrail and we managed to wedge
16 that in, but it just wasn't working.

17 I've mentioned they give me a key, I really don't
18 know what I did with that, to be honest, because
19 I couldn't find the lock for it.

20 Q. Whilst you were running up and down the carriages,
21 reassuring the occupants, I think you helped one
22 particular gentleman out of the train, not from the back
23 of the train, but from the interconnecting door between
24 two of the carriages.

25 A. That's correct, sir. It was a tall, slim black guy.

1 He'd managed to get the side doors open, the
2 interconnecting doors open, and he managed to squeeze
3 himself through it. I mean, it was a struggle for him
4 to get through.

5 Q. So it wasn't possible for any number of passengers to
6 come out that way?

7 A. No, it was a very tight squeeze, but he managed to do
8 it.

9 Q. At some stage, you took up an elevated position in the
10 tunnel so that you could be seen and you could perhaps
11 shine your torch in a wider arc?

12 A. Yes, I think, prior to that, somebody had actually
13 opened the rear doors where the other driver's cab would
14 have been to the rear of the train, as I've mentioned in
15 my sketch. I think it's probably an Underground member
16 of staff has gone down there. He's managed to open the
17 doors. And obviously, from that carriage, people would
18 start going through. It was then obvious more people
19 were appearing from that far end, so it was a matter of
20 then getting everybody to start moving down towards the
21 rear of the train and make their way out the back of the
22 train.

23 I ran up and down telling everybody to keep going
24 and then I think, once one started, the flow started
25 going, and people started to reappear towards me.

1 Once they'd done that, that's when I took up the
2 elevated position, I can't remember what I stood on,
3 I think it was some sort of debris or some sort of
4 mechanical part of the Underground system, but it was
5 enough with my orange vest and a torch to -- just to
6 start ushering people down.
7 And after that, it was just a steady, steady flow of
8 people coming towards me, and it was just me constantly
9 shouting "Police. Keep coming, keep coming. That's the
10 way out".

11 Q. It was a very large number of people?

12 A. There was, it was a constant flow. I mean, how long it
13 went on for, I don't really know, but it was constant.

14 Q. Do you recall any fellow officers in the tunnel near you
15 at that stage or the arrival of the emergency services?

16 A. At some stage during -- when people -- the flow is
17 carrying on, Bob Munn, Inspector Bob Munn, who I've
18 known since I joined the police, he appeared, it was
19 like a friendly face there who appeared. We had --

20 Q. I think you had a couple of --

21 A. He had a couple of officers with him. I didn't know who
22 they were, but they were with Bob, and we had a brief
23 conversation. I don't really remember what it was, but
24 it was along the lines of, you know, "I'm getting
25 everyone out", something along those lines.

1 Q. But as a result of speaking to him, when it seemed to
2 you that most people, if not all the people, had walked
3 off the train, did you decide to carry out a sweep
4 inside the carriages to make sure that everybody who was
5 able to get out had, in fact, got out?

6 A. That's correct, sir. All I managed to do was actually
7 climb in through the interconnecting door where the
8 black guy came through, I managed to get into the
9 bombed-out -- the carriage next to the bombed-out one,
10 and I started my sweep from that end.

11 There were about three people there looking into the
12 bombed-out carriage. I told them to get out as well,
13 and two of them did, one refused to go. He basically
14 wanted to stay -- he was looking into the carriage and
15 said he just wanted to stay there. So I basically said
16 "It's your call, mate, you stay if you want", and I left
17 him.

18 I then --

19 Q. Went backwards towards the rear?

20 A. -- walked backwards, checking everybody was out and then
21 finally got through to the end of the train and carried
22 on my sweep along the track then.

23 Q. As you got to the end of the train, did you see the
24 members of London Underground who had been helping
25 passengers out the back of the train?

1 A. Yes, I do recall one guy, but that's about it. I just
2 recall a uniform, to be honest, that was there helping
3 people down. He must have been helping them down.
4 Q. Right. You went back up the track. Was the lady whom
5 you had previously seen on the track still there?
6 A. Yes. Basically, me and the Underground staff, we made
7 a clean sweep, we made sure that everyone was off the
8 tracks and no one was beyond us and, once we'd satisfied
9 ourselves there, there was now a guy with Thelma.
10 Q. Was that the same person you'd seen earlier, Colin?
11 A. No, I can't recall, sir, to be honest.
12 Q. Do you recall whether he was a passenger or a member of
13 staff?
14 A. I think he was a passenger, to be honest. I don't think
15 he was a member of Underground staff. He didn't have
16 a uniform on anyway.
17 Q. What did you tell him?
18 A. I basically told him to go, "You go and I'll stay with
19 Thelma". By this time, I think there was -- there were
20 other officers around. There was less people around.
21 The Fire Brigade had turned up, I think. I'd made the
22 clean sweep, I was satisfied that everyone was off the
23 train, no one was behind me, it was just Thelma on the
24 track, and because there was other emergency services
25 around, I went with Thelma.

1 Q. Did you notice by this stage that the emergency services
2 had entered the bombed-out carriage and were attending
3 to the people near the two people on the seats that you
4 had earlier seen and the young lady who was draped over
5 them?

6 A. No, it was too far away, sir.

7 Q. Too far away for you to see?

8 A. Yes, my total focus was Thelma then.

9 Q. Did you assist in carrying her out of the tunnel, in
10 fact?

11 A. I did, yes.

12 Q. How was that done?

13 A. We made a makeshift stretcher and we tried several times
14 to put her on to a proper stretcher, but was unable to
15 do so with her positioning. Eventually, we managed on
16 some sort of cloth-type stretcher, put her on to some
17 metal board or something and, with the Fire Brigade, we
18 carried her out. But this -- it was quite a way --
19 a while that I stayed with her. I mean, she was -- it
20 was a long while that we were there, to be honest.

21 Q. When you came out with her, she was no doubt triaged at
22 the top level. Did you go back down to the track or did
23 you remain then outside?

24 A. No, I stayed with Thelma, paramedics worked on her,
25 I assisted them. When they were satisfied she was

1 stable, we then carried her to an ambulance, put her in
2 the back of an ambulance, shut the door, and then
3 I just -- it was pure chaos and pandemonium then, I just
4 wandered around the front of Aldgate and in the distance
5 I saw Ian Baker stood at a cordon and that's when I went
6 over to him, really. I never went down again.

7 Q. Very sensibly, you went to have a cup of tea.

8 A. Yes, that's when Neil Kemp at some stage just turned up
9 and said, "Come on, Tony, we'll go for a cup of tea" so
10 we went to a caff just round the corner.

11 Q. May I ask you this, please, officer: as a result of the
12 assistance that you gave to passengers on the train,
13 were you awarded the MBE in January 2009?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you very much.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

17 Questions by MR COLTART

18 MR COLTART: Just a few questions from me, if I may.

19 I represent the interests of a young man called
20 Richard Ellery who died on the train that morning.

21 I just wonder whether we can get your handwritten sketch
22 back up on the screen, if we may?

23 From the descriptions which you've given, there
24 would be some reason to believe that the person that
25 you've annotated at point 1 on your plan might have been

1 Mr Ellery. I'm going to explain why that's so before
2 I then go on to ask you a few questions about it.
3 He fits the description, broadly speaking, of the
4 person that you've described in your statement as being
5 at position number 1. Other witnesses have described
6 him having very jerky body movements in the period
7 shortly after the bomb had exploded.
8 You've mentioned movements this morning. Are you
9 able to expand upon that at all?

10 A. The only way I can describe the movements, when he was
11 trying to get up and when he actually at some stage had
12 actually got on to his feet and was moving towards the
13 doorway, was like a World War I trench victim, when
14 they've got those shakes and the body was shaking. He
15 was on his feet, he was quite stable, but he was in
16 shock. That's how I could only describe it. He was on
17 his feet, he was shaking, but he was in shock. He
18 wasn't understanding anything, I don't believe, of what
19 I was saying.

20 Q. So you were attempting to communicate with him, but it
21 didn't appear that he was registering anything that you
22 said?

23 A. No, he was totally dazed, totally out of it, is the only
24 way I can say.

25 Q. We haven't heard from Mr Kemp yet, but we will hear from

1 him later today, in fact. It appears that he did have
2 some dealings with Mr Ellery in the period shortly
3 before he died. What precisely did Mr Kemp say to you
4 about the young man that he had had dealings with on the
5 carriage that morning?

6 A. The only conversation -- all he's mentioned, and that's
7 why I put it in my statement, the young man -- which
8 I assumed was who I've put on the sketch as number 1 --
9 had died. That's the impression I got. He didn't
10 exactly say -- whether or not we were talking about the
11 same male, I don't know, but he said "the young male in
12 the carriage" and he's the only -- apart from the two
13 sat down. I just assumed it was number 1 had died.

14 Q. So this was -- I'm not being remotely critical here, I'm
15 just trying to get to the bottom of it -- this was an
16 assumption on your part that you were talking about the
17 same person?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You haven't, for example, sat down with Mr Kemp and had
20 a look at your sketch plan to see whether you might have
21 been talking about the same person or different people?

22 A. Not at all, sir, no, we haven't spoken about it, no.

23 Q. I wonder whether we could just get up on the screen,
24 please, [INQ10280-8]? It's the same diagram that we've
25 been dealing with in terms of the annotations of the

1 doors. Do you see where double door D6 is at the bottom
2 of that diagram?

3 A. I do, yes.

4 Q. The direction of travel is from left to right on this
5 particular plan. Are you sure that, when you looked
6 through the double doors on your arrival at the
7 carriage, you were looking through double doors D6 as
8 opposed to double doors D8?

9 A. No, it was definitely D6, because that's the way the
10 doors on that picture -- you see there the classic
11 picture of Aldgate station where the doors are hanging
12 and where the step ladder is, that's where I've stepped
13 up, so that would be D6.

14 Q. Did there ever come a time when you looked through
15 double doors D8 from the tracks, as it were? Did you
16 ever look through the doors from that perspective?

17 A. I shone the torch briefly, but I didn't see anything.

18 Q. Because Mr Ellery -- do you see where position number 11
19 is marked on that plan, just inside double doors D8?

20 A. I do, sir, yes.

21 Q. That's where Mr Ellery was later found and that's where
22 we assume Mr Kemp had dealings with him. You are as
23 sure as you can be in your own mind that that wasn't
24 where you saw the young man that you describe in your
25 witness statement?

1 A. On D6 where you have number 23, which is Thelma Stober,
2 that's where I think the position of the young male that
3 I dealt with.

4 Q. Thank you. We needn't explore that any further. Just
5 one other short topic, if I may. I think that on the
6 day itself, at the end of the day, you were offered, but
7 declined, a meeting with an occupational health
8 therapist, a welfare meeting. Was that arranged
9 presumably by BTP?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. But the following week, on 14 July, you did have
12 a meeting with a lady called Fiona, as you describe it
13 in your witness statement, who was from the occupational
14 health team at BTP.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I've no wish to explore the contents of that meeting
17 with you at all, that's obviously an entirely private
18 matter between you and the occupational health
19 therapist, but did there ever come a time when you were
20 invited to take part in a formal debrief process so that
21 could you give your views as to how matters had gone on
22 that day?

23 A. No, sir, the only time I've described what happened on
24 that day was when I made a statement on tape, and that's
25 the only time.

1 Q. This is the -- that was on 20 July, wasn't it, where you
2 obviously met with officers I think from the
3 Metropolitan Police, is that right, who --

4 A. No, they were British Transport Police officers.

5 Q. It was British Transport Police, was it, who took your
6 witness statement?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But, other than that, you've never been invited by
9 British Transport Police to take part in any sort of
10 formal or informal debrief process?

11 A. No, sir, none.

12 Q. Because your witness statement is obviously a factual
13 narrative of the actions which you took on that day, but
14 have you ever been asked to provide an opinion as to how
15 the rescue operation went, what went well and what
16 didn't go so well?

17 A. No, sir.

18 MR COLTART: All right, thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

20 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

21 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Silvestro, I want to go back, if I may,
22 it's the same diagram, [BTP86-9]. In order to get our --
23 or for me to get my bearings, Mr Silvestro, the four
24 boxes you've marked, the larger ones, are the four
25 doors, aren't they?

1 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

2 Q. So going from the right, it's D2, D4, D6 and D8?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You've marked the numbers 2, 3 and 4 and below that

5 you've written "seats"?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, I don't want to unnecessarily trouble you with

8 names, but are you aware of any names now of who those

9 people may have been?

10 A. No, sir, no.

11 Q. All right. I'm asking you some questions on behalf of

12 a family called the Stevensons. We believe from the

13 description you've given that the lady you're describing

14 as number 4, would be a young lady called Carrie Taylor

15 because of the way you have her positioned across the

16 lady, in particular, on the end of that seat.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. All right? The gentleman who was sat next to -- so the

19 lady we understand is Crystal Main and next to her

20 Bruce Lait, and Carrie Taylor is across Crystal Main's

21 lap.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you remember seeing another lady, very similar, blond

24 hair, maybe a few years older, who was across the lap or

25 legs of Mr Lait?

1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. The man that you've got down as number 2?

3 A. No, sir, not at all.

4 Q. In fairness to you, you've never suggested there was

5 anybody else you were aware of --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- at that stage. Apart from the doctor, who is

8 number 5, Dr Quaghebeur, would this be right: you

9 appeared to have been the first person into that part of

10 the carriage that was not somebody who was a passenger?

11 A. That's correct, I believe so, yes, sir.

12 Q. Because of everything you've told us about being with

13 Mr Baker upstairs, coming downstairs, having taken the

14 visibility jacket and torch and, as it were, your

15 movements into carriage number 2, you appear to have

16 been the first person?

17 A. Yes, I believe so, yes.

18 Q. Then you've described what you did for others, and later

19 were aware other emergency services have arrived?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. At that stage, you don't remember seeing another lady?

22 A. No, I don't, sir.

23 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Silvestro.

24 A. Thank you, sir.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

1 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions in the second
3 row? Third row? Yes, Mr Taylor?

4 Mr Silvestro, this is Mr Taylor, who is the father
5 of the lady who we think was across the lap.

6 A. Okay, my Lady.

7 Questions by MR TAYLOR

8 MR TAYLOR: Good morning. I think Mr Saunders has just
9 covered most of what I wanted to ask anyway, but there
10 is some confusion between Carrie and Fiona.

11 Could we put that plan back up, please, that shows
12 the carriage, the seat number?

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you want the one that has the
14 numbers on it --

15 MR TAYLOR: Yes, please.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- rather than the rough diagram?
17 That one?

18 MR TAYLOR: Yes, that's the one. Now, when you say you saw
19 this young lady, she was laying face down?

20 A. When she was laid across their laps?

21 Q. Yes. Was -- her body was laying on their laps, but was
22 she laying face down or face up?

23 A. I recall she was face up.

24 Q. If you look at the diagram, seats 18 and 20, there's
25 a partition just behind seat 20?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And a part of that partition would, I believe, be
3 a pole?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. Was that lady pressed up against the pole?

6 A. I don't actually recall a pole being there, to be
7 honest, in its normal upright position. I just recall
8 just the body, to be honest. I couldn't describe --
9 I mean, there was twisted metal everywhere. I couldn't
10 honestly say whether or not she was twisted up against
11 a metal pole. There was just twisted metal everywhere.

12 MR TAYLOR: Okay, thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any other
14 questions? Yes, Ms Simcock?

15 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

16 MS SIMCOCK: I am very grateful.

17 DC Silvestro, in your statement, when you describe
18 seeing the young woman who we think is Carrie Taylor
19 with the doctor, you said you thought she was dead. Do
20 you remember that?

21 A. I do. She was motionless, but the doctor said she
22 wasn't.

23 Q. That was my next question; it was just, could you
24 explain what made you think that she was dead initially,
25 and it was that she wasn't moving?

1 A. Just because she wasn't moving, that's correct.

2 Q. Did she appear to be unconscious?

3 A. When I was there, dealing with her, she was unconscious,

4 yes.

5 MS SIMCOCK: I'm grateful, thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart, do you have another

7 matter?

8 MR COLTART: My Lady, forgive me for rising again, could

9 I revisit briefly the position of the young man we were

10 dealing with?

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course.

12 Further questions by MR COLTART

13 MR COLTART: Could we get please the diagram of the carriage

14 back up? Thank you very much indeed.

15 I'm sorry for going back over this again.

16 A. That's okay, sir.

17 Q. But you said -- almost your last answer to me in

18 relation to this topic was you knew it was double door

19 D6 because of the classic photograph of the door hanging

20 off and the ladder up against the carriage.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I'm just going to ask you to look at a photograph.

23 My Lady, it's one of those which is within our core

24 bundle, I'm assuming that it's a photograph which

25 doesn't cause any difficulty. I don't know whether

1 my Lady would like to have a look at it first before we
2 put it up on the screen.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Why don't you alert Mr Keith and
4 Mr Hay to the photographs?

5 MR COLTART: The same photograph appears at our reference
6 INQ10317 [INQ10317-1].

7 Now, Officer, we see a photograph here of the bombed
8 carriage, and you can see the door hanging off and the
9 stepladder going up into the carriage.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, it appears from this photograph as if the door and
12 the ladder are positioned, in fact, at the fourth set of
13 double doors, which is double doors D8 on our
14 photograph -- on our plan, forgive me. Can we just go
15 back to the plan for a moment, please?

16 Now, there's no issue at all that Carrie Taylor and
17 Fiona Stevenson, the young women that you have just been
18 asked questions about, were positioned around about
19 points 17, 18, 20 and so on on our plan, which is as
20 would you look through double doors D6 on the left-hand
21 side.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The photograph that we've just been looking at relates
24 to double doors D8 further down the carriage to the
25 left, which is where Mr Ellery was in fact positioned.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Is there any possibility that you have elided, as it
3 were, the two images, the one of Mr Ellery inside double
4 doors D8 and the one of Ms Taylor and Ms Stevenson
5 inside double doors D6?

6 A. I mean, if that ladder is up against door D8, then it's
7 been moved. When I put the ladder up against the door,
8 it was D8.

9 Q. Do you mean D6?

10 A. Sorry, D6, I placed the ladder against D6 where the
11 doctor was, the two -- the young man and female and
12 where the young guy was trying to get up. At no time
13 did I put it against D8.

14 Q. You're as confident as you can be that the young male
15 that you saw was just inside double doors D6?

16 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

17 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Barton?

19 Questions by MS BARTON

20 MS BARTON: Thank you, my Lady.

21 DC Silvestro I ask questions on behalf of City of
22 London Police and I'd just like to take you back to the
23 moment that you first met Sergeant Neil Kemp, whom
24 you've talked about.

25 Can you recall approximately where you were in

1 relation to which carriage when you bumped into him?

2 A. It was close to the bombed carriage.

3 Q. When you bumped into him, you had to ask each other who
4 you were, didn't you?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. Was that because, so far as Neil Kemp is concerned, he
7 had no fluorescent vest of any type, he was in jeans and
8 a T-shirt?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. He identified himself to you as a City of London police
11 officer?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. We've had another witness, a Mr Brown, describe him as
14 somebody with a loud voice who was reassuring. Would
15 you agree with that assessment?

16 A. There was a lot of shouting, you know, we were both
17 shouting, it was obvious to me he was a police officer,
18 that's all I can say, really, I don't know why, but it
19 was obvious that Neil was a police officer.

20 Q. Thank you. Up until that point, you had not considered
21 what the cause of the damage to the second carriage was.

22 A. No, I mean, it was just purely dealing with members of
23 the public, the passengers. It was never an issue
24 whether or not it was a bomb or not, it didn't really
25 matter, it was just a matter of dealing with people.

1 Q. The suggestion that it was a bomb and that there was
2 a risk of secondary devices came from Sergeant Kemp?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So far as the rescuers who were already on the tracks
5 were concerned, the fact that there was a mention of
6 secondary devices did not cause any of you to stop and
7 leave the track, did it?

8 A. Not at all, no.

9 Q. In fact, so far as the rescuers on the tracks were
10 concerned, that suggestion had quite the opposite effect
11 and it gave an urgency to the rescue and recovery
12 operation?

13 A. Yes, it did, yes.

14 Q. In fact, the reason it gave an urgency is because
15 Sergeant Kemp said, "Because of the risk of secondary
16 devices or perhaps chemical weapons, we have to get
17 these people out as quickly as we can", or words to that
18 effect?

19 A. It was a conversation between the two of us that we
20 needed to get people out as quickly as we could.

21 Q. Nobody left those tracks as a result of saying "There
22 might be a secondary device, so we'd all better
23 evacuate"?

24 A. No, it never entered my thoughts, to be honest.

25 Q. It certainly wasn't a suggestion that either you or

1 Sergeant Kemp made?
2 A. No.
3 MS BARTON: Thank you very much:
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?
5 Questions by MR GIBBS
6 MR GIBBS: My Lady, may I clarify two areas, please? If we
7 could have on screen [BTP86-9], and if we could split the
8 screen and perhaps -- and then, if we could have
9 [INQ10280-8] in the other half of the screen, we can see
10 where you've drawn the seats with 2 and 3. We know
11 that's Bruce Lait and Crystal Main. 4, we know that's
12 Ms Taylor. 5 is the doctor?
13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
14 Q. The doors to the right-hand side, as we are looking at
15 it, of them, are the doors D6?
16 A. That's correct, sir.
17 Q. At which, when you were there, you think there was
18 a ladder and that's how you got in?
19 A. That's where I put the ladder. When it was given to me,
20 I propped it up against the double doors.
21 Q. Just because, obviously, it's most important for the
22 family of Mr Ellery to know whether the person at 1
23 might be him, the person who you've put at 1, who was
24 staggering around and who you told to sit down was, am
25 I right, definitely to the right-hand side of where the

1 doctor and Ms Taylor and so on were?

2 A. Yes, definitely.

3 Q. So then the other double doors, D8, the other side of
4 that group of people, do you remember looking in there
5 shining your torch in there at any stage?

6 A. I shone the torch on that area whilst I was inside the
7 carriage and just saw twisted metal. When I stepped
8 back on to the tracks and moved along the carriage,
9 I shone it briefly into the carriage but didn't see
10 anything.

11 Q. Could you see debris in there?

12 A. There was debris. It was just twisted metal, wires,
13 soot.

14 Q. Could you see, when you looked in there, anything that
15 was identifiable to you as a human body?

16 A. No, I mean, it was chaotic, I mean, there's distraction,
17 people screaming, it was pandemonium. I just -- as
18 I passed, I shone, I saw no obvious person stood or sat,
19 so I just carried on focusing on who I actually saw and
20 calming people down.

21 Q. Thank you very much. We can remove that from the
22 screen. The second area, you've told us already that
23 timing is just probably something of a blur to you.

24 A. It is, sir, yes.

25 Q. If we could go right back to the beginning from the

1 moment when you hear the bang and the building shakes,
2 and you go down and you evacuate, you and Mr Baker, with
3 others, the two trains and you go back upstairs, having
4 cleared the trains, and then someone says there are
5 people in the tunnel, can you tell us how long you think
6 elapsed between the bang, given what you then did, and
7 hearing someone say there are people in the tunnel?

8 A. It couldn't have been any more than four minutes.

9 Q. Four minutes?

10 A. Four, five minutes. I don't think it was longer than
11 that.

12 Q. When you then came downstairs into the station again,
13 was the smoke thicker than before?

14 A. Yes, there was -- in the whole station, there was
15 a distinct electrical smell and all I can describe is
16 a haze, it was very hazy. It's only when I ran down the
17 platform towards the tunnels, when the smoke started
18 billowing out of the end of the tunnel, that's where it
19 was at its most thickest.

20 Q. Had that electrical smell and the haze been present when
21 you had first gone down there to evacuate the trains?

22 A. Yes, it was, yes.

23 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: On the question of timing,

25 Mr Silvestro -- and I appreciate, as everyone else has

1 done, how difficult it is -- have you any estimate of
2 the time from when you heard the bang to when you
3 realised there were other emergency service personnel
4 around you?

5 A. Not at all, my Lady. The only timings I have is from
6 the time that I went down to the bombed-out carriage
7 around 9.00, and the next time I looked at my watch is
8 at 12.30 when I'm stood at the barrier with Ian Baker,
9 12.30, and that's all I know, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Does anybody
11 else have any questions for Mr Silvestro?

12 Mr Silvestro, extremely grateful to you. You may
13 have been on duty that day as a police officer, but what
14 you did went way beyond the call of duty. Armed only
15 with a torch and a vest, it seems, you ran into that
16 tunnel, not knowing what you faced, and you stayed down
17 there doing everything possible to help and evacuate the
18 passengers, even when you were reminded of the risk to
19 yourself. Being told of the risk, you didn't run for
20 your life, you redoubled your efforts. You were very
21 brave. Thank you.

22 A. Thank you.

23 MR KEITH: Thank you, Officer.

24 A. Thank you, sir.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?

1 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call
2 Inspector Robert Munn.
3 INSPECTOR ROBERT MUNN (sworn)
4 Questions by MR KEITH
5 A. My Lady, I'm Robert William Munn, Inspector 2502 with
6 the British Transport Police. I'm currently stationed
7 at Ipswich in Suffolk. In July, at the date in
8 question, I was a temporary inspector at Stratford in
9 East London.
10 MR KEITH: In July of 2005, Inspector, you had already
11 behind you many years of service in the British
12 Transport Police?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. I think then, not now, you were a temporary Inspector,
15 and you were in charge of the Silverlink Metro Unit,
16 which was situated at Stratford train station?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. That morning, you'd arrived at work around about 6.30?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. And around 8.50 you heard someone say over the radio
21 that she had heard a loud bang and wasn't sure if it was
22 an explosion or a train crash.
23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
24 Q. So what did you do?
25 A. I was the duty officer for our London north area at the

1 time, sir. That means my responsibility is to attend
2 any incident and take command if anything should happen.
3 The tone of the radio message was such that there was
4 obviously something wrong. It was the type of incident
5 that I'd want to go to. I had with me at the time
6 Sergeant Barnes, PC Curren and some probationary
7 officers. I instructed all of them to get their coats
8 and hats together, get in their cars and to go to
9 Liverpool Street.

10 Q. The probationary constables, how long would they have
11 been with the British Transport Police at that time?

12 A. They were about three weeks out of training school, sir.
13 They weren't signed off for independent patrol, they
14 were only allowed to go out with a trained tutor or
15 a supervisor.

16 Q. They had presumably been assigned to you and your
17 colleague, I think Police Sergeant Barnes --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- for supervisory purposes, so you could show them the
20 ropes?

21 A. They are on-the-job training, sir, yes.

22 Q. On-the-job training. So you proceeded out of your
23 office towards Central London?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. I think initially there was some difficulty in finding

1 the right road.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. You may have got a little bit lost somewhere near the

4 Aldgate area?

5 A. We were heading on -- trying to go directly to

6 Liverpool Street.

7 Q. Was that because the radio message had referred to

8 Liverpool Street?

9 A. Yes, sir. As we were driving to Liverpool Street, we

10 were going along the Mile End Road, we'd come to

11 Aldgate, it's actually on the route we were taking.

12 Q. Could we have on the screen please [BTP150-14]?

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, so you came upon Aldgate

14 heading for, as you thought, Liverpool Street?

15 A. Yes, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right.

17 MR KEITH: We can see here on the screen an extract,

18 Inspector, of communications from the British Transport

19 Police controller, and the time is given there at

20 08.49.32. The time is subject to some revision, it may

21 be a couple of minutes out, but in any event we can see

22 there the controller says:

23 "BX ..."

24 Is BX a code name for the controller?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. "BX to any unit can attend Liverpool Street,
2 Liverpool Street Underground station. There's
3 reports ... of an explosion.
4 "Is there any unit on this channel can respond to
5 the BX, give them a radio test?"
6 Did you hear that message?
7 A. I don't recall that one, sir, no.
8 Q. You don't recall that one?
9 A. No.
10 Q. You subsequently prepared a note, a contemporaneous note
11 of your recollections, or rather one of your colleagues
12 did, in a PNB, a police notebook?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Can we have on the screen please [BTP98-3]?
15 If you could rotate that page, there's a reference
16 there to being on duty, BQ10?
17 A. It was Bravo Quebec 10, sir, that's my call sign.
18 Q. That's your call sign?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Then underneath, "08.50, mobile call to Liverpool Street
21 report of explosion"?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Was that your understanding of the receipt of the call
24 and your response: namely, to go to Liverpool Street?
25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. If we go to the following page [BTP98-4], we can see that there is
2 a time given at the top on the left-hand side 09.07:
3 "Aldgate LT [London Transport]. Numerous injured
4 people exiting. Smoke from booking hall. Stopped.
5 Spoke DI Baker."
6 Was that around about the time that you arrived?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. When you arrived, you saw smoke, therefore, we can see,
9 and did you see people coming out of the bottom part of
10 the station to the ground level?
11 A. Yes, sir, as we were driving past, there was smoke
12 billowing from the booking office area and people were
13 coming out with soot-blackened faces. It was obvious to
14 me there had been an incident of some description there.
15 Q. Did you speak to DI Baker?
16 A. I did, sir, yes.
17 Q. What did he tell you?
18 A. He told me he thought there had been a train accident
19 within the tunnel and that I think it was 25 injured
20 people in his office, and that he'd heard a loud bang.
21 Q. He was, no doubt, very relieved to see you.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Did you decide between you how you would individually
24 respond to what you saw: namely, did you divide up
25 functions between you?

1 A. I don't think anything as formal as that, sir. I think
2 I just said to Ian "You carry on up here". Obviously,
3 being uniformed officers, it's more appropriate for us
4 to deal with the initial incident, and I left the
5 detective to deal with the upstairs side, but it was
6 nothing more formal than "You deal with this and I'll go
7 downstairs".

8 Q. He was in plainclothes?

9 A. Yes, sir, he had -- I think he had a hi-vi on at that
10 time, a police high visibility tabard, but otherwise was
11 in plainclothes.

12 Q. We know that around this time, you called in to BX, the
13 control room. Could we have [BTP167-59]?

14 The timing there we can see, halfway down the page,
15 is 09.06.45, but the call starts a little bit before
16 that:

17 "BX from Bravo Quebec 10 ..."

18 That's you, BQ10:

19 "... active message.

20 "Bravo Quebec 10, go ahead over.

21 "Yeah, I'm at Aldgate station, confirm this is
22 a train accident. Declare a major incident. We have
23 numerous injured people at this station at this stage.

24 "All received ..."

25 Did you make that call after you'd spoken to

1 DI Baker?

2 A. Yes, sir, I did. Having spoken to Ian Baker, I was then
3 making my way down to the platform and the message was
4 passed as I was making my way to the tunnel.

5 Q. You refer there to your wish to have a major incident
6 declared. Can you tell us something about the effect of
7 making such a declaration? What happens if a major
8 incident is declared by you, an inspector of the British
9 Transport Police?

10 A. If any of the emergency services declares a major
11 incident, it has protocols in place with the other
12 emergency services that will necessitate the immediate
13 call-out of all of the emergency services to assess what
14 would then be needed. It's effectively, if you like,
15 a big "start" button, it gets the wheels in motion so
16 you know that all of the emergency services will be
17 attending if a major incident is declared.

18 Q. You described how you saw people coming up from the
19 bottom of the station from the platform area, and you
20 made reference to some 25 casualties.

21 What conclusions did you reach as to what sort of
22 incident you were dealing with?

23 A. Ian had said to me it was a train accident. I took that
24 to mean a train shunt, a derailment or a crash. The
25 injuries I saw coming up the stairs weren't, in my mind,

1 initially consistent with that. There was a lot of soot
2 and dust on faces, the whites of eyes showing very
3 prominently against blackened faces. That could have
4 been as a result of a train shunt throwing up dust, or
5 some other incident, but I wasn't happy with that.

6 The amount of smoke coming out of the tunnel also
7 led me to believe that, you know, it could be something
8 more, but it could have been that there had been that
9 and a train had caught fire, but at that time, I kept
10 a fairly open mind and went down to the train.

11 Q. On the way down, did you speak to an off-duty
12 Metropolitan police officer who started to give you an
13 account of what had happened?

14 A. That was actually before I spoke to DI Baker.

15 Q. That was before you spoke to DI Baker?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. All right. Did you go down on your own or with some of
18 the police officers who had come with you from
19 Stratford?

20 A. I left one of the probationers on the surface taking
21 a first account with instructions to report that
22 information to DI Baker, and I took two of the
23 probationers with me, that's PC Hatcher and PC Whyte,
24 and went into the tunnel.

25 Q. Before you got to the tunnel, did you see any members of

1 London Underground?

2 A. Yes, sir, there was a member of London Underground staff
3 on the platform and I confirmed with him that the power
4 was off, as we were going on to the track.

5 Q. Did you ask him where the train was?

6 A. I think so, sir, yes, and he pointed off the end of the
7 platform and, fairly soon after that, I could see a red
8 light on the -- what I assumed to be the back of the
9 train. I think it was actually the front.

10 Q. Could you describe for us, please, the scene that
11 confronted you as you left the platform to go down on to
12 the track?

13 A. Very dark, very smoky, very -- the smoke was very thick
14 and unpleasant smelling. The tunnel was dark, and there
15 were a lot of passengers coming out towards us, a lot of
16 confusion, a lot of very worried people.

17 As we went into the tunnel, we were repeatedly
18 saying to the passengers "Stay calm, keep going, you're
19 nearly at the platform. Keep going, watch your
20 footing", because there's lots of trip hazards and just
21 trying to reassure people and just keep moving them
22 along.

23 Q. When you'd initially seen passengers upstairs, when
24 you'd arrived, did you subsequently deduce that those
25 passengers must have come from the first carriage,

1 having been detrained from the front of the train and,
2 therefore, nearer the platform?

3 A. That was my guess, sir, yes.

4 Q. What about the passengers whom you saw on the track in
5 the tunnel when you got down to that level on the
6 platform?

7 A. I think they were coming from the other side of the --
8 what turned out to be the bombed carriage.

9 Q. From the rear?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Can we presume, therefore, that when you got down to the
12 track, the back of the train must have been open by then
13 and this was the start of passengers coming from the
14 rear of the train?

15 A. I think so, sir, yes.

16 Q. Was it obvious that they were walking on the rails?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did that give you some degree of comfort that the power
19 must be off?

20 A. Yes. As I asked the question, I could see people on the
21 rails, which effectively told me the answer in any case.

22 Q. It would have been obvious to anybody, Inspector,
23 wouldn't it, who had arrived on the platform that, from
24 the sheer number of people walking along the rails, the
25 power would have had to have been off, otherwise they

1 would have been electrocuted?

2 A. At that point, sir, yes.

3 Q. The London Underground staff were already in the tunnel
4 helping the passengers along by shepherding them along
5 the track, reassuring them and trying to calm things
6 down?

7 A. That's correct, sir, yes, they did a very good job under
8 the circumstances.

9 Q. Did you take time, in fact, in that pocket notebook that
10 we've seen, to record your view that you thought that
11 they were doing an excellent job in extremely difficult
12 circumstances?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Was there also a policeman, a member of the City of
15 London Police, whom you thought might have been a member
16 of its Cycle Squad because he was wearing a pair of
17 shorts?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Where was he in the tunnel?

20 A. I think I first saw him between the bombed carriage and
21 the Liverpool Street end of the train.

22 Q. So the far end?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. At any rate, when you were inside the tunnel, you
25 assisted in this process of telling people to keep

1 walking, and were there literally hundreds of people
2 walking along the track?
3 A. Yes, sir, there was.
4 Q. It may seem an obvious question, but what state were
5 they in?
6 A. Varying, sir. Some were walking relatively normally.
7 Some were close to panic. Some were injured.
8 "Chaotic", "pandemonium", are the usual descriptions and
9 really, sir, words can't really describe the noise, the
10 smell, the -- you know, the general sense of confusion
11 down there.
12 Q. As you got to the train, could you see that the second
13 carriage had been decimated?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Did you pause to look inside the second carriage?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Which part did you look in through?
18 A. Through one of the doors that had been blown out, there
19 was a gap where the doors should have been.
20 Q. Can you say whether it was the first or the second set
21 of doors?
22 A. I think it was the nearest set to Aldgate that didn't
23 have doors.
24 Q. The first set of doors, in fact, had some part of the
25 door still hanging on the hinge. Can you recall whether

1 that was the set of doors you looked through or whether
2 the opening, the aperture was completely --
3 A. Oh, I think it was the doors with no doors left.
4 Q. No doors at all?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. What could you see?
7 A. Not much. It was very dark. Lots of twisted metal.
8 There was flesh, blood. It was just completely, as
9 I said, sir, decimated, it was wiped out completely.
10 Q. Could you see people?
11 A. I think at that time I was aware there was people in
12 there, sir, yes.
13 Q. Was that because you could see human flesh and parts of
14 bodies?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. The probationer constables were still with you. Did you
17 direct them to do anything in particular?
18 A. I just told them, sir, to do the best they could to help
19 people, get people out as quickly as they could.
20 Q. Did you take one of them further along the line towards
21 the rear of the train?
22 A. Yes, sir, briefly, yes.
23 Q. Were there people still in the carriages?
24 A. Yes, there were still people coming out towards
25 Liverpool Street, to come out the end of the train.

1 Q. The people who were coming out, did they seem to you at
2 this stage to be the less severely injured, did they
3 appear to be affected by flying glass?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. They had minor lacerations and cuts in comparison to
6 some of the others whom you had seen?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. At the end of the train, did you find a member of
9 London Underground staff?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. What was he doing?

12 A. Assisting people from the train via the -- the end of
13 the train has a door in the end where there was a ladder
14 and he was assisting people down from that.

15 Q. Did you take part in helping passengers down off the end
16 of the train?

17 A. Only briefly. At that point, my main concern then was
18 to get to a position where I had radio comms where
19 I could actually report in what I'd seen. I was aware
20 that, before I went into the tunnel, there were various
21 other calls on the radio, there were calls around
22 electrical surges and bits and pieces, and it was
23 apparent to me that wasn't what I was dealing with.

24 So at that point, I really wanted to get to a place
25 where I had comms so I could actually update the control

1 with what we were actually dealing with.

2 Q. Because you say you had to get to a place where there
3 were comms, we take it that you had no ability to
4 communicate inside the tunnel?

5 A. No, sir.

6 Q. Ordinarily, you carry a radio because you are an
7 inspector with the British Transport Police.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. That is the transport -- the police for the transport
10 network, including the London Underground.

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Was it always the case that the radios wouldn't work in
13 the tunnels?

14 A. Up to that point, sir, yes.

15 Q. Could we look, please, at [BTP150-51]? This is a call
16 that you made around about 09.11, further up the page,
17 please, BX, that's the controller, Bravo Quebec 10. So
18 that's you telling the controller, BX, that it is you,
19 BQ10?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. "Yeah, BX urgent request for an ambulance to Aldgate
22 from paramedics and Fire Brigade on trains. There are
23 people on these trains who will die if they do not get
24 immediate care. We need ambulances to Aldgate urgently.
25 Over."

1 Now, this call is timed around about 09.11. There
2 is some debate as to whether it's accurate to the
3 second. But take it from me if you will, Inspector,
4 that it's broadly right.

5 You refer there to a request for an ambulance and
6 then to "We need ambulances. Over". So we may take it
7 that you must have seen the injured people in the tunnel
8 and on the train by the time you made this call?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. But the call also refers to a request for an ambulance
11 as having come from paramedics and Fire Brigade on
12 trains. From your evidence so far, it doesn't appear
13 that you've had any discussion or connection with
14 Fire Brigade or paramedics on the train.

15 A. That's correct, sir.

16 Q. So I'm just wondering whom you were, in fact, referring
17 to when you made reference, in the course of that call,
18 to paramedics.

19 May I ask you this: did you become aware at any
20 stage that there was a doctor on the train?

21 A. The first time I was aware there was actually a doctor
22 on the train was when I saw a doctor with HEMS on his
23 jacket, the helicopter emergency doctor.

24 Q. So a proper -- I don't mean that pejoratively --

25 A. A responding doctor.

1 Q. -- an official doctor who had arrived in response to the
2 incident --

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. -- and was wearing the full uniform?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Did you know that there was an off-duty doctor, or
7 a doctor of medicine who happened to be on the train
8 called Dr Gerardine Quaghebeur?

9 A. I wasn't aware of that at the time, sir, no.

10 Q. You weren't aware of that?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Can you help us as to how it is you knew, at 09.11, that
13 there were paramedics and Fire Brigade on the train?
14 Because the evidence that we have tends to suggest that
15 the first paramedic didn't arrive even at the top of
16 Aldgate until about 9.14.

17 A. Assuming that the radio timing is accurate, sir, my only
18 way of explaining that is, on the way back from my
19 initial viewing of the Liverpool Street end of the
20 train, was a second check, because I'd have to come past
21 the bombed carriage to get back to the platform where
22 I had radio comms, and I think some Fire Brigade
23 officers followed me down fairly soon. The initial
24 response from the London Fire Brigade. And I can only
25 assume that I spoke to those and assumed that they had

1 somebody with them who was a paramedic.

2 Q. There is some evidence, Inspector, to suggest that the
3 lady doctor who happened to be on the train,

4 Dr Quaghebeur, shouted out that the lady for whom she
5 was caring, namely Carrie Taylor, would die if urgent
6 medical assistance wasn't received, and it may be that
7 the first Fire Brigade officials had arrived by then.

8 Is it possible that the expression "There are people
9 on the trains who will die" was relayed to you by one of
10 the firefighters whom you met in the tunnel?

11 A. Yes, very possible, sir. And I must point out that, at
12 this time, you know, it was still chaotic, it was
13 pandemonium there, it was very noisy. My understanding
14 was it was from a paramedic. It may very well have been
15 from the doctor who was on the train.

16 Q. You plainly communicated the need for there to be as
17 many ambulances as possible, "We need ambulances to
18 Aldgate urgently".

19 Did it seem to you that, in addition, it wasn't just
20 a question of having ambulances at Aldgate; you needed
21 paramedics and medical technicians in the tunnel, in
22 fact in the carriage?

23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

24 Q. So did you take any steps to tell other people that, as
25 and when the ambulances arrived, they had to get down to

1 the track?

2 A. Yes, sir. At one point when I was on the platform,
3 I spoke to one of the Underground staff there who had
4 comms with his colleagues at the main door and I asked
5 them to ensure that responding paramedics or
6 Fire Brigade were sent to the train, because I know
7 that, if they're coming past the booking hall area where
8 a lot of the wounded people had gone to, there would be
9 a very real chance they would be stopped there to deal
10 with victims there otherwise.

11 Q. Did you ask for the same message to be passed to the
12 London Fire Brigade?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Having made that call -- and can you tell us, where were
15 you when you made the call?

16 A. To make all my calls, I had to go back to the platforms
17 at Aldgate, to run back up the tunnel to Aldgate Tube in
18 order to use my radio.

19 Q. On to the platform?

20 A. Yes, sir, or very close to the platform, sometimes it
21 would work just short of the platforms, but usually
22 I had to get on to the platform.

23 Q. You then returned back to the train?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Did you, at this stage, have a chance to look a little

1 more closely at the train and the bombed carriage?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Where did you go?

4 A. I think it was to the same door I'd been to previously.

5 Q. As you reached that spot, did you see somebody lying on
6 the tracks?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Can you tell us, please, what you saw?

9 A. As I came up to the door, sir, on my right there was
10 a male, he had no top on, which had been blown from
11 them, and the body was covered in what I would describe
12 as total bodily injury, burnt and blackened.

13 Someone who had been with them dealing with them --
14 and I don't remember if it was a member of LT staff or
15 a member of the public -- had told them they had checked
16 them and they were dead and, to my left, there was
17 a second body, a relatively tubby white male, I think he
18 had boxer shorts on, he may have still had some remnants
19 of trousers on, but again, the clothes had been blown
20 from the body. He actually sat up at that point and
21 started asking for help and I could see there was
22 a second person underneath, the body underneath had legs
23 severed below the knees and appeared to me to be
24 deceased, sir.

25 Q. The second person whom you saw, the man who sat up, did

1 it appear to you that that was the first time he'd
2 moved, I mean, was he moving when you arrived or had he
3 been still and then sat up?

4 A. I don't know, sir.

5 Q. You don't know. What did you do then?

6 A. I again assessed what we had. I think at that point
7 I again went to the platform to hurry -- I looked into
8 the train and took stock of what I had to get a better
9 understanding of what we had. It was obviously apparent
10 to me, from the moment I saw the train, that there had
11 been an explosion on the train and I discounted the
12 electrical surge. To my mind, there had been a bomb on
13 that train and I wanted to get that communicated back to
14 my control and other officers as quickly as I could.
15 Part of the reason for that was I was aware of other
16 instances going on. Whenever I went to use my radio,
17 I had to wait to actually get on the radio, because of
18 the volume of radio traffic, and I wanted to make sure
19 at that point that, one, we got further assistance there
20 as quickly as we could, and secondly, that it was clear
21 to everyone that we were dealing with bombs so that
22 officers going to other scenes were aware for their own
23 safety as well.

24 Q. On this occasion, when you looked inside the second
25 carriage before you left to make the next call, were you

1 able to see people moving around inside the carriage?

2 A. I don't recall seeing people moving around inside there,
3 no, sir.

4 Q. Did you see people inside?

5 A. I could see body parts and a tangled wreck. It was
6 obvious to me there were people in there. I couldn't
7 describe individual people in individual locations.

8 Q. Was anybody in there standing up and plainly tending to
9 the people who were in there, or was it just a question
10 of the scene being one of total carnage, people lying on
11 the ground, and no emergency personnel being there
12 tending to them?

13 A. I think at that point, sir, there were Fire Brigade
14 officers on the train. I'm trying to get the chronology
15 correct.

16 Q. It's very difficult.

17 A. It is very difficult.

18 Q. We understand. Before you left to make that next
19 call -- we'll come to that in a moment -- was there an
20 unpleasant incident whereby one of the passengers coming
21 off the train stopped to try to take photographs of that
22 carriage and the immediate environment?

23 A. Yes, sir, there was and, again, the exact chronology I'm
24 not completely certain around. Whilst we were getting
25 the majority of the people from the far end of the train

1 from Aldgate off, there was a narrow space we had to
2 walk them down. Ordinarily, I would have wanted to
3 evacuate those people away from the site of the
4 explosion. Because of the fact that the other direction
5 was a much longer tunnel to Liverpool Street and
6 I didn't know what would be in there, whether, if we did
7 that, we'd go beyond the electrified section we were in
8 and then come to a live rail, we had no option but to
9 keep evacuating people past Aldgate.

10 Now, while we were doing this, a female passenger
11 stopped and said "Hold on a minute", rummaged in her bag
12 to get a camera out to start trying to take some
13 photographs and, in doing this, she was holding up the
14 crocodile of people that we were evacuating that were
15 behind her.

16 Q. You no doubt asked her to stop, politely at first and
17 less so thereafter?

18 A. As politely as I could in the circumstances, sir, yes.
19 It was causing some agitation within the rest of the
20 passengers and abuse and derogatory comments were being
21 shouted forwards towards her.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So she didn't even stop immediately
23 when you told her to stop?

24 A. No, my Lady.

25 MR KEITH: As a result, did you snatch the camera from her

1 and throw it to the ground?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could you tell us, please, something, Inspector, of the
4 magnitude of the problem that you faced?

5 A. I really don't know where to start with it, sir.

6 Resource-wise, I had two probationers with me with six
7 weeks' service, no experience of any incident let alone
8 an incident of that scale. They had no communications,
9 wasn't able to talk to anybody without running back to
10 the platform, and visibility was poor, the air quality
11 was poor.

12 All of my decision-making was very much based around
13 the likelihood and, I felt, a real likely occurrence,
14 there is a secondary device within the tunnel, and the
15 thought of a suicide bomber being responsible didn't
16 enter my mind. All of my previous training in
17 terrorist-related incidents has been around a left
18 device, usually with a secondary device specifically to
19 aim for emergency responders as the primary target.
20 That was very much at the front of the mind. So it was
21 a case of trying to get everybody out as quickly as we
22 could.

23 I remember discussing those concerns with the lead
24 paramedic and Fire Brigade once we'd got the initial
25 flow of passengers off and we were left with the people

1 on the train, and, to me, that was a very real threat.

2 I caused -- as I got more officers there, I had some
3 search-trained officers and I caused them to search both
4 the train that had already had a bomb on and the other
5 trains that were there that had bags left -- when it
6 occurred, everyone just left their bags and went for
7 safety, and I caused those to be searched to see if we
8 could find secondary devices.

9 Q. That's moving, in fact, a little bit further forward,
10 isn't it, because that search process took place after
11 you had made your next call? You left the track and the
12 tunnel to go to the platform to make another call to BX.

13 A. I did, sir, yes.

14 Q. As you reached the platform, did you come across a group
15 of firemen from LFB?

16 A. Yes, sir, I did.

17 Q. Tell us, please, about that.

18 A. They were in their full rescue kit, breathing apparatus,
19 fully kitted up and they were stood at the end of the
20 platform as I got to the station, the immediate end. As
21 you went down to the platform, I think that would be the
22 left-hand platform, where we were returning from the
23 tracks, obviously, the right-hand platform, and they
24 were stood there waiting to come on to the tracks.

25 Q. So they were fully kitted up --

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. -- but standing still?

3 A. At that time, sir, yes.

4 Q. You no doubt said something to them?

5 A. I said "It's this way, boys, do you want to come and
6 join us?" tried to get them to come down. One of them
7 told me they weren't allowed on the tracks until the
8 current was confirmed as being discharged. At this
9 point, I stood on the third rail and said to them "The
10 power's off", and they said "We have to have it
11 confirmed by London Underground staff". There was
12 a member of London Underground staff on the platform who
13 I shouted to, I said "Is the power off?" and he
14 confirmed it. They then joined us.

15 This seemed to take forever, sir. In reality, it
16 was probably a matter of seconds and took no longer than
17 the time it just took me to describe to you.

18 Q. But it no doubt left you very angry?

19 A. I was very frustrated at the time, sir, yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It also depends on how long they'd
21 been there before you pointed out to them the power was
22 plainly off.

23 A. I can't comment on that, my Lady.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No.

25 MR KEITH: You then made your next call because by this

1 stage you were near the platform.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. So you had communication contact again. Can we have
4 [BTP150-56]? 09.17.11, if we go slightly further up the
5 page, please:

6 "BX Bravo Quebec 10 active message.

7 "Yeah, go ahead."

8 So this is BQ10 yourself calling in:

9 "BX from Bravo Quebec 10, I'm with the train at
10 Aldgate. Clear bomb damage to one carriage. One
11 carriage is decimated. The rest of the carriage on the
12 train is severely damaged and two confirmed fatalities."
13 How did you know that there were confirmed
14 fatalities by this stage?

15 A. That would have been from people dealing -- either the
16 paramedics, if they were there by that point, the
17 Fire Brigade. I wanted to get out the fact that we had
18 fatalities, the confirmed bit was just my description in
19 order to stress the severity.

20 Q. May we presume that you were also referring there to the
21 one or two, possibly, persons you'd seen on the track?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. "Nine people very severely, seriously injured and
24 trapped in the train."
25 The reference to "trapped in the train" was because

1 you'd seen people, body parts certainly, in the
2 carriage 2?
3 A. And there were -- as I said, there were personnel on the
4 train who I was conversing with as well, sir, yes.
5 Q. The London Fire Brigade, whom you'd spoken about?
6 A. That's my understanding, sir, yes.
7 Q. Then further down the page you asked:
8 "Did you receive that? Over."
9 "Bravo Quebec 10, say again. Over."
10 "Yeah, I'm at Aldgate, I can confirm bomb damage to
11 train. One carriage completely wiped out. At least
12 nine people very seriously injured and trapped, two
13 confirmed fatalities and numerous, too numerous to
14 count, injured. Fire Brigade are now with us. Won't go
15 trackside until power is confirmed off and we are going
16 to need paramedics to the train urgently. There are
17 nine people very seriously injured. Did you receive?
18 Over.
19 "Yes, yes, say again location. Over."
20 "Aldgate, within the tunnel, about 100 yards from
21 the platform."
22 So you communicated the exact location, the severity
23 of the incident and the possible cause: namely, bomb.
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. The reference to the Fire Brigade, was that a reference

1 to the incident that had just occurred on the platform?

2 A. I think it was as it was occurring. As I said,
3 sometimes my radio worked, literally just off the end of
4 the platform, sometimes I had to go on to the platform,
5 and I think, that message, I was actually still able to
6 be on the track and I think it was actually
7 simultaneous.

8 Q. Whilst you were speaking to BX, to control, did you
9 receive some information concerning other explosions or
10 incidents in London?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. As a result of that, did there then come a time when you
13 thought it was sensible to speak to the senior officers
14 from the London Fire Brigade and the London Ambulance
15 Service near you in order to decide what should be done
16 next?

17 A. Yes, sir. Once I returned to the tunnel, I called the
18 lead fire officer and the lead paramedic or London
19 Ambulance Service officer. Together we had a brief
20 discussion around our concerns. The Fire Brigade, at
21 that point, I think, had actually had more calls than we
22 had and thought they were dealing with more incidents
23 than we thought, and I thought we had a lot. This just
24 reinforced my initial concern around secondary devices.
25 The magnitude of the attack that London was under at

1 that time was unprecedented.

2 Q. This call was around 9.17?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Do we take it, then, from the fact that you spoke, not
5 just to the Fire Brigade, but to medical technicians --
6 members of the London Ambulance Service -- shortly
7 thereafter that there was at least one member of the
8 ambulance service there shortly after 9.17?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. But the Fire Brigade had been there for a while before
11 that, because you'd seen one or more members of the
12 Fire Brigade in and around the carriage before you'd
13 gone out of the tunnel to make that call?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Were wounded still coming along the track at this time?

16 A. I think there were still some stragglers, if you like,
17 sir, yes. I'm fairly sure, by that point, the main
18 steady stream of passengers had died down, but I think
19 there was probably still a trickle of passengers coming
20 off at that time.

21 Q. Around this time, did your sergeant, PS Barnes, appear,
22 together with some other officers?

23 A. Around about that time, sir, yes.

24 Q. Was that when, as you've told us earlier, you decided
25 that a search of the train in the immediate location

1 would be a good idea?

2 A. That's when I had sufficient officers to actually start
3 doing that, sir, yes.

4 Q. Did you tell him to search the trains that were on
5 platforms 2 and 3?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. The two Metropolitan Line trains, as well as the bombed
8 train?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Did he go off and do that?

11 A. He went off to arrange it for me, sir, yes.

12 Q. Do you also recall seeing at that time the officer from
13 City of London Police in his shorts, the member of their
14 Cycle Squad?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We still don't have a name for the
17 mysterious man in shorts?

18 MR KEITH: We think it might be PC Aveling.

19 MS BARTON: My Lady, there are two men in shorts. One is
20 a man in green shorts and I don't think anybody yet has
21 identified him. But the one in cycling shorts is
22 PC Aveling.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Two mysterious men in shorts.

24 MR KEITH: Two men in shorts. Around this stage, a member
25 of S013 appeared as well, did he not?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Tell us about that.

3 A. A man came up to me, a very plain man in plainclothes,
4 basically, showed me his identification, gave me his
5 name. It struck me -- I remember at the time thinking
6 how strange it was, because he was just so calm, like an
7 oasis in amongst the chaos, really. I briefed him on
8 what we'd had, what I'd seen, what we'd done, and he had
9 a look and then got on with his own duties.

10 Q. For those not familiar with the terminology, S013 is?

11 A. Anti-terrorist Branch at that time. I think now called
12 the Counter-terrorist Command.

13 Q. So really, within a very short space of time after the
14 incident, the Metropolitan Police had sent somebody to
15 the tunnel to start the process of a criminal
16 investigation?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Also around that time, members of the EXPO team of the
19 Metropolitan Police turned up, which is the shorthand
20 for the explosives officers, is that right?

21 A. I remember our own --

22 Q. It's your own BTP EXPO team turned up?

23 A. Yes, sir. There may have been Met there as well,
24 I don't recall seeing them, sir.

25 Q. Did they join your sergeant, Mr Barnes, in searching the

1 bombed train to see whether there were any secondary
2 devices?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. This must therefore have been, from the timing of your
5 earlier call, around about 9.20, 9.25, does that sound
6 about right?

7 A. That seems to be about right, sir, but as I've said, the
8 chronology is very difficult.

9 Q. There were still casualties on the train, were there
10 not?

11 A. There were certainly trapped people in the bombed
12 carriage, but most of the walking wounded had by that
13 time been evacuated.

14 Q. Did you go back to that part of the train where the
15 trapped casualties were and where there were members of
16 the Fire Brigade and the London Ambulance Service
17 tending to them?

18 A. Yes, sir, I did.

19 Q. What was needed?

20 A. I asked them -- because I was going backwards and
21 forwards to give regular sit reps, as you've been
22 hearing -- I asked them what else they required, and
23 they did ask for further carry-seats and paramedic teams
24 to actually come to the train to assist them.

25 Q. Could we have please [BTP151-19]? At 09.31, you called

1 control again:

2 "Bravo Quebec 10. From paramedics on the train at
3 Aldgate they require urgently three more teams with
4 carry-seats, I repeat, three more paramedic teams with
5 carry-seats. At the moment I have three probationers
6 with me at Aldgate ... on the train. I could do with
7 some officers to try and detrain a full train at the
8 same time."

9 So there you're relaying a request from paramedics
10 for more equipment, in particular more carry-seats. Was
11 that for the purposes of getting the severely injured up
12 from the track to ground level?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. The full train --

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry to interrupt, just to confirm,
16 if the Fire Brigade and the paramedics in the bombed
17 carriage realised they needed more carry-seats and
18 paramedics, did you appear to be the only source, acting
19 almost as a runner, to convey that communication back
20 upstairs?

21 A. I didn't know for sure whether they had comms or not,
22 and I would rather the message was passed again via me
23 to reinforce theirs, or it had been passed, or to pass
24 it, if they hadn't. I wasn't aware of their comms.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So they shout out to you that they

1 need this equipment?

2 A. I shouted up to them, my Lady, to ask what they needed

3 so I could actually include that in the sit rep and

4 request.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yet again, you've got to go out of

6 the tunnel back to the platform?

7 A. Yes, my Lady.

8 MR KEITH: You make a reference there to detraining a full

9 train at the same time. What train was that?

10 A. That was the one we had been detraining.

11 Q. That was the bombed train?

12 A. Dealing with the people that we had detrained.

13 Q. Having made that call, did you then go back to the

14 train?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. By then, had the number of casualties on the train been

17 further reduced?

18 A. Yes, sir, it had.

19 Q. When it became apparent that there was only a handful of

20 very seriously injured casualties left alive on the

21 train, did you start a process of trying to evacuate

22 from the area non-essential personnel?

23 A. Yes, sir, I did. This was part of the ongoing liaison

24 with the Fire Brigade and the Ambulance Service. I told

25 their senior officers at that point I wanted all

1 non-essential personnel to be removed from the tunnel,
2 leaving only those that were required to deal with the
3 people we had trapped in the trains.

4 The reason for that was anybody that didn't actually
5 need to be there at this time to deal with the last --
6 I think there was about six people trapped -- if there
7 was a secondary device, would be further casualties.
8 I wanted to minimise the number of people actually in
9 the tunnel at that time.

10 Q. Did you, yourself, help by going into the carriage and
11 bringing out, or assisting the Fire Brigade and the
12 paramedics to bring out some of the remaining severely
13 injured?

14 A. I didn't go into the train to do that, sir, I did that
15 from the outside.

16 Q. By carrying stretchers and the like?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Presumably, it became quieter and quieter as people were
19 removed?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. At some point, did a doctor confirm to you how many dead
22 people were on the train?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Could we have [BTP151-43]? At 09.37, you went back to the
25 platform and made another call:

1 "... update for Aldgate. We're evacuating all
2 people that are able to be evacuated and can walk. We
3 have several stationary trains ... I've got
4 search-trained officers searching them purely for the
5 safety of emergency service workers. We still have
6 numerous people trapped on this train. We cannot get
7 everybody out until that has been cleared, but we have
8 commenced search of surrounding area."

9 If you could then continue down the page or over on
10 to the next page, please:

11 "... I can confirm bomb blast to the train. I say
12 again, I can confirm it is an explosion on the train."

13 That was something you had already said in an
14 earlier call.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Do you recall why there was a need to reiterate that
17 fact?

18 A. I think from other radio messages I was getting, while
19 I was waiting to get on to the air, it appeared to me
20 that the message hadn't been fully understood and that
21 people weren't aware of what they were actually dealing
22 with.

23 Q. Further down the page, please, and maybe over the page.

24 Did you not at some stage radio in the fact that

25 a doctor had confirmed there were seven dead on the

1 train?

2 A. I did, sir, yes, yes, sir.

3 Q. Do you recall whether it was part of that radio call or
4 a later one?

5 A. I think it was later, sir.

6 Q. All right. The process of removing those persons who
7 could be saved from the train continued. Were you there
8 as the last two or three people were removed?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. By that stage, was there a severe shortage of equipment,
11 stretchers and the like?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. So what did you do?

14 A. We were using whatever we could, sir, ladders, whatever
15 was available to improvise with.

16 Q. Who was left in terms of emergency personnel at that
17 stage?

18 A. Right at the end, Fire Brigade, paramedics, I think
19 a HEMS doctor on the train, and one or two police
20 officers waiting to make up the numbers needed to get
21 the people -- we didn't cut the numbers down in such
22 a way that it would prohibit the work that was being
23 done, but I wanted the numbers there to be the minimum
24 necessary in order to do that.

25 Q. There had to be people there to help carry stretchers

1 and to carry the severely injured up to the ground
2 level?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. At 09.54 you called -- [BTP152-93], please.

5 "Bravo Quebec 10 ... Update [at] Aldgate. We
6 believe 6 fatalities and too many injured to count. The
7 saveable persons off in about ten minutes, at which we
8 are gonna evacuate the whole area."

9 Does that call indicate, therefore, that at around
10 9.55 you were down to the very last people on the
11 train --

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. -- who required evacuation? You must by then,
14 therefore, have received information about the possible
15 number of dead in the carriage and on the tracks?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Do you recall whether or not your estimate of ten
18 minutes to evacuate the whole area and bring the last
19 two or three casualties out was adhered to, did it take
20 about ten minutes more?

21 A. It may have been slightly longer, sir, but as I say,
22 timings -- time became irrelevant to us and it's very
23 difficult to actually look back and recall exact
24 timings.

25 Q. I'm very grateful to Mr Hay. The reference to the

1 number of dead being confirmed as seven was a little
2 later. It was in another call, to which I'll come in
3 a moment.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I'm sorry to interrupt you
5 and I appreciate it's an important part. I'm wondering,
6 would that be a convenient stage?

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, certainly.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Obviously we're not going to finish
9 the Inspector's evidence before we take a break.
10 I'm sorry about this, but I have to take a break
11 because there are people who have to take a note and
12 they have to remain focused. Thank you very much.

13 (11.45 am)

14 (A short break)

15 (12.00 noon)

16 MR KEITH: Inspector Munn, as the number of casualties
17 reduced itself further and further, ultimately you were
18 left with three casualties, I think?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. You may not have known their names, but we estimate that
21 they were Andy Brown, Martine Wright and Kira Mason. Do
22 those names mean anything to you?

23 A. No, sir.

24 Q. At that time, you told Sergeant Barnes, your colleague,
25 to get his team out, having completed all the searches,

1 and did you, together with the London Fire Brigade
2 official, help with those last three casualties in
3 getting them up to the ground level?

4 A. I did, sir, yes. I sent Sergeant Barnes back to the
5 platform with instructions not to let anybody else down
6 as well. Two reasons, really, for that, sir. One, the
7 obvious around secondary devices and the safety of
8 people coming down, but, also, at that time, I was
9 starting to think in terms of a crime scene and I wanted
10 as little contamination and interference with that going
11 forward as was possible.

12 Q. At 10.18, you made your final call, for these
13 purposes -- you updated BX, in fact, for the rest of the
14 morning, but for our purposes, you made your final call
15 at 10.18.47, [BTP170-55]:

16 "BQ10 ...

17 "... for your information, Aldgate, I'm the last
18 police officer to leave and I've got the last
19 Fire Brigade with me ... the station's now evacuated to
20 the front gate. I can confirm 7 ... dead bodies left on
21 the train, over.

22 "Sorry, say again?

23 "Have you got any persons trapped, over?

24 "None that's still alive, over."

25 That was at 10.18. Before you left, had a doctor

1 appeared trackside?

2 A. Yes, I think it was the -- I think it was the HEMS
3 doctor that I referred to earlier, I think.

4 Q. Dr Lockey?

5 A. I didn't -- I can't recall his name, sir.

6 Q. You didn't catch his name. Did he formally confirm to
7 you that there were seven dead?

8 A. Before we left, sir, I waited by the doctor and the lead
9 fire officer, while the doctor checked all the remaining
10 bodies that had been left behind, and confirmed the
11 number of dead.

12 At that point, sir, the doctor told us that he
13 thought he'd heard someone calling for help from the
14 other side of the train to where we'd been, which the
15 last fire officer and myself then went round to check
16 prior to evacuating, but we couldn't find anybody round
17 there.

18 Q. There was nobody there?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. Then that's the point at which you left for the final
21 time?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. On the basis that your radio call was made again from
24 the platform, we can surmise that you left the carriage
25 around about 10.15, 10.16?

1 A. Thereabouts, sir, yes.

2 Q. Thereabouts. The doctor had confirmed that there were
3 seven dead a few moments before then?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Therefore, the last casualties had probably come out
6 around about 10.10 or thereabouts?

7 A. Thereabouts, sir. The last firemen and I were some
8 minutes after everybody else came out, because, to get
9 to the other side of the train, we had to walk to the
10 far end, the Liverpool Street end, and then down between
11 the tunnel the other side, where we stood listening,
12 because we couldn't see anything or anyone, and then we
13 had to come out the same way, so it would have been some
14 minutes prior to us getting out.

15 Q. In contrast to the eerie and macabre silence in the
16 tunnel, when you got to ground level, did you find
17 virtual pandemonium?

18 A. Yes, sir. I was quite annoyed when I got to the initial
19 booking office. I had instructed that the cordons be
20 moved back from the front of the station, again around
21 the concern for secondary devices, and I remember, when
22 I got to the top, that hadn't quite been followed
23 through. I can understand why because of the sheer
24 volume of casualties. We did then move the cordons
25 further back.

1 Q. Were there times when other police officers, not from
2 British Transport Police, came through the cordons in
3 violation of your apparent orders?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. I think there were some angry disputes as to who should
6 be allowed through the cordons --

7 A. That's right, sir.

8 Q. -- and who shouldn't, so as to prevent contamination of
9 what was obviously going to be a crime scene?

10 A. It was a forensic scene, as far as I was concerned, sir,
11 so nobody should come into it, unless there was an
12 absolute need.

13 Q. You had obviously been down to the train several times.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. You had spent a long time down there, so there was no
16 question of contamination, as far as you were concerned,
17 because you were already or had already been in the
18 midst --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- of the scene, the crime scene. Then, did there come
21 a time when you met a man who you knew to be
22 Chief Inspector Pacey?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. You agreed a formal one-hour standoff period, that is to
25 say a formal one-hour period in which nobody could go

1 down?

2 A. Yes, sir, that was purely around, again, secondary
3 devices. As we left the tunnel, I told the Fire Brigade
4 and the Ambulance Service that there would be an hour's
5 standoff and, when I got out and found
6 Chief Inspector Pacey, he had done the same. It's
7 a standard operating procedure, sir.

8 Q. But in truth, you had already, because of your concerns,
9 ensured that the scene had been entirely evacuated the
10 moment that the last living casualty was brought out?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 MR KEITH: Inspector, thank you very much. Will you stay
13 there, please? There may be some further questions for
14 you.

15 Questions by MR COLTART

16 MR COLTART: Inspector, can I take you back, please, to the
17 point at which you've become concerned about the
18 possibility of secondary explosions, and the plan has
19 been formed, quite properly, of course, to evacuate all
20 the living as quickly as possible and then to get out of
21 the tunnel so that you could have your standoff period.

22 You say this at page 8 of your witness statement:

23 "I went to the train. I think there were about nine
24 casualties left on the train. I remember shouting up to
25 the ambulance staff and doctor, asking them what they

1 needed. They asked for more stretchers and sheet
2 carriers."

3 It's right, is it, that appeared to be their
4 priority in terms of what they needed in order to
5 complete that evacuation process? They had to get
6 people physically off the trains, and we're talking here
7 clearly about the very seriously injured?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. "I went back to the platform and made the request."
10 We've had a look at the transcript.

11 "I also updated the control and he seemed shocked
12 when I told him it was a bomb that had gone off,
13 I remember telling him that I had passed that message
14 15 minutes ago."

15 So no doubt that was a source of disappointment, as
16 far as you were concerned, that that message didn't
17 appear to have got through?

18 A. At the time, sir, I found it very frustrating.
19 Obviously, looking at it in the cold light of day,
20 I realise it could be a different controller, there's
21 more than one radio operator in the control room. At
22 the time, I found it very frustrating.

23 Q. Yes, of course, but you would expect, would you not,
24 that information of that importance would be
25 disseminated within the control room?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. "I asked for extra ambulances and extra Fire Brigade, as
3 there were people still trapped. I also requested extra
4 officers, as there were only about seven officers at the
5 scene."

6 So are we right in thinking that you were short of
7 assistance, physical assistance, trackside at that point
8 in order to complete this evacuation process?

9 A. It was really the equipment we needed for the evacuation
10 process, that I needed more officers really around the
11 cordoning and the crime scene that we were going on to,
12 dealing with the number of victims that we'd actually
13 already got out.

14 Q. And also extra ambulances and extra Fire Brigade staff
15 as well?

16 A. Yes, that was around the equipment that was needed, sir,
17 yes.

18 Q. We've got in the papers disclosed to us a note completed
19 by the incident commander for the London Fire Brigade at
20 Aldgate on that day. Now, he hasn't given evidence yet.
21 In fact, we've yet to identify who he is, and we'll have
22 to ask him about this in due course. I just want to
23 read out a note that he made and then ask you to comment
24 on it.

25 He says that:

1 "Faced with undertaking multiple extrications in an
2 environment that may contain other hazards, the incident
3 commander limited the number of personnel working at the
4 scene of operations."

5 For my Lady's note, this is document LFB21-2.

6 We don't know yet quite what he meant by "at the
7 scene of operations", but if he meant at the bombed
8 carriage, was his decision to limit the number of
9 Fire Brigade officers at the carriage inconsistent with
10 the needs which pertained at that time to complete the
11 evacuation process?

12 A. That's outwith my knowledge, sir. I don't know what he
13 did or didn't do, what other resources were there.

14 Q. No, but in fairness, that's not what I'm asking you.
15 I'm asking you whether, if that direction was given, and
16 if it means what it appears to mean, was that
17 inconsistent with your needs at the carriage at that
18 time?

19 A. On the face of what you've said there, sir, it would
20 appear to be, depending on the timing that that refers
21 to.

22 Q. Of course, and in fairness to the fire officer, we'll
23 have to ask him about that.

24 Can I turn to radio communications for a minute, if
25 I may? Is it fair to assume that it was a source of

1 frustration for you on the day that your radio didn't
2 work in the tunnel?

3 A. It made life very difficult for me, sir, yes.

4 Q. Because, as is obvious, you spent at least part of your
5 time running from the train carriage back to the
6 platform so that you could get coverage on your radio --

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. -- relaying a message and then back to the train
9 carriage again.

10 Are you able to assist us with how long it took you
11 on each occasion to get from the bombed carriage back to
12 the platform?

13 A. The first few messages would have taken longer, sir,
14 because there was more people, and I was helping people
15 to the platform as I went, the first few times. Once
16 the numbers had died down, probably 45 seconds each way,
17 I would think.

18 Q. And a little longer at the outset because of the
19 passengers who were still detraining presumably at this
20 stage.

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Of course, with this process of to-ing and fro-ing, an
23 inevitable consequence is that the situation might have
24 changed at the carriage by the time that you've had an
25 opportunity to go and relay your message and come back

1 again?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Was this inability of your radios to work in Underground
4 tunnels something which had been raised previously, in
5 other words, prior to 7 July, by you?

6 A. Do you mean personally, sir?

7 Q. Yes, with your employer?

8 A. No, sir. I don't have much call to work underground.

9 It's very rare that I've actually worked in the
10 underground environment. I was based overground.

11 Q. Are there some officers for whom it is a regular
12 occurrence?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Were you aware of it being an issue, as far as they were
15 concerned?

16 A. Oh, yes, I was aware it was an issue. It wasn't one
17 that I'd raised personally.

18 Q. It may be that you're not the right person to ask about
19 this, in which case please say so, but in what way had
20 that issue been raised? Do you know whether it had been
21 raised formally or whether this was just the subject of
22 canteen talk, as it were?

23 A. My understanding was it had been raised formally and was
24 being looked at, but that's my understanding based on
25 what I've heard, rather than meetings I've actually been

1 present at.

2 Q. There were difficulties, weren't there, also with radio
3 communications at the surface?

4 A. I was having difficulties even when I was in an area
5 I should have a signal. Some of the messages were
6 dropping out, they weren't very clear. I was having,
7 personally, difficulties with my radio. Whether that
8 was a network-wide issue or my particular handset,
9 I don't know, but I was certainly having issues with my
10 radio that day, yes.

11 Q. What you say at page 9 of your statement is this:

12 "At this point in time ..."

13 This is just after the standoff has been declared,
14 so we think that probably started at about 10.30.

15 "At about this point in time it was still very
16 chaotic. Nobody seemed to know what was going on, lots
17 of radio channels operating at the same time, so we
18 could not talk to each other very easily."

19 When you say nobody seemed to know what was going
20 on, was there anyone from -- well, let's start with
21 British Transport Police who were in charge, as it were,
22 directing operations at the surface at this time?

23 A. My understanding was, by that time,
24 Chief Inspector Pacey was. At the time I came out of
25 the tunnel, I'd been effectively incommunicado for an

1 hour and a half. I wasn't aware of that fact. The
2 first officer I saw when I got there, I asked who was in
3 charge, and he said, "Well, probably you, I think", was
4 his answer, as I was the only inspector he'd seen. It
5 could have been he'd only just got there and wasn't
6 aware, but at the time I asked and, again, having just
7 come out of the tunnel, the frustration, you know, the
8 adrenaline pumping -- it's not really the same kind of
9 conversation with you now, sir -- my impression then
10 was, well, you know, "What's going on?"

11 I soon found out that Chief Inspector Pacey was
12 there and was actually in a Silver meeting, I think, at
13 the time.

14 Q. In a Silver meeting and presumably, and in fairness to
15 the other emergency services, in a meeting with other
16 Silver Commanders, as it were, from the other emergency
17 services?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. So if it wasn't obvious who was in charge when you came
20 up, the explanation may be that they were all in
21 a meeting together?

22 A. That's what it transpired to be, sir, because I actually
23 went and found him in that meeting.

24 Q. Did you see Detective Inspector Baker when you came back
25 up to the surface? Do you recall seeing him again?

1 A. I'm not sure. I saw him at various times during the
2 day, but whether it was at that point, I can't recall.

3 Q. He was obviously very pleased to see you when you first
4 arrived.

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Mr Keith made some reference to that when he asked you
7 questions.

8 When you saw him later in the day, what did he tell
9 you of how things had gone at his end, as it were, up at
10 the surface?

11 A. I don't recall, sir. I don't have a recollection of
12 discussing that in depth with him.

13 Q. Did he mention to you the very intense difficulties that
14 people were experiencing with the mobile phone coverage
15 up at the surface?

16 A. I was aware that was an issue, in that I'd tried to use
17 my own mobile phone whilst waiting to get on the radio
18 and couldn't, so I was aware that mobile phone was an
19 issue. Whether it was Ian Baker that told me or not
20 I couldn't say, sir.

21 Q. Are you familiar with the term "access overload control"
22 in relation to mobile phones?

23 A. I wasn't at the time. I have read about it since.

24 Q. Did you know on the day that, at about 11.00 that
25 morning, the City Police activated the access overload

1 control system in relation to O2, which was their
2 network?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Were you aware that the London Ambulance Service tried
5 to invoke the access overload control system at about
6 10.00 that morning?

7 A. I was in the tunnel, sir, without any communications,
8 I wouldn't be aware of that, sir.

9 Q. That message wasn't conveyed to you later?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Is it fair to say, Inspector, that despite the heroic
12 individual performances of yourself and of your
13 probationers -- and they were heroic, if I may say so --
14 there were a number of lessons to be learnt at the end
15 of the day, on calm reflection, as to how things had
16 gone?

17 A. That's always the case, sir. We're never going to get
18 any incident perfect first time. We're always going to
19 have things we could do better as technologies improve.
20 There are always lessons to be learnt, sir.

21 Q. If we were just to try to enumerate some of the problems
22 which you identified during the course of your witness
23 statement, you had had difficulties, as we said, with
24 radio communications, I think we can agree on that.

25 A. Oh, yes, sir.

1 Q. You had experienced a certain amount of frustration over
2 the refusal of the London Fire Brigade to enter the
3 tunnel at a time when you were jumping up and down on
4 the track to show them it was safe.

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. There appeared to be a shortage of essential medical
7 supplies at the carriage itself, including carrying
8 equipment, stretchers and the like?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. There appeared to be a shortage of staff, emergency
11 response staff, at the bombed carriage. You were
12 radioing up for more fire officers, for more paramedics?

13 A. Certainly in the early stages, sir, yes.

14 Q. Some of your messages, important messages, appeared not
15 to be getting through in your control room; for example,
16 about the fact that there had been a bomb?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. When you appeared at the surface, as you put it in your
19 statement, it was chaos and nobody seemed to know what
20 was going on?

21 A. My statement was actually made as an ABE interview. It
22 was a video-recorded statement, and done by me being
23 effectively regressed back to talk through, and I was
24 describing my feelings at that initial time as opposed
25 to what the scene was. That was how it felt to me at

1 the time I came out.

2 Q. Yes, and in fairness to you, we've only got the printed
3 copy of the statement in front of us. I haven't seen
4 the video. If any of this is not properly represented
5 by your statement, then you must say so.

6 But in any event, there were a number of learning
7 points, as it were, for the future, as to how things
8 might be done differently in the event of a similar
9 incident at some point?

10 A. That would always be the case, sir, and when you have
11 something that is completely without precedent in the
12 UK, as this was, there would be more learning points
13 than something that's more run of the mill.

14 Q. In what forum did you subsequently discuss these
15 learning points and how things might have gone
16 differently on the day?

17 A. I've discussed it with various other officers, including
18 some of my line supervisors, but --

19 Q. Just pausing there for a moment, who did you discuss it
20 with? I'm sorry to be pernickety about this, but do you
21 recall now the names of the people with whom you
22 discussed it?

23 A. Certainly with my sergeants at the time, which was
24 Sergeant Barnes and Sergeant Woods in particular, they
25 both turned up on the day, and, you know, we discussed

1 our own learning points for ourselves and for our
2 officers.

3 Q. Where did that meeting take place?

4 A. That was -- that evening, when we got back to Stratford,
5 I debriefed all of my officers. That was a welfare
6 debrief rather than a technical debrief.

7 Q. Yes, of course.

8 A. Sergeant Barnes and Sergeant Woods I've worked with for
9 years, and still do, and we have discussed it, around
10 that time, on numerous occasions, as an informal
11 learning discussion as opposed to a formal debrief.

12 Q. Right. Did you keep any record of that informal
13 discussion?

14 A. I'm sorry, I haven't.

15 Q. Did there ever come a time when you were invited to
16 participate in a formal debrief session?

17 A. No, sir.

18 MR COLTART: All right. Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

20 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

21 MR SAUNDERS: Inspector Munn, I only have two matters I'd
22 like your help with, please. You were obviously in the
23 first few officers to attend with your probationers and
24 sergeant.

25 A. Initially, just the probationers, sir. Sergeant Barnes

1 followed some little while later.

2 Q. You came, I think, in separate vehicles and he was
3 shortly after you?

4 A. It was a fair gap, sir. He actually went to
5 Liverpool Street, deployed cordons there and then came
6 to us later.

7 Q. The position is this, is it not -- and I think you've
8 dealt with it in your statement, though I don't think
9 you've mentioned it to us at the moment -- that you
10 obviously had no equipment with you?

11 A. No -- when we went into the tunnel, sir, no.

12 Q. Once you appreciated what was required -- we've heard
13 Mr Keith has taken you through some of those calls --
14 that was why you were calling for more equipment to be
15 brought --

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. -- by responders to follow?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. My second topic leads on from that, Inspector, and it's
20 this: you will recall, I'm sure, the description you
21 gave her Ladyship about seeing the Fire Brigade officers
22 in their kit waiting on the platform.

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. I would just like you to help me with this, if you
25 would: at that stage, were there any Fire Brigade

1 officers in the tunnel?

2 A. Yes, sir, I think there were.

3 Q. Were there any actually on the second carriage, do you

4 remember?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. I appreciate it's difficult, but can you remember now

7 how many there would have been?

8 A. I think from memory, sir, two or three, maybe four. It

9 was a small number of -- it wasn't a large space for

10 a lot of people to work in at that point. My

11 recollection is a small number.

12 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you for confirming that, Inspector.

13 Thank you very much.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

15 Questions by MS SHEFF

16 MS SHEFF: My Lady.

17 I also just have two topics, Inspector.

18 Firstly, as you approached the train, you were aware

19 of the state of the passengers who were coming off that

20 train and in your statement you describe them as having

21 blackened faces and torn clothes.

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. In fact, you gave a rather visual description of them as

24 something like a cartoon character who had lit a match

25 and it had exploded in their face?

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. You later went on to describe people coming from those
3 carriages closest to the site of the bomb as having
4 blast injuries to their face?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Indeed, you describe the body on the track as being
7 blackened and charred from burns and smoke?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Did the effect of those burns and the blackened faces
10 from the soot make it difficult for you to tell the
11 racial origins of some of the bomb victims?

12 A. It could have done, yes.

13 Q. Indeed, the closer to the explosion, of course, the more
14 blackened the bodies would have been?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was that apparent to you when you looked into the second
17 carriage, the actual seat of the explosion?

18 A. Sorry, was what apparent?

19 Q. The blackened -- the effect of the blackened injuries
20 and blast injuries to the face?

21 A. Yes, yes, it was.

22 Q. Secondly, I'd like to ask you about communications. We
23 know from the transcripts that we've seen that you were
24 in regular and frequent contact with BX, who is your
25 controller, informing them of what was going on at the

1 scene and what was required at the scene.

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. One of the first people, according to your statement,
4 that you saw, was a Metropolitan Police officer who had
5 been a passenger, I think you inferred, who asked you if
6 he could give you a first account. Do you remember
7 that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You had with you PC Cotter --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- and you asked him to write down what this officer was
12 saying to you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you then make it clear to them that you wanted them
15 to communicate anything important over the air to BX, to
16 the controller?

17 A. Yes. I think my instruction to him was to report to
18 DI Baker, who was visible to him, and then ensure, via
19 speaking to Ian, that anything of note could be passed
20 over the air.

21 Q. So is it right to say that you had very much in mind
22 that you were one of the first and most senior officers
23 on the scene and your assessment of the scene would be
24 important to those who were in overall control of what
25 was likely to occur at a higher level?

1 A. I didn't think in those terms at the time, but that
2 would be correct, yes.

3 Q. That would accord with your training, presumably?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You, yourself, spoke to control at about -- at 9.11,
6 I think was the first call, when you were calling for
7 the ambulances. Do you remember if that was before or
8 after you spoke to this Metropolitan Police officer
9 about noting his recollection?

10 A. It would have been after, but I didn't speak to him,
11 I left him with PC Cotter to speak to him and I went
12 down into the tunnel.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, Ms Sheff.

14 Sorry, Inspector, because Ms Sheff is there and you
15 spoke towards her, I couldn't hear what you said.

16 A. I said I didn't speak to the person giving the first
17 account, I left him with PC Cotter and I went into the
18 tunnel.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think the question really is: was
20 the call before or after -- I think you told me earlier
21 that you spoke to the Metropolitan officer first?

22 A. That was before I even spoke to DI Baker, yes.

23 MS SHEFF: Yes. So, as far as you knew, he was already
24 communicating his recollection or his concerns about the
25 incident whilst you had gone down to see what was going

1 on in the tunnel?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Your next call was at 9.17 when you were requesting
4 paramedics again and giving the location and the cause
5 as a bomb. At the same time, you were also receiving
6 information over your police radio that there had been,
7 I think you said in your statement, at least five other
8 explosions.

9 A. That was my understanding at the time, yes.

10 Q. So as you were passing on the information about your
11 bomb, you were hearing about other bombs in other
12 locations?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You informed the senior ambulance and Fire Service
15 officers of that information that you had?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. So your role was to receive information from your police
18 radio, pass on information on that police radio to
19 others about your particular scene, and then disseminate
20 the information that you were getting to those at the
21 scene?

22 A. That's my role, that's one of the functions that I was
23 carrying out, yes.

24 Q. Yes, and effectively, if I may say so. You also spoke
25 to an officer from S013, Dick, who introduced himself to

1 you. He confirmed the information that you already had
2 that the train had been blown up.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Do you remember if that was before or after you had
5 heard that information over your police radio?

6 A. I was aware of other incidents as we arrived, there was
7 other things coming over the radio. The chronology
8 of -- I couldn't say for certain.

9 Q. It's all happening within a very short period of time,
10 because we know that, only ten or so minutes later, at
11 9.31, you're on the phone to the controller again, this
12 time asking for equipment for paramedics.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But by 9.37, when you're back on the radio to the
15 controller, you find out that the information you'd
16 given at 9.17, some twenty minutes earlier, doesn't
17 appear to have been assimilated because the controller
18 seemed shocked that you're telling him that there was
19 a bomb blast to the train and you say, "I've already
20 said that in an earlier message".

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. Then there are further calls that you make at 9.54 and
23 10.18. So in summary, your frustration arises around
24 9.37, owing to information which you had both given out
25 and received around 9.17 that there was a bomb on the

1 train at Aldgate and other bombs or other explosions in
2 other locations?

3 A. I was aware at that time of other instances, incidents,
4 ongoing at other locations. I think most of the radio
5 talk at the time was around power surges and other bits
6 and pieces, but it was apparent to me that Aldgate was
7 a bomb and I didn't need anyone with specialist training
8 to tell me that, it was apparent that was the case. My
9 concern was that people at other instances and being
10 called to other things should be aware of what it was we
11 had.

12 Q. Yes, indeed. So you, together with other senior
13 officers that you were briefing, the senior ambulance
14 and the senior Fire Service officers, who were present
15 at your scene were aware of that information and were in
16 a position to pass it on to their controllers and to
17 whoever was higher up their chain who needed to be
18 informed?

19 A. As I've already said, my Lady, what communications they
20 had in the tunnel, I don't know, and I can't really
21 comment on their ability to communicate. They had the
22 knowledge. Whether they had the ability to transfer
23 that on, I don't know.

24 Q. You had both the knowledge and, fortunately, the ability
25 to pass it on and you did do so.

1 A. Yes.

2 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, inspector. No further
3 questions.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

5 Questions by MS BOYD

6 MS BOYD: Inspector, on arrival, did you see any fire
7 appliances?

8 A. When I got there, no.

9 Q. I think Mr Hatcher, who was one of the probationers with
10 you, says, in fact, you parked behind a fire appliance.
11 Does that prompt your memory at all? If I can help
12 further, we do know from the MOBIS records that two
13 appliances arrived at 9.00.

14 A. I don't recall that being the case.

15 Q. I think Mr Hatcher also says in his statement -- and
16 we're going to hear from him -- that he spoke to
17 a senior fire officer who told him that there were fire
18 crew in the station, and that's as you arrived and
19 entered the station. Did he impart that to you?

20 A. I wasn't aware of that, no.

21 Q. Presumably, you wouldn't have been aware that, shortly
22 before you declared a major procedure incident,
23 Sub-Officer Clarke for the Fire Brigade had also
24 requested that that be implemented at about 9.05, so
25 shortly before you did?

1 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.

2 Q. You weren't aware of that?

3 A. No.

4 Q. By the time that you made your call that we've heard
5 about at 09.11 -- and it may be we have to add a minute
6 or two on to that, it's unclear -- you have told us that
7 there were fire crews down at the train --

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. -- or, not to mislead you, not fire crews, firemen,
10 I should say.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That seems to accord with Mr Hatcher's evidence. Again,
13 in his statement, he refers to the fact that there
14 appeared to be firemen already there and, indeed, he
15 says a fireman helped him open some doors. Did you see
16 that?

17 A. I didn't, but I was aware the Fire Brigade were there.
18 I thought they followed up down the tunnel. They were
19 there before us and I didn't see them in my first
20 assessment.

21 Q. Can I just ask you about the conversation you had with
22 a fire crew at the end of the platform, because this has
23 implied some criticism or some suggestion of a delay,
24 and I just want to try to clear this up and put it into
25 perspective?

1 You presumably can't identify that fire crew?

2 A. No, not at all.

3 Q. We do know that Sub-Officer Curnick, who led one fire
4 crew into the tunnel does say he asked a member of the
5 London Underground for confirmation that the power was
6 off, but he doesn't recall any conversation with
7 a British Transport Police officer and, indeed, there's
8 some evidence to suggest that he was already down at the
9 tracks before your conversation. So presumably it can't
10 be Sub-Officer Curnick?

11 A. I have no idea, ma'am.

12 Q. Your evidence is that, in any event, it took a matter of
13 seconds to confirm that the power was off?

14 A. Yes, the time that I was aware of them being there, not
15 coming on to the track with us, was as long as I took to
16 describe it, which was probably no more than 10 or
17 15 seconds.

18 It seemed longer to me at the time, but the reality
19 was it would have been a very short space of time that
20 they were there within my vision.

21 Q. Yes. Having seen what you've seen, one can quite
22 understand that you're extremely anxious to get any help
23 at all to the carriage. It would, however, be entirely
24 normal procedure for police, Fire Brigade or any
25 emergency service to ask for confirmation that the power

1 is off?

2 A. Completely. That is the correct protocol, yes.

3 Q. That would be second nature?

4 A. Without a doubt, yes.

5 Q. Because, of course, anyone leading a crew owes a duty of
6 care to members of that crew?

7 A. I think as I said, ma'am, when I went down there
8 initially, even though I could see people walking on the
9 tracks, I still automatically asked the
10 London Underground staff if the power was off, even
11 though it was obvious to me just by looking. So as you
12 say, it would be second nature to do that.

13 Q. I think we know from the evidence of Celia Harrison that
14 the London Ambulance also sought confirmation that the
15 power was off, but you may not have been aware of that
16 evidence?

17 A. No, I'm not.

18 Q. So in giving your account of that conversation, it's not
19 your intention to convey any sense of delay or
20 deliberate holding back by those firemen?

21 A. Not in the slightest. The Fire Brigade officers I saw
22 there I thought were fantastic on the day. Without
23 a doubt, without them being there to help us, we would
24 have been in a much worse position than we were. The
25 delay that I saw, although very frustrating at the time,

1 was a very short period of time that they were actually
2 within my vision.

3 Q. Thank you, Inspector. That's very helpful.

4 Can I also just ask you about your ongoing liaison
5 with the Fire Brigade and, indeed, the ambulance? When
6 you were giving evidence about that, your dealings --
7 I think you've effectively answered it -- your dealings
8 with the Fire Brigade, were they constructive and
9 helpful, or was there any kind of disagreement of
10 strategy at all?

11 A. There was no disagreement whatsoever. Indeed, at the
12 end, when I had evacuated everyone and the HEMS doctor
13 said they thought they heard somebody behind the train,
14 I was going to go and check that myself and the lead
15 fireman actually said, "No, I'll come with you", and
16 kept me company to do that, which I was very grateful
17 for.

18 Q. I think you've been referred to a document which
19 suggests that that might be inconsistent with the
20 request you were making for further assistance with
21 resources. Were you aware that actually room or space
22 in the carriage was very limited --

23 A. That's correct, it was.

24 Q. -- due to the nature of the wreckage and personnel who
25 were there?

1 A. Yes, very much the case, yes.

2 Q. As far as you are aware, was there, or can you confirm
3 there was no actual shortage of personnel in the train?
4 What was needed was casualty handlers or people to carry
5 stretchers?

6 A. And equipment, yes.

7 Q. And equipment, and indeed that was being fulfilled by
8 the London Fire Brigade?

9 A. Yes.

10 MS BOYD: And no doubt others. Thank you very much,
11 Inspector.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for the
13 Inspector? Yes, Mr Hill?

14 Questions by MR HILL

15 MR HILL: Inspector, may I take you to the time at which
16 a man identified himself as being an S013,
17 a Metropolitan Police Anti-terrorist Branch officer, he
18 introduced himself by his first name, Dick, I think?

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 Q. I think there was a time at which you weren't sure
21 whether he'd used the name Dick or Rob, unclear in your
22 mind, but when you came to make your statement on
23 20 July, which, as you've told us, was from a videoed
24 interview, you said that what he said to you was,
25 "Hello, my name is Dick, how are you?"

1 A. That's my recollection, sir, yes.

2 Q. That's the individual I'm asking about, and for
3 my Lady's note, I'm going to suggest that that is
4 Richard Travers, who's giving evidence subsequently, an
5 explosives officers with the Metropolitan Police whose
6 statement is INQ1184.

7 Just in terms of sequence of events, which I just
8 want to ask you about, that man came to you, spoke to
9 you, and, as you said earlier, page 79 of today's
10 transcript, you gave him a briefing.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Right. Do you say that he introduced himself to you
13 after you had first radioed in the finding that you had
14 made that this was clearly bomb damage to one of the
15 carriages in the tunnel?

16 A. I think it was between the two messages, sir.

17 Q. Right. Well, in terms of sequence, looking -- I'm not
18 going to ask that it's brought up on screen, but I'm
19 sure others are following what I'm putting to you.

20 In your statement of 20 July, certainly in that
21 statement, you referred to making a call to update your
22 control and expressing in that account that the
23 controller who was taking your call seemed shocked when
24 you told him that a bomb had gone off. Ms Sheff asked
25 you about this a few minutes ago.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The inference is that that updated call to the control
3 room was after you had seen Dick?

4 A. I think so, sir. The chronology is very difficult.

5 Q. All right. In terms of the calls that you made,
6 subsequent to that statement and, in fact, quite
7 recently, you made a further statement, didn't you, on
8 20 September this year, and you'd had the opportunity,
9 when you made that statement, to listen to the radio
10 transmissions that you made that day?

11 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

12 Q. Indeed, in your statement of 20 September this year --
13 the BTP reference is 230 -- you then marked up and
14 exhibited a copy of the transcript of the radio calls?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Right. In that marked-up copy, which has a separate BTP
17 reference to BTP151 that was being put in front of you
18 by Mr Keith in his questions, in BTP212, we will find
19 the marked-up references by you. I'm going to ask the
20 Trial Director to bring part of BTP212 up. This would
21 be page 27 of BTP212, which also has "page 39 of 64" top
22 right-hand corner. All right?

23 Now, that is a call made by you on this transcript
24 timed at 09.38.34. Do you see that, two-thirds of the
25 way down the page?

1 A. Yes, yes, sir.

2 Q. "BX from Bravo Quebec one zero ..."

3 That's your call sign, isn't it?

4 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

5 Q. That's you.

6 "... I confirm, confirm, bomb blast to the train,

7 I say again, I confirm it is an explosion on the train."

8 So that, as the words indicate, suggests

9 confirmation by you that it was a bomb blast on the

10 train.

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 MR KEITH: I'm sorry to rise to my feet. My learned friend

13 Mr Hill may not know, but this transcript contains all

14 the calls which were in the alternative transcript 151,

15 to which reference was made earlier, but the times on

16 this document, which were the times on the exhibit to

17 Inspector Munn's most recent statement, are different to

18 the ones on transcript 151, to which I made reference

19 this morning, because they have been verified, altered

20 and corrected where appropriate.

21 This call is the same call to which reference was

22 made earlier, but it does have a different time, 09.38

23 as opposed to 09.37.52.

24 MR HILL: Very helpful. I was trying to go cautiously,

25 seeking to identify through the inspector that we were

1 looking at the call that he's marked up, and the image
2 I brought up on screen has your handwritten line down
3 the left-hand margin to show that that's the call you're
4 referring to, you've marked it up in the transcript
5 provided to you.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But -- and you can verify with us -- if we now go to
8 [BTP151-44], we should find, BTP151-44 -- in fact, I think
9 for the time we just need to go back a page to page 43 [BTP151-43],
10 please, we'll see the corrected time -- I'm grateful to
11 Mr Keith -- 09.37.52.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, Mr Hill, I'm sure I'm
13 being terribly slow, I'm not sure what point you're
14 making.

15 MR HILL: Mr Keith is making a point that there are
16 corrected times. I entirely agree with him, but was
17 going perhaps at a pedestrian speed to ensure that the
18 inspector knew that I was referring him to the call that
19 he'd marked up.

20 What I'm asking you, Inspector, to come to the
21 point, is this: that confirmation of bomb blast to train
22 was, on your recollection of the sequence of events,
23 after the EXPO officer from S013 had made himself known
24 to you?

25 A. As far as I recall, sir, yes. But the reason I'm

1 stressing the confirmation there is because the
2 controller in the message had actually queried if
3 I'd said a bomb blast. That's why I'm stressing
4 "confirm" in the second part of that message.

5 Q. Yes. Now, that's the other reason for showing you this
6 particular message because, if we are talking about one
7 and the same message, in your statement of 20 July 2005,
8 when you are describing this message, you make
9 a reference to the shock on the part of the receiver of
10 the call, and then "I remember telling him that I had
11 passed the message 15 minutes ago".

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Now, this may be my error, I haven't found in this part
14 of the transcript a reference to you saying to the
15 controller "I told you this 15 minutes ago".

16 A. And I haven't seen that message either, sir.

17 Q. No.

18 A. My recollection is that was the message I passed.
19 Whether I did or whether it actually transmitted,
20 I don't know.

21 Q. Right. So having gone through the exercise, assured
22 ourselves that we're looking at the transcript in the
23 version that was made available to you and now in the
24 perfected version for these proceedings, you haven't
25 found a reference to you saying, "I told you 15 minutes

1 ago", or words to that effect?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Right. But what is clear is that, at an earlier stage,
4 timed around 9.17, you were radioing in under your call
5 sign to say "clear bomb damage to one carriage".

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Right. The question I ask you is whether it might be
8 the case that Dick, the EXPO officer, had made himself
9 known to you before that first call, first radio call,
10 to say "bomb damage to train".

11 A. No, I'm sure it was later than that, sir, because the --
12 I think at the time he came to speak to me, the majority
13 of the passengers had gone. So that would put it
14 chronologically later. I'm fairly sure it was while we
15 were waiting for the remaining track people to be
16 removed, so that would put it later in the chronology.

17 Q. Thank you. That leads to this question: where were you
18 when he came to speak to you?

19 A. I was on the tracks.

20 Q. On the tracks?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So he was on the tracks when he came to speak to you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Right. Were you in the train -- on the track adjacent
25 to the train --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- or were you -- right. You were very close to the
3 train itself?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was it apparent to you, could you tell whether or not
6 Dick, or Mr Travers, as I would prefer to call him, had
7 been on the train before he made himself known to you?

8 A. My recollection is he walked from the direction of the
9 platforms to me, but I couldn't say where he'd been
10 prior to that.

11 Q. So given that we've looked at all the materials at our
12 disposal, your statement, the transcript of calls made,
13 your best recollection of the sequence of events and,
14 indeed, what you recall saying in these radio
15 transmissions as compared to what's actually on the
16 transcript, you're not, in fairness, able to tell us
17 whether Dick Travers had been on the train, physically,
18 before he made himself known to you?

19 A. No, it's quite possible he had.

20 Q. If I were to suggest that it may be that he was in the
21 carriage, in the bombed carriage, as early as 5 past or
22 10 past 9 that morning, you wouldn't be in a position to
23 say one way or the other on that, would you?

24 A. No, I wouldn't.

25 Q. All right. Just one other question which also comes

1 from your statement on 20 July. Whatever conversation
2 passed between you and Dick Travers, you referred to,
3 quoting your own statement, which is INQ1094, "our EXPO
4 Alpha". What you mean by that is that there were
5 officers who arrived on scene who, within your British
6 Transport Police understanding, were your equivalent of
7 EXPO officers?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Right. Is EXPO Alpha a term of art within the British
10 Transport Police?

11 A. No, our Alpha units are our counter-terrorism response.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. The statement is, I think, a transcript from how it was
14 actually said from the tape. It's -- rather than my
15 written statement, it's a transcript of what I was
16 trying to say at the time. It's not how I would have
17 worded it, had I have gone back and written it
18 separately. It's our --

19 Q. By "tape" you mean the tape recording of the interview
20 from which your statement emanated?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. There is a specialist response unit within the British
23 Transport Police --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- isn't there?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. That specialist response unit deals with, for example,
3 suspect devices --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- in trains --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- or vehicles. That is entirely separate, is this
8 right, from explosives officers employed by the
9 Metropolitan Police?

10 A. Totally so, yes.

11 MR HILL: Thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for the
13 inspector? Mr Taylor?

14 MR TAYLOR: No.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I have a couple of questions --

16 MR GIBBS: My Lady?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, Mr Gibbs.

18 MR GIBBS: I'm sorry, would you like me to ask my questions
19 now or --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You ask your questions, by all means.
21 Actually, one of them, you might want to ask a question
22 pursuant to my question.

23 MR GIBBS: Yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's just this, Inspector Munn: I may
25 well have to consider the tension between the duty that

1 you owe to your junior officers and the duty that you
2 owed to members of the travelling public to try to
3 ensure their safety.

4 When you decided to go down to the tunnel to look,
5 was there anything in your training or protocols to help
6 you in working out whether you should go down or, if
7 there might be the possibility of danger, you shouldn't?

8 A. The thought of not going down didn't even occur to us,
9 my Lady. It was obvious we needed to get down there.
10 We went straight down there with the only officers
11 available at that time.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As far as British Transport Police
13 are concerned, unusually for a police service, you do
14 have tunnels, as it were, under your jurisdiction.

15 A. Yes, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there any kind of protocol between
17 you and London Underground and other people as to who
18 will go into the tunnels to investigate an incident?

19 A. It depends, really, on the circumstances. If it was
20 a relatively minor incident, then we wouldn't just go
21 into a tunnel. With something obviously as severe as
22 this, with members of the public wandering around on the
23 track, then, with or without any protocol, we're going
24 to go in there and assess and help people.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Gibbs?

1 Questions by MR GIBBS

2 MR GIBBS: Inspector, just a few details, please. This
3 began for you with an overheard radio conversation,
4 didn't it?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. If we bring up, please, [BTP150-1], we may be able to see,
7 actually, 8.47.57, someone is saying:

8 "Have you any information regarding Liverpool Street
9 Underground regarding [an] emergency alarm ..."

10 Then someone else breaks in, that's Bravo Lima 605,
11 and they say "active message". What does that mean?

12 A. "Active message" means it's "Listen carefully, it's an
13 important message. Don't interrupt. I just want
14 primacy on the airways", really.

15 Q. That's because, otherwise, messages can get lost by
16 other messages coming over them?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It's timed at 08.48.12. We may want to add a couple of
19 minutes on to that:

20 "Yeah, there's been some kind of explosion down in
21 the actual Liverpool Street Underground. There's loads
22 of smoke coming out from the Underground
23 Hammersmith & City Line."

24 Do you think that was the call that you overheard?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. So you got your team going and into the cars and
2 presumably on emergency lights and sirens towards
3 Liverpool Street?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. On the way, did you hear radio traffic, which, amongst
6 other things, mentioned the possibility of electrical
7 problems?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Could we have a look, please, at [BTP150-28]? I have the
10 entry at 08.58.17, please, the second half of the page.

11 We can see someone saying:

12 "We are here at London Bridge ..."

13 This is something we haven't heard about yet, and
14 there's a report here as well of a problem with the
15 power. Controller saying:

16 "Thank you. Received. As you might have monitored,
17 it does seem like this is a power problem rather than
18 any explosion. King's Cross as well seems to be
19 affected."

20 Do you remember both those stations being mentioned?

21 A. I certainly remember the second message, sir. The
22 London Bridge one, I'm not sure. There were a lot of
23 messages at the time.

24 Q. You arrived, we know, at 09.07, according to your
25 notebook, at Aldgate. You spoke to Mr Baker, you saw

1 the injuries and, within two minutes, you declared
2 a major incident?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Inspector Baker had already declared a major incident,
5 in fact before 9.00, 9 minutes before your call, but
6 he'd done it by telephone. You probably hadn't heard
7 it, therefore.

8 A. I wasn't aware of that, sir, no.

9 Q. He hadn't done it over the radio. He'd done it from his
10 mobile telephone. Within five minutes of that call, you
11 have been to the train and assessed the train and asked
12 for ambulances. Is that right?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. We have heard that Inspector Baker had himself
15 independently asked for numerous ambulances at about the
16 same time. Did you appreciate that wounded people were
17 continuously passing you and making their way up to
18 where Mr Baker was on the surface?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Going right to the end, you and the chief fire officer
21 are the last to leave, it seems. We have your telephone
22 call timed at 10.18, we're adding two minutes to that.
23 When you left, was there an emergency siren going?

24 A. As we got to the very far end of the train at the
25 Liverpool Street end, as we were coming out, there was

1 a repeated blowing of a whistle, and I remember saying
2 to the fire officer "What's that?", and he said "That's
3 our emergency evacuation signal", and it was -- "Does
4 that mean as it sounds?" He said "Yes, best we get
5 out". Then we literally ran. My assumption at that
6 time was they'd found a secondary device and were
7 telling us to get out really quickly.

8 Q. Can I ask you about the secondary device fear? I'm not
9 going to ask that the photographs come up again for
10 obvious reasons, but there were many, many bags left on
11 this abandoned train, weren't there?

12 A. Yes, sir, there were.

13 Q. The possibility that one of them might contain
14 a secondary device was a concern to you and others?

15 A. It was a very big concern, sir, yes. It was one of the
16 primary things in our thought process while we were
17 dealing with the safety of everybody in there.

18 Q. Was that why you were anxious to evacuate the public --

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. -- and why you were anxious to evacuate in gradual
21 stages the other people who were down there helping, so
22 that, if another bomb went off, as few more people died
23 as was possible?

24 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

25 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Gibbs. That looks as
2 if it's all the questions, Inspector Munn. I think you
3 stayed working until some time in the evening too,
4 didn't you?

5 A. That's correct, my Lady, yes.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What time did you eventually get
7 home?

8 A. I think it was about 11.30.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, if I may say so,
10 Inspector Munn, you behaved impeccably and courageously
11 and in the very best traditions of the police service.
12 You've praised your probationers. Well, I suspect they
13 learnt by your example. So I commend you wholeheartedly
14 for your actions that day.

15 A. Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. 2.00, please.

17 (1.00 pm)

18 (The short adjournment)

19

20