

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Hearing transcripts - 26 October 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.15 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Another apology from me. It feels
3 a bit like a sauna now. It's all my fault for
4 complaining about being cold.

5 MR KEITH: My Lady, I quite understand. My Lady, may
6 I invite you to call Daniel Kemp?

7 MR DANIEL JOHN KEMP (sworn)

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am terribly sorry, I just need to
9 try this microphone again. Is it working now?

10 MR KEITH: My Lady, if Mr Coltart doesn't have any questions
11 of this witness perhaps we could surrender his
12 microphone again?

13 MR COLTART: Having only just got one that works, I'm
14 reluctant to hand it over. No, of course. I don't
15 think I'm going to have any questions for this witness
16 and I may not have any questions for the next witness,
17 I'm more than happy to surrender mine if that would
18 help.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry about this.
20 I think what we'll do, Mr Keith, we'll carry on. If
21 we get to the stage where I have any questions, I will
22 say them out loud and I will ask somebody who has
23 a microphone to repeat them.

24 Questions by MR KEITH

25 MR KEITH: Certainly, my Lady.

1 Could you give the court your full name, please?

2 A. Daniel John Kemp.

3 Q. In 2005, Mr Kemp, were you employed by

4 London Underground London Underground as a control room

5 assistant?

6 A. Yes, I was.

7 Q. I think you were also entitled to carry out certain

8 supervisory functions as well?

9 A. Yes, I passed supervisor about six months before.

10 Q. Did your duties include giving out service information

11 to customers and staff in the station?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Monitoring the CCTV?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Making announcements?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. For example, evacuation announcements?

18 A. They would come out automated, if we had to evacuate

19 a station, I wouldn't make them live, they will have

20 been prerecorded.

21 Q. Right. Were you in the station control room at

22 Liverpool Street that morning?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. Around about 8.50, did you become aware of the room and

25 the windows in the room shaking?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. At that point, did you hear a mayday call coming over
3 the station radio?

4 A. Yes, I did, yes.

5 Q. Was the station radio the system whereby members of
6 staff had had individual handsets that they could
7 receive and make calls on?

8 A. Yes, it was the old style of radios, so yes.

9 Q. Did you hear the mayday call coming over your handset or
10 over a base station?

11 A. It was over -- because I was in the control room, it
12 would have been the base station.

13 Q. Who was that call from?

14 A. From what I remember, it was Faisal Asgar.

15 Q. Who was that?

16 A. He was a station assistant doing platform duties on --
17 I can't remember if it was platforms 1 or 2, but he was
18 doing SATs duties on that platform.

19 Q. Did he tell you over the radio that there was something
20 going wrong, or there was some incident concerning
21 platforms 1 and 2?

22 A. He said that there was smoke coming out of the tunnel --
23 all I heard was "Mayday, mayday, smoke coming from the
24 tunnel platforms 1 and 2".

25 Q. That's platforms 1 and 2 of which line?

1 A. The Metropolitan, Circle and Hammersmith & City lines.

2 Q. Did you look at the CCTV monitor and see smoke coming

3 out of the tunnel that goes towards Aldgate?

4 A. I saw smoke coming out of the tunnel. Some of the

5 lights were down. The only lights on were the emergency

6 lights, and the dot matrix indicator boards, which have

7 the train times on, were also off as well.

8 Q. Do you know how it was that the CCTV monitors had

9 remained on, whereas the dot matrix and some of the

10 other electrical appliances were off?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Having heard the mayday call and seen what was on the

13 CCTV, what did you decide to do?

14 A. Well, I turned round to the fire control panel, which

15 was showing loads of different types of faults. It came

16 up with what we call COW checks(?), which is it

17 basically detects small particles in the air and

18 basically gives us a warning just in case a fire starts.

19 There was loads of those on there. I didn't know what

20 was going on. So I just -- I decided, off my own back,

21 to evacuate the station.

22 Q. Did you press the button that enabled the automatic

23 announcement over the entirety of the station, evacuate,

24 and presumably puts up signs and signals to assist

25 people to get out?

1 A. It did, yes.

2 Q. Did you also try to contact the Metropolitan Line
3 controller?

4 A. Yes, I tried to call the Met Line controller on a number
5 of occasions, but the phone kept ringing, I couldn't get
6 through.

7 Q. Was it a question of the phone being out of order or it
8 just not being answered?

9 A. No, they just didn't answer it.

10 Q. Did you also decide, once you'd been unable to get
11 through to the Metropolitan Line controller, to speak to
12 the British Transport Police?

13 A. Yes, I had -- yes, I spoke -- as soon as I couldn't get
14 through to them, I called the British Transport Police
15 straightaway.

16 Q. Is that an autoline?

17 A. No. I would dial auto 1 -- or was it 999? I'd just
18 call 999.

19 Q. You'd call 999?

20 A. Yes, if it's an emergency, yes.

21 Q. Because you're Underground, your 999 call goes through
22 to the British Transport Police rather than the
23 Metropolitan Police?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Could we have on the screen BTP167 [BTP167-1], please? We've been

1 wondering about this caller, Mr Kemp, because, according
2 to the transcript, he calls himself "Mr Kent", but we've
3 assessed that this man was you. Could you just confirm
4 that that was you?

5 A. Yes, I can confirm, yes.

6 Q. "Hello mate, Liverpool Street here, we've had a loud
7 bang on the platform. We've got smoke at the moment,
8 Liverpool Street Underground here. We are evacuating."

9 You tell them you are evacuating because you have
10 made the decision to evacuate?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. There was a loud bang because you had appreciated a long
13 bang and because you'd seen smoke on the CCTV monitors?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You also tell them, do you not, that it's platforms 1
16 and 2 on the Metropolitan Line?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right. What did you expect them to do, if anything?

19 A. Just send some BTP officers down, that's all I was
20 really expecting.

21 Q. Did you also try to call the Network Control Centre, the
22 NCC?

23 A. Yes, yes. I got through to them.

24 Q. What did you tell them?

25 A. I told them the same thing, that we were evacuating

1 owing to a loud bang coming from the tunnel. The
2 Circle, Hammersmith & City, Metropolitan Line services
3 were more than likely going to be suspended and the
4 Central Line would be non-stopping.

5 Q. Did you also, in the end, get through to the
6 Metropolitan Line controller?

7 A. I eventually did, yes.

8 Q. Did you tell them about the situation and that you were
9 evacuating?

10 A. Yes, I told them exactly the same thing as everybody
11 else.

12 Q. By this stage, though you had no understanding of what
13 had caused the smoke or the bang, there was no
14 information in the control room?

15 A. No, I mean eventually, about ten minutes after it
16 happened, we got a message on the BBMS system, which is
17 a system we use to get all our information from the NOC
18 or NCC, and it said that there was a network-wide power
19 surge and basically all trains would be stopping,
20 I think they said it was a Code Yellow or something like
21 that.

22 Q. We're jumping forward a bit there. There was
23 a Code Amber.

24 A. Amber, sorry, yes.

25 Q. At about 9.15.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Let me just ask you, this BBMS system, is that a system
3 which is in all Underground stations, do you know, or
4 just yours because it's an interchange?

5 A. No, it should be on every station.

6 Q. Does it relay information from the NCC?

7 A. Yes, they -- what they do is they broadcast a message,
8 they just announce the general stuff, like, there are
9 minor delays on a certain line owing to this, you know,
10 that or the other, and it's all -- near enough all our
11 information comes from that, and then, eventually, on
12 the London Underground intranet as well, it sort of
13 mirrors it.

14 Q. Did you ever see any information on BBMS that morning as
15 to what the cause of the smoke and the bang had been in
16 the tunnel?

17 A. No, I wouldn't have got it for our specific location.
18 It's like network-wide. So they wouldn't have said
19 anything for just us.

20 Q. No, but obviously the fact that there was a bomb on
21 a train --

22 A. Oh, no, I didn't know anything about that.

23 Q. -- nothing like that ever appeared on the BBMS system?

24 A. No.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is the BBMS system -- that's not the

1 one that passengers hear?

2 A. No, it's just in stations.

3 MR KEITH: Is it a screen on which writing appears or is it
4 a voice?

5 A. No, it's a voice. It's just basically a square speaker
6 on -- on most stations, it's a square speaker on the
7 wall and that's it. We just get our messages from that,
8 which we then relay to the customers.

9 Q. Around this time, according to your statement, one of
10 your supervisors, a Mr Robin Mayes, came into the
11 office?

12 A. He did, yes.

13 Q. After that, did a gentleman, whom we have just heard
14 give evidence, called Mr Glazer, the station manager,
15 come in?

16 A. He did, yes.

17 Q. Did he ask you what you'd done so far?

18 A. Yes, he asked me what notes I'd taken so far, and could
19 I transfer those notes on to an incident form.

20 Q. Did he tell you that he was assuming the role of Silver
21 control at Liverpool Street?

22 A. He did eventually, yes, he told me.

23 Q. Do you recollect yourself when that was?

24 A. I would say it was probably about 15 or 20 minutes after
25 the actual bomb went off.

1 Q. To be fair to you, we know it was around about 09.11,
2 but that accords with your recollection?

3 A. Yes, it's about that time, yes.

4 Q. After he took Silver control, were you directed to do
5 anything in particular, or did you just continue your
6 role of taking in information that was coming into the
7 station control room?

8 A. Just continuing my role, just answering all the queries
9 we had from other stations, NOC, staff, things, and
10 taking notes as much as I could.

11 Q. Did you receive any information from the NCC or anywhere
12 else as to what the cause of the smoke and the bang had
13 been?

14 A. No, just -- it was, again, just a network-wide power
15 surge, that's all we were told.

16 Q. Who told that you?

17 A. That was from the NOC.

18 Q. That was the NCC?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. The Fire Brigade then appeared --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- according to your statement, around about 9.10, and
23 you recount how Mr Glazer went outside to speak to them.

24 Did he come back in and ask you whether or not the
25 traction current was off?

1 A. Yes, he asked me -- he wanted to confirm traction
2 current was off between Moorgate and Aldgate and then
3 also between Tower Hill and Whitechapel.
4 Q. Would that encompass the entirety of the section of
5 track within the tunnel between Liverpool Street and
6 Aldgate?
7 A. Yes, it would, yes.
8 Q. Did you understand why you were being asked why the
9 current was off?
10 A. Yes, I think, yeah, I know I was told that they were
11 thinking of doing a track search at some point.
12 MR KEITH: My Lady, in relation to the witness's evidence
13 concerning the call to the NCC, for my Lady's note, and
14 from Mr Hay's earlier schedule which he's kindly
15 reminded me of -- it's not on the schedule -- we know
16 that the call to the NCC was a call that ended at
17 08.51.25, so very shortly after the bang. For those who
18 are concerned, the reference is TFL86.
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A call from or --
20 MR KEITH: From Mr Kemp to the NCC.
21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I thought so, I think the transcript
22 suggests -- yes, a call to -- yes, I have it, thank you.
23 MR KEITH: So you were told that the London Fire Brigade was
24 thinking of doing a track search at some point?
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you recall whether they ever did carry out that track
2 search from Liverpool Street?

3 A. No, as far as I know, they never carried it out.

4 Q. Why was that?

5 A. Well, after I told Darren that the traction current was
6 off --

7 Q. Just pause there. How did you find out?

8 A. Because I phoned up the Metropolitan Line controller --

9 Q. Yes?

10 A. -- and then he -- well, after I found that out, Darren
11 went outside, he was talking to them, and then a little
12 while later, he came back and said, "We're actually
13 being told to evacuate the entire station" and I was to
14 call up everybody and let them know, like, NOC line
15 controllers, everybody, to let them know the station
16 would be completely unmanned.

17 Q. When you say NOC, do you mean the NCC?

18 A. NCC, sorry.

19 Q. The Network Control Centre?

20 A. That was the old term, sorry.

21 Q. So you had to call the line controllers?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The NCC?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The duty operation managers?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And make station announcements?

3 A. Well, the station would have been evacuated by then, so

4 I would just be telling staff that they would have to

5 leave the station and go to the staff assembly point.

6 Q. Did you understand that the evacuation order applies

7 equally to the London Fire Brigade?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So why, then, have you told us that you think that they

10 didn't carry out the search of the track?

11 A. Because I know they were -- everybody was upstairs,

12 everybody did leave, but I didn't know what was going on

13 at the time. I was just -- I was just told to do it.

14 Q. Did you see the London Fire Brigade leave?

15 A. Yes, I was actually the last person to leave the

16 station.

17 Q. Right. So as far as you understood, they left as well?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you tell us around about what time it was that the

20 station was completely evacuated in that way?

21 A. I'd say around -- I think it was about 9.20, around that

22 sort of time.

23 Q. By that stage, did you have any information as to any

24 further information as to what had caused the bang and

25 the smoke?

1 A. No, still the same thing, power surge.

2 Q. If any information had been received at the
3 Liverpool Street control room, would you, as the control
4 room assistant, become aware of it?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So if you didn't know, then nobody would have known at
7 Liverpool Street?

8 A. No, I mean obviously there would be some information
9 that wouldn't come through me, it might have gone
10 directly to Darren or Tom, whoever was in charge.

11 Q. By mobile phone perhaps?

12 A. Yes, exactly.

13 Q. All right. But if your colleague, Mr Glazer, had been
14 aware of what was going on at Aldgate, what we now know
15 to be Aldgate, you would undoubtedly expect that you
16 would have been told?

17 A. If I needed to be told, he would have told me, yes.

18 Q. Your mother called you, though?

19 A. Yes, I think she did, yes.

20 Q. And she told you something about what had been
21 happening?

22 A. She told me that there were problems at other stations
23 and on a bus, and she wanted to see if I was all right,
24 but they -- I don't think there was any evidence or --
25 no one ever said it was terrorist activity or a bomb or

1 anything like that, it's just there were problems
2 elsewhere.

3 Q. Right. But it may be that you had received more
4 information on the phone from her than you had received
5 in the control room at Liverpool Street?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Once you had gone out of Liverpool Street, there was
8 a roll call presumably?

9 A. Yes, correct.

10 Q. Then were you all instructed to reassemble further away
11 from the station?

12 A. Yes, we were first asked to go to our staff assembly
13 point, which was on the corner of Old Broad Street and
14 Liverpool Street. We weren't there -- we were there for
15 about 10 or 15 minutes, I think. I had to go off and
16 find some cleaners that were unaccounted for. Then
17 I got them, and went back. And then we were told we had
18 to move further away, so we decided to go to the
19 secondary staff assembly point, which was at Moorgate.

20 Q. Do you recall a gentleman called Mr O'Riordan who was
21 the group station manager?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Had he left a little earlier to go off to Aldgate?

24 A. He had, yes.

25 Q. Did there come a time when Mr Glazer also left

1 Liverpool Street to go to Aldgate?

2 A. As far as -- yes, I mean, there was a point, I think,
3 after, because he -- what happened was, before he left,
4 as far as I know he left, he gave us a briefing and told
5 us exactly what was actually happening. So that would
6 have been our -- everybody's first inkling as to what
7 was going on.

8 Q. Do you recall what time that was, the briefing?

9 A. It was -- no, I can't.

10 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Kemp. Will you stay
11 there? There may be some further questions for you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

13 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

14 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Kemp, can I just continue where Mr Keith
15 has stopped? The briefing that Mr Glazer gave you, what
16 did that tell you, or what did he tell you?

17 A. He basically -- well, he gathered everybody outside,
18 outside Moorgate station, just down the road, and he
19 basically summed up -- he said along the lines of "You
20 might have heard things over the phone or from other
21 people about what's going on", and he told us the real
22 reason, that it was terrorists, it was a number of bombs
23 had gone off at other stations, and we were to keep that
24 information to ourselves and not to divulge it to the
25 public as it hadn't actually gone public yet.

1 Q. I appreciate that you have just been asked whether you
2 can recall the time of that and you couldn't help with
3 that. But is it right that that takes place at the
4 second meeting point?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you think that that second meeting was at Moorgate
7 between 9.40 and 9.45?

8 A. Probably about right, yes, about an hour after the
9 actual bomb, yes.

10 Q. So as far as Mr Glazer telling you that it was suspected
11 terrorists and a bomb, it was about an hour after the
12 original explosion?

13 A. I would say so, that's the way it seems, yes.

14 Q. Did that include Mr Glazer being aware that a bus had
15 been involved as well?

16 A. I can't exactly remember if he -- if the bus was
17 mentioned, but I remember him saying a number of
18 stations and trains, but I can't remember about the bus.

19 Q. So we should take it, should we, that the reference to
20 the bus has only come from your mother?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Not something you've been told officially?

23 A. No.

24 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions, Mr Gibbs? Mr Taylor?

1 MR TAYLOR: Yes.

2 Questions by MR TAYLOR

3 MR TAYLOR: How long have you worked for London Underground?

4 A. About ten years.

5 Q. And from the control room as a controller?

6 A. Well, three years as a CSA, three years as a control
7 room assistant and the rest of the time as a supervisor.

8 Q. So you've got quite a bit of experience in the control
9 room?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. What sort of systems do you have in the control room?
12 CCTV?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. A radio system, base system?

15 A. Yes, a radio system, base system, now the CONNECT radio
16 system. We have computers, info -- our intranet, where
17 we can get all our information as to where the trains
18 are, service information. We've also got the fire
19 control panel in there as well.

20 Q. The fire detection system. If there's a fire in the
21 tunnel, does it come through to you?

22 A. That I don't know.

23 Q. Just from the stations, you feel?

24 A. Yes, as far as I'm concerned, it is for the stations.

25 I don't know if it -- how far it goes into the tunnel.

1 Obviously, if smoke comes out of the tunnel, as soon as
2 it hits a detection thing in the station, then that will
3 get detected.

4 Q. Would that be just for Liverpool Street or would it be
5 for Aldgate, would you receive --

6 A. No, just Liverpool Street. Every station has their own
7 fire control panel.

8 Q. I see.

9 A. The major ones anyway.

10 Q. So you weren't aware if the fire system activated at
11 Aldgate?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Can we just talk a little bit about the training you
14 received? Did you undergo training for the control
15 room?

16 A. Yes, you originally go -- you apply for the job, you do
17 testing for it, and then, when you go to a station, you
18 get two weeks' worth of training in the control room.
19 Then you have a test at the end of that, and then you
20 pass out from there.

21 Q. So that's site-specific training, is it?

22 A. That's right, yes.

23 Q. What about the documentation and all that sort of stuff,
24 though?

25 A. Yes, there would have been documentation for it.

1 Q. Quite a bit of documentation?

2 A. As far as I know, yes.

3 Q. Are you a first aider?

4 A. I know first aid, I was a first aider a few years back,
5 but I didn't do any of the refreshers, so I haven't been
6 a first aider for a few years.

7 Q. Have you undertaken any training in contingency planning
8 like for this sort of event?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Was anything handed down to any of the staff possibly on
11 major events like bombs or huge fires?

12 A. We -- I mean, we get, you know, basic training to deal
13 with things like that, but nothing specific, no.

14 I mean, we get -- when we're -- when you're training,
15 they tell you "This is your role" in everything, "This
16 is what you're supposed to do, you take the lead from
17 the supervisor", but no specific training to deal with
18 specific instances.

19 Q. So -- and there's nothing written down that you know of
20 in your standard operating procedures to --

21 A. There is -- you know, there is something written down
22 saying what I do, as being a control room assistant at
23 the time. If there's a fire, I have to evacuate.

24 There's a set guidelines of what I have to do, but --

25 Q. But no --

1 A. That's about it.

2 Q. No physical training, you haven't been taken off-site
3 and --

4 A. No, nothing like that.

5 MR TAYLOR: Okay, thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Canby?

7 Questions by MS CANBY

8 MS CANBY: Mr Kemp, just picking up on that point first --
9 I'm asking you questions on behalf of Transport for
10 London -- in relation to training and procedures for
11 major incidents, the starting document is the railway
12 Safety Case. Do you agree?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Then you have a number of railway standards?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In fact, we've been looking at one of those earlier
17 today which was called the Na100.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you agree that Na100 sets out incident
20 organisation --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and roles and responsibilities, for instance? Each
23 line then has its own emergency plan, so the Circle Line
24 has its own emergency plan?

25 A. Right, okay. Yes.

1 Q. Do you know that?

2 A. Yes, I do, yes.

3 Q. Then, in addition to that, is it right -- and you may be
4 able to help us in your role as station supervisor,
5 I think -- that each station also has its own emergency
6 plan?

7 A. Yes, we have -- yes, we have obviously a yellow booklet,
8 it's a station emergency and congestion plan that
9 basically outlines what we do in certain emergencies,
10 things like that.

11 Q. In fact, you weren't here, but yesterday, with
12 Celia Harrison, we looked at the Aldgate emergency plan
13 and we could see from that that there are a number of
14 stages and, in fact, useful flow charts to tell members
15 of staff what occurs if there is a fire.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you recall that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. If there's a bomb or an explosion.

20 A. Right, yes.

21 Q. If there's a power failure. So all of those instances
22 are dealt with in the station emergency plan?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can we move on to the Met Line controller, because
25 you've mentioned him on a couple of occasions?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Are you aware that the Met Line controller was -- had
3 duties and responsibility for parts of the Circle Line
4 and his responsibility included, not only
5 Liverpool Street/Aldgate but also Edgware Road?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Are you aware that he also had some duties in respect of
8 King's Cross station?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So on that day, obviously, we know that there were
11 explosions at Aldgate, Edgware Road and between
12 King's Cross and Russell Square --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and they are all dealt with by the Metropolitan Line
15 controller.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You also called the Central Line controller?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. You told him that Liverpool Street station was
20 evacuating and the brief reasons why. Can you recall
21 who the Central Line controller was in July 2005?

22 A. I haven't got a clue, no.

23 Q. Do you know that he would be based at Wood Lane?

24 A. Yes, I knew that, yes.

25 Q. Do you call the Central Line controller because the

1 Central Line runs through Liverpool Street?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you remember what the brief reasons were that you
4 gave him?

5 A. I told him, you know, again, there was a prolonged loud
6 bang coming from our Metropolitan Line platforms so
7 we're evacuating the station. It's basically, I told
8 the people the same thing each time, so I would have
9 told him the same, and if he could non-stop his trains
10 for now.

11 Q. Was that before or after your first call to the NCC?

12 A. I can't remember what order -- I know I called --
13 I tried to call the Met controller first, couldn't get
14 hold of him, got through to the BTP.

15 Q. Yes, and the call to the BTP, that looks like it's very
16 early on. The call there was referred to as being 8.47,
17 but we may have to add a couple of minutes, so it looks
18 as if you spoke to the BTP at about 8.49, if that helps.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. And then -- you think it was after then?

21 A. Yes, I mean, I think it was -- yes, then it was the Met
22 controller again, tried them again, couldn't get
23 through, then the NOC, then I think I eventually got
24 through to the Met controller after that.

25 Q. You've been referring to the NOC.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. No criticism of you, but in July 2005 it was the Network
3 Control Centre and it was the NCC?

4 A. I know, they drum it into you.

5 Q. We heard from Celia Harrison yesterday and she said
6 that, at about 8.55, she received a telephone call from
7 you. Do you remember that? She said, to help you, that
8 you told her you were evacuating Liverpool Street
9 station.

10 A. Yes, because part of the duties in the control room is
11 when you're evacuating a station you phone the stations
12 either side to let them know you're evacuating, so that
13 would have been the phone call, just to say we're
14 evacuating Liverpool Street and, yes, that would have
15 been it.

16 Q. She said that you told her that you had loss of power
17 and she told you that they were also evacuating at
18 Aldgate?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, Darren Glazer, it looks as if he assumes Silver
21 control at about 09.11.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. He comes into the control room. Do you recall him
24 calling a few people up and discussing issues like
25 Silver control?

1 A. I do, yes.

2 Q. Was that some time after 9.11?

3 A. I know it was after then, but I can't remember when.

4 Q. Can you remember -- or were you aware of who he was
5 talking to?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Are you aware of, roughly, how many calls he made?

8 A. No.

9 Q. You referred to a message that you received on the BBMS
10 system, the breakdown broadcast messaging system.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You aren't to know this, Mr Kemp, but actually we
13 listened to that message in the opening of this inquest.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. That was at 9.12.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. Does that sound about right to you?

18 A. It sounds about right, yes.

19 Q. For those who want to listen to it again, it's reference
20 TFL230.

21 The message was that there had been a major power
22 failure on London Underground and advice to station
23 supervisors was given to assess their own situation and,
24 if necessary, close their own station. Station
25 supervisors were told to check lighting and the message

1 said that there may be difficulties in contacting line
2 controllers.

3 At that stage, when we listened to the recording, in
4 that recording there was no reference to a Code Amber or
5 Red.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. So it seems that that may have been later on.

8 A. I think it probably -- yes, I know I heard it at some
9 point, but I can't remember when.

10 Q. You can't remember when it was?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Then you contacted the NCC on another occasion. Again,
13 we have got that recording although it's not one we
14 listened to in the opening. If anybody is interested in
15 listening to that, it's TFL334.

16 The call starts at 9.27.50, and it ends at 9.29.12.

17 You speak to the NCC incident desk and you confirm to
18 them that the BTP, the LAS and the LFB were all on-site
19 by then.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. This is the call when you tell them that there's been an
22 explosion between Liverpool Street and Aldgate,
23 passengers are trapped in the tunnel, you told them that
24 you're about to completely evacuate Liverpool Street
25 station?

1 A. Right.

2 Q. That was the call I think you said "I let them know the
3 control room was unmanned", it was that call?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you also recall that you gave them Darren Glazer's
6 mobile number?

7 A. Yes, I can, yes.

8 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Kemp, I don't have any further
9 questions.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

11 Thank you very much, Mr Kemp. You're free to go,
12 thank you for coming to assist us.

13 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Tom O'Riordan,
14 the group station manager, please?

15 MR THOMAS ANTHONY O'RIORDAN (sworn)

16 Questions by MR KEITH

17 MR KEITH: Good afternoon. Could you give the court your
18 full name, please?

19 A. Yes, it's Thomas Anthony O'Riordan.

20 Q. Mr O'Riordan, the microphone in front of you simply
21 relays your evidence to an annex. It doesn't actually
22 amplify your voice. So for the benefit of those of us
23 who are actually present in the courtroom, could I ask
24 you to keep your voice as high as you possibly can?

25 A. Yes, I will do, yes.

1 Q. Your voice is quite difficult to hear.

2 In July of 2005, you were employed by

3 London Underground as a group station manager based at

4 Broad Street in Liverpool Street, London. Is that

5 right?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. I think you'd been a group station manager for some

8 years before then.

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. Could I just ask you a few questions about the nature of

11 the role of group station manager, if I may? Can we

12 have on the screen TFL649 [TFL649-1], please?

13 There is an organisational chart. We can see "group

14 station manager" on the left-hand side, above duty

15 station manager but below performance manager?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. So you were, as we've heard a little earlier,

18 Mr Glazer's line manager?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. In that role, were you responsible for safety aspects

21 within the Underground station at Liverpool Street,

22 including fire regulations, licensing and the like?

23 A. I am, yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Are you still the group station manager there?

25 A. No, I'm not, no.

1 Q. You're not. All right. Could we have [TFL568-15],
2 please?
3 There's group station manager and the
4 responsibilities from the London Underground
5 Safety Case. We can see you're responsible for local
6 interface with other train and station operating
7 companies, you're responsible for a designated group of
8 stations, and was the group of stations
9 Liverpool Street, Moorgate and Aldgate?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. You are or were responsible for assessing and
12 controlling the risks associated with the operation of
13 the stations, safety surveys, evacuation exercises and,
14 as we can see at 13.4:
15 "Making decisions based on operational risks ...
16 "Withdrawing access if, in the opinion, operational
17 safety is or may be compromised."
18 And:
19 "... responsible for ... maintaining local emergency
20 plans ..."
21 And also:
22 "... for ensuring effective communications ... at
23 local level with the LFB, London Fire & Emergency
24 Planning Authority, and British Transport Police."
25 I think in the jargon you were the custodian of the

1 congestion control and emergency plan, is that right?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Could we just have on the screen [TFL7-2]? There is the
4 congestion control and station emergency plan:
5 "The custodian of this document is the group station
6 manager Liverpool Street Group."
7 That's you?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. What does that mean?

10 A. That means that, within this document, it makes
11 a decision as to how the station is operated at all
12 different times of the day and in different scenarios
13 and perturbed emergency, et cetera, and those scenarios.

14 Q. In the context of what we now know to be the emergency
15 that presented itself in the tunnel between Aldgate and
16 Liverpool Street, in an essence, could you just describe
17 for us what the group station manager is expected to do
18 in such an emergency?

19 A. The group station managers for the most are not
20 operational, but they're actually custodians of the plan
21 and they develop those plans with their safety champion
22 within that group and that would involve the emergency
23 planning team as well.

24 Sorry, can you repeat the question?

25 Q. Yes. Let me rephrase it in the light of your previous

1 answer, if I may.

2 Where an emergency presents itself, like, for
3 example, the one that presented itself on the morning of
4 7 July, what is the group station manager expected to do
5 by way of operational response, if any?

6 A. Well, it's to -- if available, it's to attend and
7 actually get involved in any aspect of the operations to
8 support the team on the day.

9 Q. Does that include making decisions as to how the
10 emergency services should be contacted or how they
11 should be deployed or how London Underground should
12 respond?

13 A. That would depend. If I came in and there's
14 a situation, if I'm at the very early stages, I would
15 take control of a situation. If I go in and control is
16 already in place, I would assist whoever's in charge of
17 that and act on their instruction.

18 Q. All right. Would you expect yourself to take
19 operational decisions about how to respond?

20 A. I would take a view of what was going on and, if it is
21 being controlled adequately, and everything is working
22 as it should be, then I wouldn't make any decisions.
23 However, I would intervene if that was not the case.

24 Q. Thank you. On this morning, you were in your office,
25 and I think the duty manager, Mr Glazer, of whom I've

1 made mention already, came into your office and told
2 that you there were problems downstairs in
3 Liverpool Street station.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Did you know at that early stage what the problems
6 consisted of?

7 A. No, I didn't have any idea.

8 Q. But you went down to the Underground station and then,
9 I think, into the control room, and did you see there an
10 evacuation of the station being coordinated?

11 A. Yes. By the time I got down to the station, the station
12 was evacuated of customers and staff were still on the
13 station.

14 Q. Did it seem to you that the evacuation of the station
15 was being adequately coordinated and managed?

16 A. Yes, it was.

17 Q. So you didn't, in accordance with the evidence you've
18 given us, feel the need to intervene?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. You let it develop?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When you went down to the control room, were you
23 informed by anybody of the nature of the incident that
24 had occurred?

25 A. No, when I arrived into the ticket hall to begin with,

1 I met with two members of staff who I -- who were
2 coughing and I asked them to see what was going on, and
3 they said that they were working in their ticket office
4 and a gush of dust came into the -- in through the
5 little hole in the window which caused them to have
6 respiratory problems, and then went to the control room
7 from there.

8 But I wasn't at any time told, at this stage, what
9 the problem was or what was occurring, apart from the
10 fact of being aware that the station was evacuated.

11 Q. In the control room, was there a gentleman whose name
12 you ascertained was Detective Chief Inspector Lawson?

13 A. Yes. There was somebody in the control room with Darren
14 and Daniel at the time that I entered the control room.

15 Q. That's Darren Glazer and Daniel Kemp?

16 A. Darren Glazer and Daniel Kemp, and I believe that that
17 was the officer in question, yes.

18 Q. In your statement, you recounted to the police how you
19 spoke at one stage to Celia Harrison, who we know is the
20 supervisor at Aldgate. Your statement states that she
21 informed you that there were possible injured people at
22 Aldgate.

23 A. The statement is not factually correct, in that it was
24 Darren who spoke to Celia Harrison --

25 Q. I was going to ask.

1 A. -- and Darren relayed that information to me that there
2 was potential people injured at Aldgate.

3 Q. She made a number of calls, in fact, to the
4 Liverpool Street control room and spoke to Mr Glazer on
5 a number of occasions.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. On one of those occasions -- which, for my Lady's note,
8 was the one around 9.18 -- according to her notes, she
9 told him that she had received information from a member
10 of London Underground called Mr Stallibrass who was
11 a member of the marketing department but happened to
12 have been on the train at Aldgate. He recounted to her,
13 and she recounted to Mr Glazer, how he thought there was
14 a bomb or had been a bomb.

15 Was that piece of information passed on to you?

16 A. No, no.

17 Q. You left Liverpool Street on foot to go to Aldgate to
18 see what was happening, didn't you?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. We know from the notes kept by Mr Glazer -- could we
21 have please [INQ10241-3]?

22 In the bottom left-hand corner there:

23 "Silver control Aldgate", 09.26.

24 His evidence, Mr O'Riordan, is that you took control
25 at Silver control when you got to Aldgate.

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. This note might suggest, therefore, that you reached
3 Aldgate around 09.26. And Celia Harrison, if we could
4 have on the screen [INQ9753-6], recounts after 9.30, or
5 she makes reference after 9.30, to -- a reference to
6 GSM, group station manager "T", who we think might be
7 Tom, yourself?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "Silver"?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So it sounds as if you must have left Liverpool Street
12 somewhere around about 9.20 and got to Aldgate somewhere
13 around about 9.26, 9.30. Does that sound about right?

14 A. I think I left Liverpool Street a little bit earlier
15 than that. As soon as Darren mentioned to me that
16 people were injured at Aldgate, I spoke to the
17 supervisor about taking some staff with me to Aldgate
18 and we decided that anyone who was available, who had
19 worked in the ticket office, would -- could be surplus
20 to requirements at Liverpool Street and I went on foot
21 with those members of staff.

22 Q. Did you know that the incident was between
23 Liverpool Street and Aldgate when you left
24 Liverpool Street?

25 A. No, I -- it was bigger than that at this stage, for me,

1 because, when I left Liverpool Street I was aware that
2 there was communication problems with Moorgate as well
3 as Aldgate and that there were issues around not knowing
4 what was happening at Moorgate at this stage.

5 So on the way to -- when I assembled my staff who
6 I was taking with me, which was three members of staff
7 from the ticket office and one supervisor, Robin Mayes,
8 we discussed en route that Robin, whatever was happening
9 at Aldgate, albeit that we didn't know at the time, that
10 Robin and two would stay with -- at Aldgate and assist
11 and I would then move from Aldgate to Moorgate on foot
12 with the two remaining members of staff to establish
13 what was going on at Moorgate. That was the plan at
14 that stage.

15 Q. Did it occur to anybody to call Aldgate prior to you
16 leaving Liverpool Street to see what resources, if any,
17 they actually needed there and what precisely had
18 happened, if they knew?

19 A. No, once Darren said that there was people injured and
20 we didn't know what that entailed, then it was to take
21 as many people we possibly could. So, no, there was no
22 discussion about asking Aldgate before I left.

23 Q. When you reached Aldgate, did you take the role of
24 Silver on your arrival?

25 A. On my arrival, I assessed the situation and spoke to

1 Celia and at that point said to Robin that I wasn't
2 going to go to Moorgate because the obvious -- problems
3 that we had at Aldgate, and that I was going to stay,
4 and at that point I decided to take Silver control from
5 Celia.

6 Q. You say "from" her. We've heard evidence from her that
7 she didn't understand herself, in fact, to have been
8 appointed Silver or Bronze or to take a command position
9 at all. May I just ask you to clarify that point? You
10 obviously were Silver at Aldgate.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Did you actually understand, in fact, her to have been
13 Silver before you, or was she just the person who
14 appeared to you to be in charge?

15 A. I believe Celia had the tabard on, which showed that she
16 was Silver control at Aldgate.

17 Q. I see. When you got there, you also received a message
18 from Baker Street to the effect that there was a train
19 between Moorgate and Liverpool Street?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Presumably --

22 A. Sorry, Aldgate East and Liverpool Street.

23 Q. Your statement says Aldgate and Liverpool Street. Was
24 it Aldgate East and Liverpool Street?

25 A. Yes, Aldgate East and Liverpool Street.

1 Q. When you arrived at Aldgate, you must have seen
2 passengers coming up from the platform and through the
3 station, including a large number of wounded.

4 A. When I arrived at Aldgate, I saw a lot of wounded
5 casualties in the ticket hall. I didn't see anybody
6 coming up to the ticket hall. They were already there.

7 Q. You presumably discovered from Celia Harrison and other
8 staff at Aldgate that they were coming up from a train
9 that was just inside the tunnel between Aldgate and
10 Liverpool Street?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Certainly, by then, 09.18, Celia Harrison knew that
13 people were beginning to talk of there having been
14 a bomb in the train. Did you discover that for
15 yourself?

16 A. No, I didn't. Not at this stage. We -- I didn't have
17 an idea as to what the situation was. What I believed
18 in my head at that time was -- and if I could go back,
19 at about 7.15, I arrived at Liverpool Street that
20 morning and the plan of the day was I was to meet the
21 performance manager who's next level up, Paul Kirwan,
22 and we were going to go on a home visit to a member of
23 staff who was sick together, and he lives in south
24 London, and some time around 7.30 I got a phone call
25 from Mr Kirwan to say that there was a power failure on

1 the Northern Line and that he would be running late.

2 So that was in my mind at the time I was at Aldgate,

3 that it was something to do with the power.

4 Q. As Silver control on your arrival at Aldgate, it fell to

5 you, along with others, perhaps, to decide what could be

6 done about the casualties, you saw passengers who were

7 wounded, and that must have involved considering what

8 the cause was of those injuries and, therefore, what

9 needed to be done about that?

10 A. When I got there, I did see casualties and, with my

11 experience as a duty manager and having dealt with other

12 casualties in the past, it wasn't -- what was unusual

13 was the amount of casualties rather than seeing

14 a casualty, and I felt that they were being dealt with

15 adequately at that stage without me getting involved.

16 Q. Mr O'Riordan, may I just ask you, when you arrived and

17 you saw a very large number of casualties,

18 instinctively, what did you think had been the cause?

19 A. I knew there was a major -- I felt that there was

20 a major incident after happening, but I didn't know at

21 that stage what it was.

22 Q. Did you think it relevant or important to try to find

23 out what the cause was of this exceptional and

24 unprecedented number of wounded passengers in the

25 booking hall at Aldgate?

1 A. Yes, I did, yes.

2 Q. What did you find out?

3 A. I -- what I done was I asked Celia to try and find the
4 fire officer in charge so that I could speak to the fire
5 officer and understand what was going on.

6 Q. Did you speak to the fire officer?

7 A. I did.

8 Q. What did he tell you about the cause of these casualties
9 and what was happening on your track?

10 A. He said that there was an incident on a train, as far as
11 he could make out, didn't know what it was, didn't know
12 whether it was a device that had gone off or whether it
13 was a chemical --

14 Q. Biological or nuclear or radiological device?

15 A. Yes, and at that point, he didn't -- he couldn't clarify
16 to me what was going on.

17 Q. Was there a discussion between you as to whether there
18 should be a standoff period?

19 A. Yes, there was, yes.

20 Q. Could you tell us about that, please?

21 A. Yes, when I spoke to the fire officer, I -- he said he
22 wanted the station evacuated of all staff and that there
23 would be a period of one hour where they would want to
24 have a standoff.

25 Q. Did you speak to Darren Glazer at Liverpool Street about

1 the wisdom of a standoff and as to whether or not your
2 own staff could go down on to the track?

3 A. I remember having one conversation with Darren, and
4 I remember Darren saying that we shouldn't allow any
5 members of staff to go on to the track.

6 Q. At Aldgate, did anybody tell you that a substantial
7 number of London Underground staff were already on the
8 track, indeed they were already in and around the bombed
9 carriage?

10 A. Celia had told me that -- Celia Harrison told me that
11 Tony Counihan, the other supervisor, and
12 Stephen Winning, and I think she mentioned Ola, were
13 downstairs and that she wasn't fully aware of exactly
14 where they were, but that Stephen Winning was standing
15 at the end of the platform and the casualties had come
16 off the train.

17 Q. Did she tell you that that member of staff, Ola, had in
18 fact radioed up to say he desperately wanted paramedics
19 into the tunnel because people were dying?

20 A. Yes, she did.

21 Q. So you understood there were people on the track?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Indeed, people were dying in the train?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did you, therefore, call Gold control for clarity, for

1 guidance as to whether or not you should either agree
2 a standoff period, that means evacuate everybody out,
3 or, secondly, refuse to allow London Underground staff
4 on to the track?

5 A. I spoke to Gold control once and that was to inform them
6 that I was taking over Silver control, and I didn't at
7 any time speak to them about the standoff or not
8 allowing our members of staff on the track.

9 Q. In your statement, you say:

10 "I was informed by Silver control at
11 Liverpool Street, Darren Glazer, that no members of
12 staff were to go near to the track because of the
13 potential of a second explosion. I rang Gold control
14 for clarity. I think the Gold control was
15 a Darren McCluskey. Gold control, based at the NCC
16 (Network Control Centre) at St James's Park Underground
17 station", in fact Broadway at Victoria "advised to
18 detrain people off the train that had stopped."

19 That seems to indicate that you did speak to Gold
20 control about whether or not staff could go on to the
21 track to detrain the passengers?

22 A. This was a different train.

23 Q. This was a different train. Was that the train that was
24 believed, at one stage, to have been in the tunnel at
25 Moorgate, or a train at east Aldgate?

1 A. This was the train that was stalled between
2 Liverpool Street and Aldgate East.

3 Q. In relation to the standoff period, did it take place?

4 A. My immediate reaction was that we needed to establish
5 that everybody was accounted for and, once I had
6 established that, I -- we complied with the
7 Fire Brigade's request.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Pausing there, so if you had a Silver
9 control London Underground person and a Silver control
10 fire officer or a Silver control police officer, and
11 they said "Don't do X" but you had your doubts, who
12 holds sway?

13 A. We take Gold control for the operations, but once they
14 say, "Well, you can't go in" or "You can't do X", then
15 they take the ultimate decision.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What, Gold control or your fellow
17 Silver control?

18 A. Silver control, but we would talk to our Gold control
19 just to inform them that that was the case normally.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You see, if you were being told by
21 a fire officer to evacuate or have a standoff, which
22 essentially is all staff and everybody has to leave --

23 A. Yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- you don't seem to have complied
25 with that until you were satisfied that people had been

1 got off this possible train.

2 A. That's correct. I was -- I wanted to -- I wanted all my
3 staff accounted for more so than anything else, and --

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not suggesting you did anything
5 wrong. What I'm just saying is you would take your own
6 decision --

7 A. Yes.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- depending on how you saw the
9 situation. Is that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 MR KEITH: We know from other evidence, Mr O'Riordan, that
12 there was a general clearing of the bombsite in the
13 Aldgate/Liverpool Street tunnel around about 10.00 or
14 10.15 when all the casualties had been brought out.
15 There was a later, formal standoff imposed by EXPO,
16 explosives officers of the Metropolitan Police,
17 following a first Gold group meeting at Scotland Yard at
18 10.30.

19 Can you just tell us whether you think that this
20 discussion about a standoff concerned general evacuation
21 from the tunnel, once all the casualties were brought
22 out, or the formal standoff that appears to have been
23 imposed later?

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. You don't know, all right. In your statement, you

1 describe how you all evacuated the station about 11.00.

2 A. Correct, yes.

3 Q. That may, therefore, be an indication that it was the

4 later, formal, imposed standoff period. But so that

5 we're clear, it's your recollection, is it, that nobody

6 evacuated out of the tunnel until you were satisfied

7 that all the live casualties had been brought out?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When did you first discover that there had been an

10 explosion of some sort -- indeed, we know a bomb --

11 inside the tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate?

12 A. The first time that I probably accepted properly was at

13 just after 11.00 when I actually saw it on the BBC

14 web -- TV in the incident truck, at the LFB incident

15 vehicle.

16 Q. You say "I probably accepted properly". Do you mean

17 that was when you received some kind of objective,

18 credible indication that there had been an explosion or

19 the first time you became even aware of the possibility

20 of an explosion?

21 A. No, credible, credible indication.

22 Q. When did you first gather from staff at Aldgate or your

23 own researches that there had been an explosion,

24 possibly a bomb, in the tunnel in the station in which

25 you were Silver control?

1 A. Minutes after I got to Aldgate, I was told by Celia.

2 But an explosion could possibly be a power cable as well
3 as a bomb.

4 Q. Of course. You continued to maintain Silver control at
5 Aldgate and you were then responsible, I think, for
6 a myriad of different issues throughout the course of
7 the morning concerning the station, the management of
8 its staff, whether or not it would be possible to get
9 Underground services back running again and so on?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,
12 please? There may be some further questions for you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: Mr O'Riordan, I just want to confirm this:
16 you'd gone across to Aldgate and became Silver control?

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. It's at that stage, is it, that you're aware that there
19 is discussion that this was an explosion?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So although you've said it's 11.00 when it's credible,
22 you were aware throughout of the suggestion of
23 explosion?

24 A. Yes, what that meant in the terms of explosion and the
25 content of that wasn't what I was sure of. It could be

1 anything at that stage.

2 Q. I'm sorry, it wasn't something you were sure of?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You've then described that the fire officer wand
5 a one-hour standoff?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. Should we take that to be that it was the London Fire
8 Brigade Silver control officer?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. When do you recall he was asking for that one-hour
11 standoff? (Pause).

12 If that's your statement you're looking at,

13 Mr O'Riordan, I can help you to this extent: on the
14 second page is where you refer to it, about 12 lines up
15 from the bottom. Again, to help you, if it does, do you
16 see it's at the end of the sentence:

17 "The fire officer wanted to do a one-hour standoff."

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But there doesn't appear to be a time there.

20 A. No, but it was very soon after I got to Aldgate,
21 whatever time that was, because I spoke to the fire
22 officer very soon after getting there.

23 Q. Thank you. So that's not what Mr Keith was just asking
24 you about, the 11.00 matter?

25 A. No.

1 Q. This is much earlier than that?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. We think it must be about 9.30, do we?

4 A. Yes, roughly, yes.

5 Q. Do I understand this, Mr O'Riordan, that you never gave

6 the direction, as it were, that everybody should come

7 out at that point?

8 A. The -- I went back into the office and just wanted to

9 make sure that everybody was accounted for before we

10 actually left the building.

11 Q. So at that point, was there anybody still down at the

12 train?

13 A. There was -- I couldn't -- I didn't know whether there

14 was or not so that's why I wanted a complete sweep of

15 the station to understand that all personnel were

16 accounted for and that we could leave the station.

17 Q. Was there, in fact, a stop that nobody else -- for

18 example, paramedics -- would be allowed to go

19 downstairs?

20 A. No, I never put anything in to stop paramedics coming

21 down the stairs.

22 Q. So if required, they would have been allowed to go

23 downstairs?

24 A. Yes, the ... yes.

25 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr O'Riordan.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

2 Questions by MS SHEFF

3 MS SHEFF: Mr O'Riordan, you said that, when you got to

4 Aldgate, you took over as Silver from Celia Harrison.

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Did you believe, then, that she was Silver in charge of

7 Aldgate at that time?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Wasn't it, in fact, your colleague, Darren Glazer, who

10 had assumed the role of Silver for Aldgate prior to you

11 taking over?

12 A. No, I don't believe so.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think what Mr Glazer said was he

14 was Silver for Liverpool Street but he had

15 a responsibility, as part of his general duties, for

16 Aldgate until Silver was appointed. Was that a rough

17 estimate, Ms Canby?

18 MS SHEFF: Thank you for that. So when you arrived at

19 Aldgate, you went straight to the supervisor's office

20 and it was there that you took your first message as

21 Silver control, which was from the duty operations

22 manager based out of Baker Street?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. In the hierarchy of Underground staff, where does the

25 duty operations manager come?

1 A. The duty operations manager is in charge or is in charge
2 of the line, all aspects of railway operations on the
3 line on a shift-by-shift basis.

4 Q. So he's the man in overall control, is he?

5 A. In the running of the railway, day by day, yes.

6 Q. How does that relate to Gold, Silver and Bronze command?

7 A. Once Gold is appointed, that is taken by a senior
8 manager who would be sitting in the Network Control
9 Centre at St James's Park.

10 Q. How are the functions divided between, say, Gold and the
11 duty operations manager?

12 A. The duty operations manager would have a dialogue with
13 Gold control but wouldn't be the Gold control once
14 you've got somebody at the NOC -- at the NCC.

15 Q. So do we take it that Gold is the more senior manager?

16 A. Correct, yes.

17 Q. Is the duty operations manager senior to the
18 Silver Command officers?

19 A. Not in an incident. The Gold -- the Silver reports
20 directly to Gold control.

21 Q. Did you, therefore, report directly to Gold control,
22 once you'd assessed the scene at Aldgate?

23 A. Yes, I spoke to the Gold control to inform them that
24 I was on-site and that I was taking Silver control, yes.

25 Q. That was when you arrived there?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Once you'd had the opportunity to see what was going on,
3 and particularly that it was believed that there was an
4 explosion, did you then report that on to Gold control?

5 A. Gold control had already been in dialogue with Silver
6 control at that stage and I didn't believe I needed to
7 report anything further than that at that stage.

8 Q. So when was the next occasion you spoke to Gold control?

9 A. I can't recollect speaking to Gold control a second
10 time.

11 Q. So once you told them that you were Silver, that was the
12 only communication you had with them thereafter?

13 A. I believe so, yes.

14 MS SHEFF: Yes, thank you. I have no further questions.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

16 Questions by MS BOYD

17 MS BOYD: Mr O'Riordan, I just want to ask a couple of
18 questions on behalf of London Fire Brigade. It's in
19 relation to clarifying your evidence about this
20 standoff. I'm not quite sure whether it's -- you would
21 describe it as an unofficial standoff that you're
22 talking about?

23 A. Well, I spoke to Silver control, the fire officer who
24 was acting as Silver control.

25 Q. Do you remember his name?

1 A. No, I didn't get his name.

2 Q. Can I just ask you to confirm that there was no
3 suggestion or request by him to evacuate any of the
4 emergency services who were on the bombed carriage
5 rescuing and assessing --

6 A. No, he never made a suggestion about emergency services
7 leaving the station to me.

8 Q. But I think there were also discussions about another
9 train that was stuck with about 600 passengers on it.

10 A. That's correct, yes. There was a train stuck between
11 Aldgate East and Liverpool Street which goes on the same
12 path as the train that was involved in the explosion,
13 yes.

14 Q. So just to be absolutely clear, the only suggestion of
15 an evacuation was after all the survivors had been
16 removed?

17 A. The -- when we discussed about -- with the fire officer
18 to understand what the situation was, my concern at that
19 time was the 600 people who were in a train stuck
20 between the two stations and the normal procedure would
21 be -- is to evacuate those customers forward to the next
22 station and, once he said to me that he wanted -- that
23 he didn't want any more customers coming in in this
24 direction because of a standoff period, then we made
25 arrangements for the customers to be evacuated backwards

1 to Aldgate East.

2 Q. Because I think, at that stage, also, there were
3 concerns about secondary devices, so they didn't want
4 anyone else coming and being evacuated into the station?

5 A. Correct.

6 MS BOYD: Thank you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Taylor?

8 Questions by MR TAYLOR

9 MR TAYLOR: Mr O'Riordan, I'm a little bit confused about
10 the words CBRN, chemical biological, radiological or
11 nuclear. Did you mention that or was it the fire
12 officer that mentioned that?

13 A. The fire officer.

14 Q. The fire officer?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Just refresh my memory, please. At what time was that?

17 A. It was some time roughly about 9.30, some time after
18 9.30, some time soon after I got to Aldgate.

19 Q. Was that before the trains were completely evacuated?

20 A. The evacuation was still -- well, the emergency services
21 were still down there at that stage, whether they were
22 still evacuating customers at that stage I'm not sure.

23 Q. If chemicals or biological agents were used, that means
24 that people were actually bringing those agents back up
25 to the mezzanine floors and station and eventually

1 outside into the wide world. Did you take that into
2 account?

3 A. We reacted and I think we didn't take that into account,
4 no.

5 MR TAYLOR: Thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Ms Canby?

7 Questions by MS CANBY

8 MS CANBY: Mr O'Riordan, I'm asking you some questions on
9 behalf of Transport for London. Can we go back to the
10 organisation chart just to try to understand lines of
11 responsibility and it's document TFL649 [TFL649-1]?
12 You've already been taken to the left-hand side of
13 this diagram, I think, Mr O'Riordan, or it's perhaps
14 somebody else. You're there on the left-hand side, the
15 group station manager and we see you reporting to the
16 performance manager (stations) and at that time, was
17 that Paul Kirwan?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. You've been asked some questions in relation to the DOM
20 who is the duty operations manager?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. We can see the duty operations manager is on the
23 right-hand side of that diagram. Can you see that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So the line controller reports to the duty operations

1 manager?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And at Aldgate, we know that the line controller was the
4 Metropolitan Line controller?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Do you know who that was in July 2005?

7 A. Name? I don't know the name, no.

8 Q. Does Paul Marks mean anything to you?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And the duty operations manager, was that Tony McKinnon?

11 A. I didn't get his name either.

12 Q. Okay. But we can see that the duty operations manager
13 reports to the service control manager?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And the service control manager reports to the
16 performance manager (trains)?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Then there's a general line manager?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you. You were also asked some questions in
21 relation to Gold, Silver and the responsibility of the
22 duty operations manager in a time of an incident?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We've already looked today at the London Underground
25 document that's known as Na100.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That's in relation to incident organisation?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Could we please have on the screen again [TFL27-4]?

5 Does this page here, Mr O'Riordan, summarise what

6 Gold, Silver and Bronze means?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So there we can see that Gold is a strategic role,

9 generally taken by the London Underground rostered duty

10 officer.

11 You were asked some questions about whether or not

12 you spoke to Gold and I think you said that you did to

13 let them know that you had assumed the role of Silver.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Was the person whom you spoke to Andy Barr?

16 A. No, I spoke to Darren McCluskey who was --

17 Q. Now, Darren McCluskey, he wasn't actually taking the

18 role of Gold strategic, was he?

19 A. No, but where they're located, they're all in the one

20 room which is within the NCC.

21 Q. So Darren McCluskey, he, in fact, was the NCC duty

22 manager?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. He was in the same room as Andy Barr --

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. -- who was Gold?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Could we just move on, please, to page 6 [TFL27-6] of
4 this document? It's the top half that says "definition
5 of incident roles and responsibilities".

6 You were asked about the role of the duty operation
7 manager, the DOM, in terms of an incident?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And the incident role and responsibility of a DOM, we
10 see is set out there at paragraph 6.1, and the DOM is
11 accountable for organising the initial response to
12 operational incidents?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Going back to your own role and responsibility, you've
15 told us some information in relation to that. Is it
16 also the case that, if station supervisors needed any
17 first aid supplies and emergency packs, that would be
18 ordered through your office?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. You've told us about how you went down to the control
21 room and you spoke to Darren Glazer. At that stage,
22 I think you said that you were still unaware of what was
23 happening and you told the police that there was
24 a slight smell. What did that smell remind you of?

25 A. I think it was through the dust particles. Some weeks

1 prior to that, we had gassing batteries in a secure room
2 at Liverpool Street and they let off an aroma into the
3 station. The station was evacuated that time as well,
4 while it was investigated, and it was a similar kind of
5 smell that I got that morning at Liverpool Street.

6 Q. So when you were asked about why, in the initial stages,
7 you thought it was power, was that one reason?

8 A. Yes, it was to -- that, the smell, and what happened
9 earlier in the morning on the Northern Line.

10 Q. On the Northern Line?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You'd been told that by Paul Kirwan?

13 A. Paul Kirwan, yes.

14 Q. We know that there comes a stage when Mr Glazer asks to
15 you assemble some staff to go to Aldgate. You told us
16 that you took four staff with you. You gave us some of
17 their names, but not all of them. Can you remember all
18 four of their names?

19 A. Yes. There was --

20 Q. Shall I help you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Robin Mayes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Mr Brace?

25 A. No, Bridie Brace.

1 Q. Bridie Brace?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Dave McNair?
4 A. Dave McNair.
5 Q. And Dennis Hussey?
6 A. Dennis Hussey, yes.
7 Q. Can you recall what their roles were in normal
8 day-to-day?
9 A. Sure, Bridie, Dave and --
10 Q. Dennis?
11 A. Dennis, they all worked in the ticket office, and
12 Robin Mayes is a supervisor.
13 Q. A station supervisor?
14 A. Station supervisor, yes.
15 Q. What, at Liverpool Street?
16 A. He's a reserve station supervisor and he's also the
17 local Health & Safety rep and, on that day, he was
18 released to carry out his safety inspections for the
19 three stations, that's done on a quarterly basis, and he
20 goes around, does all his checks as a -- the
21 Health & Safety rep, and then we have a meeting and
22 discuss any issues that he's got. But he was doing
23 those duties on that day.
24 Q. Now, you arrived at Aldgate at some time between 9.26
25 and 9.30.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. When you arrived, were the emergency services in
3 attendance?

4 A. Yes, they were.

5 Q. Who could you see that was in attendance?

6 A. There was lots of vehicles there, I believe, well, there
7 was definitely fire and I believe that there was
8 ambulance crews there as well.

9 Q. Could you see BTP there?

10 A. I didn't, no.

11 Q. But you were aware that they were there?

12 A. I was aware that they were there, yes.

13 Q. And City of London Police?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Finally this, Mr O'Riordan: in relation to what happened
16 after 7/7, some recommendations were made in terms of
17 placing of emergency dressing packs. Do you recall?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That was following a recommendation made after 7 July
20 and the Department of Health put emergency dressing
21 packs in major transport hubs?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. The reason why I'm asking you about this is because,
24 when you were a GSM, group station manager, you were the
25 person, the local person, responsible for those

1 emergency dressing packs. Is that correct?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, document LAS718?

4 Mr O'Riordan, you're the first person who's given

5 evidence that can tell us a little bit about what

6 happened in relation to these emergency dressing packs.

7 I'm not planning to do this in any great detail. If we

8 could just go to the next page, please, [LAS718-2] and could you

9 enlarge on the box there?

10 Could you have a look at that on the screen,

11 Mr O'Riordan? Is that what is in the emergency dressing

12 packs?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. Is the idea for them to be handed out as soon as it

15 becomes clear that there are a number of casualties?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The idea is not that they are necessarily to be used by

18 emergency services but they're to be used by bystanders,

19 or people with first aid training?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So that passengers can actually help themselves to that

22 equipment?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. Can you tell us where, within your group station manager

25 group, these emergency dressing packs have been placed?

1 A. Yes, this emergency dressing pack is situated at
2 Liverpool Street station and it's a massive box which
3 holds all that equipment in it.

4 Q. Is there one at Moorgate as well?

5 A. I'm not aware of one at Moorgate.

6 Q. Can we just have a look at page 23 [LAS718-23], please, of this
7 document?

8 It's a little bit difficult to see because all the
9 contact details have been blanked out, but there, the
10 second one down, we can see Liverpool Street Underground
11 station and then just about make out your contact
12 details, Tom O'Riordan.

13 Could we go down to the bottom of that page, please?

14 There we see Moorgate Underground station and there it
15 seems to suggest that there's also an emergency dressing
16 pack that's been placed at Moorgate.

17 A. Yes, well, that may be the case. I've left
18 Liverpool Street some three years now.

19 MS CANBY: Thank you very much, Mr O'Riordan. I don't have
20 any further questions.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Thank you very
22 much, Mr O'Riordan. That completes the questions for
23 you.

24 I don't know if you are all as hot down here as
25 I am, but I think we're all about to expire.

1 How much more oral evidence? I'm worried about the
2 microphone and I'm also worried about the heating.
3 MR KEITH: My Lady, there's no more oral evidence. There's
4 one very short written statement which Mr Hay was about
5 to read.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, right.
7 MR HAY: My Lady, this is the statement of Ray Wood, dated
8 10 January 2006 which has the usual declaration of
9 truth.
10 Statement of Ray Wood read
11 "This statement relates to the events of Thursday,
12 7 July 2005. I am currently employed by
13 London Underground as a station supervisor. I have
14 worked for the Underground for 37 years. I have been
15 a supervisor for 20 years. I am based at
16 Liverpool Street Underground station. I have been at
17 Liverpool Street for 12 years and I am familiar with the
18 layout of Liverpool Street station.
19 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, my rostered hours were
20 07.00 to 15.00. I booked on for duty as normal and it
21 was a normal day until about 08.50. At this time, I was
22 in the Central Line ticket office carrying out safety
23 checks. The first thing I knew concerning the events of
24 that day was when the fire alarm went off and it went
25 into evacuation mode. An announcement was made for

1 passengers to leave the station. I was with station
2 assistant Ron Ballard and another member of staff was
3 present in the ticket office, although I cannot remember
4 who it was.

5 "We were, as I mentioned, in the ticket office.

6 I left the ticket office to find out what had happened
7 so I made my way to the station control room. One of
8 the control room assistants, Daniel Kemp, said 'There is
9 an incident. To me it's a major incident'.

10 Darren Glazer, who is the duty station manager, was
11 present as well. He said to me 'It's the real thing'.
12 I realised that something serious had taken place but
13 I am unsure of what it was.

14 "I was asked by DSM Glazer to find some staff with
15 a view to going on to the tracks to see what had
16 happened. I made a list of staff who were to go on the
17 tracks with me. The list was made on a whiteboard
18 outside the station control room. The list consisted of
19 seven, maybe eight members of staff, including the
20 following members of staff: Ron Ballard, Nick Yeaman,
21 Greg Owen and other members of staff whom I cannot
22 remember.

23 "I fully briefed the members of staff in relation to
24 health and safety issues. At this stage, I was still
25 unaware of exactly where the incident was. After the

1 briefing, I left the members of staff and went to
2 platform 2 westbound Met, as there was a stationary
3 train in the platform to make sure there were no
4 passengers left on the train and to liaise with the
5 train driver. I brought the train driver back with me
6 to the operations room. I do not know who the train
7 driver was, and I cannot remember too much about him.
8 "I then informed the line controller for the
9 Met Line that this driver was safe and well and that he
10 was no longer with his train. Darren Glazer, at this
11 stage, became Silver control and he appointed myself
12 Bronze control. We were still unsure exactly what had
13 occurred. The line controller thought there was
14 a westbound Hammersmith & City Line train in between
15 Liverpool Street and Moorgate stations. DSM Glazer
16 requested I take my team to Moorgate station on foot to
17 meet the Fire Brigade and police at Moorgate station
18 with a view to going on to the tracks. We walked to
19 Moorgate station which took about ten minutes. Upon
20 arrival, I could see the emergency services had arrived.
21 I spoke to one of the Fire Brigade officers and police
22 officers and then to further Fire Brigade officers.
23 I must have spoken to about 20 people informing them of
24 health and safety issues concerning them going on to the
25 tracks.

1 "I then went to the station control room at Moorgate
2 to speak to the Met Line controller to confirm that
3 traction current had been discharged. He confirmed that
4 it had been discharged, so I requested track access
5 which he gave. The line controller also requested
6 I confirm that stationary trains on platforms 1 and 2 at
7 Moorgate were fully secured. I took two BTP officers to
8 confirm this. I also asked the train operator for these
9 two trains to make sure the trains were fully secured.
10 I then returned to the Fire Brigade and police officers,
11 who were waiting to go on the tracks. One of the
12 Fire Brigade officers went first, I went second and the
13 others followed in single file.
14 "We went down on to the eastbound Hammersmith & City
15 Line track. The emergency lights were on. However,
16 there was nothing wrong on any train in the tunnel.
17 Therefore, we all returned to Moorgate station.
18 "I then informed the line controller and
19 Darren Glazer of this. I remained at Moorgate on Bronze
20 control at Glazer's request. The emergency services
21 shortly after this left Moorgate and I was left in
22 charge of the staff at Moorgate. I remained here until
23 15.00 hours."
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: 10.00 tomorrow, please.
25 (3.40 pm)

1 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

2

3