

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 26 October 2010 - Morning session

1 Tuesday, 26 October 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

4 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will call the first witness,

5 Stephen Eldridge.

6 MR STEPHEN WILLIAM ELDRIDGE (sworn)

7 Questions by MR HAY

8 MR HAY: Can you give your full name for the court, please?

9 A. Yes, it's Stephen William Eldridge.

10 Q. Mr Eldridge, in 2005 you were a Metropolitan Line train

11 operator. Is that correct?

12 A. That is correct, yes.

13 Q. You'd worked in that position for four and a half years

14 at the time?

15 A. No, I started as a train operator in 2003, so it's

16 approximately two years at the time. I joined the

17 company in 2001.

18 Q. Mr Eldridge, is it possible you could keep your voice

19 up? It's a large courtroom and, unfortunately, the

20 microphone in front of you, it doesn't amplify, it only

21 records.

22 A. Okay, I'll try.

23 Q. Thank you. On the morning of 7 July, you picked up your

24 train earlier in the morning.

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Eventually, you left from Uxbridge and took your train
2 to Aldgate?

3 A. That is also correct, yes.

4 Q. Did you bring your train into platform 3? Is that
5 correct?

6 A. That is correct as well, yes.

7 Q. What time, roughly, do you remember arriving at Aldgate?

8 A. I think it's probably about 8.40. Around about 8.40.

9 Q. Then normally what would happen is you would then wait
10 at Aldgate for a little bit and then collect another
11 train to drive in the opposite direction?

12 A. Yes, I'd go through the step back procedure at Aldgate.

13 Q. The train which you were going to take over, the driver
14 of that train, was that Mr Drinkwater or do you not
15 know?

16 A. Yes, Les Drinkwater brought my train in, I think it was
17 432 that he brought in, and I was going to go down and
18 pick that train up.

19 Q. Where were you waiting whilst waiting for Mr Drinkwater
20 to bring the train into platform 3?

21 A. I was waiting on the steps, on the mezzanine level,
22 approximately halfway up the station.

23 Q. Who were you with?

24 A. I was with Paul Hawkins, who was also a train operator,
25 who was on the step back procedure as well.

1 Q. Whilst waiting on the mezzanine level, what happened?

2 A. We were just sharing a little bit of banter and, all of
3 a sudden, there was a massive bang came from the
4 direction of the tunnel and I said to Paul something
5 like, "What the bloody hell was that?" And he said, "It
6 sounded like it may have been a motor or a compressor's
7 gone up".

8 Q. I think you thought it was something more serious,
9 didn't you?

10 A. Yes, I did. I did actually, at the time, think it
11 sounded more like a bomb to me.

12 Q. It wasn't only the noise of the blast, but also,
13 I think, you actually felt the blast coming towards you?

14 A. Yes. There was some movement in the air when it
15 happened. There was a short delay and there was
16 movement in the air and, also, there was movement, there
17 was like little pieces dropping through the air as well.

18 Q. Debris?

19 A. Off of the roof. Probably more sort of large amounts of
20 dust, that sort of thing.

21 Q. In response to that, what was your initial reaction?
22 What did you think you should do?

23 A. Well, at that point, there was a train in platform 2
24 that Mark Williams, who was actually driving, he'd just
25 left, and his train was partly out of the platform, and

1 it came to a halt. So myself and Paul Hawkins, we went
2 down on to platform 2, and we'd noticed that the
3 emergency lighting was on in the train and, also, the
4 station lighting seemed to have gone down as well, but
5 there was still quite a lot of natural light because
6 it's not fully covered at Aldgate station. So there was
7 some natural light coming through. So it wasn't total
8 darkness, but we did realise that the train was on
9 emergency lighting.

10 Q. The train being on emergency lighting, would that
11 signify that the power had failed?

12 A. Probably.

13 Q. I think your response at that point was to then help
14 evacuate Mr Williams' train on platform 2?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. How did you go about doing that?

17 A. Well, I went towards the front of the train and Paul
18 went towards the rear of the train. I think I started
19 off approximately three cars from the front of the train
20 and used the butterfly cocks to open one set of doors on
21 that carriage to let some passengers out. There were
22 some passengers at that point thumping on the glass
23 saying "Let me out", and they came out, and I said, "Can
24 you leave the station immediately, please?" but they
25 didn't wait for me to finish the sentence, really, they

1 were gone.

2 I went to the other two cars then. There wasn't
3 very many people on the train, admittedly, because at
4 that time in the morning, coming back out of Aldgate,
5 it's not too busy.

6 What happened then was I thought about Mark, the
7 driver. I thought I'd better go and check he was all
8 right and, just as I got to the cab, he leapt from the
9 cab straight down on to the ballast on the track.

10 Q. At this point, were you aware of smoke coming out of the
11 tunnel from Liverpool Street?

12 A. Yes, smoke was starting to come out at that point, large
13 plumes of it.

14 Q. I think you then made your way up to the station
15 supervisor's office, Mrs Harrison's office?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Did you actually go into the office?

18 A. Not at that point, no. We stood just in front of the
19 barriers and they were in the process of evacuating the
20 station at that point.

21 Q. Mr Counihan came out --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- from the station office?

24 A. He came out and he said "We need to get down there".

25 Q. I think you went in and you grabbed high visibility

1 vests?

2 A. So what we did, because we'd got holdalls with us, with
3 our gear in, we put those into the supervisor's office,
4 put our hi-vis on and grabbed our lamps as well and made
5 our way down, down the steps, on to platform 3, and on
6 the way down I said to Tony, I said, "Is the juice off?"
7 And he said, "Yes", he confirmed it was off.

8 Q. By which you mean the power off on the line, the
9 traction?

10 A. The "juice" is traction current, yes.

11 Q. At that point, were you actually aware that there was
12 a train in the tunnel?

13 A. No, we couldn't see anything because of the amount of
14 smoke and dust that was coming out.

15 Q. Presumably the smoke itself, when you were making your
16 way towards the tunnel, made it quite difficult to
17 breathe?

18 A. It wasn't easy. There was some resistance, as I went
19 in, to be able to breathe, yes.

20 Q. But I think despite that, you continued to make your way
21 into the tunnel?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you got there, what did you see?

24 A. Well, as we were making our way into it, there was four
25 of us, drivers, plus Tony, and two of the drivers, Paul

1 and Les, they went over to some passengers that were on
2 the track that had blood on them, so they went over to
3 assist those, whilst myself and Mark Williams carried on
4 going in towards the train, and through the smoke we
5 then saw Tim Batkin, who was the driver of the train.
6 We actually saw him and he just was standing there and,
7 just at that point, a passenger came running up to us
8 and he said, "We've got to get the people out of the
9 third car" or the third carriage, we call them cars, as
10 the drivers.

11 So we went up. There was Tim, Mark, myself and this
12 passenger. We went up to car 3 and it was full up with
13 smoke and people were in there and in a very distressed
14 state wanting to get out.

15 Q. Just pausing there, we'll come on to your efforts to try
16 to help those people in car 3, but did you have a radio
17 with you, a station handheld radio?

18 A. No, at that point, we weren't issued with radios, as
19 drivers. The only radio that we had was our train radio
20 which is fixed inside the train, in the cabs.

21 Q. So you weren't able, presumably, then, to communicate in
22 any way with Mrs Harrison to say "There's a train, there
23 are people trapped, there are people on the tracks"?

24 A. Not at all, not at all, no.

25 Q. I think you said you saw Mr Batkin, the driver of the

1 train. Did you speak to him at any point when you first
2 approached him?

3 A. Just as we were about to, then that's when the passenger
4 came running down and it's just the timing, just as we
5 were about to say something to him, the passenger came
6 down, so we just went up to car 3 then.

7 Q. You mentioned there were people in car 3 and it was
8 filling up with smoke.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Obviously you were very keen to try to get them out of
11 there as quickly as possible.

12 A. Of course, yes.

13 Q. What did you do to try to achieve that?

14 A. Well, the main thing I felt, first of all, was we needed
15 to get some air in to the carriage so that everybody
16 could breathe in there, with it being so full of smoke.
17 So Mark Williams tried the butterfly cock to get the
18 doors open, but it didn't work. So I ran back to the
19 front driver's cab then and the cab at the end, the
20 Aldgate end of the train, and I got half a dozen paddles
21 out of the door pod and I also -- there's a set of steps
22 that's strapped inside the C stock train. I had
23 difficulty getting the buckles undone on it because they
24 hadn't been used for a long time. But I eventually got
25 them off and got off the train, took the steps and the

1 paddles back, and myself and the passenger tried to
2 prise the doors open with the paddles.
3 When I got back, Mark and Tim, they had gone,
4 I didn't know where they'd gone, so anyway, myself and
5 the passenger tried to get the doors open, we managed
6 just to get them open a little bit.
7 By then, a lot of the smoke and the dust was
8 clearing inside that carriage anyway.
9 Q. Just pausing there, can we have up on the screen
10 INQ10280-7, please? If we could just focus on the
11 bottom diagram. Although it says "second carriage",
12 let's assume for the moment it's the third carriage.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. To the right would be the front of the carriage and to
15 the left would be the rear of the carriage. Which door
16 were you trying to prise open?
17 A. It would have been the first set of double doors.
18 Q. Is that double door D2?
19 A. That's correct, yes.
20 Q. Was that roughly the position which you remained
21 standing in afterwards?
22 A. Yes, more or less, yes.
23 Q. I think, although you couldn't open those doors, you
24 became aware that it was possible to evacuate the people
25 from the rear of the train?

1 A. Well, what had happened, by then, as the smoke was
2 clearing, I could see towards the back of the train then
3 and I could see that there were people at the back of
4 the train, and there was passengers starting to come off
5 the back of it by then, so I realised that Mark and Tim
6 must have gone up there and they were sending the
7 passengers back along the track.

8 Q. So did you shout encouragement to people inside the
9 third carriage?

10 A. Yes, I told them help was here and we'd get them out as
11 quickly as possible.

12 Q. Then they obviously started making their way off the
13 carriage --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- and going from carriage 3 into carriage 4?

16 A. Well, I didn't notice that happening because, by then,
17 the first of the passengers was arriving where I was
18 standing.

19 Q. If we could just have on the screen INQ10280-10, please,
20 Mr Eldridge, this is a plan of the tunnel and you can
21 see on the left there is the sixth carriage, on the
22 right there is the first carriage.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The red part in the middle, that marks where the second
25 carriage probably was at the point of detonation, the

1 explosion, but the train continued to move and you can
2 see where the second carriage eventually came to rest on
3 the right.

4 You were standing by the front doors of the third
5 carriage. Is that correct?

6 A. I might have just been more towards the halfway point of
7 the third carriage.

8 Q. More towards the halfway point. I think, at about that
9 point, you became aware of the fact that there were
10 bodies on the track. Is that right?

11 A. What had happened was, when I came back with the steps
12 and the paddles, I went to step over something.

13 I didn't actually look down, just subconsciously knew
14 there was something at my feet. I went to step over it
15 and then I did look down, and I saw it was a body.

16 Q. Were you aware of any other bodies on the track at that
17 point?

18 A. I then looked around and saw other bodies, but I don't
19 know how many there were.

20 Q. Are you able to help us where the first body you recall
21 was, using that plan in front of you?

22 A. I would say possibly somewhere round about a third of
23 the way along the first -- the third carriage.

24 Q. Can you describe whether that body was male or female?

25 A. No, I wasn't sure.

1 Q. At any point, did that body exhibit signs of life at
2 all?

3 A. Nothing.

4 Q. Or was the person plainly dead?

5 A. It seemed like they were dead to me.

6 Q. The other bodies you mention, I know you can't quite
7 remember how many of them there were, but where were
8 they in relation to that other body?

9 A. They were in close proximity.

10 Q. As the passengers were coming off from the rear of the
11 train, making their way towards Aldgate, I think you
12 were very concerned to ensure that the passengers didn't
13 see these bodies. Is that right?

14 A. Well, I tried to focus their attention perhaps on
15 something else. I thought "If I tell them to keep
16 looking at the lights" -- because you could see the
17 lights of Aldgate station -- and I thought "If I keep
18 telling them to keep looking at the lights, one, they
19 wouldn't look at the body and, two, they would be able
20 to see where they're going to as well and be able to
21 make their escape". Because there wasn't enough of us
22 down there to guide people fully along the whole length
23 of the way.

24 Q. I think is it right that you intentionally stood in
25 front of one of the bodies to obscure it from view?

1 A. That's what I tried to do, yes.

2 Q. Was that the body which you first saw, the one which was
3 plainly dead or exhibited no signs of life?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I think a passenger at one point gave you an overcoat to
6 cover -- was it that body in particular?

7 A. That was more towards the end, that was, that somebody
8 gave me a coat, which the passenger, he stayed with me
9 the whole time. He deserves a lot of praise for what he
10 did that morning.

11 But I gave the overcoat to him then, because he was
12 tending to tend to the bodies, if that makes sense. It
13 didn't seem like there was a lot that he could do, but
14 he was staying with the bodies as well.

15 Q. Then I think, at one point, out of the corner of your
16 eye you saw one of the bodies appear to sort of
17 miraculously come back to life. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes. It was getting towards the end of the detrainment
19 and he -- out of the corner of my eye, he staggered past
20 me, someone that I now actually know as Phil Duckworth,
21 who, it turns out, lives just round the corner from me,
22 but he staggered past me and he went and leant up
23 against the tunnel wall, and then the passenger who was
24 with me, he went and steadied him, but his weight
25 started to fall then.

1 So the two of us managed to stand him back up again.
2 At that point, it was getting towards the end of the
3 detrainment, and two firemen came along carrying
4 a ladder and I just called them over and we put Phil on
5 to the ladder, and then, after that, another passenger
6 had come along the track who was covered in blood, who
7 had got quite serious injuries, and he said, "Can I wait
8 here with you?" And I said, "Well, you would be better
9 off going upstairs and getting some help", because the
10 hardest thing I found that morning myself, personally,
11 was I spent the whole of the time there, kept looking
12 along the tunnel to -- I kept thinking "The paramedics
13 must be here soon, they must be coming", and because
14 there was -- I did hear a female that was screaming in
15 pain, but I couldn't locate her, I didn't know where it
16 was coming from, and I just felt that I was helpless,
17 really, with it and I thought "If the paramedics come,
18 they can perhaps tend to her".

19 Q. I hope, if you don't mind me saying, I think everyone in
20 this courtroom probably thinks you were doing your
21 absolute best at the time in very difficult
22 circumstances.

23 But I want to ask you about the emergency services
24 and, obviously, you're very conscious of the fact that
25 the paramedics hadn't arrived and you were waiting for

1 them.

2 Which emergency services do you recollect coming
3 into the tunnel first?

4 A. Just before the end of the detrainment, I think that
5 there were two uniformed British Transport Police
6 officers arrived. I know there was definitely one, but
7 I think there was possibly a second one.

8 Q. How long did the detrainment take?

9 A. 20, 25 minutes. I'm only guessing on that because
10 I wasn't looking at my watch, but I would say it was
11 probably 20 to 25 minutes.

12 Q. So you remember the uniformed BTP officers coming?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Then how long after that do you remember the
15 Fire Brigade arriving?

16 A. Probably shortly after that, there was two firemen
17 carrying the ladder that came along.

18 Q. It sounds like the paramedics were the last to arrive.

19 A. I didn't see any paramedics at all that morning.

20 Q. How long, roughly, do you think you were in the tunnel
21 for?

22 A. I don't know, half an hour.

23 Q. Is it possible that you didn't see any paramedics
24 because you were obviously focusing on people walking
25 past --

1 A. Quite possibly.

2 Q. -- and the passenger, Mr Duckworth, who came back to
3 life?

4 A. Yes. But that was when I was trying my hardest to see
5 if there was a paramedic, because I felt that he needed
6 it probably as much as anybody did that morning.

7 Q. I think you mentioned you felt quite helpless,
8 presumably because you had no way of communicating to
9 say, "I need the paramedics here now"?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I think, after you left the tunnel, later in the day,
12 you attended a debrief with Mr O'Riordan. Was that
13 debrief for him to inform you about what had happened or
14 was it for you to provide feedback to him about the
15 events and how the day had gone from your perspective?

16 A. To be honest with you, it was at that point that I think
17 things were beginning to set in as to what I'd actually
18 seen and gone through that morning. So I couldn't
19 actually hear what Tom was saying and I wasn't really
20 listening to him either. So I really don't know what
21 happened on that.

22 MR HAY: Mr Eldridge, thank you very much. I have no
23 further questions for you, but there may be some more.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

25 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

1 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Eldridge, I just want to go over one matter
2 with you and I won't be keeping you very long at all;
3 all right?
4 It's towards the end of the detraining and you've
5 mentioned already one gentleman came up to you and asked
6 if he could wait there.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I just want to confirm a number of matters.
9 You spoke to that man who gave you his name as
10 Bruce?
11 A. That's correct, yes.
12 Q. He was able to explain to you that he wanted to wait for
13 his partner?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And that you thought that her name began with C. Can
16 I suggest it may have been Crystal?
17 A. Could well have been, yes.
18 Q. Thank you. What I would like your help with is this:
19 which direction did Bruce come from?
20 A. He appeared to come from towards the rear of the train.
21 Q. So exactly the same route that the other passengers were
22 taking?
23 A. Same as everybody else, that's right, yes.
24 Q. He'd asked to wait for her. You were obviously
25 suggesting "Go on, wait for her either upstairs or at

1 the platform", but he wanted to wait there, and she does
2 arrive, I think, in company with Mark Williams and
3 Tim Batkin.

4 A. Correct, yes.

5 Q. Is this the position, Mr Eldridge: doing your best with
6 timing, that's about 25 minutes after the explosion?

7 A. Probably. I did lose track of time that morning, but
8 I would say around about 25 to 30 minutes.

9 Q. Mr Eldridge, we all understand exactly you're doing your
10 best with that timing, but can you help me with this:
11 would they have been some of the last passengers to have
12 been detained?

13 A. I think Crystal was the last person who came off.

14 Q. At this point, taking on board what Mr Hay says, your
15 recollection was you hadn't seen any paramedics at that
16 stage?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. But you had seen two of the firemen with that ladder
19 you've already described?

20 A. Yes.

21 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Eldridge, thank you very much indeed.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Simcock?

23 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

24 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady. Mr Eldridge, just dealing
25 with the paramedics -- and I appreciate that perhaps you

1 were concentrating on other things and so they may have
2 been there and you didn't see them -- just to try to
3 help you somewhat, Mr Lait describes that paramedics
4 were the ones who assisted him off the train. Does that
5 help with your recollection of who was there, or do you
6 just simply not remember?

7 A. I don't remember seeing that happening at all, no.

8 MS SIMCOCK: I'm very grateful.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Mr Taylor?
10 Ms Boyd?

11 Questions by MS BOYD

12 MS BOYD: Mr Eldridge, similarly you've described how you
13 saw two firefighters come to help Mr Duckworth who
14 staggered over the rails to the tunnel wall and, shortly
15 after that, I think you say you saw the man you later
16 identified as Bruce.

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. So your recollection is, between the bomb and going down
19 to the train and seeing the man you identified as Bruce,
20 you only saw two firemen?

21 A. That's it, yes.

22 Q. Again, you might not be aware of other evidence we've
23 heard that there were several firemen who assisted to
24 release Bruce in the carriage --

25 A. Right, okay, I didn't see them.

1 Q. -- but you didn't see any of them. You presumably were
2 focusing on the passengers you were trying to help out?

3 A. There was the passengers, there was a lot of wreckage
4 down there, I was helping passengers over the wreckage,
5 and -- whilst trying at the same time to look after the
6 bodies, and then with Phil getting up and Bruce turning
7 up very shortly afterwards.

8 MS BOYD: There's no criticism intended. Thank you very
9 much, Mr Eldridge.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Eldridge?
11 Yes?

12 Questions by MS CANBY

13 MS CANBY: Mr Eldridge, I just have a couple of questions to
14 ask you on behalf of Transport for London and also
15 Tube Lines, who at the time employed the Emergency
16 Response Unit.

17 Can we go back, please, to your evacuation of
18 train 477? Can you tell us how long it took, the three
19 of you, to evacuate that train?

20 A. I don't know. Probably -- on my part, I think it was
21 probably a couple of minutes at the most, and then
22 that's when I went down and Mark jumped out the cab in
23 front of me and then we walked upstairs.

24 Q. You've described difficulties that you had because you
25 didn't have a radio.

1 At that time, the members of staff who would have
2 radios would be the station staff. Is that correct?
3 A. Correct, yes.
4 Q. So on that day, we're talking about Celia Harrison would
5 have had a station radio. Tony Counihan, who went down
6 to the track?
7 A. I don't know if he had a radio with him or not.
8 Q. But he was station staff?
9 A. But he was station staff, yes.
10 Q. Did you later see a gentleman called Ola Falayi, who
11 we're about to hear from? Would you know whether or not
12 he would also have a radio?
13 A. I wasn't aware of that either.
14 Q. Were you aware that he was also station staff?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Moving on to your attempts to try to open the doors of
17 the third carriage, you saw the damage to the train. Do
18 you think the reason why the butterfly cocks were not
19 working was because the bomb had damaged the air pipe?
20 A. If I said that, I would be speculating.
21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I couldn't hear, Mr Eldridge.
22 A. If I said that, I would be speculating.
23 MS CANBY: You described using a shoe paddle to try to get
24 some air into that carriage. Could you tell us what
25 a shoe paddle is, please?

1 A. It's a wooden paddle, it's approximately probably 4-foot
2 long, 5-foot long, and it's tapered at one end so that
3 you can grip hold of it. Normally, we use it for
4 lifting shoes, traction current shoes, on the train. So
5 they're not very thick and, as we put the paddles into
6 the doors, they were just snapping anyway.

7 Q. You refer to shoes. It may be that not everybody knows
8 what a shoe is as well.

9 A. The shoe is -- we've got a traction current rail and so
10 somehow you've got to get the traction current from the
11 rail into the train. So you have a shoe that's about
12 that long, it's a metal shoe that's then attached to
13 a cable. The shoe picks up the traction current off of
14 the traction current rail, goes through the cable, into
15 the train, into the motors which gives you the power for
16 the motors.

17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Eldridge.

18 Moving on, now, to when you were assisting
19 detraining the passengers and you were trying to prevent
20 them from seeing the bodies, did one passenger
21 disbelieve that the power was off?

22 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

23 Q. You can't remember --

24 A. Nobody spoke to me about the power.

25 Q. Do you not remember -- I think you told the Daily Mail,

1 perhaps -- that a passenger didn't believe you that the
2 power was off and so you did a little dance on the rail?
3 A. I think that was journalistic licence.
4 Q. Ah!
5 A. Because I most definitely didn't do that. I do know who
6 did it, but --
7 Q. It wasn't you?
8 A. -- it wasn't me.
9 Q. Do you know who it was?
10 A. I got told last night.
11 Q. Did you also have to try stopping some of the passengers
12 filming the incident on their mobile phones?
13 A. Yes, there was two passengers.
14 Q. After you had completed your work in the tunnel at
15 Aldgate, did you then have to go to Aldgate East to help
16 the police detrain a train between Aldgate East and
17 Whitechapel?
18 A. Yes, when I got upstairs to the pavement, the police
19 approached me and asked me if I minded volunteering to
20 help them detrain a train that was between Aldgate East
21 and Aldgate that was full of passengers. So I then went
22 with them down to Aldgate East and we went down on to
23 the track and got everybody out of that train.
24 Q. Then you returned back to Aldgate station, I think,
25 after that?

1 A. Correct, yes.

2 Q. At that point, were you met by a member of the Emergency
3 Response Unit?

4 A. That was a little bit later on. When I got back to
5 Aldgate station, I went back into the station to get my
6 glasses because they were in my bag, but the police came
7 running in and made me leave because they said it was
8 a crime scene, and I said, "Well, I just want to get my
9 glasses". They said "It doesn't matter. Get out".

10 Q. Do you know about what sort of time that was before you
11 were approached by a member of the Emergency Response
12 Unit?

13 A. Not sure, because by then I'd been in to the church, had
14 a cup of tea -- the church was next door to the
15 station -- had a cup of tea, come back out, and then
16 they wanted some train keys, so I gave them my train
17 keys.

18 Q. Did you give them all three of your train keys?

19 A. I gave them a J door key, a reverser key and a control
20 key.

21 Q. Do you know who that was from the Emergency Response
22 Unit?

23 A. No, I don't.

24 Q. Finally this, Mr Eldridge: in terms of communicating
25 now, do you now, as a train operator, have a CONNECT

1 radio?

2 A. I do.

3 Q. Does that enable you to communicate in tunnels?

4 A. I've not needed to, ever since we've had CONNECT radio,
5 but I imagine it would do, yes. It's meant to.

6 Q. Can you communicate with anybody within
7 London Underground through your CONNECT radio?

8 A. More or less, as long as we've got their numbers, of
9 course.

10 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Eldridge, I don't have any further
11 questions.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is the CONNECT radio fixed or is it
13 one you could possibly move --

14 A. No, it's a portable one. It's very similar to the type
15 police officers would carry.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? I think I just
17 asked you -- I think that the microphone was too far
18 away from me -- whether the CONNECT radios are fixed and
19 you said they were portable.

20 Thank you very much, Mr Eldridge. You said that you
21 thought a passenger deserved great praise for what they
22 did. If I may say so, so did you and your colleagues.
23 You gave no thought to your own safety and you went down
24 there to evacuate the train, and I'm sure that all those
25 passengers that you helped so ably are very grateful to

1 you for your assistance. So thank you very much and I'm
2 sorry I had to ask you to relive the events of that day.
3 Thank you.

4 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Mark Williams?

5 Mr Williams provided two statements, the first dated
6 7 July 2005 and the second dated 14 July 2005. The
7 second doesn't actually add anything, so, my Lady,
8 I propose only to read the first statement which has the
9 usual declaration of truth.

10 Statement of MR MARK WILLIAMS read

11 "I am the above-named person and work for
12 London Underground as a train operator based at the
13 Neasden train depot. On Thursday, 7 July 2005,
14 I started work at 6.13 from Wembley Park station on an
15 822 duty. I started to drive train 463, which is
16 a Metropolitan train. This I took to Aldgate
17 Underground station arriving five minutes later.

18 "I then got on to train 447, which again is
19 a Metropolitan Line train which was running on time. As
20 I pulled away, I heard an extremely loud bang. At this
21 point, I was about half a car length out of the station.
22 I immediately stopped and, at the same time, the
23 Underground electrical traction current turned off and
24 the lights in the tunnel turned on.

25 "I did not open my doors as I was unsure of exactly

1 what had happened. I then heard shouting from the
2 station staff on the platform and the doors were being
3 opened by two other train operators, Eldridge and
4 Paul Haskins who were manually opening the doors.
5 I could see this train was facing me in the tunnel, as
6 it had just turned the corner. This was a C stock style
7 train. I then went back through one car and got out of
8 the train and joined the two other train operators,
9 Eldridge and Paul Haskins.
10 "We then started to try to leave the station and, at
11 that point, I heard that people were walking along the
12 tunnel from the train I had seen. As a result of this,
13 I went to the station supervisor's office and got rid of
14 my bag and put on my orange high visibility jacket and
15 got my handlamp. I then returned to the tunnel with
16 Eldridge and Paul Haskins. I could see people walking
17 down the tunnel away from the C stock train. I assisted
18 these people, leaving Paul Haskins to guide people on to
19 the platform whilst Eldridge and myself went towards the
20 train.
21 "As I approached the train, I could see that people
22 were stuck on the train as the doors could not be
23 opened. To try to assist in getting people out, I went
24 towards the back of the train. As I did this, I passed,
25 I believe, the second car, which appeared to have damage

1 to the bulkheads with metal ripped and a hole in the
2 car.

3 "At this point, I believe I could see at least one
4 dead body was on the track and I could see other people
5 injured and in a state of shock by this location.

6 I then continued down to the end of the train to get the
7 emergency ladder down to start getting people off.

8 Other people were helping, including a plainclothes
9 police officer. This went on for around 20 minutes
10 until the emergency services arrived at my location. As
11 I was helping clear the tunnel, I assisted the
12 Fire Brigade to load an injured man on to a ladder to
13 carry him out. I then took a corner of the ladder and
14 assisted in carrying the ladder out of the tunnel.

15 "As we approached the main concourse, we were met by
16 a paramedic and I left the area. From carrying this
17 male, I was covered in blood and, due to this, I went on
18 a bus to the hospital and was briefly treated at the
19 Royal London Hospital, Whitechapel. The train operator
20 I have called Paul Haskins may be called Paul Hawkins,
21 but at this stage I am unsure of his name due to leaving
22 my bag and my diary and phone, et cetera, in the Aldgate
23 station."

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay, the fact that Mr Williams
25 hasn't come to court to give evidence shouldn't detract

1 from the fact that he, too, deserves to be commended for
2 his actions on that day.

3 MR HAY: I'm grateful, my Lady.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

5 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you call Olanayi Falayi,
6 please?

7 MR OLANAYI FALAYI (sworn)

8 Questions by MR KEITH

9 MR KEITH: Good morning.

10 A. Good morning.

11 Q. Would you give the court your full name, please?

12 A. My name is Olanayi Falayi.

13 Q. Mr Falayi, in July of 2005, you were working for
14 London Underground as a station supervisor, and I think
15 you'd held the position of supervisor for some months
16 before then too.

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. As a supervisor, were you in charge of the running of
19 a station or of a number of stations?

20 A. I was in the group reserve, so I could be called upon to
21 work in any of these three stations in the group.

22 Q. Were the three stations Moorgate, Aldgate and
23 Liverpool Street?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. On that morning, were you due to attend work at

1 Moorgate?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Because your rostered hours commenced at 9.30, were you,
4 in fact, earlier on that morning, at Tower Hill waiting
5 for a Circle Line train to get to Moorgate?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. While you were waiting at Tower Hill, did you hear
8 something?

9 A. Yes. A big bang. It was really loud.

10 Q. Did you see any effect or any consequence from that
11 bang, in terms of the lighting or the power or the
12 activities in the station in which you were standing?

13 A. Yes, as soon as we heard the bang -- it was me and my
14 Mrs, and the platform was packed -- the traction current
15 went out -- I mean, the whole station light went out and
16 the emergency light came on and, as soon as that
17 happened, I just said to her "Let's leave, let's walk to
18 Aldgate".

19 Q. You presumably couldn't see the traction current going
20 off, but because you are a station supervisor, you knew
21 that the --

22 A. Because I knew something had happened, yes.

23 Q. -- emergency lights had gone on, it could only have been
24 because the traction current was off?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Right. You said to your wife, "Let's leave". Where did
2 you decide to go?
3 A. We decided to walk to Aldgate.
4 Q. Why Aldgate?
5 A. Because I knew, by the time I'd get to Aldgate, we can
6 always get the Circle Line from Aldgate or get the
7 Metropolitan Line, and she was going to north London so
8 she would be getting off at King's Cross, and I would
9 have got off at Moorgate.
10 Q. How long did it take to you walk to Aldgate?
11 A. Normally, 6, 7 minutes.
12 Q. So we presume you arrived just before 9.00?
13 A. Just before, about -- yes, just before 9.00.
14 Q. When you arrived, did you see somebody you recognised,
15 Peter Large, who was an assistant multifunctional --
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
17 Q. -- at Aldgate, closing the gates?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So what did you tell him to do?
20 A. I asked Peter what the problem was and he said there had
21 been a power surge and they were evacuating the station
22 and, while I was talking to him, I saw someone walk up
23 the stairs, because I could see into the station, and
24 this person was covered in blood and soot, so I said to
25 Peter "There's a wounded person coming up behind you."

1 Open the gate and let me come in".

2 So he opened the gate, I went in, and Peter and
3 myself went to help this person, that was the walking
4 wounded man, and we brought him to the front of the
5 station and sat him down.

6 Q. Presumably, by this stage, you had told your wife?

7 A. Yes, at that point, I said to my wife to take a bus
8 because, once I saw the situation at Aldgate, I knew
9 there was not going to be any service. So I told her to
10 go across the road, there's a bus station, to take
11 a 253, or something, and that will take her to where she
12 was going.

13 Q. You helped Mr Large with, not just that first gentleman
14 who appeared, but a number of walking wounded who came
15 out?

16 A. Yes, quite a few people came up and they were all
17 wounded, and we sat them down, then I went into the
18 supervisor's office where --

19 Q. Just before you deal with that, was there anything in
20 your training that assisted you in deciding how to look
21 after the walking wounded who were coming out?

22 A. Yes, because I had only just completed my supervisor
23 training about six months before, so I knew that we had
24 to give first aid, and I know that, and I think, at that
25 point, one of the station assistants, Steve Winning, had

1 come out with the first aid kit, so we were just helping
2 them, see if we could clean them up and stuff, offer
3 them assistance.

4 Q. No doubt you told them to --

5 A. To calm down, that paramedics were being called, they
6 were on their way.

7 Q. You told them that help was on the way?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you sat them down in the open area --

10 A. In the open area, yes.

11 Q. -- in the station. The first aid box to which you've
12 just made reference, that, we presume, came out of the
13 supervisor's office?

14 A. Supervisor's office, yes.

15 Q. After you'd helped those first walking wounded, you went
16 into the supervisor's office, you told us?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. The station supervisor was Celia Harrison?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you take a radio, one of the handsets that was in
21 the office, and a hi-vi vest?

22 A. Yes, I did, because the situation, I thought there was
23 no need me going on to Moorgate, so I told Celia to
24 contact Moorgate, that I will be staying at Aldgate to
25 help here, and then picked up a radio and put on my

1 hi-vi, yes.

2 Q. You went back outside. Did you see a number of British
3 Transport Police offers?

4 A. Yes, at that point, there were a few, because they're
5 next door, and two plain -- one plainclothes and two
6 uniform officers were on the station then, with the
7 other supervisor, Tony Counihan, and at that point they
8 were discussing whether to go down to -- because we
9 could see people coming off the track on to the
10 platforms, so they were discussing whether to go on to
11 the track or not, and the police officers were saying we
12 didn't know the situation down there, that it would be
13 dangerous to go, but Tony and I decided to go anyway.

14 Q. The people whom you saw appearing, were they like the
15 first gentleman whom you'd seen?

16 A. Some of them were wounded, some of them were just
17 shaken, some of them were all right, just shaking and
18 all they were saying is "There's been -- something
19 terrible has happened", I mean, there was a train in the
20 tunnel, that's what they were saying, they were saying
21 "There's a train in the tunnel".

22 Q. When these further people arrived, the further walking
23 wounded arrived, did you help them also to sit down and
24 calm them down and assist them in the area?

25 A. Yes, we did. Yes, we took them up, there was

1 a particular gentleman that had -- all could I describe
2 was like a hole in his side, there was a big hole. So
3 we took him upstairs and, at that point, the BTP had
4 opened up their office, so they asked us to take the
5 wounded into their office, the waiting area in their
6 office, and the paramedics had arrived at that time as
7 well.

8 Q. If you'd just pause one moment, you've made a reference
9 to a particular gentleman who had a hole in his side.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. It may not matter much, but in your witness statement,
12 certainly in 2005, you made reference to the fact that
13 there was a lady with a hole in her side.

14 A. Oh, well, somebody with a hole in their side.

15 Q. But it was certainly a passenger?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In that same statement, you do describe how, around this
18 time, the paramedics began to arrive.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You actually say in your statement it was, by now,
21 09.08.

22 A. Yes, it was around that time, yes.

23 Q. We know from other evidence that the first ambulance,
24 London Ambulance Service ambulance, doesn't arrive at
25 Aldgate until around 9.14. You wouldn't know that.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. We also know from the written witness statements that
3 the first paramedic arrives around that time, because he
4 makes reference to the first ambulance arriving at the
5 same time as he does.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So I'd like to ask you, if I may, how you knew in your
8 statement to record that it was 09.08 that you believe
9 the paramedics first arrived?

10 A. Because it felt like it was just like ten minutes after
11 I had arrived at Aldgate.
12 Things were happening so fast, and it didn't seem
13 very long at the time.

14 Q. I quite understand. So may we take it, then, it wasn't
15 a question of you seeing the paramedics and looking at
16 your watch and seeing it was 09.08?

17 A. Not at that time, no, there was no timekeeping.

18 Q. All right. It was at some point after 9.00, perhaps ten
19 minutes or so after that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right. Did you have a conversation with the
22 paramedics?

23 A. No, not at that point.

24 Q. You didn't talk to them when they first arrived?

25 A. No, we just showed them where the people were in the

1 police, the BTP office, where we kept them, we ushered
2 them in.

3 Q. So the paramedics, when they arrived, started attending
4 to the walking wounded in the BTP office?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. They didn't go straight down to the track?

7 A. No, no.

8 Q. Right. After the paramedics arrived, you no doubt
9 rejoined the British Transport Police officers who were
10 still there?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. Was that when you decided to go down to the track?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. Is that when, as you told us a few moments ago, there
15 was some doubt on the part of some of the officers as to
16 whether that was advisable?

17 A. Whether advisable or not, yes.

18 Q. But you went anyway?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Who did you go down with?

21 A. I went down with Tony Counihan.

22 Q. The other station supervisor at Aldgate?

23 A. The other station supervisor, yes.

24 Q. The two supervisors being Celia Harrison and
25 Tony Counihan?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you go with one of the plainclothes police officers?

3 A. Yes, there was -- I think his name was Tony or something
4 as well.

5 Q. Tony Silvestro?

6 A. Yes, something like that.

7 Q. Did you go straight down to the track or did you pause
8 on the platform?

9 A. We went on the track. All this while, there were still
10 people coming off on to the platform, so we -- as we
11 went down the track, we were showing them how to walk
12 safely on to the platform, and when we got to the, like,
13 the -- a cross-section, where points were on the track,
14 and there were quite a few people walking on the
15 sleepers, right between the rails, and it was unsafe, so
16 Tony decided to stay there and show them how to walk
17 safely, so that they don't walk between the points, and
18 I continued -- me, myself, and the police plainclothes
19 officer continued to the train.

20 Q. Did another police officer join you at this time in
21 uniform?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So the three of you carried on to the train?

24 A. We carried on to the track, yes.

25 Q. I'm not going to ask you about the general condition of

1 the train, because we've heard a great deal of evidence
2 about that, but did you, in fact, go inside the bombed
3 carriage?

4 A. Yes, myself and the plainclothes officer.

5 Q. How did you get in?

6 A. Through the hole on the side.

7 Q. Through one of the doors?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We know from the evidence that the doors had been blown
10 out?

11 A. They'd been blown out, yes, I think --

12 Q. Was it through one of those blown-out door areas?

13 A. Yes, it must have been, because what happened, when we
14 got to the train, there was -- inside the carriage,
15 there was a lot of carnage, I would say, and there was
16 a particular lady that was, I think, pinned down by the
17 upright, so she was kind of thrashing about and Tony,
18 the plainclothes officer, thought she would damage
19 herself more, so he jumped on, so I followed him on to
20 the train, we climbed on into the carriage.

21 Q. Could you just have a look, please, at one of the plans
22 that we have of the carriage, INQ10280, page 9?

23 There's carriage 2, the rear of the carriage is
24 towards the left, the red cross indicates the probable
25 location of the bomb.

1 Can you tell us whether it was the first set of
2 double doors, which, again, had been blown out, D8, or
3 the second, D6, moving from left to right, that you
4 think you entered?

5 A. Direction of travel ... It was -- I would say -- which
6 one is this?

7 Q. D8 is the first one, directly opposite the bomb and
8 that's the end set of doors in the carriage and then
9 there's a second set.

10 A. I think it was the second -- that one, the D8, and
11 probably D6 as well, yes. I can't be too sure.

12 Q. You can't be sure which one you went in?

13 A. Yes, I can't be too sure, but one of them doors was not
14 there and we just got on.

15 Q. Right, but the first person you saw was, as you've told
16 us, the lady who was pinned to the floor by a pole, an
17 upright?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can I just ask you, please, about her? You described
20 her in your statement as being a lady with blond hair
21 aged 25 to 30. Is that right?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Was the upright broken and bent so it was no longer in
24 its upright position in the carriage?

25 A. I can't really imagine how it got to that point where it

1 was pinning her down, but I just thought it was the
2 upright, because normally, we have uprights on a train
3 where they hold on to, and I saw it -- that pinning
4 someone down, so ...

5 Q. Was she able to talk, do you recall?

6 A. Yes, at a point, because Tony held her, he was trying
7 to -- held her down, he was telling her to calm down and
8 everything, so I joined him, and we asked her her name,
9 and she said she was Trisha. So she calmed down after
10 a while, after we'd been talking to her, and we told her
11 to just stop moving, that we were there to help her and
12 paramedics were on their way and all that, yes.

13 Q. There was a lady on the train, who we've heard from
14 other evidence was severely injured and became entangled
15 with or was pinned down by an upright pole, called
16 Carrie. Does that ring any bells?

17 A. It might have been, yes.

18 Q. It might have been. But is it your recollection that,
19 when she was asked her name, whatever the name was, she
20 was able to respond by giving a name?

21 A. Yes, she did give a name, yes.

22 Q. Because she was moving around, Tony Silvestro tried to
23 calm her.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In your written submission to the London Assembly --

1 because I think you wrote to the London Assembly
2 Committee that looked into the events of 7/7 -- you
3 described how you may also have played a part in calming
4 her and holding her in your arms?

5 A. Yes, we did, yes. We both knelt down beside her and we
6 were holding her, yes.

7 Q. Was it a case of trying to hold her to calm her down or
8 hold her body so that she wouldn't harm herself further
9 and could breathe?

10 A. Both.

11 Q. You told her that help was on the way. Do you recall
12 anybody else in the carriage, in particular a lady with
13 dark brown hair, who was a doctor who came through from
14 another carriage to help in that area?

15 A. There might have been. I recall there was another
16 person, a lady, who was -- she didn't seem like -- she
17 was picking up stuff and lining them -- like, tidying
18 up.

19 Q. You describe in your statement another person who was in
20 complete shock who appeared to be walking up and down
21 the carriage tidying --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- bits and pieces, but I'm more concerned with a lady
24 who came directly into the carriage and checked whether
25 people were all right and checked, in fact, whether this

1 lady, who you were looking after, was all right, and
2 ended up holding her as well and comforting her and
3 tending to her.

4 A. There might have been. I can't recall.

5 Q. You can't say?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall anybody else in the carriage, a male, for
8 example, who came in from outside through the hole in
9 the doors, and also came to help this young lady? Do
10 you recall that?

11 A. There may have been. There were quite a few people in
12 the carriage, yes.

13 Q. All right. How long do you think you helped care for
14 this young lady?

15 A. I must have been with Tony and her for about two, three
16 minutes. Then I realised that I had to call the station
17 and let Celia know what was going on, so ...

18 Q. So did you leave the lady with Tony, who was still
19 holding her?

20 A. Yes, I did, yes.

21 Q. When you left, was she still able to respond to your
22 directions or to respond to attempts to calm her down?

23 A. Yes, she had calmed down -- she had stopped thrashing
24 about, trying to free herself at that time.

25 Q. Did it seem to you that she was still conscious at that

1 stage?

2 A. I can't -- I can't be too sure, no.

3 Q. So you left the carriage in order to speak to

4 Celia Harrison?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was that on the radio that you had?

7 A. Yes, I had a radio.

8 Q. The handheld radio?

9 A. The handheld radio, yes.

10 Q. What was it that you wanted to tell Celia Harrison?

11 A. I wanted her to know that there were more seriously

12 wounded people at the scene, that the paramedics should

13 come down to the scene.

14 Q. Was that because you appreciated that, for those members

15 of London Underground staff at ground level, they would

16 only be seeing the walking wounded who were coming out

17 and would not have appreciated that there were much more

18 severe injuries?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. How far did you go down the track to call her?

21 A. I jumped off the train and called -- started calling her

22 straightaway.

23 Q. Standing next to the carriage?

24 A. Standing next to the train, but because I thought the --

25 what's it called -- the coverage, the radio coverage,

1 might be -- because I was calling the station and she
2 couldn't hear me properly, I walked a little bit to the
3 front of the train.

4 Q. Do you recall what you said to her?

5 A. I said it seemed like there had been a bomb, and she
6 should send the paramedics down, that the paramedics
7 should come to the track, come to the train.

8 Q. Do we take it from your request to her that she should
9 send paramedics down that you considered that paramedics
10 were the most important emergency service that could be
11 provided at that point?

12 A. At that point, yes. Because of the -- I mean, the
13 wounded and the bodies I'd seen on the track, yes.

14 Q. There was no question of a fire, was there?

15 A. No.

16 Q. As far as you could see, the severely wounded who were
17 there were not completely trapped in the debris. There
18 was access?

19 A. Access to the carriage that was bombed, yes, because we
20 could get on it, but there were other people on the
21 train, other carriages, that I noticed other train
22 operators trying to open the doors and I knew that we
23 could get them out one way or the other.

24 But my concern at that point was the wounded,
25 basically the wounded.

1 Q. The lady that you had helped hold and cradle, what did
2 she need, did it seem to you?

3 A. She needed the paramedics.

4 Q. Do you recall whether, when you called Celia Harrison,
5 she indicated what she would do in the light of your
6 request to her?

7 A. She did say she would send them down. As soon as I told
8 her, she said, yes, she will pass the message on.

9 Q. When you'd finished the call, did you appreciate that
10 more London Underground staff had, by that time, started
11 to arrive?

12 A. At that time, I noticed that there were train operators
13 on-site then, there was the Met Line train operators
14 were waiting for their train, they were already at the
15 scene and they were -- started trying to open the doors
16 to start detraining.

17 Q. Did you, in your statement, in fact record that you
18 thought that one of them was called Leslie Drinkwater --

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. -- who we know was one of the drivers? Where did you go
21 once you'd finished your call to Celia Harrison?

22 A. I went back to -- I think I was with one of the train
23 operators, who was trying to open the doors, and I gave
24 him my J door key, and he managed to get into the middle
25 cab with the J door key and walk through to the end

1 and -- of the train, then he opened up the cab from
2 there, and that was how we started getting people off
3 the train.

4 Q. Do we take it that you went down there with him?

5 A. With him. I didn't go onto the train this time, I just
6 walked to the back of the train and ...

7 Q. Did you consider going back to the young lady whom you'd
8 left with Tony Silvestro?

9 A. There were other people with her at that point.

10 Q. Could you see that, as you walked past the carriage?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. Can you tell us about who was with her then?

13 A. I knew Tony was still with her and I may have seen the
14 woman you mentioned earlier, but I knew there were
15 people with her and, at that point, my next priority was
16 getting the rest of the passengers off the train.

17 Q. In your statement, you say that by now there were more
18 police, paramedics and Fire Brigade on the scene.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Was it around then that you began to appreciate the
21 arrival of other emergency services?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Could you see where they went?

24 A. I know the paramedics went into the bombed carriage
25 because they were with Tony, some of them were with

1 Tony, some of them were on the track with the people
2 that were lying on the track and, mainly, the LU staff
3 there were just concentrating on getting the rest of the
4 passengers off the train, and helping with whatever we
5 could help with.

6 Q. You've made mention already of the fact that you wrote
7 to the London Assembly Committee.

8 A. Is that right? I'm not sure if I wrote, or maybe
9 a statement was submitted.

10 Q. I think you submitted a written statement to them.

11 Could we have on the screen INQ8311-239?

12 We can see here it says at the top left-hand corner
13 "Written submissions from organisations". They took
14 a lot of oral evidence from witnesses as well as written
15 submissions from both members of the public and
16 organisations who had been concerned in the events of
17 7/7.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is this document to be exhibited and,
19 therefore, on the website, or is it just
20 a memory-refreshing document?

21 MR KEITH: My Lady, in accordance with your general
22 direction, because it's been on the screen, it would
23 normally go onto the public website in the absence of
24 any specific objection. I confess that I'm only
25 interested in referring to a specific paragraph for the

1 purposes of memory recollection.

2 So let me just ask you this: do you remember this
3 document?

4 A. Yes, I think I do, yes.

5 Q. All right. If we could take it off the screen, then, in
6 the document you do say that police and paramedics
7 arrived within minutes.

8 A. It felt like that.

9 Q. Do you recall subsequently giving an interview to the
10 Evening Standard?

11 A. I never gave an interview.

12 Q. You never gave any interview to the Evening Standard?

13 A. Never.

14 Q. All right. Well then, I needn't ask you about that.

15 The Evening Standard purported to discuss your
16 recollection of your activities and the role you played
17 on 7/7.

18 In any event, the paramedics appeared then to have
19 appeared relatively quickly after you had made the call
20 to Celia Harrison.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Once you had assisted with the J key and you'd assisted
23 with --

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just before you move on,

25 Mr Keith, where have we got to on the timing of that

1 call?

2 MR KEITH: The call, we know from subsequent calls from
3 Celia Harrison, must have been around 9.30 -- 9.13, I'm
4 sorry.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The radio call to Celia Harrison was
6 about 9.13?

7 MR KEITH: 9.13. I don't think that we have a record --
8 Mr Hay, as helpful as ever, is saying INQ9753. If we
9 could have INQ9753-3.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm just trying to pin down the
11 timing of when you radioed.

12 MR KEITH: Sorry, of course, it's the note made by
13 Celia Harrison that we looked at yesterday:
14 "09.13. Ambulance onto track. 'people dying'."
15 She's told us that she made a note of the call that
16 she received from you, 9.13, and there it is.
17 My Lady, on the basis that the first ambulance
18 arrives, we know from LAS records, at 09.14, and the
19 first paramedic will state, we believe, that he arrived
20 around about the time of the first ambulance, it would
21 seem that the paramedics, the first paramedics
22 certainly, arrived relatively quickly, as I've
23 suggested, after that call. So somewhere around 09.14,
24 09.15.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was just trying to consider the

1 timing, because Mr Falayi's evidence was that he saw
2 paramedics upstairs, before he came down, who helped the
3 walking wounded.

4 MR KEITH: It may be that from his earlier evidence we
5 cannot be precise as to when exactly they did arrive.
6 All we know that it was some time, as I think he said,
7 ten minutes or so after 9.00.

8 There are different ways of gauging the time at
9 which they did arrive, either by way of the first
10 ambulance arriving which, by virtue of ambulance staff
11 recording with LAS control that they have arrived at the
12 scene, puts that first ambulance at 09.14. That call is
13 09.13. We may never know precisely what time they did
14 arrive.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Falayi, can I just check with you
16 that, as far as you can recall now -- and I appreciate
17 it's terribly difficult because it's such a long time
18 ago -- but that you did see some paramedics upstairs?

19 A. Upstairs in the BTP office before I went on the track.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Before you went down?

21 A. Yes.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's because they were wearing the
23 green paramedic kit?

24 A. Green paramedic uniform, yes.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

1 MR KEITH: In your statement, you describe -- now turning to
2 the people you saw on the track -- a male lying on the
3 track whose clothes had all gone and who was, I think,
4 only in his underpants and wearing a belt and shoes.
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Do you recall whether he was conscious?
7 A. He was in and out of consciousness. But I couldn't hold
8 him to comfort him or anything because he was covered in
9 glass, shards of glass.
10 Q. Was he able to shout out, do you recall?
11 A. He was moaning.
12 Q. But asking for help?
13 A. Asking for help, yes.
14 Q. Did you see anybody else on the track other than that
15 person who was conscious?
16 A. Yes, there were other bodies on the track, and there was
17 a lady very close to the -- like, underneath the train.
18 Q. Do you recall whether she was moving?
19 A. She was calling for help and she couldn't move at the
20 time.
21 Q. Was there a third person whom you saw?
22 A. There were quite a few people on the track.
23 Q. Can you tell us, please, whether you recollect if any of
24 the other persons who you saw there were moving?
25 A. I can recollect -- maybe one or two of them were moving

1 at all.

2 Q. Do we take it that there were others, though, who were
3 not moving?

4 A. Who were not moving, yes.

5 Q. Did you see anybody being taken out of the train on
6 stretchers?

7 A. Yes, I noticed when -- because when the paramedics got
8 there, and the Fire Brigade, I knew when they started
9 cutting the upright and -- we were still detraining when
10 they took the blond lady on the stretcher out.

11 Q. Did you see what sort of stretcher it was?

12 A. I don't know what sort of stretcher they used at that
13 time.

14 Q. Where was she placed? Do you recall?

15 A. She was taken out.

16 Q. To where?

17 A. To the station, towards the station.

18 Q. Do you actually recall the stretcher being -- and her
19 being taken along the track and away, or do you recall
20 her being placed down on the track next to the train?

21 A. I can't recall.

22 Q. You can't say?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Do you recall whether she appeared conscious or was
25 moving at the time?

1 A. At that point, no.

2 Q. You don't know?

3 A. No.

4 Q. I think you gave some assistance to the lady who was
5 lying on the track, because you recollect in your
6 statement a lady whose hand you held, and you and
7 another passenger spoke to her.

8 A. Spoke to her, yes.

9 Q. As did a plainclothes police officer.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you comforted her and she was going in and out of
12 consciousness.

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Did you appreciate that that lady was called Thelma?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You now know her to be Thelma Stober?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. Did you assist in carrying anybody out of the tunnel on
19 a stretcher?

20 A. Yes, I assisted in carrying, at first, the gentleman
21 that was -- lost his clothes and was covered in glass,
22 and it was a makeshift stretcher, that one, it was
23 a ladder, because they had used the stretcher they had
24 and the Fire Service had little ladders, and they put
25 coats and blankets on them, and we used that to take him

1 out, and by the time we got close to the station,
2 I think two other paramedics took over from myself and
3 one of the Fire Servicemen that was helping to carry
4 them.

5 Then I returned to the site and that was when I was
6 with Thelma and, when we took Thelma out, it was myself
7 and three other paramedics that went down to do that.

8 Q. Once you'd taken her out, did there come a stage when
9 there was some discussion as to whether you should
10 evacuate?

11 A. Yes, right before we took her out, we had already been
12 told to evacuate. So -- and, as I got to the station
13 before I got on to the platform, I saw three
14 paramedics -- was it -- whether they were paramedics or
15 Fire Service men I can't really recall now. But they
16 had -- what's it called -- a ladder or stretcher --
17 I can't recall perfectly now -- and they said they need
18 one more person, because I told him about Thelma, that
19 she was still there and we had been evacuated. They
20 said, "If we get one more person, we can get her out".
21 So I went down with them and I think she was the
22 last person we helped out when the police said we should
23 evacuate.

24 Q. It was the police, was it, who had called for the
25 evacuation?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Just tell us something about that evacuation. When it
3 was called for, did everybody actually leave the tunnel,
4 or was it a slow process, some left, some didn't and
5 those who did leave, like yourself, in fact went back in
6 to help?

7 A. When it was first called, not everybody left
8 straightaway because we felt we could do more. Those
9 that were still lying on the track. And when
10 I eventually left, I was one of the last people to
11 leave, but I still went back with the people to get
12 Thelma out and, at the time we got Thelma out, we were
13 the last people to leave the scene.

14 Q. Once you'd taken Thelma Stober out, where did you go?

15 A. I went upstairs to -- at that point, my GSM,
16 Tom O'Riordan was there.

17 Q. The group station manager?

18 A. The group station manager, he was there. So he --

19 Q. We'll hear from him this afternoon, but had he come over
20 from Liverpool Street?

21 A. He must have done, yes.

22 Q. Did you assist him with the coordination of the
23 management of the station after that?

24 A. Yes, he had to go into a briefing with the Fire Service
25 and the police. At that point, the incident control had

1 been put in place, so he wanted somebody who was on the
2 scene firsthand, so he took me along with him to the
3 briefing.

4 Q. Did you, in fact, stay at the station, helping him and
5 assisting with all the many things that had to be done
6 until about 4.00 that afternoon?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Can I go back, if I may, to your evidence concerning
9 your recollection of the paramedics who may have arrived
10 at the station at ground level and assisted with the
11 walking wounded and the treatment of the casualties?
12 You've told us how that was around about the same
13 time as you saw a passenger with a hole in their side.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We believe that person may have been a lady passenger
16 called Emma Brown. There is some evidence, which we'll
17 hear in due course, to suggest that two London Fire
18 Brigade officers arrived around the same time as that
19 lady, Emma Brown, came out from the track.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. So may I ask you this: how sure are you that the
22 gentleman that you saw at that time treating casualties
23 were paramedics as opposed to London Fire Brigade
24 firefighters?

25 A. I can't be sure, now you say that.

1 Q. Because you've told my Lady that they were wearing green
2 apparel.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I just want to press you, if I may, as to how sure you
5 are that they were paramedics as opposed to members of
6 the other emergency services?
7 A. At that time, I think I would recognise a fireman from
8 a paramedic. I am pretty sure that they were paramedics
9 at the time before I went on the track.
10 Q. All right. Do you recall whether they were male, one
11 male, one female, two female?
12 A. No idea.
13 Q. You can't say whether they were men or women?
14 A. I can't say, no.
15 MR KEITH: All right. Thank you very much indeed. Will you
16 stay there, though, please, because there may be some
17 further questions for you from others?
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Coltart?
19 Questions by MR COLTART
20 MR COLTART: Only one matter, if I may, and it's precisely
21 on the last subject we were just discussing. It's been
22 rather put to you that there were two such people,
23 whether they were paramedics or whether they were
24 members of the London Fire Brigade.
25 Do you, yourself, have any independent recollection

1 of how many there were of those particular individuals
2 at that time?
3 A. Before I went on to the track?
4 Q. Yes. So when you first saw these people up outside the
5 BTP office -- leave to one side for a moment the
6 question of whether they were paramedics or firemen --
7 how many of them do you think there were?
8 A. I can't recollect. I can't.
9 Q. You are familiar, I'm sure, as we all are, with the
10 distinction between --
11 A. Between paramedics and --
12 Q. They wear completely different outfits, don't they?
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 Q. But your recollection at first was that these were
15 paramedics rather than members of the Fire Brigade?
16 A. Yes, because they were in green, yes.
17 MR COLTART: Thank you.
18 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, my Lady.
19 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?
21 Questions by MS BOYD
22 MS BOYD: Mr Falayi, you've been asked a number of questions
23 about whether they were paramedics that you saw in the
24 booking hall or members of the London Fire Brigade, and
25 I'm not going to press you because I know it's five and

1 a half years ago.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But there is evidence that there were a number of
4 firefighters who arrived at 9.00, and so they would have
5 been certainly in the vicinity of the station.

6 A. In the vicinity.

7 Q. Indeed, a number of them were administering first aid to
8 casualties and, in particular, a girl with an abdominal
9 injury, but does that help you at all?

10 A. No.

11 MS BOYD: All right.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It sounds, Mr Falayi, as if there are
13 a number of uniforms around that day and a lot going on.

14 A. There were quite a few uniforms there, and I can only
15 recollect as much as ... yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's totally understandable,
17 Mr Falayi.

18 MS BOYD: My Lady, if I can say, I forgot to put my speaker
19 on.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Well, just to summarise --
21 I have to summarise for the sake of people who aren't in
22 the courtroom, Mr Falayi -- Ms Boyd, you put to
23 Mr Falayi that there was evidence that indicates that
24 fire officers arrived at about 9.00 or shortly
25 thereafter and that they were assisting a lady who had

1 abdominal injuries and, therefore, you put to Mr Falayi
2 that he may have confused paramedics with fire officers
3 and I think Mr Falayi, to be absolutely fair, given
4 everything that was going on, you accepted that you
5 can't now be sure?

6 A. No, I can't be sure.

7 MS BOYD: Thank you, my Lady.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

9 Anybody else before I go to -- yes, Ms Barton?

10 Questions by MS BARTON

11 MS BARTON: Just one issue if I may, my Lady.

12 Can I take you, please, to the time that you were at
13 the front of the train getting people out of -- in fact,
14 the rear of the train, getting people out of the
15 driver's cab. Did you stand at the right-hand door, the
16 side door of that driver's cab?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Standing with you at the side door of that driver's cab,
19 was there a police officer in a yellow fluorescent
20 jacket?

21 A. There was, yes.

22 Q. Did he have cycle shorts on?

23 A. I think so, he might have, yes.

24 MS BARTON: Thank you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Taylor?

1 MR TAYLOR: No, thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, I'm sorry, Ms Canby.

3 Questions by MS CANBY

4 MS CANBY: Just a couple of questions on behalf of Transport
5 for London, please. Can you tell us what you were
6 wearing on the day?

7 A. I was wearing a blue shirt, blue CSA uniform.

8 Q. That's a blue shirt, blue trousers?

9 A. Blue shirt, blue trousers and I was wearing my hi-vi,
10 orange hi-vi.

11 Q. It's orange?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Before you went down into the bombed carriage, you
14 described how you and Tony Counihan were showing people
15 how to walk safely along the track --

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. -- and you referred to the difficulty in relation to the
18 points at that area. Could we have on the screen,
19 please, document INQ10280-6?

20 Now, this is a diagram of the station and the track.
21 Can you see, just before the end of the station,
22 a number of rails crossing over? Is that the area that
23 you were referring to?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. That's what you referred to as points or switch and

1 crossings?

2 A. Points, yes.

3 Q. Why is it so important that people don't walk on those?

4 A. It's important because those points can be thrown
5 remotely, they move, and if one is not careful and they
6 stand in between them, they could get trapped in them or
7 damage their legs or something.

8 Q. That is why Tony Counihan stayed there?

9 A. Stayed around there, to get people to walk away from the
10 points on the other side of the track.

11 Q. Thank you. You were asked some questions about an
12 account that was sent to the London Assembly. I think
13 it was actually sent on your behalf by Tim O'Toole.

14 In that, you commented on what the train operators
15 did on the day. Can you remember what you said about
16 the train operators?

17 A. I think they were brilliant. They were absolutely
18 brilliant. Without them, there was no way we station
19 staff could have got the people off the train, because
20 we didn't know how the train worked, up to the level
21 that they do. So they were absolutely brilliant.

22 Q. Can you remember how long it took you to evacuate the
23 train from when the bomb had gone off?

24 A. From the time -- it couldn't have been more than
25 30 minutes, say around 30 minutes, at most.

1 Q. Finally this: is it right that, as a result of your
2 actions, you were invited to meet Tony Blair and, on
3 a separate occasion, Ken Livingstone and Seb Coe, and
4 they all thanked you for what you did on that day?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 MS CANBY: Thank you. I don't have any further questions.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

8 Well, Mr Falayi, the train operators may have been
9 brilliant, but so were you. You were very brave and I'm
10 sure that the efforts that you made, despite the risk to
11 yourself, to save and help people there at that dreadful
12 scene will have provided some comfort to those who have
13 either lost people or who themselves were dreadfully
14 injured.

15 So on behalf of everybody, thank you very much
16 indeed for your efforts and thank you for coming to tell
17 us today.

18 A. Thank you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: All right, would that be
20 a convenient --

21 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. May I raise one point before
22 my Lady rises?

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course.

24 MR KEITH: The witness I propose to call after the short
25 adjournment is duty station manager at Liverpool Street,

1 Darren Glazer. During the course of the morning, we
2 have received a number of emails from Ms Sheff's
3 instructing solicitors, Sonn Macmillan Walker,
4 concerning the difficulties that they perceive
5 themselves to be in, in relation to their proposed
6 examination of both Mr Glazer, the duty station manager
7 and the witness for this afternoon, Mr O'Riordan, who's
8 the group station manager.

9 It is, in essence, a reflection of the same point
10 raised by my learned friend Mr Coltart a few days ago,
11 but they have expressed their concern that they may be
12 placed in a position where they are obliged to put to
13 those witnesses the points that they wish to concerning
14 the generic issue for which they have responsibility:
15 namely, whether or not the bus network should have been
16 shut, and they raise again the issue of whether or not
17 they might, therefore, be forced to apply to you to have
18 those witnesses recalled later to put those points to
19 them again, in the light of any further evidence that
20 may come to light over the next few weeks and months.

21 My Lady, may I say in relation to that that it
22 doesn't seem to us, certainly from the face of their
23 witness statements, that either of those witnesses were
24 concerned with any decision as to whether or not the bus
25 network should be shut. Indeed, Mr Glazer, who I intend

1 to call in a few minutes' time, was concerned only with
2 the role of Silver at Liverpool Street, and it's highly
3 unlikely, it seems to us, that somebody in that position
4 would ever have been called upon to consider whether or
5 not the bus network across the whole of London should be
6 shut.

7 So it may well that be the concerns that they've
8 expressed in their communications with Mr Suter and
9 myself in the course of the morning won't come to pass,
10 but I raise it now so that they know that we don't
11 anticipate that this is an issue that will have to be
12 put to those witnesses.

13 I hope that assists.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff, Mr Coltart, it seems to
15 affect you two.

16 As it seems to me -- I pre-empted your line of
17 questioning earlier, Mr Coltart, and I've also made
18 a comment to you, Ms Sheff. It seems to me that we need
19 a degree of flexibility here. If you find that you are
20 asking questions that you may have to repeat, then I am
21 not going to be critical. But if you could do your best
22 to see whether or not this is the appropriate witness to
23 ask the questions of, then I would be grateful. But
24 otherwise, I'll obviously understand.

25 MR COLTART: Thank you.

1 MS CANBY: My Lady, sorry, may I offer my assistance to both
2 Mr Coltart and Ms Sheff? If they want to ask me any
3 questions in relation to whose responsibility it was,
4 I'm quite happy to speak to them, because I am aware
5 that the witness statement in relation to the man whose
6 decision it actually was, or two men, Alan Dell and
7 Mike Weston hasn't actually been disclosed and they were
8 employees of London Buses, part of Transport for London,
9 but I am, of course, here to assist.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I suspect that might be of great
11 help, if there are statements to come that Ms Sheff and
12 Ms Coltart haven't had a chance to see, then if you
13 could alert them to the proper witness of whom to ask
14 these questions, that would be very helpful. Thank you.

15 (11.25 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (11.40 am)

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I think I owe an apology to
19 everyone else in court. I have been complaining about
20 being cold. Something has been done that's made my
21 position adequate, but I gather that everybody else is
22 now freezing in court. So I can only apologise to those
23 who are suffering. I won't say "I'm all right, Jack",
24 but I have asked that arrangements be made that -- it's
25 hopeless if people are too cold.

1 MR KEITH: Commensurate with being in the hot seat, I have
2 to say I haven't noticed the cold so far.

3 May I call, please, Darren Glazer?

4 MR DARREN SIMON GLAZER (sworn)

5 Questions by MR KEITH

6 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

7 A. Darren Simon Glazer.

8 Q. Mr Glazer, in November of 2005, which is when you gave
9 your witness statement to the police, you had already
10 been a duty station manager for some three and a half to
11 four years.

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. As part of your responsibilities as a duty station
14 manager, had you taken part in emergency planning and in
15 incident exercises concerned with addressing the ability
16 of London Underground and its personnel and stations and
17 staff and so on to respond to imaginary theoretical
18 emergencies?

19 A. Yes, I was the station-side exercise director for an
20 exercise called Exercise Bayliss, in 2004, which took
21 place at Lambeth Underground station.

22 Q. In your role, did you have then -- and I'm sure you've
23 continued to have -- experience of working with the
24 police and the other emergency services for the purposes
25 of dealing with real, major events, such as large

1 sporting occasions, and other emergencies and incidents
2 that can affect the London Underground system?

3 A. Yes, that's correct, and also with the
4 Metropolitan Police as a Special Constable.

5 Q. Could we just look, please, at the basic nature of the
6 responsibilities of a duty station manager and have on
7 the screen TFL568-16?

8 This is an extract, Mr Glazer from the railway
9 Safety Case from August 2004. We can see there, if you
10 can enlarge the middle of the page, please, the basic
11 roles of a duty station manager:

12 "Are responsible for:

13 "Deploying staff to meet service, legal and safety
14 requirements ...

15 "Undertaking regular safety inspections.

16 "Liaising with emergency services as necessary."

17 Then there are a number of other functions and roles
18 concerning the job, in particular, managing incidents
19 and emergency situations.

20 In that job, in that role, as duty station manager,
21 do other station managers report to you?

22 A. No, the line of reporting is from the station staff,
23 being customer service assistants, station assistants
24 multifunctionals and station supervisors, all of whom
25 report to duty station managers, and at that time there

1 were five of us running the group at Liverpool Street,
2 which was Liverpool Street, Moorgate and Aldgate
3 stations. There was five of us there. I was the person
4 on duty that day from 07.00, until -- the rostered
5 position was 07.00 to 15.00 and we report directly to
6 Tom O'Riordan our group station manager.

7 Q. We'll be hearing from him this afternoon.

8 Could we have on the screen TFL649, please?

9 We can see in the left-hand portion of the page duty
10 station manager, DSMS, above station supervisors, but
11 below GSMS, group station manager?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Does that accord with your understanding of the role of
14 duty station manager at that time?

15 A. It is, yes.

16 Q. The office where you worked was in Old Broad Street near
17 Liverpool Street. Is that right?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. That morning, were you in fact in that office but
20 getting ready to go to Aldgate?

21 A. Yes, one of my colleagues -- we all have different
22 portfolios to look after, different areas of the
23 business -- asked me to attend Aldgate to carry out some
24 duties to do with a safe which only could be done
25 between certain times because of the safe mechanism

1 opening for security purposes.

2 So my intention was to go down there just prior to
3 9.00, somewhere between 8.00 and 9.00, to carry out
4 those duties.

5 Q. Just before you left to go to Aldgate, did an
6 administrative assistant rush into the office to say
7 that she had heard a loud bang somewhere in the station?

8 A. I was about to leave probably quarter to 9, I had
9 a customer service assistant who was on alternative
10 duties in the office with me when my boss,
11 Tom O'Riordan, walked into the office, needed to speak
12 to me about another member of staff and, because of data
13 protection, couldn't speak to me in front of the lady in
14 the office, so we went upstairs to his office, and we
15 were only there for a matter of minutes when the admin
16 assistant came up and explained there had been a large
17 bang and the telephones were all dead.

18 Q. Had you heard the bang?

19 A. I don't recall hearing it, no.

20 Q. In your statement to the police, you describe how you
21 tried to use the phone.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. But it wasn't working?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Did you then realise that the power was out?

1 A. No, just telephones were out at that point. The power
2 to our office, which was directly above the
3 Old Broad Street entrance to Liverpool Street
4 Underground station must have been powered differently
5 to the station itself, so electricity was working as
6 normal, lights were on as normal, it was just that our
7 telephone system, which is on the autosystem for
8 London Underground, the cables run through our tunnels.

9 Q. I understand. So was there any means of communicating
10 by telephone from your office where both you, as the
11 duty station manager, and Mr O'Riordan, as the group
12 station manager, were located to Aldgate or any of the
13 other stations in the group?

14 A. Well, at that time, we didn't try, and my first, and
15 I believe my only try, was downstairs to the operations
16 room and the supervisor's office, but the phone was
17 dead, so nothing worked. So I just made my way
18 downstairs.

19 Q. In your statement, you describe how you did, however,
20 hear over the radio that something out of the ordinary
21 was occurring.

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. Is that a radio that you customarily carry with you, or
24 was that a radio in the office or a radio in the station
25 control room?

1 A. It would have been probably on charge in the office,
2 but, as soon as I leave the office, it would always be
3 on my person.

4 Q. Who does that radio connect you to?

5 A. Station staff within the station environment that you're
6 in at that time, depending on the channel.

7 Q. So this is a handheld network --

8 A. It is, yes.

9 Q. -- which connects you with other members of staff just
10 in the Liverpool Street area, because that's where the
11 office is?

12 A. Different channels for different stations at that time
13 prior to CONNECT radio coming in place, so I don't
14 recall what the channels were, but as an example,
15 Liverpool Street may be channel 1 and Moorgate may be
16 channel 2 and Aldgate channel 3.

17 Q. So that radio should, in theory, have enabled you to
18 communicate with all the stations in the group?

19 A. You have to be within a certain distance to pick up the
20 signal for each station. So being on top of
21 Liverpool Street --

22 Q. You could get Liverpool Street?

23 A. -- as duty managers, we always had it on the
24 Liverpool Street one and, also, as the home station, as
25 we called it, because it was Liverpool Street group, if

1 it we had any spare staff on the group they would always
2 be based at Liverpool Street, so we would always tune in
3 to Liverpool Street whilst we were in the office so we
4 knew what was going on.

5 Q. Was there, at that stage, in Liverpool Street a direct
6 line to the British Transport Police who were
7 responsible, of course, for carrying out police
8 functions in the Underground system?

9 A. We have our autophones which we can use to contact
10 pretty much anyone, including British Transport Police.

11 Q. But because the phones were out, they were amongst the
12 organisations to whom you could then, thereafter, have
13 no direct access because the phone wasn't working?

14 A. From our office at that time, that's correct.

15 Q. So you went down to the station control room. Were you
16 in uniform yourself?

17 A. I was, yes.

18 Q. Wearing a recognisable London Underground --

19 A. Blue trousers, white shirt for duty managers, and tie,
20 possibly a jacket as well, blue.

21 Q. What were you told when you went to the control room?

22 A. From what I can recall, it was just confusion. There
23 was comments about power surges. They had evacuated the
24 station already, so they'd done it extremely quickly,
25 because my journey from upstairs downwards was only

1 a matter of minutes. The only people on the station
2 that I can recall were station staff and some
3 plainclothes police officers with their badges hanging
4 over the jacket pocket.

5 Q. Did you discover for what reason Liverpool Street had
6 been evacuated?

7 A. There was -- I didn't know exactly what it was, but what
8 we knew at that time was that there was some smoke
9 coming out from the direction of Aldgate through the
10 tunnel into our platforms and some of which was in our
11 ticket hall area where our control room is based. It
12 wasn't thick, but there was -- you could quite easily
13 see there was some smoke, and station staff informing us
14 that there had been a large bang.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry to interrupt, Mr Keith, just
16 before we go on, we've heard a lot about power surges.
17 Before 7 July 2005, I, for one, had never heard --
18 although I was a regular Tube traveller -- of a power
19 surge. Was this a known phenomenon, a power surge, and,
20 if so, what were the known effects?

21 A. No, to be honest with you, it's not something that
22 I would expect to hear. The only time that I'd ever
23 heard of anything power related I recall was a couple of
24 years earlier where we had power problems and there were
25 people stuck in tunnels and lifts throughout our

1 network. But it didn't seem something that was
2 impossible to happen.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The idea that you could have a power
4 surge, that you would then have a loud bang and smoke?

5 A. Well, with the amount of electricity running through,
6 again, it wouldn't be impossible, it wouldn't be
7 unthinkable, to be honest.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So it wasn't something that you had
9 actually known happen, although you had known problems
10 with the power?

11 A. No, I had no idea at all. All that I was aware of at
12 that time was there was smoke, lighting was down to
13 emergency lighting, and the information being given from
14 the station staff that were on and around the platforms
15 and the ticket hall at that time.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I interrupted you, Mr Keith.

17 MR KEITH: Sorry, my Lady?

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The last note I had of your
19 questioning was there was some smoke coming out:

20 "We had been told there was some smoke coming out."

21 MR KEITH: From your statement, we know that one of the
22 members of staff in the control room was a control room
23 assistant called Daniel Kemp, and we'll hear in due
24 course how he could see on the CCTV monitors smoke
25 emanating from the tunnel at the Liverpool Street end of

1 that tunnel.

2 Do you recollect that that is how you knew that
3 there was smoke coming out of a tunnel?

4 A. My first sight of it was physically being able to see it
5 rather than on CCTV because of my entrance through the
6 overbridge which spans the platforms 1 and 2, and then,
7 coming down into the ticket hall area, as I said, there
8 was visible signs of smoke.

9 Q. Were steps taken to try to find out the exact location
10 of what it was that had occurred?

11 A. We planned to, and we started to do so, but then I was
12 stopped by DCI Lawson at the time who was Silver control
13 from BTP.

14 Q. Just pause there, we'll come back to him in a moment.

15 A. Okay.

16 Q. What steps could you have taken or what steps did you
17 have in mind to take to try to find out the exact
18 location?

19 A. Well, the first one was our normal sequence of events
20 that we carry out, which was telephone calls to line
21 controllers. At that time, I believe our -- we had
22 a couple of lines that did work, I believe one of those
23 was to the line controller and, also, one of the other
24 autophones which, for whatever reason, seemed to work
25 and I spoke to Celia Harrison on the phone, who was at

1 Aldgate. But at that point, it was quite early on and
2 she wasn't able to tell me very much, from my
3 recollection, as to what had happened.

4 Q. Dealing with those in turn, in relation to the line
5 controller, did there come a time when, in fact, either
6 you or one of your staff spoke to the Metropolitan Line
7 controller, but they seemed to be unaware --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- of what exactly had happened, and were still talking
10 in terms of a possible power surge; is that right?

11 A. That's right, yes.

12 Q. In relation to Celia Harrison, you spoke to her at some
13 point before 9.00, is that right, do you recall, after
14 she had already spoken to the NCC, and I think she had
15 called them three times during the course of that
16 passage of time, do you recall?

17 A. I recall speaking to her once and possibly twice. After
18 speaking to her recently, I'm led to believe it was
19 probably more like three times I spoke to her, but from
20 my own recollection, I definitely remember once and,
21 very vaguely, the second time, but the information, or
22 the lack of information, on those phone calls was
23 more -- it was more of a "Are you okay?" type
24 conversation and "What's going on?" and not really being
25 able to be fed much more information than that she

1 required additional staff, and it was at that point that
2 I sent a couple of members of staff along with
3 Tom O'Riordan, the group station manager, along on foot
4 to Aldgate station.

5 Q. All right. We'll come back to that in a moment.

6 Why was it important to you, as the duty station
7 manager, to find out what was going on, either from the
8 staff at Aldgate or from the NCC or from the BTP?

9 A. Well, there's a number of reasons why. First of all,
10 what are we dealing with, how many trains are possibly
11 stuck in tunnels and in each direction, not only towards
12 Aldgate, but also Moorgate. Are there people on the
13 trains? And what sort of response that we need to
14 supply to the incident that's taking place.

15 Q. Who carries the primary responsibility for liaising with
16 emergency services in determining the nature of the
17 response? We've had staff at Aldgate describe what they
18 did.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. How do you divide up the functions between you: namely,
21 between Aldgate and duty station manager and group
22 station manager situated at Liverpool Street?

23 A. Well, Silver control, which I assumed the role of at
24 Liverpool Street, is really designed to take control of
25 a situation at the location that you're present at.

1 Whereas Gold obviously has the strategic view of an
2 entire network or an entire incident.
3 That's why it was important to get someone such as
4 Tom O'Riordan down to Aldgate, who could assume that
5 role, and then hopefully we could see what was happening
6 at each individual site, pass it up to Gold, who then
7 could have an overview as to how they took control of
8 the entire incident as a whole.

9 Q. Putting aside the tactical and strategic structure, who
10 did you envisage would carry the primary responsibility
11 for seeing what had happened and what could be done by
12 way of emergency response?

13 A. That would have been DCI Al Lawson from British
14 Transport Police and myself.

15 Q. Because you were there and you had designated yourselves
16 respectively as Silver --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- in your case, London Underground, and he had
19 designated himself as Silver BTP, British Transport
20 Police?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. So you envisaged, together with him, that you would
23 determine the location of whatever had happened and then
24 ensure that the right steps were taken to get the right
25 emergency response?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But at this time, before or just around 9.00, your phone
3 lines were down with the exception of a link to the
4 Metropolitan Line controller and a link to
5 Celia Harrison, the station supervisor at Aldgate, and
6 you didn't know the exact location of whatever had
7 happened was.

8 Could you look at INQ9753-3? This is a note,
9 Mr Glazer, kept by Celia Harrison, because she started
10 keeping a log of the phone calls that she made, and
11 there's a reference there to "Darren", who we presume is
12 you, and a time at 09.10 and a number. It may be that's
13 a direct dial --

14 A. It is, yes.

15 Q. It is. So there is some evidence of the time of one of
16 the calls certainly that went between you and her.
17 You were telling us a few moments ago that you were
18 just about to start to try to find out where the
19 location of the incident was before the DCI from the
20 British Transport Police turned up.

21 In the light of the communication problems, how
22 would you have gone about finding out what the precise
23 location was?

24 A. Well, our intentions at the time were to actually go --
25 or send staff on to the track and investigate firsthand

1 as to what had happened.

2 Q. Because you knew smoke was coming out of the
3 Liverpool Street end of a tunnel --

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. -- which connected Liverpool Street with Aldgate?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did you straightaway send somebody down on foot to the
8 Liverpool Street end of that tunnel?

9 A. There had been someone on the platform, from what I can
10 recall, because we have several duties around
11 Liverpool Street station at certain times, especially at
12 that time of a morning peak, which we call SATs duties,
13 station assistant trains, where they assist in the
14 dispatch of trains and assist people via the PA system
15 on and off of the trains as quickly as possible so we
16 can have a greater throughput of trains, and I believe
17 that person said that -- or had relayed that he had
18 heard a loud bang and there was smoke coming from it
19 and, also, the supervisors told me the same thing.

20 So, no, I didn't send anyone to the mouth of the
21 tunnel. There wouldn't have been any point in doing so,
22 because you can only see so far, and we needed to, in my
23 opinion, go down and investigate firsthand.

24 Q. When you say "we" who do you mean?

25 A. That wouldn't have included myself because, assuming the

1 role of Silver, you don't physically go down --

2 Q. You don't get involved?

3 A. -- you coordinate. So I appointed a supervisor on duty
4 on the day, Ray Wood, as my Bronze controller, for him
5 to take staff down the tunnel towards Aldgate, and it
6 was at this point where we had a whiteboard where I'd
7 asked him to write the names of the staff he was taking
8 and the equipment that he was taking with him so we
9 could log it going on, so we could ensure that everyone
10 and everything came off, and, as we started to do that,
11 that was when DCI Lawson said he wasn't going to allow
12 anyone to go down.

13 Q. Can we just focus for a moment on whether there was any
14 information, just before the DCI turned up, of exactly
15 what had happened in the tunnel, because you quite
16 properly kept notes or, rather, you asked a loggist --

17 A. I did, yes.

18 Q. -- to keep a note of the main decisions that you made as
19 Silver London Underground.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. We have those notes. Can we have, please, on the screen
22 INQ10241-2? If you could just move to the left and
23 highlight, thank you, there's a time there, 08.55
24 approx. This wouldn't be your writing, of course, this
25 is the writing of the logger?

1 A. This is the writing of Terry Boyce who I appointed as my
2 loggist for the day.
3 Q. It says there:
4 "Bomb blast between Aldgate LIVST."
5 Then we think it says 09.11, but it may not be.
6 A. It does, yes.
7 Q. That is 09.11:
8 "Silver control implemented. People on train T
9 [tunnel] Aldgate."
10 I appreciate these aren't your notes.
11 A. I have the original here, so I might be able to see it
12 a little more than you can.
13 Q. Could you please look at the original and see how the
14 third line commences?
15 A. It says "at", "at Aldgate".
16 Q. "At Aldgate".
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. "S visor", supervisor, "at Aldgate to liaise."
19 Then if you could just read out the next line,
20 please?
21 A. "Are there any injuries at Aldgate? Is there anybody in
22 [the] tunnel? Need to know if train can move. Train is
23 between Aldgate and Liverpool Street. Aldgate awaiting
24 for medic."
25 Q. Right. There are two times, therefore, in that first

1 entry: "08.55 approx bomb blast"; and "09.11 Silver
2 control implemented".

3 Two questions if I may. Can you help us with how it
4 is that the loggist knew that it was a bomb blast?

5 A. I don't believe he would have known at that time.

6 Q. How, therefore, do you think that there came to be
7 a reference to "bomb blast" in a contemporaneous log at
8 that early time?

9 A. It's very possible because he wouldn't have been
10 appointed probably at 8.55. I would have appointed him
11 shortly afterwards.

12 Q. After you were implemented as Silver control?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. So you, in fact, were implemented as Silver control
15 around 09.11. He then started compiling his notes and
16 may have just written in on the top line "08.55 approx
17 [time of] bomb blast"?

18 A. I can't recall what time he was appointed, but it
19 certainly wasn't the first thing that I had done.

20 Q. We presume that, once you had appointed yourself Silver
21 control, you appreciated the need to have the decisions
22 of Silver control logged properly.

23 A. Of course.

24 Q. So it may have been around the same time, 09.11?

25 A. Or shortly afterwards.

1 Q. Or shortly afterwards. What, therefore, can you just
2 tell us, was going on in the control room between what
3 we now know is the bomb blast at 8.50 and 09.11 when you
4 implemented Silver control?

5 A. The only recollection I have of that is Daniel Kemp
6 making the normal phone calls that we would make to line
7 controllers, NOC, possibly stations either side at other
8 stations around to see if they had any information as to
9 what was going on.

10 Myself, I remember having a conversation with
11 the Met Line controller, and also Celia Harrison, and
12 then I came out of the control room and that's where
13 DCI Lawson and myself started to speak.

14 Q. Can you tell us when it was that you authorised the
15 member of staff to whom you've made reference, I think
16 Ray Wood, to put up a whiteboard and call for volunteers
17 or members of staff to go with him down to the tunnel?
18 Was it before or after you implemented yourself as
19 Silver control?

20 A. That was after.

21 Q. It was after?

22 A. It was, yes.

23 Q. So in the first 25 minutes or so, nobody was sent down,
24 we can be sure, then, to the tunnel, certainly from the
25 Liverpool Street end, to see why smoke was coming out?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Was the power off, do you recall?

3 A. I personally don't know, because I never actually went
4 on to that platform at that point, but I was informed by
5 members of staff that the tunnel lights were on.

6 Q. So shortly after 09.11 --

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, the significance of the tunnel
8 lights being on?

9 A. When traction current is discharged, tunnel lights come
10 on. So, one, you know that traction current is
11 discharged, although you cannot take that as a confirmed
12 dischargement of the traction current, and also we use
13 it in engineering hours where we have lots of people
14 walking through the tunnels carrying out activities so
15 they can find their way.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So the fact that the tunnel lights
17 have come on suggested that the power was off on the
18 line?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR KEITH: A British Transport Police Detective Chief
21 Inspector Lawton, or Lawson?

22 A. Lawson.

23 Q. He turned up. Where had he come from?

24 A. I haven't got a clue. From what I believe, he was
25 travelling through, he was on his way to work.

1 Q. He happened to have been a passenger?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. In Liverpool Street?

4 A. I believe -- I am not 100 per cent on this -- but he

5 travelled, or he did travel in from the east main line

6 service through Liverpool Street and he was just coming

7 in to jump on one of our services at Liverpool Street.

8 Q. He came in to the control room or into the near vicinity

9 of the control room, and announced that he was taking

10 charge?

11 A. He did, yes.

12 Q. As Silver BTP?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. What was the effect of that unilateral announcement?

15 A. I expected it, to be honest with you, so I don't think

16 there was any effect as such, but --

17 Q. What was the practical effect in terms of the decisions

18 that you then continued to take to respond to the

19 incident, whatever it was, in the tunnel?

20 A. Anything that we done or thought about was spoken with

21 each other. At Silver control, you need to ensure that

22 all of the Silvers that are present are aware of your

23 thoughts and decisions to see how it impacts their own

24 services in the entire incident.

25 Q. Presumably, you had to take time to speak to him to tell

1 him what you had already done --

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. -- which was: speak to the Metropolitan Line controller,

4 relay the information about smoke from the tunnel, and

5 no doubt tell him you'd spoken to Celia Harrison?

6 A. He seemed to have more of an idea than I did at that

7 time what was going on.

8 Q. Because he had perhaps, what, an idea that there had

9 been other bombs or other incidents in London?

10 A. I just presumed that he had spoken to people on the

11 telephone at that point and he was privileged to more

12 information than I was.

13 Q. Did you know at the time that he arrived on the scene

14 that there was or had been a bomb?

15 A. I think it was more of a presumption rather than

16 knowing. I think -- he just said "I think it's" -- not

17 his exact words, but I think it was something along the

18 lines of "I don't think this is a power surge, I think

19 it's something more than that".

20 Q. After you'd taken time to tell him what you'd done so

21 far -- and no doubt you'd discuss what to do -- did

22 there then appear a member from -- an officer from the

23 London Fire Brigade, a station officer, a Mr Clarke?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Is that Sean Clarke?

1 A. I don't recall his first name.

2 Q. Could we please have back on the screen that document?

3 Thank you very much. Further down the page:

4 "09.20. LFB station officer, Clarke and three LFB
5 officers on-site at Liverpool Street."

6 Did they then announce, or did he announce, that he
7 was then taking charge of Silver London Fire Brigade?

8 A. I don't recall that statement being made, but we always
9 go to the man in the white helmet from LFB.

10 Q. Right. Did you then take time to tell him what you told
11 DCI Lawson?

12 A. I don't recall the conversation, but I do recall that we
13 stood there, the three of us, having a conversation, but
14 I couldn't tell what you that comprised of.

15 Q. You describe in your statement how, after that, you
16 started to assemble staff, and that's when you appointed
17 station supervisor Ray Wood as your Bronze control?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. He was the person whom you had instructed to go down, as
20 we've heard, to the tunnel with staff and see what was
21 happening?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So that couldn't have been before 09.20.

24 A. It would have been around about that time.

25 Q. At that stage, what did you do, if anything, to find out

1 what was happening at the Aldgate end of the tunnel?

2 A. Apart from the conversation with Celia Harrison and the
3 communication with the Met Line controller, there wasn't
4 any other communication between myself and Celia. She
5 had my mobile number and my autonumber as shown on the
6 piece of paper that you displayed earlier and, if
7 anything, I was more reliant upon her feeding me
8 information.

9 As Silver control, I personally wouldn't have gone,
10 I would have asked people to possibly look for it for me
11 rather than looking for it myself.

12 Q. So you were dependent on her contacting you to give you
13 an update as to what the position was at her end of the
14 tunnel?

15 A. And also Daniel Kemp being in the control room, if any
16 phone calls would have come through to him, then he
17 would have relayed them to me via the radio or
18 face-to-face.

19 Q. In terms, therefore, of your management as the duty
20 station manager of the group and taking the prime
21 responsibility for determining the nature of the
22 emergency response, would it be fair to say, now that at
23 least half an hour has elapsed, that because of the
24 communication difficulties -- the phone being down --
25 there was really quite a severe practical limit being

1 placed on how you could manage the situation, given the
2 lack of information from Aldgate and the inability to
3 communicate?

4 A. That, I'd say, was probably a secondary, as far as I was
5 concerned. The primary factor was that I couldn't allow
6 my staff to do what I wanted them to do because I was --

7 Q. Why not?

8 A. I was stopped by DCI Lawson because of the possibility
9 of secondary devices.

10 Q. Was that an issue that arose as soon as he appeared?

11 A. It wouldn't have been as soon as, it would have been
12 a time afterwards. But I can still see the supervisor's
13 eyes to this day and the fear in his eyes of me
14 sending -- wanting him to go down the tunnel with staff
15 to something that he didn't know what he was going down
16 to.

17 Q. How did DCI Lawson -- what did he do or say to prevent
18 you doing what you wanted to do?

19 A. Again, I can't recall his exact words, but he said,
20 "I don't want anyone going down" and we actually pulled
21 back out of the station at that point because he said
22 he's concerned for secondary devices, and he said "No
23 one is going down there" and we actually pulled back to
24 Old Broad Street and everyone was removed from the
25 station in its entirety.

1 Q. Why could you have not sent someone down to the tunnel
2 and then evacuated the rest of London Underground staff
3 and any other members of the public still in the station
4 from the rest of the station or the mainline station?

5 A. We don't choose people to possibly put in danger and
6 certainly when we don't know what the situation was, and
7 DCI Lawson has greater authority than myself in
8 a situation like that.

9 Q. Were you aware that at Aldgate a substantial number of
10 London Underground employees had simply gone straight
11 down to the tunnel to help?

12 A. No, not at all.

13 Q. If we could go over the page, please --

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Before we move on, Mr Keith, I'm
15 a bit troubled. How does the NCC fit into all this,
16 where Celia Harrison was keeping them informed of what
17 was happening as far as she knew and what she needed,
18 paramedics and the like, how does the NCC feed into your
19 being Silver control?

20 A. Well, they should in theory be able to pass information
21 to Gold who would normally, as I'm led to believe, be
22 positioned at our head office at Broadway, and they
23 should be able to take all of the information and look
24 at it strategically and then feed out information
25 accordingly to whoever needs it.

1 But throughout the entirety of the events taking
2 place, it was just confusion, no one seemed to have any
3 answers as to exactly what was going on, what the
4 problem was, or where the problem was precisely.
5 There was lots of conflicting stories and
6 information coming out and, later on, it comes out that
7 there was possibly another train between ourselves and
8 Moorgate in the opposite direction. So it was all lots
9 of information coming out, but none of it was
10 substantiated, and we actually knew the full facts of
11 what had happened at that point.

12 MR KEITH: If you'd known that London Underground staff at
13 Aldgate were very courageously just going straight down
14 into the tunnel to help, what would you have done?

15 A. Probably would have pushed DCI Lawson into allowing us
16 to go down a bit more, because we are used to having to
17 push the other -- the other services, emergency services
18 a little bit for their timekeeping when it comes to
19 dealing with incidents.

20 The example I can give is you people under trains,
21 obviously there's an investigation to be carried out,
22 and, at first, it could possibly be a crime scene, and
23 we obviously need to try to get our railway back up and
24 running as quickly as possible, but assisting the
25 emergency services as well, so our role is to question

1 what they're doing and why they're doing it and, if we
2 can assist them quicker to move things on, but, because
3 we didn't know what was going on at that point, I was in
4 no place to question.

5 Q. You're Silver London Underground.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. He was Silver British Transport Police.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Could you have not said, well, "As Silver, responsible
10 for my service, and my organisation, at the strategic
11 level, I want people to get down into that tunnel and
12 find out what's happening, there could be passengers in
13 there, there could be a train in there, we need to
14 know", could you not have insisted?

15 A. No, I don't feel that I could, no.

16 Q. If we go to the next page, please, we can see in the top
17 left-hand corner, if you would be good enough just to
18 look at the original, because we've lost the top entry.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. There is a reference there to 09.22. Fire Brigade.
21 Bomb Circle Line train. Blast 100 metres from Aldgate.
22 People trapped?"

23 09.22. So by 09.22, it appears that you knew that
24 there was a blast fairly close to the Aldgate station in
25 the tunnel, and people were trapped.

1 What steps were taken by either yourself or

2 DCI Lawson to communicate that information to the

3 emergency services?

4 A. I believe that came from the emergency services.

5 Q. From the Fire Brigade?

6 A. As it's written there, yes.

7 Q. What, if anything, did you do at that stage in the light

8 of this information? Was there anything you could do?

9 A. Well, staff were sent down to Aldgate to assist along

10 with Tom O'Riordan, but again, DCI Lawson wasn't

11 allowing anyone to go down from our side of things.

12 Q. By now, over half an hour had elapsed from the moment of

13 the bang, but no one had gone down to the

14 Liverpool Street end of the tunnel and you weren't aware

15 of the exact nature of the recovery operation, if any,

16 that was in place at the Aldgate end?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. But you were the duty station manager Silver

19 London Underground in charge of the emergency response

20 from the London Underground side of things.

21 A. At Liverpool Street.

22 Q. At Liverpool Street. Part of the group in which Aldgate

23 was a member.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. There comes a time, however, where there's a reference

1 to the Fire Brigade to enter the tunnel from
2 Liverpool Street. So a decision must have been taken
3 that they could go down.

4 A. That didn't actually take place.

5 Q. Why not?

6 A. Because they weren't allowed to by DCI Lawson. We all
7 pulled out of the station.

8 Q. But the London Fire Brigade Silver was there, Mr Clarke.
9 How was it that DCI Lawson overruled his decision or
10 request that the London Fire Brigade go down to
11 investigate?

12 A. I think that's a question you need to put to DCI Lawson.

13 Q. We can see further down the page around about 09.26,
14 because there's an entry at 09.25, then 09.26, and
15 09.25:

16 "Offices to be evacuated and main line."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Whose idea was it to evacuate, firstly, Liverpool Street
19 Underground station and then the mainline station?

20 A. The London Underground station was evacuated by our
21 staff. I couldn't tell who you actually made the call
22 because that was prior to myself being on the station.
23 I was still upstairs in my office. By the time I'd come
24 downstairs, the station was virtually empty. It was
25 just staff and the odd police officer, but members of

1 the public had already been evacuated out.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. The main line would have been a joint decision between
4 the main line management and the -- and DCI Lawson.

5 Q. So you evacuated the main line. Where did you go?

6 A. That part of things isn't my responsibility, so --

7 Q. Where did you personally go?

8 A. We all pulled back to Old Broad Street, the corner of
9 Old Broad Street and Liverpool Street where we now, or
10 shortly after, we had a British Transport Police lorry
11 which we used as our Silver control meeting point.

12 Q. That must have taken some time. You had to walk out of
13 the station and go to where you had determined was the
14 appropriate place to go.

15 A. It was just on top of us, it was a short time.

16 Q. All right. Then a little bit later, there was then
17 a further decision to the effect that a greater area
18 should be evacuated, possibly including the buildings
19 around Liverpool Street. Is that right?

20 A. That was what I was informed, yes.

21 Q. So if you go over to the next page, on the right-hand
22 side we can see "09.37 main line evacuated" at the
23 bottom of the page. Just above, it 09.35:

24 "DC Lawson wants everybody out of [the] station."

25 Then over the page one more, please:

1 "Silver control meeting. City of London Police
2 on-site. Several devices gone off on Underground.
3 [something] to evacuate building in area."
4 A. "Need to evacuate building in area".
5 Q. So five minutes later, there was then a further decision
6 to start evacuating some of the buildings?
7 A. Again, I wasn't part of that decision; I was just
8 informed as to what they were doing.
9 Q. But this was a decision reached at Silver control and
10 you were present at that meeting?
11 A. Yes, but I represent London Underground and I wouldn't
12 have had decisions as to the buildings around the
13 vicinity.
14 Q. Did the sequential nature of these constant evacuations,
15 firstly, from the Underground station, then the mainline
16 station and then the immediate location round the
17 station and then a further location, hinder your ability
18 to take decisions as to the proper response to this
19 bomb?
20 A. Of course, yes, because I was stopped from doing the
21 role that we were primarily there to do.
22 Q. By this stage, 09.37, had any practical steps been taken
23 in so far as the direction of London Underground staff
24 or emergency services into the tunnel was concerned?
25 A. From Liverpool Street?

1 Q. Yes, from Liverpool Street.

2 A. It wasn't allowed. As I said earlier, we wanted to, we
3 went to do so and then we were stopped from doing so.

4 Q. At 09.45, we can see there a reference to:

5 "DSM Glazer ..."

6 Duty station manager Glazer, that's yourself, of
7 course:

8 "... told LFB to go through tunnel to Moorgate".

9 Was that because you had received information, as you
10 mentioned a few moments ago, to the effect that there
11 may have been a train in the Moorgate Liverpool Street
12 tunnel?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. That's back eastbound -- sorry, westbound?

15 A. Westbound, yes.

16 Q. Away from Aldgate going in the other direction?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Did you think that that was in any way connected to the
19 incident that had occurred half an hour before?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Because there was no way of knowing one way or t'other,
22 was there?

23 A. There wasn't, no.

24 Q. So although you were in charge of the emergency response
25 to the limited extent you were able to perform that

1 function as Silver London Underground, by 9.45, almost
2 an hour later, you didn't know, in fact, whether or not
3 the incident concerned the Moorgate tunnel as opposed to
4 the Aldgate tunnel?

5 A. It was more than that, because obviously we'd been
6 hearing that there was obviously other situations going
7 on around the network, so, yes, we weren't aware of the
8 full extent of what had happened and if we did have
9 other trains stuck between ourselves and Moorgate.

10 Q. Was any information coming in from the line controller
11 as to whether or not the incident was confined to the
12 tunnel between Aldgate and Liverpool Street or whether
13 it also --

14 A. No.

15 Q. -- encompassed Moorgate?

16 A. No, we received -- I received pretty much nothing back
17 from the line controller. The train -- the ghost train,
18 as we called it -- between Moorgate and ourselves was
19 thought to be there through a computer system that the
20 supervisors have access to, and Moorgate staff thinking
21 that that was the case, but obviously there was no train
22 there after investigation.

23 Q. Was there any information from trackernet?

24 A. That was the computer system that was used, the
25 trackernet seemed to say that there was a train stuck

1 between Moorgate and Liverpool Street.

2 Q. What about information from the NCC?

3 A. I personally received nothing through from them.

4 Q. What about staff at Moorgate?

5 A. Moorgate staff were spoken to, they were unsure because
6 they could obviously see trackernet, and eventually they
7 did confirm that there was no train stuck in that
8 tunnel.

9 Q. If you go back to page 3 on this exhibit, at 09.32 we
10 can see a reference to you:

11 "DSM Glazer told supervisor told Moorgate to 999
12 police telling them bomb blast and evacuation and
13 fatalities expected."

14 Was that with reference to Moorgate because of the
15 reference "told Moorgate" at the start of the entry, or
16 was that a reference to Aldgate?

17 A. I don't have a clear recollection of this, to be
18 perfectly honest with you, but from the point that's put
19 in there, I believe it to be that we believed there may
20 be a train between Moorgate and Liverpool Street, and
21 because of the other information that I had been fed as
22 to what was happening at Liverpool Street to Aldgate,
23 that it's possibly the same thing that we're dealing
24 with.

25 Q. In any event, the police I think were sent to Moorgate,

1 were they not, or some police were sent to Moorgate?

2 A. They were.

3 Q. We can see that noted at 09.36:

4 "Police diverted to Moorgate."

5 So certainly insofar as some of the police were

6 concerned, may we presume that's British Transport

7 Police?

8 A. I couldn't tell you, to be perfectly honest with you.

9 Q. You don't know. They were diverted away from possible
10 assistance at Aldgate to Moorgate?

11 A. I can't remember how many there were, and I can't
12 remember from what force they were from either.

13 Q. Over the page at 09.49, DCI Lawson asked for staff to go
14 to Moorgate, did he not?

15 A. Sorry, can you repeat that?

16 Q. Yes, at 09.49 you told Ray Wood to take all the staff to
17 Moorgate.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was that as a result of a direction from DCI Lawson?

20 A. I believe it was, yes.

21 Q. Presumably, by now, 09.49, somebody had spoken to
22 Celia Harrison or one of the other station supervisors
23 at Aldgate because, by that time, the staff there,
24 including the emergency services, had been into the
25 tunnel, had rescued the walking wounded, detained the

1 train at the heart of the incident and were only a few
2 minutes away from evacuating the tunnel entirely because
3 of the risk of a secondary device and the inevitable
4 standoff period.

5 None of that found its way to the Silver Command
6 centre at Liverpool Street?

7 A. I think you've possibly confused the role that I was
8 playing at Liverpool Street and subsequently at Moorgate
9 with what was happening at Aldgate. The purpose of
10 Tom O'Riordan going to Aldgate was to take charge there
11 as Silver, and, therefore, yes, information between us
12 would have been the best tool that we would have had.

13 However, that wasn't happening very well on the day
14 itself because of the telephone lines being down and the
15 different radio system that we had at the time, myself
16 being hindered from going in an easterly direction by
17 the officer in charge, DCI Lawson and, I suppose,
18 leaving my boss to carry out his role at Aldgate and, if
19 requirement was needed of additional staff or additional
20 assistance, then that would have been made to me,
21 somehow, even if it was by a member of staff on foot.

22 Q. Your boss, we remind ourselves, was Tom O'Riordan?

23 A. Tom O'Riordan, that's correct.

24 Q. The group station manager --

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. -- went to Aldgate in the end on foot, didn't he?

2 A. He did, yes, and took several members of staff with him.

3 Q. Subsequently he called you, did he not?

4 A. I must be honest, I don't recall a conversation.

5 Q. There is some suggestion -- we'll hear from him shortly,

6 but I think there's some suggestion in his witness

7 statement that he called you and asked if he could

8 detrain people from a train at Aldgate. Do you recall

9 that?

10 A. I don't, no.

11 Q. All right. Do you recall there being some debate as to

12 the need to detrain a Hammersmith & City Line train at

13 Aldgate East?

14 A. No.

15 Q. If we could have that exhibit back on the screen,

16 please, at 10.20, so page 7 of these notes:

17 "Arrived at Moorgate. OIC Inspector [Stevens,

18 possibly] told no train in tunnel. Told to shut down

19 station. Train detrained. Two empty trains on

20 station."

21 Was that you arriving at Moorgate?

22 A. Yes, I believe so.

23 Q. So in the end, you went to Moorgate yourself and we can

24 see an entry above it "proceeding to Moorgate", 10.17?

25 A. Again, that was on the recommendation of DCI Lawson. He

1 said that it was sterile now at Liverpool Street and
2 that I should go and ensure that everything was in hand
3 at Moorgate, as there was no management available to go
4 there apart from myself.

5 Q. You found there was, in fact, no train there at all?

6 A. There was no train. There were two trains, both of
7 which had been detrained, the station evacuated, all
8 staff accounted for.

9 Q. I think on page 9 of this document, two pages further
10 on, at 10.45 -- now, I've lost my reference. There is
11 a reference I think to the London Ambulance Service
12 arriving at Moorgate, not needed. If you look at the
13 first entry, 10.42:

14 "Trains inspected by Ray Wood."

15 That's your deputy Bronze.

16 10.45:

17 "Keith Sutherland from lead London Ambulance G393
18 arrives at Moorgate. Not needed."

19 Does that appear to indicate, therefore, that at
20 10.45, now a very long time after the incident,
21 ambulances, or at least certainly one ambulance, was
22 attending unnecessarily at Moorgate and was, therefore,
23 having to be sent away as being not needed?

24 A. I don't know if it was a car, bike or ambulance, but
25 a member of London Ambulance staff turned up and was

1 informed that he wasn't needed at Moorgate.

2 Q. May I ask you this, Mr Glazer: in terms of the ability
3 of the group employees at Liverpool Street, being where
4 the office for the group of Aldgate, Moorgate and
5 Liverpool Street was located, being able to respond to
6 this emergency, do you feel that the system of command
7 and control, insofar as the Silver Officers were
8 concerned, worked well on this occasion?

9 A. I think it's the same as any incident that a Silver has
10 to look at. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on
11 which way you look at it, you have to take into account
12 people that you may be sending into a situation that you
13 don't know the full extent to.

14 So on this occasion, we -- DCI Lawson wasn't aware
15 of exactly what had happened, although he had an outline
16 as to what had happened. No one was aware if there were
17 secondary devices or what the dangers were and, for the
18 safety of the staff, I presume, he made everyone stay
19 back, which I understand. However, it's probably the
20 thing that will never leave me, as my own thoughts, is
21 that, me being me, I wanted to personally be down there,
22 and being Silver control sometimes is quite hard because
23 you have to pull yourself back and send other people in
24 to carry out the activities that human nature says you
25 should be doing yourself.

1 Q. But we've heard from your own evidence that people
2 weren't being sent in and you've told us how there were
3 times in the course of this process where you wanted to
4 take steps --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- but were countermanded or at least the decision was
7 taken that your advice shouldn't be followed?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Nobody was sent into the tunnel, certainly from the
10 Liverpool Street end, for a very considerable time
11 afterwards. You didn't know what was going on at the
12 Aldgate Street end and, fortuitously, but contrary to
13 the system being adopted at Liverpool Street,
14 London Underground staff were going into the tunnel
15 despite a Command order that they should not do so.
16 You were saved by the staff, there were you not?

17 A. I was saved by the staff there?

18 Q. The system was saved by the staff at Aldgate going
19 straight down into the tunnel without pause or
20 hesitation.

21 A. Well, not the system. The unfortunate people in the
22 situation were saved and looked after. The process
23 itself is obviously there for good reason and it's seen
24 in different instances where you have to consider what
25 the possibilities are as a secondary situation on the

1 primary.

2 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Glazer. Will you stay
3 there? There may be some further questions for you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can we go back before anybody asks
5 you any questions, Mr Glazer, to my questions about
6 communications. It sounds as if DCI Lawson is taking
7 his decisions, you say, because he wasn't aware of what
8 was happening at Aldgate.

9 By, say, 9.00, 9.10, what communication systems were
10 up and running, as far as you were concerned, at
11 Liverpool Street?

12 A. I had used one direct line to the line controller,
13 Met Line controller, and I had used one autotelephone to
14 speak to Celia Harrison.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you had two lines operating, two
16 telephone lines?

17 A. I believe so, yes.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm just wondering why there is this
19 apparent gap in communicating with Aldgate.

20 A. I think it was a lack of -- at the time I spoke to
21 Celia Harrison, there was a lack of understanding as to
22 what had actually happened at Aldgate, so she was unable
23 to feed me very much information because that was quite
24 early on into the incident.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But did anybody think to ring her

1 back?

2 A. Well, there were, I believe, one, if not two, other
3 conversations between myself and Celia, but I must be
4 honest, I cannot remember what those conversations
5 consisted of. But Celia informs me that her statement
6 possibly alludes to a little bit more as to what those
7 conversations were about.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are you saying that, throughout those
9 conversations with her, you never got any impression as
10 to what was happening at Aldgate?

11 A. I got an inkling as to what was going on, not the full,
12 obviously, gravity of the situation, and I never was
13 requested to send additional staff, which obviously
14 would have been alarm bells ringing for myself that
15 something greater was unfolding there.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Coltart, any
17 questions?

18 MR COLTART: No thank you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The timing of this is rather ironic.
20 There's a power cut in the annex. Engineers are working
21 on it, but the screens are not working. Does that mean
22 they can hear us?

23 I'm afraid I think we have to continue. I don't
24 think our timetable allows. If any member of the press
25 wants to come into the courtroom, could we send

1 a message that they can do so?

2 MR KEITH: We may presume that there's no hindrance or
3 difficulty with the communication from the families in
4 their location. My Lady, yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

6 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

8 Questions by MS SHEFF

9 MS SHEFF: Just arising from her Ladyship's earlier question
10 about how the NCC fits into all of this, and you said
11 that they feed info to Gold, information from the scene,
12 as it were, and throughout the entirety of the events
13 you say there was just confusion. Don't the
14 Gold Commanders also rely upon the Silver Commanders on
15 the scene to feed that information?

16 A. They do, yes.

17 Q. Did you have any communication with the Gold Commander,
18 who we believe was Andrew Barr at the time?

19 A. I spoke to the rostered duty officer, which was
20 Paul Coote, who also would have tied in to Gold control.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, you're very close to
22 Ms Sheff, so the temptation is to direct your answers to
23 her.

24 A. Sorry.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It means that I can't hear.

1 A. Apologies.

2 MS SHEFF: I have no problem at all with you ignoring me.

3 Just look forward, and I don't take that as any form of
4 discourtesy.

5 I think you said just to make sure that that goes on
6 to the record, that you had contact with -- Paul Cook,
7 did you say?

8 A. Coote.

9 Q. What was his official role?

10 A. Rostered duty officer. We have a senior member of
11 management who's always rostered to carry out the role
12 of RDO if something was to occur on the network.

13 Q. So is he the intermediary between you and Gold Command?

14 A. You could say so, yes.

15 Q. Would you anticipate, then, that any information that
16 you fed to him would be directed upwards to Gold?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Does that obviate the need for you to speak to Gold
19 directly?

20 A. To an extent it could do, yes.

21 Q. Did you feel that your responsibility was also to pass
22 on the information that you had to Gold directly to
23 enable them to make decisions?

24 A. To be perfectly honest with you, I don't think I had any
25 information to pass on that would have made any

1 difference to Gold control because of the lack of
2 clarity as to what was happening.

3 Q. If we just look again at your log, 10241-2, the
4 information that you had was by 09.11, Silver control
5 implemented, that is essentially you implementing
6 yourself as a Silver control commander.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I think you said that shortly afterwards you would have
9 appointed a loggist.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So from -- can we assume that from probably the next
12 entry, 09.20, the log was contemporaneous?

13 A. I couldn't tell you, to be perfectly honest with you.
14 I would have thought it would have been close to that
15 time, yes.

16 Q. Because by 9.21, you are getting information about an
17 explosion at Baker Street with fatalities expected and
18 Aldgate fatalities. So you knew the serious nature of
19 the situation both at Aldgate and possibly at
20 Baker Street by 9.21.

21 Where was this information coming from?

22 A. I think at this point it was more hearsay rather than
23 information coming from anyone that I'd spoken to.

24 Q. But where was the hearsay information coming from?

25 A. I can't remember exactly, but my -- I believe it was --

1 everything that I heard, or most of what I heard, was
2 through DCI Lawson, because he seemed to have the
3 information and, again, I can only presume it had come
4 through his mobile phone.

5 Q. Turning to the next page, by 9.22, you knew there was
6 a bomb on the Circle Line train with the blast
7 100 metres from Aldgate, people were trapped.

8 What would have been the source of that information?

9 A. I don't recall exactly, again, but I believe that came
10 from DCI Lawson and/or the Fire Brigade.

11 Q. So your loggist was noting information that he was
12 receiving from the other Silver Commander at the scene
13 and was that information then being transferred upwards
14 to either directly to Gold or to your rostered duty
15 officer?

16 A. Not that I can recall at that moment, no.

17 Q. So what was your first communication, then, with
18 Paul Coote, what time?

19 A. I must be honest, until I re-read this, only a matter of
20 days ago, I couldn't even recall speaking to Paul Coote.
21 That's how little I actually recall of that time.

22 Q. Now, using the log to refresh your memory, can you help
23 us with when that first communication would have taken
24 place? (Pause).

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you know the answer to the

1 question? Can you assist the witness, Ms Sheff?

2 MS SHEFF: There is no note in the log.

3 A. I believe there is somewhere because I recall seeing it.

4 MS SHEFF: Right.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: In which case you can't assist the
6 witness. You'd better carrying on answering.

7 MS SHEFF: Yes, so nothing you can see certainly before
8 10.01, when all the networks were closed down, that
9 indicates that the information that you had available to
10 you was passed on to Gold?

11 A. No, as I say, there was one -- I do recall one entry
12 somewhere where I spoke to Paul Coote, but I recall
13 reading that in the last few days rather than actually
14 recording it myself.

15 Q. Yes. You may want to just very quickly look at the
16 first two or three pages to confirm that that note is
17 not on the record before 10.01.

18 A. Okay. (Pause). It's not on the first few pages, but
19 I don't know if it's in my statement or further on in
20 the book, but I do recall reading it.

21 Q. The Silver control meeting took place at 9.37, page 4 of
22 your log. By then, there was information available to
23 you that several devices had gone off on the
24 Underground. Again, do you think the source of that
25 information was DCI Lawson?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did that in any way inform your decisions at
3 Liverpool Street?

4 A. It didn't, no, because the situation at Liverpool Street
5 was that it was sterile. There was nothing physically
6 happening there, and that was the area that I was Silver
7 control for, and the fact that Tom O'Riordan had now
8 moved down to Aldgate and was Silver control for that
9 area, my only other concern was Moorgate.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is "sterile" a term of art, as far as
11 you're concerned, Mr Glazer?

12 A. It was a term used by DCI Lawson and, in effect, that
13 I understood that to mean that all persons were removed
14 from the area, apart from those of us that were --

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It sounds like the kind of expression
16 I might more commonly associate with a criminal
17 investigation rather than evacuation of people in
18 trouble.

19 A. It was just what he used, his terminology.

20 MS SHEFF: Indeed, by that time, 9.37, had you, in fact,
21 been relieved of your Silver Command at Aldgate by
22 Tom O'Riordan who had attended the scene itself?

23 A. I must say that I couldn't class myself as Silver
24 control for Aldgate at any point, because I had never
25 attended Aldgate.

1 Q. Although you did have responsibility for communicating
2 with Aldgate and dealing with the events on the ground
3 there until Tom O'Riordan took over?

4 A. Yes.

5 MS SHEFF: That's all I have to ask. Thank you very much.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anybody? Ms Canby?

7 MR GIBBS: Might I?

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, of course, Mr Gibbs.

9 Questions by MR GIBBS

10 MR GIBBS: I think this may just help her Ladyship to put
11 this into context while you're mentioning DCI Lawson's
12 name.

13 Could we have on screen, please, BTP167-37? It's
14 the second half of that page.

15 We'll see a -- it's in fact a telephone call,
16 I think, and the controller is at the major incident
17 Control Centre for the BTP. This is Mr Lawson ringing
18 up. You might need to add a couple of minutes on to
19 that. The controller says:

20 "Police emergency."

21 I'll just read what the detective chief inspector
22 said:

23 "Yeah, is that the BTP Control room? ...

24 "Hello, how are you doing, it's Al-Lawson DCI
25 here ...

1 "I'm at Liverpool Street station just now."
2 If we go over the page:
3 "Well I think we've got a problem here which you
4 should be aware about. Do you have a log running?"
5 The controller says:
6 "That's right, yeah, 131 is the log number."
7 We know which log that is. Mr Lawson says:
8 "Well, I'm the only senior officer on scene just
9 now, so a quick update on what's happening. The
10 station's been closed down, scene secured. I'm assuming
11 the Alpha cars are coming to Liverpool Street."
12 The controller says:
13 "Yeah, we've got AX44 and 42 both en route.
14 "Could they report to the station control room, the
15 Underground station control room ... where we have the
16 Underground member of staff who was on the platform at
17 the time waiting and ready to brief them? ...
18 "I'm with the duty station manager here as well so
19 everything's non-stopped on the District and Circle and
20 is running straight through on the Central Line."
21 He's asked whether he wants to speak to the duty
22 officer, if we go over the page, and he says:
23 "Err, if he's available put him on, please."
24 Then if we go, please, to BTP167-20, we see a call
25 beginning 08.59.07. Again, you may want to add a couple

1 of minutes on to that. It's Al Lawson again we can see:
2 "Hi Gary, it's Al Lawson ...
3 "I'm at Liverpool Street just now. I think I'm
4 probably the most senior person here so what we've
5 done ... hold on ... yeah, sorry, Gary, I think I'm the
6 most senior person here, I'm just waiting for the Alpha
7 car to meet at the London Underground station control
8 room and the member of staff who's on the platform who
9 witnessed the explosion is here just now as well."
10 He's asked what's happened:
11 "Well, we don't know if it's an explosion under
12 a train or it's an explosion down the tunnel, but we
13 think there's a power loss at some point anyway."
14 Gary Young says:
15 "But we've liaised with NCC.
16 "I expect that it's an operating problem rather than
17 a CT [that is counter-terror] problem."
18 Gary Young:
19 "We've just had a report or ask for an ambulance to
20 go to Aldgate as because of 3 or 4 walking wounded."
21 So the controller in the control room knows all
22 about Aldgate. Mr Lawson at Liverpool Street says:
23 "Right, no knowledge of that. I can only manage at
24 Liverpool Street just now, so you think we've got units
25 going there, yeah."

1 He says:

2 "So what I'll do is I'll take command at
3 Liverpool Street and get this sorted out" and he hands
4 over his mobile number.

5 Were you with him at the time?

6 A. I couldn't tell you, to be perfectly -- I wasn't aware
7 of the conversation. I know he had many conversations
8 on his mobile phone, but I wasn't privileged to those.

9 Q. Because he, as I think you've told us, had been coming
10 in to work in plainclothes and had happened to be coming
11 through Liverpool Street station at the time when there
12 was the report of the smoke and the bang, and he had
13 simply assumed control?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. If we then go, please, to BTP168-17, we can see,
16 I think, the next of his telephone calls which is at
17 09.14.14; again, you may want to add a couple of minutes
18 on to that. Gary Young is in the major incident control
19 room, and he asks:

20 "Have you got an update? I've got Mr Crowther in
21 here."

22 Mr Lawson says:

23 "Right, from what I'm told ..."

24 Told by you and by your staff?

25 A. I haven't read what's coming next, so I couldn't tell

1 you who --

2 Q. All right, let's read it and then you can answer that

3 question for me:

4 "Right, from what I'm told, we've got two trains

5 trapped, one between here and Aldgate, right, so, and

6 we've got injuries on there, so I'm told now that's

7 getting evacuated towards Aldgate. I've got London Fire

8 Brigade here taking control cos it's a rescue stage just

9 now. They're with me. Just now one trapped between

10 here and Moorgate now. We've got to establish at

11 Moorgate that's safe and secure. At that point then,

12 they'll -- the train will be evacuated from Moorgate

13 to ... from the tunnel to Moorgate."

14 The control room asks:

15 "Have we got anybody there at Moorgate?"

16 He says:

17 "I don't know."

18 So my question was: had he been told that by you and

19 by your staff?

20 A. I can only assume that obviously the two trains are the

21 ones that -- the one that we were aware of and the one

22 that we believed to be there because trackernet alluded

23 to it being between ourselves and Moorgate. So he would

24 have probably got that information from our systems and

25 ourselves.

1 Q. Yes. Hard to think where else he could have got it
2 from. Am I right?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. He continues:
5 "I'm actually just on scene here, yeah, what I could
6 do with is command support down here."
7 Mr Young says:
8 "Yeah, we've got someone who's going to
9 Liverpool Street, Bob Pacey's on his way down there and
10 we are getting the incident vehicle down there."
11 He says:
12 "Great, super, I'm told something's happening at
13 Baker Street, is that true?"
14 Mr Young says:
15 "No, no, there's a call to Edgware Road, there was
16 a fatality and a power cable's been seared at
17 Edgware Road and the London Underground seem to think
18 that's probably the route of the problems."
19 Mr Lawson says:
20 "Right, I'm told this has been declared major here
21 as well."
22 Gary Young confirms that that's right.
23 A major incident was declared at Liverpool Street
24 when?
25 A. I believe from my loggist's notes here at the top of the

1 page that starts 09.22 he's put above that "major
2 incident" so I can only presume that that's when
3 Al Lawson has informed us of that.

4 Q. Well, this call is at about 9.16 and it's certainly been
5 declared before that because the major incident control
6 room of the British Transport Police know that. Did you
7 declare a major incident?

8 A. No, I'm not in a position to do so.

9 Q. Did you hear anyone else do so?

10 A. Again, from recollection, that would have come from
11 DCI Lawson. I can't actually recall him saying the
12 words exactly, but that's just -- I'm not saying that he
13 did or didn't say that.

14 Q. Were you aware that a bomb disposal unit had been called
15 to attend a train at Liverpool Street?

16 A. I was, yes.

17 Q. You thought at the time that you had a train stuck
18 between Liverpool Street and Moorgate?

19 A. Around about that time, that was one of our concerns and
20 the staff at Moorgate were obviously trying to ascertain
21 whether or not that was true.

22 Q. The Emergency Response Unit arrived at Liverpool Street,
23 is that right?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. But you told them that they weren't needed at

1 Liverpool Street but there were walking wounded at
2 Aldgate and they should go to Aldgate instead?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. The Fire Brigade, we know, also went to Moorgate to help
5 detrain a train. Was that at your request?

6 A. I think it was a joint decision between ourselves to ask
7 the Fire Brigade to attend Moorgate, if there was a full
8 train and, at that time in the morning, obviously the
9 trains would be very busy, then as much assistance as
10 possible would be needed, but I believe, by the time
11 they got there, staff had already seen that there was no
12 train in the tunnel and the station was fully evacuated
13 and everyone was accounted for.

14 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby?

16 Questions by MS CANBY

17 MS CANBY: Mr Glazer, can we start, please, by looking in
18 a little more detail at Silver control and what that
19 means for you? Could we have on the screen, please,
20 document TFL27-4? Mr Glazer, this is a document that's
21 known as Na100, which is a London Underground standard
22 and it's titled "Incident Organisation". What it does
23 is it sets out in some detail the roles and
24 responsibilities for people in an incident.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. We can see there at paragraph 5.2 that "Silver" is
2 referred to and Silver is also known as an incident
3 officer. Is that the role that you assumed?

4 A. It was, yes.

5 Q. We can see there that it describes that:

6 "The person undertaking the role of incident officer
7 is responsible for restoring normal operation of service
8 and is in control of operations at the incident site.
9 During a 'major' incident the incident officer will be
10 positioned inside the incident cordon close to the
11 Silvers of the emergency services.

12 "Normally, if an incident has been declared as
13 'major' by the emergency services, the emergency
14 services will impose a cordon at the site of an
15 incident."

16 Was that your understanding of your role on 7 July?

17 A. Pretty much so, yes.

18 Q. Did you assume the role of Silver control, or were you
19 appointed the role?

20 A. I believe I assumed it.

21 Q. You've referred, when you've been asked about contact
22 with the rostered duty officer, who's also known by the
23 initials RDO --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- and you said that you think it was a gentleman called

1 Paul Coote?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We've been looking in your log and also in your
4 statement for references to Paul Coote. I have found in
5 your statement that you gave to the police after the
6 incident a reference to Paul Coote, and I'll read that
7 to you.

8 It seems that this is some time at about 10.00 and,
9 for those looking at the statement, I don't need it on
10 the screen, but the reference is INQ1013-3. You say
11 that you got in contact with the rostered duty officer:
12 "This is a specially trained senior manager who
13 would normally be at Gold level."

14 You say:

15 "I believe this was Paul Coote. He asked me to
16 redirect any London Fire Brigade appliances with us to
17 Aldgate and this is when I first found out the entire
18 London Underground network was shut."

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Are you sure that it was Paul Coote who was the RDO?

21 A. I couldn't be, no, not sitting here today, no.

22 Q. Because we've got some evidence to suggest that, in
23 fact, although the rostered duty officer on the time was
24 Kevin Bootle, he was very new in the post, and so the
25 man who took on the mantle of rostered duty officer was,

1 in fact, Andy Barr.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. And Andy Barr at that time was in a room at Broadway,
4 I think you've told us, and do you know that he was in
5 fact in a room next door to the Network Control Centre?

6 A. I am aware that he's based up there and I am aware of
7 the layout of the rooms in NCC.

8 Q. Paul Coote, at the time, he was performance manager for
9 trains, are you able to confirm that?

10 A. I'm not, but probably, yes.

11 Q. There is also a reference -- I'm not sure whether or not
12 this is a reference to Paul Coote. Could we have your
13 log back up, please? It's INQ10241-5. It's the
14 reference at 09.55. It says:
15 "DSM Glazer contacts 20261 RDU officer."
16 Is that a spelling mistake, or is that not the
17 rostered duty officer?

18 A. I think that's probably a spelling mistake.

19 Q. So do you think that that is, in fact, the reference to
20 the rostered duty officer?

21 A. I believe so, yes.

22 Q. It says:
23 "Updating. Appliances sent down to Aldgate. Told
24 RDU off waiting to go down to platform 2."
25 What does that mean, that entry?

1 A. I think where it says "RDU off", I think that should say
2 "officers" waiting to go down to platform 2, I think --
3 Q. Whose officers would they be, do you know?
4 A. I believe that's possibly referring to the Bomb Squad.
5 Q. Could we go back now in your log to the second page,
6 please, so page 2 of this document? We can see from the
7 level of detail -- I think you said in answer to some
8 questions from Ms Sheff, that it seems likely that you
9 appointed your loggist at around about 9.20, because
10 that's when the entries seem to be fuller and also more
11 frequent after that time.
12 A. Yes, that's probably around about the time.
13 Q. Now, the entry that is said to be at approximately 8.55,
14 so the entry that has probably been written after that
15 time, says:
16 "People on train at Aldgate."
17 So this is after Silver control has been implemented
18 at 09.11.
19 "Supervisor at Aldgate to liaise."
20 Presumably, you meant at that point Celia Harrison?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. It then continues:
23 "Are there any injuries at Aldgate? Is there
24 anybody in [the] tunnel? Need to know if [the] train
25 can move."

1 Is this a summary of the sort of questions that you
2 were asking yourself between 8.55 and 9.20?

3 A. These are the questions that I would have asked
4 Celia Harrison over the phone, as to trying to ascertain
5 what was happening at Aldgate.

6 Q. The entry continues, I think, there's a reference, yes:
7 "Need to know if train can move. Train is between
8 Aldgate and Liverpool Street. Aldgate waiting for
9 medic."

10 Do you know what the source of that information was
11 that Aldgate was waiting for medic? Was that from
12 Celia Harrison?

13 A. I believe so, yes.

14 Q. Because we heard from her yesterday that, at 09.02.33,
15 she'd requested as many ambulances as possible from the
16 NCC. So you think that the information that she was
17 waiting for a medic probably came from her?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. She also told us yesterday that at 09.10 she had
20 received a telephone call from you. Is that the one
21 telephone call that you have a good recollection of?

22 A. I'd have to wait --

23 Q. To help you, Mr Glazer, Mrs Harrison said yesterday that
24 in that telephone call you'd said to her that you were
25 taking Silver control at Liverpool Street and that she

1 should remain in touch with you.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How was she going to remain in touch with you? Did you
4 give her the number of the autotelephone?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was that the autotelephone that was in the control room?

7 A. Yes, most of the telephones are on the desk in the
8 control room. However, there is one which is not on the
9 desk itself, it's in the room as you walk in, where we
10 keep emergency equipment, and that seemed to be the only
11 one that was working where we could phone --

12 Q. So you had -- and you've already told my Lady that you
13 had two telephone lines that you thought were working.
14 One was the autotelephone line, and that's in the
15 control room.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. We're going to hear from Daniel Kemp and he recalls
18 making calls during the course of that morning. So is
19 it likely that it was Daniel Kemp's phone that was
20 working?

21 A. There was definitely a phone on his desk that was
22 working and there was one behind him in this area where
23 we keep emergency equipment that was also working.

24 Q. Then I think you also referred to a phone that could
25 give you contact through to the Metropolitan Line

1 controller.

2 A. I don't recall --

3 Q. Is that a third phone?

4 A. I don't recall if I spoke to them on the dedicated line,
5 which we just pick up straight to the controller, or if
6 it was just a normal autophone, I couldn't tell you
7 which one it was.

8 Q. We've heard a lot in your evidence about your dealings
9 with DCI Lawson from the BTP. DCI Lawson, although he
10 was on his way to work, did he have a radio that would
11 give him contact to the MICC?

12 A. Not so far as I am aware, I believe everything was done
13 via his mobile phone.

14 Q. So he had a mobile phone that was working?

15 A. Well at that point, yes, but shortly afterwards, all
16 mobile phone activity seemed to stop.

17 Q. Yes. Daniel Kemp, who is giving his evidence after you,
18 he says in his statement that it was at about 9.10 you
19 asked him to find out whether traction current was off
20 because the London Fire Brigade wanted to go on to the
21 tracks, and he says that, at that stage, he spoke to the
22 line controller -- so he obviously had a means of doing
23 so -- and the line controller informed him that traction
24 current was off and then Daniel Kemp told you that
25 traction current was off, and did you then give that

1 information to the London Fire Brigade?

2 A. I don't recall my conversation with the Fire Brigade,
3 but all activity at that point was stopped because of
4 DCI Lawson saying there's a possibility of secondary
5 devices.

6 Q. Do you know that if traction current is confirmed as
7 being off, it's not just off at Liverpool Street because
8 of the traction current section; it's, in fact, off from
9 Moorgate through Liverpool Street down to Aldgate?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. We've heard evidence from, as I say, Celia Harrison
12 yesterday. I think you concede that she seems to have
13 a better recollection of the telephone conversations
14 between the two of you.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So to assist you with your memory, her evidence was,
17 yesterday, that some time after 9.13 she telephoned you
18 and told you that they had casualties at Aldgate.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Does that help you at all?

21 A. I just recall the one conversation with her. I can't
22 see -- I can see myself on the phone where I was, but
23 I don't recall any of the others.

24 Q. She also said that some time after 9.18 she called you
25 again and she explained that a member of LUL staff,

1 a Peter Stallibrass, had been on train 204, that there
2 were dead people and he thought it had been caused by
3 a bomb. Do you recollect that telephone conversation
4 with Celia Harrison?

5 A. I don't.

6 Q. You don't. Now, according to your log, the Fire Brigade
7 arrive at about 9.20, and you had a discussion with the
8 Fire Brigade and DCI Lawson about the information you
9 had and what you were going to do and you say that you
10 decided your first priority was to get the train between
11 Liverpool Street and Aldgate detrained. Why did you
12 make that your first priority?

13 A. I don't think I said that my priority was to get it
14 detrained. I think my priority was to go down there to
15 see what we were dealing with, because I hadn't had any
16 information as to exactly what was going on, and we
17 didn't know if any people were stuck on the train and,
18 if so, how many.

19 Q. Going back to your log, could we go forward, please, to
20 the next page, page 3?

21 The writing that's cut off on the left-hand side
22 you've now confirmed to us that that, you think, reads
23 "major incident"?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You were asked some questions about where you got that

1 information from. To assist you, Mr Kemp, in your
2 witness statement to the police, you said that it was
3 DCI Lawson who told you that a major incident had been
4 declared. Does that help with your memory?

5 A. I believe -- I mean, as I said, I believe it would have
6 come from him, because he would have been the only
7 person I would have expected it from.

8 Q. We can see that the log appears to be slightly out of
9 time, or it may be that I'm reading the handwriting
10 incorrectly, but it looks, again, on the left-hand side,
11 about halfway down, there's an entry at 9.25. Is there
12 then another entry underneath that that's at 9.20, or is
13 that 9.26?

14 A. I think it says 9.25, then 9.26, then back to 9.25.

15 Q. At 9.26 it says:

16 "Silver control Aldgate."

17 Do you know what that's a reference to?

18 A. I can only presume that that's the point where
19 Tom O'Riordan arrives at Aldgate and we have
20 confirmation that he's arrived there and assumed the
21 role.

22 Q. You sent Tom O'Riordan, who is, in fact, your superior,
23 the group station manager, to Aldgate, with other
24 members of staff. Can you recall how many members of
25 staff there were and their names? Don't worry,

1 Mr Glazer, we'll get that information, I'm sure, from
2 Mr O'Riordan.

3 A. I know of Gresh, I can't think of his surname, he
4 definitely went along with. I think there was at least
5 three of them that went down with him.

6 Q. Could we go forward just one more page, please, to
7 page 4? 9.37, this is the first note of a Silver
8 control meeting.

9 Now, who would have been the other Silvers that you
10 would have been meeting at that point?

11 A. From what I can remember, DCI Lawson, the -- I think the
12 Fire Brigade Silver was there at that point as well.

13 There was also an officer who I believe was from British
14 Transport Police because they had some communications
15 set up in the van and he was manning the communications
16 side of things.

17 Q. I was going to ask you about what communications were
18 available to you from the other Silvers. You've already
19 told us about DCI Lawson. What communications did the
20 LFB have at that stage?

21 A. I couldn't tell you, to be honest.

22 Q. But you can tell us that there was some sort of van that
23 was set up with BT communication by then?

24 A. Yes, it was around about that time where we lost our
25 mobile phones as well, or prior -- just prior to then,

1 I believe.

2 Q. Finally, you were asked about the emergency response
3 units and we can see that there is an entry on this page
4 at 9.42 in relation to the Emergency Response Unit and
5 that says that four staff were on-site and you sent them
6 to Aldgate.

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Glazer. I don't have any further
9 questions.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Glazer, DCI Lawson was under the
11 impression that there was a bomb on a train at
12 Liverpool Street. Yes?

13 A. At some stage, yes.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, he obviously was because he
15 sent for the Bomb Disposal Unit.

16 A. Well, he was concerned that there may be a device, yes.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do we know where he got that
18 impression from?

19 A. I don't know. I assumed it was from a telephone
20 conversation he had had on his mobile phone. He'd had
21 several conversations where he walked away.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anyway, he'd told you that he wanted
23 the station evacuated because he had been led to believe
24 there might be a bomb, another bomb?

25 A. He said they were unaware -- if there was the

1 possibility of a secondary device, and that he wanted
2 the mainline station to be evacuated and for all of us
3 to pull back.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So are we talking about a bomb on the
5 same train stuck between Aldgate and Liverpool Street?

6 A. No, he was -- I think his primary concern was a train
7 that had been detrained at our platform heading
8 westbound. I think that was his main concern, to have
9 that checked by the Bomb Squad to make sure that the
10 station environment, including that train, were safe.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Were there communications in place
12 that would have enabled you to tell DCI Lawson that in
13 fact London Underground staff had got on to the train or
14 got into the tunnel onto the train from the Aldgate end
15 and they were busy clearing the train?

16 A. I believe that the autophone was available, but the lack
17 of information coming through from Aldgate was there,
18 but the autophone was there.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So DCI Lawson was never told that in
20 fact there are people from London Underground on the
21 train from the other end?

22 A. Well, I wasn't aware that there were people on the train
23 at the other end.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Taylor, any questions?

25 MR TAYLOR: No, thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Glazer?
2 Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr Glazer.
3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I just announce one change to the
4 advertised schedule for this afternoon, which is that
5 Mr Cotton is unable to be here but will instead be
6 available on Friday. But any gap that he may have left
7 I'm afraid will be taken up by Mr Kemp who was due to be
8 called this morning.
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. 2.15, please.
10 (1.15 pm)
11 (The short adjournment)
12
13