

1 (2.00 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I raise three matters very briefly,
4 two of which are administrative?

5 The first matter concerns an application for an
6 additional person to be designated as an interested
7 person. An application has been made on behalf of
8 Richard Gray's mother to play her part in these
9 proceedings as an interested person. She has, of
10 course, an automatic right under rule 20(2) of the
11 Coroners Rules, but may I simply for the record, and for
12 the benefit of the other interested persons, state that
13 my Lady has granted that application.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly, and just to explain why it
15 is that Mrs Gray has only recently asked for this, it's
16 because I think, before, Mr Gray's widow was going to
17 act as the interested person, but she is not very well,
18 so Richard Gray's mother has decided to take over the
19 mantle.

20 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

22 MR KEITH: The two administrative matters just concern:
23 firstly, we've prepared an amended time line for Aldgate
24 which now incorporates an additional piece of
25 information. It's the information that I referred to in

1 the course of the opening: namely, a phone call at
2 08.55.57 between the NCC and the BTP. Hard copies are
3 available, but it will be uploaded into Lextranet very
4 shortly indeed.

5 The second matter is that there are copies of the
6 additional authorities to which reference will be made
7 in the skeleton argument prepared by Mr Hay and
8 Mr O'Connor and myself for the purposes of Thursday's
9 argument, and that bundle is in court, if anybody hasn't
10 yet received it.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

12 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you please to call
13 Celia Harrison?

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

15 MRS CELIA ELIZABETH HARRISON (affirmed)

16 Questions by MR KEITH

17 MR KEITH: Good afternoon.

18 A. Hello.

19 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?

20 A. Celia Elizabeth Harrison.

21 Q. It's quite hard to hear witnesses sometimes in this
22 court. The microphone in front of you won't amplify
23 your voice, I would be very grateful if you could try to
24 keep your voice as loud as you possibly can, so that we
25 can all hear you.

1 A. Okay, I'll try.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 A. Please remind me.

4 Q. Of course I will, but I'm sure I won't need to.

5 In July of 2005, you were one of the station

6 supervisors at Aldgate Underground station?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. I think at that time your duty commenced at around about

9 7.00 in the morning, but that day, 7 July, you had

10 arrived much earlier, around 6.00.

11 A. Yes, I tended to be early for duties.

12 Q. Could you, by reference to [INQ10280-3], tell us where the

13 supervisor's office is at Aldgate, if you can see it on

14 that plan?

15 A. You can see the window of the supervisor's office. If

16 you look at the ticket office, to the right of that

17 there's some windows, and that comprised the

18 supervisor's office and mess room.

19 Q. Is the entrance to that station supervisor's office from

20 the foyer where the ticket office is?

21 A. You can see some gates there.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. So it's on the side of the gates closest to us and you

24 turn right down a very short passageway.

25 Q. There's a little alleyway or passageway, isn't there?

1 A. That's right, a small passageway.

2 Q. So the entrance to the supervisor's office is within the
3 station on the station side of the ticket barriers?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. In essence, what was, in 2005, the role of the station
6 supervisor, what was your job?

7 A. We had two supervisors on duty. I was the supervisor in
8 charge, so that would comprise things like station
9 checks, managing the staff, checking that the train
10 service is working correctly, passing out information.

11 That's a short example. Do you need more than that?

12 Q. What was the distinction between your job and that of
13 the other station supervisor, your --

14 A. My colleague, Tony Counihan.

15 Q. Mr Counihan?

16 A. His job was what we call "stepping back". So, because
17 Aldgate is a termination point for the
18 Metropolitan Line, during the peak hours, when we want
19 to speed up the service, we have extra train drivers on
20 duty and, when one train comes in, the driver from the
21 previous train is waiting at the front to take it out
22 quickly.

23 So the purpose of the supervisor is to manage that
24 process to ensure that the trains are picked up by the
25 correct drivers and moved off quickly and on time, and

1 reform the service if there's a problem.

2 Q. Therefore, on that morning, as part of his job as being
3 in charge of the "step back", was Mr Counihan confined
4 to a -- I think there's a small box on the platform, is
5 there not, when certainly at that stage the station
6 supervisor responsible for stepping back --

7 A. Not necessarily --

8 Q. -- would be there?

9 A. -- confined, but that's a good location. It has
10 a telephone where you can speak to the signal operator,
11 and you can speak to the drivers as they come in,
12 because that's the end where they drive into, and -- but
13 if you need to go and speak to a driver to say, "Your
14 train has changed number", or something like that, you
15 are able to move away from there.

16 Q. If we could look at the next page, page 4, please [INQ10280-4], of
17 that exhibit, and the top left-hand corner of that page,
18 you'll no doubt immediately recognise that that's
19 Aldgate station and you can see the two platforms.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. With two platform numbers, of course, one on either side
22 of the platform, 4, 3, 2 and 1.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If you look right at the top corner, to the end of the
25 platforms, can you just tell us where the step back box

1 is?

2 A. I believe it's at the end of -- I can't recall, I'm
3 sorry, I'm having a blank moment. I think it's at the
4 end of platform 3 and 4, but --

5 Q. Don't worry, we'll hear from Mr Counihan in a moment.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. There does appear to be some sort of notation on the
8 plan that might indicate some telephone point or a box
9 there.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You, however, that morning were in your supervisor's
12 office?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you, around about 8.50, hear a muffled but very
15 powerful thud or noise?

16 A. Yes, more than muffled. It was quite something.

17 Q. Can you just describe for us, please, what the effect of
18 it was on the station, as far as you were concerned in
19 the supervisor's office?

20 A. Well, there was this noise that we have described as
21 "muffled" because it came from underground, and it was
22 quite clear it was underground. The whole station shook
23 and we lost all electrical power. So when I looked up,
24 my computer had gone off, which I had my information
25 about where trains were and everything on. The lights

1 had gone off, and I looked at the fire control panel and
2 that had gone off as well.

3 It seemed to me that I had lost all electrical power
4 to everything.

5 Q. Did one of your colleagues come running into the room?

6 A. Yes, one of my staff, Steve Winning, came --

7 Q. Was he one of your station assistants?

8 A. That's right, he's a station assistant. He came in and
9 said, "What was that?" or "what on earth was that?",
10 something in that nature and I said, "I have no idea".

11 I think at that point Tony radioed up, then or very soon
12 after, and said that something had happened ahead of the
13 train that had just started to leave the platform.

14 Q. All right, I'm going to pause you there, if I may. Just
15 going back to who else might have been on the station,
16 you described the presence of Mr Counihan and --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- he comes on the radio in a moment. You've made
19 a reference to Mr Steve Winning.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you have a number of other staff, a Mr Basil Smith,
22 who happened not to be there that morning because he was
23 elsewhere doing --

24 A. He had been there earlier.

25 Q. But he wasn't there at that time?

1 A. Part of his duty was to take the internal mail around
2 the group and he was off the station doing that at that
3 time.

4 Q. Did you have two other members of staff?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. So that we can recognise them when we hear of them
7 subsequently, a Mr John Parrish and a Mr Peter Large?

8 A. That's right, they're both ticket office staff.

9 Q. So Mr Counihan came on the radio. Tell us something,
10 please, of what radios were available to you, as the
11 station supervisor, and what radio did he come in on
12 over?

13 A. Well, we had quite old-fashioned, handheld radios -- I'm
14 afraid I don't know the model -- and he spoke to me just
15 over the radio which I had a base point for, so I was
16 not speaking on a radio, I was speaking on a base unit.

17 Q. The base unit is in the station supervisor's office?

18 A. That's right, yes.

19 Q. How many people had a handheld radio that connected to
20 your base point, do you recall?

21 A. Issued out at that point, Steve Winning had one and Tony
22 had one, and I had about another five or six within the
23 office to hand out to staff as and when.

24 Q. We take it, therefore, that that radio neither connects
25 you to the Network Control Centre or to any driver who

1 might be passing through the station?

2 A. No, the systems were not connected at all.

3 Q. When Mr Counihan came on the radio, did he tell you that
4 he could see something ahead of the train that was at
5 platform 2?

6 A. No, they couldn't see anything because of the smoke that
7 was -- or dust, as we found out later, that was coming
8 out of it. One of the -- as Tony was speaking to us,
9 Steve and I walked out of the ticket office and stood on
10 what we called the bridge looking down over the station,
11 and we could see a train had started to pull out and
12 there were clouds of smoke and dust coming -- pouring
13 out from the tunnel and out through the open part of the
14 roof.

15 Q. If you could look, please, at [INQ10280-3], we can see
16 there a schematic diagram which shows the bridge, the
17 mezzanine level that we've called it.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Just to run through the platforms, there was a train
20 still fully in platform 3, was there not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And a train, to which you've just made reference, which
23 was just about or had just pulled out or started pulling
24 out of platform 2?

25 A. I think it was about one car's length out, I believe.

1 Q. Out of platform 2?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Is that the train 447 to which you've just made
4 reference?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. So his information was that there was something had
7 happened, but there was smoke coming out of the tunnel
8 which we -- would be to the left of this plan?
9 A. Yes, sorry, I'm just trying to think. I know that when
10 I was standing with my back to the gates looking down
11 towards this with platform 2 on my right and platform 3
12 on my left, that the smoke was -- it appeared to be
13 coming from ahead of both 2 and 3. It was a large
14 amount of smoke.
15 Q. Of course, inside the tunnel section, to the north of
16 Aldgate, all the tracks converge, do they not?
17 A. Sort of, yes.
18 Q. Right, I might not have used the right technical
19 expression there.
20 A. They go in the same direction, but another track comes
21 in from another direction and joins it going towards
22 Liverpool Street.
23 Q. Yes. Was a decision made that the station should be
24 evacuated?
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. Because it was quite clear that we were not going to be
3 running any kind of service and that --

4 Q. Because of the smoke?

5 A. Yes, because of the smoke, because of the vibration and
6 because of the loss of power, and it was quite obvious
7 as well that something bad had happened, and so the
8 first thing is to clear the station of customers in case
9 there's danger of any kind.

10 Q. Did you take part in the evacuation of the station
11 yourself?

12 A. No. Steve Winning, and I think Tony as well, carried
13 out the evacuation, and I actually went back into the
14 office to phone people.

15 Q. Did you go back into the office to phone, as we now will
16 hear, the NCC, the Network Control Centre?

17 A. I think they were actually not the first phone call
18 I made but maybe the second. I tried to -- I know that
19 I --

20 Q. Who may you have called first?

21 A. Actually, no, I did call them first. I'm sorry, I'm
22 just trying to recall which order, yes.

23 Q. Is it possible, as we'll hear in a moment, that you
24 thought you wished to speak to the line controller but
25 ended up calling the NCC directly?

1 A. No, I remember afterwards thinking I should have called
2 the line controller and I didn't. I called NCC because
3 I wanted the emergency services and we request emergency
4 services via NCC.

5 Q. Pause there, then. Could we please play -- because we
6 don't have a transcript, and so I'm going to ask you to
7 listen to your own call. TFL118, please.

8 (Audio played)

9 You actually say there, "I'm sorry, I've dialled the
10 wrong number". You ended up speaking to the Network
11 Control Centre, perhaps instead of the line controller.

12 A. No, no, I did intend to call NCC, but they have a whole
13 range of numbers, depending on who you want to speak to.
14 So they have a duty manager and they have information
15 people and taxis and a whole different range of people
16 and I had actually dialled the information number as
17 opposed to the manager who I should have been calling.

18 Q. But lest there be any doubt, it didn't matter, did it,
19 because you'd spoken to the Network Control Centre?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. They are the people who are in a position to speak
22 directly to the emergency services, if they wish to?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. You asked for the emergency services?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you recall whether, when you asked them to call the
2 emergency services, you had a particular emergency
3 service in mind?

4 A. I think I wanted all of them.

5 Q. You wanted all of them?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. All right. You were saying --

8 A. I --

9 Q. Sorry, please continue.

10 A. I remember at the time, when he asked that question
11 about, was I aware of any injuries, sort of not wanting
12 to sound like I was panicking or anything like that, but
13 very clear that we probably would need ambulances, even
14 as a precaution.

15 Q. At that stage, there was no suggestion of passengers
16 having appeared from the tunnel?

17 A. No, there was none, which was why I said not -- I was
18 not aware of anything at that time.

19 Q. You referred to, in the course of the call, "They say
20 something has exploded". I'm wondering who it was you
21 had in mind when you refer to "they"?

22 A. That was Tony Counihan and he was speaking with some
23 train operators, I believe that was Mark Williams and
24 some others, and when I came out to stand on the bridge,
25 I could see Tony with at least one other driver.

1 Q. Down on the platform?

2 A. Down on the platform, at the front of the train that was
3 part of the way out, trying to look ahead and see
4 something and they said -- Tony said over the radio he
5 had passed that information, that something had happened
6 ahead of that train and they didn't know what.

7 Q. Was there a possibility that somebody could have gone
8 down into the tunnel and along the track to see what
9 exactly had happened before you called the NCC or did
10 you think that it was sufficiently important that you
11 call them straightaway and then send someone to check?

12 A. Yes, that was it. It was clear that, no matter what had
13 happened down there, we needed emergency services.

14 Q. We know that the NCC then called the British Transport
15 Police.

16 A. Mm-hmm.

17 Q. They referred to your call and they asked the BTP
18 whether they were aware of any information, because they
19 wanted to know what sort of emergency service might be
20 required, and so they were trying to find out more
21 information.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. You wouldn't have been aware of that, but did you then
24 receive a call from the Metropolitan Line duty
25 operations manager?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What did he want to know?

3 A. Can I refer to my statement, because I know I said
4 something in there about that and I can't think of what
5 it is.

6 Q. Subject to my Lady's direction, you may, provided that
7 your statement was made at a time when these events were
8 still fresh in your mind.

9 A. Yes, they were.

10 Q. It was November 2005.

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. Could you still recall clearly then these events when
13 you made that statement?

14 A. Yes, I made a point of keeping it all in my mind until
15 I had made that statement.

16 Q. All right. Well, if I can help you, you do refer in
17 your statement to the fact that the Metropolitan Line
18 operations manager called in and wanted to know whether
19 there were any trains in the tunnel?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You told him you had no trackernet because the power was
22 down and, therefore, you couldn't tell.

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. Did you ask him -- were you surprised that, as the
25 operations manager, he didn't know whether there were

1 any trains in the tunnel, or did that seem to you to be
2 consistent with a loss of power and the loss of
3 trackernet?

4 A. I assumed that, if he was asking me, he couldn't tell
5 from trackernet, for whatever reason that was, whether
6 it was power loss or something else, and that he
7 wouldn't be asking me if he knew.

8 Q. At around this time, did some plainclothes British
9 Transport Police officers run into the station?

10 A. It may even have been a little before that.

11 Q. We know that there is a British Transport Police office
12 just on the outside of Aldgate station --

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 Q. -- and the entrance is on the street.

15 A. They were there very soon.

16 Q. You refer in your statement to one with green shorts --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- carrying a radio. We've been at pains to try to
19 discover who that person is. I don't suppose you know
20 which of the BTP officers that was?

21 A. I never got his name, I'm afraid.

22 Q. You didn't get his name?

23 A. No, I just have a very strong image in my mind of him
24 standing sort of almost directly in front of my office,
25 sort of talking on a radio.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Looking at timings, Ms Harrison, it
2 seems as if you mentioned BTP on the message -- the
3 audio we've just heard?

4 A. That's right, I did, didn't I? Yes.

5 MR KEITH: Did you also receive a call from the duty manager
6 trains, DMT?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. Do you recall anything about that conversation?

9 A. Yes, she said that train 204 had customers detraining
10 themselves on to the track, that they needed assistance
11 immediately and she confirmed that traction current was
12 off.

13 Q. Where is the duty manager trains located?

14 A. I believe she said she was from Edgware Road. I don't
15 know if that's where she was at that time, but that was
16 her home location.

17 Q. You hadn't spoken to her prior to that?

18 A. No. I believe that Tim Batkin had called her and she
19 was calling me as a result of that phone call.

20 Q. Precisely. We heard from Mr Batkin this morning that he
21 called duty manager trains at Edgware and told the duty
22 manager of what had occurred in the tunnel.

23 They confirmed the traction current was off. Were
24 you able to provide any further information to them as
25 to what had happened in the tunnel?

1 A. She didn't ask for any and I didn't give any, because
2 being told that people are detaining themselves is very
3 serious. It seemed to me that what we needed to do was
4 assist as soon as we could.

5 Q. There then came a time, didn't there, when you decided
6 to call the NCC again --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- because customers had started appearing?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. There was obviously still thick smoke in the tunnel
11 area?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can we have that call, please, TFL147?

14 (Audio played)

15 There you make express reference to Fire Brigade
16 being necessary.

17 A. Yes, mm-hmm.

18 Q. There is a piece of evidence from a firefighter called
19 Mr Edwards, who we'll see in due course, but he makes
20 a note of speaking to a station supervisor around about
21 9.00 and of being told by that station supervisor that
22 there may have been a bomb?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So may I ask you this: do you recall --

25 A. That wasn't me, no.

1 Q. That wasn't you?

2 A. No.

3 Q. By 9.00, after the second NCC call, did you have any
4 inkling as to what may have occurred in the tunnel?

5 A. From the first time it happened, you know, as soon as it
6 happened and I saw the smoke, I thought it was possible
7 that it was a bomb. I remember the exact words were --
8 that I had in my head, was that "I've never heard a bomb
9 or seen a bomb or been near a bomb, but that's exactly
10 how I would imagine it would be".

11 Q. You didn't, though, I think, pass on that thought to the
12 NCC?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Was that not something that they might have found
15 relevant because they are presumably the people who have
16 to decide how the system is going to respond and how the
17 emergency services are going to be called?

18 A. I didn't want to panic the situation, was the way I was
19 thinking about it, just like, when there's a fire, you
20 don't run around shouting "Fire!" because it makes
21 people panic. I tried to give them as much specific
22 information as I could, rather than speculating and
23 making them think that it was a panic reaction.

24 Q. In your statement, you then describe how you saw a man
25 in a white checked shirt walking along the platform.

1 A. That's right, the first customer off.

2 Q. The first customer came off, completely covered in
3 soot --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- and dirt and smoke, and did that then prompt you to
6 call the NCC for a third time?

7 A. Yes, it did.

8 Q. Could we please have TFL167?

9 (Audio played)

10 Do you recall who it was -- you made a reference to
11 "police" there -- that asked you to call for as many
12 ambulances as you --

13 A. No, I'm afraid I don't recall.

14 Q. All right. You didn't mention there your suspicion that
15 there may have been a bomb. You relayed the facts, as
16 you've told us, as you saw them to be?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But did you send one of your colleagues, who had arrived
19 from another station, a Mr Olanayi Falayi, down to the
20 platform?

21 A. Ola Falayi, was a member of staff who had a supervisor
22 licence who was on his way to work at Moorgate, and he
23 arrived in and offered to help.

24 Q. He turned up on foot at the main entrance to Aldgate?

25 A. That's right, yes.

1 Q. Did you ask him to go down to the platform?

2 A. I don't recall -- I think he asked if he should go down
3 and help and, at that point, the drivers had already
4 begun to go on to the track to help out, so he wasn't
5 the first person down, but -- yes, I accepted his offer
6 of help.

7 Q. Did you give him one of your radios?

8 A. I did, yes.

9 Q. He went down to the platform and he contacted you on his
10 radio, didn't he?

11 A. That's right, he did. I think he was not on the
12 platform; he was on the track when he made that call
13 that you're referring to.

14 Q. He was, sorry, on the platform, not on the track?

15 A. No, he was on the track.

16 Q. He was on the track. So did the station radio work,
17 then, from the track, from inside the tunnel?

18 A. Yes, which was a surprise.

19 Q. Why?

20 A. Because the station radios were sort of -- kind of tuned
21 to work in -- within that station, and it's very hit and
22 miss about how far back it extends outside.

23 Q. Could you look, please, at [INQ9753-3]?

24 Do you recognise that handwriting?

25 A. Yes, that's my handwriting.

1 Q. You made notes of the calls that you received and the
2 most relevant pieces of information that you received
3 over the course of that hour or so.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You've made a note, 09.13, we think it's "ambulance onto
6 track"?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 Q. "People dying"?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was that a reference to a call that you received from
11 your colleague, Mr Falayi from the track?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. What was it that he was telling you on the radio to
14 which you made reference there in your note?

15 A. He said, "I need paramedics down here now, there are
16 people dying".

17 Q. Do we take it, therefore, that by 9.13, 20 minutes or so
18 afterwards, after the explosion, there had not yet been
19 any paramedics or medical technicians in the station?

20 A. I don't believe so. I can't recall exactly. They
21 certainly weren't down on the track.

22 Q. After he called you on the radio to say, "People are
23 dying, you've got to get paramedics down into the
24 tunnel", what did you do?

25 A. The policeman I described, the one in the shorts, I went

1 out and spoke to him, because he was quite clearly
2 a focal point, and asked him to please ensure that some
3 paramedics got on to the track because there were people
4 dying.

5 Q. You'd called the NCC three times by this stage. Did it
6 occur to you to call the NCC a fourth time and say,
7 "Right, we've now heard from somebody inside the tunnel
8 there are people dying. He says we've got to get
9 paramedics down there. That's what I want to tell you"?

10 A. I don't recall, I don't think so.

11 Q. Could we have a look at TFL568-12?

12 That is a TfL manual, Ms Harrison, which contains
13 a very short description of the roles and the functions
14 of each of the personnel concerned with the
15 London Underground, and we can see there, "service
16 control managers", if you could scroll back out, I'm
17 hoping that there will be -- I may not have the right
18 page. Could we go to page 16 [TFL568-16]? "Station supervisors",
19 at the bottom of the page "Station supervisors":
20 "Are responsible for ..."

21 Then there is a description of a number of
22 functions. Do you recall this document or the import of
23 this document, ever, when you were a station supervisor?

24 A. I had not read the -- I can see that it's from the LUL
25 railway Safety Case. I had not read it, it was

1 a massive document. However, my training should have
2 covered all aspects within that document.

3 Q. Right. The reason that I ask is that you'll see the
4 bottom bullet point for station supervisors:

5 "Coordinating the local response to emergency
6 situations ..."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I'd like to ask you, if I may, whether you feel that
9 speaking to the police officer in the way that you did
10 was the appropriate response to receiving a call for
11 help from your colleague in the track to that specific
12 effect that "We need paramedics down here"?

13 A. I felt that it was at that time, because he was
14 a policeman and the police can take over charge of your
15 station as a supervisor if they believe the situation
16 warrants it, and because I perceived him as being
17 somebody who people were talking to, I felt that he
18 would be the best person to arrange that.

19 Q. He was in plainclothes?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did he have any kind of tabard to indicate that he was
22 officially or formally --

23 A. No.

24 Q. -- a Silver response?

25 A. No, there was no Silver on-site at that point.

1 Q. Did you catch his name or ever get his name?

2 A. No, I'm afraid not.

3 Q. If I said to you Mr Burnell, would that ring any bells?

4 A. No, because I know I didn't ask his name.

5 Q. Did he tell you that he would pass on the message to the
6 emergency services and specifically the London Ambulance
7 Service?

8 A. I can't remember what his response was. He did make
9 a response, but I don't recall what that was. I do know
10 that a short while afterwards I had a radio call,
11 I believe from Tony, wanting to confirm that traction
12 current was off before the paramedics could go on the
13 track.

14 Q. Do you know who that person was other than your
15 recollection of his first name?

16 A. Tony Counihan.

17 Q. It was Tony Counihan?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. He was still down on the track?

20 A. He was on the platform, yes.

21 Q. He asked you to confirm that the current was off?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you see the paramedics arrive?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Did there come a time when you became aware that there

1 were paramedics in the station area or going down to the
2 track?

3 A. There were an awful lot of emergency service personnel
4 in different uniforms. The first time that I distinctly
5 recall seeing people from the LAS was actually when we
6 were evacuated from the station and there were ranks of
7 them outside dealing with injuries.

8 Q. In your notes to which I've already made reference,
9 [INQ9753-4], you made an entry at 09.18 in relation to
10 somebody called Peter Stallibrass.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "Pretty sure bomb - dead people."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Who was he?

15 A. Peter Stallibrass was a member of staff. He works
16 for -- well, we call it S&SD, Strategy and Service
17 Development, based at 55 Broadway. He was actually on
18 train 204 and, when he came off the train, he came
19 straight to the supervisor's office.

20 Q. Was that the first time that somebody who had directly
21 seen the aftermath of what had occurred in the tunnel
22 had told you face-to-face, "I'm pretty sure there was
23 a bomb"?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did you call the NCC to say you'd received firsthand

1 information that there was a bomb?

2 A. Actually, no, I called my duty manager who had taken --

3 Q. You called your duty manager?

4 A. Who had taken Silver control at Liverpool Street.

5 Darren Glazer.

6 Q. Darren Glazer?

7 A. He had already told me that he was liaising directly

8 with the police, so he was the person I told.

9 Q. On the same page, at 09.20, I'm not quite sure what the

10 right-hand word is, perhaps you could help us with the

11 word next to 09.20?

12 A. "Conf", confirmed.

13 Q. Confirmed?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. "... traction current off for ambulance service going on

16 track."

17 A. For emergency services going on track.

18 Q. For emergency services going on track. Do you think

19 that is a reference to the request that was made to you

20 to confirm that the traction current was off?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So may we take it, then, that the first request to you

23 for that confirmation was at 09.20?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Does it therefore follow that no one had -- certainly

1 no one from the emergency services had ventured on to
2 the track before 09.20?

3 A. I don't think that's correct, because the staff had
4 already had it confirmed and I believe that they passed
5 that confirmation on.

6 Q. You mean your staff?

7 A. Yes, my staff.

8 Q. So who was asking? If the emergency services are
9 already going down there, who was asking for
10 confirmation?

11 A. As I recall it, it was the London Ambulance Service were
12 making that request.

13 Q. But you think that certain members of the emergency
14 services may already have gone down to the track
15 notwithstanding the absence of official confirmation
16 through you?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Then I think your general station manager, Tom O'Riordan
19 arrived?

20 A. Tom O'Riordan.

21 Q. Tom O'Riordan arrived. Can you recall when that was?

22 A. Again, it's in my statement, which I believe is in my
23 notes as well. I think it was around 9.25 -- 9.30-ish,
24 somewhere around there.

25 Q. If you go to the next page, [INQ9753-6]. It's a bit

1 difficult to read, does that assist you? That's the
2 entry for 9.30. Or the following page, [INQ9753-7]? If
3 we could go back, please, to that first page.
4 A. No, before that.
5 Q. "GSM", group station manager, "T", Tom?
6 A. "[Tom], Silver".
7 Q. "Ops room"?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did he arrive then around about 9.30, assuming that he
10 arrived between then and the next note, which is 9.40?
11 A. Yes, I think we can assume that, and the list of staff
12 above that are the ones that actually arrived with him
13 because he brought staff from Liverpool Street.
14 Q. At 09.40, the following page, did you speak to
15 Mr Batkin, the driver of the train 204?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You asked him, no doubt, what had happened?
18 A. Yes, those notes were taken because he had arrived and
19 Tom O'Riordan asked me to take some details of what had
20 happened. So Tim and I sat there and he told me, and
21 those were just my quick notes that I took of his
22 description of events.
23 Q. Then finally in your statement you refer to the fact
24 that the station was evacuated:
25 "... around 09.45 we were instructed by the police

1 to evacuate the station because it was suspected there
2 was a secondary device."

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. May I ask you this: at the time that the police
5 instructed you to leave the station, had all the walking
6 wounded been brought off the train?

7 A. I don't believe so.

8 Q. Why do you say that? Do you recall people coming out of
9 the train and up on to the station after that time?

10 A. It didn't happen instantly that everybody just left.

11 They came in and said, "We want you to evacuate. We
12 believe there may be a secondary device, you need to
13 leave", but there were certain things that had also
14 happened. We'd been made aware that there was another
15 train that was stalled in a tunnel between us and
16 Aldgate East with lots of customers on, and obviously
17 there were lots of people still moving around.

18 Tom had asked me -- sorry, Tom O'Riordan had asked
19 me to -- around that time, to find out who the other
20 Silver controls were with the other emergency services,
21 so I left the office and my impression was that there
22 were still people coming up from the platform level.

23 Q. Was it also your impression that this wasn't a case of
24 the emergency services suddenly all leaving the train
25 because an evacuation had been called for?

1 A. No.

2 Q. There were still personnel down in the tunnel assisting
3 those who needed help?

4 A. Yes, they were definitely people still down there. How
5 many were customers and how many were personnel is what
6 I'm not clear on.

7 Q. May I lastly ask you, please, about first aid equipment
8 and medical equipment.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [TFL41-2]? This is
11 a document accurately, I expect, entitled "Emergency
12 equipment on stations". You can see there "First aid
13 equipment":

14 "A first aid box [paragraph 3.2] must be kept in the
15 station supervisor's office and be readily available at
16 all times."

17 Can you recall anything about the first aid box or
18 any other medical equipment that was kept in the station
19 supervisor's office when you were there?

20 A. Yes. We had a first aid box which was fully -- was
21 full, as per the list of what should be in there.

22 We also had -- it was like a filing cabinet drawer
23 that was full of reserve equipment, so extra bandages
24 and things like that, both of those were made available.

25 Q. It may be you will be asked in a moment about what the

1 contents were of the first aid box and what else was in
2 the office. Can you recall, yourself, how extensive
3 that equipment was? What sort of first aid equipment
4 are we talking about?

5 A. Well, it's a small box about this sort of size and about
6 that kind of thickness, that divides into two.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I couldn't see.

8 A. I'm sorry.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's not your fault.

10 A. About that sort of size, length, about that wide.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

12 A. About the same height again. As I recall, the list
13 being things like, I think, 10 to 20 Medi-wipes,
14 a packet of plasters, rubber gloves, I think about --
15 usually we had about five pairs. Maybe four small
16 bandages, four medium-sized bandages, two large
17 bandages. It's in that order of --

18 MR KEITH: As the station supervisor, do you recall ever
19 having to use that first aid box for minor incidents
20 that occurred in the Aldgate station?

21 A. Not at that location, but at other locations I've used
22 our standard first aid medical box, yes.

23 Q. Was it your understanding that that first aid box was to
24 be used for minor incidents, maybe one or two persons
25 falling over and hurting themselves or some minor

1 incident on the part of staff, or for a major incident
2 involving a train?

3 A. It was not adequate for a major incident. It was
4 designed for first aid at work, which is usually for
5 employees. However, we would never say to a customer
6 "We won't help you". We use it for whatever we need to
7 use it for, but it's not designed for a major incident.
8 Sorry, are you aiming at something else?

9 Q. That's precisely the question. The Underground system
10 designed as it is to deal with trains carrying many
11 hundreds of passengers --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- is plainly going to require much more extensive
14 medical equipment in the event of an emergency in
15 a tunnel.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Because an emergency will concern a train --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- with more than just a handful of passengers on it.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you recall what you would do, as a station
22 supervisor, in the event of an incident or emergency
23 involving a train, if you needed more medical supplies
24 than that provided for in this first aid box?

25 A. I don't recall that we had anything in place. I believe

1 that one of the reasons we call the London Ambulance
2 Service is to provide medical care. The First Aid at
3 Work members of staff are there for employees and if we
4 help customers, that's something we like to do, but it's
5 not the purpose of the First Aid at Work.

6 Q. Did you get out the first aid box in that morning to
7 assist with the -- to help with the medical treatment of
8 the passengers coming up from the platform?

9 A. Yes, we gave everything we had.

10 Q. How long did it take to run out?

11 A. We didn't run out. What happened was somebody took the
12 first aid box, I gave that very, very early on, then
13 somebody else came in later and said, "We need more",
14 and I pulled open the drawer that had our reserve stuff
15 in for replenishing our first aid box, which was quite
16 generous, and that didn't get used up, but it may be
17 that it didn't get used up because not enough people
18 were aware that it was there rather than being in a box
19 that could be carried away.

20 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there? There
21 may be some further questions for you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just before you do, how large is this
23 first aid box? We've seen them in a chemist's shop.

24 Are we talking about the kind of size we might buy for
25 domestic use, or are we talking about something bigger?

1 A. No, no, it's bigger than for domestic use. They're
2 usually quite small. This is -- sorry, a gesture like
3 that, it's sort of 10 to 12 inches long, about 4 inches
4 deep, 8 or 9 inches high, in my estimate. So it has
5 enough to deal with sort of what might be one or two
6 people at work and then need replenishing.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Yes,
8 Mr Coltart?

9 Questions by MR COLTART

10 MR COLTART: Just two short topics.

11 Firstly, can I ask this: were there any stretchers?

12 Did you have any stretchers at the Underground station?

13 A. Yes, we did.

14 Q. How many did you have?

15 A. I don't recall. There was at least one. I don't know
16 if there was more than one.

17 Q. Was that also made available that morning?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. The first of my two topics, CCTV. Was there
20 a bank of monitors in your office, in the supervisor's
21 office?

22 A. Yes, behind me. If you imagine that the desk is there,
23 there was a computer there with telephones on and radios
24 on the side. So slightly behind me, to my right, were
25 the CCTV and the video recorders.

1 Q. Did the operation of the CCTV cameras survive the
2 explosion or did they go out with the computers?

3 A. I have to say I've asked myself that question and
4 I don't recall. I think when I checked the electrical
5 equipment -- I would be guessing. I can't recall.

6 Q. Not to worry. Let's just proceed for a minute or two on
7 the assumption that they did survive.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I'm just trying to get a handle on whether there would
10 have been any footage of the entrance to the tunnel
11 where you could see the smoke billowing out. Was there
12 a camera that covered that part of the station?

13 A. There may have been. The way it worked was we actually
14 didn't have -- we had two screens but a lot more
15 cameras, so you could move around whichever camera you
16 were using to be displayed on that screen, but I didn't
17 use that because I could get much better vision by going
18 outside the office and looking.

19 Q. Absolutely. I don't want us to be at cross-purposes.
20 I'm not suggesting that you should have been glued to
21 a monitor when could you see it at first-hand. But so
22 that you know where we're going with this line of
23 questioning, we're spending a lot of time at the moment
24 trying to recreate times at which people might have gone
25 into the tunnel or come out of the tunnel. I'm trying

1 to work out whether there was any CCTV footage which
2 might have shown that for us.

3 A. There may well have been. BTP took all the tapes away.
4 I have not viewed them. All I can say is there may well
5 have been.

6 Q. You obviously had the ability to look at the footage
7 from any one particular camera at any given moment in
8 time.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But did that stop the footage running on the other
11 cameras or did they continue to roll in any event?

12 A. No, just because you were viewing on one camera didn't
13 stop it from recording all the cameras, and I believe it
14 was on a time lapse, so like, you'd get one frame every
15 4 seconds or something like that. It's not continuous
16 viewing, but it's all cameras that are connected.

17 Q. Can you now recall who from the BTP came and took away
18 the footage that had been present at your station?

19 A. I know that it was logged and it wasn't the day it
20 happened, but I can't recall who it was. But it was
21 done with proper evidence bags and everything. At that
22 time, we were no longer based on the station. We had
23 been given an office within the BTP environment because
24 the whole station was a crime scene. So we weren't
25 allowed to go in there without a police escort.

1 Q. Can you recall now where the information was logged in
2 your records? Was that done manually or was that done
3 on a computer?

4 A. We didn't even have a computer at that point. It was
5 done in the logbook. Everything is recorded in the
6 station logbook.

7 Q. Would you happen to know where that logbook is now?

8 MR KEITH: I'm sorry for rising to my feet. It may assist
9 and may potentially short-circuit this evidence a little
10 bit if I say that my Lady will recall that Mr Kindness
11 made reference to other CCTV evidence which had found
12 its way into the possession of the Metropolitan Police.
13 We are aware that there are many hundreds, perhaps
14 thousands, of hours of possible additional CCTV evidence
15 still in existence, but rather than have officers go
16 through that material for days and weeks, we've asked
17 the Metropolitan Police whether they could identify just
18 a few minutes after the times of each of the explosions
19 in relation to each of the four sites, so as to assist
20 us in understanding the times at which the emergency
21 services responded, but only if the CCTV evidence itself
22 can give an accurate time, and also assuming that it
23 provides a detailed picture, an identifiable picture of
24 people arriving. A mass of emergency services arriving
25 I don't think would help anybody.

1 That request is being actioned by the
2 Metropolitan Police, but I suspect it will be some time
3 before we get an accurate answer.

4 MR COLTART: I'm grateful, of course, to Mr Keith for that
5 intervention. I, sadly, wasn't here when DI Kindness
6 gave his evidence. My Lady knows the constraints that
7 we operate under. I have read the transcript of his
8 evidence and the reason, in fact, for pursuing this
9 particular line of enquiry was that I'm conscious that
10 he said there were hundreds, if not thousands, of hours.
11 So in order to assist him and the officers who are
12 pursuing that further enquiry, I thought if we could get
13 some information from the Transport for London records
14 as to which officer collected that footage and whether,
15 for example, it might have been given an exhibit
16 reference, it might significantly narrow that task.
17 Just to return to my question, if I may, do you
18 happen to know now where that log might be kept?

19 A. If it wasn't taken for use by somebody investigating, it
20 should be archived at this point, because we keep
21 logbooks for seven years, but they go into an archive
22 system.

23 Q. Can I ask you, are you still employed by Transport for
24 London?

25 A. Yes, I am.

1 Q. Are you authorised to make such an archive request?

2 A. I probably am, but I --

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart, I don't think we need to
4 ask a witness to do it. We have Ms Canby here and she
5 is instructed. I'm sure we can see whether the request
6 can be pursued without imposing upon a witness.

7 MR COLTART: I'm grateful. If, in that case, I can leave
8 that topic and move on to my second topic, if I may.
9 We understand from your statement that when
10 everything had settled down, at least a bit on that day,
11 at around about 11.00, you had a briefing with
12 Tom O'Riordan?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is that a briefing that took place at a local primary
15 school, St Botolph's Primary School. Does that ring any
16 bells?

17 A. No, I don't believe -- no, it wasn't at a primary
18 school. There was -- there were several briefings. The
19 first one was just -- there's a kind of a traffic island
20 just outside in front of the church, that's where the
21 first briefing happened.

22 Q. We'll go through these in a moment, if we may, but we
23 may hear from a witness in due course that, although
24 there were briefings I think also which took place at
25 a local church --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- that there was also one which took place at a local
3 primary school, at St Botolph's Primary School. If
4 there was one, I take it you played no part in that?

5 A. I believe I was at all of the briefings. I was
6 certainly there until about 3.00 in the afternoon, but
7 I don't recall there being one in a school at all, no.

8 Q. That may be a misunderstanding. Let's deal with the
9 briefings which you attended.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The first one on a traffic island, is that right,
12 somewhere outside the -- roughly, what time was that?

13 A. Somewhere between 10.00 and 10.30. I couldn't be more
14 accurate than that. I didn't take a note, so ...

15 Q. Can you recall now who attended that particular
16 briefing?

17 A. If you -- you've got a copy of my notes?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. There was a list of all of the staff, LU staff, that I'd
20 recorded arriving. So all of those would have been
21 there and --

22 Q. Let's assist you with that, if we may. Can we get
23 [INQ9753-11] up, please?

24 Is this the list which you had in mind?

25 A. Yes, that's right.

1 Q. Are these the people who also would have attended that
2 briefing?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In the immediate aftermath of an incident like this,
5 a debrief can serve a number of different purposes, but
6 what was the purpose of this particular debrief, as far
7 as you understood it?

8 A. I don't recall the details of it. I think it was: this
9 is where we are and this is what's going to happen next,
10 and Tom identified certain people he wanted to work with
11 to go further. So there was a certain allocation of
12 roles and when the next meeting was going to be and the
13 church had very kindly offered some food and drink and
14 a place for us to wait until the next meeting, if we
15 weren't actually carrying out a task.

16 Q. So still very much operational at this early stage,
17 about task allocation, who was going to be doing what
18 and so on?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did there come a point in time during the course of that
21 day, initially, when you had some sort of feedback
22 debrief, if I can put it in that way, with either
23 Mr O'Riordan or with other members of staff as to how
24 the operation had gone?

25 A. No, I had a sit down with SS Robin Mayes and his wife,

1 Catherine Mayes, who was also there, and they asked me
2 to say what had happened. There was no feedback on, you
3 know, how it had gone. It was just me telling them what
4 I remembered and giving them times and details and
5 things like that.

6 Q. Did you subsequently through your employer ever engage
7 in such a feedback process, were you ever asked to
8 provide your views as to what had gone well, what hadn't
9 gone so well?

10 A. No.

11 MR COLTART: In that case I have no further questions for
12 you, thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: You have described for us, Ms Harrison, the
16 time when Mr Falawi arrived.

17 A. Sorry, his name is Falayi.

18 Q. Falayi, is it?

19 A. It's a Y, not a W. It's a typo. I beg your pardon.

20 Q. That's all right, it's my fault. When he arrives and
21 you've described that he offers assistance and he is
22 given one of those high visibility jackets and a radio.
23 How many people had already gone downstairs by the time
24 he arrived?

25 A. I was aware of -- I wasn't aware of Tim Batkin early on

1 because he was on the train --

2 Q. That's the driver, train operator, yes?

3 A. Of 204. I didn't know what had happened to the driver

4 of train 447. I only found out later, but he was down

5 there.

6 Q. Can we see if we can put a name to help others?

7 A. Mark Williams.

8 Q. That's Mark Williams?

9 A. That's Mark Williams.

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. The other step back drivers were Stephen Eldridge,

12 Les Drinkwater, Paul Hawkins, and they were all down

13 there on the track and, of course, there was

14 Tony Counihan.

15 Q. I'm going to come to Mr Counihan now, but were all of

16 them in high visibility jackets, as far as you could

17 tell?

18 A. I don't recall, I'm sorry, I don't recall.

19 Q. Tony Counihan, is it?

20 A. Counihan.

21 Q. He had gone down as well, with a radio?

22 A. Yes, he was already down there when the explosion

23 happened. He did come back up once and go back down.

24 He had a radio. I don't recall whether he had hi-vi or

25 not.

1 Q. Then I think later, I'm not sure we've already covered
2 this, but later Mr Boyle --
3 A. John Boyle, yes.
4 Q. He comes and offers his assistance?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. But that's some time later, isn't it, that's about 9.20?
7 A. Yes, I believe I wrote a note on my notes.
8 Q. I'm looking at your statement --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- where you say:
11 "At around this time [which is 9.20] John Boyle,
12 a driver based at Barking, arrived and offered his
13 assistance ..."
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And that you gave him a radio.
16 A. And a hi-vi. I gave him my hi-vi.
17 Q. And a high visibility jacket, which was yours.
18 At that stage -- I'm sorry to keep going back and
19 forth -- I'm trying to work out when the emergency
20 services would have been available. That's 9.20 on your
21 statement, Mr Boyle.
22 A. No, they were there before him.
23 Q. Exactly. I'm going to go back in time now, because what
24 you recall is that you think that, at about 9.10,
25 emergency service personnel began to arrive in numbers.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "I cannot recall which services arrived first, except
3 that ambulance was some time after."

4 A. Yes, that's my recollection as well.

5 Q. But that you do go on to say that you thought that some
6 paramedics on motorcycles were there before the
7 ambulance?

8 A. I think we're going to have to defer to my statement,
9 because I can't recall.

10 Q. All right. So if I ask you now to be any more specific
11 than that, you're not going to be able to do so?

12 A. You can ask me. I can only say if I don't recall.

13 Q. All right. Well, what I wanted to know was, in terms of
14 the people that were going down, at what point the
15 emergency services or, in particular, paramedics would
16 have been going down. Can you help with that?

17 A. My recollection -- and I have to be very specific, this
18 is my recollection and it's five and a half years and
19 so, however that works --

20 Q. Of course.

21 A. -- was that the police and the Fire Brigade were fairly
22 quick to arrive and go down, and that the London
23 Ambulance Service -- I don't recall them going down
24 apart from that request for the emergency -- for the
25 traction current, to be confirmed that that was off, and

1 that when Ola Falayi made the radio request for
2 paramedic help, my assumption was that there was nobody
3 down there at that point who was medically trained or
4 from the LAS, or maybe not enough of them.

5 Q. Again, to help you from your statement, you thought that
6 was about 9.00 when Ola made that request?

7 A. Yes, I agree with my statement. I know that I was very
8 conscientious about the times for the statement. Now my
9 memory is not as good, obviously I've tried not to
10 remember it.

11 MR SAUNDERS: All right. I quite understand. Thank you
12 very much indeed.

13 A. Thank you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

15 Questions by MS SHEFF

16 MS SHEFF: My Lady.

17 Can I ask you about the telephone call, first of
18 all, that you had, the very first phone call you made to
19 the NCC --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- at Control. What you told us was that -- we heard
22 the tape played -- there was an explosion at the front
23 of the train going towards Liverpool Street, was how it
24 was clarified, and you were not aware that anyone had
25 been injured and that you had no power.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The response that you received from the man at the other
3 end of the NCC network was, "You're not the only one
4 that's had this done", and essentially "I'm going to
5 call you back on this"?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What did you understand him to mean by that?

8 A. I'm struggling to recall exactly what I thought or felt
9 about it. I do know that we were sent some technical
10 officers and that their understanding was that we had
11 had a power surge which had caused this and I did query
12 the noise and they said, when the breaker is open, it
13 does make a big noise that could be confused with that,
14 because I found it quite difficult to reconcile the
15 information.

16 Q. If I can help with you this, in your statement what you
17 say about this is that NCC explained they were getting
18 reports of a power surge all over.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You say your information came from some technical
21 officers?

22 A. They came afterwards.

23 Q. When did they come?

24 A. I can't recall when they came. My memory is a bit
25 confused at this time. I do remember them being there.

1 They had come from Tower Hill.

2 If I was to estimate, I would say somewhere between
3 10 past and quarter past 9, but it's very much an
4 estimate.

5 Q. They came from Tower Hill, you say?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Having now heard that tape replayed where the NCC
8 controller actually says, "You're not the only one
9 that's had this done", that doesn't go on to say
10 anything about a power surge, do you think that maybe
11 your statement might be wrong about the fact that it was
12 NCC that told you they were getting reports of a power
13 surge and that, in fact, came from these technical
14 officers?

15 A. It could well be, yes.

16 Q. Who called in these technical officers?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Do you know any of their names?

19 A. I wrote some names down, but --

20 Q. Would that be in your notes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Perhaps we can have a look at that, then. That's
23 INQ9753 [INQ9753-3], please. This would be around that time, 9.10,
24 9.13, you've already been asked about 9.30, the
25 ambulance on the track, "people dying", that was from

1 I think you said your -- one of your officers, wasn't
2 it?
3 A. That was from Ola Falayi.
4 Q. Yes. Would it be anything to do with Darren, "35374,
5 09.10"?
6 A. Darren Glazer is the DSM.
7 Q. He's the DSM. Yes, I'm going to ask you --
8 A. And that was the time he called to say that he was
9 appointed Silver control at Liverpool Street.
10 Q. I want to come back to that briefly afterwards, but
11 perhaps if we can go on to the next page, [INQ9753-4]. We
12 know who Pete Stallibrass is, you've told us about that,
13 and 9.20, traction current off?
14 A. Was there an earlier page?
15 Q. Yes, there is. Can we go back to [INQ9753-2]?
16 This is your opening page, isn't it?
17 A. Yes, that's right. So, no, I obviously didn't note down
18 when they came or their names, so ...
19 Q. Yes. So 08.55 "Liverpool street -- power restored."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Would that be information you received from the DSM at
22 Liverpool Street?
23 A. No, what that was was, after I'd spoken -- I'm confusing
24 myself. I can't remember the order of my phone calls,
25 but at 08.55 I was on the telephone to the control room

1 assistant at Liverpool Street and he -- because we had
2 evacuated and closed, and I was letting him know, and
3 I told him about the power loss and he said they had
4 also lost power and, as I was speaking to him, the power
5 came back for both of us. So that was why I wrote down
6 "power restored", it was because the power came back as
7 we were talking.

8 Q. Which power would that be?

9 A. Things like lights, computer --

10 Q. Right. But this would be on the emergency system,
11 presumably, would it?

12 A. I would assume it would be, yes.

13 Q. Because we've heard, for example, that the lights that
14 went on on the platform and in tunnel were about, say,
15 20 per cent of the normal capacity of the lighting.

16 A. That's default emergency lighting, yes.

17 MR KEITH: If I may assist, I think we had a written witness
18 statement from Mr Porter describing how the normal
19 lights were reset within about quarter of an hour.

20 MS SHEFF: Thank you. So the original power that had gone
21 down hadn't been restored, but all your default -- your
22 backup lighting and power had come on, had it?

23 A. The power that came back to me there, it may have been
24 sourced from what we call the offline battery inverters.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. But that wasn't emergency -- they weren't emergency
2 equipment, if you see what I mean.

3 Q. Okay. So you had much of your equipment back online
4 again that you were relying on?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. But we can't find here, can we, then, a note of
7 these technical officers who gave that you information?

8 A. No, it doesn't look like I made a note of that.

9 Q. Did you say that they came to Aldgate in person to speak
10 to you?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. Where were they employed from? Where did
13 they come from?

14 A. We actually had an office based at Aldgate for technical
15 officers, and they are located around the system and, at
16 that point in time, they were employed by Metronet, and
17 the point of them was that if some asset failure
18 happened, that they were technical officers able to deal
19 with asset failures.

20 Q. So they could go on to the line and work out what was
21 happening and inform you so that you could work the
22 system?

23 A. Yes, and they had access to rooms that their technical
24 expertise allows them into and doesn't allow us into,
25 such as the interlocking machine rooms and computer

1 systems and things.

2 Q. So whereas the impression they were giving you, when
3 they came to speak to you about this -- what they
4 believed to be a power surge, was that Aldgate wasn't
5 the only station that had suffered this problem?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did they know which other stations were also involved
8 and did they communicate that to you?

9 A. I can't recall, but I don't believe so. I'm sorry,
10 I don't recall.

11 Q. So by that time -- and you think it's, what, around
12 9.05, 9.10, did you say?

13 A. I thought more between five minutes after that, but I'm
14 guessing. I have to say I'm guessing.

15 Q. Yes. Obviously, as you didn't write it down, you can't
16 be sure about it.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But some time around then, there were technical officers
19 who were aware that there were problems around the
20 system --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- which were believed to be a power surge. Then you
23 said it was only at 9.18 -- and that's your entry on
24 page [INQ9753-4], "Pete Stallibrass" -- that you first
25 believed that it was a bomb?

1 A. I think we can say first confirmed.

2 Q. Yes, because you had your own suspicions because of what

3 you saw from the bridge, presumably?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And because of the smoke, the passengers leaving and

6 what clearly seemed to be a very serious situation?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, all of that, no doubt, you communicated on to your

9 senior officers?

10 A. That -- I called my duty manager specifically about

11 that.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. It was within a very short period of time after that

14 that Tom O'Riordan arrived, so ...

15 Q. Right. That's just the only other thing I want to ask

16 you about. You say that your duty -- sorry, I can't

17 remember what "S" stands for duty something manager?

18 A. Duty station manager.

19 Q. "Duty station manager", thank you very much, "at

20 Liverpool Street first took over as Silver".

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Just to be clear about Gold, Silver, Bronze, et cetera,

23 these are self-appointed roles in terms of emergency,

24 are they?

25 A. No, they're not self-appointed.

1 Q. I say self-appointed in the sense that people take them
2 on when they perceive them to be an emergency having
3 already had that role allocated?

4 A. No, they're appointed.

5 Q. They're pre-allocated?

6 A. For example, on that morning, when Darren Glazer was
7 Silver control, the service manager had appointed him
8 Silver control. You don't appoint yourself.

9 Q. Right. So is there a set role in place, as it were, for
10 somebody, should there be an emergency? In other words
11 if somebody told you in advance "If there's going to be
12 a serious situation at Aldgate, you will be Gold or
13 Silver or Bronze if you're on duty that day"?

14 A. No, you're always appointed on the day when -- I mean,
15 if it's a planned situation, it will be the same person
16 who appoints you, which is the service manager, but you
17 don't decide, you're appointed.

18 Q. Okay. From what ranks are the Gold, Silver, Bronze
19 Officers appointed?

20 A. Normally, the gold will be somebody who is based at 55
21 Broadway within what was then the NCC, so I believe that
22 day it was Andy Barr, and he's in charge of the whole
23 network.

24 Each location that has an incident has a Silver. So
25 they are the person in charge of that site, and they

1 physically have to be there, and the Bronzes are
2 appointed by Silver control and they are given specific
3 tasks to do and they're usually supervisors, typically.

4 Q. So the Gold has overall responsibility and is based in
5 NCC?

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff, I hesitate to interrupt,
7 but I suspect there may be a better witness to ask these
8 questions of.

9 MS SHEFF: Yes, I appreciate that --

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't wish to stop you.

11 MS SHEFF: No, no. Let me just ask about you specifically,
12 then. As station supervisor, you were the only one on
13 the spot before Tom O'Riordan arrived?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Because the Silver was based at Liverpool Street?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So what were your responsibilities, what was your role
18 in relation to Silver Command?

19 A. What Darren Glazer had told me to do was to be in close
20 communication with him. My role was as supervisor in
21 charge of the station. I was not appointed Silver or
22 Bronze. When Tom arrived, he told me he had been
23 appointed Silver for Aldgate area.

24 Q. So when Tom is there he's on the scene, he's Silver?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And he can deal with all the Silver issues and anything
2 that occurs at the scene?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. But prior to him arriving, what are you responsible for
5 in the absence of a Silver on the spot?

6 A. As I said, I was the supervisor in charge, so a station
7 supervisor, not a Silver or a Bronze, but a station
8 supervisor in charge.

9 Q. So is your role any different, if there is a -- should
10 there be any difference if there's a Silver on the scene
11 or not?

12 A. Yes, if there's a Silver on the scene, they are in
13 charge, they make the decisions. Until the Silver
14 arrived, it was my station to be in charge of. I had
15 not been trained in -- to have the capacity to be
16 a Silver control at that point, because it's
17 a particular training that you have to have.

18 That wouldn't have necessarily stopped the service
19 manager from appointing me to that if they had felt that
20 they needed to.

21 Q. So up until that point, you were carrying on your role
22 as station supervisor doing the best that you could
23 do --

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. -- in the circumstances, and waiting for somebody who

1 was properly trained to come and take over and deal with
2 this major incident?

3 A. Not necessarily waiting. I had requested additional
4 help.

5 Q. As soon as Tom O'Riordan arrived, you handed over to
6 him, did you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you have a briefing as soon as he arrived to tell
9 him what you'd seen and what was happening at that time?

10 A. I remember him asking me and I don't recall what I said
11 to him. I did give him some information, but I can't
12 recall what that was.

13 Q. You then continued to attend all the briefings
14 throughout the rest of the day?

15 A. Yes.

16 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Harrison.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions? Mr Taylor?

18 Questions by MR TAYLOR

19 MR TAYLOR: Good afternoon. Good afternoon, Ms Harrison,
20 I'd like to refer you back to what you first said about
21 your radio communications.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I believe you said that you were, in 2005, still working
24 on the old radio system.

25 A. Yes, that's right. We now have the CONNECT system which

1 works very differently, but at that point it was an
2 older radio system.

3 Q. When you refer to the older radio system, how long have
4 you actually worked at Aldgate?

5 A. I had worked there for about four or five weeks before
6 this happened.

7 Q. Before then?

8 A. Mm-hmm.

9 Q. Have you any idea, before 2005, how long this radio
10 system had been in operation?

11 A. The particular radios that we were using were quite old.
12 We had newer ones at my previous group, but they were
13 all the same kind of system and I'd worked for the
14 company since the year 2000 and that was what was in
15 place when I joined the company. So they were older
16 than the year 2000, but I don't know before that when
17 they came in --

18 Q. When you say you joined the company in 2000, you mean
19 London Underground?

20 A. That's right, yes.

21 Q. Were you aware of any problems arising through the old
22 radio system?

23 A. Can you be a bit more specific?

24 Q. Basically, you had a problem, I believe, communicating
25 with the tunnels, inside the tunnels sometimes at

1 Aldgate.

2 A. If you mean that within sort of -- there was a limit to
3 how far you could transmit and receive, yes it was known
4 that it was generally considered that you couldn't use
5 a station radio to communicate in the tunnels. A lot of
6 the stations have train radios which you can use to
7 communicate with trains.

8 Q. But Aldgate is a very shallow Underground station,
9 I believe?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. You can virtually see it from the main road, can't you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And if you were having problems there -- did you have
14 any idea if there were any problems with other lower
15 line stations?

16 A. Deep tunnel?

17 Q. Deep tunnel stations, yes.

18 A. In my previous group, which was a deep tunnel one,
19 I don't recall us ever trying to use them in the
20 tunnels, but we were aware that there were sometimes
21 blank spots. But not seriously so.

22 Q. This was being noted. Was this being passed on to your
23 managers?

24 A. Yes, the process is that, if you're aware of that, you
25 make a report to the fault centre and they try to adjust

1 it. I do recall from when I joined the company in the
2 year 2000 that the CONNECT system that we now have was
3 still being installed and developed. It took longer
4 than planned for it to be brought into use, but the
5 company were already in the process of trying to
6 establish something more robust and better.

7 Q. You generally knew that there was a problem and were
8 trying to fix the problem.

9 Forgive me for this, but I couldn't quite
10 understand, what is the NCC, what does that mean?

11 A. Network Control Centre.

12 Q. Where is that?

13 A. It's based at 55 Broadway, and it does a strategic
14 overall view of the whole network. Then there's -- each
15 line has its own control centre as well.

16 Q. So just referring to what you said about making the
17 phone call here -- and we've already heard that -- if
18 a major incident -- or if any incident actually occurs
19 at your station, Aldgate, you have to call through to
20 the NCC at 55 Broadway to tell them that there is
21 a problem and that you need assistance?

22 A. For -- we call them for -- sorry, I'm losing my words.
23 For emergency services, we request it through NCC, yes.

24 Q. Right. You can't make that phone call yourself straight
25 to the 999 call centres?

1 A. No. I mean, we could, but we shouldn't because
2 otherwise -- it also makes them aware at the same time
3 and they have direct contact with each of the emergency
4 services.

5 Q. That's -- I suppose that's a part of your ongoing
6 procedures, your training, you're told that at your
7 training sessions?

8 A. Yes, we're told who we call for what service.

9 Q. So I mean from your -- from the phone calls that we've
10 heard you make to the NCC, it was just a brief, what,
11 one, two minutes, something like that?

12 A. It was quite quick, yes.

13 Q. Very brief. Then they've got to ring through for
14 emergency services. So the information that you give to
15 them must be quite specific, I should imagine.

16 A. Usually -- I found out since, when I've listened to them
17 talking to people requesting services, they usually ask
18 specific questions, you know, like, if you request an
19 ambulance, they will say, sort of, "Has one person --
20 who do you need it for? What's their age? What's the
21 nature of the problem?" But that didn't happen that
22 morning.

23 Q. Because on that morning, basically, the emergency
24 services were requested to go to Liverpool Street
25 instead of to Aldgate.

1 A. What I assume happened -- and I don't know -- is that
2 there were two different requests made and that my
3 request went via NCC, but I know that there were already
4 police at Liverpool Street. It's perfectly possible
5 that they also made a call for emergency services and
6 that's where the mixup happened.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think we may be asking the witness
8 to speculate, Mr Taylor, on that.

9 MR TAYLOR: Yes. I just want to -- I was going to ask you
10 about the CCTV cameras, but I think we've already dealt
11 with that, and the uninterrupted power supply system.
12 The medical supplies. Does Aldgate station carry
13 a defibrillation machine? That's -- I don't know if you
14 know --

15 A. I don't recall there being one there. It's been five
16 and a half years since I've worked there. I don't
17 recall there being one there.

18 Q. And there's still not one there now?

19 A. Possibly. When they were brought on to the system, they
20 worked out the most strategic locations for them, and
21 I believe they generally chose busy interchange stations
22 where the most customers went through.

23 Q. Finally, about first aid training, are staff encouraged
24 to have first aid training? Are you a first aider?

25 A. I was a first aider. My qualification had lapsed before

1 I went to Aldgate, about six months beforehand, because
2 you have to revalidate your training. So mine had not
3 been kept up at that point.

4 There is a legal requirement of so many first aiders
5 per so many members of staff and I believe we more than
6 exceed that, but I don't think we had any first aiders
7 on duty that day.

8 MR TAYLOR: No first aiders on duty that day? Okay, thank
9 you very much.

10 A. Thank you.

11 MS CANBY: My Lady, I just have a couple of questions,
12 I won't be longer than five minutes.

13 Questions by MS CANBY

14 MS CANBY: Ms Harrison, I just have some questions to ask
15 you on behalf of Transport for London. You've been
16 asked about your role and responsibility, particularly
17 in an emergency situation, and it's just around that
18 that I'd like to ask you some further questions.

19 Could we have on the screen, please, document
20 [TFL649-1]?

21 Ms Harrison, this is an organisational chart, and we
22 can see that you are second from the bottom on the
23 left-hand side, station supervisor?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You would be responsible for the customer service

1 assistants?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. On that day, the customer service assistants were

4 Steve Winning and Basil Smith?

5 A. That's right.

6 Q. You also had a station assistant multifunctional and you

7 had two, they were John Parrish and Peter Large?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. You don't have a station control room operator at

10 Aldgate?

11 A. No.

12 Q. But there would be one at Liverpool Street?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. In fact, I think you've already referred to

15 a conversation that you had at about 8.55 with a control

16 room operator, and that was Daniel Kemp?

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. Your manager is a duty station manager, and that was

19 Darren Glazer at Liverpool Street?

20 A. He was the duty station manager on duty at that time.

21 We actually have five of a group.

22 Q. But on 7 July, it was Darren Glazer?

23 A. Darren Glazer, yes.

24 Q. He has a group station manager, I know there are

25 a number of them, but for you, the group station manager

1 was Tom O'Riordan?

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. Could we now have on the screen, please, document
4 [TFL7-13]?

5 Ms Harrison, this is the Aldgate emergency plan,
6 Aldgate station emergency plan that was in force at the
7 time. This is just because you were asked what your
8 role would be in an emergency.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The plan sets out for you the initial actions by the
11 supervisor, and we can see there that the box has been
12 highlighted, and the steps that you should take
13 initially are those steps 1 to 7.

14 So the first thing to do is assess the situation,
15 contact all relevant parties, location, type of incident
16 and requirements:

17 "Allocated a dedicated telephone line.

18 "Request a duty manager."

19 In fact, we know you did better than a duty manager
20 because you ended up with Tom O'Riordan, who's the group
21 station manager?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. "Write notes on the key points.

24 "Close the station [and]

25 "Coordinate with emergency services."

1 Could we go forward in the same document, please,
2 but page 19; [TFL7-19]?
3 Throughout the emergency plan, there are useful flow
4 charts that tell you what should happen in terms of
5 different scenarios, one of them being fire. There's
6 also a similar page for smoke, security threat, bomb
7 alert, failure of the electricity supply. All of these
8 show that you make contact, either with the line
9 controller, if it's fire, or the NCC for other emergency
10 services.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You also have a direct line through to the BTP, is that
13 right? If you actually call 999, it's not going through
14 to the Met Police, it goes through to the BTP Police, is
15 that correct?

16 A. I'm not sure if you've got the number right there.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. But there was --

19 Q. You have --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- on your auto telephone system, you have a direct line
22 through to the BTP?

23 A. That's right, there's a direct emergency number, yes.

24 Q. In all of those situations, so either fire, smoke,
25 security threat, bomb alert, failure of electricity

1 supply, you would expect either your group station
2 manager or your duty station manager to attend the
3 station to assist you?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. That's all in accordance with this emergency plan?

6 A. Yes.

7 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mrs Harrison, I don't have any further
8 questions?

9 A. Thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I have one question, Mrs Harrison.
11 Looking at that emergency plan, was there anything in
12 the protocols that, as you understood it, bound you and
13 the emergency plans to stop London Underground people
14 going down into the tunnel?

15 A. The Health and Safety at Work Act is the one that
16 I think of and there was a discussion between us. When
17 the request was made for assisting train 204, we could
18 see the smoke coming out and I didn't direct anybody to
19 go down there because it looked as if they would be
20 endangering themselves.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you couldn't direct, but some of
22 them still went down?

23 A. Yes, the trigger was when we saw that first gentleman
24 walking off and we knew that people needed help.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't know if anybody has any

1 questions arising out of that?

2 MR KEITH: No, thank you, my Lady.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Thank you,
4 Ms Harrison, for coming along to help us.

5 We have two more witnesses who have come to give
6 oral evidence, I understand, Mr Keith.

7 MR KEITH: We do.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: If we take just, say, a ten-minute
9 break and see if we can complete those witnesses today?
10 I'm sure they would appreciate it, if we can.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you.

12 (3.37 pm)

13 (A short break)

14 (3.47 pm)

15 MR KEITH: May I invite to you call Anthony Counihan,
16 please?

17 MR ANTHONY BARRY COUNIHAN (sworn)

18 Questions by MR KEITH

19 MR KEITH: Good afternoon.

20 A. Good afternoon.

21 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?

22 A. Anthony Barry Counihan.

23 Q. Mr Counihan, in July 2005, you were one of the station
24 supervisors at Aldgate, were you not?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. On that morning, having booked in for duty at 7.00, you
2 were engaged around about 8.50 in the carrying out of
3 the duties associated with the step back box?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Is that the little box at the end of the platform where
6 a station supervisor will remain in order to supervise
7 the system for getting drivers on to trains in order to
8 speed up or slow down the service?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. I think everything was running as normal, when, just
11 before 9.00, there was, as you've described it in your
12 statement, an "almighty bang"?

13 A. Mm-hmm, that's correct.

14 Q. What happened?

15 A. I was just sitting in the box, minding my own business,
16 if you like, and heard a bang. There was a shudder and
17 as I looked out of the step back box door, which is like
18 half glass and half metal, I could see that the lighting
19 had also gone down as well.

20 Q. Is your box at the end of platforms 3 and 4 or 1 and 2?

21 A. It's at the end of platforms 1 and 2.

22 Q. 1 and 2?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. There were two trains, I think, in the station at around
25 that time?

1 A. That's correct, two Metropolitan Lines, yes.

2 Q. There was one Metropolitan Line train in platform 3 and
3 one just leaving platform 2?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. The one at platform 2 stopped dead in the tracks?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. We've just heard evidence from Celia Harrison, your
8 fellow station supervisor at Aldgate. Did she come over
9 the radio and say we've lost all power?

10 A. No. Unfortunately, it was me that got on the radio
11 first and I did use a swear word, because obviously it
12 was something out of the ordinary.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Don't worry about -- in my job,
14 Mr Counihan, I'm afraid I have to get used to swear
15 words, so say whatever you said.

16 MR KEITH: What did you tell her over the radio,
17 Mr Counihan?

18 A. I said "What the fucking hell was that?" And then Celia
19 responded by saying, "I've lost all comms and I've lost
20 all power".

21 Q. Did you notice that, at that stage, the tunnel lights
22 were on, which would seem to indicate the traction
23 current had gone off?

24 A. That's correct, yes. I exited the box -- opened the
25 door and exited the box. I looked immediately to my

1 left, which is the District line going towards
2 Tower Hill, and noticed that those tunnel lights were
3 on, and I noticed that our station lights were on, the
4 emergency lighting only, 1 in 4, 1 in 3, something like
5 that. So I knew that something obviously had happened.

6 Q. You didn't know at that stage what had happened?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Was one possibility that there had been an accident or
9 something significant in relation to the
10 Metropolitan Line train that had left platform 2, the
11 one that was partly out of the platforms?

12 A. Yes, my initial thought was that a motor or something
13 like that had dropped off of the bottom of the train
14 because the train was literally just pulling out and it
15 just -- all of a sudden, just stopped. My first thought
16 was that a motor had dropped off the bottom.

17 Q. So did you go and speak to the driver of that train?

18 A. As I -- I exited the box, started to walk down the
19 platform, and as I got towards the, like, middle and
20 front of the train, the driver's coming towards me and,
21 as I'm walking down there, I can recollect people
22 banging on the doors of the train and obviously wanting
23 to get off the train that had just stopped.

24 So I then went back and started to detrain the train
25 by using what's called the butterfly cock to open up one

1 set of doors on the train.

2 Q. You used the butterfly cock to open up a set of doors
3 manually?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. So we take it that you had to physically apply that
6 butterfly cock to one set of doors and would you just
7 open one set of doors in each carriage to allow one
8 single point of exit?

9 A. That's it, yes, it's just associated with one set of
10 doors in that particular carriage. So as soon as you
11 put your fingers -- put two fingers in, just turn it and
12 then that set of doors opens.

13 Q. That was the train that was on platform 2. Did you then
14 call your colleague, Celia Harrison and tell her that
15 you were going to go and check the train on platform 3?

16 A. Yes, that was the start of the station evacuation then.
17 So just as a matter of course, I checked that the train
18 on platform 2 was empty and checked that platforms 1 and
19 2 were empty. I then went up the stairs, across the
20 bridge and down on to 3 and 4, and just checked the
21 train on 3 and 4 -- sorry, on platform 3, checked that
22 platforms 3 and 4 were empty, and then I made my way
23 back upstairs.

24 Q. Presumably, the drivers from trains 2 and 3 were with
25 you or certainly on the platform area as well?

1 A. To be honest with you, I really couldn't say where they
2 were. I remember I was on platform 3 and 4 on my own,
3 checking the train, and the platforms. I honestly
4 couldn't tell you where the other drivers were, sorry.

5 Q. All right. While you were doing this, did you see smoke
6 coming from the front of the platforms, that is to say
7 from the tunnel towards Liverpool Street?

8 A. Personally, no, not when I was downstairs, no.

9 Q. All right. Once you'd checked that everyone was out of
10 the trains at platforms 2 and 3, did you go to the
11 office, the supervisor's office?

12 A. I come up the stairs --

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- went through the gates at Aldgate station and all the
15 front of the station was just packed with people, so
16 I've got a very loud voice and I just shouted out that
17 "Something obviously big has happened, we're not sure
18 what. Can you please exit the station, move away from
19 the front of the station, go across to the bus station,
20 use the buses to get to wherever you're going?"

21 As I did that, I then turned around and as I turned
22 around, I saw like dust, smoke, whatever you want to
23 call it, rising slowly up from the platform level. It
24 was at that point I went in to Celia and said along the
25 lines of "Have we got the Fire Brigade on the way? It

1 looks like there's smoke coming up."

2 Q. Did she tell you that she had already been in touch with
3 the NCC, the Network Control Centre, or tell that you
4 she had been in touch with anybody else, do you recall?

5 A. I can't tell you the exact words, but I do recollect
6 that she said that there was -- that there had been some
7 sort of communication with regards to emergency services
8 on the way, something along the lines of, "Yes, the
9 Fire Brigade is on their way" or "They're on their way"
10 something along those lines.

11 Q. In your statement, you then describe how you grabbed
12 your own high visibility vest and a spare one --

13 A. Mm-hmm.

14 Q. -- and you went out to the gate line?

15 A. That's correct, yes. My first thought was to get
16 prepared in case -- you know, things had obviously
17 happened, so to get myself prepared. As I got my hi-vi,
18 I saw one of the BTP officers from upstairs and, at the
19 same time, I'd got a message from Celia that people were
20 self-detraining from a train between Liverpool Street
21 and Aldgate, and that there was people on the track.
22 So my first thought was just to try to go down there
23 to see if I could assist people. So I've grabbed the
24 hi-vi, had a spare hi-vi and, as I went out, I saw a BTP
25 officer, I believe it was Tony --

1 Q. Tony? Tony Silvestro?

2 A. I believe so, yes, I wouldn't like to swear on it, but

3 I believe it was him. And then --

4 Q. So presumably you told him that you'd received a message
5 that people were detraining in the tunnel --

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. -- and you also probably told him that you would
8 evacuate and empty the trains at platforms 2 and 3?

9 A. I believe I didn't mention about evacuating. I just
10 said that "We've got reports of people self-detraining
11 between Liverpool Street and Aldgate".

12 Q. Right, and did you go down to the platform with him?

13 A. We both did, yes.

14 Q. Before you reached the platform, did you see somebody
15 coming up the stairs towards you?

16 A. Yes, as I got down the stairs towards platform 2 --
17 sorry, 1 and 2, you go down some stairs and then it
18 breaks and there's a little flat part, as I got to that
19 part there, I nearly ran smack into two people coming up
20 the stairs. Looked like they'd -- there was obviously,
21 how can I describe it, something had obviously happened
22 to them, dust and a few cuts on their faces, they looked
23 shocked and what have you.

24 I believe I said something like "Just keep moving up
25 the stairs, there's people upstairs" and I just headed

1 down on to the platform then.

2 Q. You had a torch with you, along with your hi-vi?

3 A. I took the Dragon out with me, yes.

4 Q. So did you go into the tunnel by going towards the end
5 of the platform and then down the little slope on to the
6 track?

7 A. I made my way towards the end, yes.

8 Q. Could you see other people coming out?

9 A. When I got to the bottom, it was a bit clearer. The
10 main cloud of dust and smoke had cleared, and I could
11 see several people on and around the track, some were
12 heading over towards platforms 3 and 4. I believe
13 I turned on my torch at the time, I started waving it
14 and said "Come towards my voice", I was just shouting
15 out "Come towards my voice".

16 Q. Had you had a radio with you at this stage?

17 A. I believe I did, yes.

18 Q. In your statement, you describe how you, after assisting
19 people to come towards your torch and to come to the end
20 of the platform, you had to go back upstairs to change
21 your radio. Why was that, do you recall?

22 A. To be honest with you, I really can't recall why I did.
23 I could hazard a guess, but I wouldn't like to hazard
24 a guess in case it's wrong, it might be something to do
25 with a battery, or --

1 Q. Was this one of the station, handheld, battery-powered
2 radios?

3 A. I believe it was, yes. Yes, it was definitely one of
4 the handheld ones. I'm not sure if I had one of the
5 older models, though, we had several radios on the
6 station, and some of, like, the extra ones, if you like,
7 were of an older style.

8 Q. I don't want you to guess, but were there ever problems
9 with the radios running out of battery power requiring
10 you to change them or was this just a one-off, do you
11 think?

12 A. I mean, during the course of your duty, you're always
13 checking your battery. Batteries often run out, it's
14 just sometimes you might have to change it in your
15 shift, other times you might be lucky and go through the
16 whole shift without changing a battery.

17 Q. Tell us, please, what you can recall of the state of the
18 people coming out of the tunnel.

19 A. Dazed, shocked, I describe them as walking wounded.
20 Obviously clothes were all covered in, you know, dust
21 and soot and smoke and what have you.

22 Q. How long did it take you to get upstairs, change the
23 radio and then get back down again?

24 A. One or two minutes.

25 Q. Then, when you came back down, where did you go?

1 A. I headed on to the track then.

2 Q. Into the tunnel area, and were people still coming out?

3 A. They were, yes.

4 Q. Were you doing what you did before, which is to reassure
5 them, shine your torch towards them so they could see
6 you, and tell them to come towards you?

7 A. Basically, yes. Yes, some people obviously were really
8 distressed, some were like limping or they was carrying
9 things, I was just trying to help them.

10 Q. I'm not going to ask you what you recall of the train
11 because we've heard a great deal of evidence about the
12 state of the second carriage. I'd like to ask you,
13 though, about what you recall of the arrival of the
14 emergency services.

15 Whilst you were in the tunnel on the track, do you
16 recall the emergency services arriving and, if so, who
17 arrived first?

18 A. It wasn't like "Oh, look", suddenly they was here, just
19 appeared, it was -- all of a sudden, someone just popped
20 up and it was the Fire Brigade -- obviously I remember,
21 the uniforms and what have you -- it was definitely the
22 Fire Brigade I recall seeing the first down there.

23 Q. In order to get to the tunnel, they'd have had to go
24 past you or certainly past either you or the end of the
25 other platform?

1 A. That would have been correct, yes.

2 Q. Do you recall any paramedics arriving?

3 A. My first recollection of a paramedic was somebody
4 standing -- I believe I was helping to help somebody
5 come back up to the platform -- I don't know if it was
6 because they were injured or carrying some things for
7 them -- but I was coming back towards the platform and
8 there was a paramedic standing on the end, and he said
9 "Have we got confirmation that traction current has been
10 turned off?" That's the first -- my first recollection
11 of seeing a paramedic.

12 Q. Can you help us at all with what time that may have been
13 or, rather, how long had elapsed from the time you went
14 down to the track and when the paramedic asked you that?

15 A. I mean, if I was to give you a time, I really would be
16 guessing, to be honest with you.

17 Q. We don't want you to guess, Mr Counihan.

18 I think you helped --

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, what was your answer when he
20 asked you if the current was turned off?

21 A. The question wasn't directed directly to me, it was
22 just, like, he just shouted it out, if you like, in
23 general, but there was Fire Brigade milling around on
24 the track and platform areas, there was, like, myself
25 and the train drivers that were assisting as well, so

1 there was plenty of people about. I think it was just
2 in general, just making the comment, rather than
3 directing it to myself or to a fire officer.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So are you saying you would have
5 thought it would have been obvious, because of the
6 people on the track, that the power was off?

7 A. In my opinion, yes.

8 MR KEITH: Did anybody else ask about the current?

9 A. Not that I can recall, not that I can recall. To be
10 honest with you, I didn't even -- I didn't follow my
11 correct procedure, I just went down, I saw there was
12 people injured, I just went down myself.

13 Q. What would have been the correct procedure, do you
14 recall?

15 A. Speak to the line controller, could have been one
16 method, to confirm that traction current was discharged.
17 I could have used a CRID, a current rail indicator
18 device, and put that on to the actual two rails to see
19 if there was current still running through the rails.

20 Q. I think there came a stage when you helped the firemen
21 carry equipment down the tracks towards the second
22 carriages. Do you recall that?

23 A. Yes, if I remember rightly, there was three firemen
24 struggling -- I believe it was some sort of like
25 mini-generator, or something like that, and there was

1 two at the front and one of the firemen at the back, he
2 was struggling a bit and I just helped somebody to come
3 up towards the end of the platform. So I said "Do you
4 want a hand with that, mate?" and just grabbed a corner
5 with them, just sort of mucking in with anything I could
6 do, really.

7 Q. Did you stay down there until all the passengers, or
8 certainly those who were able to walk, had come off the
9 train?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. Do you recall being down there when there was some
12 announcement about the station having to be evacuated?

13 A. I didn't hear that, to be honest with you.

14 Q. In your statement, you say that you were preparing to go
15 up when a senior fireman announced he wanted all
16 Underground staff evacuated from the station. Do you
17 recall that?

18 A. I believe that at that time -- I believed it was only
19 one or two walking wounded left, so a minute or two
20 after that, then we would all have off been off of the
21 track anyway, that's my recollection of that. I do
22 remember somebody saying that to me, though, yes.

23 Q. But it wasn't an instantaneous process, whereby the
24 officer said "Evacuate" and then suddenly everybody was
25 out. The process was allowed to continue so that the

1 final remaining walking wounded came off before
2 everybody left?

3 A. That's correct, yes, there was only -- you know, you're
4 talking sort of, like, one or two people that were left.
5 So it was basically, the timing bit I think just
6 coincided correctly with the last walking wounded being
7 taken off anyway.

8 Q. Could you just describe for us, please, Mr Counihan,
9 your recollection of the situation outside the front of
10 the station, when you got back up to ground level?

11 A. From what I can remember, chaos. There was people being
12 worked on in the street, I remember one of my colleagues
13 from -- who walked down from Liverpool Street coming up
14 to me and saying "Tony, Tony", he had to come right into
15 my face, so I was just in a daze, if you like, but
16 I remember there were two helicopters flying around, and
17 at the front, Aldgate High Street, was just completely
18 full of emergency service vehicles, ambulances,
19 paramedics, Fire Brigade, ambulance.

20 Q. You were offered, I think, medical attention, but you
21 declined because you felt that there were others in
22 greater need of such attention.

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. A little later, you were allowed back into the station
25 to collect your possessions and then I think you left.

1 Is that right?

2 A. That's correct, yes. I can't remember the exact time
3 that I left, but it was some time in the early to
4 mid-afternoon that I left.

5 Q. Is it right that, as a result of the terrible experience
6 of being there and having to go down into the track, you
7 were off work for a while after that?

8 A. That's correct. I was off for approximately five months
9 for the first time, and then, because I didn't want to
10 go back to work at Aldgate, I was found other employment
11 at Barbican and Farringdon, and then I got moved on
12 again, afterwards, but I had to go back off, and my
13 girlfriend and my GP made me go on medication the second
14 time I went off, because I couldn't sleep. I was
15 stressed out all the time and I got mood swings, angry,
16 upset, so I had to go on medication to help me calm
17 down, help me to sleep and relax and what have you, but
18 thankfully, I'm all off of that now.

19 Q. Finally, may I ask you this: when you were engaged in
20 shepherding the many hundreds of passengers out of the
21 tunnel, whom did you work most closely with? What other
22 members of staff do you recall helping you with that
23 process of shepherding them out of the tunnel?

24 A. I remember the four Metropolitan Line train drivers were
25 down there in various positions. I couldn't tell you

1 exactly where they were. Some were on the track. Some
2 were on the platform helping people at the end of the
3 platform to get physically off of the track on to the
4 platform.

5 I remember there was an off-duty train driver that
6 was going for a medical examination, I think it was
7 John Boyle, I think he was down there as well. From the
8 Underground point of view, I think, to be honest with
9 you, they were the only people, including myself, who
10 were down there from the Underground.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Counihan. Will you stay
12 there? There may be some further questions for you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody have any questions? It
14 looks as if -- Mr Taylor, sorry?

15 MR TAYLOR: No thank you, madam.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It looks as if there are no questions
17 for you, Mr Counihan. Your instincts were to help your
18 fellow human beings that day and I'm sure that those
19 people you helped off the train were enormously grateful
20 for your reassuring presence, for all the help you gave
21 them and for your loud voice. So thank you very much.
22 I hope you are truly over what was obviously a dreadful
23 experience for everybody concerned.

24 A. Thank you very much.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you for coming.

1 Yes, Mr Keith?

2 MR KEITH: My Lady, rather than read out the next statement,
3 I'm going to ask Mr Hay to call the final witness, and
4 then, if there's time left over, with your leave, I'll
5 read the final statement.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well.

7 I have a feeling my microphone may have been off
8 during parts of the last witness's evidence, for which
9 I apologise. It's because I've been trying to stop my
10 coughs and sneezes from affecting the transcription.

11 MR LESLEY ROBERT DRINKWATER (affirmed)

12 Questions by MR HAY

13 MR HAY: Can you give your full name for the court, please?

14 A. Yes. It's Lesley Robert Drinkwater.

15 Q. In July 2005, you were employed by London Underground?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. You may still be employed by them?

18 A. Yes, I am.

19 Q. We've heard reference today to the Metropolitan Line
20 train drivers, one of whom we know is Mark Williams.
21 But you were one of the other ones, weren't you?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. How long had you worked on the Metropolitan Line in
24 2005?

25 A. I had started with the Metropolitan in 2002, so

1 approximately three years.

2 Q. On the morning of 7 July, you picked up your train in

3 Neasden?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. You had taken it to Amersham?

6 A. Amersham, yes.

7 Q. And then to Aldgate?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Do you recall roughly what time you arrived at Aldgate?

10 A. I think I was due to reach Aldgate by 8.44, but I was

11 running just a little bit late, so probably

12 3 or 4 minutes late. Platform number 3 I arrived at.

13 Q. As you said, you brought your train into platform

14 number 3?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. There you hand over to another driver?

17 A. That's it.

18 Q. What should you have done then?

19 A. Basically, you normally have a break of about 5 to

20 6 minutes where you have time to maybe get a coffee and,

21 at that point, you would make your way to the front of

22 the platform and pick up the next train after your one

23 had gone out. So it's basically you step back to

24 another train.

25 Q. Can we have up on the screen [INQ10280-3], please?

1 I think you were making your way -- were you going to
2 get a cup of coffee, was that your intention?

3 A. No, normally, it's just out of habit, I would walk up
4 the stairs on platform 3, or it could be 2, but on that
5 day, it was platform 3 and sort of -- normally, sort of
6 you would hang around on the mezzanine level just before
7 the stairs that lead you up to street level and then
8 wait for your train to come in, and then make your way
9 down once you'd -- you know, that train had come in.

10 Q. When you got to the base of the stairs, what happened?

11 A. There was another passenger with me. Normally, at that
12 time in the morning, the passengers are very quick to
13 get off the train and off to work, basically, but there
14 was a passenger there.

15 We had just got to the base of the stairs, and I, at
16 that point, heard an extremely loud bang.

17 Q. What was your initial reaction to that?

18 A. Well, I sort of ducked at first because the kind of
19 girders above me -- basically, it shook throughout the
20 station, it was that intense, and kind of rust and, to
21 be honest with you, it's like pigeon droppings had sort
22 of dropped down on my head and obviously the passenger.
23 So I sort of ducked.

24 Then the passenger himself asked me, he said, you
25 know, "What the hell was that?" and almost jovially

1 I said "It sounded like a bomb", not actually thinking
2 that it was one, but that was my first impression.
3 Q. So you carried on up the stairs to the mezzanine level.
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Then I think you turned and looked towards the tunnel.
6 A. That's the first time I actually saw smoke sort of
7 filtering out of the tunnel, and then it sort of rolled
8 out of the tunnel towards ...
9 Q. At that point, you could also see the train which had
10 previously been at platform number 2, is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It had just appeared to have moved off from the
13 platform?
14 A. Yes, I would say it's about half a car, maybe
15 three-quarters of a car out of the platform when it
16 immediately stopped, once traction current had obviously
17 been discharged.
18 Q. You then received instructions to evacuate the station?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. I think your first priority at that point was then to
21 evacuate the train on platform 2?
22 A. Yes, because the doors were still closed, so, as
23 Mr Counihan had said, we operate the butterfly cocks on
24 each carriage, eight carriages all in all and,
25 basically, once the passengers are off the train, then

1 you close them, close down the train, and get the people
2 out, basically.

3 Q. How quickly were you able to evacuate the train on
4 platform 2?

5 A. It was pretty quick. There weren't an awful lot of
6 people on there, so I'd say reasonably quickly. Not
7 trying to guess, but I'd say 3 minutes, 2 or 3 minutes.

8 Q. We know that Mr Counihan assisted you in that task. Do
9 you recall who else helped you?

10 A. I would say Steve Eldridge, I'm not sure about
11 Mark Williams who was the driver of that train. Steve
12 certainly did and maybe Paul Hawkins.

13 Q. If it helps, in your statement you provided to the
14 police in October 2005 you refer to Paul Hawkins.

15 A. Oh, I did as well, okay.

16 Q. You then, I believe, made your way to the station
17 supervisor's office, Ms Harrison's office?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. What did she say to you?

20 A. Basically, at that point, we all put on our hi-vis,
21 grabbed a torch, the station had kind of been closed at
22 that point, the gates along the front had been closed.
23 The first order of business was to empty the station,
24 but she did ask if we could go down and sort of
25 ascertain what had happened. That's my recollection of

1 it, anyway.

2 Q. Who went down to the platforms with you to see what had
3 happened?

4 A. At that point, it was myself, Steve Eldridge,
5 Mark Williams and Paul Hawkins.

6 Q. I think it was at that point you made your way on to the
7 platforms and you first saw people emerging from the
8 tunnel.

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Can you describe what you saw?

11 A. I think there was a man who had come out -- who came out
12 first. Obviously, it was very dense sort of smoke and
13 dust, so you didn't really see them until they were
14 literally within a couple of yards of you, and then
15 after that, then there was a reasonably young lady.
16 That was quite shocking, because she was covered in
17 blood, front and back, and I knew then that we were in
18 serious trouble.

19 Q. I think in response to that your first thought was to go
20 back to the supervisor's office?

21 A. I run up back to the supervisor's office to Celia and
22 I requested that she get all the emergency services that
23 were available, stressed, you know, that we would need
24 them. I thought we would need them at that point.

25 Q. We heard Ms Harrison refer earlier to having some

1 station radios available.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I take it from the fact that you had to go back to her
4 office that you didn't have a radio with you?

5 A. No, no.

6 Q. When you went to the office, I think you also took the
7 first aid kit, which was a --

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. We've heard that described earlier today. Are you,
10 yourself, a trained first aider?

11 A. No, I'm not.

12 Q. But I think, rather than taking that kit down to the
13 platform and into the tunnel, you actually provided it
14 to someone who needed it there and then, is that
15 correct?

16 A. Yes, there was a gentleman, he come up to me, he had
17 blood dripping from his middle finger and he had
18 mentioned that he thought that his actual finger was
19 broken and, not having been medically trained, I sort of
20 fumbled with the box, but I didn't do a very good job
21 and he kindly said, "Look, I think there's probably
22 people down there who are in greater need than me", and
23 he made his way to the surface.

24 So basically, I left him there and carried on with
25 my duties.

1 Q. When you say you carried on with your duties, I think
2 you formed part of a human chain effectively leading
3 from the tunnel to the platform. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes. Basically, Mark and Steve moved down the ramp on
5 platform number 2, down into the tunnel. From there, it
6 was myself and then Paul Hawkins taking up the rear.
7 I'm not sure about Tony. I didn't see him. I can
8 only speak for the other Metropolitan drivers, you know.
9 But obviously he was there, you know.

10 Q. Were you all wearing high visibility vests?

11 A. Yes, we were. Yes.

12 Q. Did you all have torches with you?

13 A. Yes, handlamps.

14 Q. We often hear about people walking down the tracks and,
15 to us sitting in the courtroom, that probably sounds
16 quite simple, but actually the track itself is probably
17 quite hazardous to walk along, isn't it?

18 A. It wasn't a very good situation because -- because
19 you've got crossovers there and the pointwork, the
20 actual passengers would have to walk over quite a lot of
21 rails and it was potentially quite dangerous because the
22 visibility was quite bad at that point. So I made
23 a suggestion to Paul that it might be a better idea if
24 we could just pull them over to platform 3 so that
25 they're walking more against the cable run, where the

1 wall is, and it seemed -- but actually they had started
2 to do that anyway, so it weren't too much of a problem.
3 But we transferred the people coming off the train
4 from platform 2 then to 3. So 3 became the main
5 exitway.

6 Q. Eventually, the emergency services started to arrive.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you remember who arrived first? Was it the
9 Fire Brigade, the ambulance, the police?

10 A. I think it was the Fire Brigade. I believe they were
11 the first.

12 I haven't mentioned there were two BTP Police who
13 were there very, very quickly once the explosion
14 happened. Sorry, I forgot to mention them.

15 Q. That's because the BTP office is by Aldgate station?

16 A. That's right, yes, but they were off doing whatever they
17 needed to do. Once again, yes, it was the Fire Brigade,
18 I believe, who were first.

19 Q. Are you able to recall -- I know it's difficult, with
20 the passage of time, but are you able to recall how much
21 time had elapsed since you heard the explosion from when
22 you first saw the Fire Brigade on the platform?

23 A. It is very hard because, you know, there's so much going
24 on and your adrenaline is sort of running. It could be
25 anywhere between, I would have thought, 20 to 35

1 minutes.

2 Q. Then after the Fire Brigade, do you remember how much
3 time then passed until the paramedics arrived on the
4 platform?

5 A. Well, if the Fire Brigade got there at 20, I would have
6 thought it would have been over 30 minutes for the
7 paramedics, but again, this is pure speculation. I'm
8 trying to get an idea of timeframes and it's very
9 difficult.

10 Q. We all appreciate it was a long time ago.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. When the Fire Brigade were on the platform, do you
13 recall there being any concerns about whether or not
14 they should get on to the tracks or not? Were you able
15 to see that, or were you focusing on passengers coming
16 off from the train?

17 A. I think, at that point, we had got quite used to sort of
18 ferrying passengers off the trains, so we sort of kind
19 of carried on. If I remember rightly, there was
20 a discussion between the Fire Brigade, I think maybe
21 a senior police officer, about that there may have been
22 another device on the track, because they thought there
23 could be another bomb, and, you know -- and basically,
24 were people prepared to go back down into the tunnel,
25 could only ask for volunteers, but there didn't seem to

1 be a problem on that.

2 Q. I think, as you said, you heard this concern about
3 secondary devices?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. But you, yourself, stayed and continued to help people
6 off the platform, off the train towards the platform?

7 A. Yes, all London Underground staff, as far as I know,
8 stayed.

9 Q. How many people do you estimate came off the Aldgate
10 train that morning?

11 A. Again, I mean, in my statement, I think I put down 500,
12 but it's very speculative, could be more, could be maybe
13 a little bit less.

14 Q. Do you recall the last people you helped?

15 A. Yes, there was a guy, his name was Bruno, I believe, he
16 was very badly injured. They had got him on to
17 platform 3 and I assisted by sort of holding him up by
18 his left arm. I think there was a member -- a paramedic
19 had his right arm and we were sort of walking him up the
20 first set of stairs. He did have one eye completely
21 closed. It looked like something had hit him in the
22 eye.

23 Then, when we got to the mezzanine level before the
24 last flight of stairs to street level, he was starting
25 to pass out, but he would -- actually he'd come to then,

1 but he wouldn't actually leave until his girlfriend,
2 I believe -- and he kept shouting out for some girl
3 named Crystal, I believe her name was.

4 Q. I think you have referred to him as "Bruno", Bruno was
5 a dancer, wasn't he?

6 A. I think so. I think I saw him on TV some time
7 afterwards and I recognised the face.

8 Q. I think we know him to be Bruce Lait.

9 A. Oh, is it Bruce? I thought it was Bruno, sorry.

10 Q. Eventually, there came a point when there was
11 effectively a standoff and everyone was told to leave
12 the station.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I think we understand that to be about 10.30. Later in
15 the day, you then undertook a debrief with Mr O'Riordan,
16 is that correct?

17 A. Yes, I think there was two. When we were told to
18 evacuate the station, it was made very clear that that
19 was it, enough is enough, you're leaving the station.
20 We met -- we were sort of ferried to a kind of island in
21 the middle of the road, and we were there for a little
22 while. He gave us a kind of minor debrief, basically
23 saying, "Look, just hang about here, and we'll see what
24 we can do". The police had taken over and the
25 paramedics were just dealing with the people that were

1 left on the train that couldn't be taken off. Then we
2 were taken to St Botolph's church where we had our sort
3 of final, probably the main debrief, and at that point
4 he sort of -- he did say that seven people had been
5 killed.

6 Q. So it was a debrief at which it was explained to you
7 what had happened --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- rather than you providing feedback as to how you
10 thought the day had gone and how you thought things
11 could be improved?

12 A. No, it wasn't basically us giving any sort of testimony
13 of what had happened that day. It was basically him
14 giving us a kind of overview of what had happened that
15 day.

16 MR HAY: Mr Drinkwater, thank you very much. I have no more
17 questions for you, but there may be some more.

18 A. Okay, thank you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Drinkwater?
20 Mr Drinkwater, it sounds as if there are no
21 questions for you, so thank you very much for coming
22 along to assist these inquests. You very modestly said
23 you went back to your duties. I don't think it was your
24 duty to put your own life at risk and go into that
25 tunnel to help people, so given that you helped so many

1 people in dire need, may I thank you on their behalf.
2 A. Thank you very much.
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.
4 Yes, Mr Hay?
5 MR HAY: My Lady, there is one statement to be read. It's
6 a page and a half long.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Shall we complete that?
8 MR HAY: I'm grateful. It's the statement of
9 Stephen Winning dated 18 November 2005 and it also has
10 the usual statement of truth.
11 Statement of MR STEPHEN WINNING read
12 "I am employed by London Underground as a customer
13 service assistant, a position I have held for 20 years.
14 My duties include conducting security checks on the
15 station, manning the gate line, making announcements,
16 keeping the information boards updated and general
17 customer assistance.
18 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I booked on at my home
19 station, Aldgate, at 8.00. The supervisors on duty was
20 Celia Harrison and Tony Counihan. My other colleagues
21 were Peter Large and John Parnki, both on duty in the
22 booking office.
23 "I took up my position on the gate line and began
24 making announcements and looking after the customer
25 care. Some time around 8.50, whilst standing with

1 Tony Counihan at the top of the stairs to the platform,
2 still in the booking hall area, I heard a loud bang. It
3 sounded like an explosion. In 20 years I had never
4 heard anything like it before. All the lights flickered
5 off - the dot matrix board went blank. I then noticed
6 black smoke coming from the tunnels at platforms 2 and 3
7 from the Liverpool Street area coming towards us.
8 "I went into the office and asked Celia what had
9 happened. At the time, she was not sure. She was
10 struggling to get information. The phones were not
11 working properly. She initially told us she had heard
12 it was an electrical fault. She said we would have to
13 start evacuating fairly soon. We went back outside and
14 started to clear the station of customers. There is
15 only one entrance/exit to the station leading to Aldgate
16 High Street and that is where we sent people. The black
17 smoke was still there. It was thick and there was
18 a smell like burning rubber and dust. Then we started
19 to get people, walking wounded, coming up on to
20 platforms 1 and 2 all covered in soot, smoke and dust.
21 We started to take people upstairs to the British
22 Transport Police office outside the station and offered
23 first aid.
24 "There was a plainclothes police officer I know as
25 Tony and another officer also in plainclothes with blond

1 hair. They were helping us to evacuate the station.
2 Then Tony Counihan, two Metropolitan Line drivers whose
3 trains were in the middle two platforms, and the two
4 officers, to the best of my knowledge, left the platform
5 area and went to the train that was stuck in the tunnel
6 between us and Liverpool Street.
7 "You could just see the train from the very end of
8 platform 4. There was too much smoke to see it very
9 well. Peter Large and myself were in the booking hall
10 area assisting passengers outside the station to where
11 there were other police officers in plainclothes. Still
12 at this stage, there were no London ambulance or London
13 Fire Brigade in attendance. Some of the people we were
14 assisting had injuries. They looked like they had been
15 hit by shrapnel or caught in the blast in some way.
16 Then I went back down and assisted a police officer with
17 a sniffer dog to check the two Metropolitan Line trains.
18 They were all clear. Then the doors were all closed up
19 and the trains secured.
20 "Not long after that, the Fire Brigade and
21 ambulances began to arrive and they started to take over
22 the scene and deal with the wounded. The borwick gates
23 were partially closed and then manned by uniformed
24 police officers. I remained inside the station
25 directing people from the train upstairs where uniformed

1 officers were taking over and sending people over to the
2 bus depot over the road. Meanwhile, London Ambulance
3 Service were working on people who were badly injured.
4 Some time later, I think around 10.00 to 10.30, we were
5 all required to leave the station. We were told there
6 could possibly be a secondary device. We later found it
7 was what the emergency services called the 'cooling down
8 hour'. We went and waited at the school - St Botolph's
9 Junior or Primary nearby. Then we were told we could go
10 to St Botolph's Church to get a coffee, et cetera but
11 then to meet again in an hour for another debrief. This
12 was from our group station manager, Tom O'Riordan. At
13 the debrief, I cannot remember what time it was, some of
14 us asked if we could now go home. Then we were allowed
15 to go back into the supervisor's office, escorted one at
16 a time by a police officer to retrieve our belongings
17 before going home."

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

19 Mr Hay, I see that Mr Henning has been here today.

20 I just wanted to assure him that I had seen his email
21 and, if we haven't covered the points that he has raised
22 about the response of the emergency services during this
23 stage of the proceedings, we will, of course, be making
24 sure his questions will be addressed at some stage.

25 MR HAY: I'm grateful, my Lady.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Only one other question. As far as
2 Mrs Gray is concerned, how do we ensure that any
3 questions she may have are put?
4 Sorry, I think again my microphone wasn't on.
5 I apologise again.
6 MR HAY: My Lady, I believe Mrs Gray may be in the family
7 room and we will enquire into what is the best means to
8 ensure that, if she does need to communicate if
9 questions be put, that we find some form of doing that.
10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Smith has just assured me that
11 provision will be made, if Mrs Gray does have any
12 questions, that they are related. Thank you very much.
13 10.00 tomorrow please.
14 (4.30 pm)
15 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
16