

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 11 October 2010 - Morning session

1 Monday, 11 October 2010

2 (10.30 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We are here today to resume the  
4 inquests into the deaths of the 52 innocent people who  
5 were killed as a result of the bombs in London on  
6 7 July 2005. I should like to take a moment to remember  
7 them individually.

8 Mr Keith will read out each of their names and then  
9 I shall ask all of us who can stand to do so for  
10 a minute's silence in their memory. Mr Keith?

11 MR KEITH: Lee Baisden. Benedetta Ciaccia. Richard Ellery.  
12 Richard Gray. Anne Moffat. Fiona Stevenson.

13 Carrie Taylor. Michael Brewster. Jonathan Downey.

14 David Foulkes. Colin Morley. Jennifer Nicholson.

15 Laura Webb. James Adams. Samantha Badham.

16 Philip Beer. Anna Brandt. Ciaran Cassidy.

17 Rachelle Chung For Yuen. Elizabeth Daplyn.

18 Arthur Frederick. Karolina Gluck. Gamze Gunoral.

19 Lee Harris. Ojara Ikeagwu. Emily Jenkins.

20 Adrian Johnson. Helen Jones. Susan Levy.

21 Shelley Mather. Michael Matsushita. James Mayes.

22 Behnaz Mozakka. Mihaela Otto. Atique Sharifi.

23 Ihab Slimane. Christian Small. Monika Suchocka.

24 Mala Trivedi. Anthony Fatayi-Williams. Jamie Gordon.

25 Giles Hart. Marie Hartley. Miriam Hyman.

1 Shahara Islam. Neetu Jain. Sam Son Ly.  
2 Shyanuja Parathasangary. Anat Rosenberg.  
3 Philip Russell. William Wise. Gladys Wundowa. [INQ9965-1]  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Please stand.  
5 (A minute's silence)  
6 Thank you.  
7 Before we begin, I should like to outline the  
8 practical arrangements that we have made for the conduct  
9 of these hearings.  
10 As you can see, we have made some alterations to the  
11 layout of the courtroom. There are 16 legal teams in  
12 court today. The number of parties means that seating  
13 available in court for those not directly participating  
14 in the proceedings is smaller than usual. I'm  
15 conscious, however, that these inquests will be of  
16 interest to many people. To accommodate those who wish  
17 to follow the proceedings, my Secretariat has arranged  
18 for a semi-permanent annex to be erected within the  
19 precincts of the Royal Courts of Justice.  
20 Those seated in the annex will be able to follow the  
21 proceedings in full via a live videolink from this  
22 court. They will also be able to see the evidence  
23 displayed electronically and follow the real-time  
24 transcription.  
25 The annex is, therefore, an extension of this

1 courtroom and the same rules and code of conduct apply  
2 there. All those wishing to come and go will have more  
3 freedom to do so, but I would ask you to remember that  
4 any noise from the annex is likely to interfere with  
5 other judges, other litigants and other cases, so please  
6 be careful.

7 In this court, legal teams and others may, of  
8 course, come and go as necessary, but I would ask you to  
9 do so in a manner that causes the minimum amount of  
10 disturbance and, where possible, I would ask you to wait  
11 until there is a natural break in the proceedings.

12 Separate arrangements have been made for the  
13 bereaved families to follow the proceedings in private,  
14 should they so wish.

15 I would like to say a word or two about the privacy  
16 of those involved in these inquests. I'm aware that  
17 a number of bereaved families and witnesses, including  
18 survivors, have expressed concern about appearing in  
19 public. Not surprisingly, many are still struggling to  
20 come to terms with the terrible events of 7 July, and  
21 many will be attending court and reliving the detail of  
22 that day out of a sense of public duty.

23 In those circumstances, may I remind members of the  
24 media of the need to respect the privacy of both the  
25 bereaved families and the witnesses throughout the

1 course of these proceedings. In particular, I ask you  
2 not to seek unsolicited interviews within the precincts  
3 of the Royal Courts of Justice. I am sure that families  
4 and witnesses will be extremely grateful if the same  
5 restraint is also exercised outside the precincts of the  
6 courts.

7 No doubt those who do wish to speak to the media  
8 will make themselves known to you.

9 As you will know, I have set a very strict timetable  
10 for these proceedings which I still hope will conclude  
11 in the spring of next year. We will hear evidence  
12 relating to the Aldgate, Edgware Road and Russell Square  
13 bombs before adjourning for the Christmas break. We  
14 will resume on 12 January, when we will hear evidence  
15 relating to Tavistock Square. This will be followed  
16 in February by evidence relating to the backgrounds of  
17 Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Hasib Hussain  
18 and Jermaine Lindsay. We will then hear forensic  
19 evidence and pathological evidence, evidence relating to  
20 command and control, generic emergency response evidence  
21 and, finally, evidence on the issue of preventability.  
22 The court will usually sit Monday to Thursday with  
23 Fridays being set aside for administrative matters and  
24 or applications. For a variety of reasons, in some  
25 weeks, we may have to swap the Thursday with the Friday.

1 To accommodate the number of witnesses to be called  
2 each day, I have decided that the sitting day will, for  
3 the most part, start at 10.00 in the morning and finish  
4 at 4.30 in the afternoon. Where time allows, we will  
5 have a short break mid-morning and again in the  
6 afternoon.

7 I am immensely grateful to all of the legal teams,  
8 especially my own, who have worked so hard over the  
9 summer in preparation for today. The pressure on them  
10 will continue as we ensure that we conduct an effective  
11 and thorough investigation within the timeframe I have  
12 outlined.

13 As coroner, the decisions as to what material should  
14 be disclosed and the way in which the evidence is  
15 presented rest with me. The approach that I have taken  
16 is that all relevant material received by the Inquest  
17 team should be made available to those interested  
18 persons who have requested it. I have asked my team to  
19 interpret what is relevant broadly. There will  
20 inevitably be public interest immunity claims and I will  
21 balance carefully the needs of national security with  
22 the needs of relevance and fairness.

23 It's in the interests of everyone that these  
24 inquests are conducted in as open a manner as possible  
25 and, contrary to some reports in the media today, I did

1 not decide to sit without a jury so as to consider  
2 intelligence material in private. I have yet to decide  
3 whether it is within my powers and, if so, whether it is  
4 in the interests of justice to conduct any closed  
5 hearings.

6 I have mentioned already the practical steps taken  
7 to ensure that as many people as possible are able to  
8 follow the live hearings in the Royal Courts of Justice.  
9 It is unlikely, however, that all those who have an  
10 interest in these inquests will be able to come to court  
11 every day. I have therefore decided that the  
12 transcripts of these proceedings will be posted on to  
13 the inquest website after each morning and afternoon  
14 session. Where possible, and subject to any argument as  
15 to the exclusion of particular material or exhibits,  
16 maps, plans, photographs, witness statements, video and  
17 audio footage will be available on the website once it  
18 has been referred to in open court. However, as I say,  
19 that must be subject to argument before me.

20 I have already received two particular applications  
21 relating to material which Mr Keith intends to show  
22 during his opening to me, probably on Tuesday or  
23 Wednesday. I would invite those making the application  
24 to discuss with each other and with representatives of  
25 the media whether a sensible compromise can be reached.

1 If not, I shall decide the issue tomorrow.

2 That is not to say, of course, that every detail  
3 will be put into the public domain. As I've already  
4 mentioned, the privacy of individuals is an important  
5 consideration to me and personal details such as  
6 addresses will be withheld, unless, of course, there is  
7 some relevance to them.

8 I would also again reassure families that no graphic  
9 images of their loved ones will be made available on the  
10 website. I will hear, as I've said, representations  
11 that they may wish to make as to what material is made  
12 available.

13 As I've also indicated, I am prepared to hear  
14 submissions from the media where necessary, if they  
15 believe material should be published.

16 Legal teams know that they will have access to the  
17 Lextranet calendar, which is updated regularly with  
18 lists of witnesses. The website will also provide  
19 details of when witnesses are to give evidence. Each  
20 Friday, a list will be posted detailing the names of the  
21 witnesses due to give evidence during the following  
22 week.

23 I have received a number, a small number, of  
24 applications from witnesses seeking to remain anonymous.  
25 Out of a total of 484 witnesses with whom my team has

1    been in contact, there are, I believe, at present five  
2    applications for anonymity. Of course, I may receive  
3    more in the future.

4    Where I receive applications of this sort,  
5    Mr Martin Smith, Solicitor to the Inquest, will seek  
6    representations from the various legal teams and,  
7    indeed, the media will be free to make representations  
8    to me as well. Depending on the circumstances, it may  
9    be necessary for me to hold a short hearing to hear oral  
10   submissions.

11   I will then decide whether to grant the application.  
12   I will do so in accordance with the law which, in large  
13   part, is regarded as settled. In short, in each  
14   individual case, I will have to consider various factors  
15   and balance them, including whether or not the witness  
16   concerned has subjective fears about their safety and  
17   whether or not those fears are objectively justified.

18   If the media wish to obtain details of any  
19   application for anonymity, they can obtain them from  
20   Mr Smith.

21   That brings me to the role of the Solicitor to the  
22   Inquests and counsel. Because of the scale and  
23   complexity of these inquests, I have appointed Solicitor  
24   and Counsel to the Inquests. They are, as I've already  
25   mentioned, Mr Martin Smith, and Mr Hugo Keith Queen's

1 Counsel, Mr Andrew O'Connor and Mr Benjamin Hay are all  
2 Counsel to the Inquests. I wish to emphasise they are  
3 all independent practitioners. Mr Smith has a deputy,  
4 Mr Timothy Suter. Their job is to assist the court and  
5 help ensure that all relevant evidence is adduced before  
6 me.

7 Counsel's primary function is to examine the large  
8 number of witnesses whom I have decided to call to give  
9 oral evidence. They will also read into the transcript  
10 the written statements of any witnesses whose statements  
11 I have determined should be read as hearsay pursuant to  
12 the provisions of rule 37 of the Coroners Rules 1984,  
13 subject to any further decision I make in relation to  
14 the statements of members of the bereaved families.

15 In addition, Counsel to the Inquests will make  
16 submissions to me in open court on the law. I do not  
17 favour their submissions over those of any other  
18 counsel, but I weigh the points they make and decide  
19 whether to accept or reject them in the same way that  
20 I shall consider the points made by all the other legal  
21 teams and, of course, any submissions made to me by  
22 unrepresented parties.

23 Soon I will be asking Mr Keith to open the inquests.  
24 His opening is intended as a summary of the key points  
25 in the written evidence that is available which will

1 assist me, the interested persons and the members of the  
2 public and the media to understand the state of the  
3 evidence.

4 Of course, it will always remain my job to hear the  
5 evidence and ultimately reach my own conclusions upon it  
6 when I come to reach my verdicts.

7 I am obliged to say something about rule 37. It  
8 provides the power for me to admit in evidence any  
9 document that is hearsay, if I consider that its  
10 contents are unlikely to be disputed. However,  
11 rule 37.3 provides that, before I do so, at the  
12 beginning of the inquest I must make a public  
13 announcement that I intend to do this, that I must state  
14 the maker of the document's full name and give a brief  
15 account of the document so that any interested person  
16 may ask to see and object to it being used in this way.  
17 In these inquests, as the legal representatives and  
18 the interested persons know, I have decided that the  
19 statements of many witnesses who can give relevant  
20 evidence should be read to the court by Counsel to the  
21 Inquests.

22 All interested persons have been provided with  
23 provisional witness lists setting this out and have had  
24 an opportunity to comment upon and object to those  
25 lists. They also have access to the timetable which

1 sets out the names of the witnesses whose statements  
2 I propose are read.  
3 Those interested persons who have requested access  
4 to disclosure documentation also have access to the  
5 statements through the Lextranet database. If there are  
6 any changes or additions to the statements I intend to  
7 have read under rule 37, interested persons will have  
8 access to this information by consulting the calendar.  
9 Accordingly, interested persons who have already had an  
10 opportunity to object to statements being read under  
11 rule 37, those who wish to do so in relation to  
12 additional documents I suggest are read should consult  
13 the calendar regularly and inform me, through Mr Smith,  
14 if they have any objections.  
15 Finally, before I ask Mr Keith to speak, I'm sure  
16 I do not need to remind anyone that the material we will  
17 hear and see during the course of these proceedings will  
18 necessarily be of an extremely distressing nature. The  
19 bombings had devastating consequences, and it will be  
20 impossible to explore the issues fully without going  
21 into some very distressing detail.  
22 We have the benefit of a qualified counsellor  
23 present in court each day. Whatever your role in these  
24 proceedings, please feel free to use this service if you  
25 feel the need to do so. Thank you.

1 Mr Keith?

2 Opening statement by Mr Keith

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, as all the families know only too well,  
4 during the morning of 7 July 2005, four bombs exploded  
5 in the heart of London. They detonated amongst the  
6 innocent and the unknowing, indiscriminately killing and  
7 maiming passengers who were simply going about their  
8 daily business.

9 The bombs struck down men and women, the old and the  
10 young, British nationals as well as foreigners, they  
11 paid no regard to whether the victim was Christian or  
12 Muslim, a follower of any of our other great faiths or  
13 an adherent to none. They were just travelling on  
14 London's transport system. It is the saddest of duties  
15 to open their inquests.

16 There are a large number of families present before  
17 you today, my Lady, as interested persons. Most are  
18 legally represented, and there are also a number of  
19 organisations legally represented before you as well.  
20 Madam, the list of those interested persons and the  
21 list of their legal representatives, where applicable,  
22 is available on the public website, and I shan't, with  
23 your leave, therefore, read them all out.

24 The slaughter caused by the bombs caused not only  
25 death, devastation and mutilation, but unleashed an

1 unimagable tidal wave of shock, misery and horror for  
2 their families and loved ones. Just as the lives of the  
3 52 victims were callously and brutally ended, the lives  
4 of many others have been, and continue to be, tortured  
5 and wrecked. The bombs could only have had one purpose.  
6 They were intended to kill and to injure. They were  
7 acts of merciless savagery and one can only imagine at  
8 the sheer inhumanity of the perpetrators.  
9 Although the plotters plainly designed their plot in  
10 a way that would add the fuel of worldwide publicity to  
11 their aims, these inquests have at their heart, however,  
12 the single fact that there was a conspiracy to murder.  
13 Each of these 52 inquests is concerned with an act of  
14 murder. We have found no evidence to the contrary. It  
15 is also clear from the evidence that is available that  
16 the four men who detonated the bombs were  
17 Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay  
18 and Hasib Hussain. To reflect the reality of the  
19 position and to avoid legal sophistry, I intend to call  
20 them "the bombers".  
21 Madam, it is, of course, a matter entirely for you  
22 at the conclusion of these proceedings, having heard and  
23 considered all the evidence, and having applied the  
24 necessary standard of proof, your conclusion in relation  
25 to section 4 of the inquisition and that conclusion is

1 likely to be unlawful killing.

2 I must not, of course, prejudge your conclusion, but  
3 it would make a nonsense of these proceedings for me to  
4 suggest anything other than that the evidence so far  
5 gathered points to the deaths of these 52 deceased being  
6 unlawful killings.

7 I can say these things in relation to the essential  
8 acts at the heart of these inquests, notwithstanding the  
9 provisions of section 11 of the Coroners Act and the  
10 relevant rules in the Coroners Rules, because of course  
11 the relevant rule, rule 42, prohibits only the framing  
12 of the verdict in such a way as to appear to determine  
13 any question of criminal liability on the part of  
14 a named person, and what I say, as, my Lady, you have  
15 already observed, is only comment from the independent  
16 team instructed by you to assist and would not be  
17 reflected, in any event, in your own verdict, unless you  
18 were so satisfied, having heard all the evidence.  
19 Further, the recognition of the essential nature of  
20 these acts as acts of murder does not seem to us to  
21 amount to the impermissible expression of opinion such  
22 as would be contrary to rule 36, given that the act of  
23 detonating a bomb in a public place is so self-evidently  
24 an act of murder and that act was directly causative of  
25 death. Those identified by the police as the

1 perpetrators are, of course, dead.

2 But again, I must emphasise it is not a proper  
3 function of an inquest to attribute blame or apportion  
4 guilt, or a proper function of mine to express opinions  
5 on impermissible areas. There are other more important  
6 issues for us to explore, and I will turn to them in  
7 a moment.

8 To all in this courtroom, and to many outside, the  
9 conclusion that the four men were the bombers may seem  
10 like a statement of the obvious and the question may  
11 therefore be asked: what is the purpose of these  
12 proceedings?

13 The short answer to the question is that, as  
14 coroner, my Lady, you have ordered these inquests to be  
15 resumed for the reasons that you gave in your ruling of  
16 21 May of this year, but may I, for one moment, remind  
17 the court and those listening of what you said in  
18 essence in your ruling.

19 You observed that there have, of course, already  
20 been a number of official reports and a criminal trial  
21 of three men accused of conspiring with them to cause  
22 explosions. If I may list them, the government  
23 published, in May 2006, an official account of the  
24 bombings, but although helpful and informative, it  
25 spanned just 30 pages. The London Regional Resilience

1 Forum published, in September 2006, a report on  
2 emergency planning which dealt with matters such as the  
3 Strategic Coordination Centre, telecommunications,  
4 cordons, the effect on the business community, chemical,  
5 biological and radiological contamination, the family  
6 assistance centre and the issues concerning the  
7 Resilience Mortuary.

8 All were and remain important topics, but none of  
9 them were really directed towards the individuals  
10 concerned in the individual deceased.

11 The 7 July Review Committee of the London Assembly  
12 received, as we will hear in due course, a great deal of  
13 evidence from survivors and the emergency services, some  
14 in private and some in public, and published an  
15 extremely valuable three-volume report in June 2006, and  
16 a followup report in August 2007.

17 The report set out to establish what actually  
18 happened in the first few hours, addressed lessons to be  
19 learned and made detailed recommendations on a number of  
20 important issues, such as communications between the  
21 trains and the London Underground network control  
22 centre, the line controllers and the emergency services.  
23 Also, it focused on the emergency plans that had been  
24 put into operation, on lighting, on survivor reception  
25 issues and matters such as communication with the wider

1 public and support.

2 Finally, the Intelligence and Security Committee,  
3 commonly referred to as the ISC, of which we will hear  
4 much more, reported to the Prime Minister in 2006, under  
5 the heading "Report into the London terrorist attacks",  
6 then again, in May 2009, under the heading "Could 7/7  
7 have been prevented?", but none of these processes, even  
8 the public ones, focused, as you remarked, on the  
9 individuals who died or properly engaged their families.  
10 There was no detailed examination of what actually  
11 happened to each deceased in the three carriages and on  
12 the bus. The families had no direct or formalised input  
13 into any of the reports. In none of them was there any  
14 judicial control. There were no lawyers to ask  
15 questions on their behalves, no examination of witnesses  
16 under oath and no institutionalised independence. The  
17 ISC's processes were largely conducted behind closed  
18 doors and, although it published open versions of its  
19 findings, significant sections of the text were redacted  
20 from those versions.

21 For its part, the criminal trial, although a formal  
22 legal process, did not really focus on the events of 7/7  
23 at all, but was instead concerned with an earlier  
24 alleged reconnaissance mission by others on 16 and  
25 17 December 2004. Accordingly, it did not focus on the

1 movements of Khan and Tanweer in the early part of 2004  
2 when they came under the surveillance of the  
3 Security Service in the course of another investigation,  
4 or their activities alongside those of Lindsay and  
5 Hussain in the days leading up to the 7 July the  
6 following year.

7 In your ruling, you therefore concluded that some  
8 sort of independent inquiry was required, that it be  
9 conducted in public and that it required the families to  
10 be involved in the exploration of issues beyond the  
11 immediate aftermath.

12 My Lady, the central function of an inquest, as you  
13 know, is to investigate and, if possible, to answer four  
14 important but limited factual questions: who the  
15 deceased were; and when, where and how. That is by what  
16 means they came by their deaths. There is also  
17 a requirement that the particulars necessary for the  
18 registration of deaths be ascertained. These questions,  
19 as well as the particulars, are reflected in the written  
20 document, known as the inquisition, which must be  
21 returned at the end of the hearings. Together they  
22 stand as the verdict.

23 My Lady, as you are aware, your predecessor, with  
24 jurisdiction over these inquests, Dr Reid, has already  
25 made findings in respect of all 52 deceased on the

1 issues of identity and cause of death. He's also in  
2 each case ascertained the registration particulars, and,  
3 as you've resumed these inquests without a jury for the  
4 reasons that you gave earlier in the year, you are not  
5 required, as a matter of law, to reinvestigate those  
6 issues and you have decided not to do so.

7 Although the majority of the technical questions may  
8 in large part therefore be undisputed, the central  
9 question still remains for you, my Lady, to investigate:  
10 how, that is by what means, the deceased came by their  
11 deaths. The process of enquiring into this issue,  
12 my Lady, enables the circumstances of each death as far  
13 as they are known to be subject to public scrutiny and  
14 judicial examination. This is achieved and will be  
15 achieved in these cases by the calling of evidence in  
16 public and by way of the narrative verdict that the law  
17 now allows even in non-article 2 cases.

18 The process also enables the families to play their  
19 part in the reaching of conclusions on the main issues  
20 that you have identified and the scope of your inquiry  
21 has been set wide. As was remarked in the judicial  
22 review proceedings arising out of the  
23 terrible Marchioness disaster, the inquiry is almost  
24 bound to stretch wider than strictly required for the  
25 purposes of a verdict. So it will here.

1 In preparing for these hearings, we have therefore  
2 sought, by contrast to what has come before, to focus on  
3 each individual and on the events in the tunnels and on  
4 the bus. Although it is likely that the plotters  
5 attacked one of London's most recognisable and new  
6 structures, its transport network, in order to spread  
7 the effects of their deeds as widely as possible, it is  
8 vital that we remember that this was an attack on  
9 individual people and that these proceedings are  
10 concerned with each unique victim.

11 In the same way that, as you noted in May, each is  
12 an individual loved and mourned, each is now the subject  
13 of these proceedings.

14 For this reason, may I say, my Lady, that you are  
15 planning to call, wherever possible, evidence from each  
16 of the families. At the beginning of the evidence  
17 relating to each of the four bomb scenes, we will be  
18 hearing written and, in a handful of instances, oral  
19 evidence from members of the deceased's families setting  
20 out something about their loved ones. This evidence  
21 will attempt to give a flavour of who they were, their  
22 personal qualities, their gifts and their plans.  
23 We readily accept that, of course, the limits of  
24 this process and of time mean that only the most  
25 imperfect of pictures can be painted, but we do hope

1 that it will help set the context of the scene evidence  
2 and ensure that the proceedings give an appropriate  
3 focus to each of the deceased as individuals.  
4 My Lady, one or two people have in recent days  
5 queried why we don't intend to display photographs of  
6 the deceased. The short reason is that we do not have  
7 many photographs and some families have indicated that  
8 they would not wish, in any event, photographs to be  
9 displayed.  
10 Where the family of the particular deceased has not  
11 been able or does not wish to provide such evidence, we  
12 will instead rely upon material collated by the  
13 Metropolitan Police Service in the days following 7/7 in  
14 their anticipation of a possible criminal trial, as well  
15 as material extracted from the book of tributes and some  
16 material from the public domain, all edited for the  
17 purpose of these proceedings by Mr Smith.  
18 This material will at least give some evidence  
19 relating to the last movements of the deceased, their  
20 personal background and their travel arrangements.  
21 My Lady, we cannot of course presume that these  
22 proceedings will in any way lessen the grief and the  
23 pain of the deceased's families. No examination of  
24 relevant issues and no analysis of evidence and law,  
25 however thorough or dedicated, can adequately reflect

1 the human tragedy that has occurred here or alleviate  
2 the unbearable pain. Nor can we promise that these  
3 proceedings will answer all of their questions. It  
4 would be quite impossible to identify, address and  
5 unravel every issue in the timeframe that we have, and  
6 I suspect that the families and the parties would not  
7 thank us if we attempted to do so.

8 Some of the questions may never fully be answered  
9 and some may of course also fall outside the scope of  
10 these inquests, but what we can say is that a great deal  
11 of time, energy and resources has been devoted to  
12 finding out what happened to each deceased. Thus it is  
13 to be hoped that these inquests, however unpleasant and  
14 distressing, as they will be, will assist in answering  
15 the families' questions in allaying some of the rumours  
16 and suspicion generated by conspiracy theorists.

17 I'll return a little later to the question of  
18 whether there is, in truth, any basis for some of the  
19 theories that have been canvassed in the press and on  
20 the internet.

21 We are confident that these inquests can deliver  
22 meaningful conclusions about the indirect as well as the  
23 direct causes of the deaths, as well as the potential  
24 responsibility and the lessons can be learnt. It is  
25 worth reminding ourselves, my Lady, that the inquests

1 procedure is an enquiry or inquisition by which the  
2 court endeavours to find out what happened.  
3 As has been said before in other inquests, there is  
4 no prosecution, no defence, just a search for the truth,  
5 and the procedure is as relevant today in the era of  
6 terrorism as it was at its inception over 800 years ago,  
7 and any lessons that we learn are likely to be of huge  
8 import, given the ever-present risks presented by those  
9 who would harm us.

10 My Lady, may I then turn to the question of timings  
11 and why we are sitting now as we are?

12 Some may ask why it has taken so long for us to  
13 reach this stage. The answer is straightforward. The  
14 fatalities caused by the explosions occurred in three  
15 coronial districts, that is to say three districts  
16 within the jurisdiction of three separate coroners.

17 There was City of London in relation to the deaths at  
18 Aldgate; Inner North London in relation to the deaths at  
19 Kings Cross and Tavistock Square; and Inner West London  
20 in relation to the deaths that took place near  
21 Edgware Road.

22 Following a certain amount of legal manoeuvring,  
23 coronial jurisdiction was brought under one roof, namely  
24 that of Dr Reid, who you know sat as both the Inner  
25 North London Coroner and as Assistant Deputy Coroner for

1 Inner West London. Meanwhile, the criminal  
2 investigation into those responsible for the bombs,  
3 including possible conspirators, continued and, in July  
4 of 2007, on the 31st of that month, Dr Reid formally  
5 adjourned all 52 inquests under section 16 of the  
6 Coroners Act following a request that he do so from the  
7 Director of Public Prosecutions.

8 My Lady, that request was made on account of the  
9 initiation of criminal proceedings against three men,  
10 Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem and Mohammed Shakil. They  
11 were accused of conspiring with the four bombers and  
12 others unknown to cause an explosion. In essence, they  
13 were accused of assisting the bombers by carrying out,  
14 in particular with Hussain and Lindsay, a reconnaissance  
15 mission over the two days of 16 and 17 December 2004.  
16 Hussain travelled to London with them and they met  
17 Lindsay once they were there. At that time, in fact, as  
18 we'll hear in due course, Khan and Tanweer were in  
19 Pakistan. But by law, these inquests could not  
20 therefore be reopened for consideration of whether they  
21 should be resumed until those criminal proceedings had  
22 been concluded.

23 The first jury in the trial of Waheed Ali, Saleem  
24 and Shakil was unable to reach a verdict and so it was  
25 discharged on 1 August 2008. The re-trial then

1 concluded on 28 April 2009 with acquittal of the three  
2 defendants on the charge of conspiring to cause an  
3 explosion, although two of the men, Ali and Shakil, were  
4 convicted of conspiracy to attend a place for terrorist  
5 training.

6 My Lady, on account of their acquittal, we do not  
7 intend to address the fact of the 16 and 17 December,  
8 but the connections between those three men and Khan,  
9 Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, remain relevant in these  
10 proceedings as they shed light on their background and  
11 activities.

12 As we'll also hear in due course, Waheed Ali, the  
13 first of those three tried coconspirators had, in fact,  
14 travelled to Pakistan with Khan between July  
15 and September 2001. Indeed, during his first conspiracy  
16 trial, Waheed Ali accepted that he travelled to Pakistan  
17 with Khan in 2001 and that he, Ali, had received  
18 terrorist training when there.

19 The second man, Shakil, had also travelled to  
20 Pakistan with Khan, this time in July 2003 a fact also  
21 established in the course of their trial.

22 During that trip, Khan had used a pseudonym  
23 "Ibrahim" and Shakil the name "Zubair". There they met  
24 a man called Omar Khyam, also known as Ausman to his  
25 contacts in Pakistan, who was later convicted of

1 involvement in the Crevice conspiracy, the fertiliser  
2 bomb plot, on 30 April 2007.

3 They also met a man called Mohammed Babar who,  
4 a convicted terrorist himself, gave evidence to the  
5 effect that MSK -- Mohammed Sidique Khan, that is -- and  
6 Omar Khyam had attended his terrorist training camp in  
7 Malakand in Pakistan.

8 Waheed Ali also appears on the home video made by  
9 Khan in October 2004 of his daughter, whom he introduces  
10 on the video to men who can plainly be seen to be in the  
11 room whom he calls her "uncles". They were Tanweer,  
12 Hussain and the first of those three tried men,  
13 Waheed Ali.

14 These connections, relevant to background and to  
15 their motivation, will also be relevant to the issue of  
16 preventability, to which we'll turn next year, because  
17 Omar Khyam subsequently came under surveillance by the  
18 Security Service in February and March 2004 and, during  
19 that surveillance, the Security Service observed contact  
20 between him and certain then unidentified men who turned  
21 out to be Waheed Ali, Khan and Tanweer. I'll turn to  
22 this area later in my opening.

23 After the completion of the criminal proceedings  
24 concerning those three men, the inquests into the deaths  
25 arising from the explosions at Aldgate, Kings Cross and

1 Tavistock Square were transferred from Inner North  
2 London jurisdiction to Inner West London jurisdiction  
3 and you were then appointed as the Assistant Deputy  
4 Coroner for all 52 inquests. The first pre-inquest  
5 review hearing took place, my Lady, as you will recall,  
6 in February of this year.

7 Madam, the essential issues that the inquests will  
8 examine are contained in a provisional index of factual  
9 issues. This was drawn up in May of this year following  
10 your ruling, and the parties were afforded the  
11 opportunity to comment upon the list and to persuade you  
12 to revise it. I now intend to make reference to it.

13 My Lady, the issues are not, of course, set in  
14 stone. They simply set the current parameters, as it  
15 were, for the issues that will be developed through the  
16 course of these proceedings. [INQ10440-1], [INQ10440-2], [INQ10440-3]

17 In broad terms, the evidence will be directed to the  
18 following issues. Issue 1, the background/personal  
19 evidence regarding the 52 deceased and their movements  
20 prior to the explosions.

21 My Lady, I have already referred to this and to the  
22 personal evidence that you propose to call in relation  
23 to each of the 52 deceased.

24 Under the heading "Explosions and the immediate  
25 aftermath", we then have issue 2, the travel of Khan,

1 Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay to and within London on the  
2 morning of 7 July 2005.

3 We will hear evidence, fairly shortly, over the next  
4 two days, relating to the movements of the bombers on  
5 and immediately prior to 7 July, and I'll open this  
6 evidence to you later today.

7 I do so, not because any real issues will turn on  
8 this topic, but because, like the background of the four  
9 bombers, their travel set the scene for what followed,  
10 and, having opened it in some detail, we may then not  
11 need to dwell on the issues in evidence for great  
12 length.

13 Issue 3 concerns the circumstances at each of the  
14 four bombsites immediately following the explosions.

15 Issue 4 addresses which of the 52 deceased were  
16 killed immediately by the explosions and which survived  
17 for a period of time thereafter.

18 Issue 5 concerns in respect of each of those who  
19 were not killed immediately by the explosions, what  
20 happened to them, what attention and/or treatment they  
21 received, whether there were any failings in the way  
22 that they were treated, the circumstances of their  
23 death, whether there were failings in the emergency  
24 response and whether they contributed or were causative  
25 of their death and, in particular, we will be addressing

1 issues concerning whether there were delays, whether  
2 appropriate triage procedures were operated, whether  
3 there was sufficient lighting, whether there were  
4 failings in relation to other aspects of the first aid  
5 or the medical equipment available in trains and in the  
6 stations.

7 Scrolling further down the list to issue 6, we will  
8 also look at the issue of whether a decision ought to  
9 have been taken prior to the explosion at  
10 Tavistock Square to close some or all of the transport  
11 network.

12 Addressing those issues, the ones that I have read  
13 out, together for a moment, due to the fact that you are  
14 not sitting with a jury, and on account of the sheer  
15 number of the deceased and the very large number of  
16 witnesses, I don't propose to open to you now in detail,  
17 with your leave, the evidence relating to the explosions  
18 or the response of the unfortunate passengers or their  
19 rescuers to the horror that ensued, although I will  
20 outline later today, but probably tomorrow, the  
21 essential facts relating to each of the deceased.

22 You are, as you know, likely to be calling over 240  
23 witnesses to give oral evidence and there are many  
24 hundreds more written statements, and it does not seem  
25 to us to be a good use of precious time for me to

1 rehearse before the interested persons in detail the  
2 evidence that those witnesses are likely to give.  
3 The reality will emerge in any event from the  
4 witnesses themselves, and it is the witnesses and not  
5 I or the Inquest team who are best placed to provide the  
6 necessary information to answer those issues and  
7 concerns.

8 We will hear evidence over the next two and a half  
9 months or so from many of the survivors, from each of  
10 the bomb carriages and the number 30 bus. We will also  
11 hear from members of the London Underground staff who  
12 heard the explosion, those who responded, those who  
13 bravely descended into the tunnels and then those who  
14 were also caught up in the subsequent explosions.

15 In some cases, they descended into the tunnels  
16 without personal regard to their own personal safety.  
17 You will hear from the Metropolitan Police Service, the  
18 British Transport Police and the City of London Police  
19 and their officers who responded, as well as in relation  
20 to Tavistock Square, members of the public, and you will  
21 also hear, of course, from officers from the London  
22 Ambulance Service and the London Fire Brigade.

23 It is by their evidence, my Lady, that you will  
24 judge whether there were delays in the emergency  
25 responders reaching scenes of the explosions and, if so,

1 what the reasons were for those delays. You will hear  
2 and judge whether there was sufficient lighting  
3 available to rescuers on the trains and in the tunnels,  
4 whether injuries were treated with appropriate medical  
5 care.

6 The dreadful conditions in the tunnels, in  
7 particular the Piccadilly Line tunnel, are self-evident,  
8 and every proper allowance must be given, but there is  
9 no doubt that some survivors, indeed some responders,  
10 talk of delay, of an absence of proper medical equipment  
11 and of failures in communication and lights.

12 Another issue will be the significance and effect of  
13 the ever-present risks of secondary devices, because, of  
14 course, such devices are designed to kill emergency  
15 responders, and you will hear evidence in due course as  
16 to whether that was a factor which weighed in the  
17 balance in the judgment calls made by the responders in  
18 their descent into those hellish scenes.

19 Throughout, we have sought to ensure that those able  
20 to give direct evidence about the deceased and how they  
21 died should do so orally, that those able to give  
22 significant evidence about the other provisional factual  
23 issues should do so orally, and that there is as little  
24 duplication as possible, but it is, my Lady, simply not  
25 possible to call everyone and, although there are many

1 witnesses who could have given evidence of what befell  
2 them, such evidence would not, we believe, have been  
3 directly relevant, and you have so ordered.

4 Issue 5 -- to go back to the list of issues which is  
5 on the screen -- covers, as everyone will appreciate,  
6 a number of different issues, one of which is the issue  
7 of whether there were relevant failings, not in the  
8 direct medical treatments applied to the dying and the  
9 severely injured, but in the generic emergency response:  
10 namely, the way in which the emergency services  
11 responded by providing personnel and equipment and  
12 whether that way contributed to any of the deaths. In  
13 other words, were there systemic problems on 7 July that  
14 contributed indirectly to any of the deaths?

15 I don't propose to open that particular topic for  
16 reasons concerning the disclosure process, to which  
17 I will turn in a moment.

18 Turning back to issue 4 and the issue of whether any  
19 of the deceased might have survived, had they received  
20 different or more timely medical treatment, I need to  
21 spend a little time introducing this subject, if I may.

22 My Lady, as you know, it has long been clear that  
23 some of the deceased were not immediately killed by the  
24 explosions. In our written submissions in April, we  
25 identified those of the deceased in respect of whom,

1 according to the scene reports, there appeared to be  
2 credible evidence that they were alive for at least  
3 a period of time thereafter.

4 In this most sensitive of subjects, it is important  
5 that I emphasise that we do not want to set hares  
6 running. We have given the most careful consideration  
7 to whether, in respect of any of the deceased, the  
8 witness evidence appears to suggest that there is  
9 a proper basis for believing that he or she survived the  
10 initial explosion, and the list to which I've made  
11 mention has been the subject, as you know, of amendment  
12 in the intervening period since April when we first  
13 identified this matter.

14 Equally, I must also emphasise that the fact that  
15 a person was not immediately killed does not necessarily  
16 mean that he or she would have survived, even if they  
17 had received immediate medical attention. But in each  
18 such case, we do propose to call appropriate witnesses  
19 during the relevant scene evidence to attempt to  
20 determine whether the deceased did indeed survive and,  
21 if so, for how long.

22 Only when that evidence has been given and assessed,  
23 can the difficult task then commence of identifying  
24 those cases in which it might reasonably be said that  
25 the individual deceased might have received, had he or

1 she received different or more timely medical treatment.  
2 We propose, therefore, to explore this further issue,  
3 not during the scene evidence, but in February after the  
4 scene evidence has been concluded.

5 My Lady, it may well be that, even in some of those  
6 cases, you decide that it would not be right to pursue  
7 this issue, perhaps because the family, on  
8 representations from them, do not wish it to be pursued,  
9 a factor that would, of course, have considerable  
10 weight, or perhaps because the evidence is that the  
11 deceased only survived for a matter of minutes after the  
12 explosion, so that earlier or different medical  
13 treatment could not, in truth, have had any causative  
14 effect.

15 But, as I've said, my Lady, these are matters for  
16 the future. But in order to prepare the ground under  
17 your direction, Mr Martin Smith commissioned a team of  
18 experts from the Defence Science and Technology  
19 Laboratory and the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine to  
20 address, in essence, the effects of explosive forces on  
21 the human body and, in particular, whether it's possible  
22 to plot blast injury types and therefore survivability  
23 of blast injury in terms of proximity to the seat of an  
24 explosion.

25 We have also been concerned to know something about

1 the extent to which primary blast injuries may be  
2 suffered without external evidence of trauma, given that  
3 the evidence so far disclosed reveals that some  
4 passengers died although they appeared externally to  
5 have suffered less severe injuries than some who  
6 survived -- I'm so sorry, they appeared externally to  
7 have suffered less external injuries than some who  
8 survived.

9 In a similar vein, some passengers survived,  
10 notwithstanding the traumatic amputation of both legs,  
11 whilst others succumbed.

12 These experts will also turn their attention, once  
13 we have a better feel for where the scene evidence will  
14 take us, to consideration of the facts of each  
15 particular case. The experts intend to insert the  
16 external injuries revealed by the post-mortem reports  
17 into a computer-generated model of survivability in  
18 order to express a view on whether those deceased who  
19 may have survived the explosions might have been  
20 expected to have lived, all other things being equal.  
21 Of course, the absence of severe external injury in  
22 some cases and the absence of material as to internal  
23 injuries -- because there were, as we know, no internal  
24 post-mortems -- may mean that they are unable to express  
25 any views at all, but we shall see and you have directed

1 that this is a course that is worth pursuing.  
2 It is a task, however, that is unlikely to be  
3 completed before Christmas.  
4 My Lady, you may also be assisted in considering  
5 issues as to survivability by hearing the evidence of  
6 the pathologists who conducted the post-mortem  
7 examinations in those individual cases. I stress it's  
8 possible, because, since as I've said, those  
9 examinations were limited, it may be that the  
10 pathologists will be unable to comment other than in the  
11 most general terms, but we are pursuing this matter,  
12 my Lady, and I hope to have more to say on it in due  
13 course.  
14 It's also possible that, when we come to consider  
15 survivability in February, we may -- and I emphasise  
16 "may" -- suggest that you consider recalling one or two  
17 of the paramedics or calling suitably qualified medical  
18 personnel to address the issue of whether the medical  
19 treatment that was customarily provided in 2005 was the  
20 appropriate treatment and whether, with the passage of  
21 the years, it is still considered to be the best form of  
22 medical intervention.  
23 In addition, in order to pave the way for the issues  
24 to be explored, we have taken the precaution of  
25 transferring pictorial and written descriptions of the

1 injuries in all these possible cases on to  
2 computer-generated images of the human body, a process  
3 known as body mapping.  
4 In this way -- this is why I raise it -- you will be  
5 able publicly to receive and consider evidence in a way  
6 that avoids use of the highly distressing scene and  
7 post-mortem photographs.  
8 The body maps themselves will, under no  
9 circumstances, be disclosed to the public website or in  
10 any way provided to the public.  
11 Turning to forensic issues, issues 7, 8 and 9 on the  
12 list of provisional issues, we can see there three  
13 issues relating to the manner of construction and mode  
14 of operation of the bombs, the involvement of Khan,  
15 Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay in the development of the  
16 explosive devices and the presence at the scenes of  
17 those four bombers and their proximity to the  
18 explosions.  
19 My Lady will hear evidence from the police and  
20 forensic investigators about what was found at  
21 111 Chapeltown Road, at 18 Alexandra Grove, at the  
22 various cars as well as the bombsites, and I will  
23 outline this evidence in a moment.  
24 The majority of this material is contained in  
25 a forensic report which, as you know, was prepared by

1 the Metropolitan Police as your coroner's officers  
2 earlier in the year.

3 This evidence, which will be heard in February, will  
4 address issues such as how the materials were purchased,  
5 how the bombs were constructed and how the four men were  
6 linked, both to the bomb factories in the two addresses  
7 and to the bombsites themselves.

8 Although, of course, it is, I repeat, entirely  
9 a matter for you, I should say that we have found no  
10 cogent evidence to suggest anything other than the four  
11 bombers were intimately connected with the construction,  
12 transportation and detonation of those bombs.

13 Issues 10 and 11 fall under the rubric of pathology  
14 issues and those are issues upon which I've touched  
15 already, they include the issue of blast injuries and  
16 whether it will be necessary to call pathology evidence  
17 and those are issues to which we will turn in the new  
18 year.

19 Issue 12, the backgrounds of Khan, Tanweer, Hussain  
20 and Lindsay. These concern issues such as their  
21 education, radicalisation, association, overseas travel  
22 that they undertook as well as their movements before  
23 the immediate days preceding 7 July.

24 As with travel to London, my Lady, the background  
25 evidence is not at the heart of the events of 7 July,

1 but it will, we anticipate, shed light on those events  
2 and, accordingly, the evidence won't dwell on the area  
3 although it will address it as comprehensively as you  
4 have directed.

5 At your direction, I propose to call some evidence  
6 that summarises the educational, family and work  
7 histories of the bombers, but then look in greater  
8 detail at those aspects of their lives that shed light  
9 either on their motivations or on their actions.

10 For example, the travel by Tanweer and Khan to  
11 Pakistan between 18 November 2004 and 8 February 2005.  
12 We intend to look at the videos of 26 October 2004 and  
13 15 November, compiled by Khan before he went to  
14 Pakistan, the rental of Chapeltown Road and  
15 Alexandra Grove, the videos made also by Khan and  
16 Tanweer in advance of 7 July, but released afterwards  
17 posthumously for propaganda purposes.

18 At your direction we will also call witnesses  
19 relating to an Islamic bookshop in Beeston, the Iqra  
20 bookshop, with which both Tanweer and Khan, as well as  
21 two of the other defendants who stood trial in the  
22 conspiracy trial to which I've made reference, had some  
23 involvement.

24 My Lady, preventability. Like the issue of the  
25 generic response of the emergency services and, as

1 I indicated in court some weeks ago, I don't propose to  
2 address in detail at this stage the issue of  
3 preventability, that is to say the issue of whether the  
4 terrible events of 7 July could reasonably have been  
5 prevented by way of some sort of intervention by the  
6 state or the Security Services or the police after Khan  
7 and Tanweer had featured in the surveillance conducted  
8 by the Security Service in February and March 2004 or  
9 possibly following identification through other leads.  
10 In order to explain why I'm not in a position to  
11 open it today and because disclosure is an important  
12 part of maintaining public confidence in this process,  
13 may I say a little about the basic facts of that  
14 surveillance operation and then say something about the  
15 disclosure process in these inquests.  
16 I've mentioned already the basic fact Omar Khyam  
17 came under surveillance in early 2004. He was a key  
18 member of a group of plotters who were involved in  
19 a plan to construct and detonate bombs made from  
20 ammonium nitrate, known as the Crevice bomb plot.  
21 The publicly disclosed and thus edited ISC,  
22 Intelligence and Security Committee, report reveals that  
23 on 2 February 2004, Khyam was seen to get into a green  
24 Honda Civic which had driven to Crawley with its three  
25 occupants and parked alongside his car. Two men got out

1 of the Honda and one remained in it to drive up and down  
2 the A23 with Khyam in what was plainly a meeting.  
3 Once all the people had returned to their original  
4 cars, the Honda Civic, with its three people on board,  
5 was followed away from the meeting in Crawley to an  
6 address in Leeds, an address to which the car was in  
7 fact registered under the name of a lady called  
8 Hasina Patel.  
9 West Yorkshire Police were asked by the  
10 Security Service for any details that they had on  
11 Hasina Patel, but there is no record, as far as we are  
12 aware, of a written response. At any rate, it doesn't  
13 appear to have been discovered, perhaps for good reason,  
14 that a Hasina Patel had married a man called  
15 Mohammed Sidique Khan in October 2001.  
16 After 7 July 2005, the three previously unidentified  
17 men, the three men in the Honda, known then as  
18 unidentified males C, D and E were assessed, that is to  
19 say judged, by the Security Service to have been Khan,  
20 Tanweer and Waheed Ali, the man who subsequently stood  
21 trial for conspiracy.  
22 I mentioned that Khyam was concerned with a plot  
23 involving fertiliser. After the discovery of fertiliser  
24 in a storage depot on 20 February following a call to  
25 the anti-terrorist hotline and the arrival the following

1 day of an electronic bomb expert called Khawaja, and the  
2 revelation that Khyam was discussing a number of  
3 possible targets, the Security Services investigation  
4 took on a new urgency and intensity.

5 On 21 February, Khyam and another man were seen to  
6 be sitting in Khyam's car chatting. Live monitoring  
7 seemed to confirm that there were only two people in the  
8 car, and the listeners heard a reference to "operation",  
9 but subsequently further detailed analysis of the tape  
10 recording by West Yorkshire Police for the purposes of  
11 the second Crevice trial in February 2009 revealed that  
12 there were four people in the car, in fact: Khyam and  
13 three people, after 7/7, by that time identified to be  
14 Waheed Ali, Khan and Tanweer again. That was all in the  
15 future, of course.

16 But there then followed further surveillance and the  
17 three unidentified men were seen to meet with Khyam  
18 again. On 28 February, the three men C, D and E stayed  
19 with him all day and they attended, my Lady, a meeting,  
20 they visited a number of builders merchants and were  
21 then followed back to Batley near Leeds. They had thus  
22 travelled many hundreds of miles to meet him.

23 This time, checks on the Honda revealed it to be  
24 registered to a man called Sidique Khan at an address  
25 11 Gregory Street in Batley, but the car was linked to

1 previous registered addresses of this man, one at  
2 11 Thornhill Avenue and also to another address,  
3 99 Stratford Street in Leeds.  
4 Then, on 2 March, just a few days later, the  
5 Security Service asked West Yorkshire Police about  
6 a storage facility at that address, 99 Stratford Street,  
7 because they thought it might be linked to Khyam, the  
8 key plotter in the Crevice investigation, and that  
9 address was linked to a man called  
10 Mohammed Sidique Khan. So there appeared then to have  
11 been two links to the address and two links to a person  
12 called Sidique Khan.  
13 On 21 March, a green Vauxhall Corsa -- subsequently  
14 discovered but only after 7 July 2005 to have been  
15 a courtesy car lent to Khan -- was seen to pick up Khyam  
16 and his brother in Crawley, and then, on 23 March, two  
17 days later, two of the men -- D and E -- subsequently  
18 discovered many, many years later to be Khan and  
19 Tanweer, along with two other men, met with Khyam again,  
20 and during a conversation Khyam was heard to be  
21 discussing the Madrid bombings as well as financial  
22 fraud with one of the men.  
23 The car then was understood to belong to a vehicle  
24 management company but, as far as we are aware, no  
25 steps, certainly from the publicly available material so

1 far disclosed to us, appear to have been taken to  
2 identify to whom the car had actually been lent.  
3 All the people that Khyam met and spoke to were  
4 assessed, as you would expect, to see if they were  
5 involved in some way in criminal activity, in  
6 facilitation activity, that's to say the provision of  
7 financial or logistical support, or in the fertiliser  
8 bomb plot itself.  
9 But in essence, following the discussion in the  
10 meetings such as they were, they did not merit the  
11 classification as essential targets as opposed to  
12 desirable targets. Of the several thousand contacts  
13 monitored during the Crevice operation, I should say,  
14 the Security Service were unable to identify 150, and of  
15 those unidentified individuals, 15 were categorised as  
16 "essential", D and E were among a group of 40  
17 categorised merely as "desirable". I say "merely", not  
18 pejoratively, because, as you have heard, of course,  
19 in April, the decision as to whether or not a target  
20 should be classified as "essential" or "desirable" is an  
21 exquisitely difficult decision to take and depends to  
22 a very large degree on difficult and differing strands  
23 of intelligence, on difficult questions of resource and  
24 what the Security Service is able to achieve.  
25 It also transpired after 7 July that four calls, to

1 or from a mobile associated with a man called  
2 Mohammed Qayam Khan, the leader of an Al-Qaeda  
3 facilitation network in Luton, the investigation into  
4 whom had led the Security Service to Omar Khyam, the man  
5 I mentioned first, had been made in July and August 2005  
6 to numbers assessed after 7/7 to belong to Khan.  
7 One of the calls, the first one, was to a number  
8 registered to a man called Sidique Khan and the address  
9 of that phone number was the Iqra bookshop in Bude Road  
10 in Leeds, of which I've spoken. But there was nothing  
11 in the databases that suggested that Khan was involved  
12 in terrorist-related activity, and so the contact was  
13 not investigated further.  
14 The three other calls of the four that I mentioned  
15 were to prepay unregistered mobile phones and therefore  
16 could not be traced.  
17 Secondly, one of about 40 men observed by  
18 West Yorkshire Police attending a training camp in 2001  
19 organised by two known extremists was, in fact, Khan,  
20 but a photograph of him was not identified until after  
21 7 July 2005.  
22 Thirdly, he had given a very short lift  
23 in April 2003 to a known extremist who had happened to  
24 be under surveillance by West Yorkshire Police.  
25 Although the car was found to be registered to

1 a Sidique Khan, the contact was not considered  
2 significant.  
3 And lastly, fourthly, Lindsay, Jermaine Lindsay's  
4 mobile number found its way into the Security Service's  
5 files in 2002 after it was linked to a person who was  
6 himself or herself the target of an investigation.  
7 After they found that there was no registered owner to  
8 that mobile number, no further action was taken, and the  
9 link was only discovered subsequent to 7/7 through an  
10 application to open a savings account which, when  
11 scrutinised, had contained the same number.  
12 My Lady, in the course of your ruling in April, you  
13 observed that it was far from clear when the 7 July bomb  
14 plot had actually crystallised to any significant  
15 extent, that is to say it was far from clear when it had  
16 started to take shape, and I must make clear that, so  
17 far, we have seen no material, let alone evidence, to  
18 suggest that Khan and his conspirators even had it in  
19 mind in February or March 2004 to detonate bombs in  
20 London in July 2005.  
21 Indeed, in what is termed his goodbye video of  
22 15 November 2004, a video he prepared, that video tends  
23 to suggest that he thought he was leaving the  
24 United Kingdom for Pakistan or Afghanistan in the winter  
25 of 2004 to take part in some form of Jihad and did not

1 intend to return.

2 But the links to the Crevice plotters are  
3 undoubtedly significant, and the events of February  
4 and March 2004 therefore merited, as you ruled, further  
5 investigation. Plainly a number of judgment calls had  
6 to be made by the Security Service and no one suggests  
7 that they would have been made other than in the utmost  
8 good faith. As to whether and how the leads concerning  
9 D and E, in particular, spotted during Khyam's  
10 surveillance, should be followed up.

11 My Lady, such judgment calls no doubt called for the  
12 most careful consideration of a number of factors,  
13 including available resources and the significance of  
14 the contacts. But the relevancy of this issue to my  
15 opening is that we've not yet had disclosure of material  
16 relating either to when the plot crystallised, if such  
17 material exists at all, or as to the judgment calls that  
18 were made by the Security Service in the early months of  
19 that year and, until that process is complete, it's not  
20 possible for me to advance any comment on the  
21 correctness or wisdom of what was done in February  
22 and March 2004, and thus it's not an area that I can  
23 open now.

24 But I should issue a word of caution, if I may.

25 Even if it transpires that Khan and Tanweer should have

1    been followed up more thoroughly, on the current  
2    material it cannot necessarily be supposed that, even  
3    had the Security Service pursued and identified them,  
4    and even had they been made subject to some sort of  
5    interference by way of continuing surveillance, arrest  
6    or perhaps a control order, which didn't in fact come  
7    into legal existence until March 2005 by virtue of the  
8    Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, it cannot necessarily  
9    be supposed that the events of 7 July 2005 would have  
10   been prevented.

11   May I explain something about the disclosure  
12   process?

13   We have sought to gather evidence to assist you in  
14   fully, fairly and fearlessly investigating each of these  
15   52 inquests, how each person came by his or her death.  
16   We have sought to ensure that all material relevant to  
17   the issues that you have ruled be investigated be  
18   obtained, assessed for the purposes of deciding which  
19   witnesses and which exhibits should be called and then  
20   disclosed to the parties so that they have a proper  
21   opportunity to test and challenge that evidence.

22   As you will know, but others may not, the team led  
23   by Mr Smith have spent many thousands of hours gathering  
24   potentially relevant evidence and making it available on  
25   a database, making enquiries and liaising with over 90

1 interested persons and 15 different legal teams. Over  
2 14,000 statements and exhibits have been assessed for  
3 disclosure to the interested persons, in relation  
4 primarily to the scene evidence, but also in relation to  
5 all the other issues that you have directed be  
6 investigated.

7 In the course of that process, many hundreds of  
8 witnesses have been spoken to.

9 Madam, I don't know whether that's a convenient  
10 point before I go into the detail of the disclosure  
11 process?

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly, we'll break now until  
13 12.00.

14 May I just add this? If at any stage any member of  
15 a bereaved family or any survivor has any concerns,  
16 could I urge them to bring them to the attention of  
17 either their legal representatives, if they are  
18 represented, or a member of my Inquest team so that we  
19 can try to deal with them? Thank you.

20 (11.45 am)

21 (A short break)

22 (12 noon)

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I say something now about the  
25 disclosure process because of the importance that

1 process commands in these inquest proceedings.  
2 The Metropolitan Police have acted, my Lady, as you  
3 know, as your coroner's officers, and may I say that we  
4 have been hugely assisted by the work that they have  
5 done in collating and preparing the material and making  
6 it available to us.  
7 They are in an unusual position because they  
8 perform, in fact, a number of overlapping functions.  
9 They are the holder of more than 40,000-exhibits on the  
10 HOLMES database relating to their investigation of the  
11 events of 7 July. The HOLMES database is a tool or  
12 a database used for police investigations and is  
13 primarily designed to deposit documents generated in  
14 connection with large scale investigations. The  
15 account, or rather the part of the HOLMES database which  
16 is concerned with the events of 7 July 2005 also  
17 incorporates documents connected to the investigation of  
18 the events of 21 July, a few weeks later, and is the  
19 largest account or system of documents ever opened by  
20 the Metropolitan Police.  
21 They were also amongst the primary responders on the  
22 day, as part of the emergency service response, and it  
23 also acts, as I've said, as your coroner's officers  
24 under the rubric of Operation Ramus. The  
25 Operation Ramus team, which is quite separate, of

1 course, from the face of the Metropolitan Police  
2 represented today, consists, I think, of some  
3 30 officers.

4 Much of the evidence relating to the bombsites and  
5 the movements of the bombers which will be called has  
6 come from their criminal investigation into the events  
7 of 7 July and from the evidence prepared for the trial  
8 of Ali, Saleem and Shakil, the conspiracy trial of which  
9 I've already made mention.

10 We are, as I've said, greatly indebted to the  
11 Metropolitan Police Service for their hard work and  
12 industry in assisting in the collation of the material  
13 and in preparing for these hearings. They've been  
14 inundated, in fact, by our requests for further  
15 information, but they have progressed them all with  
16 commendable industry and good humour.

17 We are confident, as a result, that we have had  
18 disclosed to us by them everything that is properly  
19 relevant to the issues revolving around the explosions,  
20 the bombers and their movements.

21 Furthermore, following your order in May to all the  
22 relevant organisations to the effect that they disclose  
23 to you all documents which might reasonably be  
24 considered as touching upon all the identified issues,  
25 we have received thousands of other documents.

1 A large majority of these documents have been  
2 assessed as being potentially relevant and have  
3 therefore been disclosed to all other parties.  
4 A substantial number of them will also be put into  
5 evidence by us.  
6 The police have sought to respond to this wider  
7 obligation also, and it's an ongoing process, but due to  
8 the sheer number of documents on the HOLMES database and  
9 the limited time available, it is simply not feasible to  
10 review the entirety of that HOLMES data account for all  
11 other potentially relevant documents.  
12 Instead, we have agreed, as you know, because you  
13 directed, that the best course is for the  
14 Metropolitan Police to produce schedules listing all  
15 those potentially relevant statements, exhibits and  
16 documents that it holds in connection with this and  
17 other investigations.  
18 These schedules alone, when complete, are likely to  
19 total some 2,000 pages or more and, although the  
20 documents referred to in those schedules can be searched  
21 for by reference to certain headline subject words, the  
22 task of searching for documents connected to the issues  
23 that you've identified to be pursued is not yet  
24 complete.  
25 But may I emphasise that this wider exercise

1 reflects a counsel of perfection. We are entirely  
2 confident that we have what we need to commence and that  
3 the ongoing process will serve to ensure that we have  
4 all the relevant material for the issues by the time  
5 that we get to them.

6 But one of those issues, as I've said, is  
7 preventability. The disclosure exercise has proved, as  
8 anticipated, to be complex and protracted because of the  
9 demands of national security, which, as you know, but  
10 some may not, under our laws prevent the disclosure of  
11 documentation and information into the public domain  
12 where such publication would cause substantial harm to  
13 the public interest, that is to say national security.  
14 Although the process of collation and identification  
15 and confirmation of those issues continues, we have so  
16 far received relatively little. We have also, of  
17 course, been concentrating our time on the evidence  
18 relating to the scenes, because this is the first area  
19 of evidence to be called, and it's plainly important  
20 that we ensure that the disclosure process for that area  
21 of the evidence is complete and the relevant documents  
22 disclosed, lest the witness evidence that we're about to  
23 commence upon unwittingly paints an inaccurate picture.  
24 The Security Service is of central importance in  
25 this process because they, of course, hold the documents

1 and material underpinning the ISC reports. These are  
2 the documents relevant to the surveillance of the  
3 Crevice plotters in February and March 2004, as I have  
4 outlined. The Security Service alone possesses the  
5 material relevant to the decisions taken and the  
6 judgments exercised in connection with whether the two  
7 men could and should have been investigated further.  
8 My Lady, may I simply say for these purposes, and at  
9 this stage, that a very significant exercise has been  
10 undergone by the Security Service in searching their  
11 files for relevant material. That process will continue  
12 during the forthcoming weeks and months, but, as you  
13 know, it's not straightforward because of the  
14 application of our disclosure laws, but I should say  
15 that the Security Service has indicated that it will  
16 wish to argue in due course that you are entitled,  
17 perhaps obligated, to sit in closed to consider this  
18 national security protected material. This is not the  
19 time to explore that issue, but may I say for those  
20 listening that my Lady has indicated that it's an  
21 argument that will be subject to the closest of scrutiny  
22 and will be addressed in the next two or three weeks.  
23 For all these reasons, although we are confident the  
24 disclosure exercise will be completed in good time, I'm  
25 not in a position to open preventability now and I will

1 reopen that issue in January following the completion of  
2 the scene evidence.

3 I propose to do the same in relation to the generic  
4 emergency response issue, of which I also spoke a few  
5 moments ago. We've been provided with a very large  
6 number of emergency planning documents from most of the  
7 responders and we will continue to scrutinise that  
8 material during the autumn, but it doesn't enable me to  
9 open that subject now.

10 My Lady, one further area that I do not propose to  
11 open in detail now, because you have properly determined  
12 that it falls outside the scope of these inquests, is  
13 that of identification.

14 It is clear to us that the process by which their  
15 loved ones were identified, how they were informed of  
16 their deaths and how they were informed only after the  
17 formal disaster victim identification process was  
18 complete has given rise to a huge amount of anguish on  
19 the part of the families.

20 All I should say, because this is an issue which  
21 doesn't fall within the scope of these inquests, is that  
22 your coroner's officers in the Metropolitan Police have  
23 fulfilled your direction that this issue should  
24 nevertheless be separately addressed by way of  
25 a separate report prepared and published by them for the

1 families.

2 That detailed report, which will be disclosed

3 shortly, shows that the Metropolitan Police have

4 endeavoured to explain how the complex disaster victim

5 identification system works and that it's obligated to

6 conform with a number of internationally agreed

7 protocols and that explains why the deceased were

8 removed from the scenes in the way that they were, why

9 the scenes had to be forensically searched in the way

10 that they were and why there were then necessarily

11 delays in informing their loved ones of their deaths.

12 They've addressed questions concerning the family

13 liaison officers, the Metropolitan Police Casualty

14 Bureau and specific concerns raised by a number of

15 families and they've also sought and obtained a witness

16 statement from the leading expert on this process of

17 disaster victim identification, Commander Bracken, who

18 was either involved in or in charge of matters at

19 Ladbroke Grove, the Selby disaster, Potters Bar,

20 Hatfield and the south-east Asian Tsunami. We very much

21 hope that that material will go some small way to

22 assuaging the concerns that have been expressed to us by

23 the families.

24 Before turning to the facts in detail, I do wish to

25 emphasise also that you have directed that all the

1 issues that you have identified remain open. It would  
2 be wrong for anyone to assume that the provisional  
3 questions that have been identified have been in any way  
4 departed from or watered down. I know that you are  
5 determined to pursue them as far as you properly can  
6 and, if criticism is properly to be deduced from the  
7 evidence, you will not hesitate to allow such evidence  
8 to be given. The best time, however, to form judgments  
9 is when all the material has been gathered and the  
10 evidence called.

11 May I finally sound, my Lady, three further  
12 cautionary notes in the same vein?

13 The evidence is still coming in and every day we  
14 receive significant quantities of material. The oral  
15 evidence that we hear in court may, in any event, shed  
16 a very different light on what we know and may differ  
17 substantially from any views that I might have  
18 expressed.

19 For this reason, it may also be that certain of the  
20 issues will, once we have considered the evidence, fall  
21 away. Others may come more sharply into focus, but if  
22 new issues do become relevant, my Lady, you have  
23 directed that they will be explored.

24 The evidence will of course be subject to  
25 considerable scrutiny by the legal teams and will

1 develop over time and it will naturally be available, as  
2 you have ordered, on the court transcription service and  
3 on the public website.

4 Second, I must make clear that any comments that  
5 I make in respect of the evidence reflect, of course,  
6 only my views and those of the team that I lead, in  
7 particular Mr O'Connor and Mr Hay, to whom I'm greatly  
8 indebted.

9 Although we appear to assist you in discharging your  
10 function in exposing what happened, we appear as  
11 independent counsel, as you've said, and our views are  
12 not yours.

13 It's your view, naturally, that ultimately matters,  
14 and you will, with your vast judicial experience behind  
15 you, naturally assess the evidence and the weight to be  
16 given to it.

17 For the same reason, let me also make clear for  
18 those who are not familiar with this process that,  
19 although we will be conducting the examination, we will  
20 not necessarily be doing such an examination in the same  
21 way that you would have done or might have done, and no  
22 doubt you will ask your own questions where it's  
23 appropriate to do so.

24 The last related point, my Lady, if I may, is that  
25 we must all be astute to guard against the ease by which

1 one can unfairly judge with the benefit of hindsight.  
2 The atrocities committed on 7 July stand as the largest  
3 single terrorist attack on British soil. Those who  
4 guard us against such acts and those who respond to them  
5 should not necessarily be criticised for decisions that  
6 they took or acts that they performed under the  
7 pressures of time or resources or lack of information  
8 or, in the tunnels in particular, on account of fear,  
9 danger and the presence of death.  
10 The bomb attacks presented a very fast-moving,  
11 unprecedented and difficult set of circumstances, and  
12 those who came to assist were met by scenes of  
13 unimaginable horror, but I'm sure that everyone  
14 understands that.  
15 My Lady, we will play on Wednesday an edited  
16 compilation of the CCTV evidence recording the most  
17 significant movements of the bombers in the run-up to  
18 7/7, some of which has not been seen in public before.  
19 There is, in fact, a considerable amount of CCTV  
20 material of which we will be playing only a part and  
21 we'll hear from the police officers how it was gathered  
22 and compiled.  
23 During the 7/7 investigation, over 20,000 CCTV video  
24 tapes were seized and I think some 1600 or so hard  
25 drives.

1 The edited version that we intend to play will  
2 commence on 28 June 2005 when Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay  
3 travelled to London for a trip that lasted only 3 hours  
4 and 49 minutes. We'll see clips of them travelling as  
5 they did on the morning of 7 July and around the same  
6 time from Luton railway station, clips of them appearing  
7 at Kings Cross, the Embankment Circle Line station,  
8 South Ken and Baker Street, and at South Ken they're  
9 seen walking from the Circle Line to the  
10 Piccadilly Line.

11 The compiled edited version will show Tanweer, Khan  
12 and Hussain visiting a B&Q premises in Leeds on 4 July,  
13 perhaps for the purposes of purchasing more equipment,  
14 as well as Khan visiting Dewsbury Hospital on Tuesday,  
15 5 July, with his wife, who was pregnant and taken to  
16 hospital due to complications with her pregnancy.

17 The significance of this visit is that a number of  
18 calls were made by Khan to the three other bombers on  
19 5 and 6 July. Six calls were made by Khan to Hussain  
20 alone on 5 July. Examination of Khan's mobile telephone  
21 which was recovered from the tunnel between Kings Cross  
22 and Russell Square showed that he sent a text message at  
23 04.35 in the morning of 6 July saying:

24 "Having major problem. Can't make time. Will ring  
25 you when I get it sorted. Wait at home."

1 So it may have been that the attack was originally  
2 planned for a different day.

3 The CCTV will also show a Nissan Micra entering an  
4 Asda superstore in Pudsey in Leeds in the very early  
5 hours of 6 July. Khan and Tanweer can be seen getting  
6 out of the vehicle and going inside. They are seen to  
7 be getting items out of a chest freezer and paying for  
8 them, and an Asda till receipt discovered in the  
9 devastation of Edgware Road was examined and found to  
10 relate to the purchase of 15 bags of ice at 05.27 on  
11 6 July.

12 We will hear from a witness who saw the bombers on  
13 the morning of that terrible day. You will hear from  
14 Sylvia Waugh, a lady who lives on Alexandra Grove in  
15 Leeds, who recalls being woken by voices outside her  
16 house in the early hours of that morning.

17 So let me say a little bit at this stage about  
18 18 Alexandra Grove.

19 It is the ground-floor flat that was  
20 incontrovertibly the main address used by the bombers as  
21 their bomb factory between some point in May and their  
22 departure in the morning of 7 July. It was discovered  
23 on 12 July. A local authority address, it was rented by  
24 a man called Samir Alani. He, however, had returned to  
25 Iraq and left the keys with a relative,

1 Mahmoud Shakhir Alani, who rented it out to  
2 Jermaine Lindsay, who was using the name "Jamal". We  
3 expect to hear from Mr Alani in due course.  
4 When discovered, 18 Alexandra Grove still had most  
5 of the bomb-making equipment in place. My Lady, you  
6 have directed that we hear from the principal forensic  
7 investigator at the forensics explosives laboratory,  
8 Clifford Todd, as well as other officers from the  
9 Counter-terrorism Command's forensic management scene,  
10 who will take us through what was found and the many  
11 forensic links to the four bombers and to the  
12 explosions.  
13 To put it in some sort of context, over 7,000  
14 exhibits were subject to forensic analysis and over 200  
15 sites were forensically searched including, in addition  
16 to the bombsites, cars and homes. 900 exhibits were  
17 removed from 18 Alexandra Grove in the initial search  
18 alone.  
19 Police and forensic investigators found in that  
20 address an improvised explosive detonator made from  
21 a light bulb, wire, aluminium foil and a substance  
22 called HMTD. HMTD is a primary high explosive compound  
23 called hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, which is made  
24 from hydrogen peroxide.  
25 They also found containers, ice packs, bags, trays,

1 funnels, filter paper, fuses, batteries, nails and  
2 several kilograms of HMTD as well as containers  
3 containing mixtures of pepper and hydrogen peroxide, the  
4 main explosive mix that the HMTD detonators were  
5 designed to explode.

6 Perhaps an indication of the bombers' determination  
7 to fulfil their aims, police also found large quantities  
8 of white powder which turned out to be a second form of  
9 high explosive, TATP, triacetone triperoxide. Also  
10 found were respirators, wire, gloves, hotplates and pans  
11 used to concentrate the hydrogen peroxide, a bath used  
12 to cool the mixtures afterwards and documents containing  
13 handwritten equations and references to boiling, liquid  
14 oxygen, batteries and ice packs.

15 Police also found on a broken CD extracts from an  
16 anarchist's cookbook, which included sections on how to  
17 construct and improvised explosive device.

18 Other than tape over the net curtains to keep them  
19 affixed to the window frames so as to prevent people  
20 seeing in, the extraordinary chaos and profusion of  
21 equipment and materials scattered throughout  
22 18 Alexandra Grove makes it plain, you may think, that  
23 the bombers took no steps to clear up behind them in an  
24 attempt to hide their evil work. They had no intention  
25 of returning, you may deduce, or of facing their

1     accusers.

2     One piece of paper, we shall see, made reference to

3     "things to do", including ice packs, boiling, batteries,

4     shrapnel and wiring and to "backup plan" and "rules for

5     the day" as well as to "wills" and "reconnaissance".

6     We can see, perhaps, on the screen, although it's

7     difficult to read the writing, exhibit CW/254 which

8     contains at page 2, if we can zoom in on the top

9     left-hand part of the page, please -- it's going to be

10    too difficult to see -- but there are references on that

11    page to the work that they were carrying out and

12    handwriting analysis established that Tanweer and

13    Hussain had definitely written on this document and

14    strong support for the conclusion that Khan had written

15    on it too. That is a document that contains a reference

16    to "wills" and "reconnaissance". [INQ10097-2]

17    Another piece of paper contained volumes and weights

18    possibly relating to the calculation of hydrogen

19    peroxide densities.

20    We can see there percentages and volumes and figures

21    produced on that page, which, in the opinion of the

22    Metropolitan Police forensic investigators, related to

23    the calculations necessary for part of what was being

24    done. Handwriting analysis conducted by the police also

25    showed that there was moderate support for the view that

1 the handwriting on that document was Tanweer and  
2 Hussain's.

3 There were other documents in the address.

4 Mr Clifford Todd, the forensic scientist, deduced from  
5 the number of manufacturers' labels found in the flat  
6 that at least 34 milk pans had been used to boil and  
7 concentrate the hydrogen peroxide. All that remained,  
8 however, were the labels, because the pans had been  
9 presumably destroyed by the harshness of the process.

10 He will take us through the links between the  
11 bombers and what was found at that address, as well as  
12 at the two cars at Luton railway station. I may mention  
13 them now, because they will be relevant to the CCTV  
14 evidence.

15 Tanweer had a rented, blue Nissan Micra which he  
16 rented on 4 July from 4 to 8 July. So he rented it in  
17 advance for four days. Lindsay had a maroon red  
18 Fiat Brava. The Fiat Brava, in particular, was heavily  
19 contaminated with HMTD, the primary high explosive,  
20 hexamethylene triperoxide diamine.

21 Traces of HMTD, which was used as the initiator  
22 explosive for the pepper mix, were also found at the  
23 site of three of the explosions, probably, in the  
24 opinion of the investigators, because they were on  
25 documents and items that had been in close proximity to

1 the bombers, such as the rucksack and, in relation to  
2 Khan, a wallet.

3 The actual main explosive mix, the hydrogen peroxide  
4 pepper mix was destroyed in the blasts themselves.

5 HMTD, the initiator explosive, was also found in  
6 Tanweer's red Mercedes at 111 Chapeltown Road, the first  
7 bomb factory, and on a waste pipe in Khan's home  
8 address. Khan's silver Honda Accord, his own car, was  
9 heavily contaminated.

10 Returning to Mrs Waugh, the lady who saw them in the  
11 early hours of that morning, she will, we expect, give  
12 evidence that between 04.05 and 04.10 in the morning she  
13 was woken by noise and looked out of her window. She  
14 saw, she recalls, six Asian males addressed in casual  
15 clothing and she will recount, we anticipate, how four  
16 of them got into a light-blue, newish, four-door car,  
17 possibly the blue Nissan Micra. The others got into an  
18 older-looking, white car.

19 At 03.58, so perhaps a few minutes later, presuming  
20 there to be some inaccuracy either in Mrs Waugh's  
21 timings or those of the CCTV, a CCTV in the Hyde Park  
22 area of Leeds picked up a bluish car as it left Leeds  
23 for the M1 and its journey to Luton.

24 The whitish car, assuming Mrs Waugh to have been  
25 correct in seeing one, is not seen again, but if there

1 was one, there must be a strong suspicion, given that it  
2 left the flat at the same time as three of the bombers  
3 on their final journey, that its occupants must have  
4 known what was going on. Enquiries made by the Inquest  
5 team of the Metropolitan Police have disclosed that  
6 extensive enquiries were made by the police in an  
7 attempt to identify, trace and locate the white vehicle,  
8 if there was one, and its occupants, and these included  
9 CCTV checks, checks of the police national computer and  
10 checks of vehicles linked to associates. But all those  
11 enquiries proved negative.

12 A matter, my Lady, to be determined in due course by  
13 yourself is whether there was another car there and, if  
14 so, what the involvement of that car and its occupants  
15 was.

16 The CCTV available to the police then follows the  
17 car, the blue Nissan Micra, down the M1 via  
18 Woodall Services at around 04.53, where Tanweer is seen  
19 to buy petrol and food, to Luton railway station where  
20 it arrives at around 06.50 in the morning and parks next  
21 to Lindsay's Fiat Brava which had arrived in the station  
22 car park earlier in the morning at 5 minutes or so past  
23 5.

24 My Lady, perhaps we could look at some of the  
25 material in the core bundle.

1 Mr Smith and his team have prepared for the use of  
2 the interested persons a core bundle. I'm not going to  
3 take my Lady to it at this stage, but I'll refer instead  
4 to the Lextranet version, but the core bundle contains  
5 the documents that we anticipate will be the ones that  
6 are most frequently and readily referred to in the  
7 course of these hearings.

8 It contains -- as I say, we can see it on  
9 Lextranet -- this page 2, a map, if we can zoom in on [INQ10105-2]  
10 the middle, Bradford, Leeds and Dewsbury, and then, on  
11 the following page, the closer map showing Dewsbury, one  
12 of the three maps on the page before, and if we can  
13 please zoom in again on the middle of that page, we can  
14 see there 69 Lees Holm, which was the home address of  
15 Khan. If you go to the top of the page, please, by  
16 scrolling up, we can see 11 Gregory Street, which was  
17 a former address which will become relevant to the  
18 surveillance that was carried out in March  
19 and February 2004. The map also shows the hospital,  
20 Dewsbury and District Hospital, which was the hospital  
21 where Khan went to on 5 July.

22 It also shows the address, as I say,  
23 11 Gregory Street. [INQ10105-3] In fact, it's the address where the  
24 car which was followed on 2 February 2004 was followed  
25 to, and Eurotravel is coincidentally the agency from

1 where Tanweer and Khan bought tickets for a trip to  
2 Pakistan which we will look at in due course  
3 between November 2004 and February 2005.  
4 The next page shows the more detailed examination of  
5 Bradford [INQ10105-4] and, if we scroll in on the two addresses, on  
6 the right we can see the Asda superstore which was the  
7 address where ice was bought in the morning of 6 July,  
8 as well as a travel agency which is not relevant for  
9 present purposes but will be so in February.  
10 Page 5 is a map of south-west Leeds [INQ10105-5]. It shows,  
11 commencing in the bottom right-hand corner,  
12 Hamara Healthy Living Centre, which was an address where  
13 Hussain, Khan and Tanweer attended karate classes  
14 between August and October 2004. Revolving  
15 counter-clockwise, Iqra bookshop is the bookshop to  
16 which I've already made reference, my Lady. There is  
17 a mosque where some of the perpetrators attended, and  
18 then 99 Stratford Street, which was a former address of  
19 Khan and one of the addresses that came to the attention  
20 of the Security Service and the police in the course of  
21 the investigation in March and February 2004.  
22 Finally, there is a B&Q warehouse on the bottom  
23 left-hand corner, the address where purchases were made  
24 on 4 July, probably in relation to preparations for the  
25 travel to London.

1 My Lady, there are two addresses which are redacted.  
2 They are the two addresses of Hussain and Tanweer and  
3 they are redacted because members of those two  
4 respective families still live in those addresses and  
5 you have therefore directed that they should not be  
6 publicly disclosed. But for present purposes, we can  
7 see that the address on the top is in the Holbeck area  
8 of Leeds and the second redacted address, the address in  
9 the middle of the page, is in the Beeston Hill area of  
10 Leeds.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Pausing there, Mr Keith, just to make  
12 it absolutely plain, they will remain redacted unless  
13 and until I'm satisfied there is a relevance to their  
14 being published.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Then page 6, please. We  
16 have there a map of the north-west area of Leeds and it  
17 shows the two bomb factories [INQ10105-6], the two addresses  
18 concerned with the construction and maintenance of the  
19 improvised explosive devices, 111 Chapeltown Road and  
20 18 Alexandra Grove.

21 Finally, over the page on page 7, we can see there  
22 a map of the Aylesbury area [INQ10105-7] which gives the address at  
23 that stage of Jermaine Lindsay of 10 Northern Road.

24 My Lady, the other maps in the core bundle will  
25 become most relevant when we deal with preventability

1 because they show the movements and whereabouts of  
2 Omar Khyam and others in February and March 2004.  
3 Returning to the Nissan Micra on 7 July -- the next  
4 map hasn't, I think, found its way on to the  
5 Trial Director system, but it was in fact a map showing  
6 the journey of the Nissan Micra down the M1 to Luton.  
7 We will hear evidence being read from a parking  
8 attendant who recounts how he saw a Fiat Brava parked in  
9 the station car park with its driver, a black male,  
10 asleep in the front seat. The parking attendant,  
11 my Lady, issued a parking charge notice at about 05.53  
12 that morning but didn't want to waken the man as he was  
13 on his own and feared being attacked.  
14 We have from the police call data schedules, that is  
15 to say a schedule setting out records of the most  
16 relevant phone calls between the bombers, and that  
17 schedule shows that Khan called Lindsay, the man asleep  
18 in the Fiat Brava in Luton car park, at 06.24 and that  
19 his call is returned at 06.38.  
20 My Lady, I don't propose to take time to go through  
21 the chart in detail now, but if we could simply zoom in  
22 on 7 July, which is further on down the document, and  
23 then further on again, and then further on again, we're  
24 now going through to 6 July. 7 July, very early in the  
25 morning, at 04.21.21, if we could highlight those three

1 or four entries there, please, we can see there 04.21.21  
2 a voice call lasting no more than 36 seconds between  
3 a phone which is attributed to Lindsay, the place, that  
4 is to say the mast of the mobile phone company and its  
5 location which picked up his call, and it calls a number  
6 which we have highlighted as red, which is the phone  
7 number which has been attributed by the police to  
8 Mohammed Sidique Khan.  
9 So he calls him at 04.21 in the morning and then the  
10 next line down, conversely, because the red and the blue  
11 numbers are reversed, we can see a text, Khan texts  
12 Lindsay and then further down, a little later, so an  
13 hour or so later on, there are then two voice calls from  
14 Lindsay to Khan and then one back from Khan to Lindsay.  
15 We'll hear evidence in due course, my Lady, how the  
16 phone numbers that the four bombers used on that morning  
17 were what the Metropolitan Police call operational  
18 phones: namely, they were phones used by them for the  
19 purposes of their communications that morning and were  
20 not their usual phones, although they used them to  
21 communicate with each other as well, which phones they  
22 had previously used. [INQ10395-1]  
23 The CCTV, my Lady, shows Lindsay getting out of his  
24 car and going into the station. He then exits the  
25 station and, after those two calls that we've just seen,

1 the Nissan arrives and the four men meet up.  
2 The CCTV shows, as we'll see, the boots of the cars  
3 being opened, but at the distance it's impossible to see  
4 what exactly is being done. But a commuter,  
5 Susan Clarke, provided a statement in which she recounts  
6 how she saw four men getting out of the two cars  
7 carrying two large rucksacks, although the CCTV shows in  
8 fact that all four put on rucksacks. They then leave  
9 for the station itself. Tanweer, the driver of the  
10 Nissan appeared for some reason to have changed his  
11 jogging bottoms between the moment when he's seen by  
12 CCTV at Woodall Services on the M1 and the moment when  
13 he leaves the car in the car park at Luton for the last  
14 time at 07.21, and his original jogging bottoms were  
15 found by the police in the back seat of Lindsay's red  
16 Fiat Brava.  
17 The Nissan car, my Lady, when searched, was found to  
18 have four further improvised explosive devices in  
19 a black rucksack. Two of them showed traces, after they  
20 had been made safe, of HMTD, the initiator explosive  
21 substance to which I have made reference. Two of them  
22 also had nails attached to them with plastic tape and  
23 were plainly designed to cause yet greater injury.  
24 There were also eight other home-made devices, at  
25 least one of which showed traces of HMTD.

1 Half of them were made from shallow dishes, half  
2 from tubes, and it may be that the intention of the  
3 bombers had been to throw them, if they were apprehended  
4 and came under attack. Also found in the car were  
5 icepacks, nails, for the purpose that I have outlined,  
6 spare batteries, coolboxes and thermometers. The  
7 relevancy of the coolboxes and thermometers will become  
8 plain in a moment.

9 The other car, the Fiat Brava, was found, on  
10 analysis, to have traces of pepper, pepper being one of  
11 the constituent parts of the main explosive substance,  
12 and HMTD was also detected on samples from the rear  
13 passenger and driver seats.

14 Also in this car were three icepacks, a telescopic  
15 sight for a firearm, a semi-automatic pistol,  
16 a magazine, and a case containing a carrier bag with one  
17 silver and five yellow-coloured bullets.

18 A police investigation showed that a DNA profile  
19 matching that of Lindsay was found on swabbings on the  
20 side of the pistol and his fingerprints were found on  
21 the latches of the case, inside the case and on the  
22 handles of the bag in which the telescopic sight and  
23 pistol were found and on two of the bullets.

24 The gun had been modified by having had a make-fit  
25 barrel attached, but was capable of firing, although

1     curiously the bullets which were found with it could not  
2     have been fired from that gun, that is to say they  
3     weren't capable of being fired from that gun.  
4     The CCTV records the Bedford to Brighton 07.23 train  
5     pulling into platform 1 and Khan and Tanweer walking  
6     towards it. The clock shows that it left at 07.25. The  
7     automatic ticket barriers at Luton record, as you would  
8     expect, a number of commuters passing through them that  
9     morning but, by gauging the CCTV times, it's possible to  
10    calculate roughly the times at which the four men passed  
11    through the barriers and, on that assumption, they  
12    appear to have passed through the barriers between 07.22  
13    and 07.23, and the records of the tickets used at the  
14    barriers, because the record is kept electronically by  
15    the machine, reveals that they went through on three-day  
16    return tickets to London Thameslink.  
17    All the tickets for the preceding ten minutes before  
18    they went through were for particular zones not  
19    connected to the bombsites and were spread out. They  
20    were, for example, individual tickets and, therefore,  
21    made it less likely that they related to the four  
22    bombers.  
23    The next tickets were two or three minutes later,  
24    and so the police are confident that they have  
25    identified the particular tickets on which they

1 travelled.

2 Two commuters, from whom we'll hear, noted the men  
3 on the train. Mr Leech, a barrister, saw at least three  
4 men together, two of whom had rucksacks. He described  
5 them as smiling and laughing and generally relaxed. He  
6 described all three as being of Asian origin and when,  
7 later, watching Sky News, he immediately recognised one  
8 of the men as being involved in the bombings, he  
9 contacted the police.

10 A second man, Mr Sylvester, was travelling from  
11 Luton Airport Parkway to Blackfriars. He found himself  
12 constantly watching two men, his suspicions having been  
13 aroused. One of them had a rucksack which he thought  
14 was full and heavy, judging by the way in which he kept  
15 pulling at the straps and bending over and, even though  
16 there seemed to be some seats available, neither man  
17 appeared willing to sit down and neither spoke to the  
18 other or to anybody else, and it seemed to Mr Sylvester  
19 that they were trying to avoid eye contact.

20 He was relieved, on account of his suspicions, to  
21 see them get off the delayed train at Kings Cross  
22 Thameslink at around 08.23. He went on to Blackfriars,  
23 and he subsequently recognised both men from the news  
24 coverage, but was so concerned that he told a work  
25 colleague of his worries, even before the news of the

1 subsequent bombs had been disclosed and been made known  
2 to him.

3 A CCTV in Kings Cross Thameslink shows the train  
4 from Luton arriving there. The CCTV is timed at 08.23  
5 and I said a moment ago the train was delayed. Having  
6 left at 07.25, it was meant to arrive at 07.59, but  
7 didn't arrive until 08.23.

8 My Lady, the official account first provided to the  
9 House of Commons stated that the train had left at  
10 07.40. This was corrected by the Government but the  
11 change has spawned all manner of conspiracy theories on  
12 the internet. Can I simply, for present purposes, show  
13 up a document produced by a Thameslink employee which  
14 gives the anticipated and actual arrival times? [INQ8867-3]

15 The train should have arrived, as I say, at 07.59  
16 but did not arrive until 08.23 at Kings Cross  
17 Thameslink, and we can see that, because on the  
18 left-hand column, five entries from the bottom, is the  
19 arrival time at Kings Cross Thameslink. The booked  
20 time, that's the fourth column, says 07.59, but the  
21 lateness column gives the figure of 24 minutes. So it  
22 arrived, in fact, 24 minutes late at 08.23 rather than  
23 at 07.59.

24 That time accords with the CCTV, and a number of  
25 different CCTV cameras show all four men walking along

1 the platform, down the stairs to the passage that links  
2 Kings Cross Thameslink with Kings Cross  
3 London Underground station and they are seen to be  
4 carrying rucksacks.

5 Another passenger on the Bedford to Brighton train  
6 recalls how at some point after 08.23, at Kings Cross  
7 Thameslink he noticed a tall, Asian male carrying  
8 a full, blue rucksack. He was wearing a blue jacket and  
9 appeared overdressed for the warm day. As this man was  
10 coming up the stairs, he bumped into the witness,  
11 Mr Gransby and, without apologising, just carried on,  
12 muttering under his breath. Mr Gransby later identified  
13 him from a photograph in the paper as Hussain and the  
14 CCTV shows him wearing, in fact, a dark-coloured jacket.  
15 My Lady, we're not sure why Hussain was going back  
16 up the stairs, having just arrived at Kings Cross  
17 Thameslink, but at any event, the CCTV continues to  
18 record the movement of the men having gone down the  
19 stairs and along the tunnel towards Kings Cross  
20 London Underground station.

21 The bombers are last seen together on the CCTV at  
22 08.26, but they were seen from then on by two more  
23 people.

24 They were seen by Joseph Martoccia, a passenger who  
25 was walking from the Piccadilly Line to the Metropolitan

1 and Circle Line. The layout at Kings Cross has changed  
2 very considerably since 2005, but he will give evidence  
3 how, at the point where there used to be a concourse  
4 between the two Circle Line platforms, he saw a group  
5 of, he thought, four to six Asian males. Oblivious to  
6 the flow of people around them, he thought they appeared  
7 happy, even euphoric, but he noticed that they were all  
8 wearing similar rucksacks with the same logo and all the  
9 rucksacks seemed similarly well-filled.

10 When he was shown photographs of the bombers, he  
11 stated that he was 90 per cent sure that he recognised  
12 Hussain and Tanweer, albeit less sure in relation to  
13 Khan, and still less sure Lindsay.

14 My Lady, it is plain that from that point Tanweer  
15 boarded an eastbound Circle Line train via  
16 Liverpool Street. The train that he destroyed, train  
17 set number 204, left Kings Cross about 08.38, and we'll  
18 hear evidence in due course from the computerised  
19 tracker log showing how it arrived at Liverpool Street  
20 at 08.57 or thereabouts and then left Liverpool Street  
21 at 08.48. We will see a CCTV recording showing the  
22 train leaving Liverpool Street, and then, awfully, at  
23 08.49, we see smoke coming back out of the tunnel  
24 between Liverpool Street and Aldgate.

25 One passenger, Michael Henning, who almost boarded

1 the back of the second carriage but moved to the front  
2 of the third carriage, thinks he recalls an Asian man  
3 carrying something, standing just inside the second  
4 carriage.

5 A document found inside Lindsay's passport and found  
6 in the Piccadilly Line tunnel contained notes on its  
7 reverse that indicated links to Paddington, Westminster  
8 and Bond Street. Had the train from Luton not arrived  
9 24 minutes late, it is conceivable that Tanweer might  
10 have made it to Westminster via the eastbound  
11 Circle Line by the detonation time of 08.50. [INQ8814-2], [INQ8814-3]

12 The document found inside Lindsay's passport and  
13 located in the devastation of the Piccadilly Line tunnel  
14 shows -- and I think it will be over the page -- timings  
15 in relation to the Central Line service, there are  
16 references to "Holborn" and to times for journeys on the  
17 "westbound" -- the westbound Circle Line presumably --  
18 and "Paddington" as well as "Bond" -- presumably  
19 Bond Street -- and then further down, the bottom of the  
20 page, if you could then revolve it, please, further  
21 times in relation to "Paddington", "west" -- presumably  
22 westbound -- "Paddington" again, and "Bond",  
23 "Circle Line", "Bond Street", "Circle Line", as well as  
24 to "Notting Hill Gate".

25 Khan boarded a westbound Circle Line train set

1 number 216 around 08.42. It was the first Circle Line  
2 train after Tanweer's eastbound train had departed. For  
3 some reason, Khan didn't take any of the Metropolitan or  
4 Hammersmith and City lines that had departed in the  
5 meantime. The train that he took arrives at Edgware at  
6 08.48.50 and left at 08.49.35, according to the  
7 computerised Circle Line tracker log which is now on the  
8 screen.

9 The last trackernet time can be seen adjacent to  
10 Edgware Road -- if we can zoom in -- at 08.49.46. It is  
11 the box at the top left-hand corner.

12 The last movement from trackernet 08.49.46. [INQ8450-2]  
13 Lindsay did not board a Piccadilly Line train,  
14 however, until around 08.48. It may be that this was  
15 due to delay in the Piccadilly Line service that  
16 morning. London Underground records show that, at about  
17 07.57, early in the morning, a northbound train on the  
18 Piccadilly Line at Caledonian Road station was found to  
19 be issuing smoke and, as a result of that incident, the  
20 service towards Cockfosters station was suspended, and  
21 all the trains were then fed on to the Piccadilly Line  
22 through a different depot. An all clear was  
23 subsequently received, but the result was that there  
24 were severe delays on that line and the frequency of the  
25 trains was reduced to a 9-minute spacing rather than the

1 normal 5-minute spacing to ensure a regular service.  
2 In addition, the Piccadilly Line was very congested  
3 that morning, and it may be that Lindsay, who was, of  
4 course, carrying his rucksack, was not able to board the  
5 first Piccadilly Line train that he could have done,  
6 which was around 08.39, but only the second. This was  
7 the ill-fated train set number 331 that passed through  
8 Kings Cross arriving at about 08.47 and leaving at about  
9 08.48.

10 I can't put up, my Lady, the automatic recording  
11 system in relation to the Piccadilly Line because at  
12 that time there were no recording systems recording the  
13 movements of each train on the Piccadilly Line.

14 But there is a curious feature in the evidence  
15 possibly relating to Lindsay. A London Underground  
16 employee, who was manning the barriers in the main  
17 concourse at Kings Cross, reports how he thought, around  
18 about 08.15, a male of African appearance approached  
19 from the escalators to the Victoria/Piccadilly lines and  
20 said he wanted to speak to a duty manager about  
21 something that was very important, but by the time the  
22 manager had been called, the male hadn't remained by the  
23 barrier, he had disappeared.

24 The London Underground employee recalls how the man  
25 was carrying a rucksack and, when asked, he said that he

1 resembled a man whose photograph he was shown which was  
2 a photograph of Lindsay.

3 It may be, of course, that it was someone entirely  
4 unconnected and the times certainly do not quite match,  
5 because we know that the Luton train didn't arrive, of  
6 course, until 08.24 and, therefore, Lindsay, if it was  
7 him, couldn't have been on the main concourse at  
8 Kings Cross 50 minutes before then. There would also  
9 have had to have been time for him to ascend the main  
10 barriers and then go back down again.

11 But if the time given by the London Underground  
12 employee is mistaken and it was later, and if the man he  
13 saw did indeed resemble Lindsay, then it's possible, for  
14 whatever reason, Lindsay went back up to the main  
15 barriers at Kings Cross.

16 From the reconnaissance trip on 28 June, which is  
17 a trip carried out, as I've said, just one week before,  
18 it's possible to speculate -- we will never know -- that  
19 Lindsay was intending to get to South Kensington but was  
20 delayed by delays on the Piccadilly Line.

21 Had the train from Luton not arrived 24 minutes  
22 late, he might have been able to catch an earlier  
23 Piccadilly southbound train or westbound train.

24 The movements of Hussain are more puzzling.

25 A passenger, Janice Stephens, arrived on the

1 Northern Line at Kings Cross London Underground at  
2 08.45. She decided to cut through to the southbound  
3 line by going via the northbound platform and she saw,  
4 my Lady, an Asian male with short, dark hair sitting on  
5 a bench with his elbows resting on his knees. Like her  
6 fellow passenger, a few moments before, Mr Martoccia,  
7 she thought it odd that a man was wearing a walking-type  
8 jacket in July. When she saw a picture of Hussain on  
9 the news a week later, she immediately recognised him as  
10 man that she had seen.

11 My Lady, it's not clear what Hussain was doing on  
12 the northbound platform of the Northern Line. Perhaps  
13 after he had separated from the others, he realised  
14 before the time had come to detonate the bomb, or after  
15 he tried to detonate the bomb, assuming that  
16 Janice Stephens in fact arrived on the platform just  
17 after that time, that his battery, which was probably  
18 required to detonate the bomb, was not working, or  
19 unusually, or curiously, that he had left it behind.  
20 Perhaps he was wondering how to respond to the  
21 temporary evacuation of the upper level of Kings Cross  
22 which had just been ordered in Kings Cross at 08.30.  
23 There had been suggestions that he may have been  
24 trying to use the northbound line on the Northern Line  
25 but found that it was delayed, but our enquiries show

1 that in relation to the Northern Line, although the  
2 service had earlier been suspended, the suspension  
3 hadn't ended until 09.02. That had apparently had  
4 little impact on the degree of frequency of trains on  
5 that line.

6 But in any event, the CCTV recordings show him  
7 exiting Kings Cross London Underground station in the  
8 crowd at 08.54. He then heads east towards York Way  
9 before turning left into Boots, from which he then exits  
10 a moment or two later.

11 He is seen on CCTV using his mobile phone and the  
12 call data shows that he attempts to call each of his  
13 conspirators but of course, by then, all had exploded  
14 their bombs and were dead.

15 We can see, if we go to 7 July, please, the end of  
16 the document, a tranche of yellow calls, that is to say  
17 calls from Hasib Hussain, on a number which, according  
18 to the police, is a number attributed to him, and we'll  
19 hear evidence, my Lady, in due course as to why the  
20 police are so sure that these numbers are the numbers of  
21 the men that they say they are. 07/07/2005, and the far  
22 left-hand column, we can see six voice calls commencing  
23 at that time, 08.58.53, to Lindsay, then Khan, then  
24 Tanweer, and then Lindsay, then Khan, then Tanweer.

25 The CCTV shows Hussain rummaging around in his [INQ10395-1]

1 rucksack before entering WH Smith, where he buys an item  
2 believed to be a pack of batteries, and we'll hear  
3 evidence in due course about that. In fact, I think  
4 I will be corrected, it's one battery.

5 The CCTV records him at various places in the near  
6 vicinity of Kings Cross, in McDonalds and walking back  
7 and forth along the Euston Road and he is last seen,  
8 around 09.24, walking east towards Gray's Inn Road, and  
9 there we have a document, reflected, as before, in the  
10 core bundle, which shows the various places past which  
11 he walked or which were associated with their journey.  
12 It's a blowup of the area near Kings Cross, York Way,  
13 down which he walks, McDonalds into which he walks,  
14 Gray's Inn Road, which he walks up to, and along in  
15 a moment, in fact, going eastbound, before getting a bus  
16 back westbound. The Thameslink on the far right is the  
17 Kings Cross Thameslink, and then, on the left of the  
18 screen, we can see a variety of bus stops as well as  
19 a Burger King and Barclays Bank. [INQ10281-2]

20 It's believed that Hussain took a number 91 bus  
21 westbound from Gray's Inn Road to Euston where he  
22 boarded the number 30 bus to Old Street. We will hear  
23 from two witnesses, Paul Reckret and Aneta Dybek, who  
24 may be able to assist. Aneta Dybek saw a male wearing  
25 a large blue and grey backpack getting on to a number 91

1 bus in Gray's Inn Road. Mr Reckret reported seeing  
2 a mail carrying a large rucksack on board a 91 bus  
3 between Caledonian Road and Euston.  
4 The number 91 bus terminated at Euston station.  
5 A further witness, Lisa French, was boarding the  
6 number 30 bus at Euston when a man with a rucksack  
7 pushed past her and walked towards the stairs. It is  
8 believed that that man was Hussain.  
9 As is well-known, my Lady, the number 30 bus left  
10 Euston, but was diverted up Woburn Place towards  
11 Tavistock Square. Although we have some CCTV material  
12 from premises in Woburn Place showing the bus going  
13 past, and from the bus in front, there is no CCTV from  
14 the number 30 bus itself. After the explosion, during  
15 the forensic examination, during the latter part of the  
16 afternoon and the evening, the CCTV was removed, but was  
17 found, on examination, to have malfunctioned and  
18 contained no footage from that day.  
19 My Lady, from the damage wrought, forensic  
20 investigators concluded that each of the bombs consisted  
21 of several kilograms of high explosive. There were no  
22 traces of recognised high explosives, that is to say the  
23 sort of high explosive that forensic investigators are  
24 accustomed to seeing. In light of that, and the nature  
25 of the damage, and because of the finding of the remains

1 of icepacks at Alexandra Grove, the forensic experts  
2 concluded that the mixture used in each of the bombsites  
3 was that which had been found at Alexandra Grove:  
4 namely, a mixture of pepper and hydrogen peroxide.  
5 At that time, such use was unique in the  
6 United Kingdom and possibly worldwide. No containers  
7 other than the remains of the icepacks used to cool the  
8 material, were found, and so, together with the evidence  
9 of plastics, explosive damaged plastics found at the  
10 scene, of which there was a certain amount of material  
11 of very thin plastic, it may have been that the mixture  
12 was carried in each one of the four cases in one or more  
13 plastic bags. Each bomb, which would have been in the  
14 consistency of paste or wet paste, was carried in  
15 a rucksack but kept cool by the use of icepacks.  
16 From the effect of the bombs, it is plain that the  
17 bombs had been placed in each case on the floor. Police  
18 and forensic investigators were able to find fragments  
19 of fabric, buckles and zips, which, when reassembled as  
20 far as possible, made up the rucksack in each case of  
21 the same make and type as that being carried by the four  
22 men as can be seen from the CCTV.  
23 The remains of the icepacks found at the bombsites  
24 was of the same type and make as those found in  
25 Alexandra Grove. Labels were also found at

1 Alexandra Grove that matched the type of the rucksack  
2 found at two of the bombsites.

3 At Khan's home address was found a receipt, dated  
4 1 July 2005 for icepacks, for two Wilderness Trail  
5 rucksacks and one Sherpa rucksack. The rucksack used at  
6 Tavistock Square was a Sherpa rucksack and the rucksacks  
7 used at Aldgate and Edgware were Wilderness rucksacks.

8 A receipt for the ice was found at Tanweer's  
9 address.

10 A 9-volt battery showing possible explosive damage  
11 and, therefore, possibly the one bought at WH Smith, was  
12 found at Tavistock Square. Although no other batteries  
13 were found due to the extraordinary devastation of the  
14 sites, and thus contamination, it is likely that  
15 electrical detonation was used for all four bombs:  
16 fragments of white plastic insulated wire of similar  
17 characteristics and dimensions to wire found at  
18 Alexandra Grove were found at Aldgate and on the  
19 number 30 bus.

20 My Lady, is that a convenient moment?

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is. I shall return at 2.00.

22 Thank you.

23 (1.00 pm)

24 (The short adjournment)

25