

J7 Response to the Provisional Index of Factual Issues – Provisional Index of Factual Issues – Issue 5

5. *In respect of each of those who were not killed immediately by the explosions, what happened to them; what attention and/or treatment they received; whether there were any failings in the way that they were treated; the circumstances of their death; whether any failings in the emergency response contributed to or were causative of their death. In particular:*

(a) *Whether there were delays in the emergency responders reaching scenes of the explosions and if so the reasons for such delays;*

Although many of the issues regarding the responses were covered by the GLA reports¹, J7 research has uncovered some major discrepancies in reports of the response to the incident on the Piccadilly Line train at Russell Square. These discrepancies have yet to be investigated.

Andy Trotter, Deputy Chief Constable, British Transport Police²:

I was in the British Transport Police HQ in Tavistock Square when the first information came through at 9am. I immediately dispatched senior officers to the scene, then watched, horrified, as the tale unfolded in front of us.

'Within minutes, the casualties from Russell Square tube began arriving at our HQ.'

A series of FOI requests³ uncovered that 9 casualties were brought to the BTP HQ, the first arriving at 9.09. from the Piccadilly Line train.

The first casualty brought to BTP's HQ was from the Piccadilly Line train.

The casualties started to arrive at BTP HQ about 20 minutes after the first reports, at approximately 0909hrs.

No explanation has been given by British Transport Police of how, within 19 minutes of the explosion, this was possible. Yet the emergency response at Russell Square was woefully inadequate with the London Ambulance Service claiming:

2.59 The first 999 ambulance call reporting an incident at Russell Square was

1 Report of the 7 July Review Committee PDF - <http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/7july/report.pdf>

2 My 24 hours | UK news | The Observer - <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/10/july7.uksecurity8>

3 The Mysterious Case Of The Non-Existent Train Time - <http://bridgetdunnes.blogspot.com/>

not received until 9.18 am, 25 minutes after the explosion. Passengers began appearing at the platform, having been led from the train by one of the two drivers in the driver's cab. The London Ambulance Service despatched a Fast Response Unit at 9.24 am, which arrived at Russell Square station at 9.30 am. **A major incident was finally declared at Russell Square by the London Ambulance Service at 9.38 am, 45 minutes after the explosion.** At that point, the Ambulance Service Professional Standards Officer at the scene was reporting 6-15 fatalities and 50+ casualties. This was a full 20 minutes after the British Transport Police received reports of loss of life and limbs.

and

2.62 The initial deployment of ambulances and fire engines to Russell Square was much slower than at the other sites, and it took longer to establish what had happened. The first 999 call was not received until 25 minutes after the explosion, and a major incident was not declared until 9.38am.

Much is made in reports of the confusion at Russell Square, and how the emergency services were redeployed due to the more visible bus explosion in Tavistock Square, but 09:09 is 38 minutes before the bus explosion at 09:47.

For casualties to be evacuated from the train at Russell Square, if it was indeed Piccadilly Line train 331, they must have been in the affected carriage, the carriage we are told that the bomb exploded in. To then be in the British Transport Police HQ's in Tavistock Square by 09:09 would imply that survivors were able to exit this train and walk down the tunnel and presumably use the lift to evacuate the station within minutes. This is borne out by interviews given to the media by two women who describe being led off the train by the driver **within 3 – 4 minutes**⁴, whilst another survivor describes the evacuation from the first carriage somewhat differently⁵:

There was screaming and groaning but we calmed each other and tried to listen to the driver.

He told us he was going to take the train forward a little so he could get us out, after he had made sure the track wasn't live.

We all passed the message into the darkness behind us, down the train.

After **about 20 to 30 minutes** we started to leave the train.

There is an account of one British Transport Police officer entering the tunnel from Russell Square⁶, yet no reports of the British Transport Police evacuating passengers and survivors

4 YouTube - 7/7 Eye witnesses interviewed in Brunswick Square - <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4JD6Pnogvc>

5 BBC NEWS | UK | Coming together as a city - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4670099.stm#thursday>

6 'You grind yourself down with it, and then it's finished' PART FIVE: - page 2 | Sunday Herald, The Newspaper - http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20060702/ai_n16513047/pg_2/

from the train as early as 8.50. On the contrary, the duty station manager, Gary Stevens, describes being on the train alone for 40 minutes⁷, and a train driver, Ray Wright, who was accompanying the driver in the cab of the train, states that he saw the first policeman at Russell Square station after the bus explosion⁸. He and the driver had both thought that the explosion on the train had been caused by an electrical or mechanical fault until being informed of other explosions, including the bus, which puts this encounter some time after 09:47:

He said as they got people off the train, he and the driver still thought it was a mechanical or electrical fault.

It was only when the first police arrived he was told other bombs had gone off on two other Tube trains and one on a bus.

Who were the officers that Andy Trotter claimed were despatched to the scene, why were only some survivors taken to the British Transport Police HQ, and how does this fit in with the accounts of the loss of the 'golden hour' of rescuing the victims?

Exercises: What lessons were learnt from previous exercises undertaken with regard to the issues raised?

The BBC Panorama exercise London Under Attack⁹



The May 2004 edition of Panorama focused on London falling victim to a terrorist attack and, coincidentally, featured three explosions on underground trains and one explosion on a land-based transportation device. This exercise was cold-shouldered¹⁰ and criticised¹¹ by the government.

7 BBC NEWS | UK | 'I will take 7 July to the grave' - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4566632.stm>

8 BBC NEWS | England | London | Tube driver tells of bomb chaos - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/4694801.stm>

9 BBC NEWS | Programmes | Panorama | London under attack - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3686201.stm>

10 BBC NEWS | Programmes | Panorama | Wall of silence over terror threat - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3713049.stm>

11 BBC NEWS | UK | Terror programme 'irresponsible' - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3716785.stm>

“In a unique fusion of drama, detailed research and expert discussion Panorama puts Britain's emergency plans to the test. Set in the future - but only just - the city of London is thrown into chaos by a series of terrorist attacks. The fictional day of terror unfolds through the immediacy of rolling news bringing the catastrophic attack into our living rooms.”

The findings of this mock exercise closely resemble the findings of the GLA Review Committee in their report into failures connected with the emergency response on 7th July. A dossier was presented of Panorama's findings to the government of the day. These included¹²:

- Police, ambulance and fire services communications systems are not compatible underground. They are not compatible with each other across England and Wales and are not compatible with each other in London.

Atlantic Blue¹³

Atlantic Blue was a Home Office led exercise that took place between 4-8 April 2005. It was designed to examine and test response capabilities to coordinated internationally linked terrorist incidents in London. Atlantic Blue was the UK component of the overall exercise ‘Global Resolve’, the US component was ‘TOPOFF3’ and the Canadian ‘Triple Play’.

TfL¹⁴ note that this exercise focussed on a potential terrorist attack:

Well prepared

- London Underground conducted a live emergency exercise at Tower Hill station two and a half weeks ago on 12 June which fully tested the combined emergency services response to an emergency
- Each year LU holds an emergency exercise to test procedures
- There was a multi national emergency desktop exercise, Atlantic Blue, earlier this year which focused on the response to a potential terrorist attack.

According to this article, Atlantic Blue simulated a similar scenario to the Panorama exercise, the MPS Hanover exercise and the actual events in London on 7th July, that of 4 terrorist bombs going off at once.

Today it is the turn of Julia Dent, chief executive of the South West Strategic Health Authority, to be "gold lead", the person in charge of the response of the National Health Service to any major disaster. **By an extraordinary**

12 BBC NEWS | Programmes | Panorama | Facts behind the fiction - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3704801.stm>

13 Exercises - Exercise Atlantic Blue - <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/atlanticblue.aspx>

14 10:00 hours - Today's transport services | Transport for London - <http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/media/newscentre/archive/3972.aspx>

coincidence, all the experts who formulate such plans are together in a meeting at the headquarters of the London Ambulance Service - and they are discussing an exercise they ran three months ago that involved simulating four terrorist bombs going off at once across London¹⁵.

The Home Office has never made the findings public. What were the lessons learned?

Other coincidental meetings and exercises taking place on the day of 7th July¹⁶:

- Police Counter Terrorism exercise South London
- Senior clinicians conference at the British Medical Association building
- Senior health service managers meeting at Lambeth, Central London
- Senior clinicians meeting at the Royal London hospital helicopter landing pad¹⁷

There was also a paramedics conference in Millwall football stadium as noted by the 7 July Review Committee:

*“The London Ambulance Service response was aided by the fact that the entire management of the London Helicopter Emergency Medical Service happened to be a meeting at Barts and The London hospital, and a number of the explosions took place close to major hospitals from where nurses, doctors and others came to the scenes to help. A large number of the Service’s senior managers were at a conference at Millwall, and were therefore despatched by face-to-face communication. Martin Flaherty, Director of Operations at the London Ambulance Service, told us that, ‘it is clear that if we had not been in this position our difficulties would have been more pronounced’.*¹⁸

Another meeting taking place that morning was of senior Network Rail staff:

There was also at the time a meeting of senior Network Rail staff in the Russell Hotel, yards from the Tavistock Square and Russell Square tube station, and, donning their emergency jackets, they were quickly able to help out at the two nearby scenes of bombings, King’s Cross and Tavistock Square¹⁹.

15 Thursday: Minute by minute, the horror emerges - Crime, UK - The Independent -

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/thursday-minute-by-minute-the-horror-emerges-498281.html>

16 The London Ambulance Service (LAS) response to the 7th July explosions -

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/34641645/The-London-Ambulance-Service-LAS-response-to-the-7th-July-explosions>

17 Notes for editors, Barts and The London NHS Trust : Ministry of Defence visit Royal London to meet military air

ambulance and hospital clinicians - <http://www.bartsandthelondon.nhs.uk/formedia/press/release.asp?id=1008>

18 Report of the 7 July Review Committee | Greater London Authority - [http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-](http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/the-london-assembly/publications/safety-policing/report-7-july-review-committee)

[london/the-london-assembly/publications/safety-policing/report-7-july-review-committee](http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/the-london-assembly/publications/safety-policing/report-7-july-review-committee)

19 Ready for anything: a capital response - <http://www.christianwolmar.co.uk/2005/07/ready-for-anything-a-capital-response/>

A Forensics Science Conference was also taking place on 7th July, as mentioned in this House of Commons debate on Forensic Science:

Last summer, I journeyed to Lincoln to speak about the issue at a conference of forensic practitioners. **The meeting took place on the day of the London bombings, and the people there knew immediately that it was not an electrical fault that caused the disastrous events** that occurred one after the other. It was interesting that some of them disappeared because they had to help out with the analysis of the situation.²⁰

There was also a seminar being held at the Emergency Planning College at Easingwold, North Yorkshire on Emergency Procedures for Police Family Liaison Officers in times of emergency in mass fatality situations²¹.

Another coincidence was a meeting described by Metropolitan Ambulance Service Project Manager Máiréad Doyle, director of non-emergency operations with the London Ambulance Service (LAS).

‘We were lucky in that 7 July was the day we were holding our bi-monthly top 100 managers conference. When the calls started to come in, we were all together and only about 15 minutes drive from headquarters. We were able to deploy our staff incredibly quickly and get the message out almost instantaneously to the people who were going to be directly involved.’

Communications with LAS non-emergency personnel was limited to mobile phones and, due to the high amount of mobile phone traffic, the network crashed. LAS was aware this problem might arise due to it happening on the eve of the Millennium, 31 December 1999. On 1 January 2000, LAS established a strategy for non-emergency operations. ‘The strategy was that if a major incident occurred, non-emergency operations personnel would be able to self deploy to pre-arranged locations where land lines were set up for communications,’ Doyle said.²²

The Police Counter Terrorism exercise taking place in South London has never been examined nor mentioned in any reports, official or otherwise. Was an exercise being held? Was it by any chance linked to these news reports of armed police around southern end of the Northern Line?

I was due to pick a work colleague up from Balham at 7:15am, but when I got there

20 Forensic Science: 20 Apr 2006: Westminster Hall debates (TheyWorkForYou.com) -

<http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2006-04-20b.139.1#g148.0>

21 Hampshire Police, <http://www.hampshire.police.uk/NR/rdonlyres/977FD2FB-75CD-4B6E-9A8E-C6FB2BCFDCB7/0/Frontline114.pdf>

22 <http://www.ambulance.vic.gov.au/media/docs/Perspective-December-2006-ebe11322-b2ff-45ec-ba77-2abac8e38460-0.pdf>

I was greeted with Tube emergency vans, police and hoards of people being turned away from a closed station.

All very strange they must have known something was going to happen, they surely had a tip off. As I drove along the road, (which also follows the tubes) they were all shut and hundreds of people were queuing for buses.

When I reached Oval, which was open there were two armed policemen in a road next to the station, which for a quiet area like that is extremely rare.

The northern line was shut from Morden to Stockwell. They blatantly knew something was going down, they just got it wrong and are hoping no one mentions anything²³.

There were many problems on the London Underground, just as there were on the Luton Thameslink line on the morning of 7th July²⁴.

Hanover Series²⁵

Joint Training and Planning

The anti-terrorism branch of the London Metropolitan Police Service hosts quarterly joint exercises, known as the Hanover Series, to practice what to do in the event of a major incident. Partner agencies and other stakeholders meet in the outskirts of London for weekend tabletop exercises that increase everyone's knowledge of roles and responsibilities. According to emergency service personnel, the practice sessions also increase familiarity with other key personnel, provide the opportunity to test procedures and rehearse the standardized LESLP command and control system, and help agencies learn how to respond and react collectively.

The exercises use the Silver and Gold components of LESLP's command and control structure and therefore help reinforce and improve multiagency coordination. Perhaps most importantly, the scenarios introduced during the Hanover Series are grounded in practical, wide-ranging incidents that require in-depth planning and response duties. These exercises usually reflect local, national and international events and address a series of issues to improve multiagency cooperation.

Hanover is discussed in the Intelligence and Security Committee Report²⁶, yet claims that Hanover is run annually rather than quarterly:

23 http://disruptive.org.uk/2005/07/13/london_bombs_8.html

24 <http://www.julyseventh.co.uk/7-7-kings-cross-russell-square.html#undergroundproblems>

25 <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/260/interagency-coordination.htm>

26 Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 - Intelligence and Security Committee (12 May 2009. Adobe PDF, 1.4 Mb) - http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf

Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented?

Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005

226. The Metropolitan Police Service told the Committee that they had, in the past, run **exercises with scenarios similar to what actually happened on 7 July 2005**. Since 2003, they have run an annual exercise known as Operation HANOVER which develops different scenarios for attacks on London and rehearses how the Metropolitan Police Service would respond. By coincidence, their 2005 exercise, run by the Security Co-ordinator's office in the Anti-Terrorist Branch, took place **just a few days before the attacks – on 1–2 July**. The office-based scenario for this exercise was simultaneous bomb attacks on three London Underground trains at Embankment, Waterloo and St James's Park stations. Once again, the scenario is quite similar to what actually took place, and the fact that it took place so close to the actual attacks is an interesting coincidence.

Despite the IISC report appearing to examine the issue of "Was there a police/MI5/Transport for London exercise taking place on the morning of 7 July 2005 to train for multiple bomb attacks on the tube?", and which also mentions the Visor Consultants exercise that morning²⁷, this doesn't address another question:

Could some or any of the Emergency Service personnel have mistaken the actual events that morning as a 'live exercise'?

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(b) *Whether the lighting available to the responders on the trains and in the tunnels was adequate, and where it was not whether appropriate steps were taken to improve the lighting;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

(c) *Whether appropriate triage procedures were operated;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

(d) *Whether the individuals in question received medical treatment that was appropriate to their injuries;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

²⁷ J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign - The People's Independent Public Inquiry into 7/7 – The Terror Rehearsal - <http://www.julyseventh.co.uk/july-7-terror-rehearsal.html>

(e) *Whether there were failings with regard to supply of first aid kits and/or other medical equipment on trains and/or in Underground stations;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

(f) *Whether there were failings with regard to the medical equipment and supplies brought to the scenes by the first responders and/or the subsequent provision of such equipment and supplies to each of the scenes;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

(g) *Whether those of the individuals in question who needed to be taken to hospital were removed from the scenes of the explosions and transported to hospital in a timely fashion;*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

(h) *Whether there were failings with regard to the difficulties in the operation of telephones and radios below ground and above ground , and whether, having regard to all the circumstances, transport staff and emergency responders took appropriate steps to ensure effective communications during the response, both below ground and above ground;*

While it is important to know the answers to these questions, much investigation into these issues has been done by various parties and it was known long before July 7th that there were major compatibility issues with the communications systems used on the London Underground by blue-light emergency services, and various other parties involved in the related operations. The most notable investigations into communications difficulties being the inquiry into the King's Cross Station fire and, more recently, by the Greater London Authority's 7 July Review Committee.

The Greater London Authority's Report of the 7 July Review Committee²⁸ referred to in the Home Office narrative is, thus far, the only open and public examination of the events of 7th July 2005. The committee's final report was published on 5th June 2006 and the focus was on "issues of communication". Many of the communications issues were reported on and presented to the Home Office over a year earlier in May 2004 by the BBC and their Panorama programme, "London Under Attack"²⁹, as referenced above. The Panorama programme focused on London falling victim to a fictional terrorist attack and featured a scenario in which three explosions occurred on the London Underground, followed by a fourth explosion on a land-based transportation device approximately an hour later. In the case of Panorama's fictional attack on London the overground explosion was not a

28 Report of the 7 July Review Committee, *Greater London Authority*,
<http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/scrutiny/7julyreview.jsp>

29 Panorama: London under attack was broadcast on BBC One on Sunday, 16 May 2004 at 22:15 BST,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3686201.stm> . A transcript of the programme is available here:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/panorama/transcripts/londonunderattack.txt>

London bus, as it was on 7/7, but instead a chlorine tanker.

The findings of Panorama's "London Under Attack" programme that were presented to the Home Office by Panorama in May 2004 are almost precisely the same findings that emerged from the 7 July Review Committee's investigation into the London bombings some two years later. And the 7 July Review Committee findings about communication systems were themselves very similar to findings uncovered during the inquiry into the King's Cross fire³⁰ of 18th November 1987, over 18 years previously. The final GLA report itself makes this point, and highlights the unacceptability of the fact that these issues had yet to be resolved in its conclusion:

2.24 The official inquiry into the King's Cross fire, published in 1988, included a chapter on communications. The report highlighted the lack of communications between the station surface and underground, and the inability of officers from the British Transport Police and London Fire Brigade to communicate underground unless they were within line of sight of each other. The report made recommendations aimed at putting in place effective communications within and between the emergency services underground. These were categorised by Desmond Fennell OBE QC, who conducted the inquiry, as among the most important recommendations made in the report.

...

11.5 It is unacceptable that the emergency services, with the exception of the British Transport Police, are still not able to communicate by radio when they are underground, 18 years after the official inquiry into the King's Cross fire recommended action to address this problem. The Committee has been told that this problem will be resolved by the end of 2007.³¹

(i) *Whether there were failings with regard to the procedures in place for the emergency services urgently to attend scenes of large-scale injuries.*

- No J7 submission prepared for this issue.

30 Investigation into the King's Cross Underground Fire, Desmond Fennell OBE QC, *Her Majesty's Stationery Office*, <http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/eventssummary.php?eventID=138>

31 Report of the 7 July Review Committee, p120, *Greater London Authority*, <http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/7july/report.pdf>